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apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same. Pursuant to said RA 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated 13 March 1992 with Judge Vega praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of RA 7169. On 10 April 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution 348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitation Committee. Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen. Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen. Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez learned that the Central Bank was set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while PVBEU-NUBE's and Fernandez's claims have been frozen to their prejudice. On 3 June 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with Judge Vega. PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez, on the other hand, filed the petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order. In a Resolution, dated 8 June 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case. On 22 June 1992, MOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. On 3 August 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular banking operations. Issue: Whether a liquidation court can continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES:

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE vs. Vega [GR 105364, 28 June 2001] Facts: Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (Case SP-32311). Thereafter, the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. (PVBEU-NUBE), represented by Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP3231. After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. On 8 March 1991, PVBEU-NUBE Fernandez moved to disqualify the Judge Benjamin Vega, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. On 2 January 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, PVBEUNUBE and Fernandez filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. Republic Act 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes", which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on 2 January 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on 24 February 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of 3 years from the date of the reopening of the head office.

Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which

ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid. Held: The enactment of Republic Act 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, Judge Vega has been stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation. Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank. 157 scra 766 Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been 263 scra 420 Publication Administrative Orders PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision. warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding. HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.

Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commissions 4 SCRA 627 (1962)

Facts: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."

Petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc. wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Moreover, it contended that due notice via publication was not complied with.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

Held: It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.

In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents maintained that since, under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, the rule on technicalities should be relaxed and their right to appeal upheld. On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution seeking to revive the case. Held: The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law. Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, Statues regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural rules are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Held: Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Benzonan vs. CA GR no. 97973 (Jan 27, 1992) DBP vs CA and Pe GR no. 97998 (Jan 27, 1992) Facts:

Mun. Govt of Coron vs. Carino GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987) Facts: Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a certain space the government then needed. The clearing of that space would require the demolishment of respondents structures. The case was brought to court. After a series of postponements, a date for the final hearing was set, during which respondents and their counsel failed to appear. Upon petitioners motion that respondents failure to appear be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine petitioners witnesses and to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision. Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on appeal. Respondents also failed to act on the appellate courts directive to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed. The resolution dismissing respondents a ppeal became final and executory on September 27, 1982, and a writ of execution issued on February 1, 1983. BP 129 (Sec. 39): No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal... Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs. 18): ...the filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with... (Sec. 19b): ...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of appeal being required.

Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued on Oct 29, 1969. He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial loan, the proceeds of which he used to build improvements upon the land. Upon failure to pay back his loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977 and was the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on Jan 24, 1978. Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP but failed to redeem it within the one year period. DBP then sold the lot to spouses Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979. On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land from DBP. Upon denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec 119 of CA 141. RTC and CA upon appeal both affirmed that the land should be reconveyed to Pe. Spouses Benzonan raised the issue of when to count the fiveyear period for repurchase from date of foreclosure sale or from expiration of one year period to redeem foreclosed property? Section 119 of CA 141 provides: Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provision, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the lot was mortgaged, acquired in a foreclosure sale, and sold subsequently to the Benzonan spouses, it was held that the five-year period should be counted from the date of the foreclosure sale. Reversing this decision was the Bellisiano case (1988) which held that the five-year period should be counted from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.

NORMA DE JOYA vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003 Facts: The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Batangas City. Despite conviction in the two separate criminal cases filed against her, petitioner remained at large. In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Admin. Circular No. 12-2000. After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. She filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court was denied, asking it to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Arguments: Petitioner: Her detention was illegal. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent: The two (2) judgments of conviction against the petitioner had long attained finality and could no longer be modified. The SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified Admin. Circular No. 132000 did not delete the penalty of imprisonment in BP 22 cases. Issue: WON Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by Admin. No 13-2001 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of BP Blg. 22 Held: No. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the

more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL. G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006. FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them. Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation. On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City. On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction

over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final PreTrial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail. Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup dtat before the regular courts. 2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable. HELD: 1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation

allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "serviceconnected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case. US vs. Bull 15 PHIL 7 FACTS: H.N Bull, who was the master of a vessel transporting cattle, carabao and other animals from Formosa to Manila, failed to provide suitable means for securing the animals while they are in transit. Such

neglect was a violation of Act. No. 275 of the Philippine Commission, which reads: The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation. Bull contends that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over his offense. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over this case. RULING: When a vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within the territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the territorial waters regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas. In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The People of the Phil. Island, plaintiff-appellant vs Wong Cheng (alias Wong Chun),defendant-appellee

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.


Whether or not the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the crime committed by Wong Cheng aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters?

Held: Yes. The crime on the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus having our court the right of jurisdiction over the offense committed. The court said Having the opium smoked within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is a breach of the public order, because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and court ordered further proceedings


G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), Defendant-Appellant. Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as August 19, 1909)s everal persons, Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or

Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti. It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu. The defense moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district or the wharf of Cebu. The court ruled in favor of the government and against the defendant, hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port Decision: Decision of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with modification. Held: The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. And that, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree. Original sanction: The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. Revised penalty: reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including

its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;chan robles virtual law library 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. corpus delicti n. (corpus dee-lick-tie) Latin for the substantial fact that a crime has been committed, and in popular crime jargon, the body of the murder victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been proven?

RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should be construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the size of the amount brought.

U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917) Cf. French vs. English rule

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-appellants. FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug. En Banc Villareal, December 14, 1931 Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -Act/Omission Facts: Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise) On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana: The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt Issue: Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves) Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late The fire destroyed about 48 houses Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal) Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)

Holding: No. Ratio: Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice. Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.