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Assessment of Hydrocarbon Explosion and Fire Risks by Professor Jeom Paik

The LRET Research Collegium Southampton, 11 July 2 September 2011


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Assessment of Hydrocarbon Explosion and Fire Risks in Offshore Installations: Recent Advances and Future Trends
Prof. Jeom Kee Paik, Director The LRET Research Center of Excellence at Pusan National University, Korea

New Paradigm for Robust Design of Ships and Offshore


Various Ocean Environmental Phenomena
Traditional Future

Design Formula Past Experience Deterministic Allowable Stress


Mathematical Algorithm
lim
i =1 j =1 x m n

Engineering First Principles Probabilistic


Limit States/Risk

n! x 2 x + r !( n r )!

Experimental Investigation

Trend in Offshore Oil & Gas Production Systems Fixed type in shallow waters Floating type in deep waters Ship-shaped offshore unit, Semi-sub, Spar, TLP Pipeline infrastructure Multiple functions such as production, storage and offloading

FPSO for Oil and Gas Production

Vessel (hull), topsides (process facility), mooring, risers/flow lines, subsea, and export system

Oil/Gas Leak Resulting in Explosion and Fire

Source: HSE

Pipe Alpha Accident


6th July 1988, UK 167 people killed Property damage of 1.4billion US$ Risk based engineering became mandatory since the Pipe Alpha accident

Deepwater Horizon Accident


20th April 2010, Gulf of Mexico 11 people killed, 17 people wounded Environmental damage of approx. 30 billion US$

Oil spill

Hydrocarbon Explosions and Fires


Hydrocarbons can explode through ignition when combined with an oxidiser (usually air). Thus, when the temperature rises to the point at which hydrocarbon molecules react spontaneously to an oxidiser, combustion takes place. This hydrocarbon explosion causes a blast and a rapid increase in overpressure. Fire is a combustible vapour or gas that combines with an oxidiser in a combustion process that is manifested by the evolution of light, heat, and flame. The impact of overpressure from explosions and that of elevated temperature from fire are the primary concern in terms of the actions that result from hazards within the risk assessment and management framework.

Mechanism of Gas Explosion Depending on Topology and Geometry


Flame front wrinkled, burning surface greater, increased mixing, faster burning

Gas burns

Gas expands

Turbulence

BLAST

Volume increases
Larger volume pushes unburnt gas ahead

Unburnt gas pushed around obstacles

Gas flow increases

CONGESTION?

CONFINEMENT?

Factors Affecting Explosions and Fires


Wind direction Wind speed Leak rate Leak direction Leak duration Leak position (x) Leak position (y) Leak position (z) Type of oil or gas (molecules) Concentration ratio Temperature of oil or gas (LNG Cryogenic -163 degree C)

Risk Based Design Process

Hazard identification (Step1)

Risk assessment (Step2)

Decision making recommendations (Step5)

Risk control options (Step3)

Cost benefit assessment (Step4)

What is Risk? How to Manage Risk?

R=

F C
i i

Asset risk - Damage to structures and equipment - Duration of production delay (downtime) Environmental risk - Amount of oil that spills out of the offshore installation Personnel risk - Loss of life

Trends in Risk Assessment Qualitative


Past Experience

Quantitative
Simulation

, Experiment

Deterministic
Specific Scenarios

Probabilistic
All Possible Scenarios

API Procedure for Risk-based Design


Assessment complete ensure good practice Yes Does the facility meet screening criteria? No Risk matrix Medium or Higher Reconsider or modify concept or reassess risk with more rigorous approach No Implement measures to reduce fire and blast risk Are nominal load cases applicable? Yes No Consider fire and blast risk Event-by-Event Low

Method 1 Design according to guidances is sufficient if low consequences are expected

Establish performance criteria

Modify or select new concept or reassess risk

Yes

Implement measures to reduce fire and blast risk

Risk matrix Medium or Higher

Low

Method 2 Possibility to omit load assessment in certain cases

Assess impact on safety critical elements

Are performance criteria met? Yes Assessment complete for the facility

Method 3 Scenario based load and consequence assessment

Assess load and response for the event

Are performance criteria met? No Yes Are further risk reduction options available?

Yes

Assessment complete for the event

No

Redesign

Simulation-based Procedure for Risk-based Design


Dead and live loads Nominal loads Design guidance

System description

A: Limit states based design B: Risk based design

Definition of scenarios

Loads assessment

Performance acceptance criteria Risk acceptance criteria

Design load

Consequence

Frequency

Risk evaluation Mitigation Risk acceptable Risk unacceptable Redesign Design complete

Joint Industry Projects

EFEF JIP - 27th JIP in the World


Explosion and Fire Engineering of FPSOs Coordinators:
- Pusan National University, Korea - Nowatec AS, Norway

Partners:
- DSME, SHI, HHI, ABS, KR, LR - Gexcon, CompuIT, USFOS, UK HSE, NTUA

Quantitative Gas Explosion Risk Assessment and Management (1/2)

EFEF JIP Procedure for Explosion Risk Assessment and Management (2/2)
Selection of credible scenarios involving PDF parameters of leak and environment conditions
Latin hypercube sampling technique CFD model

CAD model

Selection of credible scenarios involving PDF parameters of gas cloud condition


0.01

Large cylindrical vessels (Point 171 )

Gas dispersion analysis

Explosion frequency of exccedance (per FPSO year)

0.001

0.0001

0.00001 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1

Overpressure (MPa)

Explosion CFD simulation

Design loads with exceedance curve

Nonlinear consequence analysis under explosion

EFEF JIP Fire Risk Assessment and Management (1/2)

EFEF JIP Procedure for Fire Risk Assessment and Management (2/2)
Selection of credible scenarios involving PDF parameters of leak and environment conditions
CAD model Latin hypercube sampling technique
0.1

CFD model

Exceedance fire frequency(per FPSO year)

0.01

Mean temperature (Point20 and Point31)

0.001

0.0001

Mean temperature (Point41 and Point52)

Nonlinear consequence analysis under fire

0.00001 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

Temperature(K)

Design loads with exceedance curve

Fire CFD simulation

Applied Example: VLCC Class FPSO Topsides

Effect of Gas Cloud Volume on Maximum Overpressure Comparison between EFEF JIP and Existing FPSO Practices
0.45 0.4 0.35
EFEF JIP FPSO A FPSO B

Overpressure (MPa)

0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000

Equivalent volume (m3)

Design Explosion Loads with Exceedance Curves


0.01

Process decks

Explosion frequency of exceedance (per FPSO year)

0.001

Top process deck (Point 226 & 274) Solid process deck (Point 76 & 124)

0.0001
Above the middle process deck (Point 161)

0.00001 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12

Overpressure (MPa)

Design Explosion Loads Comparison between EFEF JIP and Existing FPSO Practices
0.14

EFEF JIP vs. FPSO C EFEF JIP vs. FPSO D

Risk accepted loadFPSO C, D (MPa)

0.12 0. 10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

0.14

Risk accepted loadEFEF JIP (MPa)

Design Fire Loads with Exceedance Curves

0.1

Exceedance fire frequency(per FPSO year)

Surrounding separation train1


Gas compressor (Point 75)

0.01

0.001

Separation train 2 (Point 77)

0.0001

Oil inlet (Point 96)

0.00001 280 300 320 340 360 380

Temperature(K)

Nonlinear Structural Consequence Analysis Escape Route

Trends in Risk Assessment Qualitative


Past Experience

Quantitative
Simulation

Experiment

Deterministic
Specific Scenarios

Probabilistic
All Possible Scenarios

CFD Explosion Simulations

(barg)

Gas Explosion Tests with or without Water Sprays (1/2)


- Importance of Risk Management

Without water sprays


Source: The Steel Construction Institute, Fire and Blast Information Group

With water sprays

Gas Explosion Tests with or without Water Sprays (2/2)


- Importance of Risk Management
TNO PI-10, Test 10, LDN Nozzles 2.0 TNO PI-10, Test 11, MV57 Nozzles TNO PI-10, Test 12, No Deluge 1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Time (ms)

Source: The Steel Construction Institute, Fire and Blast Information Group

Explosion and Fire Test Facilities under Construction in Korea

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