Euthyphros Epistemology While there are obvious ethical consequences of the Euthyphro dilemma, I will argue that the

dilemma originates in an epistemological problem. The trouble begins when Euthyphros father abdicates his agency to the decision of a seer while his slave dies from exposure to the elements. This problem is epistemological because who is qualified to know is at stake. Euthyphros father believed himself to be unworthy to act at all and so relied totally on the seer for pious knowledge. The immediate consequence of this inaction is that the servant died. This death was caused by the seers exclusive and private right to communicate with God. This exclusivity and privileged status is echoed frequently by Euthyphro in the dialogue. Thus, Euthyphros top down epistemology can be summarized: God speaks to Euthyphro, and Euthyphro informs everyone else what God said. Platos response to this epistemological monopoly is not really found in the Euthyphro dialogue, but rather can best be teased out in his Allegory of the Cave. By reversing Euthyphros epistemology and offering everyone the chance to reason their way to discovering piety, Platos epistemology has a built-in safeguard: we are emancipated from the heavy handed authority of self-serving prophets, priests, and even philosophers by being held responsible to others reasoning. The epistemology in the Euthyphro dilemma uncovers the ethical role of an authoritys knowledge by either inviting people to question or reducing them to intellectual dependence. My set up of the dialogue does not conflict with traditional or ethical framing, but instead focuses on how epistemology has ethical consequences. I will argue that in terms of behavior, Plato and Euthyphro are very similar insofar as both claim to follow divine guidance in carrying out their mission. I will then link up this epistemological characterization of Euthyphro with an analysis of how Plato characterizes his epistemology in his Allegory of the Cave. In this section I

will make a distinction between commands, which are meant to be followed without rational scrutiny, and commandments, something that requires a rational explanation. Additionally, this section will also develop Platos use of light as understanding: I will argue that the fire in the cave is representative of Euthyphros epistemology while the sun depicts Platos epistemology. Finally, this section will draw a distinction between testing and questioning authority: questioning, here, simply means a way in which those who do not understand attempt to understand, while testing will mean a more antagonistic methodology that targets not the idea or lesson, but rather the teacher or authority. The next section will examine the differences between kinds of authorities and draw a distinction between priests, people who are legitimate experts in a field, and priesthood, people who have the position of an authority and use that position to secure advantages and avoid questions. I will conclude my paper with an examination of how the differences between Socrates and Euthyphros epistemology can be incorporated into how authorities in religion or philosophy conduct their methodology. Fundamentally, if philosophically methodology is to remain Socratic, it must use its authority as a way to encourage questions and intellectual engagement. Setting the Scene One scene that shows a strong contrast between the two epistemologies of Socrates and Euthyphro is the death of Euthyphros fathers servant. The reason why Euthyphro thinks his father is guilty of murder is because the servant died. The reason the servant died is because after the servant kills a slave, Euthyphros father bound [the servant] hand and foot and threw him in a ditch, [his father] then sent a man here to inquire from a priest what should be done (4d). Plato is not just providing a background story for Euthyphro; he is providing evidence for why it is

dangerous to only rely on authority which has privileged access to piety.1 He further spells out the peril of this solitary reliance when Euthyphro tells us that during that time [Euthyphros father] gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer (4d). Euthyphros father did not think it his place to pass judgment on the servant and so waited for the seers instructions. This dependence resulted in the death of the servant and the charges brought up against Euthyphros father. Had Euthyphros father thought through his actions and tried to contemplate some potential consequences on his own, the entire tragedy could have been averted. This back story is actually a case study for the inefficient praxis of the Divine Command Theory. Euthyphros father waited on the seers judgment not to critically reflect on it or discuss it further, but to accept whatever solution the seer would have commanded. By physically arresting the servant, Euthyphros father also arrests himself: by binding the servant Euthyphros father halts any physical movement and by relying on the seer Euthyphros father halts any intellectual activity i.e. sentencing the servant. The problem then is twofold: (1) whatever the seer would decree would have been followeda traditional problem of the Euthyphro Dilemmaand (2) by vesting the sole decision making ability in an authority people are handcuffed into not being able to make any decisions since they are not qualified to give an account of what is pious. Plato attacks the belief that the seer, or anyone else for that matter, has an exclusive right to pronounce judgment as a dangerous belief and the traditional philosophical corpus does a terrific job spelling out the potential harm in the Divine Command Theory: something is good in virtue of God saying so. The epistemological problem, as the death of the
1

My choice to use piety over morality is grounded in the classic articles on Euthyphro, S. Cohens Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A-11B and P.T. Geachs Platos Euthyprho: An Analysis and Commentary .

servant indicates, adds another dimension: the very commands in question were delivered by prophets, seers, and soothsayers. Thus, epistemologically, the divine command flowed from God, to the prophet, to the people. Plato points out that this sometimes doesnt worknot only does the game of pious telephone delay action, but sometimes the words of God too often sound like the words of a prophet. The Cave Platos Allegory of the Cave proves to be the inverse of Euthyphros account of how we come to know the divine. Euthyphros account is a top down epistemology: we are told what is pious. Platos epistemology, in this respect, is one where we discover for ourselves how things are and are able to check someones discovery against our own. Yet, even if Platos process is more emancipatory than Euthyphros, we still have a final product that looks like a command. Even Socrates strays from his famous philosophical aporia in The Apology when he says I do know that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey ones superior, be he god or man (emphasis added 29c). Does Socrates actually obey the commands of his superior? How is his daemon different than Euthyphros divination? I think a fruitful distinction to make is between commands and commandments. Commands and commandments can both come from the divine, but the important difference is in their praxis, not their origin. Commands are specific actions and superimpose the will of God or an authority figure on the will of subordinates, they are obeyed without question. Commandments are more general; they respect rational inquiry by allowing latitude for humans to tease out just what action the commandment is encouraging. Divinely authored, neither the goal nor the origin of the commandment is in question, but rather humans are left to use reason to figure out the methods of living out the commandment. Thus, Euthyphro simply follows divine commands and does what he is told while Socrates uses reason

to try and decipher what he is supposed to do by constantly checking his results against the commandments of his daemon. The Allegory begins with people being held prisoner in a cave. They are held not only by physical bondage, but also by their own ignorance, fear, or apathy. Puppeteers project shadows onto the wall from fire to provide insidious entertainment for the captives. The truth, for those in bondage, is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts (Rep. VII 515c). Notice again, these puppeteers are telling the prisoners what is true; the prisoners cannot get up and investigate the shadows or silhouettes, they simply have to take the puppeteers word for it. What other choice do the prisoners have? They are, after all, prisoners. Not only are there statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood and every material...some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent (Rep. VII 514b-c). Because all these idols are physicalstones, wood, etc.they are all less real for Plato, both in a sense of an idol standing in place of an ideal and the physical world being less perfect because it inherently decays. The talking carriers are those who speak for what the people in bondage believe to be the truth. These puppeteers represent people who abuse their authority and use their position to silence intellectual demurral, which is branded as dissent. Their authority, if it can be called such, is less real than someones who simply presents ideas as an intellectual midwife. The puppeteers project commands, not commandments, because the prisoners are bound by whatever the puppeteers show them. The prisoners are not free to think, examine, or investigate the claims. The similarity between the prisoners bound by ignorance and Euthyphros fathers actions restrained by an ignorance of piety compels the question as to what kind of bondage, physical or intellectual, is primary for Plato; they seem to go hand in hand.

The real point of importance is when a prisoner decides to leave the cave. The pathway to the outside world is dangerous though; the prisoners eyes are not yet adjusted to the little sunlight available and so she may slip, stumble, or fall. But with patience, perseverance, and courage, the prisoner is finally able to make it out of the cave and into the sunlight. Equally so, our minds when first liberated to think for ourselves, are weak. They grow stronger only with practice. The journey up is important for two reasons. First, it is a larger metaphor for how we come to learn truth for Plato. Exiting the cave and emerging into the sunlight establishes one of the most basic paradigms in Western philosophy: sight is a metaphor for understanding. Plato establishes this when he says the prisoner would, upon exiting the cave, look up toward the light...because he is a bit closer to the things that are and is turned towards things that are more he sees correctly (Rep. 515c-e). We might even replace sees with understand; the journey up terminates when the prisoner understands correctly. The final object in Platos allegory here is the sun. It allows all other truths about the world to be seen, to be intelligible. It, in a sense, governs our perception and understanding of the world above the cave. Our interaction with the sun is not pure; we must rely on some kind of an intermediary. Plato cautions in the Phaedo, to not look directly at the sun, as our eyes do not have the proper power to engage with it directly (99e). The need to filter our interaction seems like we have again come full circle to someone like Euthyphro, but these intermediaries need not be so heavy handed. We might rely on these people to be the reflections of the sun in the water because it would be too painful to look at the sun itself for very long, especially during our first visit to the surface. The longer we stay at the surface, the more our eyes adjust and so are able to tolerate more of a
direct gaze at the sun. Equally so, those who have sat with philosophical truth longer may be able to use their experience as a better kind of report as to how things are. Indeed, the Socratic dialogue itself

acts as a microcosm for this adjustment: Socrates looks into someone else for the truth and only builds his own thoughts on what he has found in other people. This kind of interaction outside the cave differs greatly from the interaction within the cave. Inside the cave, or under Euthyphros epistemology, the prisoners only interact with what the puppeteers tell them to interact with, and do so in a very limited way; the prisoners are entirely passive in their interaction. Outside the cave, or under Socratic epistemology, people are free to answer questions or even ask their own. Even lacking an actual conversation partner, we can initiate a Socratic dialogue of sorts with ourselves; by reflecting on our own thoughts or ideas, we have, in a manner of speaking, two speakers: one represented by the old beliefs and the other speaker by the present questions. Thus, a major difference between Euthyphros epistemology and Socrates epistemology is how active the interlocutor, or the self, is. The second reason that the journey up from the cave is important is the very nature of the journey. Here it is beneficial to make a distinction between questioning and testing. If commands turn on authority, then it seems that any kind of challenge is a fundamental rejection of the command. Commandments, however, welcome questions. Questioning can be an introspective account, as Plato demonstrates in his account of the prisoner who liberates herself. The prisoner does not direct her questions to the guards or the puppeteers, but rather to herself. Equally so, questioning the divine backdrop to piety internally, or using other people as a soundboard, does nothing to undermine the commandment itself; in fact, it is at the heart of the Platonic project. Platos journey up from the cave is really a drawn out series of questions aimed at the desire for an increase in knowledge and understanding. Asking questions like Why is this right?, How could this possibly be good for me?, and even wrestling with apparent contradiction in regards to other commandments, But didnt God say otherwise earlier?, all

lead to a more mature understanding of the commandment. Testing, however, is more of an antagonistic challenge to the author of the commandments; it seeks not to understand, but to undermine. In a classroom, teachers welcome questions about the material, but tend to shun or disapprove of students testing their authoritywho are you to be the teacher? Simply questioning often proves whether or not the authority is actually worthy to be the authority, as their answers fairly quickly can demonstrate the quality of their understanding. The denial of questioning in terms of pious introspection is a litmus test to see if a person is relaying something from the divine or from themselves. The suppression of questions indicates the latter while the openness to questions and attempts to puzzle out the meaning of a cryptic divine messagesay, no one is wiser than Socratesis evidence suggesting the former. Reason, Authority, and Epistemology There is one way up from ignorance, from the cave, and that is reason. Plato denied that it was emotion, authority, or anything else which liberated people from the falsehoods of the cave. Philosophy may begin in wonder, but reason sustains it. Just as Platos prisoner exits the cave to better understand the nature of reality, so too must we exit the cave of a nave understanding of piety. As we rationally explore or question a commandment, we find that it either becomes clearer to us or that it reduces to a command under the light of reason. But the prisoner is not to remain outside the cave forever. She is compelled, according to Plato, to return to her former prison and liberate others from the authority of the shadows. This return cannot be done, however, by force. Simply forcing someone to obey because one has seen the Forms is not enough; each other prisoner must see a reason to leave their life in the cave. The liberator must begin a kind of battle with the puppeteers and their carriers. In practice, both sides will explain that they are using light to help those captive, and so their actions will look vastly similar. Yet

one is using fire and the other is using the sun. Herein is the difference between Euthyphro and Socrates. Plato is clearly against the idea of prophets, soothsayers, seers, etc. making pious decisions for people. His philosophy at bottom is a reversal of this position of authority. Instead of coming to know of the divine by a holy man, Plato intrepidly reasons his way past the Divided Line and into the Realm of the Forms. This journey is repeatable and so if we do not believe or trust Plato, we can reason for ourselves. Not so, however, with soothsayers, as their private relationship with the divine is one of a receiver; they cannot produce another authentic commandment, they can, at best simply repeat the divine transmission or, at worst, make up another. Seemingly there is a contradiction here; holy men like Euthyphro are not good enough to issue commandments, but the Oracle at Delphi is. Here is where the distinction between command and commandment bears fruit. Euthyphros command is to prosecute a wrongdoer there is no room to see if there were mitigating circumstances or examine the details of the crime. By following one commandto wait for the seerEuthyphros father violates another do not murder. Socrates commandment leaves the license to action open endedaccept or deny the Oracles command, Socrates can reason for himself if it is true.2 Furthermore, the cryptic wording of the commandment invites meditation and reflection: is Socrates the wisest because he knows the most or is he the wisest because he knows he knows nothing? In fact, the oracle is the impetus for Socrates to question. And therein lies the difference, Socrates went on to rationally examine, explore, and investigate the consequences of that particular divine communication.

While the no man is wiser than Socrates does not look like an imperative, it retains a kind of illocutionary force; saying it is a command to make it so by instigating the Socratic enterprise of perpetual questioning.

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Euthyphro simply carried out his apparent command with no thought or consideration. If we look at the consequences, the actions of both men, we see little difference. Both carried out their mission faithfully. It is reason, therefore, which separates Socrates and Euthyphro. What is at stake in the dialogue, epistemologically speaking, is actually the role of authority, specifically the role of the priest. A facile reading of Plato suggests an unrestrained philosophical hostility towards religion; after all, Socrates, the philosopher, humiliates Euthyphro, the prophet. Yet Platos target seems to be priesthood, rather than priests. I believe that the distinction between priests and priesthood will help us get clear on the methodological consequences of ethical epistemology I have been analyzing in Euthyphro. Let me be perfectly clear here, by priesthood I do not mean someone belonging to a group who interprets and offers an educated or wise understanding of matters. By priesthood I mean someone who is in a position of authority to arbitrate on matters of importance and uses their office to refuse examination or questions. Priest and priesthood are, here, two very different things. Priests, in the religious sense, are those who have studied religious texts or meditated on deep questions and provided their experience and expertise to a given community. Priests welcome questions and try to explain problems or help misunderstandings when they arise. Priests may even have evolving interpretations of revealed texts or mystical experiences. Members of the priesthood, however, are those officials who abuse their power and deny any inquiry into the interpretation that is offered. They discourage free thought or questions and browbeat opposition into submission or acquiescence. The priesthood stains what is otherwise a white collar. Philosophers should not read Euthyphro as a triumphal dialogue, but rather as one of selfrestraint. Platos caution here is that philosophers should help guide inquiry into questions, and

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be careful that they do not dominate it. Philosophers should not, by virtue of their position as philosophers, discount questions or beliefs simply because they do not match up with philosophical beliefs. Even if these beliefs are hostile or dangerous beliefs, the successful philosopher is one who guides the person to conclusions, not one who intimidates their interlocutor by academia or intellect. Plato comments on this very issue when he says that the person who is dragged up from the cave would be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be true (516a) because this person did not naturally come to these conclusions, but instead was dragged to them. The Socratic method gradually guides people away from false beliefs and helps them genuinely understand and accept true beliefs. Just like the former prisoners attempted jail-break, the seed must be cultivated by the potential jail-bird, not by the returning prisoner. The dialogue then provides philosophers with a note of caution to praxis. We may read the Socratic dialogues with the belief that Socrates knew most of his interlocutors were blowing smoke, at least Euthyphro and the sophists are safe bets of that; Socrates, however, attacks these positions very innocuously. His questions have no venom, his arguments no vitriol, and yet, by the end of the exchange, Socrates almost always devastates his opponent. Philosophers, by their very position, are seen as authorities on knowledge, but the position of philosopher can sometimes be abused. Many schools of philosophical thought have argued that philosophers need to be more aware of their own biases when doing philosophy, not only in the conclusions they reach, but in the questions they ask, and the methods they employ. Feminist philosopher Margaret Walker in Authority and Transparency: Feminist Skepticism articulates this concern well when she examines how philosophers construct moral theory: when these representations of moral life are put forward authoritatively as truths about human interest, our intuitions, rational behavior, or the moral agent, they do not just say what is

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false. Rather, they uncritically reproduce the represented positions and locations as normative, i.e. as the central or standard (if not the only) case (51). Philosophers must be especially sensitive to the ability, simply by virtue of their position, to dismiss or otherwise discount another persons take because that person lacks professional philosophical training. Yet in dismissing anothers persons claim, simply because the person is not a philosopher, we are no longer describing, we have smuggled in a proscription for what even is permitted entry. Consider a simple exercise in listing famous philosophers. There is a certain agreed upon canon, but there are also deviancies. Depending on who is describing, we have already made a value judgment on who simply is able to be defined as philosopher. To the non-philosopher, this issue seems more like a pointless squabble, but consider a short list: Lucretius, Pascal, Newton, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Derrida, Poincare, Camus, Gdel, Ayn Rand, and Robert Persig. By simply defining some on this list as not philosophers, we have also defined what they do as not philosophy and thus unworthy of philosophical rebuttal. Of course, some of these names may not belong in the category philosopher by any means, yet by refusing to categorically engage with people because they are not philosophers, we begin to abandon our Socratic heritage in favor of one better embodied by Euthyphro. This dismissal is not just done in terms of individuals: certain fields within philosophy are often denigrated as not philosophy. Feminist philosophy was and is often viewed as soft philosophy, Postmodernism can be derided by analytics as a joke, and one of the newer disciplines, Experimental Philosophy, is sometimes unwarrantedly held as sociology or survey taking. Perhaps these disciplines do not contribute to philosophical inquiry, but most of the evidence strongly suggests elsewise. Had these disciplines not been given the chance to offer new methods and ways of inquiry to philosophy, we, as a philosophical community, would have been poorer. The moral, I believe, is

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that we should not deny questions on the assumption that what we have been doing is the only way to do things. We must always be cautious so as not to reach for anger over patience, outrage over curiosity, and authority over intellect. Our description, our definition, acts as a gateway of who is entitled to know and furthermore, who is entitled to question. Conclusion Examining the epistemological ramifications of the Euthyphro dilemma helps shed light not only on other issues often neglected by the traditional discussion of the dilemma, but also helps us remember what it means to be an authority. The members of religious authorities, scientists, or philosophers who do act like Euthyphro are probably few in number, but we must always be on guard to prevent the slide of an open discipline into a doctrinaire discipline. People in positions of authority must be willing to dialogue and discuss with those who view them as authorities. The questioning of authority, in any matter, is necessary to an improved engagement with knowledge and anything else. Legitimate intellectual authority welcomes questions so as to deepen understanding. Philosophy, then, begins in an attempt to question and philosophers who demand immunity from questions cease to be philosophers.