LTD Cases

G.R. No. 112905. February 3, 2000.*FIRST DIVISION.
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE LEON, petitioners, vs. HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and their successors-ininterest, respondents. Actions; Land Registration; Courts; Jurisdiction.In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the rule has always been that the court having territorial jurisdiction over the property should take cognizance of its registration, upon the creation of a branch of the court in another locality pending applications for registration should be transferred to that court.When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot No. 1 before the CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the governing law then as regards the matter of jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law providing for the permanent stations of district judges or judges of Courts of First Instance stated that for the Seventh Judicial District that included the province of Cavite, there would be two judges in Cavite City. The law did not create other branches of the CFI in the province of Cavite outside of the City of Cavite. It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749 took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City was set up. That amendment to Republic Act No. 296 _______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 592 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
provided that four judges would preside over the Courts of First Instance of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Martires who would be judges of the first, second, third and fourth branches of that court. Because the rule has always been that the court having territorial jurisdiction over the property should take cognizance of its registration, upon the creation of the
Tagaytay City branch, petitioners application for registration should have been transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is located in that city. Same; Same; Same; Same; Venue; Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. Thus, the last paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land registration cases, the Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked with the administration and supervision of all courts, may transfer land registration courts to any other place more convenient to the parties. This implied that Land Registration Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite City branch of the CFI if it would be convenient to the applicants who had been used to transacting business with that branch; the case did not have to be transferred to Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46 dated July 3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag addressed to all CFI judges and clerks of court in line with the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947, merely quotes Section 6 thereof. Said circular does not elucidate on whether cases should be transferred to the branches that had territorial jurisdiction over them. Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where in an earlier case, the principal issue raised in the petition for review on certiorari was the personality of a party to file an opposition to the application for land registration, the Supreme Courts affirmance of the lower courts ruling on that issue in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was likewise resolved.Petitioners claim that this Court had sustained the jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of the CFI over Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue raised in the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality of the Municipality of Silang to file an opposition io the application for land registration. While this Court upheld the lower courts ruling on that issue, such 593 VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 593 Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was likewise resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to light for resolution. Same; Same; Same; When a land registration court issues an order of default, it is presumed to regularly perform its task in accordance with law especially with regard to notice requirements.As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch over the land registration proceedings instituted by private respondents, the order of general default issued in Land Registration Case No. 299 is of relevance. When the Cavite City branch of the CFI issued an order of default, it is presumed to have regularly performed its task in accordance with law especially with regard to notice requirements. Same; Same; Same; Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication has the effect of notifying all persons interested in the proceedings.Compliance with the requirement of notice and
publication had the effect of notifying all persons interested in the proceedings including the herein private respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan: x x x it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the pendency of the present registration case even if they were actually occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but such procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because registration proceedings have the nature of actions in rem. x x x. Same; Same; Same; Double Registration; A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property; Where a party files an application for registration of a parcel of land which is already the subject of registration proceedings, the second court could no longer entertain the same. A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the application for registration and service of notice to affected parties. Consequently, when private respondents filed their own application for registration of the same parcel of land, strictly speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer entertain the application for registration as the res involved had been constructively seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court. In hind594 594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
sight, this complication of two applications for registration having been filed for one and the same tract of land could have been avoided had Land Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to the Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it rightfully belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 3947. Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule that where more than one certificate of title is issued over the same piece of land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title.In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. It should be stressed that said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.
Same; Same; Laches; A party is guilty of laches where he neglects or omits to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that he either had abandoned or declined to assert it Even granting that petitioners did not really have actual knowledge of private respondents application for registration, yet after discovering that the land was already registered in the name of private respondents, petitioners should have immediately sought recourse in law to protect their rights. As it turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass from such discovery before they acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment. Hence, they filed the separate action for execution of judgment and cancellation of titles of private respondents because more than five (5) years had elapsed since the promulgation of the decision directing the issuance of a decree of registration. Under these circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier. They neglected or 595 VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 595 Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches. Same; Same; Same; Land registration proceedings entails a race against time and non-observance of time constraints imposed by law exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious effects of the application of the doctrine of laches.The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. Land registration proceedings entails a race against time and nonobservance of time constraints imposed by law exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious effects of the application of the doctrine of laches. An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the oneyear period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved applicant certain remedial measures, these are designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the property and not necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he had allowed by inaction to be vested in another person. Same; Same; Remedies of an aggrieved party after the lapse of one year from issuance of decree of registration.In Javier v. Court of Appeals, the Court set out these remedies as follows: x x x. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value,
an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for 596 596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro damages, x x x. In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, the Court also said: x x x it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In the determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather than its title, are the proper gauges.The wrong appellation of petitioners complaint shall not mislead this Court as, in the determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather than its title, are the proper gauges. A reading of the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. TG1028 betrays petitioners true intention in filing the case. In paragraph 15 of the complaint, petitioners alleged that they were unduly deprived of their ownership and lawful possession of the land x x x due to the wrongful registration of the subject land in the name of the defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentations. Except for this general statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged with particularity in the complaint. This is unfortunate because, if filed within the time set by law, a complaint with the proper allegation of fraud coupled with proof thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of private respondents title to the property. It is established that if fraud attended the acquisition of title under the Torrens System, such title cannot be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Same; Same; Same; An aggrieved applicant for land registration cannot seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration proceedings.The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners were cognizant all the while of the futility of their attempt to cancel the title of private respondents under the law. Hence, they indirectly and collaterally attacked the land title duly issued to private respondents on the theory that the revival of the dormant judgment in their favor could result in the realization of their objective of nullifying such title. However, aggrieved applicants for land registration cannot seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration proceedings. 597
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 597 Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
Land Registration; The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the lower courts order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership over the same property.The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the lower courts order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership over the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an explanation why they caused the publication of the notice of hearing in private respondents application for registration notwithstanding that the same office had already published the notice of hearing as regards petitioners application for registration of the same parcel of land. It is within the power of these officials to determine whether or not the same parcel of land is the subject of two applications for registration. The indefeasibility of private respondents title over the property should not get in the way of an administrative investigation of possible omission or neglect of official duty. This Court cannot let such Malfeasance or misfeasance in office pass unnoticed lest the integrity of the Torrens System of land registration be undermined. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Valdez, Domondon & Associates for petitioners. Augusto F. Del Rosario for private respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: In this case, the two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed twelve years apart in different branches of the same Court of First Instance, but a certificate of title was issued in one case while the other is still pending appeal. The applicants in the earlier case are now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. They assert that the decision ordering the issuance of a decree of registration in their favor, while promulgated subsequent to the issuance of
598 598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
the certificate of title in the names of the second applicants, should be executed and that the certificate of title issued to the latter should be nullified. The facts of the case are as follows: On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al. filed an application for the registration of a 69-hectare parcel of land in Tagaytay City with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch III under Land Registration Case No. 299 and LRC Record No. 11617. On January 29, 1957, the court issued an order of general default, excepting only the Director of Lands. On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging that a portion of the land applied for which the municipality had leased to private persons had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged that in a registration case entitled Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R), the Court of Appeals found that the applicants had never been in possession of the land sought to be registered. In its answer to the amended opposition, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to register was their inheritance, which includes Lot No. 2 of plan PSU-51901 with an area of 119 hectares. However, it had to be excluded in the application for registration of the 69-hectare land in Cavite upon the recommendation of the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office because it is located in the province of Laguna. Similarly, Lot No. 1 of PSU-51901 that lies within Tagaytay City had been excluded from the registration proceedings under G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 53498 or Land Registration Case No. 2201 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.1Rollo, p. 67. _______________ 1 Rollo, p. 67.
599 VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 599 Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to dismiss the application for original registration of Lot No. 1 on the ground of res judicata. The applicants, on the other hand, contended that the principle of res judicata is not applicable because the subject matter of CA-G.R. No. 8161-R (Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang) was Lot No. 2 or the portion of the land in Laguna.
On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit on the ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene considering that Lot No. 1 was outside of its territorial limits. The lower court held: x x x. Even if said land was communal property of the Municipality of Silang, by virtue of its incorporation into (the) city of Tagaytay it became the property of the latter. Hence, the Municipality of Silang has no personality to appear in this (sic) proceedings. If any right of action exists, it accrues in favor of the City of Tagaytay and the same should be pursued by the said city.2Ibid., p. 68. The oppositor municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. On July 23, 1970, the court issued an order stating that in order not to impede whatever action the movant might take against the order of February 7, 1969, said motion should be denied. On January 12, 1971, the applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive evidence for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executory by virtue of which the Municipality of Silang no longer ha(d) any personality to appear in these proceedings.3Decision in CAG.R. No. 49053-R, p. 4; Rollo of G.R. No. 51054 (Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals), p. 52. The court granted said motion and directed the clerk of court to submit a report on the matter. In his report dated April 15, 1971, Clerk of Court Rolando D. Diaz stated that since time immemorial, Micaela, Fer_______________ 2 Ibid., p. 68. 3 Decision in CA-G.R. No. 49053-R, p. 4; Rollo of G.R. No. 51054 (Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals), p. 52.
nando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all surnamed De los Reyes, owned and possessed the parcel of land in question. On November 3, 1870, they sold the land to Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad and Francisco Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property passed in ownership to Pedro Lopez de Leon, Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the daughter and sole heir of Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad. Pedro and Maxima remained in possession of the property until their death when their children, applicants Pedro Lopez, Mariano Lopez de Leon, Pastor Lopez de Leon, Eulogio Lopez, Clara Lopez, Ricarda Lopez and Rosario Lopez took over ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs succeeded
over the property and, on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it. The agricultural property was under the supervision of Domingo Opena who planted portions thereof to rice and other agricultural products. The clerk of court thus recommended that the court confirm its order of general default, approve his report, and register the property in the names of the applicants in accordance with the extrajudicial partition of the property.4Record, pp. 20-21. On April 19, 1971, the court5Presided by Judge Alfredo Catolico. accordingly rendered a decision approving the report of the clerk of court and ordering that once the decision becomes final, the corresponding decree of registration of title be issued in favor of the applicants.6Rollo, pp. 74-80. The oppositor Municipality of Silang interposed an appeal from the said decision of the land registration court to the Court of Appeals. On May 2, 1979, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision7Penned by Associate Justice Milagros A. German and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente and Pedro D. Cenzon. dismissing the appeal Tor lack of personality of the oppositor-appellant Municipality of Silang to interfere in the registration proceedings below.8Rollo, pp. 66-71. Undaunted, the ________________ 4 Record, pp. 20-21. 5 Presided by Judge Alfredo Catolico. 6 Rollo, pp. 74-80. 7 Penned by Associate Justice Milagros A. German and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente and Pedro D. Cenzon. 8 Rollo, pp. 66-71.
oppositor municipality filed with this Court a. petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 51054 (Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals) which was denied on September 19, 1979. The municipalitys motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with finality for lack of merit on Octobe r 24, 1979.9Ibid., p. 73. On November 9, 1979, judgment was entered in the said case.10Rollo of G.R. No. 51054, p. 102.
Meanwhile, in the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the decree of registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission discovered that Lot No. 1, plan Psu51901 had been decreed in favor of private respondents Honesto de Castro, et al.11Rollo, p. 19. Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967,12Record, p. 83. Honesto de Castro, et al. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in Tagaytay City, an application for the registration of the same parcel of land under Land Registration Case No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No. N-33292. The case was called for hearing on March 18, 1968. Eight (8) days later or on March 26, 1968, the court13Presided by Judge Jose C. Colayco. promulgated a decision adjudicating the land located at Barrio Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more particularly described as Plan Psu-51901-Amd., in favor of said applicants and directing that upon the finality of the decision, the corresponding decree of registration be issued.14Rollo, pp. 82-84. The ruling of the court was based on its finding that one Hermogenes Orte, who originally owned the land sought to be registered, sold it in 1932 to Marciano de Castro. The deed evidencing said sale was destroyed during the Japanese occupation. De Castro continued possession of the land until his death on April 26, 1940. His wife Epifania and their children named Maria Socorro, Francisco, Honesto, Romualdo, Felicitacion, Faustino and Felixberto continued possession of the _______________ 9 Ibid., p. 73. 10 Rollo of G.R. No. 51054, p. 102. 11 Rollo, p. 19. 12 Record, p. 83. 13 Presided by Judge Jose C. Colayco. 14 Rollo, pp. 82-84.
property who declared the land for assessment and taxation purposes in Cabuyao, Laguna. However, upon learning that the property lies in Tagaytay City, the applicants declared it in their names in said city. The cause of the conflicting claims over the same land was never explained because the head of the geodetic engineers of the Land Registration Commission did not appear in court in Land Registration
Case No. 299. Hence, on August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III15Presided by Judge Hector C. Fule. issued an order declaring that the court had lost jurisdiction to hear the case, without, however, dismissing the case. Seven (7) years later, or on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez, et al. filed a complaint for execution of judgment and cancellation of land titles of the defendants and their successors-in-interest before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, at Tagaytay City. Docketed as Civil Case No. TG1028, the complaint named as defendants Honesto C. de Castro, Maria Socorro de Castro married to Antonio Perigrina, Francisco de Castro widow, Faustino de Castro, Felixberto de Castro, Epifania C. Vda. de Castro and their successors-in-interest. The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce the judgment of April 19, 1971. The plaintiffs, petitioners herein, alleged further that, upon the filing of their application for registration with the CFI of Cavite, Branch III at Cavite City, said court acquired jurisdiction over the res because land registration proceedings are in rem and therefore, the CFI of Cavite, Branch IV at Tagaytay City could not have acquired jurisdiction over the same res by virtue of De Castros application for registration. They claimed that no less than this Court had recognized the jurisdiction of Branch III in Cavite City when it passed upon the correctness of the lower courts ruling in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al. Contending that the decision of Branch III on April 19, 1971 declaring that title to the land belonged to Pedro Lopez, et al. had become final and executory on June 18, 1980, they asserted that they were the ________________ 15 Presided by Judge Hector C. Fule.
lawful owners of the land. However, they had been unduly deprived ownership and possession thereof on account of its wrongful registration in the name of the defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentation. As a result of their undue deprivation of ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property notwithstanding that the question of ownership had been settled in their favor, plaintiffs claimed that they suffered actual and moral damages. Claiming that the judgment sought to be executed had not been barred by the statute of limitations, they prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to effect: 1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) Branch III, Cavite, dated April 19, 1971 by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico which becam e final on June 18, 1980;
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the titles of the land in question under the names of the defendants and their successors in interest and that new title to the same parcel of land be issued to plaintiffs; 3. Ordering all the occupants of the questioned land to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs; 4. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in interest to pay plaintiffs or its (sic) heirs and/or successors in interest actual damages (in) the amount of P200,000.00 or the amount that may be proven during the hearing and trial of this case; 5. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; 6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 or the sum that may be proven during the trial; 7. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit. Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs just and proper under the premises.16Rollo, pp. 64-65. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the defendants interposed the defenses of prescription, laches and/or _______________ 16 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
estoppel and failure to state a cause of action. They averred that they were no longer the owners of the property as it had been sold absolutely and unconditionally to innocent third parties for valuable consideration and in good faith. They contended that in view of the indefeasibility of their title to the property, even the title of their successors-in-interest can not be subject to collateral attack. They claimed that Branch III of the CFI in Cavite should have remanded the records of LRC Case No. 299 or LRC Record No. 11617 to the same CFI branch in Tagaytay City to which the legal and proper jurisdiction to hear and decide that particular case belonged. They asserted that the complaint should have been directed by the plaintiffs against the Assurance Fund under the provisions of P.D. No. 1529. Alleging that the very precipitate and wrongful suit caused them mental anguish, serious anxiety,
social humiliation and similar injury, they claimed moral damages of P500,000.00, nominal damages of P100,000.00 and attorneys fees of P300,000.00. On May 21, 1990, the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay City17Presided by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. rendered the decision in Civil Case No. TG-1028 dismissing the complaint for being improper and premature. The court likewise dismissed the defendants counterclaims for their dearth of sufficient legal, factual and evidentiary support.18Rollo, pp. 89-94. The lower court held that the decision of Branch III that became final on June 18, 1980, could not be enforced against defendants considering that they were not parties in LRC Record No. 11617. Neither could it order the cancellation of the titles issued to defendants because the LRC and/or the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City had not been impleaded as parties to the case and therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The lower court held further that because the case was covered by Act No. 496 and/or P.D. No. 1529 which are special laws, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on execution of _________________ 17 Presided by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. 18 Rollo, pp. 89-94.
judgment by independent action cannot be invoked. The court also ruled that: Treating the second issue raised by plaintiffs, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, or this Court, validly acquired jurisdiction over the case filed by defendants Honesto de Castro, et al., in LRC Case No. TG-95. The records show that herein defendants as petitioners) in that case, complied with all the jurisdictional requirements of law, conferring jurisdiction upon this Court to try that case and lent validly (sic) upon its proceedings. As admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, this Court was not aware of the existence of LRC Record No. 11617, pending before the other Branch of this Court, in the same manner that they, or the plaintiffs themselves, did not also know the existence of LRC Case No. TG-95 before this Court. This Court is assured that good faith pervaded among the parties concerned, in the conduct of its proceedings, all procedural requirements having been punctiliously complied with and no irregularity or breach of law having been committed. So that the decision rendered by this Court in that case is valid and subsisting, for all intents and purposes and can be nullified only under circumstances
and through procedures mandated by law. Hence, the corresponding decree of registration issued in TG95 and the original certificates of titles issued to defendants in consequence thereof, are all valid and binding until declared otherwise, in a case directly assailing their validity, and of course, by a competent court. And by express provision of law, the same are insulated from any collateral attack.19Ibid., p. 93. The court concluded that the complaint was in the nature of a collateral attack on the validity of the certificate of title issued in favor of the defendants and their successors-in-interest because, (b)y its caption and averments, the validity of the title in question, is not directly assailed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, which was denied on May 29, 1991. It reiterated that the plaintiffs failure to implead the Administrator of the NLRDRA, the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City and the possessors of the property in question was a fatal procedural ________________ 19 Ibid., p. 93.
error because they were indispensable parties over which the court should acquire jurisdiction. Their inclusion as defendants in the case was necessary in order that their title to the property could be directly attacked. Petitioners should have availed of the remedy provided by Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 and their failure to observe that law was a colossal error because once issued, a certificate of title becomes indefeasible, completely insulated from any form of collateral attack assailing its validity.20Ibid., pp. 95-97. Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal on November 29, 1993.21The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Alfredo J. Lagamon. Stressing the indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System of land registration, the Court of Appeals echoed the lower courts ruling that the decree of registration in favor of respondents cannot be reopened or set aside in a collateral proceeding such as the one in the case at bar which has for its objective the execution of a judgment which apparently has become dormant, thus appellants insistence that it be revived. Citing Article 1544 of the Civil Code on sale of property to different vendees which it opined had a persuasive influence in the resolution of the appeal, it held that in case land has been registered in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date (of registration) shall prevail. Nonetheless, emphasizing that the land in question has been transferred to a third person the Court of Appeals ruled that the title issued in favor of
respondents should be maintained in their status quo, until the proper court shall have determined their priorities, and the equities resulting therefrom.22Rollo, pp. 105-106. Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following assignment of errors: ________________ 20 Ibid., pp. 95-97. 21 The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Alfredo J. Lagamon. 22 Rollo, pp. 105-106.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE VITAL AND PIVOTAL ISSUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT (CFI TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH IV), HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBSEQUENT LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HEREIN, AND IN DECREEING THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE SAID LOTS WHICH WERE ALREADY PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS BY ANOTHER COURT (CFI CAVITE, BRANCH III) IN A PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION CASE IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH WAS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EVEN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE INSTANT ACTION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF CFI BRANCH III, WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A REVIVAL OF THE JUDGMENT. 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN MERELY RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE RESPOkDENTS TITLES, AND PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS, WHICH RELIANCE ARE MISPLACED AND UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND TO ISSUE THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS CANNOT DIVEST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED LOTS BY FILING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS TITLES. 5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY AND LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.23Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 67; 270 SCRA 328 (1997). When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot No. 1 before the CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the governing law then as regards the matter of jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law providing for the permanent stations of district judges or judges of Courts of First Instance stated that for the Seventh Judicial District that included the province of Cavite, there would be two judges in Cavite City.2444 O.G. 4757, 4775. The law did not create other branches of the CFI in the province of Cavite outside of the City of Cavite. It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749 took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City was set up.2559 O.G. 8553. That amendment to Republic Act No. 296 provided that four judges would preside over the Courts of First Instance of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Martires who would be judges of the first, second, third and fourth branches of that court. Because the rule has always been that the court having territorial jurisdiction over the property should take cognizance of its registration,26Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661, 665 (1959). upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch, petitioners application for registration should have been transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is located in that city. It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the venue of petitioners application for registration, apparently on account of the following provision of Rep. Act No. 3749: _________________ 23 Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 67; 270 SCRA 328 (1997). 24 44 O.G. 4757, 4775. 25 59 O.G. 8553.
26 Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661, 665 (1959).
SEC. 6. Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court of First Instance is or are established in this Act in the same place where there is an existing court or courts of first instance, all cases already filed in the latter court or courts shall be heard, tried and decided by such latter court or courts. Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase in the same place refers to the judicial district/province or the place where a branch of the court is stationed. Hence, considering the general rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case it remains with that court until its full termination,27Secretary of Health v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 803, 812; 241 SCRA 688 (1995). the phrase in the same place should be interpreted as referring to the province of Cavite. The Cavite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over the application for registration because there was no jurisdictional question involved in the proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was in question was whether the Cavite City branch of the Cavite CFI was the proper venue for said case upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch. As this Court once said: Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.28Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 256, 265-266. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience tothe parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to _________________ 27 Secretary of Health v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 803, 812; 241 SCRA 688 (1995). 28 Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 256, 265-266.
610
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
the place of trial.29Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 413, 416-417. Thus, the last paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land registration cases, the Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked with the administration and supervision of all courts, may transfer land registration courts to any other place more convenient to the parties. This implied that Land Registration Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite City branch of the CFI if it would be convenient to the applicants who had been used to transacting business with that branch; the case did not have to be transferred to Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46 dated July 3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag addressed to all CFI judges and clerks of court in line with the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947, merely quotes Section 6 thereof. Said circular does not elucidate on whether cases should be transferred to the branches that had territorial jurisdiction over them. Petitioners claim that this Court had sustained the jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of the CFI over Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue raised in the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality of the Municipality of Silang to file an opposition to the application for land registration. While this Court upheld the lower courts ruling on that issue, such affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was likewise resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to light for resolution. As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch over the land registration proceedings instituted by private respondents, the order of general default issued in Land Registration Case No. 299 is of relevance. When the Cavite City branch of the CFI issued an order of default, it is presumed to have regularly performed its task in accordance with law especially with regard to notice requirements. Act No. 496 provided that after the court shall have set the application for initial hearing the following procedure should be observed: _________________ 29 Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 413, 416417.
SEC. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing of the application from the clerk of the Court of First Instance, the Chief of the General Land Registration Office shall cause a notice thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of the Official Gazette, in the English language. The notice shall be issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, and shall be in form substantially as follows: x x x.30As amended by Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 96 and Rep. Act No. 1151. The general order of default of January 29, 1957 stated as follows: It appearing from the certificate of the Chief of the General Land Registration Office and the return of the Sheriff, attached to the record of this case, that the notice relative to the application in said case was duly published, posted, and served in accordance with law; and that the time allowed for entering appearance and filing answers expired at 9:30 A.M. on the 29th day of January, 1957, for which date said case was duly set for hearing by the Court; And it further appearing from said record that no person has appeared as respondent in the case filed an answer within the time for that purpose allowed, with the exception of the Director of Lands represented by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi; All persons, except those herein above named, are hereby declared to be in default in the aboveentitled case, and it is ordered that a general default be recorded in said case, and that the application therein be taken as confessed by all the world, except the persons hereinabove named. It is so ordered.31Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 49053-R, pp. 1011; Rollo of G.R. No. 51054, p. 76. On January 24, 1957, the Municipality of Silang filed a motion to lift said general order of default and to admit its opposition to the registration.32Ibid., p. 11; supra. This fact supports the presumption that the officials concerned performed their duties regularly __________________ 30 As amended by Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 96 and Rep. Act No. 1151. 31 Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 49053-R, pp. 1011; Rollo of G.R. No. 51054, p. 76. 32 Ibid., p. 11; supra.
because it implies notice, whether actual or constructive, on the part of said municipality that a land registration proceedings had been filed with respect to Lot No. 1. Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication had the effect of notifying all persons interested irt the proceedings including the herein private respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan: x x x it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the pendency of the present registration case even if they were actually occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but such procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because registration proceedings have the nature of actions in rem. x x x.33Supra, at p. 666. A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property.34Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 239, 248; 276 SCRA 276 (1997). Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the application for registration and service of notice to affected parties.35Republic v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852, 868 (1996). Consequently, when private respondents filed their own application for registration of the same parcel of land, strictly speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer entertain the application for registration as the res involved had been constructively seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court. In hindsight, this complication of two applications for registration having been filed for one and the same tract of land could have been avoided had Land Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to the Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it rightfully belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 3947. Be that as it may, the Court is not persuaded that the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents should ________________ 33 Supra, at p. 666. 34 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 239, 248; 276 SCRA 276 (1997). 35 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852, 868 (1996).
be nullified by reason of the fact that the Cavite City branch of the same court was already proceeding with another registration case for the same piece of land.
In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.36Margolles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97, 114. It should be stressed that said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected. Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thlis presumed to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by private respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite CFI thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto. The fact that an interlocutory matter in Land Registration Case No. 299 had to be resolved by both the Court of Appeals and this Court did not in any way mean that petitioners should no longer exercise due diligence to protect their right or interest in the said proceedings. On the contrary, they were bound to exercise such diligence with vigor especially because ________________ 36 Margolles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97, 114.
as early as April 19, 1971, they already had a judgment in their favor. The record does not show why petitioners did not have actual knowledge of the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents. However, the lack of such knowledge in fact raises a doubt as to the veracity of their claim that they were in possession of the land. If indeed they possessed the property, even if through an administrator, as diligent owners, the threat to their ownership could not have escaped them considering that the property is in a rural community where news travels fast.
Even granting that petitioners did not really have actual knowledge of private respondents application for registration, yet after discovering that the land was already registered in the name of private respondents, petitioners should have immediately sought recourse in law to protect their rights. As it turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass from such discovery before they acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment. Hence, they filed the separate action for execution of judgment and cancellation of titles of private respondents because more than five (5) years had elapsed since the promulgation of the decision directing the issuance of a decree of registration.37Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provided for the filing of an action to enforce a judgment after the lapse of the 5-year period. Under these circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert it.38Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206, 218; 264 SCRA 181 (1996). In short, they were guilty of laches. The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or _________________ 37 Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provided for the filing of an action to enforce a judgment after the lapse of the 5-year period. 38 Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206, 218; 264 SCRA 181 (1996).
claim to be enforced or asserted.39Ibid., at pp. 219-220. Land registration proceedings entails a race against time and non-observance of time constraints imposed by law exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious effects of the application of the doctrine of laches. An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved applicant certain remedial measures, these are designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the property and not necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he
had allowed by inaction to be vested in another person. In Javier v. Court of Appeals40G.R. No. 101177, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 498, 504. the Court set out these remedies as follows: x x x. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages, x x x. In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals,41323 Phil. 462, 477; 253 SCRA 391 (1996). the Court also said: ________________ 39 Ibid., at pp. 219-220. 40 G.R. No. 101177, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 498, 504. 41 323 Phil. 462, 477; 253 SCRA 391 (1996).
x x x it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. In filing the action for execution of judgment and cancellation of titles, petitioners must have realized that only the remedy of filing an action for damages was available to them. Otherwise, they could have filed an action for reconveyance of the property. Of course, petitioners cleverly clothed their complaint as one for execution of judgment under the provisions of the Rules of Court. Clearly, such procedural strategy was a bid to revive the decision of the lower court ordering the issuance of a decree of registration in their names. In other words, petitioners availed of procedural remedies provided for by the Rules of Court as it appeared that because of the lapse of time, they would not benefit from remedies prescribed by land registration laws.
The wrong appellation of petitioners complaint shall not mislead this Court as, in the determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather than its title, are the proper gauges.42Heirs of Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 752, 763 (1997). A reading of the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028 betrays petitioners true intention in filing the case. In paragraph 15 of the complaint, petitioners alleged that they were unduly deprived of their ownership and lawful possession of the land x x x due to the wrongful registration of the subject land in the name of the defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentations. Except for this general statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged with particularity in the complaint.43In Heirs of Manuel A Roxas v. Court of Appeals (337 Phil. 41, 52; 270 SCRA 309 *1997+), the Court held that there is fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application for registration where it is alleged that no other per... This is unfortu__________________ 42 Heirs of Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 752, 763 (1997). 43 In Heirs of Manuel A Roxas v. Court of Appeals (337 Phil. 41, 52; 270 SCRA 309 [1997]), the Court held that there is fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application for registration where it is alleged that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land.
nate because, if filed within the time set by law, a complaint with the proper allegation of fraud coupled with proof thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of private respondents title to the property. It is established that if fraud attended the acquisition of title under the Torrens System, such title cannot be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.44Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75336, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 516, 524-525. We take note of petitioners allegation in their reply memorandum that in the registration proceedings filed by private respondents, what was published in the Official Gazette was the description of a bigger tract of land that includes the smaller lot actually applied for by respondents.45Rollo, p. 186. That factual allegation could have had its impact before the trial court in an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud in the acquisition of title but not before this Court where factual issues may no longer be raised.
The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners were cognizant all the while of the futility of their attempt to cancel the title of private respondents under the law. Hence, they indirectly and collaterally attacked the land title duly issued to private respondents on the theory that the revival of the dormant judgment in their favor could result in the realization of their objective of nullifying such title. However, aggrieved applicants for land registration Cannot seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration proceedings. The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the lower courts order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership over the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an explanation why they caused the publication of the notice of hearing in private respondents application for registration notwithstanding that ________________ 44 Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75336, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 516, 524-525. 45 Rollo, p. 186.
the same office had already published the notice of hearing as regards petitioners application for registration of the same parcel of land. It is within the power of these officials to determine whether or not the same parcel of land is the subject of two applications for registration. The indefeasibility of private respondents title over the property should not get in the way of an administrative investigation of possible omission or neglect of official duty. This Court cannot let such malfeasance or misfeasance in office pass unnoticed lest the integrity of the Torrens System of land registration be undermined. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED, and the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028 is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice so that an investigation against officials who were responsible for the publication of two notices of hearing of an application for registration of the same parcel of land may be conducted and the guilty officials duly sanctioned. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.A decision of the land registration court, ordering the confirmation and registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995]) o0o [Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro, 324 SCRA 591(2000)] G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.*THIRD DIVISION. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Appeals; Petition for Review; Where a party appeals a final disposition of the Court of Appeals, his remedy is a petition based on Rule 45, not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. Same; Same; Land Registration; Publications; Absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of the applicant. Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. ______________ * THIRD DIVISION. 277 VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 277 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute; If mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative where the law includes such requirement in its detailed provision.The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD No. 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Actions in Rem; An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication; The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity 278 278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concernednay, the whole worldwho have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; The Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all; The all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.It may be asked why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocationthere is room only for application.Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no 279 VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 279 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Apollo T. Tria for private respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory? Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision1Rollo, pp. 29-36. promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2Ibid., p. 37. promulgated on November 19, 1991 ______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 29-36. 2 Ibid., p. 37.
280 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
by Respondent Court of Appeals3Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente; and Justices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring. in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4Ibid., p. 35. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence. Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued. The Facts On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5Known as the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6Presided by Judge Niovady M. Marin. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistadorepresented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
______________ 3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente; and Justices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring. 4 Ibid., p. 35. 5 Known as the Property Registration Decree. 6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
281 VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 281 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7Rollo, p. 41. x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. E) in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit E was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits F and G). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8Ibid., pp. 41-42. It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 *of PD 1529+ has a two -fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
______________ 7 Rollo, p. 41. 8 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. It is thus strange why the OSG described its petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of... The Issue Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion10Ibid., p. 21. This should really read reversible error since as already explained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45. in holding x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication. Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary ______________
9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. It is thus strange why the OSG described its petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the Court, in its Resolution dated March 9, 1992 admitted the OSGs petition for review on certiorari, clearly ruling that the petition was one for review, and not one for certiorari. 10 Ibid., p. 21. This should really read reversible error since as already explained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45.
to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and x x x in x x x a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.11Ibid., pp. 22-23. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12Ibid., pp. 56-57. In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6. x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:14Ibid. x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration. The Courts Ruling We find for petitioner. ______________
11 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 12 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 13 Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6. 14 Ibid.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. 1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. xxx xxx x x x
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991. the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by ______________ 15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963. 16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991. 17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.18Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concernednay, the whole world who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose. It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such ______________ 18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA 708, 712, August 22, 1968 citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881... There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur. Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On leave. Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Application for land registration dismissed without prejudice. Notes.Publication should precede the date of initial hearing, and where the issue of the Official Gazette where the notice was published was released only after the initial hearing, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the case. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442 [1994]) The Supreme Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand there is no reason for it to ______________ 19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA 708, 712, August 22, 1968 citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito vs. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968. 288 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Bondoc vs. National Labor Relations Commission
deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551 [1995])
o0o [Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276(1997)] G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997.*THIRD DIVISION. TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-appellees. Land Registration; Actions; A land registration proceeding is in rem, and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches.A land registration proceeding is in rem, and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. Same; Same; A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be liti-gated or decided in the land registration proceedings.A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System. _______________ * THIRD DIVISION. 160 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the
same.The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering officer being of itself a performance of duty by a public official. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Godolfredo D. Cabildo attorney in fact of petitioner. MELO, J.: The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as Camp Overton. The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912. In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914], the trial court made the following pronouncements: Re: Case No. 6908 The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who
161 VOL. 269, MARCH 3, 1997 161 Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909 The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the balance by his own possession and cultivation. A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question. The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by Anandog. And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States. Re: Cases 6908 & 6909 Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.
162 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon some conditions, must have indisputably become final. Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees under the following guidelines: Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316 (1968), and the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their opposition. Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses.
The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the parties. (p. 59, Rollo.) Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-issuance of the decrees. In their Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition to the amended petition, respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads: The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the issuance of the subject decrees. This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959 were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final and conclusive. In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits C, D, E and M). In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and properly
done based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded in LRCs Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the LRC and transmitted to this Court. (Exh. M). On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho. Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh. M), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and date of issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. Nos. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the plans and corresponding technical descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. T).
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors counsel, Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs. T, P and 19). From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and indubitably by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended petition has to be granted. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted. 2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon payment by the petitioner of the required legal fees. SO ORDERED. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.) From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint brief assigned the following errors: The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cachos amended petition for reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmi-ties; II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved pending compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions albeit, as of date, no competent evidence exists showing compliance with the
imposed conditions and/or the rendition of a final judg-ment and/or the issuance of decrees pursuant thereto; III. The petition is barred by laches; and IV. The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who does not have a lawful interest in the case. (pp. 16-17, Rollo.) Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred: 1. In giving due course to Teofilo Cachos petition for reconstitution of titles when the same is already barred by laches. 2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a real party in interest. 3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of sufficient proof to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were indeed issued to Demetria Cacho. 4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979 dismissing the original petition for reconstitution of title. 5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant City of Iligan pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October 1965) which ownership was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al., 158 SCRA 158]. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.) The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed aside respondents claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to wit: As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915,
respectively, according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court), submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were regularly done based on existing records. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.) This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice, for the following reasons: First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617, regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in part the application for adjudication and registration of the two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho, appellees predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases was reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth therein. 1.) Re: Case 6908, x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908 (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: case No. 6909, the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares x x x (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog (28 Phil. 630); And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned. . . (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court decision in Cacho vs. US ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned; that applicant Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if it was made, must have a smaller area and a later date of approval. As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of the new survey on which to base the area and technical description of the parcel of land in Case No. 6909. Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches. According to appellee, appellants failed to prove: a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellees inaction into believing that appellee would not assert the right on which he bases his suit; c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the suit is not held barred; and d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered by the decree. The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the state. The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle that all lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced. (pp. 50-53, Rollo.) Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court: First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance with conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively presumed to have been complied with before the original decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into. Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316, when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees. Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof to establish the requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the Regalian doctrine to dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches. Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens system. Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and gratuitous allusions to the contrary. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.) The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case. We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is in rem, and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs.
U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System. Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915). Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these
are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive. As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. . . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. . . (p. 1297-1298) Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]). Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real party in interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his existence and identity as well as his legal interest. By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the
Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering officer being of itself a performance of duty by a public official. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed and set aside. Notes.An attorney who discovers the futility of his clients application for land registration because the land applied for is forest land must inform his client that he has withdrawn the application. (Santos vs. Panganiban, Jr., 120 SCRA 799 [1983]) The torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113 [1991]) A decision of the land registration court, ordering the confirmation and registration of title, being the result of a pro173 VOL. 269, MARCH 3, 1997 173
MSCI-NACUSIP Local Chapter vs. National Wages and Productivity Commission
ceeding in rem, binds the whole world. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995]) o0o [Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 159(1997)] G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997.*SECOND DIVISION. SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents. Natural Resources; Land Registration; Land Titles; Regalian Doctrine; Before the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown, hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions.The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant, (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889. Same; Same; Same; Laches; It is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include certain properties in a reservation for provincial park purposes when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 393 VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997 393 Palomo vs. Court of Appeals
park purposes. If the petitioners predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago. Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the acts of its agents.As regards the petitioners contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. Same; Same; Same; The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. Same; Same; Same; It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons.It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases. Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases. Same; Same; Same; Petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith 394 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Palomo vs. Court of Appeals
in introducing improvements on the lot.Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch
as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, in conflict with provincial reservation. In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots. PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Alfredo E. Kallos for petitioners. ROMERO, J.: The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The facts of the case are as follows: On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.1Act 648 of the Philippine Commission entitled, An Act authorizing the Governor-General to reserve for civil public purposes and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public purposes, unless otherw... _______________ 1 Act 648 of the Philippine Commission entitled, An Act authorizing the Governor-General to reserve for civil public purposes and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public purposes, unless otherwise
395 VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997 395 Palomo vs. Court of Appeals
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916;2directed by law and extending provisions of Act Numbered 627 so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public use, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be brought under the op... December 28,
1916;3As shown by Expediente No. 6, GLRO record 9821 which became the basis for the issuance of the alleged OCT No. RO-1956 (173) and Expediente No. 8 GLRO Record 9823 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1954 (176). and January 17, 1917.4As shown by Expediente No. 5 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1953 (513). Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 1735OCT 513 covered Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of Plan II-9299 while OCT 169, 176 and 173 covered Lot Nos. 2, 1 and 3 of Plan II-9205. Another alleged OCT with an unspecified number covered Lot No. 4 of Plan II-9205. to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.6Exh. 21. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.7Exhs. B. The Register of Deeds of _______________ directed by law and extending provisions of Act Numbered 627 so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public use, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be brought under the operation of Land Registration. 2 As shown by Expediente No. 7, GLRO Record 9822 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. 1955 (169) and Expediente No. 10 GLRO Record 9868. It should be noted however that the Register of the Deeds does not have any record of any OCT issued pursuant to GLRO Record 9868. 3 As shown by Expediente No. 6, GLRO record 9821 which became the basis for the issuance of the alleged OCT No. RO-1956 (173) and Expediente No. 8 GLRO Record 9823 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1954 (176). 4 As shown by Expediente No. 5 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1953 (513). 5 OCT 513 covered Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of Plan II-9299 while OCT 169, 176 and 173 covered Lot Nos. 2, 1 and 3 of Plan II-9205. Another alleged OCT with an unspecified number covered Lot No. 4 of Plan II-9205. 6 Exh. 21. 7 Exhs. B.
396 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Palomo vs. Court of Appeals
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.8TCT 3911 (Exh 1-A) originated from OCT No. RO-1953 (513) (Exh 1); TCT 3912 (Exh 2-A) originated from OCT No. RO 1954 (176) [Exh 2] while TCT 3913 (Exh. 3-A) originated from OCT No. RO 1955 (169) [Exh 3] and TCT No. 3914 (Exh 4-A) originated from OCT No. R... On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon9Aside from tax receipts marked as Exh. 9-U to 9-H covering the years 1977, 1983 and 1984, tax declaration Nos. 1838, 1528, 1527, 1526, 1536, 1840, 1835, 1842, 1833, 1841, 1832, 1834 and 1839 marked as Exh 6, 6-A to 6-L, also presented in evidence marked as... and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, _______________ 8 TCT 3911 (Exh 1-A) originated from OCT No. RO-1953 (513) (Exh 1); TCT 3912 (Exh 2-A) originated from OCT No. RO 1954 (176) [Exh 2] while TCT 3913 (Exh. 3-A) originated from OCT No. RO 1955 (169) [Exh 3] and TCT No. 3914 (Exh 4-A) originated from OCT No. RO-1956 (173) [Exh 4]. 9 Aside from tax receipts marked as Exh. 9-U to 9-H covering the years 1977, 1983 and 1984, tax declaration Nos. 1838, 1528, 1527, 1526, 1536, 1840, 1835, 1842, 1833, 1841, 1832, 1834 and 1839 marked as Exh 6, 6-A to 6-L, also presented in evidence marked as Exh 19 was a Certificate of Appreciation awarded by the Province of Albay in 1956 to petitioner Ignacio Palomo for prompt and up to date payment of tax obligations.
Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00. On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay. The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled. A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the plaintiffs. In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants: (1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153,10Should be OCT 513. 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles. (2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants; ________________ 10 Should be OCT 513.
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,11Should be Lot 2. 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park; (4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T3913 and T-3914. Costs against the defendants. So Ordered.12Rollo, pp. 63-64. The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the SpanishAmerican War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976, square meters fall within the reservation area,13Records, p. 62. The Republic, in fact, never claimed the entire 3,384 square meters as shown by the Relocation Plan of II-6679 (marked as Exh H-3-T) when surveyed for Civil Case T-143 and 176. the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues: 1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. ________________ 11 Should be Lot 2. 12 Rollo, pp. 63-64. 13 Records, p. 62. The Republic, in fact, never claimed the entire 3,384 square meters as shown by the Relocation Plan of II-6679 (marked as Exh H-3-T) when surveyed for Civil Case T-143 and 176.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter. 3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the government is against our existing law and jurisprudence. The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid. Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then GovernorGeneral Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of law. In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916. We are not convinced. The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could
only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant, (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.14Exhibits 14, 15, 15-A, 16, 16-A, 17, 18, 18-A. The aforesaid decisions of the Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court. Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a _______________ 14 Exhibits 14, 15, 15-A, 16, 16-A, 17, 18, 18-A.
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago. As regards the petitioners contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.15Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 (1974); Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145; Sharp International Marketing v. CA, 201 SCRA 299; Republic v. IAC, 209 SCRA 90; GSIS v. CA, 218 SCRA 233.
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.16TSN, 27 September 1977, pp. 18-19. Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,17Vano v. Government of P.I. 41 P 161 [1920]; Li Seng Giap y Cia v. Director, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Fernandez Hnos. v. Director, 57 Phil. 929 [1931]; Military Reservations v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 [1973]; Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. IAC, 152 SCRA ... unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. _______________ 15 Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 (1974); Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145; Sharp International Marketing v. CA, 201 SCRA 299; Republic v. IAC, 209 SCRA 90; GSIS v. CA, 218 SCRA 233. 16 TSN, 27 September 1977, pp. 18-19. 17 Vano v. Government of P.I. 41 P 161 [1920]; Li Seng Giap y Cia v. Director, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Fernandez Hnos. v. Director, 57 Phil. 929 [1931]; Military Reservations v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 [1973]; Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. IAC, 152 SCRA 679; Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.18Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472; Masagana v. Argamosa, 109 SCRA 53; Ferrer Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393; Carag v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313; Director of Lands v. IAC, 195 SCRA 38. Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 194819Exhibit H-4. contains the following note, in conflict with provincial reservation.20Exhibit H-5. In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots. Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,21Petitioners alleged that 4 bamboo groves in the lots covered by TCT 3913 and/or 3914 were eradicated by employees of the Office of Parks and Wildlife, now Bureau of Forest and Development. were within the perimeter of ________________ 18 Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472; Masagana v. Argamosa, 109 SCRA 53; Ferrer Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393; Carag v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313; Director of Lands v. IAC, 195 SCRA 38. 19 Exhibit H-4. 20 Exhibit H-5. 21 Petitioners alleged that 4 bamboo groves in the lots covered by TCT 3913 and/or 3914 were eradicated by employees of the Office of Parks and Wildlife, now Bureau of Forest and Development.
the national park,22TSN, 28 October 1985, pp. 26-27. no pronouncement as to damages is in order. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification. Notes.It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period being tacked to his possession. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]) Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. (Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341 [1994]) All mineral lands, as part of the countrys natural resources, belong to the Philippine State. (Atok BigWedge Mining Company vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 261 SCRA 528 [1996]) o0o [Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392(1997)] G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000 *FIRST DIVISION. JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Land Registration; Public Lands; The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only ta alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a _______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 194 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals
grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
Same; Same; There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Pedro D. Diwa Law Office and Patricio A. Ngaseo for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,1Records, Vol. I, pp. 268-271. which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.2CA Records, pp. 30-34. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992.3Id., p. 45. _______________ 1 Records, Vol. I, pp. 268-271. 2 CA Records, pp. 30-34. 3 Id., p. 45.
195 VOL. 323, JANUARY 25, 2000 195 Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale
which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles. On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.4Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-16. The case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.5Id., pp. 20-21. The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.6Id., pp. 136-142. _______________ 4 Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-16. 5 Id., pp. 20-21. 6 Id., pp. 136-142.
196 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985,8Records, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. this time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for. On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner.9See Note 1. The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower courts Order.10See Note 2. It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.11See Note 3.
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of thirty (30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986. II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves. III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the applicantappellant and his predecessors-in-interest over the parcels of land occupied from 1908.12Petition for Review, p. 8; Rollo, p. 15. _______________ 7 Order, Las Pias Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79; Records, Vol. I, p. 98. 8 Records, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. 9 See Note 1. 10 See Note 2. 11 See Note 3. 12 Petition for Review, p. 8; Rollo, p. 15.
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-ininterest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972,13See Exhibit Ufor the petitioner, Exhibit 1-Afor respondent; 1st Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development, dated 20 August 1986, with the following remarks: Verification disclosed that subject areas fa... petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents. In Republic vs. Doldol,14G.R. No. 132963, 295 SCRA 359, 364 (1998). the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as follows x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled _______________ 13 See Exhibit Ufor the petitioner, Exhibit 1-Afor respondent; 1st Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development, dated 20 August 1986, with the following remarks: Verification disclosed that subject areas fall within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Metro Manila certified and declared as such on March 27, 1972 as per Forestry Administrative Order No. 41141 per LC Map 2623. 14 G.R. No. 132963, 295 SCRA 359, 364 (1998).
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (italicized in the original) Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.15Spouses Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999, 309 SCRA 193. A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16G.R. No. 94524, 295 SCRA 296, 310 (1998). where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted _______________ 15 Spouses Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999, 309 SCRA 193. 16 G.R. No. 94524, 295 SCRA 296, 310 (1998).
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do. We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners predecessor-ininterest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead
patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio. Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.17Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81961, 172 SCRA 455 (1989). In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.18Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 73974, 244 SCRA 537, 546 (1995). Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.19Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50464, 181 SCRA 443, 448 (1990). ________________ 17 Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81961, 172 SCRA 455 (1989). 18 Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 73974, 244 SCRA 537, 546 (1995). 19 Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50464, 181 SCRA 443, 448 (1990).
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development20See Note 13. from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned. Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Note.The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. (Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392 [1997]) o0o [Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193(2000)] G.R. No. 112567. February 7, 2000.*THIRD DIVISION. THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARINO, respondents. Land Titles; Land Registration; Private respondents has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate hijs claim of ownership.The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and information possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title. In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership. The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondents petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496. Same; Same; Evidence adduced by private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.Even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Same; Same; Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor. Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State. ________________ * THIRD DIVISION. 758 758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed.Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. x x x There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition. Same; Same; General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. Same; Same; The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Jose B. Alvarez for private respondent.
759 VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 7, 2000 759 Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals
Agapito G. Carait for the legal heirs of private respondent. PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent. The facts that matter are as follows: On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Carino, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1Original Records (O.R.), pp. 4-6. for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2Direct Examination of Aquilino Cario, August 23, 1977; O.R., p. 36. and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3Id., pp. 40-41. In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Carino, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extrajudicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4Id., p. 36. ________________ 1 Original Records (O.R.), pp. 4-6. 2 Direct Examination of Aquilino Cario, August 23, 1977; O.R., p. 36. 3 Id., pp. 40-41. 4 Id., p. 36.
760 760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed: x x x
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials; 2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict; 3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued therefor; 4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extrajudicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner; x x x5Original Records, p. 26. With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondents petition, disposing thus: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, _________________ 5 Original Records, p. 26.
Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, mcve or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address at Binan, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued. SO ORDERED.6O.R., p. 54. From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from. Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7Petition, Rollo, p. 12. The Petition is impressed with merit. The petition for land registration8O.R., p. 4. at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9Act No. 496. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his _______________ 6 O.R., p. 54. 7 Petition, Rollo, p. 12. 8 O.R., p. 4. 9 Act No. 496.
petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and information possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.10Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999. In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership.11Tsn., p. 10, Cross-examination of Aquilino Carino, August 23, 1977. The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondents petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496. Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12Further amended by P.D. No. 1073, issued on January 25, 1977. as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim ________________ 10 Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999. 11 Tsn., p. 10, Cross-examination of Aquilino Carino, August 23, 1977. 12 Further amended by P.D. No. 1073, issued on January 25, 1977.
and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.13Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210, p. 218, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195. Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,1442 Phil. 227. this Court stressed that: x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system, simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15Ibid. ________________ 13 Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210, p. 218, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195. 14 42 Phil. 227. 15 Ibid.
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition.16Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, pp. 244-245.
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:17Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20, citing Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146. x x x Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in wellnigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. x x x18Ibid. In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999. In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such ________________ 16 Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, pp. 244-245. 17 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20, citing Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146. 18 Ibid. 19 Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.
a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced
sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911. Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150, p. 156. From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother, Severino Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21O.R., pp. 34 and 41. It bears stressing that the Exhibit E referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit E shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22O.R., p. 41. The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the _________________ 20 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150, p. 156. 21 O.R., pp. 34 and 41. 22 O.R., p. 41.
findings by the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondents predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23167 SCRA 150, p. 155. the Court ratiocinated thus: This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA
259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court. and x x x in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. 24Id., p. 155, citing Carabot v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 368, 377 -378; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 636; Vda. De Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 799; and Fegurin v. NLRC, 120 SCRA 910. Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are ________________ 23 167 SCRA 150, p. 155. 24 Id., p. 155, citing Carabot v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 368, 377-378; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 636; Vda. De Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 799; and Fegurin v. NLRC, 120 SCRA 910.
mere indicia of claim of ownership.25Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, p. 194, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177; Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, p. 348. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:26160 SCRA 186. x x x if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.27Id., p. 194.
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 21. In a case,29Supra. this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law; holding as follows: ________________ 25 Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, p. 194, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177; Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, p. 348. 26 160 SCRA 186. 27 Id., p. 194. 28 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 21. 29 Supra.
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernards Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondents declaration is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession, x x x30Id., p. 21.
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31115 SCRA 25. the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit: We hold that applicants nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de duefio. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land. They did not present as witness their predecessor, Penaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners. xxx On the basis of applicants insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32Id., p. 28. _________________ 30 Id., p. 21. 31 115 SCRA 25. 32 Id., p. 28.
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under RD. No. 1073,33Issued on January 25, 1977. amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law. The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.34Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA
71, p. 74. To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35Lee Hong vs. David, 48 SCRA 372; Pinero vs. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20; citing: Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146. Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de duetto for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37Director of Lands vs. Datu, supra. the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private respondent. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more ________________ 33 Issued on January 25, 1977. 34 Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71, p. 74. 35 Lee Hong vs. David, 48 SCRA 372; Pinero vs. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386. 36 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20; citing: Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146. 37 Director of Lands vs. Datu, supra. 770 770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cruz vs. National Labor Relations Commission
particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Petition granted, judgment set aside.
Note.The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. (Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392 [1997]) o0o [Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 757(2000)] G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000.*FIRST DIVISION. MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO,**Some of the petitioners are already dead. petitioners, vs. ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents. Land Registration; Evidence; The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition, the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain considering that the inclusion in a title of ________________ * FIRST DIVISION. ** Some of the petitioners are already dead. 574 574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Turquesa vs. Valera
a part of the public domain nullifies the title. Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. In the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in footnote number 2. Same; Same; The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible and conclusive evidence required in land registrationallegations of her predecessors ownership of the
lot during the Spanish period is self-serving and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration. Allegations of her predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is selfserving and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration cases. Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her predecessor-ininterest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. 575 VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 575 Turquesa vs. Valera
Same; Same; Technical Descriptions; The applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to; What defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to, inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private respondent against persons who were in actual possession under claim of ownership, the latters possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership. This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Marlyn M. Damasen for petitioners. Cielo B. Pre for private respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: More than half a century ago,1April 18, 1949. private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot ________________ 1 April 18, 1949.
576 576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Turquesa vs. Valera
(hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places. The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons2The other oppositors aside from petitioners were: Nicolas Bergonia; the heirs of Ricardo Bersamira; Perico Talape whose rights were transferred to oppositor Mateo Valera; Galingan; Manuel Magala later substituted by his heirs represented by Louisa Magala B... opposed the application of private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by the lower court on June 16, 1950.3Order of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Abra issued by Judge Zoilo Hilario. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands) aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in
_________________ 2 The other oppositors aside from petitioners were: Nicolas Bergonia; the heirs of Ricardo Bersamira; Perico Talape whose rights were transferred to oppositor Mateo Valera; Galingan; Manuel Magala later substituted by his heirs represented by Louisa Magala Bayle; Agaton Pajo; Cornelio Bayubay substituted by his heirs who are represented by Maria Bayubay and his widow Lourdes Sindon Bayubay, one of the petitioners; Bonifacio Bringas; Matias Turdil; and Juan Medrano. See Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)First Civil Cases Division before it was again renamed Court of Appeals (CA)promulgated March 26, 1984 penned by Justice Rosario Quetulio-Losa with Justices Ramon Gaviola, Jr. and Eduardo Caguioa, concurring, p. 2; Rollo, p. 22; CA Rollo, p. 23. 3 Order of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Abra issued by Judge Zoilo Hilario.
577 VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 577 Turquesa vs. Valera
her application for registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the Director of Lands opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the subject lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to present their evidence. After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for registration as follows: In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-11956l, with an area of 210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera. After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the corresponding title issue in accordance with law.4Decision of the trial court dated April 23, 1956 penned by Judge Jose M. Mendoza; Rollo, pp. 23, 253-254. Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the
case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection of the land ________________ 4 Decision of the trial court dated April 23, 1956 penned by Judge Jose M. Mendoza; Rollo, pp. 23, 253254.
applied with a view to determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter have been included in Lot 1 of the applicants plan to warrant their exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names of the oppositors who have presented evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.5CA Decision dated March 15, 1966 penned by Justice Salvador Esguerra with Justices Julio Villamor and Ramon Nolasco; Record on Appeal, pp. 19-23; Rollo, pp. 26, 254. In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found: That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by them personally or by their supposed representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying sketch plan marked as Annex A of their report by the corresponding names, area and dimensions. That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967. OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS 1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex A are not shown in the original survey plan Psu-119561; 2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex A although three of these claims bear different identifying names in the sketch Annex A;
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex A is 69,683 square meters; _________________ 5 CA Decision dated March 15, 1966 penned by Justice Salvador Esguerra with Justices Julio Villamor and Ramon Nolasco; Record on Appeal, pp. 19-23; Rollo, pp. 26, 254.
4. That the Calle para Collago which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on the South and on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. A; That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicants property sought to be registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey.6Rollo, pp. 26-27. The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon a second ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,7677Exh. D.... square meters in the name of private respon dent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular inspection: The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as Calle para Collago which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the Calle para Collago referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former proceedings that the Calle para Collago was on the South but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the Calle para Collago is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing Calle para Collago is more to the South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of the applicant.8Rollo, pp. 256269. ________________ 6 Rollo, pp. 26-27. 7 Exh. D. 8 Rollo, pp. 256-269.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of plan Psu119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued. Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue. The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation survey.9Court of First Instance (CFI) Decision dated August 28, 1967 penned by Judge Macario M. Ofilada, p. 6; Rollo, pp. 27-28, 271; Record on Appeal, p. 29. The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR 40796-R) by the oppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case.10In addition to petitioners herein (except Flora Labuguen who was not included in the appeal), the rest of the appellants in CA-GR 40796-R were Layao Galingan, Mateo Valera, Crispin Baltar, Louisa Magala Bayle and Bonifacio Bringas. (See Annex B... They argue that the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in private respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to
the Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the ________________ 9 Court of First Instance (CFI) Decision dated August 28, 1967 penned by Judge Macario M. Ofilada, p. 6; Rollo, pp. 27-28, 271; Record on Appeal, p. 29. 10 In addition to petitioners herein (except Flora Labuguen who was not included in the appeal), the rest of the appellants in CA-GR 40796-R were Layao Galingan, Mateo Valera, Crispin Baltar, Louisa Magala Bayle and Bonifacio Bringas. (See Annex B of the Petition; Rollo, p. 38)
same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs. SO ORDERED.11Annex B of PetitionCA Special Former 8th Division. Decision promulgated April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R penned by Justice Simeon Gopengco with Justices Mama Busran and Lorenzo Relova, concurring p. 13; Rollo, p. 48. This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.12Per CAs Entry of Judgment, the April 30, 1979 CA Decision had become final and executory on September 22, 1979; Rollo, p. 244. Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors).13Record on Appeal, pp. 41-42. In an Order issued on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.14Order dated September 14, 1981 issued by Acting Presiding Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella of the then CFI Branch II, Abra. The dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, finding that there are no oppositors on the land of the applicant-movant, beca... When her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25, 1981,15The dispositive portion of the Order dated November 25, 1981 provides: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated September 14, 1981 denying the issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by the applicant and finding that ... private ________________
11 Annex B of PetitionCA Special Former 8th Division. Decision promulgated April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R penned by Justice Simeon Gopengco with Justices Mama Busran and Lorenzo Relova, concurring p. 13; Rollo, p. 48. 12 Per CAs Entry of Judgment, the April 30, 1979 CA Decision had become final and executory on September 22, 1979; Rollo, p. 244. 13 Record on Appeal, pp. 41-42. 14 Order dated September 14, 1981 issued by Acting Presiding Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella of the then CFI Branch II, Abra. The dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, finding that there are no oppositors on the land of the applicant-movant, because all landholdings of the oppositors as indicated in Exhibit H are excluded, the motion is denied. SO ORDERED. (Record on Appeal, p. 43; Rollo, pp. 21, 258). 15 The dispositive portion of the Order dated November 25, 1981 provides: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated September 14, 1981 denying the issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by the applicant and finding that the writ prayed is not in accordance with the dispositive portion of the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals because it covers landholding of the oppositors which were clearly excluded in the decision, the motion is hereby denied. SO ORDERED. (Record on Appeal, p. 48; Rollo, p. 21).
respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering: 1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato; 2. Confirming the word Landholding in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicant-appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967. Without any special pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.16AC First Civil Cases Division Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 promulgated March 26, 1984 penned by Justice Quetulio-Losa with Justices Gaviola, Jr. and Caguioa, concurring, p. 15; Rollo, p. 35. Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals.17CA Resolution dated September 29, 1986 penned by Justice Jose Campos, Jr. with Justices Venancio Aldecoa, Jr. and Reynato Puno, concurring; CA Rollo, p. 124. Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition.18SC Minute Resolution dated February 4, 1987; Rollo, pp. 64, 67. ________________ 16 AC First Civil Cases Division Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 promulgated March 26, 1984 penned by Justice Quetulio-Losa with Justices Gaviola, Jr. and Caguioa, concurring, p. 15; Rollo, p. 35. 17 CA Resolution dated September 29, 1986 penned by Justice Jose Campos, Jr. with Justices Venancio Aldecoa, Jr. and Reynato Puno, concurring; CA Rollo, p. 124. 18 SC Minute Resolution dated February 4, 1987; Rollo, pp. 64, 67.
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition,19Under Section 2(a), Rule 45 (now Section 4, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the petition shall set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the petition. Petitioners ... the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant20Gutierrez Hermanos v. CA, 178 SCRA 37 (1989). who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.21Maloles and Malvar v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548 (1913); De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420 (1916); Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367 (1918); Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227 (1921) cited in Republic v. L... On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain22Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 244 SCRA 537 (1995); Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990); Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71 (1990). considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title.23Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990). Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown,24Cacho v. CA, 269 SCRA 159 (1997); Moscoso v. CA, 128 SCRA 705 (1984). except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case.25Cachero v. Marzan, 196 SCRA 601 (1991). In the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in footnote number 2. ________________ 19 Under Section 2(a), Rule 45 (now Section 4, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the petition shall set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the petition. Petitioners counsel (Marilyn Damasen Bontia) who signed the petition and petitioners memorandum cannot be considered as having concisely stated her arguments. The said pleadings were not prepared with proper attention and adequate preparation. 20 Gutierrez Hermanos v. CA, 178 SCRA 37 (1989). 21 Maloles and Malvar v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548 (1913); De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420 (1916); Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367 (1918); Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227 (1921) cited in Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13 (1991). 22 Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 244 SCRA 537 (1995); Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990); Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71 (1990). 23 Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990). 24 Cacho v. CA, 269 SCRA 159 (1997); Moscoso v. CA, 128 SCRA 705 (1984). 25 Cachero v. Marzan, 196 SCRA 601 (1991).
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private respondents name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that she be installed in
possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondents application for land registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of private respondent since the notice was published in accordance with law. Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-ininterest for a certain period, does not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration.26Republic v. Lee, 274 Phil. 284, 291; 197 SCRA 13 (1991). Allegations of her predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving27Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, 123 SCRA 516 (1983). and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.28Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989). It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration _________________ 26 Republic v. Lee, 274 Phil. 284, 291; 197 SCRA 13 (1991). 27 Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, 123 SCRA 516 (1983). 28 Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989).
cases.29Palomo v. CA, 266 SCRA 392 (1997); Rivera v. CA, 244 SCRA 218 (1995); Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1992). Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her predecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing.30Santiago v. CA, 278 SCRA 98 (1997).
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to,31Republic Cement Corporation v. CA, 198 SCRA 734 (1991); Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 367 (1938) cited in Alba Vda. de Raz v. CA, G.R. No. 120066, September 9, 1999, 314 SCRA 36. inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.32Dichoso v. CA, 192 SCRA 169 (1990). Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private respondent against persons who were in actual possession under claim of ownership, the latters possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership.33Article 433, Civil Code (NCC) reads: Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. See also David v. Malay, G.R. No. 1... This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the ________________ 29 Palomo v. CA, 266 SCRA 392 (1997); Rivera v. CA, 244 SCRA 218 (1995); Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1992). 30 Santiago v. CA, 278 SCRA 98 (1997). 31 Republic Cement Corporation v. CA, 198 SCRA 734 (1991); Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 367 (1938) cited in Alba Vda. de Raz v. CA, G.R. No. 120066, September 9, 1999, 314 SCRA 36. 32 Dichoso v. CA, 192 SCRA 169 (1990). 33 Article 433, Civil Code (NCC) reads: Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. See also David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 711, citing Faja v. CA, 75 SCRA 441 (1977).
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.34Civil Code, Article 434.
Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only landholding and not landholdings, thus referring only to that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur. Puno, J., No part. (Had some participation in court below) Judgment reversed and set aside; orders of trial court reinstated. Notes.The technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. (Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr., 265 SCRA 182 [1996]) What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but the boundaries or _________________ 34 Civil Code, Article 434. 587 VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 587 Phil. Registered Electrical Practitioners, Inc. vs. Francia, Jr.
metes and bounds of the property specified in its technical description as enclosing it and showing its limits. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366 [1999]) o0o [Turquesa vs. Valera, 322 SCRA 573(2000)] G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001.*THIRD DIVISION.
FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZGONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ, JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents. Natural Resources; Regalian Doctrine; Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of _______________ *THIRD DIVISION. 113 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 113 Seville vs. National Development Company
any asserted right to ownership of land.Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In Menguito v. Republic, the Court held that *u+nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. Same; Land Titles; Tax Declarations; Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the landat best, they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without factual basis. Instead, they maintain that the private character of the land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court. Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. In Spouses Palomo v. CA, the Court also rejected tax declarations as
proof of private ownership, absent any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable. Same; Same; Actions; Quieting of Title; A suit for quieting of title is an action quasi in rem that is binding only between the parties.In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties. The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein. Same; Same; The power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private entities. Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the x x x described property. It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, the power to classify a land as 114 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Seville vs. National Development Company
alienable belongs to the State, not to private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved. Land Registration; A certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDAs OCT, which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the present suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real property and damages, is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides: SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost. Same; Actions; Reversion; Where the subject land was public before a Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued, a private party has no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to himthe proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA,
petitioners have no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which reads as follows: SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
115 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 115 Seville vs. National Development Company
Arthur D. Lim Law Office for petitioners. Government Corporate Counsel for respondent NDC and LSBDA. Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for respondents PASAR and LEPANTO. Quiroz, Dumas, Capistrano & Teleron Law Offices for PHILPHOS. PANGANIBAN, J.: Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals1Penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, with the concurrence of Justices Arturo B. Buena (Division chairman and now an associate justice of this Court) and Bernardo Ll. Salas (member); rollo, pp. 147-155 (CA), as well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution2Rollo, p. 157. denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs against plaintiffsappellees.3CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 155. The Facts
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner: _______________ 1 Penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, with the concurrence of Justices Arturo B. Buena (Division chairman and now an associate justice of this Court) and Bernardo Ll. Salas (member); rollo, pp. 147-155 2 Rollo, p. 157. 3 CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 155.
116 116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Seville vs. National Development Company
1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the successful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowner. 2. On June 14, 1980, *Respondent+ Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08 -000047 consisting of 464,920 square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425, 1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor. 3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of 442,7508 square meters. 4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-respondent] National Development Company (NDC) as a result of which a new Transfer of Certificate of Title was issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).
5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was later on amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against [respondents].
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibits PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio; 2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters real property subject of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega; 3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT No. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to issue a new title to the said portion in the name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega; 4. *Respondents+ LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly and severally to *petitioners+ the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the present, plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease Contract between NDC and PASAR; (Exhibit 54) 5. *Respondents+ LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay jointly and severally *petitioners+ the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to the present, plus the accrued interest for non-payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above; 6. *Respondents+ are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the ancestral home; 7. *Respondents+ are also ordered to pay jointly and severally *petitioners+ the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorneys fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as expenses for litigation; 8. Finally, *petitioners+ and *respondents+ are ordered to sit down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise agreement on how the improvements introduced on the landholding subject of the
present suit should be disposed of and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
Costs against *respondents+. SO ORDERED. 4CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 148-150. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in character. Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches, because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property. Hence, this Petition.5The case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the Memorandum for the Republic of the Philippines and the Register of Deeds of Leyte, signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Nestor J. Ballacil... The Issues In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for the consideration of the Court:6Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 394. Upper case used in the original. _______________ 4 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 148-150. 5 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the Memorandum for the Republic of the Philippines and the Register of Deeds of Leyte, signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Nestor J. Ballacillo and Sol. Fidel Thaddeus I. Borja. Filed earlier were the Memorandum for Respondents National Development Company and Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority, signed by Government Corporate Counsel Jun N. Valerio, Assistant Government
Corporate Attorneys Efren B. Gonzales and Roy Christian L. Mallari; Memorandum of Respondents Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., signed by Attys. Roberto N. Dio and Abner C. Gener of Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose; Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Attys. Arthur D. Lim and Jaime M. Vivar; and Memorandum for Respondent Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, signed by Atty. Rolando G. Campos of Quiroz Dumas Capistrano & Teleron Law Offices. 6 Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 394. Upper case used in the original.
A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void. B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid. C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches. D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court. In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDAs title. In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether, before the issuance of the title, the land was private or public. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. Main Issue: Validity of LSBDAs Title Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void, having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty years.7Petitioners Memorandum, p. 23; rollo, p. 404. Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as alienable and disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership. ________________ 7 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 23; rollo, p. 404.
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First, there was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof through acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners challenge to LSBDAs title cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law. Public Character of the Land Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.8Spouses Reyes, et al. v. CA, 295 SCRA 296, September 10, 1998; Cacho v. CA, 269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997. In Menguito v. Republic,9GR No. 134308, 348 SCRA 128, December 14, 2000, per Panganiban, J.; citing De Ocampo v. Arlos, GR No. 135527, 343 SCRA 717, October 19, 2000 and Santiago v. De Los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 152, November 22, 1974. Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides: ... the Court held that *u+nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. That title may be the subject of judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act, which provides: _______________ 8 Spouses Reyes, et al. v. CA, 295 SCRA 296, September 10, 1998; Cacho v. CA, 269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997.
9 GR No. 134308, 348 SCRA 128, December 14, 2000, per Panganiban, J.; citing De Ocampo v. Arlos, GR No. 135527, 343 SCRA 717, October 19, 2000 and Santiago v. De Los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 152, November 22, 1974. Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,10Promulgated on January 25, 1977. paragraph b of the aforecited provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The provision reads: SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of
the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without factual basis.11Petitioners Memorandum, p. 17; rollo, p. 398. Instead, they maintain that the private character of the land was _______________ 10 Promulgated on January 25, 1977. 11 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 17; rollo, p. 398.
evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court.12Ibid., p. 18; rollo, p. 399. Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.13Director of Lands v. IAC, 219 SCRA 339, March 2, 1993. In Spouses Palomo v. CA,14266 SCRA 392, January 21, 1997. the Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable. Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property, which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do not prove that the land was private in character. The question remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the time, the vendors were already its owners, or that the land was already classified as alienable. Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v. CA,15153 SCRA 96, August 14, 1987, per Paras, J. in which the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed property. In that case, the sole issue was whether the respondent judge x x x acted in excess of jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega.16Ibid., p. 97. The Court did not at all make any ruling that the property had been classified as alienable. In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties.17In Realty Sales Enterprises v. IAC (154 SCRA 328, 348, September 28, 1987, per
Cortes, J.), the Court held: Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but The _______________ 12 Ibid., p. 18; rollo, p. 399. 13 Director of Lands v. IAC, 219 SCRA 339, March 2, 1993. 14 266 SCRA 392, January 21, 1997. 15 153 SCRA 96, August 14, 1987, per Paras, J. 16 Ibid., p. 97. 17 In Realty Sales Enterprises v. IAC (154 SCRA 328, 348, September 28, 1987, per Cortes, J.), the Court held: Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but
present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein. While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing the private character of the disputed property, they make no claim that these cases directly involve the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto. Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on the claimant.18See Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, 303, December 17, 1990; Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57, May 23, 1986; Director of Lands v. CA, 129 SCRA 689, 692, June 22, 1984. In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. LSBDAs Title Equally unmeritorious is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner of the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with the notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.19Exhibits 30-49; Bill of Exhibits and Minutes, pp. 319-339. ________________ being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. x x x. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. 18 See Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, 303, December 17, 1990; Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57, May 23, 1986; Director of Lands v. CA, 129 SCRA 689, 692, June 22, 1984. 19 Exhibits 30-49; Bill of Exhibits and Minutes, pp. 319-339.
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the x x x described property.20Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 397-398. It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved. In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDAs subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she did not have. Collateral Attack There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Petitioners insist that they are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system. Supposedly, they are only praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land, or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131
issued to LSBDA.21Petitioners Memorandum, p. 24; rollo, p. 405. This disputation is mere quibbling over words, plain and simple. Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDAs OCT, which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the present suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real property and damages, is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides: _______________ 20 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 397-398. 21 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 24; rollo, p. 405.
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.22Spouses Zaragosa v. CA, GR No. 106401, 341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000; Ladignon v. CA, GR No. 122973, 336 SCRA 42, July 18, 2000. Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issu-ance.23Section 103 in relation to Section 32 of PD 1529. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that *u+pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud. Although LSBDAs title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the amended Complaint only in 1990. Reconveyance Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is
an action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which reads as follows: SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the *Republic+ of the Philippines. _______________ 22 Spouses Zaragosa v. CA, GR No. 106401, 341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000; Ladignon v. CA, GR No. 122973, 336 SCRA 42, July 18, 2000. 23 Section 103 in relation to Section 32 of PD 1529.
Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap, without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA. Conclusion In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand on. Absent any showing that the land has been classified as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDAs title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate of title that has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper action in accordance with law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., In the result.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed. Notes.Before the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown, hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions. (Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392 [1997]) Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony, hence the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the 127 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 127 Cario vs. Cario
person applying for registration. (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296 [1998]) o0o [Seville vs. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112(2001)] G.R. No. 124605. June 18, 1999.*FIRST DIVISION. ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING, respondents. Judgments; Evidence; The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void.The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal. However, petitioners make an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided over the proceedings. We have ruled in People vs. Rayray, that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process. Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; Questions of Law and Questions of Fact; There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or the falsity of alleged facts. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to this Court, only questions of law may be raised. And for a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. To reiterate the distinction between the two types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to _______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 528 528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serna vs. Court of Appeals
what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. Land Registration; Land Titles; Evidence; Tax Declarations; Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. Respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time in 1939, while respondents began paying taxes in 1967. They had their residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy agreement with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes together with his tenant Sixto. Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. Same; Same; Actions; Fraud; The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree. After the lapse of said period, the de cree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.The 529 VOL. 308, JUNE 18, 1999 529 Serna vs. Court of Appeals
fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real proper ty is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from the time of such registering, filing or entering. An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from the time of such registering, filing or entering. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rodolfo A. Lockey for petitioners. Anacleto Montemayor for private respondents. PARDO, J.: The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,1In CA-G.R. CV No. 39922, Eighth Division, promulgated on August 22, 1995, Salas, J., ponente, Lantin and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurring. which affirmed _______________ 1 In CA-G.R. CV No. 39922, Eighth Division, promulgated on August 22, 1995, Salas, J., ponente, Lantin and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurring.
530 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serna vs. Court of Appeals
that of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan,2Civil Case No. A-1329. Judge Vivencio A. Bantugan penned the decision. declaring respondents as the absolute and lawful owners of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The antecedent facts are as follows: Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins. Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing an area of twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.3Regional Trial Court Record, Civil Case No. A-1329, p. 2. In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same year, Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan. In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate property tax thereon. On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven hundred pesos (P1,700.00), Rosa sold the land to her nephew, respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered. _______________ 2 Civil Case No. A-1329. Judge Vivencio A. Bantugan penned the decision. 3 Regional Trial Court Record, Civil Case No. A-1329, p. 2.
531 VOL. 308, JUNE 18, 1999 531
Serna vs. Court of Appeals
In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in question, which was completed in 1957. On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two (2) children, Fructoso and Paciencia, executed another deed of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent Santiago Fontanilla. In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter Mila Fontanilla Borillo. They stayed there until 1981. On December 20, 1978, taking advantage of respondents absence from the country, petitioners Enriquito and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan for registration4Land Registration Case No. 396, LRC Record No. N-53913, Court of First Instance, Alaminos, Pangasinan. of the said parcel of land in their name. In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to Decree N-176768, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to petitioners. On January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, an action for reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T. No. 139.5Docketed as Civil Case No. A-1329. In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla originally owned the land in dispute. However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property for three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn, traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca. Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey costs in 1921, Turner Land Surveying Company took the property in question as payment for services. Her father, Alberto Rasca, redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed of sale, which, however, Amparo could not produce _______________ 4 Land Registration Case No. 396, LRC Record No. N-53913, Court of First Instance, Alaminos, Pangasinan. 5 Docketed as Civil Case No. A-1329.
532 532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in court. When her father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the deed covering the transfer of the property, which Santiago did not return. She said that the property was first declared in Albertos name for taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was ceded to her. After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court and in the land registration case, on June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing, decreeing: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and legal owners of the land in question particularly described and bounded and stated in paragraph two (2) of the complaint; (b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and Recover *sic+ Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to the plaintiffs; (c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; (d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; (e) And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages. Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992. (t/s) Vivencio A. Bantugan Judge6Regional Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 227-228. From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents questioned the court a quos failure to grant their claim for moral damages. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court committed serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law and jurisprudence. On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the trial court. _______________ 6 Regional Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 227-228.
533 VOL. 308, JUNE 18, 1999 533
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996,7Resolution, Rollo, p. 40. the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the appealed decision is supported by evidence; (2) whether or not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.8Petition, Supreme Court, Rollo, p. 8. The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal.9Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 651, 659 [1996]; Pagobo vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 870; Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344; Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 673; Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122; Linzag vs. Court of App... However, petitioners make an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided over the proceedings. We have ruled in People vs. Rayray,10241 SCRA 1 *1995+. that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process.11People vs. Christopher Espaola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997]. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by _______________ 7 Resolution, Rollo, p. 40. 8 Petition, Supreme Court, Rollo, p. 8. 9 Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 651, 659 [1996]; Pagobo vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 870; Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344; Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 673; Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122; Linzag vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 304; Congregation vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 385. 10 241 SCRA 1 [1995]. 11 People vs. Christopher Espaola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997].
certiorari to this Court, only questions of law may be raised.12Rule 45, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. And for a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.13Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, 725 *1995+. To reiterate the distinction between the two types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.14Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, supra, on p. 658. Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not reviewable in this appeal. On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time in 1939,15Rollo, p. 32. while respondents began paying taxes in 1967.16Rollo, p. 32. They had their residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy agreement17Rollo, p. 32. with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes together with his tenant Sixto. Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant,18Deiparine vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111257, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 668. tax declarations and receipts ________________ 12 Rule 45, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, 725 [1995]. 14 Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, supra, on p. 658. 15 Rollo, p. 32. 16 Rollo, p. 32. 17 Rollo, p. 32.
18 Deiparine vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111257, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 668.
535 VOL. 308, JUNE 18, 1999 535 Serna vs. Court of Appeals
can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.19Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1998 edition, p. 76. Going to the second issue that the appellate courts decision is not supported by law and jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and without merit as well. At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree.20Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309, 317 [1997]. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law21Section 32, Presidential Decree No. 1529. as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.22Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, supra. An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that petitioners should have _______________ 19 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1998 edition, p. 76. 20 Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309, 317 [1997]. 21 Section 32, Presidential Decree No. 1529.
22 Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property.23Bernardino Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111027, February 3, 1999, 302 SCRA 589; Sta. Ana, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 624, 629. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 24Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, supra. In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land sometime after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name. Fortunately, respondents action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens title over the property.25Sta. Ana vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Tale vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 266. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Petition denied; decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Notes.The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on _______________ 23 Bernardino Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111027, February 3, 1999, 302 SCRA 589; Sta. Ana, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 624, 629. 24 Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
25 Sta. Ana vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Tale vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 266. 537 VOL. 308, JUNE 21, 1999 537 Domingo vs. Reyes
the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous. (Arceo vs. People, 256 SCRA 569 [1996]) The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision, but some other judge in his place, constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions and does not per se render it erroneous. (People vs. Quiamco, 268 SCRA 516 [1997]) While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, they are strong evidence of ownership. (Heirs of Segunda Maningding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601 [1997]) o0o [Serna vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 527(1999)] G.R. No. 116372. January 18, 2001.*THIRD DIVISION. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents. Appeals; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusivethe Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that follow in support thereof pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented in the courts a quo in complete disregard of the well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. Indeed, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by the parties particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. Same; Land Titles; The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law is a question of fact. The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Such factual finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons. None has been adduced in the case at bar. Witnesses; Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of the witness testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue of credibility is unavailing con_______________ * THIRD DIVISION. 452 452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Court of Appeals
sidering that the judge below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of the witness testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect. Same; It is axiomatic that a witness interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution in considering the witness testimony, does not of itself operate to reduce his credithis testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if it is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, may be relied upon.It is axiomatic that a witness interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution in considering the witness testimony, does not of itself operate to reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it) is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may be relied upon. In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Divinaflors testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the premises, this Court will not and cannot take issue. Same; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; It is an elementary rule in evidence that when a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify.In the same vein, the issue of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of his predecessor-in-interest since 1939 is likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objection was never made by petitioner on the ground of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on this matter at any stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary rule in evidence that: when a witness
is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent. Same; Same; Child Witnesses; It is well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined; The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity 453 VOL. 349, JANUARY 18, 2001 453 Republic vs. Court of Appeals
of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioners claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listanas possession since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana possessing the land. Land Titles; Tax Declarations; While the Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially where there are no other persons claiming any interest in the lot.We agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by law since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that
tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
454 454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29578 entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner-Appellant v. Romeo Divinaflor, Claimant-Appellee1Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, with Justices Serafin V.C. Guingona and Eubolo G. Verzola, concurring. Rollo, pp. 32-37. which affirmed the deci-sion2Penned by Judge Rafael P. Santelices. Rollo, pp. 29-30. of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 12, rendered in favor of private respondent Romeo Divinaflor. This case stems from Cadastral Case No. N-11-LV initiated, pursuant to law, by the Director of Lands, as petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay (Branch 12). In due time, Romeo Divinaflor filed his answer to the petition relative to Lot No. 10739 with an area of 10,775 square meters situated in Oas, Albay, claiming ownership of said lot by virtue of possession for over thirty years. The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Lot 10739 of the cadastral survey of Oas, Albay is one of the parcels of land subject of these cadastral proceedings. When this case was called for initial hearing, nobody offered any opposition. Whereupon, an order of general default against the whole world was issued. Claimant was allowed to present his evidence. Lot 10739 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of riceland situated at Maramba, Oas, Albay containing an area of 10,775 square meters bounded on the north by Lots 10738 & 10737; on the East by Lot 10738; on the South by Lot 10716; and on the West by Lot 10716. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who began possession and occupying the same in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, ad-
_______________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, with Justices Serafin V.C. Guingona and Eubolo G. Verzola, concurring. Rollo, pp. 32-37. 2 Penned by Judge Rafael P. Santelices. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
455 VOL. 349, JANUARY 18, 2001 455 Republic vs. Court of Appeals
versely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939. He planted palay and harvested about 60 cavans of palay every harvest season. He declared the land in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1987 (Exh. 1). On May 21, 1973, claimant acquired ownership of the land by means of deed of absolute sale (Exh. 2). He caused the same to be declared in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1442 (Exh. 3). There was another reassessment under Tax Dec. No. 35 (Exh. 3-a). He continued planting on the land and all the products are used for the benefit of his family. The land was surveyed in the name of the previous owner per certification of the CENRO (Exh. 4). The cadastral survey costs had been paid in the amount of P72.08 under Official Receipt No. 50652483 (Exh. 5) and the certification thereof (Exh. 5-a). All the realty taxes has likewise been paid up to the current year per Official Receipt No. 6422679 (Exh. 6) together with the certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Oas, Albay (Exh. 6-A). There are no liens or encumbrances and neither are there persons claiming adverse ownership and possession of the land. The lot does not infringe the public road, river or stream, It is not part of a military reservation, public park, watershed or the governments forest zone. The lot has not been utilized as a bond in civil or criminal cases or as a collateral for a loan in any banking institution. There is no pending petition for its registration under Act 496 known as the Land Registration Act or an application for the issuance of free patent with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). Claimant is not legally disqualified from owning disposable property of the public domain.3Rollo, pp. 32-33. Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily possessed and occupied this land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939 very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10739 in the name of the Spouses Romeo Divinaflor and Nenita Radan. The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the trial court that claimant-appellee and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10739 since 1939 is not
sufficiently supported by the evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 and the certificate of real estate tax payment is dated 1990. _______________ 3 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
It was further contended that the testimony of Romeo Divinaflor was largely self-serving, he being the applicant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from. It ruled: To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations and tax receipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession which appellee has convincingly established. Repeatedly, the fact of possession is hammered into the record by appellees testimony on crossexamination by appellant. Thus: ASST. PROVL. PROS. CRISOSTOMO: Q: You said that you bought this land from Marcial Listana, and you are referring us to this deed of sale? WITNESS: A: Yes, sir. Q: This land is located at Maramba? A: Yes, sir. Q: Since when did Marcial Listana begin possessing this land? A: Since 1939. Q: What was Marcial Listana doing on the land? A: He was planting palay and sometimes corn. Q: In what concept was he possessing the land?
A: In the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively. Q: Do you know whether there are disputes involving the boundaries of the land? A: No, sir. Q: Are there also persons claiming adverse ownership and possession of the land? A: No, sir. Q: Does this land encroach any road, river or stream? A: No, sir. Q: Is this part of a military reservation, public park, watershed or the governments forest zone? A: No, sir. Q: Have you paid all the taxes on the land? A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the cadastral costs? A: I also paid the same. Q: What do you do with the land now? A: I planted palay during rainy season. Q: How many cavans of palay do you harvest every agricultural season? A: I get 40 cavans of palay every harvest season but sometimes more and sometimes less, during summer month I plant corn and harvest about 8 cavans of unhusked corn. Q: If and when this land will be titled, in whose name would you like the title to be? A: In our names, my wife and myself. PROSECUTOR CRISOSTOMO: That is all.4Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated July 24, 1990, pp. 5-6.
While it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts, may be considered as evidence of a claim of ownership, and when taken in connection with possession, it may be valuable in support of ones title by prescription. Nevertheless, the mere payment of taxes does not confer nor prove it. (Viernes, et al. vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286. See also Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701). The omission to declare the land in question for taxation purposes at the inception of the tax system in 1901 of this country does not destroy the continuous and adverse possession under claim of ownership of applicants predecessors in interest. Fontanilla vs. Director of Lands, et al, CA-G.R. No. 8371-R, Aug. 4, 1952. Finally, appellant asseverates that the testimony of appellee is insufficient to prove possession for being self-serving, he being one of the applicants. We remind appellant on this score that self-serving evidence comes into play only when such is made by the party out of court and excludes testimony which a party gives as a witness at the trial. (See N.D.C. vs. Workmens Compensation, et al., 19 SCRA 861; 31 C.J.S. 952).5Rollo, pp. 34-36. Motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision having been denied, the Director of Lands has brought the instant petition raising the sole issue of _______________ 4 Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated July 24, 1990, pp. 5-6. 5 Rollo, pp. 34-36.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. Petitioner Director of Lands assails the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioner argues that Divinaflor failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 for the following reasons: (1) Divinaflor failed to present sufficient proof that his predecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has possessed the lot since 1939; and (2) Divinaflor is incompetent to testify on his predecessors possession since 1939 considering he was born only in 1941, and in 1945, he was only 4 years old. We find no reversible error in the assailed judgment. Denial of the instant petition is proper in light of the well-entrenched doctrine upholding the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.6Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 374 (1996). It is likewise very basic that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is the very rule relied upon by petitioner.7De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 299 (1996). While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that follow in support thereof pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented in the courts a quo in complete disregard of the well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.8Ibid. Indeed, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by _______________ 6 Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 374 (1996). 7 De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 299 (1996). 8 Ibid.
the parties particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.9South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744 (1995). This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol10295 SCRA 359 (1998). that, originally, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 194211Approved on June 22, 1957. which provided for a simple thirtyyear prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Interpreting the above-quoted provision, the Court stated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals12235 SCRA 567 (1994). that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following: (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. There is no dispute that the subject lot is an alienable and disposable tract of public land. Since claimant Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of Lot 10739 from Marcial Listana by deed of absolute sale dated May 21, 1973,13Exhibit 2; Original Records, p. 12. the pivotal issue is whether his predecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership. The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact14Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 317 (1999). which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. Such factual finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons. None has been adduced in the case at bar. Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue of credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.15Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 375 (1999). Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of the witness testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.16Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 446 (1999). Further, it is axiomatic that a witness interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution in considering the witness testimony, does not of itself operate to reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it) is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, It may be relied upon.17Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 728 (1998). In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Divinaflors testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the premises, this Court will not and cannot take issue. _______________ 13 Exhibit 2; Original Records, p. 12. 14 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 317 (1999). 15 Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 375 (1999). 16 Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 446 (1999). 17 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 728 (1998).
In the same vein, the issue of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of his predecessorin-interest since 1939 is likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objection was never made by petitioner on the ground of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on this matter at any stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary rule in evidence that:
when a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent.18Ricardo J. Francisco, Basic Evidence, Manila: Rex Book Store, 1991. Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence.19Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 356 (1999). The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflors testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal. Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known.20Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V. Manila: Rex Book Store, 1999. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is well-established that _______________ 18 Ricardo J. Francisco, Basic Evidence, Manila: Rex Book Store, 1991. 19 Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 356 (1999). 20 Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V. Manila: Rex Book Store, 1999.
any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined.21People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998). The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.22Ibid. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained
in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioners claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listanas possession since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana possessing the land. Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by law since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases23Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712 (1996); Heirs of Severo Legaspi, Sr. vs. Vda. de Dayot, 188 SCRA 508 (1990). that tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court resolves to AFFIRM the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 which sustained the JUDGMENT of the Regional Trial Court rendered on July 27, 1990 granting the registration of title to herein private respondent. _______________ 21 People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998). 22 Ibid. 23 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712 (1996); Heirs of Severo Legaspi, Sr. vs. Vda. de Dayot, 188 SCRA 508 (1990).
SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownershiptax declarations and tax receipts are only prima facie evidence of ownership or possession. (Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 574 [1998]) If a party acknowledges in his tax declarations that the disputed portions belong to another, his claim as owner thereof must fail, (Alviola vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 537 [1998]) Real property tax shall be assessed in the name of the person owning or administering the property on which the tax is levied, and a tax declaration in the name of a person who has no successional or administrative rights to a decedents estate is null and void. (Cenido vs. Apacionado, 318 SCRA 688 [1999]) [Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451(2001)] G.R. No. 129471. April 28, 2000.*SECOND DIVISION. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS CAJES, respondents. Land Registration; A decree of registration cuts off or extinguishes a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the landnot to the right of ownership thereofwhich was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon.Petitioner would thus insist that, by virtue of the decree of registration, Jose Alvarez and those claiming title from him (i.e., the spouses Beduya) acquired ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land, despite the fact that they neither possessed nor occupied these lands. This view is mistaken. A consideration of the cases shows that a decree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the landnot to the right of ownership thereofwhich was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon. _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 268 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property it does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible.But to make this principle applicable to a situation wherein title acquired by a person through acquisitive prescription would be considered cut off and extinguished by a decree of registration would run counter to established jurisprudence before and after the ruling in Benin. Indeed, registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property. As early as 1911, in the case of City of Manila v. Lack, the Court already ruled on the purpose of registration of lands, viz.: The Court of Land Registration was created for a single purpose. The Act is entitled An Act to provide
for the adjudication and registration of titles to lands in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the Legislature in its creation was to bring the land titles of the Philippine Islands under one comprehensive and harmonious system, the cardinal features of which are indefeasibility of title and the intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles and interest, with the resultant increase in the use of land as a business asset by reason of the greater certainty and security of title. It does not create a title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible. . . Same; Tax Declarations; Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.In the present case, private respondent has been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the property since 1950. This fact was corroborated by the testimony of Eleuterio Cambangay who personally knew that Ulpiano Mumar transferred the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3840 in favor of private respondent in 1950. Private respondents claim based on actual occupat ion of the land is bolstered by Tax Declaration Nos. R-1475, R-799 and D-2247 which were issued in his name in 1950, 1961 and 1974, respectively. Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals: Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be 269 VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 269 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Same; Prescription; An uninterrupted adverse possession of land for more than 30 years could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property.It was established that private respondent, having been in possession of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when it was registered by Jose Alvarez in 1969, his possession tacked to that of his predecessor-in-interest, Ulpiano Mumar, which dates back to 1917. Clearly, more than 30 years had elapsed before a decree of registration was issued in favor of Jose Alvarez. This uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years
could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten (10) years, in case the possession is in good faith and with a just title. Such prescription is called ordinary prescription, as distinguished from extraordinary prescription which requires possession for 30 years in case possession is without just title or is not in good faith. Same; If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.In contrast to private respondent, it has been shown that neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya were at any time in possession of the property in question. In fact, despite knowledge by Gaudencio Beduya that private respondent occupied this 19.4 hectares included in the area covered by TCT No. 10101, he never instituted any action to eject or recover possession from the latter. Hence, it can be concluded that neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya ever exercised any right of ownership over the land. The fact of registra270 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
tion in their favor never vested in them the ownership of the land in dispute. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included. Same; Actions; Reconveyance; Land erroneously included in the certificate of title of another must be reconveyed in favor of the true and actual owner thereof, reconveyance being clearly the proper remedy.Considering the circumstances pertaining in this case, therefore, we hold that ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land presently occupied by private respondent was already vested in him and that its inclusion in OCT No. 546 and, subsequently, in TCT No. 10101, was erroneous. Accordingly, the land in question must be reconveyed in favor of private respondent, the true and actual owner thereof, reconveyance being clearly the proper remedy in this case. Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of the decree of registration except when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land.Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, such as the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of decree of registration. However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land. Thus, it has been held: . . . [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. 271 VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 271 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Counterclaims; Pleadings and Practice; The act of the defendant in an action for recovery of possession of land of filing a counterclaim claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages is not tantamount to a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of Torrens title; A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiffit stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same. A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. . . . It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. In an analogous case, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the original action instituted before the lower court was a case for recovery of possession. The Court reasoned that since all the facts of the case are before it, to direct the party to institute cancellation proceedings would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy which has already dragged on for 20 years. Actions; Reconveyance; It is a condition sine qua non for an action for reconveyance to prosper that the property should not have passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.Succinctly put, 38 provides that a certificate of title is conclusive and binding upon the whole world. Consequently, a buyer need not look behind the certificate of title in order to determine who is the actual owner of the land.
However, this is subject to the right of a person deprived of land through fraud to bring an action for reconveyance, provided that it does not prejudice the rights of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. It is a condition sine qua non for an action for reconveyance to prosper that the property should not have passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 272 272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Banks and Banking; Judicial Notice; Mortgage; While an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title, in the case of a banking institution, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract; Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof.The evidence before us, however, indicates that petitioner is not a mortgagee in good faith. To be sure, an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title. Nonetheless, especially in the case of a banking institution, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof. Banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands. Land Titles; Innocent Purchaser for Value; A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otkerwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.Two circumstances negate petitioners claim that it was an innocent purchaser for value when it bought the land in question, including the portion occupied by private respondent: (1) petitioner was already informed by Gaudencio Beduya that private respondent occupied a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 10101; and (2) petitioners representative conducted an investigation of the property in 1979 to ascertain whether the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in TCT No. 10101, In other words, petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the foreclosure sale. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. 273 VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 273
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor.Petitioner deliberately disregarded both the fact that private respondent already occupied the property and that he was claiming ownership over the same. It cannot feign ignorance of private respondents claim to the land since the latter mortgaged the same land to petitioner as security for the loan he contracted in 1978 on the strength of the tax declarations issued under his name. Instead of inquiring into private respondents occupation over the land, petitioner simply proceeded with the foreclosure sale, pretending that no doubts surround the ownership of the land covered by TCT No. 10101. Considering these circumstances, petitioner cannot be deemed an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value. As we ruled: The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and public possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith. In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificates of title and ma[k]e inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Estoppel in Pais; Words and Phrases; Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondents title. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself. Indeed, nothing in record indicates that peti274 274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
tioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondents title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Jorge T. Salise, Jr. for petitioner. Roberto C. Cajes for private respondent. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the decision1Per Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Fidel P. Purisima (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and resolution2Per Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. of the Court of Appeals dated August 30, 1996 and April 23, 1997, respectively, declaring private respondent Carlos Cajes the owner of 19.4 hectares of land embraced in TCT No. 10101 and ordering the segregation and reconveyance of said portion to him. The antecedent facts are as follows: The land in dispute, consisting of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol, was originally owned by Ulpiano Mumar, whose ownership since 1917 was evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 3840.3Exh. 4. In 1950,4TSN, p. 8, Jan. 19, 1989. Mumar sold the land to private respondent who was issued Tax Declaration No. R-1475 that same year.5Exh. 4. The tax declaration was later superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. R-799 issued in 19616Exh. 2. and D_______________ 1 Per Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Fidel P. Purisima (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. 2 Per Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. 3 Exh. 4. 4 TSN, p. 8, Jan. 19, 1989. 5 Exh. 4. 6 Exh. 2.
275 VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 275 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
2247 issued in 1974.7Exh. 3. Private respondent occupied and cultivated the said land,8TSN, p. 7, April 6, 1989. planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land.9Exh. C. In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468.00 square meters,10TSN, p. 28, Oct. 7, 1988. in his name for which he was issued OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969.11TSN, p. 5, April 6, 1989; Exh. A. The parcel of land included the 19.4 hectares occupied by private respondent. Alvarez never occupied nor introduced improvements on said land.12TSN, p. 6, April 6, 1989. In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom TCT No. 10101 was issued.13Exh. A. That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.14Exh. A-2. In 1978, the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00.15Exh. A-3. The spouses Beduya later failed to pay their loans, as a result of which, the mortgage on the property was foreclosed.16TSN, p. 6, Oct. 7, 1988. In the resulting foreclosure sale held on January 31, 1985, petitioner was the highest bidder.17Exh. B. As the spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership.18TSN, p. 7, Oct. 7, 1988. _______________ 7 Exh. 3. 8 TSN, p. 7, April 6, 1989. 9 Exh. C. 10 TSN, p. 28, Oct. 7, 1988. 11 TSN, p. 5, April 6, 1989; Exh. A. 12 TSN, p. 6, April 6, 1989. 13 Exh. A. 14 Exh. A-2. 15 Exh. A-3. 16 TSN, p. 6, Oct. 7, 1988. 17 Exh. B. 18 TSN, p. 7, Oct. 7, 1988.
276 276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
It appears that private respondent had also applied for a loan from petitioner in 1978, offering his 19.4 hectare property under Tax Declaration No. D-2247 as security for the loan. As part of the processing of the application, a representative of petitioner, Patton R. Olano, inspected the land and appraised its value. Private respondents loan application was later approved by petitioner.19Id., pp. 9-11. However after releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of the amount.20Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; CA Rollo, p. 22. Private respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in question from encumbrance.21Exh. 5. Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioners representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent was occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent was informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he was occupying, and he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so,22TSN, pp. 17-18, Oct. 7, 1988. petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him. The case was assigned to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City,23Records, pp. 1-3. which after trial, rendered a decision, dated August 22, 1989, declaring petitioner the lawful owner of the entire land covered by TCT No. 10101 on the ground that the decree of registration was binding upon the land.24Decision, pp. 2-3; Records, pp. 69-70. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: _______________ 19 Id., pp. 9-11. 20 Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; CA Rollo, p. 22. 21 Exh. 5. 22 TSN, pp. 17-18, Oct. 7, 1988. 23 Records, pp. 1-3. 24 Decision, pp. 2-3; Records, pp. 69-70.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the court renders judgment: 1. Declaring plaintiff bank Development Bank of the Philippines the true and legal owner of the land in question covered by TCT No. 10101 farm of Gaudencio Beduya; 2. Dismissing defendants counterclaim; 3. Ordering defendant to vacate from the land in question; the portion of which he claims to belong to him for without basis in fact and law; 4. Ordering defendant, his agents or any person representing him or those who may claim substantial rights on the land to vacate therefrom, cease and desist from disturbing, molesting and interfering plaintiffs possession of the land in question, and from committing any such act as would tend to mitigate, deny or deprive plaintiff of its ownership and possession over said land. SO ORDERED. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and gave judgment for private respondent, declaring him the owner of the 19.4 hectares of land erroneously included in TCT No. 10101. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby rendered: 1. Dismissing the complaint. 2. Declaring the disputed 19.4000 hectares of land embraced in TCT 10101 as exclusively belonging to defendant-appellant, ordering its segregation from plaintiff-appellees title and its reconveyance to appellant. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.25CA Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 51. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in a resolution dated April 23, 1997.26Rollo, p. 59. Hence this petition. _______________ 25 CA Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 51.
26 Rollo, p. 59.
Petitioner contends that: I. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF LAW (Sections 38 and 46 of ACT 496) AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF BENIN VS. TUASON, 57 SCRA 531. II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OVERLOOKED THE ISSUES ABOUT THE DBP BEING AN INNOCENT MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE OF THE LAND IN QUESTION AND OF HAVING PURCHASED LATER THE SAME DURING A PUBLIC AUCTION SALE. III. THE RESPONDENT COURTS RULING DECLARING DBP IN ESTOPPEL IS ILLOGICAL.27Id., p. 8. First. Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Benin v. Tuason2857 SCRA 531 (1974). in support of its claim that its predecessor-in-interest, Jose Alvarez, became the owner of the land by virtue of the decree of registration issued in his name. In Benin, three sets of plaintiffs filed separate complaints against Mariano Severo Tuason and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., praying for the cancellation of OCT No. 735 covering two parcels of land called the Sta. Mesa Estate, or Parcel 1, with an area of 8,798,617.00 square meters, and the Diliman Estate, or Parcel 2, with an area of 15,961,246.00 square meters. They asked that they be declared the owners and lawful possessors of said lands. Benin is distinguished from this case. In the first place, Benin involved vast tracts of lands which had already been subdivided and bought by innocent purchasers for value and in good faith at the time the claimants obtained registration. Secondly, when the claimants ancestors occupied the lands in question and declared them for tax purposes in 1944, the lands were already covered by the tax declarations in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In 1914, OCT No. 735 was _______________ 27 Id., p. 8. 28 57 SCRA 531 (1974).
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VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 279 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
issued in the name of Tuason so that, from that time on, no possession could defeat the title of the registered owners of the land. Thirdly, the validity of OCT No. 735 had already been recognized by this Court in several cases29Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Acua, 59 Phil. 183 (1933); Alcantara v. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796 (1953); Santiago v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16 (1960). and, as a result thereof, the transfer certificates of title acquired by the innocent purchasers for value were also declared valid. It was held that neither could the claimants file an action to annul these titles for not only had these actions prescribed, but the fact was that the claimants were also barred from doing so by laches, having filed the complaint only in 1955, or 41 years after the issuance of OCT No. 735 to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Thus, it was not solely the decree of registration which was considered in resolving the Benin case. What was considered decisive was the valid title or right of ownership of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and that of the other innocent purchasers for value and in good faith compared to the failure of the claimants to show their right to own or possess the questioned properties. Petitioner maintains that the possession by private respondent and his predecessor-in-interest of the 19.4 hectares of land for more than 30 years cannot overcome the decree of registration issued in favor of its predecessor-in-interest Jose Alvarez. Petitioner quotes the following statement in the Benin case: It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496).30Benin v. Tuason, supra at 597, citing Santiago v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., supra. _______________ 29 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Acua, 59 Phil. 183 (1933); Alcantara v. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796 (1953); Santiago v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16 (1960). 30 Benin v. Tuason, supra at 597, citing Santiago v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., supra.
Petitioner would thus insist that, by virtue of the decree of registration, Jose Alvarez and those claiming title from him (i.e., the spouses Beduya) acquired ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land, despite the fact that they neither possessed nor occupied these lands. This view is mistaken. A consideration of the cases shows that a decree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land not to the right of ownership thereofwhich was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon. Thus, Act No. 496 provides: Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws of Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the Registry. Second. Taxes within two years after the same became due and payable. Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined. But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner.
Hence, in Cid v. Javier,31108 Phil. 850, 853 (1960). (Emphasis added). it was held: . . . Consequently, even conceding arguendo that such an easement has been acquired, it had been cut off and extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens system without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.
This principle was reiterated in Purugganan v. Paredes32161 Phil. 91; 69 SCRA 69 (1976). which also involved an easement of light and view that was not annotated on the certificate of title of the servient estate. But to make this principle applicable to a situation wherein title acquired by a person through acquisitive prescription would be considered cut off and extinguished by a decree of registration would run counter to established jurisprudence before and after the ruling in Benin. Indeed, registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable property. As early as 1911, in the case of City of Manila v. Lack,3319 Phil. 324, 328 (1911). the Court already ruled on the purpose of registration of lands, viz.: The Court of Land Registration was created for a single purpose. The Act is entitled An Act to provide for the adjudication and registration of titles to lands in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the Legislature in its creation was to bring the land titles of the Philippine Islands under one comprehensive and harmonious system, the cardinal features of which are indefeasibility of title and the intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles and interest, with the resultant increase in the use of land as a business asset by reason of the greater certainty and security of title. It does not create a title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible . . . _______________ 31 108 Phil. 850, 853 (1960). (Emphasis added). 32 161 Phil. 91; 69 SCRA 69 (1976). 33 19 Phil. 324, 328 (1911).
Again, in the case of Angeles v. Samia3466 Phil. 444 (1938). where land was erroneously registered in favor of persons who neither possessed nor occupied the same, to the prejudice of the actual occupant, the Court held: . . . The purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court has had occasion to so state more than once, is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register title already created and already vested, and of course, said original certificate of title No. 8995 could not have vested in the defendant more title than what was rightfully due her and her co-owners. It appearing that said certificate granted her much more
than she expected, naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave rise to said anomaly, be corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324). The defendant and her co-owners knew or, at least, came to know that it was through error that the original certificate of title in question was issued by the court which heard cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from the time said certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from December 15, 1921. This is evidenced by the fact that, ever since, they remained passive without even attempting to make the least showing of ownership over the land in question until after the lapse of more than eleven years. The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). This is permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia (55 Phil. 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the registry and reproduced in the _______________ 34 66 Phil. 444 (1938).
certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is registered in the registry. In other words, if the plan of an applicant for registration or claimant in a cadastral case alleges that the land referred to in said plan is 100 or 1,000 hectares, and the land which he really owns and desires to register in the registry is only 80 ares, he cannot claim to be the owner of the existing difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title granting him said area of 100 or 1,000 hectares.35Supra at 448-450. The principle laid down in this 1938 case remains the prevailing doctrine, its latest application being in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals36G.R. No. 127608, Sept. 30, 1999, 315 SCRA 626. See also Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA (1997). wherein we ruled that the fact that a party was able to secure a title in his favor did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the property.
In the present case, private respondent has been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the property since 1950. This fact was corroborated by the testimony of Eleuterio Cambangay who personally knew that Ulpiano Mumar transferred the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 384037Exh. 4. in favor of private respondent in 1950.38TSN, pp. 25-26, January 19, 1999. Private respondents claim based on actual occupation of the land is bolstered by Tax Declaration Nos. R-1475, R-799 and D224739Exh. 4; Exh. 2; Exh. 3. which were issued in his name in 1950, 1961 and 1974, respectively. Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals:40328 Phil. 238, 248; 258 SCRA 712, 720-721 (1996). Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his _______________ 35 Supra at 448-450. 36 G.R. No. 127608, Sept. 30, 1999, 315 SCRA 626. See also Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA (1997). 37 Exh. 4. 38 TSN, pp. 25-26, January 19, 1999. 39 Exh. 4; Exh. 2; Exh. 3. 40 328 Phil. 238, 248; 258 SCRA 712, 720-721 (1996).
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. More importantly, it was established that private respondent, having been in possession of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when it was registered by Jose Alvarez in 1969, his possession
tacked to that of his predecessor-in-interest, Ulpiano Mumar, which dates back to 1917.41Exh. 4. Clearly, more than 30 years had elapsed before a decree of registration was issued in favor of Jose Alvarez. This uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten (10) years, in case the possession is in good faith and with a just title. Such prescription is called ordinary prescription, as distinguished from extraordinary prescription which requires possession for 30 years in case possession is without just title or is not in good faith.42Gesmundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119870, Dec. 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 487. In contrast to private respondent, it has been shown that neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya were at any time in possession of the property in question. In fact, despite knowledge by Gaudencio Beduya that private respondent occupied this 19.4 hectares included in the area covered by TCT No. 10101,43TSN, p. 9, Oct. 7, 1988. he never instituted any action to eject or _______________ 41 Exh. 4. 42 Gesmundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119870, Dec. 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 487. 43 TSN, p. 9, Oct. 7, 1988.
recover possession from the latter. Hence, it can be concluded that neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya ever exercised any right of ownership over the land. The fact of registration in their favor never vested in them the ownership of the land in dispute. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.44Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148, 155 (1991). Considering the circumstances pertaining in this case, therefore, we hold that ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land presently occupied by private respondent was already vested in him and that its inclusion in OCT No. 546 and, subsequently, in TCT No. 10101, was erroneous. Accordingly, the land in question must be reconveyed in favor of private respondent, the true and actual owner thereof, reconveyance being clearly the proper remedy in this case.
The true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled and the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendants, the registered owner to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof. (Vital vs. Amore, 90 Phil. 955) The reconveyance is just and proper in order to terminate the intolerable anomaly that the patentees should have a Torrens title for the land which they and their predecessors never possessed which has been possessed by Navo in the concept of owner. (Bustarga v. Navo II, 129 SCRA 105)45Linaza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 855, 860-861 (1990). Second. Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, such as the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of decree of regis_______________ 44 Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148, 155 (1991). 45 Linaza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 855, 860-861 (1990).
tration.46Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 589 (1999). However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land. Thus, it has been held: . . . [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.47Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339 (1997); Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 330 (1993). Having been the sole occupant of the land in question, private respondent may seek reconveyance of his property despite the lapse of more than 10 years.
Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the question of the validity of _______________ 46 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 589 (1999). 47 Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339 (1997); Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 330 (1993).
TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same. A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. . . . It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.48A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 349, 358 (1998). In an analogous case,49Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 508 (1988). we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the original action instituted before the lower court was a case for recovery of possession. The Court reasoned that since all the facts of the case are before it, to direct the party to institute cancellation proceedings would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy which has already dragged on for 20 years. Third. Petitioner nonetheless contends that an action for reconveyance does not lie against it, because it is an innocent purchaser for value in the foreclosure sale held in 1985. This contention has no merit. Sec. 38 of Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act, provides: If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such de cree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser _______________ 48 A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 349, 358 (1998). 49 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 508 (1988).
for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630.) Succinctly put, 38 provides that a certificate of title is conclusive and binding upon the whole world. Consequently, a buyer need not look behind the certificate of title in order to determine who is the actual owner of the land. However, this is subject to the right of a person deprived of land through fraud to bring an action for reconveyance, provided that it does not prejudice the rights of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. It is a condition sine qua non for an action for reconveyance to prosper that the property should not have passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.50Lucena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77468, Aug. 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47. The same rule applies to mortgagees, like petitioner. Thus, we held: Where the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when the land is mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite suspicion, said mortgagee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. Although Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides that absolute ownership of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor is essential, the subse_______________ 50 Lucena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77468, Aug. 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47.
quent declaration of a title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of a mortgagee in good faith.51Rural Bank of Sariaya, Inc. v. Yacon, 175 SCRA 62 (1989). The evidence before us, however, indicates that petitioner is not a mortgagee in good faith. To be sure, an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title. Nonetheless, especially in the case of a banking institution, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof. Banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.52Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 13169, Feb. 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 346, citing Tomas v. Tomas, 98 SCRA 280 (1980). In this case, petitioners representative, Patton R. Olano, admitted that he came to know of the property for the first time in 1979 when he inspected it to determine whether the portion occupied by private respondent and mortgaged by the latter to petitioner was included in TCT No. 10101. This means that when the land was mortgaged by the spouses Beduya in 1972, no investigation had been made by petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that petitioner failed to exercise due care and diligence in establishing the condition of the land as regards its actual owners and possessors before it entered into the mortgage contract in 1972 with the Beduyas. Had it done so, it would not have failed to discover that private respondent was occupying the disputed portion of 19.4 hectares. For this reason, petitioner cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value when it bought the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in 1985 at the foreclosure sale. Indeed, two circumstances negate petitioners claim that it was an innocent purchaser for value when it bought the land _______________
51 Rural Bank of Sariaya, Inc. v. Yacon, 175 SCRA 62 (1989). 52 Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 13169, Feb. 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 346, citing Tomas v. Tomas, 98 SCRA 280 (1980).
in question, including the portion occupied by private respondent: (1) petitioner was already informed by Gaudencio Beduya that private respondent occupied a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 10101; and (2) petitioners representative conducted an investigation of the property in 1979 to ascertain whether the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in TCT No. 10101. In other words, petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the foreclosure sale. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.53Lucena v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 336 (1995). Petitioner deliberately disregarded both the fact that private respondent already occupied the property and that he was claiming ownership over the same. It cannot feign ignorance of private respondents claim to the land since the latter mortgaged the same land to petitioner as security for the loan he contracted in 1978 on the strength of the tax declarations issued under his name. Instead of inquiring into private respondents occupation over the land, petitioner simply proceeded with the foreclosure sale, pretending that no doubts surround the ownership of the land covered by TCT No. 10101. Considering these circumstances, petitioner cannot be deemed an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value. As we ruled: The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and public possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith. _______________ 53 Lucena v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 336 (1995).
In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificates of title and ma[k]e inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. (Citations omitted.) .... One who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of another should, at least, make some inquiry concerning the right of those in possession. The actual possession by other than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarcely, in the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessors.54Ibid. Fourth. From the foregoing, we find that the resolution of the issue of estoppel will not affect the outcome of this case. Petitioner claims that the fact that it approved a loan in favor of private respondent and executed a mortgage contract covering the 19.4 hectares covered by tax declarations issued under private respondents name does not mean that it is estopped from questioning the latters title. Petitioner accuses private respondent of having made misrepresentations which led it to believe in his valid title and ownership. The claim has no basis. Private respondent made no misrepresentation with regard to the land occupied by him as he is actually the real owner thereof. Moreover, when private respondent entered into a mortgage contract with petitioner, his claim of ownership was supported not only by the tax declarations but also by a certification of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Bohol that no civil, land registration or cadastral case has been filed or instituted before the court affecting the validity of Tax Declaration No. D-2247 covering the land located in Bugang, San Miguel, Bohol and declared in the name of Carlos Cajes.55Exh. 8. These documents were relied upon by private respondent in support of his claim of ownership. We cannot consider the submission of these documents as misrepresentations by private respondent as to the _______________ 54 Ibid. 55 Exh. 8.
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
actual ownership of the land. Rather, private respondent believed in good faith and with good reason that he was the owner of the 19.4 hectares occupied by him. As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondents title. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.56Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123817, Dec. 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 88. In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself.57Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; CA Rollo, p. 22. Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondents title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101. However, for reasons aforestated, we uphold private respondents ownership of 19.4 hectares occupied by him. As a necessary consequence thereof, such portion of land included in TCT No. 10101 must be segregated and reconveyed in his favor. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed in toto. _______________ 56 Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123817, Dec. 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 88. 57 Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; CA Rollo, p. 22.
293 VOL. 331, APRIL 28, 2000 293 Heirs of Quirico Seraspi and Purificacion R. Seraspi vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.Any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove he is in actual possession of the property. (Heirs of Juan Oclarit vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 239 [1994]) Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712 [1996]) Certificates of titles merely confirm or record title already existing and vestedthey cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. (Esquivias vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 803 [1997]) [Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 267(2000)] G.R. No. 117971. February 1, 2001.*SECOND DIVISION. ESTRELLITA S.J. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, LAURENCE and JENNIFER, BOTH SURNAMED VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO MILLAMA and ROLLY DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LINA F. VDA. DE SANTIAGO, EDDIE, ROLANDO, WILLY and MARILOU, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO, respondents. Civil Law; Actions; Res Judicata; A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reivindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action.The principle of res judicata does not apply in this case. The two earlier actions filed by Anacleto and Victorino were for forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership. Meanwhile, the instant case is an accion reivindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reivindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Same; Same; Same; The issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.On the other hand, respondents insist that the validity of said titles cannot be assailed in a counterclaim, as resorted to by petitioners, since a collateral attack is not allowed under the law. Respondents are correct. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Petitioners raised the issue of invalidity of the _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 13 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 13 Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
titles as a defense in an answer/counterclaim to respondents action for recovery of ownership. This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final judgment and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. Sec. 48 of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree requires no less than a direct action for reconveyance duly filed within the period provided by law. The issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Thus, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the subject lots is beyond the province of the instant petition. Same; Land Titles; A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for petitioners. Rodolfo R. Aquino for private respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition assails the decision dated May 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA. G.R. CV No. 40735, reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71 which dismissed the action for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages brought by respondents against petitioners concerning two registered parcels of land situated in Malabago, Sta. Cruz, Zambales, particularly described as follows: A parcel of land [Lot 3-A, plan Psu-132649 Amd., L.R. Case No. N-212, L.R.C. Record No. N-16557], with all the improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio of Malabago, Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
14 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
Zambales. Bounded on the NE., and SW., from point 2-4, by Lot 1-A; on the SE., from point 4-1, by property of Simeon Maya; and on the S., from point 1-2, by Lot 3-B [Republic of the Philippines]. A parcel of land [Lot 1-A-2, of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-285423, being a portion of Lot 1-A, Psu132649, Amd., LRC Rec. No. N-16557], situated in the Barrio of Malabago, Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the N., points 11-12, & 13 to 1, & 1 to 2, by Lot 1-A-1, of the subdivision plan; on the E., points 2 to 3, by the property of Gavino Roxas; on the SE., points 3 to 4, by the property of Daniel Mercurio, and points 4 to 5, by the property of Pedro Maya; on the SW., & NE., points 5 to 7, by Lot 3-A, Psu-132649, Amd., on the SE., points 7 to 8, by Lot 1-B and the SW & NW., points 8 to 11, by Creek [Lot 1-B, both of PSU-132649, Amd.].1RTC Records, pp. 148 & 150. On Dec. 20, 1962, the land registration court, in a final decision in LRC Registration Case No. N212,2Rollo, pp. 28-29. awarded the disputed lots, measuring 98,800 square meters to the spouses Antonio and Rosario Angeles. The spouses sold the lots to Victorino Santiago on October 9, 1967. Victorino Santiago converted a portion thereof into fishponds and on August 9, 1977, sold the lots to Anacleto Santiago, husband of respondent Lina Santiago.3RTC Records, pp. 140-141. At the time of the last sale, no decree of registration had yet been issued for the said lots despite the final judgment in the land registration case. On August 15, 1977, Anacleto engaged the services of Pedro Adona to develop the properties into fishponds. When Adona saw the lots for the first time, there were existing fishponds of about three (3) hectares on the lower portion of the land. Adona leveled the three (3) hectares, placed partitions, constructed dikes and elevated the pilapil from one (1) meter to two and one-half (2 1/2) meters. Work halted during the first week of October 1977 due to lack of funds. Meanwhile, on February 28, 1978, Victorino filed an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 309 against Carlos Villanueva and his wife, petitioner Estrellita Villanueva. Since Vic_______________ 1 RTC Records, pp. 148 & 150. 2 Rollo, pp. 28-29. 3 RTC Records, pp. 140-141.
15 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 15 Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
torino had already sold the property to Anacleto and Lina Santiago, the lawsuit was dismissed on June 19, 1978.4Id. at 286-287 & 293. Adona and his men resumed work on May 15, 1978 and stayed in a nipa hut near a creek inside the property. However, on Sept. 22, 1978, while Adona was in Alaminos, Pangasinan, some people entered the property and destroyed the nipa hut. Adona reported the matter to Anacleto who advised him to stop work until the problem was solved. By then, Adona had completed work on about six (6) hectares of the entire 9.8-hectare property, including the three (3) hectares which were fully developed.5TSN, May 15, 1992, pp. 22-27. A week before the incident, Anacletos wife, Lina, was warned that Carlos Villanueva would enter the properties and destroy the hut, but Lina dismissed the warning thinking that Carlos would not pursue his plan.6TSN, June 5, 1992, pp. 37-38. When she saw the hut destroyed, she instructed her nephew, Ereberto Flores, to call a policeman. They took pictures7Supra, Note 3 at 187-188. of the demolished hut which were presented in court. Lina added that they were not able to reclaim the properties since Carlos threatened them with a gun.8Supra, Note 7 at 30-31. On Dec. 12, 1978, the decrees of registration covering the subject lots were issued and Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-7125 and 0-7126 were transcribed in the name of Antonio Angeles on December 27, 1978.9Supra, Note 3 at 146-147. On February 22, 1979, Antonio Angeles, as original owner and vendor, executed a Deed of Confirmation of Sale, Waiver and Quitclaim over the lots in favor of Anacleto Santiago who had bought the lots. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-24726 and T-24727 were issued for Lot 3-A and Lot 1-A-2 respectively in the name of Anacleto Santiago. The lots were declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 28-292, 9109 and 9108 and Anacleto paid the corresponding realty taxes thereon.10Supra, Note 2 at 28-29. ________________ 4 Id. at 286-287 & 293. 5 TSN, May 15, 1992, pp. 22-27. 6 TSN, June 5, 1992, pp. 37-38. 7 Supra, Note 3 at 187-188. 8 Supra, Note 7 at 30-31. 9 Supra, Note 3 at 146-147. 10 Supra, Note 2 at 28-29.
Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
On Feb. 26, 1979, the Santiagos sued the Villanuevas for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 1174-I. On February 14, 1980, Criminal Case No. 1307-I was also filed against the Villanuevas for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.11Supra, Note 3 at 274-278 & 294-295. During the pendency of these cases, Anacleto discovered that the Ministry of Natural Resources granted to Carlos a Fisheries Lease Agreement12Id. at 273. over the said lots on February 28, 1980. Anacleto sought the cancellation of the said agreement, but both the Ministry and the Office of the President dismissed Anacletos petition.13Id. at 305-315 & 321-339. On April 21, 1980, Criminal Case No. 1307-I against the Villanuevas was dismissed.14Id. at 299. Eventually, the Fisheries Lease Agreement granted to Carlos was nullified upon appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-12493,15Id. at 155-157. which judgment became final and executory when a petition for review thereof was dismissed on technical grounds by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1991.16Id. at 152. Civil Case No. 1174-I was also dismissed on January 28, 1982.17Id. at 280. In the meantime, Carlos Villanueva and Anacleto Santiago both passed away. Hence, the present case was brought by Anacletos heirs against the heirs of Carlos. In their complaint18Id. at 1-6. filed on July 30, 1991, Lina Vda. de Santiago and her children, Eddie, Rolando, Willy and Marilou, maintained that as successors-in-interest of Anacleto, they were unlawfully deprived of the possession, use and enjoyment of the fishponds for the last twelve (12) years by Carlos and now, by the latters widow Estrellita Vda. de Villanueva and their children, Laurence and Jennifer. They also impleaded as defendants caretakers employed by the Villanuevas, Rogelio Millama and Roly De Jesus. The Santiagos asked the court to order the Villanuevas to vacate the lots and restore to them possession and ownership of the lots registered in _______________ 11 Supra, Note 3 at 274-278 & 294-295. 12 Id. at 273. 13 Id. at 305-315 & 321-339. 14 Id. at 299. 15 Id. at 155-157. 16 Id. at 152. 17 Id. at 280. 18 Id. at 1-6.
their predecessors name. They also demanded actual damages in the amount of P135,000.00, lost earnings for every hectare from the time of dispossession until restoration in the amount of P20,000.00 per annum, moral damages in an amount deemed just and reasonable by the court, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. For her part, respondent Estrellita Villanueva countered that as early as the year 1950, her father-in-law, Maximino Villanueva, offered to sell the fishponds situated on the disputed parcels of land to her and her husband, Carlos. According to Estrellita, they bought the fishponds from her father-in-law which was then classified as swamp land. When they sought to have the properties titled with the Bureau of Fisheries, they were told that this was not possible due to the lands classification. Carlos then instead applied for a Fisheries Lease Agreement which was granted under FLA 3022.19TSN, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 5-8. Estrellita added that in all the twenty years that they possessed the subject lots as well as the other twenty or so years that the same was occupied by her father-in-law, they were never disturbed in their possession thereof. She further stated that although she had seen Antonio Angeles enter the fishpond and the latter applied for the issuance of a title, her father-in-law did not receive any summons pertaining to said application and resultantly, title was issued in favor of Angeles. She also claimed that before the instant complaint was filed by Lina Santiago, no proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 1508 or barangay conciliation were ever held.20Id. at 27-29. In a decision dated Dec. 18, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and res judicata. Relying on the tax declarations which classified the lots as swamp land, the trial court disposed: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants, declaring: (a) Dismissing the instant complaint against the defendants, with costs; _______________ 19 TSN, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 5-8. 20 Id. at 27-29.
Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
(b) Declaring the tax declarations stated in paragraph 2 of the complaint null and void and (sic) no legal force and effect; (c) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7125, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7126, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24726 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24727 as null and void and without any force and effect; (d) Declaring the defendants as the lawful possessors of the lands in litigation.21CA Records, p. 91. The Santiagos elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one entered. 1. declaring the validity of OCT Nos. 0-7125; 0-7126, Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-24726 and T24727 as valid (sic); 2. declaring plaintiffs-appellants as lawful owners of the lands described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; 3. ordering defendants-appellants to restore possession of the lands to plaintiffs-appellants; 4. with costs against defendants-appellants.22Supra, Note 2 at 40. Hence, this petition alleging that: A. THE PRESENT CASE IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS DISMISSAL OF TWO CASES INVOLVING COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT WITH PREJUDICE. B. SINCE THE LAND IS A SWAMPLAND, IT CAN BE DISPOSED OF BY LEASE AND THE TITLES OVER THE SAME ARE NULL AND VOID. C. SINCE THIS CASE INVOLVES REAL PROPERTIES, IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT THE COMPLAINT MUST FIRST BE REFERRED TO THE BARANGAY FOR CONFRONTATION AND CONCILIATION.23Id. at 18. _______________ 21 CA Records, p. 91. 22 Supra, Note 2 at 40. 23 Id. at 18.
For our resolution are the following issues: Is the present action barred by res judicata? Should respondents complaint be dismissed for failure to submit to barangay conciliation? Did the appellate court err in ruling that respondents titles constitute valid and indefeasible proof of ownership? First, the procedural issues. The principle of res judicata does not apply in this case. The two earlier actions filed by Anacleto and Victorino were for forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership.24Cagayan De Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, 231-232 (1996) citing: Joven vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700 (1992); Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613 (1980) and Rule 70, Sec. 7 (now Sec. 18) of the Rules... Meanwhile, the instant case is an accion reivindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership25Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1990 Edition, Arturo M. Tolentino, pp. 48-49. because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reivindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. There was also no need to submit to barangay conciliation proceedings since the action for recovery of ownership, possession and damages was filed by respondents with the trial court on July 31, 1991. At that time, the applicable laws regarding barangay conciliation proceedings as condition precedent to the filing of an action in court were Sections 226SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:1. Where one party is ... and _______________ 24 Cagayan De Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, 231232 (1996) citing: Joven vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700 (1992); Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613 (1980) and Rule 70, Sec. 7 (now Sec. 18) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1990 Edition, Arturo M. Tolentino, pp. 48-49. 26 SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: 1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; 2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; 4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
327SECTION 3. Venue.Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or mun... of P.D. 1508 and not the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect only on Jan. 1, 1992. Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 were applied in Tavora vs. Veloso, et al.,28117 SCRA 613 (1982). an action for ejectment filed by petitioner against his tenant for failure to pay rentals. We held then that no lupon was authorized to take cognizance of the dispute since the barangay lupon had no jurisdiction over cases where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality. We said that Section 3, which requires actions involving real property or any interest therein to be brought in the barangay where the property is situated, refers to venue and presupposes that the Lupon has authority over the dispute. In this case, petitioners are residents of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan while respondents reside in Perez, Bulacan, Bulacan and Gama, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Conformably then to Secs. 2 and 3 and Tavora, petitioners did not err in directly filing the present action with the trial court since the parties reside in different provinces. We now tackle the substantive and main issue. Are respondents certificates of title valid and indefeasible proof of ownership? To support their position that respondents certificates of title are null and void, petitioners submit that the lots in question are swamp lands and therefore, not susceptible to private ownership because the same are inalienable public lands. On the other hand, respondents insist that the validity of said titles cannot be assailed in a counterclaim, as resorted to by petitioners, since a collateral attack is not allowed under the law. Respondents are correct. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Petitioners raised the issue of invalidity of the titles as a defense in an answer/counterclaim29Supra, Note 3 at 11. to respondents action for recovery of ownership. This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final judgment and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. Sec. 48 of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree30Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. requires no less than a direct action for reconveyance duly filed within the period provided by law. The issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Thus, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the subject lots is beyond the province of the instant petition.31Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 18, 25-26 (1999) citing: Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743 (1991) and Co vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 705, 706 (1991). Note also that OCT Nos. 0-7125 and 0-7126 were issued as a result of a decision rendered by a competent land registration court. Thus, a presumption exists that the lots could be registered and titles were regularly issued and are valid.32Land Title and Deeds, Noblejas & Noblejas, 1992 Edition, p. 210 citing: Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9, 11 (1990). This presumption trumps the tax declarations because a tax assessors classification of land is based merely on the taxpayers representations. The latter cannot prevail over a land registration courts final determination regarding the nature of the registered lots. _______________ 29 Supra, Note 3 at 11. 30 Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 31 Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 18, 25-26 (1999) citing: Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743 (1991) and Co vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 705, 706 (1991). 32 Land Title and Deeds, Noblejas & Noblejas, 1992 Edition, p. 210 citing: Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9, 11 (1990).
Moreover, aside from Estrellitas bare assertion, no other evidence was presented to show that petitioners had any right, whether real or equitable, to occupy the lands. Their claim of ownership is belied by conflicting and inconsistent defenses. While they assert that as swamp lands, the lots could only be leased from the government, they contradictorily assert that their material possession of the
lots for forty (40) years has ripened into ownership. At one point, petitioners even alleged that they bought the properties from Maximino Villanueva. Assuming that the lots could only be leased from the government, petitioners did not even show that they were legitimate lessees of the lots. The Fishpond Lease Agreement upon which they rely has long been cancelled in CA. G.R. No. SP-12493. In this related case, which has become final and executory, the Court of Appeals explicitly held that: It may be true that the exercise of the Secretarys power under the Decree necessarily involves the determination of identity of land devoted to the cultivation of fish and which applicant is qualified to a lease agreement with the Ministry with the incidental power to place him in possession thereof undisturbed by other applicants for lease. The power nevertheless is delimited in the case at bar by the existence of a certificate of title issued by a competent court after due notice and hearing (Annex C, Petition). It is settled that a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. It goes without saying that under existing circumstances the Ministry must respect the rights of petitioner herein as a Torrens title holder until a court of competent jurisdiction rules otherwise in a proper action.33Supra, Note 3 at 156-157. This declaration of the appellate court puts an end to petitioners insistence that they are entitled to possession of the lots as successors-in-interest of Carlos. ________________ 33 Supra, Note 3 at 156-157.
To prove her father-in-laws possession of the lots since time immemorial and that petitioners possessed the lots in a personal capacity for twenty (20) years, Estrellita testified that she saw the lots for the first time when the same were offered for sale to her and her husband in 1950. Strangely, her marriage certificate34Supra, Note 3 at 341. reveals that Estrellita could not have been more than five years old at that time. Also, Estrellita did not present any documents attesting to their purchase of the lots from her father-in-law, as she claims. Neither did she offer any proof to show the nature and extent of Maximinos right and interest over the subject lots. At any rate, petitioners could not have acquired
ownership of the lots since it is well-settled that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.35Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529, p. 205 (1979). In view of the foregoing, the appellate court was correct in ruling that respondents titles constituted indefeasible proof of ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties. In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.36Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 183 (1999) citing: Sec. 47, P.D. 1529 and Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 189 (1993). The following award of damages are also warranted by the evidence on record: (a) P5,000.00 in actual damages for the destroyed nipa hut; (b) P20,000.00 per annum representing lost earnings from the time of dispossession in September 1978 until possession is properly restored to respondents; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for the forcible dispossession of respondents from the property registered under their _______________ 34 Supra, Note 3 at 341. 35 Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529, p. 205 (1979). 36 Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 183 (1999) citing: Sec. 47, P.D. 1529 and Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 189 (1993).
predecessors name; and (e) attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40735 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION insofar as the award of damages is concerned, (a) P5,000.00 in actual damages for the destroyed nipa hut; (b) P20,000.00 per annum representing lost earnings from the time of dispossession in September 1978 until possession is properly restored to respondents; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for the forcible
dispossession of respondents from the property registered under their predecessors name; and (e) attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modifications. Note.The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of action but on whether the same facts or evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action. (Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 731 [1999]) [Vda. de Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 12(2001)] G.R. No. 118982. February 19, 2001.*SECOND DIVISION. LORETA BRAVO CERVANTES, LOIDA CERVANTES, LEAH CERVANTES, CHRISTY CERVANTES, CHARME CERVANTES, SPS. ARMANDO ABAD and ADORACION ORDUNA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO (GIL) FRANCISCO, VENANCIO FRANCISCO, APOLONIA FRANCISCO and VIRGINIA FRANCISCO, respondents. Land Titles; Land Registration; A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein, in this case the private respondents _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 48 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
father, Antonio Francisco. A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of ownership. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eufrocino L. Bermudez for petitioners. Corleto Castro for private respondents. DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1Penned by Associate Justice Corona IbaySomera and concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Asaali S. Isnani, Rollo, pp. 4251. of the Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1994 affirming the decision2Penned by Judge Cornelio W. Wasan, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16211 (for Recovery of Land with Damages) ordering herein petitioners to vacate the respective parcel of land which they are occupying and to recognize private respondents ownership thereof. In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land (Parcel 1, Lot No. 1, plan Psu-131830) situated in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, with an area of seven thousand seven hundred thirty-three (7,733) square meters, covered and described in TCT No. 2200Pangasinan and registered in the name of Antonio G. Francisco.3Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 22-24. A portion with an area of 3,768 square meters was earlier ceded to the Municipality of Bugallon, Pangasinan.4Exh. D-2-A, Records, p. 59; Exhibits F-2, Records, p. 64; Rollo, p. 22. On July 8, 1985, plaintiffs, herein private respondents, filed an amended complaint alleging that they were the heirs of the late ________________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Asaali S. Isnani, Rollo, pp. 4251. 2 Penned by Judge Cornelio W. Wasan, Sr. 3 Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 22-24. 4 Exh. D-2-A, Records, p. 59; Exhibits F-2, Records, p. 64; Rollo, p. 22.
49 VOL. 352, FEBRUARY 19, 2001 49 Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals
Antonio G. Francisco who was the registered owner of the subject property, and that they recently discovered that the defendants, herein petitioners, were illegally occupying and had declared in their names portions of said property as follows:
Antonio Cervantes398 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 316, now Tax Declaration No. 445; Armando Abad and Adoracion Ordua442 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 473 and assessed at P2,480.00. Plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the subject premises, but the latter refused to do so.5Rollo, p. 22. Hence, this action for recovery of land wherein the plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be ordered to (1) vacate immediately the portions of land that they are occupying and to recognize plaintiffs ownership thereof; (2) pay reasonable rentals from the time this complaint was filed up to the time they vacate the land; (3) pay actual damages amounting to P4,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees, moral damages and the costs.6Rollo, pp. 22-23. In his answer, defendant Antonio Cervantes, herein petitioner, denied the material allegations of the complaint, and in defense claimed legal possession over one of the parcels of land in question alleging that he, together with his brother Claro and sister Macrina-Teresita, inherited the land from their late father Tranquilino Cervantes who purchased the same on January 22, 1947 from Juan Abad, now deceased, who in turn earlier purchased the property from plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest. During his lifetime, Tranquilino Cervantes introduced improvements in the land without any objection from the plaintiffs or their predecessors-ininterest. By virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by the heirs of Tranquilino Cervantes, the ownership of the contested premises were allegedly transmitted to them. In his counterclaim, Cervantes prayed that judgment be rendered: (1) dismissing the complaint against him for lack of cause of action; (2) declaring the validity of the Deed of Sale dated January 22, 1947; ________________ 5 Rollo, p. 22. 6 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
50 50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals
(3) ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigating expenses; P5,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs.7Amended Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 25-29.
Defendants spouses Armando and Adoracion Abad, on the other hand, alleged that their possession, together with that of their predecessors-in-interest, over the questioned parcel of land was lawful and in the concept of owner. Their possession was for more than 70 years, even dating back before the year 1920. The questioned parcel was a portion of the land jointly purchased by their parent, the late Juan Abad, and Marcelino Nievera from Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totaez, who purchased the same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn purchased the property from Vicente Espino, whose possession and ownership of the property was public, exclusive, notorious, open and continuous long before the alleged registration of the subject property in the name of Antonio Francisco, under Act No. 496, the latter being known as a mere trustee or overseer. When Juan Abad died, the defendant spouses acquired the subject property partly by inheritance and partly by purchase.8Records, pp. 14-15. Defendants Abad alleged that the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Torrens Title do not apply to the case at bar because registration by the applicant-registrant was done in bad faith and by way of actual fraudulent acts; that Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529 was never intended to shield the fraudulent and unlawful acts of the applicant-registrant in order to divest the actual owner and possessor thereof before the registration; and that between the actual owners-possessors before the registration under Act No. 496 and a usurper-trustee who applied and successfully registered the same land in his name, the former should prevail over the latter.9Records, pp. 14-16. As counterclaim, defendants Abad prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; appearance fees computed at P300.00 per hearing; P20,000.00 as actual and other ________________ 7 Amended Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 25-29. 8 Records, pp. 14-15. 9 Records, pp. 14-16.
incidental expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit.10Records, pp. 16-17. Based on the Pre-trial Order dated July 8, 1985, the parties agreed that the issues are the following: 1. Who are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question?
2. Whether or not the parties are entitled for damages as claimed in their respective pleadings.11Pretrial Order, Records, p. 33. On October 28, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, which in part reads: Thus, this Court hereby declares that the plaintiffs are the owners of the parcels of land subject of this action having acquired it from their late father, Antonio Francisco by hereditary succession. Prescription and laches cannot be raised against the plaintiffs. If there is/are somebody who is/are guilty of laches in this case, it would be the defendants. Because for a considerable long period of time, they failed to obtain a title over the parcels in question. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit: a) ordering the defendants to vacate immediately the parcel of land they are occupying, and to recognize the plaintiffs ownership thereof; and b) ordering the defendants to pay actual damages in the amount of P4,000.00 by way of reasonable attorneys fees and P10,000.00 by way of moral damages and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.12Rollo, p. 28. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in its Decision promulgated on August 25, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed herefrom the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. ________________ 10 Records, pp. 16-17. 11 Pre-trial Order, Records, p. 33. 12 Rollo, p. 28.
SO ORDERED.13Rollo, p 51.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 13, 1995. Petitioners ascribe to the Court of Appeals the following errors: 1. IT IS AN ERROR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION BASED ON A DOUBTFUL MUTILATED ENTRY IN TCT NO. 2200. 2. IT IS AN ERROR (NOT) TO CONSIDER SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE PARTIES AFTER THE SALE TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE SALE. 3. IT IS AN ERROR NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFENDANTS, HEREIN PETITIONERS, AS LAWFUL OWNERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RESIDENTIAL LOTS.14Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 11. Petitioners faulted the Court of Appeals for concluding that private respondents are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question based on a doubtful mutilated entry in TCT No. 2200. Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, petitioners asserted that as shown in the pre-trial order, they did not admit the authenticity of Exhibits D, D-l and D-2, which were the photocopy of TCT No. 2200 in the name of Antonio Francisco. Further, the resolution of the issue of ownership of the subject premises called for examination of the respective evidence of the parties. It is in this connection that they questioned the correctness and authenticity of the mutilated portion on page 3 of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit D) showing that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Espino, purchased parcel 2 of Lot No. 3 instead of parcel 1 of Lot No. 1, where their respective houses were erected fifty (50) years ago. They argued that under the entry compraventaVicente Espino on said page, the true identity of the land sold was mutilated and it was made to appear in handwriting that Vicente Espino purchased parcel 2 of Lot No. 3. There was no evidence adduced to show that ________________ 13 Rollo, p 51. 14 Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 11.
the handwritten words were the correct words before the mutilation, considering that the next entry showed that one Pablo Zalazar also purchased the same parcel 2 of Lot No. 3.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not raise in issue the authenticity of the now contested TCT No. 2200 or a portion thereof during the pre-trial and trial on the merits in the trial court. An issue which was neither raised in the complaint nor ventilated during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process.15Medida v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 887, 893 (1992). Moreover, the determination of issues at the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.16Bergado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 497, 501 (1989); citing Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 26 SCRA 332 (1968). Further, petitioners did not object to the formal offer in evidence of TCT No. 2200 as Exhibit D and Series17Records, p. 48. and Exhibit F and Series;18Records, p. 49; Exhibits F to F-2 are certified photocopies of TCT No. 2200. hence, there is a waiver of any objection to its admissibility.19People v. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264, 282 (1999). Nevertheless, an examination of the evidence on record particularly Exhibits D-2 and F-2, which contained the encumbrances affecting TCT No. 2200, showed that the sale to Vicente Espino involved Lot No. 3, while the sale to Pablo Zalazar involved Lot No. 7.20Records, pp. 59, 64. Clearly, the sale to Vicente Espino, the alleged predecessor-ininterest of the Abad spouses did not involve the parcel of land, subject matter of this case, which is parcel 1, Lot 1, Plan Psu131830. Petitioners further argued that the private respondents inaction for 50 years showed that they were not the owners of the subject parcels of land, and realty taxes were not paid by them. On the other hand, petitioners, who are in physical possession of the lots have been paying their obligation as landowners as shown by their respective tax declarations and tax receipts. ________________ 15 Medida v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 887, 893 (1992). 16 Bergado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 497, 501 (1989); citing Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 26 SCRA 332 (1968). 17 Records, p. 48. 18 Records, p. 49; Exhibits F to F-2 are certified photocopies of TCT No. 2200. 19 People v. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264, 282 (1999). 20 Records, pp. 59, 64.
The argument of petitioners is without merit. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein,21Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 183 (1999). in this case the private respondents father, Antonio Francisco. A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.22Id. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of ownership.23Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38, 44 (1991); Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 184 (1999). Further, the trial court found that defendant, herein petitioner Cervantes, had no right to the parcel of land which he and his siblings were occupying, thus: Taking into consideration the documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs, particularly that of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit A) which the parcel in question is included, among others, that the sale of the parcel in question was made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino Cervantes (father of defendant Antonio Cervantes) on January 22, 1947 took place when the said TCT No. 2200 was already existing in the name of Antonio Francisco, the late father of the herein plaintiffs. Said TCT No. 2200 was issued on November 8, 1924, or more than twenty-two (22) years before the aforesaid sale between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes. This clearly shows that what Juan Abad sold to Tranquilino Cervantes on January 22, 1947 was a parcel of land that did not belong to the former. It is because said parcel of land already belonged to Antonio Francisco for having obtained a title over said parcel of land covered by TCT No. 2200. Not being the owner of the parcel in question, Juan Abad did not transmit any right whatsoever with respect to the parcel in question. Well-settled is the rule that one cannot sell what he does not own and this rule has much force when the subject of the sale is a titled land that belongs to another person. Simply put, the sale of the parcel in question made by Juan Abad to Tran________________ 21 Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 183 (1999). 22 Id. 23 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38, 44 (1991); Heirs of Mariano, Juan, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176, 184 (1999).
quilino Cervantes did not affect the title of Antonio Francisco over said parcel.24Rollo, pp. 25-26. Likewise, the trial court correctly held that defendants Abad had no right to the parcel of land they were occupying, thus: The purchases alleged by the defendants-spouses on the questioned parcel of land beginning from their alleged primitive predecessor-ininterest Vicente Espino to Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totaez to Juan Abad and Marcelino Nievera were never proven in court. The documentary evidence they presented before this Court were not sufficient to establish their right over the parcel in question. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real and Personal Property with Sale has no probative value because it is selfserving. Besides, it sought to partition the parcel of land which is already covered by TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of Antonio Francisco. Simply stated, there was no property that they could partition among themselves because said property subject of the partition did not belong to their late father Juan Abad but to the late Antonio Francisco, the father of the plaintiffs. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit 2) entered between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes, has no probative value also for being irrelevant. Besides, this is the same deed wherein this Court has already passed upon concerning its efficacy and ruled in the early part of this decision that it has no effect whatsoever to TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the late Antonio Francisco. The Tax Declaration issued in the name of the defendants-spouses and the corresponding Tax Receipts have no probative value also as against the TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the late Antonio Francisco. It is because they are not proofs of ownership. TCT No. 2200, on the other hand, serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein Antonio Francisco. Further, after the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558).25Rollo, pp. 27-28. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, the same being in accordance with law and the evidence. ________________ 24 Rollo, pp. 25-26. 25 Rollo, pp. 27-28.
56 56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Dichoson
Hence, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals should be as it is hereby affirmed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. Note.It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. (Brusas vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 176 [1999]) o0o [Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 47(2001)]

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G.R. No. 112905. February 3, 2000.*FIRST DIVISION.

26 Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661, 665 (1959).

______________ 7 Rollo, p. 41. 8 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

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