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iVIilitary R e v i ~ w
Ma";<'h 1979
Published by
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Deputy Commandant
Colonel E:dward M Bradford Eddor In ChIef
EDITORIAL STAFF: LIeutenant Colonel Jamie W Walton.
MJlldUl1lg Editor, LIeutenant Colonel Ernest L Webb.
AssoCIate Er/!tCJr
PRODUCTION STAFF M., R Protluc/,on[(1<10t M,
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EX r,,"wr,ll Donn A CnmmdflUer Tr,T1n,ny ,1n(l Doc""-'E'
(("''''h)"rl LW'11endnl Gp'WtJI J R Thurm.l(l Comm,j(l,1{'f Comp,npu Arms
CEn".t Mdlor (,,-n,,al Hume, D Smith Cummano1er l Cf'ntf)f Mdjor
Gf'l'\pr,ll Ht"f'ltv Mdhr [h,PI uS Army R(,sprve Major General ldVern b
\1\,"1"" [10,,1 flllI't}{lJ/ G",l'oB"reau MUIOI Genprll Fred'K Matl,Jifey
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I, """'1/ nt'vl'l"n'''en'<; MJ)or GenclJI Ben)amln l Harrison
COlnn'.Itldct Bn9<ldlPr G;>ner.JI J J a'oph" Ass,stant
Dt:'t'"h [om'''"n<l", ["mb,ned Al(ll,s Combat Oevelopmel1t tlerll"lv and
C<>,,,,,,,'I''' M""'" T, 1"""9 [)eH-'lop'>lents Ar;tl\"ty
ACTIVE' Colonel T f 811gg Oe/J,urmem of laa,es Colonel Wa'ne D MeDd
Of'/Mrlment 01 l.d .r: .. H,O" <1/1d [ur"culum Aflmrs Colonel J E:. Sullon
Oe/J.]rrmpnl 01 Re'oufci' MaflVfjPnWfl{ Colonl R A Man,on 01
Un,f,t';' .111(1 [Ofllh,npc, Opera/lolls Dr Dl,dlc-y T Corn,,)h John f MOfllson
[I.n,r of H,s/or Colonel Cor! Acree rv<ltHJnal GuJrd Bl.lrf'au Mr Roy
Root Ollr((! 01 II,l' Chief Army Reserve Colonel W 5 Raypr Comboned Arm3
[om/wf Ot'vp1oomen/ AC',v,ty and Comblfwa Arms r'iJInf(lg Oevefoprrrents
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M"lnr W J (IH:\nIPIOu Adm,(l,<;trtltlOfl C{'nter Major C W Mclnnls LOfj'';TICS
[enUJr C01Unl'! D fortes. CommanQ
I' :.
Military Review
NO 3
by Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. Miller, US Army
by Colonel Wolfgang Gerhardt, FRG Army
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard A Dixon, US Army
by Captain James K. Bruton Jr .. US Army Reserve
by General Walter T Kerwin Jr, US Army, Relired
by Lieutenant Colonel Sam C Sarkes!an, US Army, Retired
by Fred M Kaplan
by MalOI Dennis Carlin, US Army
by Major John W Taylor, US Army
REVIEWS from reports and loumals
88 BOOKS contemporary reading for the profess,!:nal
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Military Review
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leave.lworth. Kansas 66027
Military. Review
U.S. Army Command and General St,!ff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Salute to NATO
1979 the 30th anniversary of the :-.iorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, an
alhance so famlhar to us that Its acronym, NATO, no longer needs to be defined in
our lIterature. Thl' well-organlled defemive system, created by the allies and Joined
by signature In April of 1949, has provided a basis of stability and confidence fiom
which we have been able to guarantee our collective security for three decades.
We often forget that the post-World War II era of NATO's beginmng was different
from the world as we now know It. The' threat \\a, clearly v ISIble.! he former allies
of the \\ar, diSillusioned by the SOViets' unwilhngness to live In peace and harmony
WIth all nations. and fearful of possible further Sonet expansion westward. were
compelled to onCe again seek alliance for their common defense. A dangerous
clImate of In'tabillty prevaIled.
Since then. things ba\e changed Through ;'o;ATO. a stable military and pohtical
balance ha, been created bet\\een Ea,t and West NegotIatIons for pOSSIble mutual
and balanced reductiOn> of mIlitary forces and other measures aimed at easing
ten'lom were begun and are continuing In the meantime, we 'have also beeome
\\I,er. We arc a\\arc of our shortcoming, In the area of standardl7ed forces. We
kno\\ that the 1 hreat continue, to Impro\e It> military posture and strengths. Two
NA I 0 member; havc wIthdra\\n theH forces from the command. Many incon-
'I,tcncle' In thc ceonOl1l1e fIeld remain. and common development of equipment
and wcapon i, lar trom Ideal. H,mever. \\e mu,t not be misled into
thinking Lh,1l the deflclcncles di'played by :-':A TO mean a weak organi7atlon. It IS
not Much ha' been accomplIshed In three decades. Continuing Improvement m
unctc"tandm/!. rcdeplclyment. and pohtlcal will all add up to a mighty
:\e\t month. thl' Ili/ira!"r R"I'I<'II Will f"CU' on thl' AtlantiC alliance of ours, Some
of our article, will dc,cribc not only mIlItary cOl1SlctcraUoll> of the alliance hut
It, politlcal and ml,!ani/atIon:1l Ljllc,Uons a, wdl. Thi, month. our salllte-next
mOllth. a look. /

f ,fl'l
"'" :
000 314
Air Superiority
at __ Treetops
Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. Miller, US Army
The United Slates emerged from the Vietnam conflict as the
undisputed expert in tactical employment of helicopters.
/{owever, the Soviets appreciated the role of helicopters in
future warfare and are rapidly expanding their use of attack
helicopters and airmobile forces. In an oversimplified way,
our doctrine calls for the Army to win the ground battle and
the Air Force to win the air battle. But there is a gray area:
the 100 feet abpve the battlefield. There is where the
helicopters u'ill be flying. What happens if the Soviets use
their attack helicopters in an air-to-air role against our
attack helicopters waiting to pounce on their massed ar-
mored and mechanized units? In the event of a Soviet
airmobile. assault, do our" helicupters attack the Soviet
helicopters, or do they continue to fight the battle to our
front? If we are to win the land battle, we must have air-
superiority at the treetops. Within present dollar con-
straints, what can we do? One answer is to equip our
advanced scout helicopters (ASHs) with air-to-air weapons.
In this way, the ASH can provide our attack helicopters
security against Soviet attack helicopters, become a potent
weapon against Soviet airmobile forces and continue its role
as scout. A larger question remains unresolved: Do we have
the time and funds to 'go through a long and expensivf
research and development cycle, or wlfwld an off-the-shelf
commercial helicopter be just as effective once it has been
" " .
, !
ORLD War I introduced three
very lethal weapons. They were
the machinegun, the tank and the
airplane. German military planners
were quick to realize the impact of
these systems. Between World Wars I
and II, the German army refined its
concept of warfare and built its ground
forces around the mass employment of
mechanized forces. One only has to
look to the successes of Rommel and
Guderian to realize the extent to which
the German High Command had
adopted the use of these new tactics
,and weapons. In contrast, only a few
farsighted individuals in the US Army
such as George S. Patton Jr. had fully
realized the impact that armor was to
have on future warfare.
In South Vietnam, the US Army
quickly embraced the concept of air-
mobile warfare. Tactical necessity and
the obvious advantages to be gained
by using the helicopter to provide both
firepower and mobility in a war that
was classified asr-t'tow intensity"
overcame previous prejudices toward
helicopter vulnerabilities. The United
States emerged out of Vietnam as the
world's leader in helicopter warfare.
However, as the emphR.sis shifted from
the rice paddies of Vietnam to the
complex problems associated with
fighting in Europe, the US Army
began again to question the sur
vivability of helicopters in combat.
Forgotten were the previously
favorable findings of the Howze Board
and 11 th Air Assault tests of the early
1960s that examined the use of
helicopter-borne forces in mid-intensity
conflict even though these findings
were verified in actual combat. In
conditions approximating mid-
intensity warfare, as experienced in
Lam Son 719 and An Loc, we lellrned
that helicopters could survive if flown
in the "nap of the earth" and equipped
with aircraft survivability equipment.
These findings were further substan-
tiated by tests conduded at Fort Hood,
Texas, by Project MASSTER.
The "nap of the earth" envelope
limited helicopters to a relatively small
layer of maneuver area determined to
be that air space that begins just a few
feet above the ground and extends
upward to approximately .100 feet.
Because of the lethality of air defense
systems, it is ~ o w a foregone con-
cl usion that all helicopters, friendly
and enemy, will have to operate in this
portion of the atmosphere.
As the German High Command
realized the importance of armor before
World War II, NATO's potential
,-adversary, the Soviet Union, has
realized the importance of the role of
the helicopter in future warfare. The.
Soviets' use of both attack helicopters
and airmobile force'S is expanding at
an alarming rate. This implies that
NATO's use of the air space at or near
the treetops could be hotly contested by
Warsaw Pact helicopter forces if
hostilities were to erupt.
It must. be realized now by US
planners and our NATO allies that the
helicopter will have a significant
impact on winning or losing the land
battle. This means that our helicopter
systems, doctrine, force structure and
training must concentrate on winning
the helicopter battle in order to ensure
success on the ground. In order to
accomplish this, we must gain and
maintain air superiority" at the
To what extent does the Soviet
Union appreciate the advantages
gained by the helicopter and air-
mobility? The recent Ogaden War in
Ethiopia supplies the answer. Soviet
Mi6 helicopters supported tbe Cuban-
Soviet attack against Somali forces by'
flying troops, supplies and equipment
across the Ahmar Mountains. Some
observers reported the transportation
of PT76 tanks by these helicopters.
The entire operation was a coor-
dinated combined arms attack using
armor, macserl artillery, tactical air
and helicoptE'rs to envelop the Somali
strongpoint in the vicinity of Jit'iga.
quoted an Arab mil' ary
attache' saying "it was over al ost
before it start<,rl. It was the kind of
maneuv<'r that up to now has been
donI' only on paper maps in staff
collches." The implications are
In this age of systems analysis of
tomorrow's jJossible battlefield In
Europe, combined arms planners have
to finrl the best 'solution to
the complex problem of fighting out-
numbered anrl winning. Allocations of
NATO ground combat power versus
Warsaw Pact ground combat power
have bl'l'n clmlely scrutinIzed in order
to maximize effectiveness and lreduce
the risks of defeat. The eml1rgence of
the active defense has been the fallout
of this scrutiny. It is apparent that Air
Force planners h'ave applied
themselvcs to the tasks of developipg
tactics to be employed in winning tre
ail' battle in Europe. ,
Emphasis has been placerl by Air
Force planners on fighting air battles
above 100 feet and by Army planners
on conrlucting ground combat, but who
is looking from ground level to 100
feet'! Exactly how will we fight in this
vital area of the battlefield?
The JA WS (Joint Air Weapons
System) exercise
that resulted in a
draft manual entitled Joint Air Attack
Team T-actics (JAA'l'T) is the first
major step toward achieving an un-
derstanding of how. we should use this
air space to. our best .tactical ad-
vantage. Air-toair engagements by
helicopters were examined by the US
Army Aviation Center during the ACE
(Air Combat Engagements) studies'
conducted at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in
the fall of 1977. The result was the
funding of a' joint project (Air Force
and Army) entitled J-CATCH (Joint
Countering of Attack Helicopters).
/ This project .has been tasked with the
dFelopment of methods of countering
tl1e growing Soviet armed helicopter
threat. ' ,
In order to gather additional in-
sights into the 'relative value of this air.
.space. let's examine several scenarios
in which our attack helicopters are
employed as a combat multiplier to
provide the flexible response vital to
the conduct of the active defense. Upon
completion of thE' description of each
vignette, we will attempt, to assess
impact of the introduction of Soviet
attack helicopters into these situations.

third scenario the

i pact of a. large Soviet ailrmobile
at ack.
Scenario One
A US mechanized division is con-
ducting an active defense along a 100-
kilometer front. The division has es-
tablished a combined arms task force
as its covering force. Helicopter killing
zones were established forward of the
covering force's battle positions. The
division's two attack helicopter' com-
panies have been placed under
operational control of the covering
force commander. Notification of at-
tacking enemy columns and their
lengths, direction and speed has been
passed to the covering force com
mander who launches his two attack
helicopter companies. The
mission is to engagp a motorizeJ
rille rpgiment that is now approach-
ing thp kill zonp that was established
on the most dangerous avenue of
. The two.... attack helicopter com-
arp to attack positions
by SOT AS (Standoff Target Ac-
quisition System)' and att.ack upon
notification that the regiment is in the
zone. Attack ships firing 2.75-inch
multipurpose rockets' begin the attack
by saturating the enemy column in
order to degrade or destroy the enemy's
air defense umbrella. As the last sup-
pression rockets explode, TOW firing
helicopters press their attack from
their positions around the kill zone.
The attack is completed in lpss than 80
minutes, and tbe helicopters withdraw
to rearm, refuel and prepare for further
What if} Soviet attack helicopters
were employed to the fronL and Ilanks
of this column as a security element?
Or what if Hinds were employed in
overwatch positions as the column
moved toward and through the kill
zone? It is unlikely that a surprise
attack by our helicopters would be
Or what if our attacking helicopters
were counterattacked by Soviet attack
helicopters during tbe engagement?
The resulting US helicopter losses
probably would be unacceptable. In
other words, the attacking enemy
motorized rille regiment would close at
full strengtb with our covering force
Scenario Two
Enemy. forces have forced the
withdrawal' of the covering force and
are now attempting to conduct a
breakthrough of our main battle area.
The US 'division commander has iden-
tified the area in which the enemy will
attempt his breakthrougb. He- is
attempting to meet this threat with a 3
to1 combat ratio and is shifting forces
laterally to achieve this objective.
In order to gain time to accomplish
his realignment of forces, he now
his two attack helicopter com-
panies on tbe Ilanks of the massing
enemy echelons. Unopposed by other
. aerial systems, the attack belicopters
engage the enemy along with the in
tegratpd fires of artillery, tanks,
ground guided missile systems and
A /0 close support aircraft. It is
probable that the US ground com
mander could reposition his maneuver
elements during this time and prepare
to prevent the breakthrough.
Tbis situation could be changed
drastically by the entrance of enemy
attack helicopters. Our attacking
helicopters could be totally neutralized
if tbey were attacked wnile attempting
to destroy the enemy's massing armor.
In addition, the enemy helicopters
would be free to roam in our rear areas
and could destroy targets of oppor-
tunity at will.
Scenario Three
During the enemy's buildup and
eventual massed armor and
mechanized attack, he launched large
numbe'rs of Hip troop-carrying
helicopters accompanied by Mz-6 heavy
lift helicopters carrying BMPs and
PT76 tanks internal and escorted by
Hind attack helicopters. Even though
hp sustained aO-percen t losses, the
enemy inserted a force to a
motorizt'd 1'I)le division behind the
main battle arpa.
The US division commander is now
in the position that French forces
oef!'nding the Maginot line found
at the beginning of World
War II-that of fighting in two direc-
tions simultaneously while oriented to
fight only in one direction. By
adhL;nng to the principles of mass,
mobilIty surprise. the enemy used
vertical pnvplopment by motorized
forct's to rpducp the combat power of
our force,.; in the main battle area.
Without the means to counter such
foret's, the outcome of this situation
should be obvious.
How Should We Proceed?
Rp(,pnt simulator studies imply that
the most effiCIent countersystem to an
attack helicopter is another attack
helicopter. If air superiority at the
treetops is vital to winning and the
most effective countersystem to the
helicopter is another helicopter, air-to-
air engagements between helicopters
are' inevitable on any future European
battlefield involving NATO and
Warsaw Pact armies.
Rased on preliminary in-
vestigations, it also can be expected'
that helicopter air-to-air engagements
the treetop level will be fleeting,
violent, intense and of short duration.
This means that detection, speed and
maneuverability plul;! accurate, long-
range destructive weapons systems
will be key factors toward winning
victories in the air space just above the
What must we do? We could in-
crease our buy of the incoming AH64
advanced attack helicopter with its
basic weapons system, Hellfire, or we
could increase the purchase of ad-
ditional AHIS TOW Cobras. Both of
these helicopters could prove to be
effective helicopter killers.
Will present dollar constraints
support either course of action? The
question really should be: "Can we not
afford to field adequate Qelicopter
countermeasures?" By the mid to late
19R08, the US Army should have in its
inventory the total quantities of AH64
and A HIS a ttac k helicopters
programed for purchase to meet force
structure requirements. Attack
helicopters and air cavalry units have
been programed to offset superior
numbers of armor and motorized rifle
of the Warsaw Pact. Given
the additional requirement of
providing' a defensive capability
against Soviet attack helicopters, will
there be adequate US helicopters to
engage enemy armor while employing
a If'0rtion of these attack helicopters in
an overwatch security role?
The threat will demand that
helicopter security fQrces be employed
to protect those helicopters that are
engaging armor targets. Adaitionally,
large numbers of attack helicopters
will be to meet enemy air-
mobile forces to destroy these forces
before they reach their objectives. All
of these factors imply that an'increase
in the numbers of attack helicopters is
not only justified but is a necessary
'element of s'urvival.


Scout lift

20 ASH' 8 UH60s
(10 per platoon)
4 TOWs
4 Dragons
8 Motorc.ycles
8 Ground lightweight
laser Designators
"Each aircraft equipped with 10 to 12 air-to-air missiles
Figure 1
How can this be accomplished in a
climate of severe funding constraints?
In addition to the ongoing purchases of
AH64 and AHIS attack helicopters,
could we not increase the numbers of
. attack aircraft by arming future scout
aircraft? '
In the spring of 1978, a consensus
was reached by the attendees at the
Aviation Employment Conference that
a definite requirement exists for an
advanced scout helicopter (ASH).
Agreement could not be reached as to
. whether it should be armed or un-
All agreed that it should be
equipped with the ta,rget ac-
quisition/ detection system (T ADS) and
with the pilot night vision system
(PNVS). These two. systems plus sur-
vivability equipment increased weight
requirements to 7,000, pounds. (This
approximates th size of the UHIH.)
Development of the ASH also implies
large expenditures of research and
development dollars and years of
waiting before ASH becomes a reality.
Balancing dollar constraints
against the urgent need of increasing
our attack helicopter fleet, where can
we make tradeoffs? Should we not
rethink the ASH's mission and design
requirement-s? Could the ASH provide
the increase in attack capability while
still performing its traditional role as a
scout? How survivable must the ASH
be? If the decision were to arm the
Overwatch ASH Overwatch
tHlnq helicopters
'ASH Overwatch
TOW Cobras or HellfIre
equipped AH64
attack helicopters
ASH Overwatch
Figure 2
ASII, whilt armament would hp the
l'ff," tive,'! Do we really nt't'(j to
undc'l'gn ('xhaustivp and
dt'vPlopnwnt, or "ould an off-th" shelf
h"lll'opter snU"r" our need'! It is un-
d,'rstood that many alternatives
nll1ginh from off thl' shl'lf thnlUgh new
dl,\t'lopnH'nt currently are bemg
tIll' Department of the
It IS impl'rative that we forego
n'sl'<ll'l'h and d,'vl'lopml'nt and sl'ek an
advancl,d scout aircraft that could be
pU1Thasl'd ofT thl' sl1Plf and with
mrttl-air missiles. The ASH would
havl' to Ill' equipped with a radar
dt'lt'(,tioll sYstl'm that would permit
parly wa;'ning and long-range
l'n"l;g{'ml'nt of enemy helicopters. Ad-
it must be higbly
maneU"l.'ernhll' and capable of high
airs!>l'l''!s (above ISO miles per hour):
- At lirescnt, Hughes Aircraft is
providing 11 small TOW-equipped
helicopter for the Republic of Korea_
This helieoptl'r is a modified version of
its ci"llilian counterpRrt, the 500D. The
,';O()/) is capable of lifting a useful load
of 2,OOl) pounds (internal or external),
flying at 175 miles per hour, and has a
fuel endurance of three and one-half
h'l'urs. On the international market,
the A"usta A109 and B0105 are in
production and possess similar
The fact remains that an off-the-
shelf helicopter with the 'required
capabilities exists and could be
equipped with a lightweight helicopter
radar aetector, a miniaturized
TADS/l'NVS system, survivability
equipment and air-to-air missiles. Its
prImary armed mission would be to
in/tercept and destroy enemy
helicopters. Other missions to be per- ,
formed would be that of a scout. The
ASH so equipped would be the nucleus
around which we could reorg;mize air
cavalry units. The air cavalry troop
could be reorganized as shown in
Figure 1.
The air cavalry's mission would
remain reconI'laissance and security,
with increased emphasis on security.
The security mission would require the
employment of ASH, armed with air-to-
air missiles', in overwatch positions
when attack helicopters (AHIS or
AH64s) were conducting their attacks
on armor targets. This would prevent
surprise attack b,y enemy helicopters.
In vignette one, we described the sur-
prise attack on an enemy armored
column forward of the covering force.
Now let's add ASH employed in its
security role. Helicopters could be
positioned aA depicted in Figure 2.
This attack could be enhanced
further by adding AIO close support
ships to ensure armor kills and
perhaps increase protection from other
1 The OgJden Ol'bilcle Newsw!'ek 20 Mdlch 1978
2 Durong JAWS A,r Forcl' AIDs lOW Cob/os aOl delpn,>"
arhllp.y armo' and arl,lIpf\l Wl'rp mdneuvPred <Ig(J,no;t an oppo<;.,ng
torce lank battalion In 01 ';,erle'; of freepld". exerCises
3 The ACE wert' p,{,I,mona''f 01 d" 10 ,),.
combal ergdgements between helicopters at treetop all,]udes
em:my aerial weapons systems. In the
event of the launch of massive air-
mobile forces as described in scenario
three, the ASH, AHI Sand AH64 could
be employed to destroy these forces
while en route to their objective areas.
The use of the air space just above
ground maneuver systems is critical to
winning on tomorrow's battlefield. We
must take immediate steps to ensure
that we have the capabilities to control
this area of the battlefield. Our
potential adversaries have recognized
its and, as indicatrd by the
Ethiopian experience, are moving
toward expert use of this air space to
gain dramatic tactical advantages. In
all probability, he who fails to win air
superiority at the treetops will fail to
win the war.
d The system (on",<;I<;. of d rolal,ng ""de 100k'1'9 a,rborn, radar
(5LARI mounlpd on a UH1H helicopter
') The multipurpose 2 75 ,nlh rocket ,s one 01 It>e ot a
nt'"" lam,!y 01 2 7':J ,n(/1 roCkets thai dTe PdT! of the new Droduct
Imprnved 2 75 Inch sySTem For more deldlls see Colonel James L
Tow < 2 75 Upd,)IP WbaTever HnDDeT1ed The Egg on ttle Wall>
Un,/ed Army O.qe5t May 1978
Lieutenant Colonel Retsae H. MIller IS
WIth the Department o( TactICS. USACGSC.
He rccelt'ed a B A. (rom the Unwerslty o(
M,am, and an M.A (rom Webster College and
is a graduate o( the USACGSC. He has
au cavalry and assault
h /tcoptCT unrts and served wIth alT assault
lantry. AsslRnments mclude serVlce with
t e 1st Cavalry and IOIst Airborne DWlslOns
in' V,etnam and wzth the Army SectIOn. US
MILItary Group, Honduras.
, ,
, . ,
Colonel Wolfgang Gerhardt, Federal'Republic of Germany Army
NATO Corps LANDJUT is unique within the NATO
command structure. Located in Rendsburg, Germany, Head-
quarters, Allied Land Forces, Schleswig-Holstein .and
Jutland, was created in 1962 to protect the critical area of
the land approaches to the Baltic approaches and exits.
Manned in peacetime by a West German armored infantry
dil'ision and a Danish division plus a West German
territorial forces brigade, the corps would expand in war to
im'lude forces from the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom. Major exercises such as Bold Guard test
the corps' readiness. Interoperability is a key factor in the
corps' success. Perhaps based on the experience gained with
Corps LANDJUT, we can look forward to more mul-
tinational corps in NA TO.
ECENTLY in at one of
the staff meetings at
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,
Europe, one of the participants, when I
introduced myself and I was from
Corps LANDJUT, asked: "Corps
what?" This was not surprising to me.
Even within the NATO command
structure, this unique corps head
quarters is not wellknown.
Generally, all army corps are
national corps, 'and, as far as the
German forces in NATO are con
cerned, they also are the highest
national field command level. This
multinational corps headquarters with
the long title of Headquarters, Allied
Land Forces, Schleswig Holstein and
Jutland (LANDJUT), was created in
1962 for the critical area of the land
approaches to the Baltic approaches
and exits. The headquarters is located
in Rendsburg, Germany, and its
position in the allied chain of
command can be seen on Figure 1. The'
corps commands in pellcetime the 6th
Federal Republic of Germany (GE)
Armored Infantry Division with head
quarters in Neumiinster and the
Danish Jutland Division with head
quarters in Fredericia, Denmark.
Corps combat support and service
troops are earmarked to the corps 'from
both nations. A unique major for
mation also is assigned to the com
mander, Allied Land Forces,
Schleswig Holstein and Jutland (COM
LANDJUT). The German Defense
Group l:l a territorial brigadesize
formation located a1 Eutin, Germany.
This formation is an exception since
territorial formations normally are
assigned to the local territorial com
mander for rear area security missions.
Because of the peculiar situation in the
area and the existing threat on the
Warsaw Pact side, this brigade has a
defense mission in the forward defense
area alongside divisions.
The a reduced
peacetime strength of around 1'00, in
c1uding officers and noncommissioned
officers from Germany, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States. These. nations have
certain contingency forces earmarked
"\ XXX
Allied land Forceo;;.
Holstem and ...Jutland
Neumuostcr frederic,,,
for the area, ;]nd it is deslrahle to have
expertise pre:-;ent in the headquarters.
As to the manning, only the com
mander and chief of staff rotate in a
cycle bl'tween Denmark and
Germany-at the present time, the
commander is Lieutenant General P.
O. W. Th<m;en of Denmark; the chief of
staff, a German hrigadier general. The
other staff positions are divided per-
manently between the and,
since Germany and Denmark provide
the maj .. rity of the forces, they hold
ilost of the positions. .
For exercises and in war, the head-
I Corps I DEN GE
quarters wIll expand to about three
times its peaC'etime strength. The
Emergeney Establishment Personnel
('orne from the concerned.
Many of the Ekablishment
Personnel have established close
relations to the headquarters and are
taking activl' part in all activities
beyond their exercise assignments.
has proved a valuable point for
cohesion and proficiency.
, One glance at Figure 2 will
demonstrate that the area, is vital to
both NATO and -the potential
aggressor. For operatior) in the
Atlantic, the Warsaw Pact has. to get
out of the confining waters of the
Baltic and return for repair and supply
since a high percentage of its support
facilities are located in eastern
harbors. The sensitivity of the waters
is demonstrated by the permanent
Warsaw Pact presence of a number of
electronic warfare 1 ships at various
points around the three exits.
Our left flank neighbor is the Allied
Land Forces, Zealand; in peacetime a
Danish national corps command at
Copenhagen. LANDJUT maintains
dose liaison with them as well as with
our neighbor to the right, the I German
Corps just south of the Elbe River. Due
to its peculiar situation, LANDJUT
has a number of liaison tasks that are
not normal for this type of command.
For instance, there are links to the
local Lunder governments in Kiel and
Hamburg as well as to the Federal
German Border Police and the flag
officer, Germany, with his naval air
arm who is, in turn, responsible for the
waters outside Schleswig-Holstein. The
two senior national commanders in the
area, the German admiral in Kiel and
the Danish general in Arhus, Northern
Jutland, detach liaison teams to
LANDJUT to present the views of
their respective commands. This is a
vital aspect in planning since the
Platoon leader of Home Defense
Group 13 training for combat in
bUlltup areas
, \
Figure 2
introduction of external n'inforcements
from thl' United Kingdom or United
States into the area brings a number of
host nation support problems that only
"national commands can solve.
In the field of standardization, some
significant steps have been made.
During the last few years, a number of
major items in weapon systems, such
as the Leopard tank, the MI09
howitzer, the M 113 armored personnel
carrier and the Redeye air defense
missile, have been introduced in both
the Danish and German divisions,
making logistics and mutual support a
great deal easier.
. I
The mission of COMLANDJUT
tells him to defend the area as far
f ~ r w a r d as possible and as flexible as
possible in order to deny an attack into
the heart of Schleswig-Holstein. To
fulfill this mission, COMLANDJUT
has a number of major formations and
units assigned. The missions and tasks
that these formations have to execute
are laid down in a general defense plan
which is written and modified by the'
One of the problem areas is the
. availability of forces. Whereas the
German forces are readily available
and near their wartime positions, the
Danish Jutiand Division must be par-
tially mobilized and has to travel 100
to 200 kilometers to its wartime
positions. An early availability of
these forces is necessary which means
that a political decision has to be made
in order to send them forward.
Another aspect is that because of its
geographic situation and the Warsaw
Pact doctrine, the LANDJUT
operations plan has to include the
possibilities of tactical air landing deep
in the defense sector and/or
amphibious operations anywhere
along its long. left flank. This
necessitates close liaison requirements.
To enhance the capability to react
to any of the Warsaw Pact options, a
constant permanent exercise
program is being conducted at all
levels throughout the year. This is not
confined to German soil, but takes
plaee on Danish territory as well.
While other- commands still question
the word "interoperability," we in the
LANDJUT area have practiced it for
years ahd not only in the head-
quarters, but all the way down to the
brigade and sometimes right down to
the' company. Recent training com
petitions in the fields of artillery,
engineer and military geography prove
this point well when the multinational
teams start taking home the prizes
from national
Every four years, a major live ex-
ercise is being conducted under the
name of Bold Guard. This year, the
exercise will see on the' Blue side
possible forces that COMLANDJUT
can count on in a crisis situation. Not
only will the three major land for-
mations and strong territorial units
participate, but a US Marine Corps
amphibious brigade- with its own air
component and logistic support is be-
ing shipped from the United States
along with a British 'forml;ltion called
the 6th Field Force. The field force has
a strong antiarmor capability and a
parachute battalion for high reaction
mobility. Naval and air force units of
the nations concerned arso will be in-
- It will be the biggest exercise ever
conducted in the area, and it should
demonstrate that the NATO area of
Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland-Hamburg
will not give in readily to the Warsaw
but will be defended by a joint
and combined effort of at least four
nations. That this can be done under
the command of a multinational corps
headquarters is one of the aims of the
exercise. Interoperability should not
remain a "new fangled device," but
should convince others that this is one
of the answers to our defense problems.
< ,
The saying in the German army
when Schleswig-Holstein problems are
being presented "Alles ist anders in
Schleswi{<-Holstein" (Everything is
'different in SoH) might turn into,
like "There is something
we would like to look
at In S,H. I
The exercise' will serve as a vehicle
to gain experience so that' mul-
tinational corps-similar to
LANDJUT-might be the prospect of
the future in some NATO areas. The
necessity for more at
all levels is one factor pointing the
way. "'R
Colonel Wolfgang Gerhardt. Federal
Republic of Germany Army, IS G3, Head,
quarters. AllIed Land Forces, SchleSWIg,
llolstem and Jutland. He is a graduate of the
Humboldt Oberrealschule Berlm and the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt I Mam, He has served as
'an mstructor at the German Armed. Forces
Staff Coliegr and was chIef of ,he German
S,ectlOn, USACGSQ, 1973 to 1975,
Northern operations, arctic warfare, cold weather
operations just do not excite many readers. However, be it
Alaslla, Korea or Central Europe, winter warfare is a fact of
life which most choose to ignore and refuse to plan for. An
American unit trained to fight in the snow suddenly becomes
a "special purpose" force. Have we forgotten the Ardennes
Campaign in World War II or the Chasin Reservoir in Korea?
The Soviets train for winter warfare and not just because
they have more <fold weather. They train because many of
their past successes have come on snow-covered battlefields.
They learned their lesson well in Finland. US equipment and
Sol'iet equipment should perform equally well in most
climates. The difference, then, may be one of attitude and
training. We need to accept the fact that we may haee to
fight our major battles during the winter in a cold en-
l'ironment. Next, we need to train our units right down to
the squad level on how to use the cold and snow, to ad-
t'anta!:e and how to fight to win in a cold weather en-
Winter Warfare
by A - ~ y
Other Name ...
Li('ut('l1l1nt Col(llwl HichHl'f1 ,\. Dixon, US Army
N 196:5, the US Army published a
field manual entitled .vorth.ern
OprJ'atlO/lS, and defimd its
arena as' gf.'hl'rally north of the Arctic
Circll'. Northern opl'mtions is syn-.
onymous with arctic operptions.
Sprinklp in a [pw, exotic terms like
auroral l'nvironment and 50 degrees
isothenn. ,;nd instant obscurity is
assurpd. .
The Vl'ry term "arctic' warfare" .
paints a fanciful ml'ntal picture of
armies maneuv('ring against each
otlwr across thl' frozen wastelands of
th .. f[H north. Thl' probability of that
kind of military action warrants littll'
attention whl'n compared with the
-realIties of our most likely .future
hatt ll'fil'lds. The atmosphere crea,ted by
this geographically limited frame of
rpfl'rence has seriously hamper{'d cold
weathl'r com hat devl'lopments and has
resultl'd in our reference to any unit
trairil'd primarily to fight in the snoW
as a "spl'cial purpose" force.
A replacement field manual is to be
, titled OperatlOlls ~ n Cold Weather. and
that is a little closer to the mark in
establishing a reality-oriented
rl,ferencl' with real-world impact. But it
IS gomg to take more than changing
the' title of a field manual to draw
attention to the need to upgrade our
wintl'r capability.
In point of fact, a preoccupation
with geographic frames of reference
obscures the main difference between a
winter battlefield and any other kind:
the presence of cold and snow. Call it
by any other name, winter warfare
.simply means that the way we fight is
influenced by the presence of cold or
. snow or both on the battlefield
. regardless of where in the world that,
hattlefield is. Call it by any other
name, and' the need to prepare for it
becomes less ,obvious:
Cold begins to influence operations
whenever people ani:! materiel begin to
lose efficiency because of 'it; Cold
affects people as a function of wind
speed a'nd humidity, as well as of
temperature. These effects. can'
seriously hamper operations at
t{'mperatures well above zero degrees
Fahrenheit. Most of our hardware is
designed to operate' efficiently in
temperatures do'wn to minus 25 degrees
Fahrenheit, and that is acceptable. for
operations almost anywhere in the
Northern H.emisphere, including about
90 percent of the time in the coldest
regions of the north.
Some problems begin to appear at
about plus 20 'degrees Fahrenheit, but
prevention of serious equipment
problems is relatively simple until the
temperature falls - below about zero
degrees Fahrenheit. Wherever man-.
fachinB interface is required, the'
effect of cold depends on whether the'
machine is designed to protect the
operator from the environ]llent. For
example, at 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a
driver in the heated cab of a truck is
perfectly effective. Total effectiveness
of the system may be seriously
hampered when the driver has to
perform operator maintenance wnile
exposed to the elements.
Snow acts as an obstacle of varying
lJ1agnitude depending upon its depth
and consistency. The farther north. we
go, the more likely it is that snow will
be so hard crusted so as to provide
avenues of approach rather than serve
as obstacles. Farther south, snow is,
likely to' be present in softer, deeper'
quantities, providing obstacles of
karying magnitude more or less
directly proportional to its depth.
There is no magically derived depth
Area of northern operations from Field Manual 3171 perspective focuses on north
polar regIon obscuring inclusion of hIgh ba,ttle areas
of snow for deflmtlvl' military con
siueration. Most of our tactical whcelpd
vehicles haw' udTiculty nCh'otiatinh'
any depth of snow when travelmg off
road. Most of our tr,t('k('d vchidl's do
vpry well In up to approximately :Hl
inche" of ,;now as Ilmg as ,I solid
eXIsts und('r tlll' Most of the
timp, snow would prPSl'nt no grl'at
obstack to llll'chanil.l'd lllf,llltry It the
infantry l'ould always fight from
within thpir "I'hid!'s and if thosl' units
Wl'n' not dplH'nd!'nt on whl'plPd
v('hicks for r('supply. As long ,IS in
fantry is r('quirl'd to IlIllVI' Oil foot
across any p<irtioll of tIlt' hattll'fi!'ld,
snow prl's,'nts u potl'ntlall,'
clphilitating ohstacl!'.
When both of thest' phl'llOllH'IJa,
cold and snow, act in concert, it can be
I'xtl'l'mely diffi('ult for the commander
to mass his combat power at the
(It'cisiVl' place and timp. When the
pl'l'senc(' of pithPI' cold or snow or both
tOh'l'lhl'r force thl' commander to take
positIve' action pither to' overcome
difficulties or to use those
ditTicultil's to his own advantah'e, he is
"IIh'.lgl'd ill wintl'!' warfare whether he
IS m f\iortlwrn Alaska, Korea or in
('('ntral Enropl'.
I ll'filll'd in this wav, wintpr warfare,
I'old w('utlll'r warfare: or whatever you
dlllos.' to call it IS not confilll'd to the
frO/I'll alTtic wastl's. With some
1I0tahll' I'xl'l'ptioIlS, thosl' areas of the
NIlrtlwl'll 1il'llllsphl'l'l' Slluatpci north of
tIll' lOth parallt'l arc I<C'[lsonahly sub-
Land areas between 40 north latitude and ,he Arctic Circle include highly probable battle areas
subject to winter warfare conditions .
jected to winter conditions.
Many historic ancl highly probable
futurp battlegrounds lie between the
40th parallel and the Circle to
include most of Europe and more than
half. of Asia. Campaigns in the
Ardennes during World War II and the
Chosin Reservoir in Korea serve as
dynamic examples of the effects of cold
and snow well south of so-called cold
regions of the world.
We should expect to fjght the first
'battle of the next war during winter
because that is what our greatest
potential adversary does best. Given
the Soviet Union's proven propensity
for success in winter combat, we can
reasonably anticipate an attack when
snow and cold can be used to' best
advantage. I
The next war has been advertised
as a "como:: as you are" war, and are
to be expected to win outmanned and
outgunned. If decisive battles of that
war are fought during winter, we can
expect opposing force equipment to
function very well no matter how cold
it gets. We can expect our own
equipment to work very well within the
norm'al temperature ranges of the
. .
probable battle areas. If the
battleground is covered by deep snow,
both sides will face the same mobility
problems. Prime targets for air inter-
di'ction will be the ;oad nets that both
friendly and enemy forces are
attempting to use for movement of
vehicles either forward or to the rear.
A wintl'r environment tends to be
an equalizer of combat power by
placing the burden of fighting onto the
dismounted infantry soldier. The
Soviet army learned from bitter ex-
perience . in Finland that when the
snow is deep, maximum combat power
forward often consist" mainly of in-
fantry units trained to maneuver effec
tively on foot. If German experiences
in Russia during World War II are any
indicator, the Soviets learned their
le,;son well. .
Understanding that the weather
itself is neutral-that is, its effects are
felt equally by both Rides and that the
advantage reRts with whichever side
can best use the environment-when
winter weather, particularly deep
snow, endangers the momentum of a
Soviet advance, we can expect units to
dismount and continue the attack on
foot. We can expect the Soviets to use
snowstorms, fog and darkness to in-
filtrate regiments into a defender's rear
to cut lines of communication, destroy
command and control facilities and to
attack front-line posltions from unex-
pected directionR.
The Soviet Union apparently has
standardized an extreme cold re-
quirement for most of its war
machinery. Tanb. sel1'propelll'd ar-
tillery and other weapons and
trc1l1sport Ipavl' assl'mhl.v lim's
preparf'd for opl'rations in
temperatures wl'll IH'low minus :,!;-,
degrees Fahn'nhl'it. Thi" appears to hl'
a defense-oriented measure because
while extreme cold temperatures can be
expected within the Soviet interior,
temperatures of bordering countries
rarely drop to minus 2f) degreE'S
Fahrenheit. That means our equipment
will generally as well as theirs
on any where we are likely
to meet.
Major Soviet advantages for winter.
warfare exist in attitude and in
training. Extensive winter training of ci
a majority of Soviet forces appears to
be more than a function of geographic
location. It is a logical extension of an
attitude that because the hostile winter
environment has servea so well as an
ally in the past, it should be used
whenever posRible to gain and
maintain advantage over any less-well :
prepared enemy.
A common op1l1ion that people who
art' born llnd live ('ut their liVE'S in a
cold clitnate are better suited
physically for cold weather warfare is
a mvth. The human body does not
to cold in' the same way it
to heat. For example, the only
measurable advantages an Eskimo
posseSRes over an Arab for cold
weather exposure are based on lifelong
psychological conditioning and
training. An effective winter Roldier
dol'S not fear the cold, he respects it. He
has learne,d to accommodate his way of
living and fighting to it.
Cold can be an insidious enemy,
wounding on contact and forcing the
soldiE'r to take positive action merely to
['nsure hls own Rurvival. Snow can be
an all'encompassing obstacle forcing
f'xhausting energy expenditure for the
simpll'st maneuvers. With proper con-
ditioning, soldiers can be taught to use
till' winter environment to great ad-
vantagl'. Conversely, if winter is
treated like another enemy. then we
are forced to fight on two: fronts.
Training starts with attitude. All
too often. US soldiers entering the
winter environlTIent for the first time,
regardless of civilian experience with
winter. display fear symptom5 out of
proportion to actual dangers. When
queried as. to what portion of cold
weather orientation they remember
best. they often recall grizzly
photographs of the physical effects of
frostbite on the human body. This is
evidence that their training has had
the same psychological impact as
would. for example. orienting on
physkal results of skiing accidents
have on beginner ski instruction. The
resulting induced fear inhibits effective
Cautionary training certainly is
necessary, but its positive value must
, always be placed in proper perspective.
Effective eold weather training focuses
on how we can make the environment
work for us rather than on what it will
1/ 22
do to us if we i are careless.
Once the need fQr more universal
winter training has neen recognized as
a requirement in response to a real
threat. several facts of life on the
winter battlefield present themselves
as worthy of consideration. Paramount
among them are: The environment
affects the way we move in a much
more dramatic way than it affects the
way we shoot ot communicate; the best
way to move about the winter
battlefield is to fly over it; and light
infantry is best suited for combat if\:
deep snow.
Effects of cold and snow on materiel
are well-established' and a5e
reasonably predictable.' We know, ftr
example, that dry cell battery power
diminishes rapidly in the cold,.
propellant charges burn more slowly,
metal becomes brittle and bursting
radii are diminished by snow. We know
that a rifle brought into a warm tent
will sweat and likely freeze up when
reintroduced to the cold. Procedures
If ' .
and 5pe:::ial equipment where needed
are standardized 'and elicit little con
jecture or controversy.
Ground trafficability, on the other
hand, is subi\ct to so many variables
that its accurate prediction is often
impossihle. Snow depth arid con-
sistpnc'Y, ambient temperature, cloud
cOWl', vpgetation, condition and type of
pnrth bpneath the snow are a few of the
Thpse variubles may all change
several times in any given 24-hour
ppriod. For example, tanks may find
themselves hopelessly bogged down in
3 feet of snow, after easily plowing
thl"llugh it for several hours, simply
hpcausp a tempel'aturp rise of a few
degl'pes has made the snow heavier
and stickier. When that happens,
fOI"\\ ard momentum of heavy units
may be lost if they are not prepared to
continue operations as light infantry.
InfantrY cannot man'euver effec-
tively in deep snow unlpss it has been
trained to use snowshoes or skis or
both. Proficiency in the use of
snowshoes requires very little training
and practice. It is possible to issue
snowshoes on the battlefield and
pxppct an untrained unit tel be able to
move short distances effectively. A
relatively short period of training will
allow it to fight and move longer
distances with confidence.
Units on snowshoes cannot be ex-
pected to maneuver successfully on the
groui1d against ski troops. Skis are
fasLer and 'less tiring to well-trained
troops than are snowshoes. On the
other hand, skiing skill is much more
difficult to learn than is snowshoeing.
Reasonable proficiency on skis,
even using the most modern equipment
and teaching techniques, requires a
minimum of two weeks' intensive
:1 .
... l'--J
training, followed by continued
habitual use of skis for all field
_, training activities during
Forces stationed in areas
,ready access to snow-covered terrain
i for at least four months each year
, cannot expect to gain and maintain a
: viable skiing capability. Attempts to
prepare units for winter exercises by
conducting "crash" courses in skiing
have proven themselves largely a
wa;;te of time. These units are better off
settling for the mobility limitations of
Mobility disadvantages of forces on
snowshoe;; oppo;;ing ski troops can be
partially overcome with an air assault
capability. Theoretically, the best way
to maneuver in deep snow is to fly over
it. Air assault exercises conducted in
Alaska during the past six years have
proven that the helicopter provides
very effective winter troop transport
even in extreme cold. Air assault
troops on snowshoes are at least as
effective as ski troops so long as
helicopters are able to fly and can
place troops fairly close to objectives.
The primary disadvantage of
relying on the helicopter for battlefield
mobility is weather. During early
winter months in Alm;ka, for example,
flyable weather occurs during ap-
65 percent of the time.
Even a'ccou'nting for increased flying
risk factors durin-g combat,
vulnerability to ski-b'orne attack may
be present during a significant period'
of time. For that reason, Alaskan in-
fantry units have not abandoned ski
proficiency despite a strong air assault
If we accept the realities cif the most
probable areas for future conflict, the
capabilities of potential enemies and
the kind of war we can expect to have
to fight, we also should accept the fact
that major battles may well be fought
during the winter in an environment
whi(ch will have a tendency to
neutralize our mechanized mobility
capability. We cannot expect to ignore
that environment and "muddle
through somehow" as' we have
managed to do in past wars,
We need to train our units for winter
warfare. Training needs to be more
comprehensive than periodic exposure
to large-scale allows. Large
exercises provide a high-level ap-
preciation for winter difficulties, but
allow very little opportunity for small
units to develop solutions to those
problems. The first battle of the -'come
as you are war" had better find us
prepared to fight it hip d'e.ep in snow. ""k
LlI'UtCllClllt LRlone! Rlchard A DIxon lb com
mand,'r of th .. US Army Combat Developments
ActIVit' (Alaska), Fort RIchardson, Alaska
Oth('r held Within the actwlly have
been m, dllef of matCrll'l d('[t'iopmt'llt and as
chief of doctrme and or!:amzatum. He has par-
tiCIpated In many tramUlI: exerCIse!! in Alaska
and Canada and m a NATO l'Xl'rClSC in
Nortlll'rn Nort('ay. He 'received a B S. { the
llnll'I'nlt" of Wl1 ... hl11,l!ton and an M .:1-1.A.S. from
till' (l811('(;8C.
I .

In Rhodesia
Captain James K. Jr., US Army Reserve
The Rhodesian army h seen called the world's finest
counterinsurgency force. Th ruthor had occasion to visit
Rhodesia and study its mili structure, training and
tactics. His opinion is that hodesia has the necessary
manpower to counter the insur ncy, but a shortage of funds
limits the expansion of the training base and other
programs. This article was witten in the fall of
Portions of the article may hav been overtaken by events
suah as the change in 'gol'ern ,nts on,3i December 1978,
but, on the whole, this pieee rep <'lents one man's opinion of
what is happening in Rhodesia today,
HE Rhodesian army has, been
called the world's finest counterin-
surgency force. Although branded as
an outlaw nation and constricted by
United Nationsimposed trade sanc-
tions. the Rhodesians have responded
to the threat of a Marxist-directed
terrorist war with determined
resiliency and astounding ingenuity.
This nation's eclectic applications
of the principles of war are embedded
in the training system and reflected in
tactical operatIOns. Rhodesia's im-
provisations include the use of a h o r s ~
mounted infantry unit, the deployment
of austere bush wise, longrange
tracking teams, insertions of quick-
reaction forces in operational jumps,
protected movement afforded by
hideous looking, mine protected ar-
mored vehicle::; and an assortment of
locally manufactured weapons.
Rhodesia's counterinsurgency doc
trine has' been influenced specifIcally
by the army's experience as part of the
British I Commonwealth forces in
Malaya and, in general, by the study of
revolutionary movements in Africa.
This doctrine can be hroken down into
six points:
Popular support or fighting a war
for people, not for terrain. This i's
sought through the maintenance of
government services administered hy
the Internal Affairs branch.
Protection of the populace from
terrorist harassment through the es-
: tablishment of protected villages
guarded by special guard troops.
Predominant reliance on local
police intelligence and operations as
the means of maintaining civil order.
Coordination of combined
operations between civilian alld
. military services at district and
provincial-level Joint. Operations'
Centers (JOCs).
Continuous small unit tactical
operations using observation posts,
patrolling, ambushes and tracking con-
ducted by highly mobile forces who
spend extended periods in the bush .
Surprise cross border raids on
terrorist. training camps within their
,;anctuary areas of Zambia and
Most significant in instilling the'
tactical applications deriv\,d from the
doctrine is the Rhodesian training
system. This system generates a
steady flow of officers, noncom-
missioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers
into the force structure while con-
tinually advancing. their profes&ional
development. A proficient leadership
cadre is seen as an essential re-
quirement in any counterinsurgency
Critics who see the Rhodesian war
as a racial struggle are often surprised
upon discovering that three-quarters of
the Security Forces are African, with
blacks and whites fighting side by.
side, and that most businesses,
restaurants, hotels, discotheques and
the national university are multiracial
as well.' .
The majority of Rhodesia's African
population of six to seven million are
farmers and craftsmen living in the
Tribal Trust Lands. The towns and
cItIes support a growing. African
middle class.
This group and the 265,000 Eu-
ropeans, who have held key positions
in the government, in the military and
police units and in the commercial
sector, have the capability of providing
the social and political leadership
needed to administer the country .
from tribes-
men In the
In March 1978, Prime Ian
Smith, rppresenting the strongest par-
ty of the European population" the
Rhodesian Front Party, concluded a
settlement with three of the moderate
African nationaliRt leaders. These are
Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, the
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and
Senator Chief Jeremiah Chirau who,
'With Prime Minister Smitn, form the
provisional Executive Council. An in-
terim government filled by both.
African and European officials is
preparing for nations,l elections
scheduled in December. On 31
December 1978, power will be'
transferred to a black parliamentary
majority government. Rhodesia then
will officially become Zimbabwe (5he
traditional African name),
Opposed to the evolvement of such
- moderate leadership with concomitant
'support of the wHites, the Marxist-
directed Patriotic Front (PF), under'the
doctrines of revolutionary warfare, has
been .conducting a campaign of
terrorism and s\lbversion to gain
within Rhodesia. Recent'
targets of the terrorists have been the
moderate blaek party leaders and their
The importance of Rhodesia to the
West is both moral and strategic.
Morally, the realization of a mul
tiracial government based on British
parliamentary procedure and English
common law, and committed to a
liheral capitalist society, can serve as a
needed model of stability and growth
on a continent suffering from a
shortage of democracies and an'excess
of repressive one-party states ad-
ministering stagnant economies:'
Strategically, Rhodesia is a
minerally rich area contiguous to an
even richer area, It is a leading
'supplier of asbestos, beryllium,
chromium, copper, lithium, magnesium
. and nickel. It is a dagger pointed at the
Republic of South Africa,. with its
strategic geographic sigmfieanel" as
well as its resources of platinum,
chrome ore, gold, diamonds. uranium
and copper. Furthermore. both coun-
triet, have vast food potential.
Rhodl'sia has become the prime
target within the Soviet
strateg.v of "liberating" Southern
Africa through the use of surrogate
forces-namely, jndigenom; terrorist
organizations such as the Patnotic
Front and the SouthWest Africa
Peoplr's Organization, trained und
supported by advisers und technicians
from Sovirt bloc nations and Culm.'
Intelhgl'nce r<'ports link the plunning
and orchl'stratioll for the Patriotic
Front to an African veteran and top
KGB (Committee of State Seeunty)
mun, Sovil't Ambassudor Solodnov
nikov, who i8 stationed in Lusaka,
Zambia ..
Rhode"in was found,'d in 11'90 as a
Britisb hy a minerals magnate,
Cecd Rhodes. It was ndministered un-
dpr a Royal Cbarter granted to the
BritIsh South Afnca Company.
This early period saw longstanding
hostility erupt into war between the
warlike Mata!>rlr and the mon'
peacpful Mashona tribal groups,
followed by a rebellion of the
Matal",l"s and then the Mashonas
again"t the whitr settlers. Upon com
pletion of ppace negotiatIOns between
thl' seulers and the tribesmen, the
admll1istrative and ecollol'c foun
dations wen' established for the
development of modern-day hodesia.
When the Roval Charter elXpired in
192:l, Rhode'sia became a self
governing colony of Great Britain. In
both world wars, Rhodesia contributed
its share of men, both black and white,
to the imperial British forces."
During the 1960s, Britain began
granting independence one. by one to
its former African colonies,. After a
complicated dispute WIth the London
government on the constitutional
question ahout the speed toward black
majority rull2,. Rhodesia, under Prime
Mmiste)' Ian Smith, proclaimed its
Unilateral \)eciarfition of In-
dependence (UDI) on II November
Britain retaliated with a trade em-
bargo, and, in 19GH, it persuaded the
United Nations to impose mandatory
e('onomie sanetions to bring an end to
thp "rebellion" against the Crown.'
Subsequent talks between British and
RhodeSIan representatives to resolve'
the mattl'r haw' bepn unsuccessful.
Origins of' the current terrorist
organization go back to legal African
nationalist in the 19PiOs.
CIvil disturhanee;; by militant
of some African nationalist
parties broke out in several African
townships in 1961. Because of political
VIOlence, two partips, the ZImbabwe
African People's Union ,ZAPU) and
the 21mbahwe African National Union
(ZANU), were banned, their leaders
arrested and their remnants scattered
in in neighboring countries.
During this period, ZANU and
ZAPU eadrl2 hegan to receive military
and political training in 113nzania
from the Chinese.' Small teams con-
ducted incursions into the northeast
from Mozambique and the northwest
from Zambia from 196G to 1972.
, The terrorists. in groups of six to 10
men, attacked mainly farmhouses, ab-
ducted black workers, ambushed lone
vehicles or planted mines. Rhodesian
Security Forces encountered little dif
fkulty in tracking down and killing or
capturing most of these terrorists.
As a briefing officer of the Com-
biill'O Operations' in
S'ahshury descnbed the situation:
From UJ70 ()lllcards ZAPU played
'11" part III tllfJ terronst Icar. They u"r('
III a state of' dl,array fol/o(('illg llzeir
dI'Clsil'" ddeats It'itlllll Rhodesia, and
thl'Y fool! Ihl' opportulllty ()( COil
sohdatlll" Ih"lr poSltWII hy s(,lldillR
thl'lr t.:rronsts. O(ltSU/C thi' (,Olllltry, Oil
l'.ttl'lIdl'd "ours,'s to RUSSia. {uha. alld
North Korl'a. TII/s sltuatwlI as n'"ards
ZAP(l culltillul'd ulltll 1976. ZANU
took tlillC out to 1'1" tIll 11 I< Ihe tacllcal
that thl'v had Icamt. At thzs
tzml'. /Z'" sail' Chmese COIll'
most Si"lIIl
lcallt dl'c'l'lopml'llt Icas that I
ZANU lea lit tIll' lessolls of Mao Ts("
TUIIM, lIall dy, that It Ica" pOllltil'SS to
ope'rail' 11/: remot., arcas (('itl/IJut thc
support of fhl' lo('al populatioll."
Howevpr, Z/\NU g-uerrilla attacks
intensifieo toward the pnd' of A
coup in Lisbon, Portug-al. in /\prii I Hl4,
broug-ht about a chang-e for thp better
for the Z/\NU. The new Portug-upsp
g-overnment negotiatpd with thp
Marxist guerrilla movement in Mozam
bique (FRf;LIM(). (Mozambique
LiberatIOn Front)) to ,give in-
dependence to its former colony. The
FRELIMO not only gave complete
sanctuary to the Rhodesian tprrorists
and permitted establishment of
trmmng camps, but also placed
vehicles, railways and ships at tneir
Rhodesia, which is abo.\lt the si'ze of
California, now faced what was to
b!;come a fourfront war: ZANU incur-
sions in the northeast and eastern
highlands from Mozambique, terrorist
attacks in the northwest by the ZAPU
and limited terrorism and recruiting
mainly by, the ZAPlJ along the
western border with Botswana. Only
22:> miles of border: that with South
/\frica, remained' that could be called
friendly toward Rhodesia.
The ZANU, under the titular
leadership of Robert Mugabe, a
declared M",rxist, allied itself in 1976
with the ZAPU faction under Joshua
Nkomo to form the Patriotic Front.
-" Chinese ad"isory and logistical
;;upport appears to have been
withdrawn from Mozambique camps, if
"'\ not from Tanzania . .soviet, Cuban and,
"reportedly. East .German support
ZANU camps are based in
Mo ambique, while the ZAPU con-
tinu(',' to operate out of Zambia and
,somettmeH Botswana.
The Patnotrc Front IS a marriage of
conveniencl'. Thp Z/\PU derives most
of its support from the Matabele tribal
groups 111 the west, the ZANU frum the
Mashona groups 111 the east. Both
factions ,are wracked with internecinE'
p.';..'er struggles.
At the time of this writing, the.
Z/\ PC iH trying to expand its influence
to tbe east'. and thp ZANU is pushing
to thp west. /\rmed clashes between the
two organi7ations have been
reported. 1-'
Both terrorist leaders thus far have
declined invitfltion to participate in the
Decem ber elections. Nkomo and
Mugabe are not interested in -power-
sharing nor in black majority nile in
and 'of itHl'If. \put, rather, in 10tal power
with which to 'affect the revolutionary
transformatIOn of society under their
aegis. In free elections, many doubt
whether Nk'omo and Mugabe together
could win 15 percent of the vote, hence
the resort to gunbarrel politics. -
Should international pressures
cause the current governmental'
structure of white and moderate black
admimstration to collapse and the
Patriotic Front to assume power, the
underlying tribal animosities could
easily trigger the bloodiest con-
flagration in Africa since the Nigerian
Civil War.
The PF strategy is to undermine
government control over the pop-
ulation in three ways. First is dis-
ruption of internal administration and
governmpntal services. In the vast
Tribal Trust Lands and African
townships, health clinics, medical
stations, local council offices, cattle
dips and schools, as well as mis-
sionaries, have been prime targets. I I
Governmpnt spokesmpn acknowledge
that while no part of Rhodesia has
been given up, there are areas where
the government has difficulty main
taining its prespnce.
The second part of PF strategy is
complete intimidation of thp populace
through thp use of murder, mayhem
and savagp barbarism. The terrorists
seek to hide among the prople to
recruit support and to r:esupply
themselves. They attempt to neutralize
government intelligence and anti-PF
sentiment. The terrorist strikes,
therefore, focus on "soft" civilian
targets. One objective is to break down
the traditional tribal authority, with its
implied replacement, ultimately by
some new form of social organization.
The other objective is to demonstrate
government inability to provide
While insurgent attacks on white
civilian establishments, including In-
ternational Red Cross teams, mis
siqnaries and commercial airliners,
receive most of the attention in the
world press, around 90 percent of the
terrorist victims are black.
Reports document mass killings of
African workers, abduction of school
children, incidents of enforced can-
nibalism, the public torture and ex-
ecution of village headmen and others
randomly selected as "sellouts to the
Smith regime," mining of civilian road
traffic and urban terrorism. While an
overwhelming majority of ,Africans
resent tprrorist intrusions, many
remain cowed by the terrorist threat.
The third part of PF strategy is to
render the entire counterinsurgency
effort of government cost-ineffective.
Attaeks on farmers have caused ap-
proximately 10 percent to abandon
their farms.
Distribution serVices, affecting the
sales volume of many manufacturlnR
lIldustries, hal'e been severely curtailed
as a r e ~ u l t of guerrilla activity ....
DISfrlhu.(;/On MIS collapsed eompletely
in much of the former sales area,
causin;< a sel'ere cutback in turnouer
and profit margins."
The decline in farming and com-
mercial activity has reduced the
government tax base, while the cost of
fueling the military machine is in-
creasing. The war effort, along with
the economic sanctions, is costing
Rhodesia over one million dollars a
The war against soft civilian
targets has mobilized Rhodesia into an
armed camp. Security alarm fences
guafd farmhouses, police convoys
protect vehicular movement in the
countryside, women become adept at
handling pistols and Uzi sub-
machineguns and many camouflage-
u.niformed soldiers remain armed while
ih the otherwise normal-looking cities
of Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali.
Most men of the European 'population
from 18 to 50 are subject to varying
lengths. of military or police com-
RAR soldiers on patrol.
The SeeurIty Forces l'onducting the
counterinsnrgency Inl'ludp roughly
40,000 persons in the air force, the
poliee and the army, whose total
strength that of a full
division. Thp army is composed of
regulnr units and Territorial Army
The backbonf' of the counterin-
surgpncy effort is represented by bat-
talions . from two regulflr infantry
regiments: the Rhodesian Light In-
fantry (RLI) and the Rhodesian
African Rlf1es (RAR). The entire RLI
and most of the RAR are airborne
qualified. Most European regulars-
volunteers with cqntracts of three
years "'or .more-are assigned to the
RLl. Most African regulars are posted'
to the RAR, Rhodesia's senio'r
The 1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light
Infantry, is organized along com-
mando lines. It consists of three
company-size units called "Comman-
dos" and a support group with mortar,
reconnaissance and tracking detach-
ments. Trairied to operate either as
small teams, as separate comman-
dos or as an integral battalion, the RLI
has the general mission of following up
suspected terrorist presence or of
backing up other troops in contact.
Volunteers for the;'.RLI receiveJ,heir
16 weeks of recruit training the
regiment and undergo continuous unit
training within their respective Com-
mando. Normally, RLf units spend a
month to six weeks in the bush and 20 I
days in their 'camp south of . ,
for ret and retraining.
By lmj! standard, the Rhodesian
African Rifles is an elite unit. As there
are on a weekly basis far more African
volunteers than positions to fill, the
RAR recruits are hand-picked. Six
months of basic training- at the depot
RAR in Balla Hana cover both conven
tional and counterinsurg-ency'tactics
intensively and extensively. The newly
trained soldiers are assig-ned to sub-
units the reg-iment.
A rigid selection system in the RAR
produces candidates for junior and
sl'nior NCO training- courses. Officer
candidates are likewise selected from
among the N'cOs. RAR units are
farmed out to 'the operational com-
mands for security missions, for seek-
anddestroy operations or for areawide
reaction force contingencies.
The Territorial Army corresponds to
the' US' National Guard ot Army
Reserves. It is filled by national servo
icemen who, as opposed to regulars,
enter the army with an ISmonth ini-
tial commitment, followed by periodic
callups thereafter.
Following four and a half months of
basic training at Llewellin 'Barracks,
the majority of these men are assigned
to one of the battalions of the
Rhodesian Regiment (RR) or to
dependent companies where they serve
their mitial tour. Some are selected to
servl' in a specialist unit or a Service
Corps unit. COll\pleting their ISmonth
requirement, the territorials are then
assigned to a reserve RR battalion at a
center near their homes where they
train and serve during their callups.
The constant retraining and the
maintenance of unit integrity results in
a high experience level for the
Territorial Army. The RR battalions
now assume as active a combat role as
do the regular battalions.
Specialist units, those with unique
combat specialties, include the
Rhodesian Armored Corps (RAC), the
Artillery Regiment, the Grey's Scouts,
the Selous Scouts and the Special Air
Service (SAS). Formerly known as the
Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment, the
RAC fulfills an armored cavalry
mission. It possesses. antitank
capability and usually functions with
its suhelements assigned to operational
commands for task organization. The
corps represents a unit approximately
regimental size along with an armored
car trammg center. Armored car
operational techniques are influenced
hy llS, British, German and South
African doctrine and experience.
Officers, NCOs and soldiers of the
RAC all have had infantry training,
followed by armored car training in the
'corps depot. Drivers, gunners and
vehicle commanders are cross-trained
in others' skills and m vehicle
maintenance as well.
.Particulars ahout most of the ar
'mored vehicles are classified.
Generally, their design protects the
occupants from mine blasts which
damage little more than the tire.
As with the armored troops, the
gunners of the 1st Field Regiment
Rhodesian ArtillPry are trained first as
infantry. Using SSmm gun howitzers
and heavier pieces (which are
classified), the batteries are oriented to
both the conventional and counterin-
surgency requirements.
The Grey's Scouts are a mounted
infantry unit about battalion -size that
specializes in tracking and
Then' are few places in
highvcld and lowveld _ that horses
cannot go, and horses are more silent
than army lorries 'or land rovers.
1;he Grey's are deployed in the
operational areas by squadron. A
Selous Scouts tracking
squadron (roughly equivalent to a
company) is made up of three troops
(roughly equivalent to platoons), each
with four eight-man sections. The
Grey's Scouts consist of three "saber"
(c;ombat) squadrons and a support
squadron containing a. 60mm and
81mm mortar section, a recon-
naissance troop and.a tracking dog
troop using mostly English foxhounds.
With b ~ t t e r visibility and {aster
mobility, an eight-man section can
cover the same ground as a foot-bound
infantry battalion. This section,
working in two teams of four, can
advance on a 550-meter front.
'Sometimes when closing in on fleeing
terrorists, the Grey's radio for
heliborne reinforcement of a "fire
force" for mopping up operations.
Most soldiers in Grey's Scouts are
selected from recruits who undergo
basic training with the RLI. They then
receive 16 additional weeks oftraining,
including . horsemanship, with the
Grey's at Inkomo Barracks, north of
The Selous Scouts hf),ve become
legendary during their short ex-
iistence.'K They basically area 300-man
tracking unit, about half African, half
European, who can travel and survive
in the bush for extended periods on
limited rations. The Selous generally
work from friendly lines forward. In
pursuit of terrorists, they also radio for
reinforcement, if required.
Their selection course is rough.
Every eight up to 400 trained
soldiers may he screened to select
about 100 candidates for the arduous
truining course. Of these, only one-
sixth will complete a four-week en-
durance and survival course, with con-
stant deprivation of food and sleep.
Once in the unit. the men are prepared
literally to follow terrorist spoor for
-weeks on end in all types of Rhodesian
terrain while living off the land.
The mission of the Special Air
is longMrange reconnaissance',
generally far in front of and working
hack toward friendly positions. Tht'
SAS has an additional role as a quick-
reaction forct' and the capahility for
dirpct-action missions such as cross-
border operations,
Modt'ipd upon the British SAS, the
men of this unit t'xperience the most
di',prsified trainiRg of men in any of
tht' unit",. Initially, this includes static-
line parachutIng. Ijght and heavy
weapon trmning, hushcraft. first aid.
communications, watermanship
(handling canoes and boats) and minor
SAS tactics_ Succpssful compll'tion of
thp above just gt'ts the voluntper into
the unit!
I<\om this point on, he has to un-
dergo a sl'ries of specialist courses in
such subjects as advanced medical
work, demolitions, free-fall
parachuting, tracking, aqua-lung
diving and a course in indigenous
language. SAS training can take up to
three years.
Combat support and combat service
support is provided by supporting serv-
ices, These include the Service Corps,
the Medical Corps. the Military Policl',
the Pay Corps, the Rhodl'sian Women's
Servic,,, the Engineers and thl' Signal
While the army provides the
preponderance of forces in most of the
operational. areas, the Rhodesians see
their stage-one level' of counterin-
surgency as essentially a police
operation-and correctly so. The
terrorists are not trpate(\ as a true
guerrilla organization, subject to the
Geneva Convention, but. as criminal
lawbreakers. Evidence concerning in-
cidents,is accumulatod, presented in
court 'within established legal
procedurp and the dpfendants
sentenced accordingly.
The British South Africa Police
havp both a regular police role and a
paramilitary function. The Support
Units arc predominantly African
regular:; with both polIce investigative
and hush warfare training. Nicknamed
"the' Blackboots," they operatt'
nationwide. Tl1P Police Antitl'lTorist
Units arC' predommantly European
reSl'rvlsts who operate on callup within
their own local PH.
Thp command and control of
ollPrations art' from the Com-
bint'd Operations Headquarters in
Salisbur.v under one' commander to
four major JOCs, each of which incor-
poratps an army brigadp headquartprs
and controls a major operational
area.'; Under each major JOe are
sevpral "mini-JOe"," corresponding
with districts.
A ,JOe is a combined operating
('enter containing rppresentatives of
the army, the air force, the poli('e and
Internal Aff'lirs, Sometimes present
are the Special Bninch personnel, the
government's intelligC'n('e service, The
army commandpr is the senior com-
mander of the ,JOC. The variou!o'
ell'mpnts of the Seeurity
assigned to ea('h Olwrational comm<ind
an' task'organizC'd for that arpa's re-
Thn'" 01 tIll' mHJor JOCs eHc'h con
troIs a quickrl'adion forl'l' enllNj a
"fin' fonp." ])pscrillld by om' offic!'r as
"OUI' l",,;t killing machinl'," thl' fin'
. forc,' ll'olllpnSIng n'glllm' ill' Territorial
A rIll \. Ilmts I I" ,urdl'opPl'd and or air-
I.lnd"d h.v 11l'1}('t'pll'r to i'einf!ll'cl'
fon,ard units In "ontact and to pursue,
hlol'!, ;Inri "10';,, WIth L"ITori"t forces.
TIlt' gtl\l'rnlll"nt h.}. ... count('rl'd the
gLll'l'rilb pn'"l'lll''' hy till' ""tahhshn1l'nt
tit prtlll,t"d \ lllagd.. wlthm tlll'
If 1"('Il'd .lrl',IM. TIlt' vlllagtr,., rl'main in
th,s, I,n,"dm cOlllpll'x,'''' undl'r a
du,.,kttldawn "Ul'i'!'W TIll' vdlag"c an'
jll'<>t,,ttd .1 (;uard Fort''' ullit and
,Idllllm"t,nd InLPrnal Aff'lirs ad

\\'hl'l(, tl'l'l"Ilrt:-..t pn.':--l'IH'l' Ill' i.\Vl'IlUl';-;
til' <lpl"'o'Il'l1 nr" known, poll,'" ())'
conduct l'xtt.'nsivp
pntndilng ;lnd nmf>us!w". Attelltion IS
dm,t"d to"ard th" jlojluLlt"d nn'as
w!ll'n' t'ITori,.,t IncHI"nt,; 'In' frl'qul'nt.
V('l'\' It'w fire' fights dl'v"lop that an' of
tilt' or durntion that l':-I
!lOtiI'''' l'IH tlunt,nd in Vll'tn.lm, Thi,; is
h', .. lu,.,, till' t,!'!'or],.,t", wlltl IIsuallv
tlpl'rat, in It I to s!ll'ks at th-"
mo,.,!. ttl .lvtJld (,.,ntal'l WIth th('
:-I"curitv Fon'l''' or, fading ('hat,
11,, aftl'r a hrid skirmish. On the
wholl', th, PatriotIc Fl'<lnt"s "In"dom
igh!,r ..... an' ctlnsldl'rl'd nl'ithl'r n ",<,11
tram,d nor a wtll(ilsciplinld military
{o 'l' ..
T 1.,': Hhodl'sJan militar,v tnl1mng
systPI has lhn'" distll1l't fl'atun's sup
portll1g 'ontinuous l'volv('ml'nt of dol"
trilll' anII tactical applicHti,;n First is
that till' thn'" major ,.,eh""d.,; arlO staffl'd
hy oftk 'rs and NCO" who mtate to
instrul'ttll' posltlOn,; from their
.nsjlldlll" IHlrl'nt regiments. Between
training ('yd"s, thpsp instructtH's visit
till' "pt)1'Htional units, Thus. vital
feedback channels between the combat
rt'alities at the "Sharp End" and thE
presentation m the classroom are
The s('('ond feature is the wealth of
l'xpL'riencti' represented by the in-
struetor cadre thems<'lves. The in-
structors' ba('kgrounds reflect their
div('rse pxperience denved from their
pan'nt units bke the RLI. the RAR, the
SA:-I and the Selous Scouts. hence' a
gn'at amount of cross-fertilization of
idl'as .
TIll' third fL'ature is the emphasis in
thL' sehools given to producing NCO
eadn. Trained as instructors
in ,;ppl'lfi-c disciplines, thJse men
to their units to hplp the high
I"vel of hasic or of continuation
(''<lining within the units.
Thp thl'l'e majOr Hchools the
:-Iehool ot Infantry at (;welo, the Depot
HH at Llewellin Barracks near
Hulawayo and /)ppot RAR in Balla
TIll' :-Ichool of Infantry is organized
mto thn'e training wings: the tactical,
tlw cadN and the regimental wing. The
t.lltical wing conducts courses in tac-
tics and operations from junior NCO
fl'wl up t" battalion' brigadp level for'
captains and majors." The cadet wing
"ffl'r,; training for both European ahd
Afriea11 officer candidates who have
h(,L'11 selecit'd by a board. Aside from
di]'('ct aiJpointment, this school is the
only ,,,,,utTe of army commission, The
regimental wing instructs NCOs in
drill and in and has one
wpapons COurSl' for junl0r officers,
The school holds that men can
aetually gl't rusty in the bush with
rpgard . to weapons' handling and
. training, and require formal'
retraining. With only 3U officers and 45
NCO,.;, the School of Infantry is ex-
peded to train up to 3,000 students in
National servicemen undergo four
and a half months of basic training at
Llewellin Barracks. Those selected by
a board the first week can go directly.
into officer cadet or NCO cadet
training. African regular recruits
receive six, months of basic pt the
Depot RAR, Balla Balla, where junior
leader courses also are taught for
privates and corporals to advance.
Rhodesian military training places
emphasis in four areas:
drill, physical and mental con-
ditioning, marksmanship and
immediateaction techniques in con-
ventional and counterinsurgency
Grey"s Scouts
In the British tradition, the
Rhodesians see "square-bashing," or
drill, as the foundation for discipline,
esprit and leadership. The results from
the parade field can be seen in the
sharp appearance and impeccable
military etiquette reflected throughout
the army. .
The training for recruits and for
officer and NCO cadets is rigorolls
physically and mentally. A number of
foreign. volunteers in the Rhodesian
army, inc! uding sOIJle American
Vietnam veterans, have failed to com-
plete their initial training course
successfully or have eventually "taken
the gap" (deserted). Night-long land
navigation. exercises, 15 to 20-kilometer
forced marches over difficult terrain in
full l'omhat kit and negotiation of an
of 12 or so obstacles,
wlwre live fire, and sil'I\ulators
add verisimilitude, servp to toughen
ant! to l'onfidpncp.
On the ritk range, each recruit fires
1'1 III to 1,IlOIl rounds to perfect his
The FN
"Inl' th" infantryman's
Sl'C'lI1g clasHica1. conventional war
as tlll'ir longtl'rm threat, the,
WlO(jpsians Hpl'nd 7() perl'ent of thplr
trHlI1l11g timp on l'unventional tactics.
pprc('nt goes to counlPrin-
"urgc'IH',Y tactic's Counterinsurgency
trall1l11g lIlc!uch'", study of terrorist
1,!('li,'s, patrolling, ambush, vehicular
1l1I)Vl'111l'nt in Hn operational nrea.
org:ll1ll.:ltion oj' patl'lll hases, cordon
:Inc! sparch opc'ratHlns, attack on
t(,IT,)\'I,,1 ","I1P';, and muunted and dis
Ill,,"nll'c! ('"unteramhush' techniques.
FIPlc! I rai I1Ing and "tactical
,'x,'n'ls;'" Without twops" both
('on\ ,'nllon,d and counterinsurgency
l!'('hni''1ul''' within a realistic Hcpnario.
Hlw<l""i:l's is a performance-
on,'nlt'd assess of-
fi"l'r .11](1 ;-.I( '() p('rformapcl' in the
s!'fwols to j'('comnwnd thpir
'lsslgnlll('nts to troop iead('rHhip or to
,,,llllinistrativ(' positionH. One may opt
to ""'1'\'(' indl'f'lIlltply 111 one capacity,
lII:1int'"l11ng his prl'Hent rank, or to
,;dv1In'c,' to a different position fur
wllIch h(' is qualified. In
army, retention of and
I'xlwri('ncl' at levpls of ad-
ministration and command
prl'fl'rahll' to thl' "up-or-out" syndiome'
known to uther armies. Howpvcr, a
. qualified, motivatpd trooper, African or
Eurnpean, can rise to NCO rank or to
,'ommi;;siolll'd rank in a relatively'
, short timC'.
To maintain the link between the
people and the government, an in-
creasingly large cadre of ad-
ministrators, advisers, policemen,
technicians, health workers and
teachers are needed.
Rhodesia's counterinsurgency effort
is definitely hampered not by any
manpower shortage, but by shortage of
funds required to expand training
facilities and programs, The survival
of Rhodesia ;as a free, multiracial
society hinges on this economic factor
rather than on the fighting ability of
the Security Forpes. A strained
<'('onomy with a decreasing growth rate
curtails the expansion of such
If Western nations began lifting
to establish trade and
domestic, investment resumed its
former levp1. this broadened base of
tradp and commercial activity would
enable the government to expand its'
Intl'rnal Affairs activities. Undpr thpse
favorable conditions, the insurgency
could be overcome within 10 ito 18
Many have erroneously counted the
survival of Khodpsia's present form of
government in just a matter of months:
first, nfter the UDr in 196fi, after im-
of UN sanctions in 1968 and
again after the collapse in
Mozambique in 1974, Not considered
was a homogeneous European
by a sizable segment of the
African population, that was willing to
tax itself to the limit and to conscript
almost its entire manpower, Also not
considered is the most important factor
of all in international politics-the
sheer force of will-which Rhodesians
have aptly demonstrated over the last
14 years,
1 In Rhodesian parlance l/1e term Atncan refers to the
indigenous black popuiallon The term European reters to the
wtllle!> regardles!> 01 natlollal ongln 01 length of family duration ,n
the country
') The terms 'terronst gueHllla and Insurgent arp
Interchangeabl'!' In the RhodeSian context t;1lven the brutal attacks
on to break down law and order the term terrOrist IS not
3 Some ,Of the Atncan state!> most VOCIferouS In their call lor one
man aile vote black maJor I!,!, rule for RhodeSia are tho!>e ruled b,!,
their armies and tho'i' w'lh pres, dents lor hie
4 The border alea betwpen Argola and South West Africa Which
IS admmrstered bv the RepubliC at Snuth Africa IS the scene of
another rnsurgen,,!, South AfTican forces and South West AtTIca
People s Organization (SWAPOI terronsts baSed III AngOla are lOcked
In conflrct over contrOl of the OvambO tflbal area See AI J Venter"
South Afnca vs SWAPO Terronsts So/(1Ier at Fortune November
5 COunt Hans Hu,!,n RhodeSIa and Southern Africa DeCISion tor
the Future of the Free World Jou!naf of ImeTnallona' RelatIons
Volume III Spnng 1918 p 63
6 Among these was a farmer named Ian Smith who flew on the
Rh9des,an Squadron of Ihe Ro,!,al A" r orce dunng World War 11 On
occaSion hiS Sp,t/lfe was Shot down behind German hnes In
Ital'!' He lived for a time ""ltIl Italran parhSans then evaded through
German POSitIons to the Amellcan Iones
7 I=or an account of the event'i leading up to the UOilateral
Declaration of Independel'lce Irom the 8rrtlsh see Robert
81ake A H,s/oIY of RI10desia Alfred A Knopf Inc N'f 1978
8 The sanct,nns had the reverse e"etl of compelling the
Rhodec"ans to develop local mdus,y 10 manufacture what had been
Imported From 1968 to 1976 the economrC InfrastflJcture
'itlengthened minerals. and food were and the economy
c.ontlnued to e><.pand
9 Lieutenant Colonel R E H LOCkl!',!, A 8f1el OperatIonal H,stO!y
01 the Cam{)algn If) RhOdeSIa COllerlllg the PerIod 1964 1918 a
bnehng paper ongrnall,!, drafted In November 1977 and reVised
10 Ibid
11 In more precrse termlnologV the lANU (ZImbabwe African
Natronal UnIOn) alld the lAPU tZ,mbab>.ye Afrrcall People s Union)
refel to pohtlcal parties The ZANU calls. Its guernllas rhe lANLA

Army) Rhodesrans regard Nkomo"s ZlPRA although 1he less active of
the two groups to be better trained
12 GodWin Matatu ltmbabwe A Journey Wuhout Maps Alflca
Ma.,. 1978 'P 11
13 WI\h 903 SChOOlS destro'!'ed around 218 000 African children
have bepn deprived of education and 4900 teachers lett un
emplo'!'ed Cattle are d,!,lIlg b'!' the hundreds due to t!IITunlshlng
vetellnarv services See John Maynard The Forces of Wat and
D,Sorder Illustrated Llle RhodesI8 3 August 1978 P 8
14 IbId
15 Named after CapTain Gporge Gre,!, who organized a mounted
,nlantr.,. unit dUfing the 1896 Matabele upnSIng
16 Named after F C 19th cenrUf,!, scout and hunter
17 These operational areas are named Tangent under 1st Sngade
(the west and northwest! HUrTIcane under 2d Bngade {the
northeast! Thrasher under 3d Bllgade Uhe eastern hlgtJlands) and
Repulse under 4th Bngade (the southeaSt) There are also two
millroperational areas Grapple (the m1dlands) and Splinter flake
t 8 These courses ale the JunIor NCO tactical COurse the tactical
Inc,lru(1or s (our'Se 10f NCOs the sen,or NCO tactical COurse the
combat team COurse tor tralnlllg ofhcers to run a com pan,!, w,th a
baCkground In battahon functions the JOint services countenn
surgenc,!, course on JOint Operations Ce ... ter operatlons tor arm\, air
forre polrce and Internal Affairs personnel the temtonal compan,!,
commander and platoon leader COurse and the battle group com
mander COurse lor .captall"ls and malOrS coverlllg battalion
operatlon'i With a bac.kground III brigade operations
. Captam James K Bruton Jr'
US Army
Resen.'er IS a sales representatwe for HIltz Inc.
U(' recellNd a B A from WashIngton and Lee
Unll.'crslty. a fr1aster of Internatwnal
Management degree from the Amencan
Graduate School, and is a USACGSC
/:!raduate. He has served In Korea, VIetnam
and Thailand and In the OffIce of the Deputy
ChIef of Staff for OperatIOns, Readmess and
intelligence, Headquarters, Us.. Army
Trammg and Doctrme Command He IS
currently mohllLZatlOn deSIgnee to the 3d
Rafta/LOn. 12th Speczu/ Forces Group,
Military Review Binders, Keep your back issues of the MIlitary ReVIew
In a stU(dy, hard-covered binder. Available In marool'! With gold
lettering, the binders hold 12 Issues and are only $5.50 postpaid. Orders
should be sent to Military ReView, US Army Command lind General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
An Olfl
YEAR AGO, when I accepted General Thurman's kind invitation to address
, your graduating cljlss, I did not realize that it was ,to be my last major
presentation before retiring from active duty. But, since it is, there are several things
I want to pass on to you .
. Now, I know that I entered West Point as a cadet in 1935 before most of you were
born, and I graduated from LeaveiIworth in 1948 about the time you were in
kindergarten. You may well wonder what I could possibly have that could be of
value to you. If you do have such thoughts, you would be one with the majority of
Americans who are convinced that anything in ,the past is ancient history with no
relevance to the present or to the future.
This article IS adapted from an address made by General Kerwin on 9 June 1978 at the USACGSC graduation
Prior to his retirement after almost 40 years of military
service, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Walter T. Kerwin
Jr. shared some of his insights with the 1978 US Army
Command and General Staff College class last June. In his
graduation address, General Ker!pin discussed the value of
developing perspective and prop'ortion in dealing with con-
temporary problems. The valu'; of perspective allows us to
see that many of our problems are not new and gives us
insights on how to deal with them. Proportion allows us to
view one' element or segment in relation to the other ele-
ments or segments which make up the whole. The balance of
these elements is very important, and the emphasis shifts
rapidly to meet changing situations. The tools of perspective
and proportion are invaluable in dealing with the problems
of this complex world-now and in the futllre.
As a people, we tend to be future-
oriented. While this does make for a
dynamic and creative society. it also
costs us valuable ,tools with which to
deal with contemporary problems.
These tools are perspective and pro-
portion, and these are what I want to
P&J3S on to you today.
This is a good time for you to
receive these tools. You are arriving at
that time in life where perspective and
proportion become increasingly im-
portant. Some have called the period
you are entering the "mid-life crisis."
Your life is beginning to take on a
certain shape. Most of you have
growing families. Your careers are
becoming somewhat more fixed. For
example, your graduation here today
marks a midpoint in your professional
military development.
Recently, I have had an opportunity
to put perspective to good use. When
talking to the new brigadier generals
of our Reserve forces, I gave them a
copy of an article on "The New Na-
tional Guard." Although the article
was written in 1892, it had a clearer,
more cogent rationale for today's Total
Army than articles written five years
Again, when talking to the new
active duty brigadier generals, I gave.
them an article about the "new" vol-
unteer Army. It told of recruits from
the disadvantaged sectors of our so-
ciety who resented authority and were
difficult to train and discipline. The
interesting thing about this article is
that it was talking about the Army in
1948 rather than 1978.
The value of perspective is that it
allows us to see that many of our
problems are not new. It gives us
insights on how to deal with these
problems and warnings of the probable
consequences of failure to face and
resolve problems as they occur. The
article on the "new" volunteer Army of
1948 told what happened when these
untrained, undisciplined troops were
committed to combat in 1950-a clear
warning to us today.
It is too early for you to put Leaven-
worth in' perspective, but, from npr
perspective of 30 years, I know that
Leavenworth is the most important
school you will attend during your
military careers. It is the most im-
portant it has given you a set
of proportions, the second tool I want
to discuss with you today.
Until your arrival at Leavenworth,
most of you had been too busy le'arning
and practicing basic skills of your
particular branch to concern yourself
with larger issues. The Army revolved
around the infantry, the ordnance
corps or whatever was your primary
specialty. In your assignments and
your basic and advanced schools,. you
were isolated from the rest of the
During the past year, you have met
and studied witn men and women from
other branches, from other services
and from other nations. You have seen
your particular branch in proportion to
the whole of our Armed Forces.
You have had an opportunity to see
the to the other
services and to the nation. You have
gained an appreciation of the legit-
imate role of the military in a free
society. In your management studies
and in your studies' of the budget
process, you have seen the realities of
civilian control of the military.
Leavenworth is unique among the
Army's schools since it combines both
education and training. You will put
the training you received here to imme-
diate use. The education will continue
to guide you throughout your careers.
The proportion of the curriculum de-
voted to education and to training has
changed to fit the Army's needs time
and again since the' turn of the
cen.tury. It will continue to change in
the future. This dynamism is what
'makes Leavenworth what it' is. As
graduates, it will be your responsibility
to 'ensure that Leavenworth continues
to meet the of the Army.
'Ailied with finding the prop,er pro-
portions between education and
training is the need to find the balance
between military art and military
science. In 1935, when he was chief of
staff, General Douglas MacArthur
wrote' a paper to the officers of the
Army pointing out the need for both
military art and science. He defined art
as the strategies and tactics that had
evolved over the centuries; science he
defined as the' application of these
strategies and tactics to new tech-
nology. As Americans we are more
comfortable with military science than
with military art, but we ignore the
lessons of history at our peril.
The very name of institution
gives us another set of proportions-
the proportion between command and
staff. Until you came here, many of
you spent most of your careers with
troops. After you leave here, the ma- .
jority of your time will be with staff.
Leavenworth should have given you
an understanding of the fact that while
the Army exists to fight, before it can
fight it must first exist. If we do not
have the staff to gain the funds, the
equipment and the soldiers, we cannot
have an Army in the field.
And, as Leavenworth has
you, the Army in the field must find
the balance between operations and
logistics. They are interlinked and
interdependent, and the -absence of
either can spell disaster on the battle-
I field. '
The final set of propoitions I want
to leave with you is' the proportion
between management and leadership."
In today's complex Army, effective
management is an absolute essential.
We have borrowed many techniques
from civilian industry to improve 'our
performance. We have made extensive
use of computers. We can take great
pride in the effectiveness of our re-
source management. We must take
care, however, that we do not get a
false transfer of values.
Techniques that work well for the
management of things may prove dis-
astrous in the management of people.
We must be constantly aware that the
factors for which soldiers are willing to
sacrifice their lives-morale, esprit,
loyalty,' team spirit-cannot be quan-
tified. Personal leadership is as nec-
essary to today's battlefield as in any-
time in history. While wars can be lost
through lack of management, they can
only be won through leadership.
As I said earlier, Americans tend to
lack perspective. We also are uncom-
fortable with proportions. We like cer-
tainty. When confronted with alterna-
tives, we want to concentrate on either
one or the other.
But we do not have this .luxury.
When you examine the proportions I
discussed earlier-your particular
branch versus the Army, the Army
versus the other services, the Army
versus society, education versus
training, military art versus military
science, command versus staff, opera-
tions versus logistics and manage-
ment versus leadership-you can see
that the rear challenge is in finding the
balance between these alternatives.
This balance if! constantly changing
and shifting to meet new and different
situations. It will take all of your skills
to keep them in concert. :
In the 30 years since I graduated
from Leavenworth, I have had the
opportunity to use the tools of !per-
spective and proportion many times.
They have been most useful in dealing
with the problems of this complex
Take these tools with you. As I look
at the many challenges the Army faces
today and the threats that our nation
faces in this troubled world, I am sure
you will find a use for them. As an old
soldier, let me give you one other thing
to take with you. If'you get nothing
else from this college and what I have
said to you, remember these four
words: "Never forget the soldier. Never
forget the soldier." Good luck and God-
speed. "i..
General Walter T. Kerwm Jr., US Army.
Retired. was u,ce chIef of staff of the Army
from October l,974 untIL his. retirement in
June 1978. He IS a graduate of the USMA. the
USACGSC, the Armed FQrces Staff Col/ege,
the Army War Col/ege and the NatIOnal War
Col/ege. H,s actwe duty assIgnments mcluded
serumg as commandmg general of the 3d
Armored DlUlSlOn In Germany; Ithe II Field
Force, VIetnam; and the US Army Forces
Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
India Chooses The IndIan government has chosen the
Bntlshmade Jaguar fIghter aircraft to replace Its aging fleet of
Canberras and Hunters. Two hundred Jaguars have been. oraered from
Great Bntaln. but It IS expected that a large portton of will be bUIlt
In India under 'lIcense, Jaguars won the chOIce in with the
French Mlfage and the SwedIsh Viggen,
Changing '.Dimensions of
Military Professionalism:
Education and
Lieutenant Colonel Sam C. Sarkesian, US Army, Retired
TEEPED in the classic concepts of "Duty, Honor, Country," military
professionals perceive the nature of professionalism as selfevident. Civilian
scholars, on the other hand, differ in their interpretations and analyst!s. These
varying nnd at times conflicting perspectives and assessments have been reflected
in the literature, Yet few of these studies provide candid assessments of politics and
professionalism. Those that do are influenced considerably by Samuel Huntington"
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politrcs of Civil Mihtary Relations, and
the Garrison State thesis.'
Many political scientists, as well as civilian and military scholars of other
disciplines, seem to presume that the military institution is separate from the
political system except in an abstract sense. The military is said to be isolated from
the mainstream of politics and political life, This view is reinforced by the idea,
particularly among the civilian liberal oriented, that the military institution is
fundamentally antithetical t.o
The frequent outcry that military men have no business publicly commenting on
policy or becoming involved in "politics" is a further reflection bf this point of view.
In no small measure, these views have influenced the scope of research on military
professionalism-limiting it to internal military matters or tq broad dimensions of
policy and civil-military relations, to the neglect of political attitudes, political roles
and the politics of military professionalism.
ThIS artIcle IS an abridged verslOni of the original paper presented at the Tactics/IUS Symposium at ,the Command and
: General Statt College >n March 1978
CopYright 1979 by lIeutenant Colonel Sam C Sarkeslan, US Army, RetIred
Those within the military view the military as a profession.
l'et feu' studies pr,ol'ide candid assessments of politics and
professionalism. The po/iticai dimension of the external
environment in which the military must operate almost
presupposes that the military be aware of and l'ersed in the \
political perspectiL'e surrounding them. The changed inter- \
national scene and the new technological age haue forced
changes on the military establishment. Since World War II,
for better or worse, the military has become a major political
actor. The military ,professional becomes increasingly
familiar with political and social intricacies as he moves to
positions of greater responsibility. Higher education for the
military professional ;n both Civilian institutions and service
schools is probably the best way to develop the intellectual
sensitil'ity and analytical insights he will need. The end
result of this synthesizing should be a military professional
who is able to understand and contribute more to the
decision making process. While this enlightened advocacy
may not prol'ide closer linkage betw.een military and civilian
structures, if may help achieve an intellectual empathy and
understanding within military and civilian circles. The
military professional' should not "play politics" but must be
fully l'ersed in and appreciaie the politieal system in which
he operates.
This is a curious oversight. The
importance of the political dimension
seems clear in the light of the extetnal
environment in which the military
must operate, the nature and politics of
the domestic political system, and
organizational behavior and politics.
The purpose of this article is to ex
amine these matters and explore them
with respect to their ramifications on
military professionalIsm.
In this context, this article is based
on two premises regarding the military
profession. First, regardless' of the
debate centering .around the status of
the mIlitary as a profession, it is
presumed that the military is indeed a
profession. This presumes that it has
the attributes generally associated
with civilian professions. Additionally,
the uniqueness of the military
profession is perceived to be based on
three important characteristics: the
coneept of ultimate liability, the state
professi\>n relationship (that is, the
state as'the sole client) and the concept
of honor. Many of these matters have
been discussed ir. detail elsewhere in
the literature."
Second, military professional refers
primarily to the officer corps.
Regardless of the importance of the
enlisted structure (to include quantity
and quality): it is the relationship
between the officers corps and the state
that is fundamental to the nature of
civil-military relationships. Indeed, it
is the officers corps that sets the
"pace," provides professional stand-
ardsand creates the professional im-
age. :
ore we explore the matters
associated with the purpose of this
article in greater detail, it is necessary
briefly to examine prevailing political'
perspectives and their consequences'
regarding the military profession.
The existing political and social
environment in the Unitcd States has
created an ambiguous context and
contradictory' directions within the
military. On the one hand, a liberal
traditional alliance has articulated a
narrow professional dimension while,
on the other hand, thc political and
\ocial demands require a more flexible
and intellectually broadened military
professionalism. The military
professional, imbued with the idea of a
traditional and narrow professional
focus, is thus placed in an environment
that demands much more than
professionalization can provide. As a
result, there has developed an am
biguity of professional purpose and an
increasingly indistinct professional
identity. '
The liberal-Traditional Alliance
A narrowly defined military
professionalism confined to purely.
military matters serves a particular '
purpose. Fo'r the liberal political
heritage, it ensures (presumes) civilian
control and a nonpolitical military. For
the traditional military orientation, it
(presumes) a total focus on
specific military skills and training as
the proper career orientation. The con-
sequences of the liberal-traditional
alliance -constrain' the military
professional from developing a broad
intellectual awareness of the political-
social environment in which he must
operate while insisting that be in-
tensely and solely i concern hImself
with immediate of a clear
military content.
Our argument rejects these perspec-
tives. The' politics of the military,
politics of war and the issues of
democraQY and the military require a ,
heightened intellectual and political
and an expanded
to military profes-
sionalism." These distinct, yet interre-
Jated elements of professionalism not
only affect: military posture, but are
necessities' strategic requirements of
the 1980s. ,I
Military and Politics
The post-World War II period, a
vastly dhanged international en-
vironment 'combined with the new
technological a/ile ushered in by
nuclear weap:ons, precipitated
significant crhanges in the military es-
tablishment, '
Military 'requirements thus became
a futtdamehtaz' ingredient .of foreign
policy, and, military men and in-
'stitutions acquired authority an,d in
fluences far' surpassing that ever
previously possessed by military
professionals on the American scene.
The 'preoccupation with national
securi ty and a proper defense posture
stimulated the growth of a vast defense
establishment and concomitant
! ,
political power and involvement in the
political process. The military, for
better or worse, became a major
political actor.
This political arena has not
generally been acknowledged as a
legitimate concern for military officers.
That is, it has not become an element
of the professional ethic in 'the same
sense as other military expectations
and specialties. Indeed, many
professional military men still view
"politics" as something denigrating
professionalism-yet virtually every
officer in the middlerank years and
beyond is immersed in military
politics,6 There is a multidimensional
nature about politics and the military
profession that includes intraservice,
institutional and systems politics.
Thus, in virtually every aspect of
professionalism and the military
system, there is a political component.
Changed Concept of War
It has been popular to presume that
politics are left to politicians and wars
to generals. This cliche has long been
outmoded. To presume tJwt military
professionals, for exaIflple, should
remain unconcerned about the political
and social conditions of potential
aggressors, and that the military
professional should not be involved
until the first "shell explodes," is to
neglect the lessons of modern wars.
The purpose here is not to examine
the details of strategic issues and the
nature of warfare. More simply, it is to
suggest that at least three elements of
modern war warrant, if not compel, a
political dimension to military
professionalism. These include the
issues associated with military
deterrence, intervention and dis
engagement. In each of these cases,
there are political! and social
necessities governing military in
volvement. Moreover, traditional styles
of command resting on a singular
military perspective may not be ade-
As one obs'erver has noted:
, .. the traditional pattern of cen
tralized command in battle is no longer
posszble; commanders must be more
flexible, familiar with a wide range of
techniques of combat, above all more
highly educated; they cannot be expert
in all fields now relevant to their job
but they must be able to handle and
dipest expert advice.' (Emphasis add-
Deterrence. It has long been
recognized that successful deterrence
rests on two considerations: capacity of
the military instrument and credibility.
Not only must the military be capable
of inflicting damage that is un accept- .
able to the enemy, but the political
leaders must be prepared to use the
military instrument in (his capacity.
To ensure that the pOfential enemy
d o ~ s not miscalculate or is not tempted
to instigate a major war, the United
ptates must be in a position to engage
in a judicious mix of political maneu-
vering, psychological warfare and
military shows of force.
Deterrence seeks to prevent military
Essentially, deterrence means dis-
couraging the enemy from' taking
military action by posing for him a
prospect of cost and risk outweighing
his prospective gain ... deterrence
u'orks on the enemy's mtentions; the
deterrent value of military forces is
'their effect in r<;ducing the lihelihood of
military movE'S," '
Deterrent strategy thus not only
contradicts the traditional concept of
military utility, hut also adds a
political dimension to profes-
sionalism-demanding that military
men know when not to use military
force an.d when to use it in a non
combat function.
Intl'l'{'I'ntlOll. Most serious students
f international affairs now recognize
that intervention by US military forces
'.. a matter considerably greater in
climl'nsion than a military operatirm.
Indeed, nonmilitary factors may be
more demanding yet inextt'icable from
military factors and generate serious
political repercussions with significant
military ramifications.
One need only glance at our
Vietnam involvement to appreciate the
complexities of military intervention.
Not only are questions raised about the
purpose of intervention, hut also about
the use of the military instrument once
intervention is an accomplished fact. If
Vietnam is a precedent, military men
will have no small role in determining
US interventionist policies. It would
only belahor the point to' argue the
political-social dimensions of such
Disengagement. Any military
operation necessitates serious thought
to disengagement. On the conventional
battlefield, disengagement from the
enemy is a highly complicated and
intricate operation-one that only
seasoned soldiers can accomplish
without fear of disastrous results. Dis-
" '
engagement after military intervention
is likely to involve equally difficult-if
not more complicated-operations with
potentially serious political impact.
It is difficult to envision, for ex-
ample, US military involvement in any
area of the world (other than areas in
which the US military is already
operating with ground forces) without
serious political overtones in the
United States and in the target area.
To presume that a Mayaguez-type
operation or that a swift surgical
operation in the character uf Entebbe
can always be acc'omplished
successfully is wishful thinking. The
disengagement of military forces from
any.area may require restructuring of
political forces and restoring the en-
vironmel)t to' some semblance of
civilian order. This eannot be done
simply by ordering a military
In sum, the concept of war in the
'1980s is sufficiently different from the
past to make irrelevant the traditional
division of labor between civilian and
military roles. As the military learned
in Vietnam, the ability to handle non-
military aspects of war successfully
goes beyond traditional skills. While
the nonmilitary issues surrounding
any type of military action are an
important part of every professional's
intpllectual baggagp, the aftermath of
military action is just as important. In
such circumstances, to presume that
somehow one can clearly ideNtify pure
military issues and implement pure
military solutions is simply to forget
the lessons of history or to lack the
intellectual competence for concep-
tualizing on such matters.
An understanding of the American
political system, its values and
democratic theory, is essential for the

military professional if he is to perform
his role effectively and acceptably to
American society. The problem is a
difficult one because, in its ideal form,
this requires the acceptance and com-
patibility between a system based on
hierarchy, order and authority and
another based on negotiations, com
promise, pluralism, decentralization
and "liberty and equality." Moreover,
demands of institutional loyalty within
the profession are countered by the
constitutional right of critical inquiry
and individual freedom in a democratic
The difficulty of transferring these
considerations to the operation of a
military system is clear. The fun-
damental professional dilemma
evolves from the need to accept these
democratic values and reflect them in a
reasonable way in the military system
while maintaining an effective
military posture. Such an un-
derstanding and appreciation requires
more than a cursory study of
America's government or a
"newspaper" knowledge of politics.
Another manifestatioh of the in
herent tensions between the military
and democratic society is in the
relationships between individual
autonomy and organizational loyalty.
Professional stress on the requirements
of integrity and institutional goals has
normally shaped individual behavior
so as to reduce dissent or
considerably. In other words, iljltegrity
and instant obedience are sine qua non
of military institutions.
Yet the question of conscience and
actions contradictory to in::;titutional
demands has become particularly sen-
sitive in today's military. The close
relationship between personal values,
institutional norms and community
value systems is necessary if con-
gruence with the civilian community is
. to be maintained. There must exist a
harmony between the values of the
democratic system and military
professionalism-not necessarily a
perfect harmony, but at the least an
adequate commonality of values rein-
forcing the ideology of the system.
When the ethos 01 the military
profession and its behavior move
beyond perceived social norms, the
loses its credibility and
legitimacy of purpose ..
While the nature of
systems may appear to be inherently
antithetical to the military ethos, the
military is an integral part of the
political system. As such, there must
be an acceptable way in which the
military profession can exercise its
functions within a democratic en-
vironment. To presume that the.
military remains immune from the
environment and society which it is to
serve is simply to deny its very status
as a profession. Moreover, in the
relationship between society and
military, there are no clear and ab-
solute solutions. Society changes,
values change and previously held
8ssumptions <tnd relationships may
prove fragile and incorrect.
Synthesizing the inte!lectual
demands and conceptual ability to
understand and appreciate, the
professional requirements of military
politics, politics of war, democracy and
the military is a difficult matter. To do
so, the military professional must be
able to apply political-social tools,
quantitative and analytical
insights and to develop an intellectual
sensitivity to the sturly of rlomestic and
international politics. Thti singular.
channel through which one can
achieve 'this is through .higher
erlucution-grarluate erlucation-in an
environment that exposes the in-
rllviduaf tl) a variety of ideas, 'analyses
and perceptions not likply to be en-
countprprl in a professionally focused
This rloes not necessarily mean that
civilian education and
erlucation 'in the liberal arts can be
achieved lonly through nonmilitary
education:jtl systems. Yet the fact
remmns that the relatively broad scope
of l'ivilian-type educatIOn systems,
their stres.s on conceptualizing and
their relatively free range of in-
tellel'lual inquiry, makes them more
attuned to the kinds of educational
necessities required for military
professionals than the education
system in the military establishment.
Moreover, a liberal education is fun-
dampntal in this dimension.
Perhaps the most fandamental
L'Uluf' of hberal educatlUn' is that it
makes lile more mterestinf! ... it
allou's you to see things which the
undereducat('d do not see. It allows
you to und('rstand thi.zgs which the
untutored find incomprehensible. It
al/uu's you to thlllk thzngs which do
not occur to the less learned. I I
The issue of civilian education for
professional officers has primarily
revolved around whether or not
'civilian education is needed to fill
. cprtain positions or billets. This has
been fueled by arguments over training
or education. In our perspective,
howeveJ'\ civilian gra!iuate education is
an essential element of profes-
sionalism. It' is neither a luxury
nor is it limited to a selected number of
billets. Rather, graduate education or,
more precisely, the- intellectual and
interdi&ciplinary dimensions that are a
funda??ental part of graduate
is an important part of
professiOJjlalism. Every professional
who ,expects to proceed beyond the
. mirldle-rank years must qe "educated."
Moreover, it has been aptly
demonstrated that in our society
higher education correlates closely
with greater participation in the
political system; that higher education.
provides a more' enlightened view of
rlemocratic values and the political
system." But the values and
knowledge acquired 4L higher
education must be nurtured'--<a!:ld in-
stitutionalized if they are to serve
professional purposes.
A case also can be made for higher
education on the .premise that the
educated professional makes a better
professional. This can be accomplished
without jeopardizing the ability to
handle purely military skills. Indeed,
OIi.e can argue that an educated officer
is in a better position to integrate
military skills with military 're-
quirements. Moreover, the educated
officer will be intellectually prepared to
understand the conseq_uences
military actions and the overarching
political and social limplications of
military operations.
Is there not fundamental antipathy
between the twin purposes of military
schooling; between training, which is
either technical or aimed at getting
men accustomed to doing what they
are told, or both, and education, which
must be devoted to helping men learn
to think critically, to establishing their
minds, standards of aesthetic and in-
tellectual excellence against which
they will implicitly weigh the value of
what they are told to do?
Indeed there is '" the truly
liberally-educated soldier is the soldier
who can reconcile the necessity for
training and education, and be happy
in both .... For it is the man liberally
educated, not the man technically
educated, who will be the most sen
sitive to the great flux of civil life; it is
the man who is both liberally and
professionally educated who will be the
better soldier. '3 .
These observations on higher
education have their detractors. With
compelling arguments, some military
men, as well as scholars, have pointed
out the susceptibility of the military to
"politics," arguing that higher
education stimulates political in-
volvement, denigrating profes-
sionalism. Thus, while concern with
military politics and higher education
implicitly a close iden-
tification with society, avoidance lof
politics and concentration on military
skills supports a separateness from
society. This separation, it is argued,
will allow military men to concentrate
on being a military professional and
limits the need for higher education.
The debate over these matters in the
profession is reflected in two orien-
tations: traditional professionalism
and progressive professionalism." The
former rests on the premise that
military professionals have a
Epecifically defined military purpose
with a clear delineation between
military and political systems. This is
a baSIC part of the liberal-traditional
alliance. Thus, profes::;ional training,
socialization ana career orientation are
directed toward nurturing the
traditional professional ethos-success
in combat.
Progress'ive professional, on the
other hand, presumes that military
professionals need to have some
knowledge of foreign policy and the
policy objectives to which the military
may' be used. This
perspective receives little support in
civilian liberal- circles or in 'traditional
military groups. It can be argued that
the demand for military men to study
politics is a charge without clear direc-
tions. To study politics outside of an
discipline and scholarly
and conceptual rigor simply fosters a
false sense of political expertise and
faulty perspectives.
To be sure, there is rarely a clear
delineation between the two
professional perspectives-rarely. does
. either type appear in its extreme form.
. That is, few military men advocate a
professionalism inextricably immersed
in politics or one completely isolated
from society. Nevertheless, one or the
other perspective tends to dominate the
thinking of military men, but there is .
disagreement on where and what is the
middle ground.
The political-military environment
of the 1980s will necessitate a military
profession that rejects the li!llitations
of the liberal-traditional alliance. The
profession must engender a true spirit
of intellectualism conditioned by
political and military realities. This is
best accomplished by an enlightened
advocacy posture. Such a posture
evolves from an educational foun-
.dation and professional dimensions
that recognize the complexities of the
real world, particularly the political-
social. components of political systems.'
Enlightened' a'dvocacy is not a
description of professional roles or
purposes, but a concept of professional
perceptions, Enlightened simp.1Y
means horizons and perspectives that
are not bound by military
considerations-horizons and perspec-
tives that consider social and political
implications of military decisions and
the need for priorities that
irtermix civilian and ,military con-
siderations, Advocacy means the ar-
ticulation cf a particular point of view
or policy while attempting to influence
the political system to accept such a
point of view or policy."
Enlightened advocacy, therefore,
presumes not only the advocation of a
particular position or point of view, but
also that this be done with
sophistication and maturity, a
and maturity that rests
on an .educational foundation in the
best intellectual tradition. This re-
quires intellectual revitalization and
continual expansion of educational
horizons. As Goodpaster succinctly
points out, "The most advanced
academic and intellectual insights are
no more than <1 necessary starting
What this new perspective argues
for, then, is an educated military man
who is an enlightened advocate. This
will not necessarily lead to a civilian-
military utopia. After all, the essence
of the military profession makes it
anathema to a liberal dpmocratic
society. Nonetheless, enlightened ad
vocacy will provide a close link
between the intellectual dimensions of
military professionalism and
democratic principles. While it may not
lead to a closer linkage between the
various military and civilian struc-
tures, it may provide the best en
vironment to achieve an intellectual
empathy and understanding between
the elite within military and civilian
Not all professionals need to be men
and women for all seasons, but the fact
remains that an enlightened advocacy
thrust within the profession will have
a profound revitalizing impact on
professionalism and the individual
professional. Moreover, it will enhance
the profession's ability to deal with the
political-military environment of the
To achieve these goals, a number of
changes within' the military profession
are necessary. First, the profession
needs to broaden the concept of
military education to include a wide-
ranging graduate education ex-
perience. This can be accomplished in
a variety of ways from fully funded
education, a more university-type en-
vironment in the highest level senior
schools, to a broad political-social
perspective in tactical and strategic
Second, the military profession
must recognize a legitimate political
dimension to the profession. On OJ;le
level, the study of politics should be
,part of every professional's military
education. On another level, the
profession needs to provide intensive
as well as extensive education and
skills in politics and political analysis.
This can be accomplished by adding
political specialties to those now
available to offieers as a secondary
specialty. These specialties can focus
on policy evaluation, political power,
political-social groups and
relationships and the general
operation of the political system. In the'
foreIgn area, political specialties can
focus on economic development,
revolution, the role of elites, internal
politicalsocial dynamics and the
resulting policy of foreign systems.
The essentials of these specialties
are a social science background with
particular emphasis on analytical tools
and evaluation methods. Thus, while
the broadly based liberal education
thrust would be a part of the generalist
career pattern, specific analytical skills
provide a basis for a specialty in
politics and political evaluation.
Third, a more "open" system of
communications should be established
between officers who are involved in
political-military matters, staffs at the
various highlevel headquarters and
senior-level military schools, and
policymakers in the Pentagon. Perhaps
this : kind of channel (that is, the
political-military back-channel) can
stlm\llate serious military thought on
military policy and provide oppor-
tunities for professionals in sensitive
political-military areas to state'. their
views without being accused of op-
posing policy: Moreover, such a
str!lcture can provide realistic i.nput to
the policy process that is not limited to
a narro",; group of Pentagon ,officials.
Obviously, what is suggested here is
not an easy alternative for the military
profession. It not only an
institutional change, but a differing
professional spirit. It will be difficult,
for example, to rationalize the
enlightenpd advocacy perspective in
cost-effective terms. Cost-effectiveness
C{l1l rarely measure subjective factqrs
and leadership effectiveness. What is
more difficult is to "sell" such an
aitprnativp to whose immediate
concern is operational effectiveness
now, over and above all else.
It wili be still more .difficult to
change the traditional' professional
view of the world. While there is a
valid argument to maintaining the
"military point of view," it is clear that
its 'meaning needs to be expanded. A
traditional (and narrow) meaning is
inadequate, not only historically but
for future military considerations. One
of the sharpest criticisms of the
traditional military thinking process is
voiced by 1. F. Stone in his ex-
amination of the Vietnam War.
In reading the military literature on
guerrilla warfare now so fashionable
at the Pentagon, one feels that these
writers arc like men watching a dance
from outside through heavy plate glass
Windows. They see the motions but
they can't hear the music. They put the
mechanical gestures down on paper
with pedantic fzdelity. But what rarely
come;; through to them are the injured
racial feelings, the misery, the
rankling slights, the hatred,. the
devotion, the inspiration and the
desperation. So they do not really
understand what leads men to
abandon wife, children, home, career,
frir>nds; to take to the bush and live
gun zn hand like a hunted animal; to
challenge overwhelming military odds
rather than acquiesce any longer in
humiliation, injustice, or poverty.'7
One basic issue, then, is how to
equate the military necessities to a
position of enlightened advocacy. For
those looking at the future through
heavy plate glass windows, it will be
impossible to rationalize and justify
such a position. And here is the
'paradox: to appreciate the need for
such a professional perspective will
'require professional military men who
are indeed enlightened and educated.
There is little evidence to suggest that
such military professionals exist in
sufficient numbers or have the nec-
essary power to influence the
profession at this period of time.
In any case, there is indeed a
military point of view. We argue that
the military professional is in the best
position to provide this military point
of view. But to presume somehow
the military perspective should not
include the bringing to bear of a
military intellectual focm, that ap-
preciates and understands the conse-
quences of military decisions upon the
political and social life of the system is
to deny the very criteria of a
"profession." ,
Thus, who argue that the
military men' should focus only on
providing the best military judgment
upon military problems are dealing
with half-truths. Moreover, such
arguments forget at least one lesson of
Vietnam: the inadequacy of a purely
military splution to revolutionary war.
In this respect, to blame civilians for
not making proper civilian decisions is
simply to presume that traditional
professional perspectives are correct in
any war and relegates strategic
thinking and "intelligence" solely to
Enlightened advocacy will not be
attained in the profession by adding
courses to senior service schools, in-
creasing by x percent the nUIT\ber of
military officers attending civilian
graduate education or by including it
in commander's operational orders. It
requires a basic change in the
socialization and education of the
military professional and flexibility in
the military institution.
What is being suggested here is
primarily a long-range perspective in
which military operations and military
schooling include political-social
factors, and the ability to apply
methCJdologjcal tools for political
1 5arnupl P Hunl,nglOn Tfle Sold,er and the State The Theory
dna PU/'('(5 of M,lder" RelatIons VintagE' Books NY 1964 and
HiJrOld D The GarrIson State Ameflcan J(lurnal of
Soc,alngy 1<346 DP 45568 See also MOIfiS Janowltt The
SoldIer A Social aAd Po/'t,cal Portrad, Free Press I'll v
2 See C Jr The Mlhlary Annual ReVIew of
VOlurne 2 1976 tor a review of the literature See also an
unpublosherl p.Jpe' by Arthur larson 'M,litary Purpose and
ProlE'SSlonallsm Old DefInitions and New RealitIes November
3 See Dav,d W Moore and B Thomas Trout M,litary Ad
VISIbIlity Theory of PromOllon Ameflcan PaM,cal
SC'iHl(e Relllew June 1978 P 468 The authors nOll" thaI Th['
Hunl<nglon approach s['ems to hav.e been overtaken by evenls The
military alre' all has become qUIte >nvol .... ed or Integrated InlO the
deCI':>lon making process and ph,!,slcal .501.lllon ot Ihe military tram
soc.elv ,s no long('r a teas,bl[, or reall,:>tlc al!ernallve 'l'et many
proles,:>,onal mIlItary men as lIIIeli as academICIans and scholar5
lIIIou[d deny lIle mlllla.'!' Ihe n['cessa'y educatIonal and 'ntcllcClutll
[,lIpefl('n{"c anu apporlunll,!, 10 approach thOlr pohllcal folc Itom a
S,!,Sl['m,lhC fJrl<i protesslon.ll pf'rsp('O'vc [n Ihls lesp['CI s('e Jerome
SI.1!!'r ApOh!ICal Wmrror or Sold'l'r Slatesm,ln The Milltarv .1n\III1I'
ForeIgn Polle.'( Process In the Post V,elnam ErJ .lnd Jot,n'lovelt
analysis and policy evaluation and
articulation as a matter of cowtse. This
perspective is only a starting point
since specific answers must be sought
by who accept these perspectives.
But it seems to us that nothing could
be more dangerous to military
professionalism than to develop a
world. view that is undimensional, om
nicompetent and limited in its in-
In the final analysis, we are
convinced that' the educated military
man, skilled in his own profession and
unafraid to commit himself to higher
principles, provides the best safeguafd
to civilian control and a democratic
system. Attuned to broad conceptual
thought processes, and with horizons
to go beyond the "military world," the
professional is likely to be sensitive to
the proper place of politics in the
profession, concerned about
ethics and in a position to
develop an intellectual awareness to
deal reasonably and rationally with
the political and military tvironment.
ApolitIcal WaTflor or SolduO'-, Slate':>mil.... Co""!mentary 4rmed
Fones and Sanely Fall 1977
4 Thf> argoment here IS foe used only on one sidp at the
D.oblem-Ihe mlillary 51d[' A good C80;[' can also b[' wadp lor the
nppd of CIVlloan ehles 10 understand and appreciate Ih[' mll,tary an
understanding Ihal reQulIE's more Ihan ,vory 10llller asseSS"'ent5
based on h,stoflcal slpreotvpe-s It rPQulfCS a 5en':>III\<lty 10 the
demalld5 Of the profession and a \lelllblll1Y 01 ('Vlllan perspectIves
These ure nol necpssarlly acqu.rpd by "blar,!, 'e.<;['i1r( h 0' one t,mp
ellpo':>Ule to generals
5 Huntmgton ap CIt p 345 ;)Iso TOllllnsend Hoppl's
C,v,l,an MIlitary Balance Volle December 19')3 pp 218
6 See tor ['lIample Milllhellll B R,dgwav So/(J,(" The MemOirs
of Maff/!(;'w B Rldgw.JY HJrper & ROIIII Publ'sher'.> InV' N'I' 19[>6
Mallwell Taylor Swords dna Phl .... S/>dft'S W W l\Iorlon & Co Inc
N y 1972 WllIlJm Weslmorphln,\ A SO'l/'f'{ Reports Doubleday &
Co Inc NY 1976 and Elmo lumllllall 011 WaUh A Mt'm01f
Quadr<\ngle Books 1\1 'I' 1976
7 As envl,:>,onod heft' ,nlliJ')ervl{p polItICS lak[' place Il\:'lwt'er\
IIld,,,,,\lual profeSSIOn,l!!:; ,Im\ stT1all groupo; and group mlt'lact,ons
wlll1,n part.cular ':>Ct .... '({''.> In'>htutlontlt pol,t!!:.s take p1ac.p Iletlllleen
Itw \,ou,> S{VVILC,) ,In{j Of ad ',oe mllll,)ly I.lsks and Include
mll.tafy (Iv,l,an pollh(at acto.s Jnd the-,' power System
pOill,V; I<lke plall! Lwlwpen Ille system as a .. the
(I ..... !odn IlpCIS'UI\!l1ilk,ng mach,ne'rl; ,)nO (', ... ,I,an pOh\ICcll dctoro; outside
Ihe n"hliHli m';iltul,on
8 Phillip Tn,., Late P'ofe&s.on 01 Arms AmbIguous
Gd,lls .1n(\ Optpr,olal,nq \/leans In B',Ii\ln European Journal of
Vatu Tl(' VI Numbel 2 t 96:' 0 246
9 Gllnn H Snyder Dt-u'rrloet .Inc! Tow"IO.1 '"(,ory 01
Ndt.O"'" Sf"tu/"v P, nCPlu'l Un,y""."r" Press Princeton N J 1961
'p 3
10 Tile IJOIoLY dnd rlfll'ds 01 the m,IoI,1ry pio!t,ss,on and
Ihpl! fl'l.lI.,l'l'>'''IlC, 10 l'r\uCclt.on \II"]'> 'I-'lognoled over two deC,ldes ago
llv [WI '>, ""l,."'" JOh,' VV \/I _.,IJn<l ,jnt! Lll"pn(f' I Rildwtlv
J",I Schut". o\1,j,/,lrv fdu[ alnn an,/ NJI1ona' Pc>/'c'V Prof'cplon Un,
P"n(tlop 190/ P .... ,' Thev wlote Illal rn,IIlary
te,llltlS ,1te 'PqUO(P,jlu Uf'UPr<,I':l"u1 In com nun Cl1le w,lh l1mJ
tv l v,1tu,lIP /l1e ]lIdq.""en! ()! Ipauers ofhcodt'i.. of olher
p,,', "l' '" Il'<' .1"" CPU 111".,,, "P' l,,,Io,,I,, Ih('y ""'uS! ...,ilke SOund
1."1'jP,pp,,fs tlll'm<;t on 'l")lIur"" wb'Ch alfeel d w,de viJroelV Of
( (ll"C("n.., TIlt'v .JI, C<lUp,1 upun 10 eVdluil\!' the mutlv.11,0f'<'
,],1(1 J 01 f!J' (,.qn und to e",hmal(> the {'lft'clS 01
Ar'lt'''' iln ao,nn or IndO 1011 ... PO,l the[,e ndt,Of'1; Ano alJOve dll Ihe
'It)1IIt Inlp nl m,II,)!v I["ln,"'> I('Clt. rpS of Ihem d helghlened
,1""'" ent''>5 01 Ihe p'.'l('ple l,1 ou' dprnpC,;]I,( <;0('1'1'1'
11 K,ng"',)I' 8rpw<;"".Jr 71" R('",rrt aIr!>" Pr('s,rlC,l/ 197576
'rJ t' Un,vp,.,.,ly Pr"l/rny Serv (( Nt''''' Havpn C"rn 1976 Mr
[JI,W',,!, II" \I't' 'nilTH'r pr.,,,.(j!::-'lI Yfl'f' Un" ... "r.,.ly drU 1''1197811').,
1.' ...,.' f", ex.l11ml", G<lhr 1;'1 AIr>,on.1 <1"'0 S.dnl'V Vertld /1)[, ('OIL
c,./'''' 4ft,c""".; d'ld ,/1 ('V(' NJt,orlS L,nl,'
RI" ..... r Ii. (0 8U.,lun M<I.,., flP 31718 and 67 .'1 wll,cn It'e
.1t.H".,., (un, I u1. d'''"''\J ntt'(,1 tt""\JS I'lill I')c more educ ..J1ed
P""""''1. mUll' " ..... d'e Of II 10' ,mpdl! 0
\Jo",,n,rl"1 on the .nJ,y.du.:l1
tI .. tllOt., .'.tu, Jtl'J il'" to p.H' (lll.ltP In H,e pollical prueel;'>
", '" Ih. .. J""!!,,., 11,1' more el1ucateJ ,nl1,,,,duill hal; more
,>uhl'tJ' ,ntu,,'f')l,un l\""tv mUH;' eduCilIed "'d'v<Ju<\t '0; 'nmt' (.10.('1" !{l
'xDr,.<,c. <'o"I,,j, (I{". ,,, h,,, <;'O(h)!' un\"vnrnunt to UP!>"VH l1r,}1 ottrel
P"pp!,' .". ""slwunhy df'rl !>('Iptul At50 Ihe .3uthor" .,Iille lloill tn
II,! Unlit (lSI.!!"., at)d 8"I<1,n whpre a ld'gl' prorort.on 01 Pw
I, S<"",rl,,,," ,"<[.Il'.,., w,de ''l IhE' 0010' (,11 ckJa'a<lpr>st,{,,"; 01 H't:"
I"l" P'tlpol1.u" "".1., h'\Jhp1 among Ih .. beller er.luCiltf'd
".,.p",)h ",., I, \',P Un,led SI.:Iles 92 percenl 01 !I'ol;e Will' some
.",.""1,,,1'1' .,1, t.l',On rpsponded ,,",.,h POlttl(dl obJect", of [lnde
T'.,"'> .,I! '" "'\0' qn the '(otAt,onsh'p of h'gl1er educat,on
and n"H,c,11 <11111"de", See lor el<<l"'ple Lester
11.''''''..1'"'1 "nJ M l Gu, Pol,t,r.]1 P,Jrt,('(Idtlon How dna v..'lly
P, "1'/' 1" /nn,/\',,/ ,Ii Po/,(,(S R<I"tJ Mll\,allv Collegl' Pub1,";h'''g Co
I 1()77 I\,v""," f-< l\I,,' '::"dnPV Vnrba <lnU Jol'" >I
p,",,,,, ,k rh, (/, )"4""1 Amtf.(cln V<.lr('r Har\iard Un'ver<,,\v PI('SS
1976 ,Yod 'S'dnpy Vprb<l and H 1\,'1'
", AT/lt'1'C.1 Poi>t,r,)1 O('mOCfdLY a,u"/ Soclal
t;ol"'" & Ro ...... P,o',sher., jn( \,N'f 1972 Thp
I".-,""hh-,.ln,,- uf ('v.den(p ,n Il"'p I le'<llul(, ;'ugges!s Ihal O,e higher
'"H, .lI. 'I t,. ,1 ) de"-'u( I,'l\i ,S 10k ely 10 exh.b,1 a ,,!ronger
,-""Hlllrn,'nl In Ih, dp!ll<Jlldtir antl a I',gher concern wllh
IruJlv.(h"d r'9"IS "no ",11up<,
13 JOSiah 8unt,ng. The Humanities In the EducatIOn of the
Mrlota", ProfeSSIonal Tile System for Educatmg Military Olltcers m
the US Edited bv Lawrence J Korb, International S1udles
ASSOClat,on Unrverl;Ity of PlttsblJrgh PIttsburgh, Pa _ 1976, p 158
14 Thul;p VIPWS. are bel;l reflected by Genet'al Douglas MacArth/,Jr.
Genf'ri\1 Mal<wcll Tuylor and the late Presrdenl John F Kennedy At
h,S fanlolls addrel;s to the Corps of Cadets at the US M,htary
Acddelll .... In 1964 General MacArthur. In arhCulallr19 tradltlonaJ
profel;l;'!Jnahl;!l' said In parI 'Your mlSl;lon rema,ns fixed. deter
mined ,nviolable " rS 10 w.n wars Ever",lhlng else In your
proft;'':o,;.on,ll careerl; 'I; but corollary to m,S. Vital dedlcatron The
genpral wenT on to I;ldle emphatlcalJ", that concernS about
guvernmpnlal prOCPSses 'nlprnal domesl1c Issues ctvrl rights and
,,",Pit' grpl1t f'atronal Issues but not lor the parhClpat10n of ttle
tnlii/dry prolesslonal nor for mrlltary solution Progressive
p'ofeSSIOnfll!srn 's best represented by Ihe perspect,ve expressed by
Gpner;]l Ta"lor Of) Cd pp 25455 who argues For the
s.",.ord to bp an efleCltve Instrument 01 lorelgn pottc", ItS forgers must
tla\(' SO'Tle underslandtng 01 Il1e purposps to whiCh It may be put
'wn[I' know I;ornpthlng of the futurp goals of nallondf pohC\, and the
ol/l;lacles 10 them which mClY have to be resolved b", f1lllitdry force
Supporting 111'3 po.nt Tdylor quotes.lrom John.F Kennedy'S speech to
Ihe Pornt Corpl; of Cadets 'The non m,jltar\, oro!JlemS whICh
you w.!) facu ...... oIr .11<;0 be the most de>mand,ng-d,plomatlc pol'lIcal
and cconO'TlI( YOu wrll need 10 and understand not only the
101e'9n paltry of tne uS hut Ihe forergn policy 01 all c.ountltes
5callP'ed dround file world YOu wtll need to understand the
01 mollr.I''v power and also The Ilmtl";' ot power
You ""rll haye obhgalton 10 deler war as well as fight It The
pOhlCS of Ihll; ct11lrge II; self e"/ldent
1 b Willie t'lere have beAn I;ome caut,ous. support of an advocatory
rolt (not PXol(tty'n thp sense' of advocac" used her e)-I hat IS. m,lotarv
nlUn flufend'''9 pubhc pOlCY outl;,de of !,n.htarv crrcle";-Itlel;e have
been q"alof'f'd by "g'd rpSI"ct.ons For 8!lample see John A Probert
VH-'hld>ll ,",'} Un,I/;,.j SlilIP';, M,hl-j'Y l'houy"! CIVI!
M,',IOf.., Roll'S ,n Govl'rnmt>nt Relat,()fl[. C11an9,n9
(vncepfs ,n /Ile SfJvenl,es fo'led by Charles L Cochran, Press
I\, Y 1974 pp 140 51 The SlngJaub affa,r may be ,nstructlve In thrs
rpg.1rd M<lJor Genpral John K Stnglaub of Stdff.:US Forces rn
KOll><l was qUlck.!y remOVl'd from hll; POl;t In the surilmer of 1977.
.:liter l;uggpl; 10 a Ihal Pre-;"dent Garter., decrSlon to
'elT'ove uS ground forcp,,; from South Korpil would create a
Oangl'ruus SOO'( ullty p'ob1em In the ared It (I; Interestmg to note
op Cft p 370 on tllll; pOlnl and th'5 '1; the el;sentral
poml 1 said thaI thp c'v.l,an duthorotre[' mu.,1 scrupuloust", respect
the> .nt'gr,ty the mlplleclual honesl" of ,I!. off.cers corps Any effort
!o lorre unan,m,I\o' of vrew 10 compel adherence 10 somp pol'lrro
m,llta'\, pdrl" [,ne aga'f'st Ihe honestly flJr:pressed vrew,,; 01 lespon
Slblt' o/lll..ers I potnled out rs a perniCIOUS pract.ce which Jeopardrzes
ratl1('t than p'otPCls tnp ,nlegr,ty of the mrlotary profeSSion
16 Andrelllt'J GOodpd.,ter and Samuel P Huntrngton el al. C'VIl
Relatlolls Amprlcan Enterprtse InStltute'tor PubliC Poltcy
Rp"Pdl(h Wa.,h,ngton DC 1977 p 45 I
17 I F Slonp If) Tfmp 01 Torment 'Vrnlage Book.s NY 1968 pp
LH'utl'llallt Colonel Sam C SarkeslGn, US
Arm v. Rf'flr(>d. and chairman In
the of Political SCIence. Loyola
Unwcn:,lly of Chlcaf{o. Hc rerewed a B.A.
{mm 1'1,,' llladel and an M.A and a Ph.D.
{rom Co/umhza UnlVcrslly. He Includes
anIon,.; Ius publtcatcons Pohtics and Power:
An IntroductIOn to American Government,
and hI::> artIcle "An EmplrtCal Reassessment
of !l-ldltary Prof('sslOnalism" appeared in the
AUNusl 1977 Military ReVIew

Just how effective is the present Soviet civil defense system?
Many in the United States and Western Europe consider it a
first-rate program and on such a level that it is a crucial link
in the SOl'iet move toward achievement of strategic militury
superiority over the Free World. The uuthor unulyzes
evidence, however, which suggests that while the civil
defense system in the Soviet Union 'appears to be a massive,
widespread effort, carefully coordinated and well-executed,
it isn't nearly as effective as we might think. This is not to
say that a program does not exist; both its military and
civilian components are well-designed. There is a centrally
controlled, nationwide organization with a large number of
trained and experienced people in charge. Plans are ex-
tensive and well-defined. Resources and training are
another matter, and, as far as Kaplan is concerned, the
Soviets simply aren't far enough along to execute their
complex schemes efficiently .
Soviet Civil Defense:
Fred M. Kaplan
Condensed from Survival IGreat 8[1talO) MayJune 1978
OT since the early 1960s has civil
defense loomed so large in con-
troversies over US military strategy.
Several -defense analysts and experts
on the Soviet Umon believe that the
Soviet Union's civil defense program is
so comprehensive that it significantly
alters the strategic balance.
The Soviet Union, it is claimed,
could launch a first strike against US
land-based missiles, bomber bases and
submarines in port. Also, owing to its
civil defense program, the Soviet Un-
ion would, upon allout nuclear
rf'taliat'ion by the United States, lose
only two to 10 percent of its population
and could fu.!ly repair its economy to
preattack levels within two to four
years. This <lnticipated level of
damage, these analysts claim, is
hardly sufficient fur "deterrence."
If all this is true, it is indeed
somewhat alarming. However, at the
root of thf'se Soviet civil defense
analyses are several assumptions that
are highly questionable. These
assumptions must themselves be
The components of Soviet civil
defense that are assumed 01' described
in many of these analyses include: a
massive pvacuation aRd sheltering
plan; nationwide industrial protection
and dispersion; a well-trained public;
huge budgetary . resources;
preparations for postattack rescue and
recovery missions. These are necessary
ingredients for a civil
defense system, or at least for one
designed to protect 90 to 98 percen t of a
country's population. If even one of
these elements were to fail, the
:calculations made by a Soviet leader
concerning the degree 'of dalmage in-
. flicted upon his society in event of
an American nuclear strike would be
drastically undermined. This article
questions the existence of each of these
The Soviet Union has an im-
preSSIVe evacuation plan incorporating
most of its urban population.
No major city in the'Soviet' Union
has staged an evacuation exercise, nor
have any smaller cities conducted a
full-scale evacuation. 0f those drills
that have taken place, none has been
executed simultaneously with any
other; only one form of transportation
has been used; the drills had been
prepared weeks in advance. It would be
an extremely demanding task to
evacuate Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and
the other 219 Soviet cities with pop-
ulations above 100,000 without a single
rehf'arsal-and highly risky if it con-
stituted a crucial aspect of a nuclear
offensive (or uhreat of an offensive)
that would itself be hazardous.
Calculations,' based on figures in
Soviet civil defe'nse manuals, indicate
that 1.1 to 1.6 million people would
have to coordin'ate the evacuation and
alerting of citizens, registering of
evacuees, issuing travel authorizations
to them, forming convoys, providing
shelters and keeping evacuation com-
missions apprised of the vacuation's
progress. These organizers, according
to the manuals, would be drafted "from
the individuals not subject to call-up by
the armed forces." How so many
people would be selected, located, in-
structed .and compelled is not spelled
Problems with transportation would
be manifold. ,Most rail lines are single-
track. Most of the trains are constantly
loaded with freight, and many would
not be in the right place at the right
time. In a wartime emergency (which
this certainly would be), many would
be transporting- reserves and
equipment into Eastern Europe and
along the Sino-Soviet border. There are
only 4.2 million motor vehicles in
working order in the Soviet Union.
Roads are poor, only one-third of them
,being hard-surfaced. In winter, spring
or autumn, deep snow and ice or else
heavy rainfall would exacerbate the
In addition, since Moscow and
Leningrad, for example, are sur-
rounded by other industrial cities,
'-0wse residents would also be
evacuating, and since Leningrad
borders on to the ocean, evacuation of
the Soviet Union's two largest cities
would not disperse their populations to
any great extent.
Existing alld expeiiiellt shelters
would adequately protect Soviet
cit izell s.
At present, very few existing
shelters have food; only a few more
have water. The well-known Soviet-
food shortages-involving long grocery
lines and virtually no family
stockpiliog-would make survival in
shelters problematic.
The linchpin of a' shelter is its
ventilation system. Yet scientists at
Oak Ridge Laboratory in Tennessee
note that the filter specifications in the
official Soviet civil defense handbook
for 1974 significantly underestimate
the amount of air needed for shelter
survival. From this weakness, which
they describe as "the most serious flaw
in the whole Soviet Civil Defense
planning," the scientists infer "that
the Soviet Union has not conducted
mass shelter living experiments or
even simulated ones as has been done
in the US.''
Those simulations would hardly
inspire confidence. In one of the more
'famous US government-sponsored ex-
'periments, conducted in 19tH, it was
found that 85 degrees Fahrenheit was
the upp'er threshold of psychological
and physical tolerance in a shelter,
and concluded that mainfaining
tempprntures lower than this would be
so "difficult and expensive" as to be
not worth attempting. Moreover, in
needed: timber, boards, sheet metal,
bricks, cinder blocks, shove'If,_ Yet no
one has explained how they would be
handed out to the tens of millions
needing them, or demonstrated that
these materials are sufficiently
stockpiled and distributed. In an
"apartment society:" such fiS the Soviet
Union's, the problem of providing ade-
Schematic Diagram of a Shelter Air Supply System
With Industrial Equipmenit (Variant)
y ~ 2 5,;12
. 12 : I
I : '
1b 2 12 5 I I
l r----11-c ~ - f-----H------,
1 a Air tntake on the filter ventilation system
1 b - Air Intake on the clean ventilation system
7 Electro manual ventilator fan
8 - Regenerating UOit
2 - Antlellploslon mechamsm (gravel blast attenuator) 9 - Oxygen bottle
3 Carbon monmllde filter
4 Heat protective filter
5 Dust filter
6 Filter ventilation unit
existing shelters, the power for the
filtration system is connected to
outside power plants; if the plant is hit
'by a nuclear warhead, the filtration
. system is powerless.
As for expedient r;helters, one
wonders how they would be built,
Soviet s9urces list the materials
10- Air separation network
11 - Radioactive ventilator electnc blower
12 Airtight valves
quate supplies of shovels is par-
ticularly notable.
One also wonders when these
shelters are to be built. In the spring
and summer', food stocks are depleted
as the planting season is about to
begin. In autumn, it rains almost all
the time. In winter, hard snow covers
much of the ground, making digging
(and long-distance walking) very dif-
The Soviet Union has dispersed
its industries, thereby making the
United States hurl many more
warheads than has been thought
necessary to deliver "unacceptable
damage" to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has indeed built
many new towns and industrial
facilities east of the Urals (largely
because that is wher,e most of the
country's natural resources lie). Still,
this does not negate the fact that
Soviet economic planners have
deliberately followed a policy, since
World War II, of specialization, cen-
tralization and industrial concen-
tration. This is only befitting of a
centrally imposed planned - economy
with numerous bottlenecks.
To the extent that the Soviet
economy contains "choke points," they
are the chemical,' steel and electrical
industries. Yet 25 cities (most of them
major population centers) contain vir-
tually all the chemical plants in the
Soviet Union. Sixty percent of all
natural steel output comes from 15
plants, each producing 2.4 million tons
annually which are largely concen-
trated in the Ukraine's Donbas and
Dnieper Bend. The entire Central and
Volga regions, with a total population
of almost 60 million, receive almost all
their electricity from three
hydroelectric and two atomic power
plants, all located in large cities.
Twelve cities manufacture all the
cars. Of the 19 aluminum and alumina
factories, four Siberian plants produce
65 percent of the entire Soviet output.
Nine tractor plants produce 80 percent
gf the entire output. Almost all
engineering is done in seven cities.
There are only 34 sizable petroleum
refineries, eight copper and six lead-
zinc refineries. One could cite many
similar figures involving virtually
every important sector of the economy.
The Soviet Union spends huge
sums on civil defense-probably about
$20 billion in the past 20 years.
The $20-billion figure is cited com-
monly by many analysts. It is in-
structive to read one explanation of
how it was hit upon: .
... I must say this is all guesswork.
of course.
One calculation was to take 20
million people and provide them with
gas masks and protective
clothing . .. and so on. We priced it
once. back in 1962, what the equivalent
US cost would be . ...
Shelter construction ... and filter
ventilation units ... [are] expen-
sive . ... It is hard to put a figure on it.
We have nothing corresponding in this
Even without Representative LE\5l
Aspin's cogent criticism that it is mis
leading to gauge Soviet defense
spending in terms of what it would cost
in US dollars (owing to the Soviet
nonmarket economy, the nonconvert-
ibility of the ruble, differing pay scales
and teclinology costs in the United
. States and Soviet Union, and so forth),
this sort of methodology yields
meaningless results. It is difficult to
determine how many shelters,
sandbags, gas masks, and so forth
actually exist. Thus, it is impossible to
price such items realistically in the
aggregate cost. The "worst-possible
case" is merely assumed-
substantiated neither in fact nor in
Soviet manuals-and, in a rather un-
sophisticated results
The Soviet population is well
: trained for the rasks of civil defense.
I This claim in effect, disp\lteri by
I none other than Deputy Defense
Minister Alexandr Altunin,
the Soviet civil ?efense chief. In his
1976 annual report, he wrote:
In several: places [training of
command perSQnnel] took place after a
delay, and bt times at a low
methodological level. Many people
assembled for such sessions and were
led throug+ the various points of a
demonstrajtion exercise, but the
trainees did not _ receive what was
necessary. IThe practicai portion was
poorly org4nized and in a stereotyped
manner. I I
In 197 , the 35-hour :civil defense
training p ogram was reduced to 29
hours to allow"more time for other
military subjects. The study of nuclear
weapons effects and decontamination
elements of any
realistic civil defense training-was
dropped 'from the compulsory course.
The Soviet Union is wel/.equipped
and prep,ared for postattack rescue and
repair operations. '
Clearing roads would be one of the
first tasks of a postattack rescue and
repair. operation. Yet Soviet tractors
and bulldozers have very low-
horsepower, and 30 to 40 percent of
them are out of flction at anyone time
due to maintenance difficulties. Radio
and telephone communications
between command centers and field
workers are liable to be severed cpm-
pletely since many power lines and
radio stations will have been blasted
and many transmitters and receivers
melted by the effects of elec-
tromagnetic pulse.
Civil defense manuals presume the
use of protective gas masks for rescue
teams, indicating four different sizes of
masks. Yet nowhere is it indicated that
such gear is adequately distributed or
that the sizes are correct. The manual
notes: "In the winter, the [mask's]
facepiece may become stiff in ex-
tremely cold weather and the in-
halation and outlet valve mechanisms
may freeze." It is acknowledged that
residential areas would be ignored or
receive only secondary attention and
that "little can be done about
Maintaining adequate spare parts
and replacement capital is very dif-
ficult in the Soviet peacetime economy
and would be the more so when much
of the industrial base had been
dcstroyed. The chemical and
automoti VI' industries, in particular,
suffer from shortages in these areas.
Long delays plague the construction
of nurperous facilities, even with a
fully supportive economic in-
frastructure. The cement and con-
struction industries arc extraordinarily
slow; not a single cement plant has
been finished within the plan's
schedule. It takes the Soviet Union 11
to 15 years to build a single thermal
electric generating plant (compared
with four and one-fourth years in the
United States).
The 1974 civil defense manual notes
... transport of civil defense units
to stricken areas ... shall employ
motor transport of city motor transport
facilities not involved in evacuating
the civillUn population and available
In the rural zone.
Yet whether any cars will not have
been evacuated, whether these
facilities would survive and how-
given the poor quality of roads and
railway lines-they are to' be
transported are :Critical questions.
Moreover, even if the Soviet Union
could fully recover industrially within
two to four years, that is a long time
politically. China could take ad-
vantage of the Soviet Union's tem-
porary vulnerability and invade,
grabbing back long-lost territories and
perhaps more. Eastern Europe could
break away frq>m the Soviet orbit. 'Fhe
political for which,
presumably; the. Soviet Union
launched a first strike to begin with
would be severely hampered, if not
The UnitM States, after a Soviet
first strikp. 11'IJuid be able to destroy
only a very small fractlpn of Soviet

It has been assumed that after a
Soviet counterforce first strike, only
one-half of the American strategic
'nuclear arsenal would remain_ It is
then thought the United States would
target for maximum destruction of
Soviet industry with a single full-scale
attack using submarine-launched
ballistic missiles only_ Some
calculations indicate the United States
could, destroy only three percent of
Soviet territory.
However, it should be noted that
"the top 200 cities total about one-
fourth of one per cent of Soviet land
area." In other words, three percent of
Soviet territory comprises 12 times the
area of the 200 largest Soviet cities!
Moreover, there is no compelling
reason to believe that no American
bombers or intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) would survive. The
. I .
United would have at least three
days' Warrtin
time of evacuation.
This woul be ample tim. to retarget
ICBMs, d sperse bombe s and put
several onl airborne aler, put more
.. ' submarine$ on-station, i pose a tem-
porary missile launc -on-warning
policy, prepare for possible launching
of many of the 1P,000 or $0 American
"tactical nuclear weapons," and any
.number of other moves.
Furthermore, seven Poseidon sub-
marines could destroy roughly 60
percent of (he Soviet industrial base. If
one wanted to hit only those relatively
few, vulnerable and critjcal industrial
all of which lie in
major population centers-then a
much lower nuclear force would still be
sufficient to deliver what could
reasonably be called "unacceptable
damage" to the Soviet Union.
Several defense analysts, among
them Defense Secretary Harold Brown,
realize the enormously flawed
character of the Soviet civil defense
program (and civil defense generally).
They still worry. however. that Soviet
leaders might delude themselves into
believing that they could su'rvive and
win a nuclear war anyway,_ with dis-
astrous consequences for the Soviet
Union. the United States and the
There is. of course. always the
danger of an irrational leader coming
to power and possessing nuclear
weapons. However, it is not at all clear
that, under such circumstances, the
existence of a civil defense program-
especially a very limited one-would
make much difference. It is interesting
to note that not once has any Soviet
civilian or military, bran-
dished their civil defense operations as
a possible supplement to a first-strike
threat. Only certain people in the West,
many of them extreme RussoiJhobes,
have waved the specter of Soviet civil
defense and' "strategic superiority."
Soviet civil defense development
was first spurred in the late 1950s
when the Soviet Union feared the
possibility of an independent West
German nuclear force. The civil
defense effort has been moderately
upgraded in recent years. This has
coincided with the intensification of
Sino-Soviet tensions and the in-.
troduction of Chinese nuclear missiles,
as well as the American doctriil.e-
most explicitly stated by then Defense
Secretary James Schlesinger in 1973
and 1974-of "selective strikes" and a
much wider range of "strategic flexible
options." Given the extraordinary
political centralization and concen-
tration of the Soviet leadership. even a
few warheads landing in Moscow, for
example. could threaten the ruling
elite. .
Whatever the motivation behind
Soviet civil defense-which is itself
open to much speculation-it is quite
clear that the Soviet economy is not at
all conducive to comprehensive
protection efforts; that the civil defense
. chief himself doubts the program's
effectiveness; that the program is, on
numerous levels. quite unimpressive;
and that even if it suddenly became
more impressive, the United States
could easily and readily take steps to
counter any Soviet efforts and threats
with forces far below even present
levels. ''''k
Fred M. Kaplan IS a graduate fellow at tho
MIT Center for Internatzonal Stud,es.
"\,. ,
If we are to survive the confusion, isolation and fear on the
battlefield of the future and remain an effective fighting
force, we must believe. The individual soldier must train in
such an environment; he must believe in his equipment, his
fire team, his leaders and, most of all, in himself. Leaders
must know what they are doing. They must earn the respect
and trust of their troops. They, too, must practice and train.
Tactical exercises without troops and war games provide a
learning environment for leaders and staff officers. The sum
total of this experience is a team or unit which is combat-
ready and willing to fight the hard battles because they
VR knowledge of the future
battlefield is, quite naturally, in-
complete. However, we can be sure of
certain aspects of the battle. With long-
range weapons, heavy artillery, con-
centration, electronics warfare, smoke,
chemical agents and possible nuclear
release, we can be assured that con-
fusion will be near disaster propor-
tions. Our enemy will try to exploit this
confusion by employing a fast-moving
attack spearheaded by large armoI'-
heavy combined arms forces.
This type of attack would maximize
the already apparent isolation of our
combat formations. Soldiers fight
better and longer when supported by
other ubits. This confusion and
violence will tend to demonstrate their
isolation to them and thus decrease
their will to resist. What I am
describing are the building blocks of a
Can we manage this situation? It
would seem that only superhuman
effort could counter such a disaster. We
must remember, however, that violence
will be perceived on both sides. The
enemy soldier is not immune to the
effects of isolation and fear.
Our efforts must be directed toward
developing combat teams that are
proficient in the use of their weapons
and trained to integrate themselves
into the combined arms effort. They
must be made aware of the expected
scenario. It is not confusing to observe
a violent tank attack bypass your
position if you know it was part of the
plan. We must convince our own
soldiers of their ability to defeat the
Isolation is not to be taken in the
geographical sense. Teamwork toward
accomplishment of multiple tasks
leading toward a known objective will
reinforce the feeling of being sup-
ported. Sheer numbers will not ensure
because the feeling of isolation
is a personal experience which can be
imposed easily. during battle due to the
very confusion we earlier discussed.-
ASS,uming this evaluation is near
correct, how must we prepare our
combat battalions for this en-
vironment? This article will discuss the
training environment required tQ mold
an effective battalion combat team!
We ofteh speak of realistic combat
training, but what is realistic? Clearly,
realism pertains to your individual
sphere of activity. I have divided the
spheres for consideration into the in-
dividual soldier, the small unit leader,
the company commander and the bat-
talion staff officer. This does not cover
the entire waterfront, but demonstrates
the critical issues in training a combat
The individual soldier reluctantly
accepts the authority of others. He is
supremely protective of his own
identity, relating to others based upon
his own complicated language and
experience. In short, he believes he is
as capable as the next man to evaluate
what is good and bad for pis welfare.
Authority over this person is es-
tablished through repetitive
demonstrations that your judgment is
sound and your heart is with him,
Don't fool yourself; you must believe in
your soldiers if they are to believe in
Information is the key to belief.
Sufficient facts must be presented to
allow each \nan to assess the fUture
battle as it ,applies to him. Our recent
efforts toward threat briefings are a
step in that direction. Further proof
will be found in exercises such as
these develop personal understanding
of the implication of the exposure to
enemy I fire. The force ratio, however,
musl\ be realistic (3-to-1) if we are to
provide the soldier with a proper
outlook on his environment. This type
of exercise will build personal respon-
sibility, but will require other basic
Each soldier has the right to believe
. his equipment will perform as adver-
tised. This will require frequent visits
to the qualification range. Be smart!
Allow the individual who will actually'
employ each partIcular weapon tQ
qualify frequently. Your goal should be
excellent firing results each time they
fire. Remember, they will convince
themselves; you only provide infor-
Although tactics are difficult to
check at higher levels, individual
tactics can be checked through exer-
cises. Also necessary, however, is a
l'rIa)o'r Dcnms CarlEn IS a staff offIcer
aSSigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff fur OperatIOns and Intelilgence, First
US Arnjy, Fort George G Meade, Maryland.
He receIved a B A from St. Martm's College
and has served with the 377th Arttllery; 2d
Battaho'n. 827th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 54th
Infantry; and the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored
thorough knowledge of techniques
available for the soldier's use. His
understanding of these techniques
must be thoroughly checked-he must
believe he knows them. He can apply
only that which he is aware of.
We are back to isolation. The most
terrifying isolation is found directly
after contact when all are dispersed
and, due to cover, are not intervisible.
This must be overcome by training.
Immediate actions, perfected through
numerous and frequent repetitions, will
lead to automatic reaction. Action-
any action-will overcome this feeling
of isolation.
The individual is very much aware
of his lack of relative mobility. Land
mines are a critical part of his
protective shield. He knows you have
them. Don't hide them from him. Allow
him to prove to himself, through per
formance testing, that he is capable of
employing land mines.
Chemicals and nuclear weapons are
becoming more and more a threat.
Don't hold him hostage to your own
reluctance to operate in this en-
yironment. If, however, you expect him
to believe, you must require him to
perform his combat duties in a
chemical and nuclear environment.
Don't waste his time. He doesn't need
to have a special week, month or
quarter devoted to chemical training.
You control chemical and nuclear
release. Use it to convince, not scare.
The practice necessary to perform
critical tasks in nuclear, Qiological,
chemical (NBC) equipment is
paramount in his confidence in himself
and those around him.
He must believe he is as tough as
the enemy. The soldier will dwell on
such things as the enemy closing with
him and fighting hand to hand.
Clearly, this isn't what ,*e intend to let
happen, but we are willing to accept
that type engagement in given cir-
cumstances. Allow him to prepare for
Allied to this and the previous re-
quirements is the physical ability to
accomplish these demanding tasks
over a prolonged period. Physical
training must build strength and en
durance. Combat leaders, don't hide
behind the annual physical fitness
test. You have clearly demonstrated to
him that he can do that without being
in shape. Yes, he knows he's out of
shape. You must develop a program
that requires the strength and en-
durance required for extended combat.
We could take a lesson from our
adversary in this. A combat obstacle
course that would be timed might
fulfill this requirement.
We have discussed the individual in
great depth. He is the cornerstone of
your team. If he is expected to perform
your impossible mission, he must be
supremely confident in himself and
those around him.
The leader must be aware of these
needs. It is his mission to prepare his
men to do his bidding. We spoke of
confidence in your judgment and con-
victions. We are not telepathic. Your
performance is judged by your men
based upon what they see and hear.
Don't expect them to simply believe.
The small unit leader is relatively new
himself so he also must be prepared:
The small unit leader must believe
in his own grasp of the techniques of
employing his unit and equipment. The
learning process should not expose his
lack of knowledge to his subordinates.
Remember, you are counting on their
belief in him. You can't be there all the
TactIcal exercises I: without troops
(I'EWTs) are an 'pxeJlJent method to
providl'. a Il'arning environment. He
will rl'cpive the opporiunity to pmploy
tl'elllllques ill a controlled en
TI1l'sl' techniqups later can
bl' wIth his persoilnel to
dpvl'l()p tpamwork. It also will develop
(;iw him till' opportunity t() perform
llS many l'l'petitlOn::; ()f thpse
t(,l'hniqups as IS possible. Each
.lpplH'atllln should bl' vaned so that hl'
('an ('v,duat!' what tl'('hniqul' IS best for
what sltuati()n
Impli!'d 111 thl' individual soldier's
h.ISi" art' such things as "'Be,
hInd mllll'S llnd ()bstacles. and combat
tl'ChnHIUls. Obviously, these also apply
t() till' It'adp!,. Ill' must be til<' trainEe!',
pl'tlvllling ,til th., lip must be
prl'p:lrl'd f()!' this roll'.
('()mpany commallde!'s, I am sure
you an' f('pling thl' pressure. You
belll'H' in prl'p;lrntlOn for c()mbat, but
f(ll'i your tilTIll hl)lng (}uien (lv,,'ay by
I ()tlwr ohltgations. It is w<,11 to kpep in
rnind that yuur mpn anl not ;dways aoS
busy as vou are. In order to receive the
gn'nll'st mt'asun' I()r y()ur training
hour, vou must pnsure thlH vou ac-
tl1(' of
j'Pqulft'mt:nts in a givl'n tra 111111 g
p('riod. You must have clearly defined
pl'rf()l'lnan('p ohjPl'livps with known
standanb. Estahlishpd training stand-
ards carry with them a built-in
The training of the company com
mand .. r cannot be ignored either. He
be an expert in the application of
('ombat [t is not required
,that he be a combat veteran. lie, too, is
to fear and confusion.
'. Prepare him for confusion, above all.
You should expose him to potentially
confusing situations, allowing him an
opportunity to prove to himself his'
ability to deal with them.
Excellent methods of imposing this
confusion are combat simulation
games and field exercises. Your ob-
jective is to prove competence.
,Judicious use of advice and counseling
will bring most commanders along.
Make your extrcises increasingly dif
ficult. Hl' must be able to employ all of
his asspts. You aan '{ lower this re
quirement; it exists of itself. He will
knnw that he doesn't know.
To thi,; point, I have allowed the
description of the individual soldier to
Htand for all soldiers. It is important
hpre to elaborate on this . when
dpscribing the staff officer. I
[ am not going to accuse him of
horrible crimes against humanity, yet
'the natun' of the creature is slightly
differt'nt. Often, the staff officer has
. alrPHdy been pxposed to troop duty. His'
current assignment does not provide
the excitement nor danger of troop
duty, and his reaction is predictable.
The desire to effect the readiness of the
battalion is often translated in terms of
compptition with those performing his
" old duties. You must control this and
channelize these honorable intentions.
Thp staff officer is a member of a
team that is developed to inform and
assist the decisionmaking process of
thp commander. Staff officers must be
molded into a team by .th'e executive
officer and operations officer. The
ability to ttansform intelligence and
requirements into a staff estimate and
later into'l a staff recomrfiendation will
challenge your training abilities. Their
effect on your overall effOr) is
enormous. Properly trained, they. will
allow more time for assessment 0 the
mission at lower levels,. enhanbing
their knowledge of the intended
Combat simulation games are of
benefit here, as well as command post
e;{ercises. The staff officer also must be
prepared for confusion in orders and
reports. It is critical that his trabing
not be put off for reasons of
housekeeping requirements. It will
have beneficial side effects on day-to
day functions suc!' as better time
All training accomplished by our
organizations must be measurable. In
order to mold a team, you must make
them aware of the team. Confidence in
his own performance will lelfd to con-
fidence in those around l;1im. The
knowledge of objectives and standards
reinforces a belief that the team i ~
ready to perform. Frequent repetitions
of demanding exercises will cement
confidence in one another. The team
will have trained itself, developing the
esprit found in self-confident units.
You will have developed a combat-
ready battalion willing to stick in a
hard fight because they believe. "1..
Management of Army's Retirees for Potential Mobilization. The US
Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RC-
PAC). St. LoUIS. M,SSOUri. has begun a new personnel management
program The program will Identify. classify. establish periodic contact
with and make tentative employment aSSignments for Army retirees
(Regular Army and Reserve component) upon general mobilization.
Department of the Army now plans to recall selectively ap
proximately 10 percent of the various categories of the Army's retirees
to fill the Continental United States post. camp a'nd station positions
upon national mobilization. thus freeing others for demanding troop unit
assignments The follOWing upper age and grade criteria are being used
for mobilization consideration. age 64 for general officers. 62 for
warrant officers. 60 for all others.
RCPAC has matched its computerized personnel records against
those of the US Army Finance and Accounting Center. Now. uSing age.
grade and the dates upon which personnel retired. RCPAC Will group
the retirees Into an o r d ~ r In which they might be considered and called
for mobilization
Category I Will be th phYSically qualified retirees who meet the age
and grade CriteriA and have been retired for less than five years
Category II Will be those phYSically qualified who meet the same age
and grade criteria. but have been retired for five years or longer.
Category III will be those who are physically disqualified or who no
longer meet the age and grade criteria. A second task will be to examine
retirees' records. particularly regular Army personnel, and fill In gaps in
the 30 key data fields necessary for management.
RCPAC expects to contact each retired member tWice a year to verify
addresses, phYSical status and ciVilian occupation. Based upon military
and civilian skills, RCPAC will match retirees against Modification T,able
of Distribution and Allowances positions and, at mobilization, call them
to active duty as required.
For the past five years, the US Army has been reviewing and
updating its tactical doctrine. FM 100-5 has provided a good
starting point for the new doctrine. Perhaps it is time to
mOL'e on from there to develop modifications iT;l tactical
doctrine for other contingencies and to begin dealing with
strategic theory and doctrine 'as the base for alternate
tactical means to meet political objectives and contingencies.
The author has some definite ideas on how we should
develop and institutionalize a sound, logical method to
evaluate and modify our doctrine so that we are always
. prepared for the next war.
URING the past five the US
Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) has launched a
major program to review and update
our tactical doctrine. It is difficult to
measure the significance of that
program just yet. Nevertheless, the
men responsible for bringing our doc- I
trine out o{the era of World War II are
to be commended for their ability to
perceive the necessity for change. In
addition, they have developed a format
'for making that doctrine readable.
. Despite the positive results of the
TRADOC program, I am concerned
with what I believe to be major
deficiencies in the process of doctrinal
development as I believe it exists in our
Army today. In its most' simplistic
form, the process of doctrinal develop-
ment must consist of' at. least two
phases. The second, more perfunctory
phase consists of the writing and
publishing of. doctrine. Certainly
within the past five y;ears, we have
learned a great deal how to write
and which layout format is best for
Nevertheless, I believe a more
significant issue is from Whence did
that doctrine come? fl:'hat question
wg""," th, "T' .,,'
a phase of hypothesizing, concep-
tualizing and developing theory. After
all, doctrine is but a corollary of
theory. It is vitally important, then,
that we know upon which theories our
doctrine is based and even what the
foundation is for those theories.
We need to apply some of the prin-
ciples of transactional analysis to an
analysis of our doctrine. We must
begin by asking in a very critical
sense: What is our doctrine, and on
. what theories is it based? Then, we
must ask if we really want to base our
doctrine on that theory, or is that
theory just some of our intellectual
baggage inherited long ago and now
just a s'ubconscious influence, an in-'
fluence which should be recognized
and discarded? If we are to answ,er
such questions, the people who develop
\lur doctrine must go to their history
books and become serious students of
the history of the military art.
With that thesis in mind, I want to
discuss briefly six critical factors
which should be considered in the
process of developing US Army doc-
trine. Before doing that, though, a
precise working definition of doctrine
is necpssary. I submit the following
definition of doctrine:
Policies and generalizations
applicable to a subject which have
been developed through experience or
theory. They represent the best
available thought on the subject and
indicate and guide but do not bind in
practice. Doctrine is fundamental and
general in nature.
Doctrine is not universal in
application. There must be different
doctrine for different situations. In
addition, doctrine is the result of a
reasoning process, and it also must be
applied with reason. Doctrine should
guide a commander; it should form the
foundation of his thought process, but
it must not be dogmatic. Every battle is
different, and the successful use of a
doctrinal tactic in one war game or
battle does not predetermine its success
in the next.
With that understanding of what
doctrine is, the first and most im-
portant factor to be considered is our
intellectual and cultural military
heritage and our cognizance of that
heritage. Our developers of doctrine
should be able to discuss at a whim the
theories and practices of men like
Napoleon, Jomini, du Pi<;q, Grand-
maison, Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder,
Schlieffen, Guderian, Dragomirov,
Suvorov, Zhukov, A. T. Mahan, J. F. C.
Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet and Mao.
In addition they should be familiar
with the disciples, biographers and
analyzers of those men. Indeed, they
ought to be able to find most of those
works in their personal libraries. We
can ill afford ignorance of those men
and their theories among our doctrinal
developers. Yet a reading of Field
Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in-
dicates little understan'ding of, and
virtually no conscious attempt to draw
upon, the ideas of these men.
To illustrate the point, try to im-
agine an artist who is not trained in
the classic and romantic schools of art
and who cannot converse intelligently
about the masters and their con-
tributions to the world of art in terms
of technique and ideas. The same
relationship which exists between the
contemporary artist and the masters
should exist between contemporary
writers of doctrine and the masters of
our military profession.
Without a full understanding of
those masterful theorists and prac-
titioners of the military art, the
developers of cannot expect to
be conscious of, and have an analytic
appreciation for, their own thought
patterns. If they are. not cognizant of
the school of thought with which their
own ideas are most closely asSociated,
it is unlikely they will fully understand
what the alternatives are to that
school., Furthermore, without un-
derstanding their own thought
p3.tterns or the alternative schools of
thought, they will 'not possess the
knowledge necessary to analyze the
current state of the art intelligently.
It also logically follows that they
will not be able to develop viable new
courses of action to overcome the
dilemmas which exist within the
curren t state of the art. Indeed, the
ideas and principles of the various
schools of thought are the building
blocks upon which the final com-
position of current doctrine must rest.
Thus, the requirement exists to be
intimately familiar with our military
The second factor which should be
considered in developing Army doc-
trine is the national strategic objec-
tives. Our foreign policy ob,jectives are
numerous and diverse. It is obvious to
all that the defense of Western Europe
is a vital objective of that foreign
policy. But it is not our only national
objective. The Army's capstone doc-
trinal manual should contain our
philosophy and system of war. The
doctrine it expresses should be
applicable in general and limited,
nuclear and conventional war
operations, whether: those operations
be in the desert, id the jungle or in
, Europe.
Our present capstone manual is
oriented almost el\.c1usively toward
, I
gon,," in I
acknowledge the existence of"
specialized "How to manuals,
but I believe it is necessary to add
balance to our capstonJ manual. With
its present contents, i FM 100-5 is
basically a How to Fight manual for
Europe. Such a manual is necessary.
The capstone manual, however, should
be more general in scope and do ex-
actly what FM 100-5 purports to do:
provide those general 'principles and
statements of doctrine from which the
specialized How to Fight manuals can
be derived. Then, FM '100-5 could, in
fact, reflect the of US
strategic objectives.
The third factor, understanding
military strategy, is closely in-
terrelated with the first two factors.
Carl von Clausewitz telis us, "The
. political object-the original motive for
the war-will thus determine both the
'military object tp be reached and the.
amount of effort it requires.'" In other
words, military Istrategy-that is, the
military objective and the means and
manner by which the objective is to be
attained-should be modified ac-
cording to the national political ob-
Our capstone manual does not
suggest that either th'e military ob-
jective or the "amount of effort" might
be adjusted. The first sentence of the
first chapter of FM 100-5 clearly
defines the objective., "The Army's
primary objective is to win the land
battle . ... " How that objective is to be
attained is clearly stipulated on the
second page of the first chapter. '
The purpose of military operations,
and the focus of this; manual, is to
'Car! yon Clau5cwltz On War Edlled!and translated bv Michael
110""a10 ann Pete! PalO! Pfl'lCel0n Urllveh,l1Y Press Pnnceton N J
1976 p 81 I
describe how the U.S. Army destroys
enemy military forces and secures or
dcfends important geographic objec
tives. (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, the thrust of the en tire
manual is that the means by which the
land battle is to be won is by
destroying the enemy force. Our
capstone manual never provides
guidance on what military objective
rrnght properly be sought if it is not
necessary to destroy the enemy in
order to win the land battle.
Furthermore, it provides no
guidance on how to adjust the effort
expended if the political objective does
not require, and more importantly if
the political objective is not capatible
with, destruction of the enemy force.
Do our developers of doctrine believe
the American people and their
government will allow us to employ a
strategy of destruction with the mass
casualties to our own forces that such a
strategy entails in another limited
Clearly, destruction should not be
our only choice. About 100 years ago,
the noted German scholar, Hans
Delbruck, argued there were two basic
forms of military strategy: the strategy
of annihilation and the strategy of
attrition. In other words, an army
could destroy its adversary in the field,
or it could deny the enemy its means to
resist. Since the end of World War I,
theorists in increasing numbers have
argued a third alternative exists: the
strategy of exhaustion, a strategy
whereby the enemy's will to resist is
broken-that is, an attack on the
enemy's psychological or moral fabric.
It is imperative that our developers
of doctrine be aware of these three
forms of strategy and how near im
possible it has been to achieve success
with a strategy of annihilation during
the last 100 years. Unlike the 1968 and
previous editions of FM 1005, the
current edition does not include moral
factors in its definition of combat
power. On page 5-2 of the 1968 edition,
the following is found:
Combat power is 11 combination of
the physical means available to a
commander and the moral strength of
his command. It is meaningful only in
relation to the combat power of the
opposing force.
On page 3-3 of the current edition, a
far more limited and quantifiable
definition is found: "Adequate forces
and weapons must be concentrated at
the critical times and places. The com-
bination is combat power." Logically,
then, because we have chosen to ignore
of moral factors, we have
denied ourselves the possible use of a
strategy of exhaustion. It is difficult to
believe we did that intentionally.
Maybe we have simply forgotten some
of the teachings of the masters.
It is important to point out here that
we do not have within our new family
of field manuals a manual which deals
with strategi'C theory and doctrine. I
am compelled to recommend that one
be included. If that manual properly
accounts for the possibility of ad-
justing the strategic means of war,
then the developers of tactical doctrine
can develop alternative tactical means
to meet political objectives and con-
The actual process of doctrine for-
mulation, the fourth factor, includes
thinking, analyzing and testing. It
requires the synthesis of the three
factors already discussed.
In addition, such factors as our
theory of war, the national will, social
and political beliefs, fiscal constraints,
technological developments, enemy
capabilities and gepgraphic influences
must be considered. The delicate
balance achieved in the synthesis of all
those factors considered in doctrine
formulation determines the quality of,.
modern doctrine.
Now, we have reached a fun-
damental issue: the qualifications of
the people who perform those func
tions. Although my comments thus far
"have centered on just one discipline, I
believe the people who our
doctrine should represent three
different disciplines. There should be
scholars who are expert" in the
evolution of the military art. There
also should be systems analysts, and
there should be functional experts from
the combat, combat service and
combat service support branches.
Individually and collectively, they
should represent the finest minds in
the Army. They should be locat.ed in a
single headquarters and constitute a
balanced interdisciplinary team. That
. is an important point. All three dis-
ciplines can make valuable con-
tributions. We should never allow any
single discipline to dominate the
process. We must remain open to the
ideas and criticism of each .
In addition to their obvious func-
tions, the members of that inter-
disciplinary team should be a
wellspring of theoretical concepts and
provide a constant stream of articles
for publication about new concepts so
that those concepts can be thoroughly
challenged and refined in open forum
before they become doctrine.
The remaining two factors tb be
considered, writing and publication,
form the substance of the second phase
of doctrinal development. If tne team I
have described is, in fact, represent-
ative of the finest'minds fu the Army,
the writing of doctrine should continue
to improve. TRADOC has significantly
improved the readability of our doc-
trinal manuals with the . format
adopted for the new family of manuals.
Continued emphasis in this field
will result in further sophistication of
various writing techniques so that
specific manuals can be effectively
targeted at specific audiences. Once the
manuscript is written, the authors on
the interdisciplinary team shuuld be
responsible for only consultation and
approval of any editorial changes.
Publication, the final factor in the de-
velopment of doctrine, should be, ac-
complished by a centralized TRADOC
During the course of this article, it
should have become apparent to the
that there are two levels of
doctrine with which I am concerned:
strate !tic doctrine and tactical doctrine.
In order to accommodate the need to
present both levels of doctrine, I
believe a hierarchy of doctrinal
manuals is necessary. At the top of the
hierarchy should be a manual devoted
to strategic doctrine for the conduct of
land warfare.' It must address joint
service operations. It should be written
for the highest echelons of military
command. Consequently, it should be a
scholarly work.
In addition to advising under what
circumstances the three _ forms of
strategy should be employed, it should
wax philosophical and historical in
content. It should provide sufficient
strategic options to the field army
commander that he can adjust the
military strategy to meet the political
The second level of the hierarchy
should be the capstone manual for
tactical doctrine. It should be targeted
at those general officers who manage,
allocate and concentrate the resources
for war, and its scholarship should be
commensurate with their level of
education and expertise. Since it is
directed at the managers of war, it' also
might address US Army doctrine for
the logistical support of our mass,
tonnage-consuming army.
The next level of the hierarchy of
manuals should be directed at the
colonels who direct the battle. These
should be the upper echelon How to
Fight manuals. Although there may be
a few theoretical and historical
passages used to justify or explain a
particular doctrine, the predominant
thrust of those manuals should be
toward tactical doctrine which tells the
brigade and battalion commanders
how to direct and coordinate the mul-
titude of assets available to them.
The bottom level of the hierarchy is
reserved for the men who fight the
battles. These men need manuals
devoted exclusively to tactical doctrine
and principles. They need to know how
to fight. Some How to Fight manuals
may be written for captains, others for
sergeants. The manuals must be
written accordingly.
Even at the fighting level, doctrine
should, not be dogmatic. The fighting
leader must be challenged to think on
the battlefield. He must be provided
with principles and doctrine in his
training manuals which enable him
through a logical 'reasoning process to
develop a doctrinally sound plan
regardless of the situation. The ul-
timate test of any doctrinal literature is
that it provides its user with the basis
for developing a thoroughly reasoned
solution to an unforeseen situation.
"A great deal of good has come from
TRADOC's efforts of the past five
years, not the least of which is the
stimulation of thought, discussion and
debate about what our doctrine is and
ought to be. Now, it is time to turn our
'attention to the' matter of how our
doctrine should ~ e formulated. We need
to develop and institutionalize a sound,
logical, open method which will enable
us to evaluate and modify our doctrine
continuously so that we are always
prepared for the next war.
This article is but a first attempt to
suggest a method for developing doc-
trine. I hope it will stimulate further
discussion in open forum, for, if we are
to meet our responsibilities to preserve
not only our materiel resources, but
more importantly to minimize the loss
of our troops in the next war, we must
continually seek better ways to develop
better doctrine for how we fight. "h
Major John W. Taylor is the Off.ce of
the Deputy Ch.ef of Staff for OperatIOns and
, Plans. Washington, D.C. He received a B,A.
In h.story from M.ddlebury College and an
M.A. In miiltary h.story from Temple UnI-
vers.ty and .s a 1978 graduate of the
USACGSC. He has served as assistant
professor of history of the military art at the

The Danish Resistance Movement
and Its Relations With Great Britain
Major K. G. H Hlllmgs,l\
Militaert tJdssknft'
August-September 1978 (Denmark)
Under lessons learned from history, one
asppct of defense which is frequently
neglected is the relatIOnship between the
people of an occupied country and the
enemies of the occupation forces. Since
formal declarations of war, neatly drawn
front lines of battle and clear conceptions
of wh9 started It seem to be things of the
past, a closer look at what happened in
Denmark during World War "'iJ.....might
provide some insight mto the strengths and
pitfalls of pursuing or dealing with those
who might conduct a de facto revolutionary
war. The parties involved In the Danish
occupation were Denmark, Germany, Den-
mark's legal government and the Allies.
Through the years, certain factors have
been i characteristic of every successful
revolutionary war. These factors include
the goal, the active group, the motive, the
existence of objectIve and subjective con-
ditions for a revolutionary war in the target
state, support, unity of command, terrain,
economy and time.
Denmark could not be regarded as an
ally during World War II for several
reasons. Denmark was never officially at
war with Germany. The Danish will to
. resist was dampened by the lawfully
government and the ensuing reluc-
tance of the majority of Danes. Also, the
DanIsh resistance movement was
fragmented and had no official leadership
from 1940 until September 1943.
The'results of the armed resistance were
relatively insIgnificant. The Allies doubted
the Danish to fight and bureaucratic
politics jn London interfered with
recognition of the results of the fighting.
Christmas Ml'lller, who tried to help the
resistance movement from London, had
political and personal trouble leading the'
Danish resistance movement despite his
ideals and nationalIstic motivation. His
ineptness, lack of understanding of the
English language and British political
system and lack of official' status for a year
and a half contributed to the weaknesses in
the command and communication systems
between Great Britain and Denmark.
Becnuse of the difficulty in cooperation
w.ith Great Britain, the Danish resistance
movement received less support in general
from the other Allies
The American MIlitary on the Frontier
Proceedings of the Seventh
Military History Symposium
US Air Force Academi
1976 i
Edited by Major James P Tate, USAF,
US Air Force Academy
Nicely presented, but weal> in unity of
organization, the compiled lectures and
commentaries of this symposium do not
develop the stated theme that; .
Throughout the course of American
history the military in the west has exerted
a strong influence on developing American
institutIOns, attitudes, weals and culture.
They do, however, provide a collection of
enjoyable lectures and stimulating com
by distinguished historians on a
wide range of subjects concerning the
American military on the postCivil War
frontier, thus offering something ;f interest
for mlhtary history buffs of all inclinations.
Author Henry Walker's lecture "The
Enlisted SoldIer on the Frontier," coupled
with Dr. Sandra L. Myres' "The Ladies of
the Army-Views of Western Life,"
presents the rIch detail of history through
glimpses of personalities and singular
Walker's description of training Dnd
discipline wIll shock some readers as he
concludes that many frontIer disasters can
be attributed in large measure to the
soldier's inability to ride and shoot.
Numerous labor details and other duties
left little time for marksmanship and riding
Myers' excerpts from dIaries of Army
wives allow for a better understanding of
Victoriun vIews of the West, as well as
showing another SIde of the Army's "of-
ficial and PrJvutp attitudes and actions."
Th" comparatl ve hIstory student would
be remISS in not readIng both Professor
Ilesmond Morton's "Comparison of
U S. Canadian Military Experience on the
FrnntlPr" and the inCIsive commentaries on
his lecture by Professors Robert G. Athearn
and Richard A Preston. Together, the,e
thrl'e pieces WInnow myth from reality und
identify SIgnifICant dIfferences between the
two nationo-differences In philosophy and
ideology which impacted on the actions
and attItudes of the two respective milItary
The k"ynotl' I"cturc, given by Professor
Robert M. Utley. provides two especially
thoughtprovokll1g conclusions: One, the
Amerwan military has fail .. d to learn from
thl'St' t'xp<'ril'ncf's where thl' "frontier army
was a l"onvpntlOnallnilitary force lryinj..! to
control hy ('()nvl'nlIonal military methods,
a p"ople that did not behave like conven
tional enemies"; two, that "a clear and
undpniable contribution of the frontier to
the national military tradition is its large
role in the rise of professionalism in the
Ironically, Dr. Utley argues that the
stimulus for this growth of professionalism,
"so indispensable in the great world wars
of the twentieth century," resulted from a
turning il).ward as the soldiers were rejected
by their countrymen and isolated on their
frontier posts.
Is America Becoming Number 27
Current Trends
in the USSoviet Military Balance
Committee on the Present Danger
5 October 1978
The debate on the state of the SovietUS
military balance has produced a consensus
judgment that if present trends continue,
the US will soon be in a situation of
military inferiority. This is the conclusion
reached by a recent analysis which drew
together the full range of available in
telligence concerning the military
capabilities of the two superpowers against
a background of their respective strate,pc
doctrines. Authors of the report further
agree that such a position of US inferiority
will Increase instability in international
politics by making it possible for the Soviet
Union to attempt political coercion backed
by the credible threat of superior conven
tional and nuclear force.
The actions of the Soviet leaders over
the last 15 years leave no doubt they
consider the shift in the US Soviet balance
favorable to them and the growth, of Soviet
military power-specifically' nuclear
power-to be basic to all else that has
happened, 'or may happen, in the evolution
of world politics.
US accommodation to the Soviet drive
for strategic superiority would confer to the
Soviet Union the ability to intimidate and
coerce the We'!;t into accepting unfavorable
bargins. Soviet strategic superiority would
give the USSR dominance in crisis
situations; the US would then have to
accept that if a crisis were to escalate to
strategic nuclear war, the Soviet Union
would expect (at a high but not intolerable
cost) to prevail while maintaining a
postwar preponderance of global military
The Soviet military buildup has been
steady, impressive in scale and quality and
dramatic in breadth and dep,h. It has gone
on for more than 15 years and continues
steadily at a :rate rehably estimated to be
between at least four percent to five percent
a year. Their military budget today is
greater by almost 60 percent than' our own.
"The size, sophistication and rate of
military growth far exceeds the re-
quirement for defense," concludes the
report. The buildup reflects the offensive
nature of the Soviet political and military
challenge and the Soviet belief that the use
of force remains a viable instrument of
foreign policy.
Strategic Mobility
Can We Get There From Here-In Time?
AssociatIOn of the United Army
Special Report
In 197G, the Association of the US Army
Defense Report identified strategic mobility
as Hie "Achilles heel" of the US defense
estahlishment. This current 'report, well-
researched and presented in terms readily
understandable to the layman, concludes
that httle has changed. It is doubtful that
we could deploy and support the forces
necessary to meet stated international com-
mitments. .
Based upon the United States' publicly
stated policy to "be prepared to fight one
and a half wars simultaneously," the
authors considered the "impact of the
mobility system on a NATO reinforcing
mission and the possibility of a
simultaneous Mideast mission." They then
conducted a comprehensive analysis both
of the total system and of the various
subsystems. Their conclusion is that the
total system is marginally adequate to
support the NATO mission alone for any
extended period of ground combat. Un-
questionably, the additional Middle East
contingency would overtax our mobility
Two major subsystems are identified as
the weak li,nks. First is the dilapidated US
railroad system. Today, the United States
has fewer miles of active railroad lines
rhan we had in 1945, and much of what we
have IS inadequately maintained to support
the massive cargo' required to
support a NATO mission. Secondly, our
once powerful maritime strength is greatly
diminished in numbers, vessels capable of
carrying military cargo and in ability to be
off-loaded expeditiously. If, as the authors
contend, "the deciding battles of a NATO
war could be fought on, over and under the
Atlantic Ocean, not on tke soil of Western
Europe," we have reason. for concern.
This rep6rt should be read by all
military leaders, for truly: .
... the best fighting} units in the world
are of little value to ire exercise of United
States foreign poltcy rand the protection of
Unzted States intere ts if they cannot be
moved, landed and !ppported where they
are needed.
Tht'se art? puhh.shpd as a serV1C't? to the readers Every effort IS made
to enSUfe' acrurate translatIOn and summanzatlOn. However: f
more detalled
readers should Tpfer to the origInal articles. No official endorsement of
the Vl'WS. OpInIOnS or factual slatements in. these Items IS inten ed or should be
inferred -EdItor . I

Arm) Training Study. In the fall of 1977, the Department of the Army COA)
dll'pctpd a study to examme the relatIOnshIps between training resources, training
prol-(rams, training readiness and combat effectiveness. To accomplish the
ohjP"tivl' of the study, the Army' Training Study (ARTS) Study Advisory Group
ISAG) imtmlly ggreed to examine the following seven major issues: resources and
traimnl-( programs required to achieve training proficiency within tbe Total Army
tf,lIning- s:\,stpm; a common costIng program for training which would accurately
addl'l'ss dollars, people and time; a readiness reporting system capable of
'tnt'Cl1-.UrIng' training profieipncy and training readiness, the optimum mix of
tramllll-( programs in the training base and in the operating force: training
pn>l-(rams which could facilitate the efficipnt transition of the total peacetime
Army to one of sustained comhat; a methodology which would establish the
rt,latllln,llIp hetween training programs, proficiency and combat effectiveness for
tl1l' Total Army; and a plan for an effect:ve and justifiable training system for the
It hecaml' evident, however. that traming data from all availahle sources were
lllsufticlent to respond to the imtial study goals. In early HJ7K, the ARTS WDS
ndrl'Owed to focus on relating the number of indIvidual and collpctivl' tasks which
Ulllb nlust mastpr to the requirpd rpsources and frequency of traIning necessary
fllr maintmninl-( competence ThIS mcluded a determmation of the tmining
progrdnl:-> required to optimize the capabIlities of major n('w weapons systems
pl'Ol-(ramed for delIvery to the forcp in the 1980s and a plan to prescnbe
pn.mobilization strateg-ie.s for Re,sprve components.
To "alTV tl", study, the ARTS group developed the BattalIon Trall1l11g Model
IHTMI Th" BTM was a general traInmg model which depIcted thp rplationsblP
among rCFiources. traInIng programs, traInIng proficiency. verIficatIOn and
"om hat "ITeetlveness and which trnnslated attItudInal and DnDlvtleal data into
trainlll': facts It related such factors as turbulence; officer and n,;ncommlssioned
otfw"r st'l"pngth, aVaIlabilIty of trainers and trainees; allocation of resources
(pdroil'un1. OIls and ammunItIun, repair parts, training an'as); ttme
nl"""arv to traIn and retrain for thp Army Training and EvaluatIOn Program,
tl1<' Soldi'pr's Manual and miSSIOn tnsks; II1divldual and collpctivp profiCIency; and
tl'<llnlng and combat rt>ndIness.
Anotlwr support arm of the ARTS was the Training Effectiveness Analysis (rEA)
l'rol-(ram d,'vplOjH'd by the US Army TraIning and Doctrint' Command. The TEA
l'rol-(ram was used prImarily to provide the necessary data for the BTM and to
.:"'" a ':l'nt'ral Ilvervipw of the general state of training in the Army.
TIll' Alfl'S finnl re]lort products were distnbuted to the SAG and consultant
.:rouJls 111 August and Sppt,'ml1l'r 197K. Releasp of ARTS conclusions will be'in
"onJulH'tion with I)A approval
lLt'm:-. In thl:-' department ar' SUlnmar1l':-. of studleH curnmtly underway or
rtI..'tntly {'omplt'tt'ci 1I1 tht dl'fpnsp commumty, Whtlt' CVNY toffort is made
tn t.>nsun al'l'urm'y, puhhl'utlOn )('ad tlmp may result In differences
between the !-iummnrIes nnd the uctual study prog-ram,-F:dltor

The Real Puerto Rican Guard
In the August 1978 issue of the MilItary
RCl'lI'Il'. there appears a condensed a'rticle
from one origInally published in An
CvsantOlr, written by Shaun M. Darragh, a
former captain of the Puerto Rican Army
National Guard. I
I am cvmpelled to take exceptIOn to the
article pel' se and In specific uf certain
supposedly true infurmation that appears
therein. FIrst of all, Captain Shaun M.
Darragh served in the Puerto Rican Army
NatIOnal Guard from June 1972 to
November 1fl74. Taking as true the date of
September 1977 uf the angInal publicatIOn
in All Cosalltolr and August 1978 as the
publication date of the article in the
,Hililary ReUleii' magazine, it is incorrect to
hay!' identified CaptaIn Darragh as a
Puerto Rican Army National Guard officer
,ince he was officially discharged from the
Pm'rto RIcan Army NatIOnal Guard of the
United States In November 1974.
From the very outset of the article, it is
thoroughly evident that former Captain
Darragh's short tenure in the Puerto Rican
National Guard has led him to propose as
true the erroneous assumptIOn that the
militia of Puerto Rico or the Puerto Rican
military forces was founded by "an Irish
general." First of all, Alejandro O'Reilly
was not an Irishman, but a descendant of
Irishmen that had settled in Northern
Spain. The historic founder of the Puerto
Rican mtlitia was the first governor of
Puerto Rico, Governor Juan Ponce de Leon.
in the early 16th century, the same that
died in what is now the state of Flqrida in
pursuit of the fountain of youth. '
The Constitution of the United States
authorizes the establishment. of a state
militia. The name Fuerzas Mllitares de
Puerto RICO means Military Forces .of
Puerto RICO, organized as authorized by the
Constitution ot the United as local
milItia controlled by the state, whose of-
ficers and men are commIssioned by the
governor, as authurized by state law.
Through specific regulatiuns promulgated
by the secretaries of the. Army and the Air
Furce, through' the National Guard Bureau,
they are federal1y. recognized.
Because the mission and the duties of a
state national guard, state military forces,
state milItia, or army or air force national
guard of a state or a commonwealth are
well known, I will not discuss them. As in
any other state, commonwealth or territory,
the .commander in chief of the state
military forces is the governor except, when
federalized, the commander in chief is the
president of the United States. It is unfor-
tunate that smce we are not a state we
cannot claim to be the oldest state mihtia.
Since we are a part of the United States, we
can claIm to have the oldest state militia or
mihtary forces under the United States
Dunng the Korean War, the 65th In-
fantry Regiment was mobilized and saw
actIOn m the Korean Conflict. The 65th
Infantry Regiment has a place of honor in
the history of the United States Marine
Corps when, against a superior and more
numerous enemy, it covered the retreat of
the 3d Infantry Marine from the
Chosin Reservoir. It is ot. no particular
significance that during the. Vie1l)a'm" War,
National Guard llnits of Puerto Rico" were
not feperalized since it was a rare exceptipn
that units from the several states were
federalized for the Vietnam theater. 'It is"'
important to note that during the Whole
period that ,covers the Vietnam era. Puerto
Rico's seleotive service system quota was
always filled by volunteers. Percen
tagewise, Puerto Rico had more casualties
during the Korean War and the Vietnam
War than most of the states of the union.
The article leaves a question that asks:
Can the Puerto Rican National Guard
fulfill its dual mission'? As the a'1ljutant
general of the Puerto Rican NatIOnal
Guard, as a Ul11ted States citizen and as a
member of the executive branch of our
government, freely elected by the Puerto
l{ican electorate, whose great "majority has
demonstrated Its d('sire to maintain a per
manent unItll1 with the United States, I
believe the answer to be very obvious. It is
evident that the Writer unfortunately lacks
the knowledge and feeling of what is a
Mal Gen Orlando lIenza. PRNG.
The Adjutant General
Are We Serious About RSI?
Thl' US Army, espeCially US Army,
Europl'. talks about the importance of
rationalization, standardiLatlOn and in
teroperallllIty IRSI) with our NATO allies.
One area of [{SI IS standardization
agn'eml'nts but General
Blanchard. commander In chief, US Army,
Europe, recently said he was amazed and
at the Armywidp lack of
awareness of STANAGs.
If the Armv IS seriOUS about [{SI, the US
Armv and Doctrine Command
InSist that the appropriate
STANA(; be included as an appendix to the
next "han!4" to every field manual which
dcalh With an area of NATO a!4reemenl. A
sid" b"lwfit of thiS n'quirpment would he to
pOInt out and nodif,\' thp areafi in which our
dodrint' haH from thp of'tl'n out-
It Col William A Cauthen Jr , USA
Durndl Plains
I read Lieutenant Colonel James B.
Channon's article "Boris Popov and the
Electric Piranha" (Military Review,August
1978) with great interest. It seems to me a
very innovative article, and there is no
doubt much value in it-if you can agree
with the ptltential theater of operations.
It is just there where my reservations
arise. On page 39, it becomes evident that
the land of Durndl includes the Rhine
River. Colonel Channon, having served a
tour in Germany, is most certainly not only
familiar with Rheinwein, but he is most
likely also aware of the geographical
position of this river. Locating the land of
Durndl at the Rhine gives one reason to
think. Between the Elbe and the Rhine,
there is nothing more than a few blades of
grass. In other words, there is nothing like
a theater where the electric piranha doc
trine would seem appropriate: 30 percent of
West Germany's population and 25 percent
of its industry lie within 65 miles of its
eastern borders. Thus, even a minimum
loss of our territory would jeopardize West
Germany and render impossible any
further defense of Western Europe.
This is why NATO has adopted the
strategy of forward defense. And that is
why Allied Command Europe had best
continue to be the big guys-perhaps not as
big as Comrade Popov but big enough to
keep him away from NATO territory.
Col Manfred K Rode, FRG Army
Outdated Reserves

I have Just reading Captain
,john T. Fishel's "Ready for What?: The
Army's Heservp Components" (MR,
Nllwmbl'r 197H), and I am dismayed that
such n distinl4l1ished professional journal
would puhlish such an outdated, incomplete
:tlld misbldin!4 ar!lele,
The use of strength data more than two
,years old is cause for wonder. Surely, the
Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and
the National Guard Bureau could have
provitkd more uptodate figures. CIting
examples of annual training evaluatIOn
mort' .than five years ago ignores the
significant progress that has been.achieved
through til<' application of the
STEADFAST concept. I am sure that
members of the US Army Forces
Command, Office of the Deputy Chi"f of
Staff for Operotions and Plans, Reserve
TraInIng DivIHIOn, or any
Army readiness region or the armies in the
Continental United States would have been
pleaoed to bring Captain Fishel up to date.
The diSCUSSIOn of the Reserve
cmnp"lll'nts (RC) eqUlpmJnt problem is
totally incomplete. This is a senous
proble111 nnct one deserVIng nlore com-
prehensive treJtment.
I belIeve a subject as cntical as the
readiness of the RC deserves the h"nefit of
mnn' timely r"search and a better ap
preciatinn of what today's probjems are.
The citizensoldier of today Ifaces a
monumental task with too few resources'
availahle to him. Yet the "Qne.Army
Cllncept" demands the highest of RC
pl'act'lime readiness ever deman ed. I, ap-
prl'ciate Captain Fishel's in teres , but he
shlluld "tell it like it is"-not "was."
Col B. J. Pinker,ton, USA
US Army Readiness VII
Exploring FM 100-5
Your continued exploratidn,: through
your articles, into all the ramifiations of
Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Opera/ions, has
been good reading. The challenges
presented by Soviet/Warsaw Pact
breakthrough strategies can be met
through our constant analysis aind subse-
quent doctrine perfection. '
Mai Theodore M. K\uz, USAF
Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their
opInions and ideas on military topics. It is not restricted. to comments or rebuttals on
previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may
stImulate or improve the value of thought in the military community.
The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in
deference to available I
More AH1S Helicopters Ordered. The Army has ordered 66 more
AHT S antlarmor helIcopters from Bell HelIcopter Textron. DeliverIes of
the modernized Cobtas Will take place betweeh April 1980 and February
1981 The $33.702.000 contract Includes service, maintenance and
data consideratIOns for the aircraft
~ E W S
The US Air Force has ordered mto production the ANITRN41
lightweight, alr-droppable tactical air navigation (TACAN)
The 100-pound system provides bearing and distance mfor-
matlon to pilots landing at small, unimproved landmg sites.
The battery-powered TACAN delivers a complete 100-watt
signal, usable to distances up to 75 miles
The TACAN IS produced by E-Systems of Salt Lake City, Utah.
The contract, valued at more than $1.5 million, calls for the
delivery of the first systems, support equipment and technical
data m 1979. Production IS scheduled for completion m 1980
The Mlilcary Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff
College assume no responsibility for accuracy 01 mformatlon contained in the NEWS section 01 this
publication Items are printed as a service to the readers No official endorsement of the views,
opInions or factual statempnts IS Intended -Editor
A new mobility system for US ar-
mored vehicles that IS lighter, simpler
and provides a smoother ride over rough
terram IS bemg fabricated and tested by
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.
The new tread. called the Loopwheel. can
reduce the weight of a vehlcle nearly 10
percent and contams 85 percent fewer
parts than the conventional track and
suspension system now bemg used on
US armored vehicles
The Loopwhee/ consists of two or
more barrel-shaped glass fiber oores that
are nested together with a rubber-like
material which provides the tread.
Metallc parts protect the edges Lockheed
,orlgmally conceived the system for
possible use on a lunar rovmg vehicle,
and a prototype was tested earlier by the.
National Aeronautic and Space Ad-'
The photograph shows the Loopwheel
alongside a conventional track. The
drawmg shows detail of the design.
Straight Portion
D.strlbutes Load

Morcos (Mortar Computing System) is
a new, lightweight, hand-held computer
for use in mortar command posts.
Developed by Marconi Space and
Defence Systems, Limited, England,
Morcos has been designed to elec-
tronically replace the existing manual
methods of fire prediction calculation
which are time-consuming, inaccurate,
clumsy, difficult to teach and wasteful of
Morcos is single self-contained unit
incorporating a computer, keyboard for
data entry, display and batteries. The
case is built of durable plastic and
profiled so that it fits comfortably in the
hand. It is built to full military
specifications to withstand adverse
climatic, environmental and nuclear
The computer in Morcos is a
microprocessor with access to a
semiconductor backing store. Each
ballistic program can predict for one type
of mortar and Its attendant ammunition.
The program can be changed in seconds
by removing a plug-in memory unit
(called a. personality module) and by
. replacmg it by another for a different
mortar or ammunition system. This can
be done in all weather conditions:
because the moisture seal in the
equipment is not broken.
Morcos is powered by batteries which
can be either primary cells or
rechargeable. It weighs, including
batteries, less than 0.91 kilograms and
measures 21.5 millimeters long, 9.9
millimeters wide and 4.5 millimeters
Accordmg to reliable sources, the
NatJOnale Volksarmee (NVA) of the
German Democratic Republic IS to be
equipped with newly developed biological
and chemical weapons systems Current
plans of the East Berlin defense Mmlstry
call for every army to receive a chemical
battalion and every regiment a chemical
combat platoon NVA soldiers have been
trammg m Soviet trammg camps. Upon
completion of their traming, special of-
ficers are scheduled to organize the new
chen!lIcal battalIOns. In the division staffs
of the NVA, preparations are underway
for establlshmg the new units.
sources mdlcate that chemical battalions
and chemical platoons will be set up in
MIlitary District III, Headquarters, Leipzig,
and in MIlitary District V, Headquarters,
Neubrandenburg.-ASMl, 1978.
The ZPUIA has recently seen in the hands of several Third World
nations and groups. Some pieces of the equipment were captured
by the Ethiopians dUring the fighting with Somalia. It has not been identified
in Warsaw Pact units. indicating the weapon apparently IS produced by the
Soviets for export only.
Although primarily an antiaircraft (AA) weapon. the ZPUIA may be used in a
ground fire role.
Characteristics of the ZPU1A are:
Caliber .......................................................
Maximum AA range .................................... 2,000 meters
Maximum hOrizontal range .............................. 7.000 meters
Rate of fire ........................ (cyclic) 550600 rounds per minute
Fire control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. reflex/telescope sight'
Crew ............................................................... 3
-AFSTC news Item.
A Norwegian company has developed
a new fighter tank to be mounted on. the
chassIs of the American M24 tanks II')
service In Norway since 1945 The new
NMl16 has a 90mm gun, two 12 7mm
machlneguns, a laser range finder and a
new 255-horsepower diesel motor. Ac-
cording to Norwegian calculations. the
new NMl16 should cost only a third of a
new foreign tank -Kampftruppen.
The Syrian armed forces have ordered
2,000 Pinzgauer cross-country vehicles
from Stfyr-Dai.mler-Puch. The Austrian
-motor speCializes In cross-
country alpine vehicles It produces the
Pinzgauer two-axle 4x4 and the three-
axle 6x6 which have a variety of military
and commercial applicatlons-
A Royal Australian Air Force Flll C
fighter-bomber began preparation In Oc-
tober for a program expected to convert It
mto the most sophisticated strategic
reconnaissance aircraft In the world.
The aircraft. the first of four
scheduled to be converted. will have
extensive detection capabilities. The air-
craft's manufacturer. General Dynamics
of Fort Worth. Texas. is the prime con-
tractor for the conversion though the
systems to be installed have been
designed in Australia.
The cost of convertmg the four aircraft
Will be $A28 million The first plane will
be converted In the United States; the
others Will be done at the Royal
Australian Air Force base in Queensland.
The reconnaissance kits will be in-
stalled in the aircraft's weapons bays
rather than pod-mounted on Wings.
This is expected to allow the aircraft to
operate at maximum range rather than
lose distance because of the extra drag
associated With external stores.-
Australian Bulletin. '

Documenting Southeast Asia
BIG STORY How the AmerICan Press and TeleVISIOn Reported and Interpreted the enSls of Tet 1968 '" Vietnam and Washington
by Peter Braestrup 740 Pages. Volume L 706 Pages. Volume 2 WestView Press. Boulder. Colo 1977 $5000 a set
More than 10 years have passed since Tet appeared on the television screens and front
pages of America. Concerned and confused, the American public was bombarded with report
after report of Vietcong ana North Vietnamese army assaults, allied responses and the
resulting carnage on both sides. News coverage 9f Tet 196R and later press coverage of the
Vietnam War aggravated an already touchy relationship between the media and.the military.
During the ensuing 10 years. many officials-military men, members of the media and
citizens alike-have questioned: "How good a job did the American press do in reporting the
Vietnam conflict'?" .
Peter Braestrup. by any account one of the most knowledgeable and experienced reporters
writing from Vietnam during the Tet period, has attempted il1' Big Story to provide the
answers. In large measure. he has succeeded. .
Braestrup possessed what most Vietnam reporters lacked-firsthand knowledge of
warfare-when he joined The Washington Post in 1968 as Saigon bureau chief. He served as a
frontline infantry officer and l"ter covered combat in Algeria and Southeast Asia for The
Neu' York Times. J
In a prodigious, scholarly, twovolume work (a cOlldensed paperback is also available),
Braestrup wrote from firsthand knowledge of how the American press and television reported
and interpreted the crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. If you thought the worst of
press performance in reporting the war, this boo\< will probably confirm the indictment.
i Using Tet as a case history in depth of the po!1lrayal of the war in Vietnam, Braestrup hflS
compiled an easily readable document reflecting his analysis of millions of words 'published in
newspapers and news magazines and broadcast over radio and television, the examination of
I thousands of feet of television film and interviews with scores of participants in Vietnam .
. Reportage by leading journalists appears in the work, and their reports and commentaries are
matched not against official claims or a critic's polemics, but against the facts and resources
available to news organizations at the time the original accounts were written. This work is a
milestol1e-a solid .... dispassionate analysis of the role of the US presS in the Vietnam War, and
the most study ever of print and electronic news coverage of a major event.
l Big Story has,aroused strong emotions among the reporters who participated in telling
America .about Tet 1968. One womar reporter states that the book "in fact is a superlatively
detailed case history of ohe of the most monumental foulups ~ f contemporary journalism."
Another reporter. who won a PUlitzef Prize fot his Vietnam ,reportage, calls the book an
"ambitious study: .. but fails to clinch the judgment."
By Braestrup's account, Yietnam was not one of American journalism's finest hours.
Neither can the senior commanders and their staffs take solace from his analysis.
Big Story judges many of the more than 600 "correspondents" accredited during the Tet
period illprepared to be military correspondents, but pays special homage to the relative
handful who succeeded (although not always) in reporting with accuracy and objectivity one
of the most complex and difficult wars in which our nation has engaged.
Less attention is devoted to the dilemma which confronted commanders involved in a
politicalmilitary environment they didn't understand too well with too few experienced public
affairs professionals to support and adVise them. Nevertheless, I heartily recommend the '
book. It adds much to our understanding of the failures of press and government in informing
, the public of war and offers recommendations which may help avoid public affairs disasters
I in the event of future wars.
Mal Gen Robert B Solomon,
Chief of PubliC Affalf', US Army
4 CAMBODIA Year Zero by FranCOIS Ponchaud Translated by Nancy Amphoux 212 Pages Holt. Rmehart & Wmston, N V 1977 $895
Emptied of its populatIOn and despoded of Its goods, Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia
since 1865. pearl of Southeast Asia w4th its wide, shady avenues, has become a ghost town
and is gradually being reclaimed by ~ h e forest.
This statement, more succinctly t h ~ n any other in this poignant documentary, convinces
the reader that "Democratic Kampuchea" is now linked with tragedy in contemporary htstory.
The author, a young missionary who spent 10 years in country, left Cambodia just days
after it fell in April 1975. He has detailed a landmark book on the brutality of thetmer
Rouge (Cambodian Communist) takeover of that once gentle land. His account is not 0 erlong
although it is loaded with fact, insight and analysis. Ponchaud interviewed 94 mer
refugees. They included peasants, clerks, shopkeepers, soldiers, fishermen, teachers, doctors
and a prince. Their personal accounts are as diverse as their individual backgrounds. Yet all
have conveyed to the author the wanton rape of their country by revolutionaries obsessed with
a "new beginmng." The cruel irony of this beginning is that it excludes the Cambodian people
themselves. It has become the most self-serving Communist revolution of the recent past.
Among the most bizzare activities following the Communist military victory was the total
evacuation of the major cities. In all, over 2.5 million "countrymen" were driven from their
homes. Cambodia, or Kampuchea as it is now called, is today almost totally rural. The cities
are dead. Security and effective control are given reasons for the evacuations. Perhaps more
fundamental to the goals of the new leadership, however, are the ideolob"ical implications.
Commerce and bureaucracy, or any activity whicn suggests a Western influence, are forsworn.
Th!' lenders hnve stated that only those who live off the land, from hnnd to mouth, can know
"true humanity." The book indicates that owing to the incredible displacement which has
ensued, the people in fact know poverty and despair on a far greater scale than they have ever
known before. ' .
The radicalization of the few madmen who now hold the gutted Cambodia is recounted in
the chapter "Thirty Years for a Battle." In the appendixes can be found the constitution of
"Democratic Kampuchea:" This document adds a surrealistic note to this all too real
holocaust. Cambodia: Year Zero is recommended .highly to the student of current politico
military affairs.
A W McMaster ttl.
World Wars I, II ,and III
WAR AIMS AND STRATE.GIC POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR Edited by Barry Hunt and Adnan Preston 131 Pages Rowman &.Llttlelield,
Totowa. NJ 1977 $1350
ThiS book contains a collection' of six essays covering the objectives and strategy of
Britain, France, Canada, the United States, Italy and Germany in World War 1. For a number
of years, the belief has lingered among some that the European powers blundered blindly into
the holocaust labeled World War I. These essays dispelled that notion and point out that the
ar 'aims of the natIOns underwent systematic examinations and discussions.
T,he complexity of what truly the world war is appreciated, and emphasis is
laced on the confused relationship between political leaders and the military commanders.
ith the exception of America, civilian leaders of the other co.mtries involved in the conflict
abdicated their political control to the military. It was at this point the problem arose-How
could this power, once relinquished, be regained and how could it be employed to'promote
alternative policies to replace the nonproductive strategies of incompetent generals? But even
then the question persisted-What were the alternatives? '
The book shatters the a,rgument that all the admirals and generals and
"blimps," but it' does .illustrate that late 19th-century military professionalism became too
preoccupIed with the techpical.materialistic aspects of combat and neglected Clausewitz's
dictum on the primacy.of political in war. The lesson to be learned is that although
man inay thoroughly plan his strategy and perfect the instruments of destruction, frequently
events overcome the leaders and the latter lose control. This brief work is\Worth reading since
it helps straighten the twisted tail of historical fallacy. . '
Col Jerome J Haggerty, USAR,
Cansultmg USACGSC
THE SECOND WORLD WAR: An Illustrated Hlstmy by A J P. Taylor 240 Pages Berkley Wtndhoven Books, NY. 1978 $7 S5
Thirty years of consideration is the basis for this factual and succinct account of the most
crucial six years the world has known. By the author's admission, this work is one of
detachment and considered judgments, Since it covers all factors of W.orld War II, historian
Len Deighton refers to it as "the book agrunst which all other war histhries must be judged,"
The book is, in actuality, a factual depiction of the influences of four men and how they
waged a war,
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that four men-Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt and
Stalin-made every important decision of the war personally, with Mussolini feebly trying to
imitate them. Only Japan continued to be run by a more or less anonymous committee.
The four great men embodied, each in his own way, the National Will-a strange
conclusion to the age of Nationalism and Democracy that had started with Rousseau.
The author further asserts that the. politics and strategy of World War II were determined
almost solely by these men.
Readers should note that Taylor vij)ws this war as a "good war," It is a war justified in the
successful accomplishment of its aims, as well as a war that acknowledges the lasting
suppression of the tyranny of the Nazis and Japanese, He infers that although the prke was
extremely high, the results have been substantiated.
Carefully selected maps, photographs and drawings add much to the book's impact.
Illustrations complement the text rather than assume the role of page fillers or reader
distractors-often the case in similar works. One does not have to seek the aid of an
acknowledgment list or glossary to determine the significance of an illustration.
Chapter flow is smooth, and transitions keep the reader aware of chronological events in a
proper perspective. Such important items of note as casualty figures and future impact are not
casually tossed to the reader but are placed where they are most useful-immediately
following their referents and in the summary chapter.
This is a very vivid approach to the history of World War II and is a must for all students
of this dramatic era, It ranks among the best.
2d Lt Steve ChadWick.
Department of UmfIed and Combmed Operations, USACGSC
THE THIRD WORLD WAR-August 1985 by General SI[ John Hackett Sedgewlck & !ackson, London. Eng 1978 795
As a NATO general, Sir John Hackett has long uttered warnings to the politicans of the
alliance to awaken them from their apathy, Now, in collaboration with others, he has written
a scenario of the third world war, The start of the conflict is August 1985 when the Warsaw
Pact crosses the interGerman boundary and attacks NATO,
This book is written as a diary of events leading 'inexorably to war. Hostilities end after'the
limited use of strategic nuclear weapons and the beginning of the political disintegration of
tbe Soviet empire. The reader sees the war as an outside observer through accounts and
extracts of news and reports published over the period of the conflict.
Hackett pulls no punches. The opposing forces are equipped, organized and trained as they
are today, and, to the military observer and historian, the outcome of the battle is both logical
and feasible. A political situation in the Balkans leads to Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia
which brings them in direct confrontation with US forces in a limited conflict. This escalates
rapidly to a fullscale war involving the whole of NATO and in which the Federal Republic of
Germany is almost overwhelmed.
General Sir John Hackett commanded the Northern Army Group and has m?de his views
public both while a serving soldier and since retirement. His book is an awesome warning to
the Western democracies to reverse the politIcal trend of reduced defense expenditure with
detente as the excuse and social benefits for the people as the cause. He does not claim that
the war is inevitable nor that the outcome will be as he describes. In fact, his conclusions are
that unless the West takes steps to improve its defense, probability of war is increased
and the possibility of defeat more certain.
Col John S Fowles
Bntlsh LlJlson OffICer. USACGSC
the Arsenals
ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: Amencan Weapons Available for Export by Tom GervasI 240 Pages Grove Press, NY 1977 $1950
Tom Gervasi is a former officer assigned to the Army Secunty Agency
but has been an editor and book publishing market executive since 1961. His book is in two
parts. The first 45 pages deal with the .what, how and why of US arms trade. The large second
section lists in detail over 500 weapons either currently in service with other nations or
available for sale in the future. .
The most interesting part of the book is the second half. It is filled with good illustrations,
weapons descriptions and sales information. It is flawed, however, by factual errors. For
example, he is mistaken about the number of tanks in Army units and the' assertion that the
MI14 reconnaissance vehicle is still on active duty in great numbers. Both of these errors
question the accuracy of other information presented in this section.
On the other hand, the first part of the book is p10st revealing concerning the operation of
US overseas and domestic arms trade. The mecharucs 'of the trade are wellpresented. Greater
credibility could rave been established in this section though more of the author's
statements were supported by references. At other times, he lapses into editorialization,
sharply undercutting other well-made points. His strong area is the section which deals with
the momentum of the arms business and the attempts to limit or slow the traffic. It would
almost appear that the beast is too big to be reined. Overall, the first part of the book, which
has good potential, is weakened by its occasional editorial style and lack of references.
Nonetheless, Arsenal of Democracy'is an interesting compilation of weapons, capabilities
and arms sales. It suffers from an uneven treatment of the subject area, a flaw which throws a
shadow upon the better sections of the book.
Mal Paul Baerman.
SUPPLYING WAR Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton by Marlin Van Creveld 284 Pages Cambndge UniverSity Press. NY 1978
This book is mandatory reading for those who do not know th\! axiom that military
strategy achieves that which logistics has made possible. Works on strategy, tactics,
operational and campaign histories abound. They are exciting when compared to the few,
usually dull works dealing with logistics in warfare which are most often ignored. That is not
true with Van Creveld's fine work. Never dull, he writes a fast-moving, action-packed. book
that deserves to be considered for textual use at any Army educational institution.
The book is broken into two themes. The first concerns logistical considerations in the pre-
1914 period when the prime logistical function was the feeding of men and animals. Van
Creveld postulates that movement of armies was made mandatory because of the necessity to
live off the land. In his view, once an army stopped, it began to starve. Magazines, depots and.
bases were constructed in order to tide an army through such periods of nonmovements yet
rarely succeeded in fulfilling this goal.
Van Creveld provocatively argues that 18thcentury warfare did not rely on bases,
Napoleon did not. improve logistical organization and railroads did little to keep armies
supplied in the wars of 1866 and 1870. He examines the oftenquoted Schlieffen plan,
concluding that it was foredoomed to logistically caused failure. At Schlieffen's behest, the
infallible German General Staff chose to ignore the feeding of men and animals during the
crucial turning movement in Belgium. He concludes that movement of mass armies no longer
could keep them provisioned. More importantly, moving armies could no longer be kept
supplied with ammunition. Railroads and horsedrawn wagons were unable to sustain mass
armies equipped with technologically sophisticated means of destruction.
The second theme begins with the consideration of how movement was to the
battlefield after 1914. In Van Creveld's estimate, the development of the motor truck, as well
as tracked vehicles, was equally responsible for the restoration of mobile operations. Of this
restoration of mobility, he has much to say. For example, he there actually were two
German armies in the 1930s-one armored, fostmoving and motorized (including its logistical
tail)-the other footbound and supplied by horsedrawn wagons. It was only the former army
which practiccd blitzkrieg. Van Creveld concludes that the key German decision in warfare
"' ,
was the attempted balance between tracks, wheels and rails. This balance, he says, was never
reached. '
A look at the formation of the Russian campaign is interesting. Great reliance had to be '
given to securing rail lines to cover the immense distances in Russia, yet not enough trucks
could be found to sustain units at the front. Further, to keep the momentum of the invading
armored forces going, motorized supply columns were organized actually preceding the slower
moving foot and horsebound rest of tpe army. Van Creveld argues that from the inception of
Barbarossa, logistical considerations foredoomed it to failure.
Van Creveld also makes a case study of the famed exploits of Field Marshal Rommel.
Citing revealing figures, he points out that British sinking of Rommel's supply ships was not
the key to his difficulties; rather, port capacities, immense road-bound supply lines and
increased proximity to British airfields were 'the causes of Rommel's defeat. At a time when
the Russian campaign was suffering acute supply problems due to insufficient numbers of
trucks, Rommel asked for over two-thirds of those available to the German army. He was not
to get them.
(There is much in this work to challenge the reader. For example, I do not agree with the
author's interpretation of a too detailed Overlord planning nor his assertion that a single
lightning stroke toward the Rhine was feasible. What is interesting is that he questions all the
old assertions, analyzes them with pertinent logistical,data and formulates usually so,und
conclusions. This work is uniformly well-written and historically researched.
I recommend this work for every professional army officer, but particularly those in the
operations field who are used to moving units with the stroke of a grease pencil.
Mal Michael D Krause,
Office of the Jomt Chiefs of Staff
ARMS ACROSS THE SEA by Phdlp J Farley. Stephen S Kaplan and William H LeWIS 134 Pages Brookings InstitutIOn, Washington,
DC 1978 $795 clothbound $295 paperbound
In 1977, President Carter undertook a review of US policy for the transfer' of American
arms to other natiqns. This r,eview was prompted by several developments within the
international arms transfer arena. These developments included the growth of world military
expenditures (now over $350 billion annually), the size of the backlog for arms deliveries (the
current backlog is 'two to three times the size of deliveries) arid the dominant position of the
United States in arms exports (for the past 30 years, the United has been the world's
leading arms exporter). As a result of this review, the Carter initiated a policy
of substantially reducing US transfers.
This study, authored by three members of the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies staff,
describes the role of the United States in the international arms trade, with emphasis on'the
administration's new policy. The subjects discussed include security assistance history and
policies, arms sales legislation, coproduction programs, arms transfer policy toward the
'Middle East and African states and congressional oversight of arms sales. The text also
includes several useful tables which provide current statistics on world military expenditures
and arms transfers,
In their analysis of current arms transfer policy, the authors suggest that US withdrawal
from the arms trade would not cause a significant reduction in the magnitude of world arms
transfers. However, it would be prudent for the United States to adopt a cQurse of moderation
and selectivity in its arms transfer policy which could help lessen the intensity of the arms
transfer process. The authors believe that the long-term objective of US armS transfer policy
should be to reduce the dependence of its trade partners on military arms and turn their
. efforts toward economic development and human well-being.
Most readers will probably' agree with the study's long-term recommendations for
moderation in the transfer of American arms to other nations. While the authors provide a
comprehensive review of the political aspects of US arms transfer policy, they do not present
an adequate description' of the economic effects of this policy on the US military-industrial
base. US arms transfers now exceed $13 billion annually and account for over 50 percent of
the international arms trade. Consequently, a more thorough review of the economic effects of
US arms transfer policy is needed before the authors' recommended policy changes can be
adopted. .
The study offers a concise and enlightened view of the US arms transfer Although
not a "popular" work on the order of The Arms Bazaa.r, it offers a balanced discussion of US
arms transfer policy. It is recommended reading for anyone interested in developing an
understanding of the US security assistance program and US arms transfer policy.
Mal Richard Kelley,
FamIlies In Ten Andean Cities by Philip Musgrove 365 Page')
BrOOktngs Institution Washmgtort. DC 1978 $1695
DOG OWNER S BIBLE Ed,ted by Roger Caras 480 Pag" Stoeger
Publishtng Co South Hackensack, N J 1978 $791)
Volume 8 by Seymour M Kaye 527 Pages US Army Armament
Research and Development Command. Dover N J 1978 $40 00
EUROCOMMUNISM The Hallan Case Edited by Austin Ranney and
Glovanm Sarlorl 196 Pages American fnferprlse Institute for Pubhc
Polrcy Rr'!.Pdrch Washing/on, 0 C 1978 $101'J clothbound $475
F 111 by BIU Gun'!.ton 112 Pages Scnbner'!., NY 1978 $995
by Robm Higham and Carol Wilhams 202 Pages Iowa State
Ames 10l'la 1978 $1395
fORT ON THE PRAIRIE Fort Atkmson on the CounCil Bluff, L8L9-
1827 b.,. Colonel Virgil Ney 214 Pages CommanCl Publications.
Wash,ngton, DC 1976
FOUR BROTHERS IN BLUE Or Sunshine and Shadows of the War of
the Rebellton" A Story of the Great Civil War From Bull Run to
Appomattox by Captam Robrrt Goldthwaite Carter. US Army Refired
f{)reword by frank Vandiver IntroducllOn and mdri by John M
Carroll 537 Pages Unwerslty oJ Texas Press AUSM Texas 1978
lHE GREAT MUTINY Ind,a, 1857 by Chro'topher H,bbert 472 Pages
V,kmg Press, NY 1976 $1595 '
the Harvard Lampoon 191 Pages DOlph.n/Doublc<l,y NY 1978
THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR The EnglISh In france, 1337-1453 by
Desmond Seward 296 Pages Antheneum. NY 1978 $11 95
INDIA AT THE POLLS The Parhamentary Elections of 1977 b.,. Myron
Wrmer 150 Pages American Enterpnse Institute lor Pubhc PoliCY
ResearCh, Washmgton DC 1978 $375
INDIA Emergent Power? by Stephen P Cohen and Richard l Park.
95 Pages Crane Ru:)sak & Co. NY 1978 $450
INSTRUMENTS OF DARKNESS The HIStory of Electromc Warfare by
Allred Prince 284 Pages Scnbner 5, NY 1977 $1295
'IRElAND AT THE POllS The 0,,1 ElectIOns of 1977 Ed,ted by
,Howard R Penniman 199 Pages Amencan Enterpnse Institute tor
PubliC Pohcy Washington 0 C 1978 $475
IRON COFFINS by Herbert Werner 4171'age5 Bantam Books, NY
1978 $115
THE KILLING ZONE' My life In the Vietnam War by fredenck Downs
740 Pages W W Norlon & Co, N y 1978 $995
TH liON'S LAST ROAR Suez, L95G by Chester I Cooper 310 Pages'
Harpe' & Row, NY L978 $L295
MODERN GUNS IdentificatIOn and Values by Rus.sell C and Steven
C Quertermous 415 Pages. Collector Books Paducah Ky 1979
MOSQUITO AT WAR by Chaz Bowyer L43 Pages SCribners, N Y L917
ABSTRACTS ON STRATEGY by Rub," A Ramirez M,tchelJ 3L8 Pages
National Defense COllege Buenos. Aires. Arg 1978
John B Keeley 206 Pages Umverslty Press Of VIrginia, Charlottesville,
Va 1978 $695
Splelmann 184 Pages Westview Press, Boulder Colo. 1978 $1600
c'r'IFLlq STUDIES The Soviet Union and Eurocommunlsrn by
l nard Schap 10 24 Pages Institute for 11'r Study 01 Conflict london
E,g 1978 $450 '
A TER LENINGRAD' From the Caucasus to the Rhine August 9.
1 41March 25 1945 by Elena SkqablPa Trans.lated and pdlted. with
III IOOuetlon. by Norman 190 PiliP:' Soufilprr IIhno''.> Un,
VI ro.,,'y Pre')'.> farbanda1r III \978 $10 95
A RBORN[ AT WAR by Napier crookenden 144 Page'.> SLnbfle
I 78 $1495
A R FORCE OM bl' 3J6,eudY'& CCI NY
I 78 $09\
A 'ERICA REVIS1TED 150 Yeats After Tocqueville Eugene J
M' evIl Y :?J6 Page" & Co NY 1978 $79:'
A: [RICAN CAESAR Douglas MacArthur 18801964 by W',harn
, nct 1")11:'1 193 PJgf') Little Brown & Co Boqon 1978
$ \JO

The Photographic legacy of America s Bloodle5t Day bv

'II '1 fll A rr],\,w,to 30':: N'I 1978 $1595
f-< Imp, F. Me t'r fIj) 1911:1 $2.7 011 rlothholln,j $8 lJ papNbounj
AI MIES AND POLITICS Jark \/i,'nddl'> 309 Pages Inlern,H,on.:l1
P, rlrl,q I-'r' N) 1978 ';,i ':Ie
T' f ART OF WAR Waterloo to MOll5 by W'lIr<1m MCtlw(\e 346 PagE's
I tklll,j lJ'1 1'1 Prt',,- BlolOl'lll)?,cn :r'(] 1978 $495
T E ATlAS Of MODERN WARFARE b, (.I"]r,s COOk and Joh,r 'ilevemool
I i G P PU'r]dm', Sor,> NY ;'978 $22 '10
C MERA Al SEA 1939 1945 (dllt'u hy A.nthoLly P'l":,tOrl 192 Pages
L NJv.11 Ir "tr;utt' A 'naCJ ': W,j 1918 $2100
CAVAlRY The of Mounted Warfare b'l [Ii,> 19; Page;.
G: r <;O'h Nv :978 $I(1UO
CtHD IS THE SEA ri' 8,>,,(1"] H('llr Rlrt'hart &
w'n'lrl ;978 $100[1
COMMANDOS AND POliTICIANS Elrte Mrlrtary Umt5 rn Modern
hi" lll<J1 A Cohen forel"lorc' hv Sa'TlJPI P Hunt l,,!Cn
13G Pdge,> Harvar,1 Celtfl' lor Ir]ler'-'atr.]nj: Alla,rs
(,ltl'bl dbe Md)' lQ18 $89, $395 p<1De'bo'Jnd
Wrlkln,;rn L"lham 96 Page:; H PDrJ(rpne Ny 1978 $121)0
und blockfrelen Staaten Europas Volume 3 F/led!Jch Wlenpr 352
Pages Bprnard & Graele MunlO' FRG 1978 38 OM
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA An Introduction by Edmu,ld J Gannon 185
Page" COlincl1 on AmPflcan Washington. DC 1978 $500
and Treatment ElHl'U R F,gley 326 PaRt's'BrullnPf'MalPI
Ir C N'Y 1978 $1500 " "
STORM OVER THE GILBERTS War In the Ceotral PaCIfIC 1943 by
fdwltl P Ho'y! Ill) Page,> Van No,;trand Reinhold Co Ny 1978
THE SILENT WAR A History ot Western Naval Intellrgence b'y
Richard Deacon 288 Pages Hlppocrene 800ks, N'f 1978 $1695
Norman Polmar 350 Page" US Naval Instrtute Press Annapo;ls, Md
1918 $1895
Foreword by Malor Gpnera1 Edward G lan,;da1p USAF. Retired 169
Indrana Unrversrty Bloommgton, Ind 1978 $1250
clothbound $393 paperbound
PolitiCS, and NatIOnal Secunty by Marlrn Brnkln Herschel Kanter
and Rolt H Clark 113 Pages Brookmgs Institution. Washmgton. 0 C
1978 $195
SHARPS FIREARMS by frank Seller':i 358 page':i Fnllett Chrcago. IU
1978 $3495
BILDUNG Zpr sOllalen Herkuntt des OffiZiers, Number 19 Edited by
Detlel Bald Ekkehard LIppert and Rosemane Zabel 222 Pages
SOllalw!s.senschaftliches Ins.trfut der Bundeswehr. Munrch, FRG 1977
MONEY WISE The Prentrce-Hall Book of Personal Money
Management Rrchard J Strllman Prentrce Hall, Englewood Clltts,
'J<J J 1918 $1495
THE REPUBliC Of VIETNAM' An In-Depth Study of Indochma's
Fortress Under Attack and the Roots of U S. Involvement by Harold
R Moroz 63 PMes EXpC'sltlon Press. Hicksville NY 1978 $500
THE PACIFIC WAR World War " and the Japanese. 1931-1945 by
Saburo lengaga by Frank BaldWin 316 Pages Patheon
Books, NY 1978 $1000 ,

OIlIce Washmgton, 0 C 1978
PANZER ARMY AFRICA by James Lucas 211 Pages PresrdlO Press
Son Ralael Ca'rl 1977 $1100
PANIERS AT WAR by A J 144 Scrrbner's NY 1978
POWER AND POLICY IN CHINA Second and Enlarged EditIOn by
H Chang 331 Page':i Pennsylvanra State Press. Unl
vprs,tv Park Pa 1978 $13 95 clothbound $695 paperbound
John Cbarles DJ!Y. Moderator 42 Pages Amerrcan Enterprrse In':itrtute
tor Publlr POliCY Research Washington DC 1978 $200
10 Pagps Amerrcan Enterpflse Instrtute lor PubliC POliCY
Wa"twlgton PC 1978 $125
SHALL WE TELL THE PRESIDENT by Jell"y Archer 286 Pages
fJl'I"cett Crest NY 1977 $225
SHOOTER S 81BLE 1979 70th Edrtr," [drIed b) Robert f Scali 576
Stoeger Publ shl!:g Co Sou1h HaCkensack N J 1978 $795
SOLAR HOUSES 48 Energy-Savrng Desrgns by Lours Gropp 160
Pages Pall'ieon 800ks NY 1978 $1395 clothbOund $895 paper
SOUTH AFRICA War. Revo'lutlOn. or Peace? by l H Gann and Peter
DLJlfnan 8S Pagr, Hoover In&trfutlon Stlnford Calli 1978
" 9\
SOVIET AIR FORCE FIGHTERS Part 1 b'l Wl1tram Green and Cordon
68 Arro Publrshlng Co N 1977 $4 95
STABLE PEACE by Kenfleth E Bouldlng 143 Pages University of
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STRATEGIC SURRENDER The PolitICS of VICtory and Defeat by Paul
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1918 $17 \0
STRATEGY FOR DEfEAT Vietnam In Retrospect b'l Admrral U S
Grant Sharp US Navv, Ret red Foreword by Hanson W Baldwrn 324
liN AN -IN
flATlONARY WORLD bV Fritz Leuh'.nler_14 Pages Amer(can Enterpnse
Engelma'yer and Robert J Wagman 209 Page':! Dale Books,'N Y 1978 a)
THE U S AIR SERVICE INiWORLD WAR I Volume I The Final Report 2
and a Tactical History tiled by Maurer Maurer 448 Pages US
GOllemment Pnntmg Ollic . Washrngton. 0 C 197-8
rntroductron by Hans A Schmrtt 171 Pages Regents Press of Kansas
Lawlence. Kan 1978 $11 00 clothbOtInd $695 paperbound Ci
THE UNKNOWN WAR by Harrl')on Salisbury 224 Pages Bantam Books.
166 Pages Oxford Unlver51ty Pres'), NY 1978 $895 clothbound
$295 paperbound E
WHOS WHO IN WORLD WAR" by Davrd M"on 363 Pag,,-, <
Brown & Co, Boston Mass 1978 $19 95
WRITtNG UNDER FIRE Stones of the VIOtnam War Edited and V>
rntroduchon by Jerome Khnkowltz and John Somer 274 Pages Delta =:J
NY 1978 $495