Focus on IMO

International Maritime Organization, 4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210 Contacts: Lee Adamson Senior External Relations Officer; Natasha Brown External Relations Officer E-mail: media@imo.org Web site: www.imo.org These documents are for background information. Please refer to the website www.imo.org for up-to-date information.

March 1996 Tanker safety: the work of the International Maritime Organization Oil pollution from ships was first recognized as a problem during World War I, but it was not until 1954 that the United Kingdom arranged a conference which resulted in the adoption of the first international treaty to prevent oil pollution of the seas from ships. The Convention itself was concerned only with operational oil pollution from merchant ships - there was no attempt to introduce measures concerning accidental pollution, nor to deal with pollution by other substances. But the fact that the Convention was adopted at all was something of an achievement, since only eight of 32 countries attending said they regarded oil pollution as a problem and some did not want a convention at all. The Convention's main weapon was the establishment of a series of zones where the discharge of oily wastes was prohibited, a device that had been used by individual countries ever since the 1920s. The Convention also required the provision in ports of facilities for the reception of waste oils from non-tankers (there were no such requirements for tankers, which produced far greater quantities of waste oil). The 1954 Convention was therefore limited in its achievements - but from this point on, marine pollution from ships was always to be on the international agenda and Article XXI stated that responsibilities for the Convention would be taken over by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)1 as soon as it came into being. IMO had been created by means of a treaty adopted in 1948 at a conference organized by the United Nations, primarily to develop international measures to improve shipping safety. It was assumed that the treaty would receive the acceptances required for entry into force within a few years but some Governments were suspicious of the whole idea of regulating shipping by international means and the new agency did not meet for the first time until 1959. The most important measures adopted by IMO are contained in international treaties usually known as conventions. These are developed and adopted by representatives of the Organization's 153 Member Governments. IMO also adopts recommendations, codes of practice and guidelines and has developed a successful technical co-operation programme which is designed to help Member Governments put these measures into practice. By the 1960s there was evidence that oil pollution from ships was becoming more of a threat: the amount of oil being moved by sea was increasing, as were the numbers and sizes of tankers. There was also mounting evidence that the 1954 OILPOL Convention was not as effective as some had hoped. Studies by
IMO was originally called the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. The name was changed in 1982.
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IMO showed that facilities for receiving waste oils in ports were inadequate and the very fact that reception facilities would have to be provided had deterred some countries from ratifying the Convention at all. It was also proving virtually impossible to prosecute those who discharged oil in zones where it was forbidden. In 1962 IMO called a conference to amend the Convention. The amendments entered into force in May 1967 - but by then international attitudes to oil pollution had been changed for ever by one dramatic event: the sinking of the tanker Torrey Canyon on 17 March of the same year and the spilling of 120,000 tons of crude oil into the sea off the south-west coast of England. The grounding of the Torrey Canyon was the biggest marine pollution disaster in history at the time and it was to have profound consequences. Something, it was agreed, would have to be done - and it would have to be done at an international level. That meant it would have to be done through IMO. The Organization concentrated on a number of areas. 1. Preventing operational oil pollution Tankers carry their cargo in a number of tanks or compartments within the hull of the ship. After the oil is discharged, the tanks have to be carefully cleaned and about one third of them have to be filled with seawater so that the ship's propeller is properly immersed and it has correct handling and sea-keeping characteristics. This process is known as ballasting. In the early days of oil tanker operations it was a common practice to clean tanks with jets spraying seawater, resulting in a mixture of oil and water which was then pumped overboard, but, by the 1960s, technical advances made it possible to improve the requirements of the Convention. IMO concentrated on reducing operational pollution because it was a bigger cause of pollution than tanker accidents. One of the most important innovations was load-on-top. Under this, the oily mixtures resulting from the normal tank cleaning processes are pumped into a special slop tank. During the course of the return voyage to the loading terminal this mixture separates. Oil, being lighter than water, gradually floats to the surface leaving the water at the bottom. This is then pumped into the sea, leaving only crude oil in the tank. At the loading terminal fresh crude oil is then loaded on top of it. The process has advantages for the owner of the oil, since the oil normally lost during tank cleaning can be saved (as much as 800 tons of oil on a large tanker), but the main beneficiary is the environment. In 1969 the existing OILPOL convention of 1954 was amended to introduce the load on top system. Some experts believe that without it the amount of oil being dumped into the sea as a result of tank cleaning could have reached more than eight million tons a year. Despite this success, work on reducing operational pollution continued and although oil was recognized as the major threat to the marine environment, concern was growing about other pollutants. The present day environmental movement, which has done so much to change public attitudes toward the environment, was making ground and in 1972 the first major international conference on the environment was held in Stockholm under the auspices of the United Nations. IMO played an important role in preparing for the conference and the conference itself was to give further impetus to IMO's work in this field. In 1973 IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, which covers pollution by chemicals, packed goods, sewage and garbage as well as oil. This was modified by a protocol in 1978 and is now usually known as MARPOL 73/78. MARPOL 73/78 greatly limits the amount of oil which may be discharged into the sea during routine operations and bans it completely in some areas. The overall aim is to reduce the amount of oil-water mixtures that have to be disposed of and then

make sure that there are facilities on shore for receiving the oily wastes that remain. This means including provisions for ships to be fitted with segregated tanks for the carriage of ballast water and for cleaning to be carried out by crude oil washing, rather than water - in other words, the cargo itself. When sprayed onto the sediments clinging to the tank walls, the oil simply dissolves them, turning them back into usable oil that can be pumped off with the rest of the cargo. There is no need for slop tanks to be used since the process leaves virtually no oily wastes. MARPOL requires Governments to provide reception facilities for oily wastes (from all ships, not just tankers). The Organization has developed guidelines on how these should be provided and has held seminars and workshops around the world to provide further technical guidance on installing them. A Comprehensive Manual on Port Reception Facilities was published last year. 2. Preventing accidental pollution IMO's major function is to make shipping of all types safer, including tankers. The measures incorporated in the numerous safety conventions and recommendations therefore apply to these as well as other ships - and the safer a ship is, the less likely it is to be involved in an accident. The most important of all conventions adopted by IMO is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, which includes special requirements for tankers. Fire safety provisions, for example, are much more stringent for tankers than ordinary dry cargo ships, since the danger of fire on board ships carrying oil and refined products is much greater. It is not just fire which is dangerous - in certain circumstances a single spark can cause a disaster, for even tanks which contain no oil are filled with flammable gas which can explode unless proper procedures are followed. The normal method is to fill these tanks with inert (non-explosive) gas from the ship's boiler flue: it is cleaned and then pumped into the empty tanks, or into the spaces left above the oil in loaded tanks. An inert gas system is required on all new tankers and most existing tankers of 20,000 dwt and above. IMO has introduced several measures over the years which are designed to ensure that, in the event of mechanical failure, the ship can still be controlled. SOLAS makes it necessary for essential parts of the steering gear of tankers to be duplicated. As with other ships, much of the navigational equipment of tankers must also be duplicated. IMO is also considering the possible duplication of propulsion to provide power in the event of emergencies. Since 1995 all tankers and bulk carriers aged five years and over have been subject to a specially enhanced inspection programme which is intended to ensure that any deficiencies - such as corrosion or wear and tear resulting from age or neglect - are detected. It is expected that this measure will be a major step forward in eliminating sub-standard ships. Since 1 January 1996, G overnments have been able to propose to IMO the introduction of mandatory ship reporting systems in areas where there are special environmental or navigational concerns. These would require ships to report in to shore authorities when they reach a designated routeing system and give the ship's name, cargo and other information. This would enable the ship to be identified on radar and its course plotted throughout the system. Consideration is also being given to the introduction of mandatory transponders which would give these details automatically. Since the same date all new tankers of 20,000 dwt and above have had to be fitted with an emergency towing arrangement fitted at either end of the ship. Existing ships must also be fitted with such an arrangement at their first scheduled dry-docking but not later than 1 January 1999.
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Other safety conventions which are particularly relevant to tanker safety include the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972, which contain special provisions for ships such as tankers which, by virtue of their draught, have a reduced ability to manoeuvre: and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, several of whose requirements are designed specifically for those working on tankers. This Convention was completely re-written in 1995 and the amendments became effective on 1 February 1997. For the first time they will give IMO the right to check on the administrative, training and certification procedures of Governments to ensure that the seafarers they produce meet IMO standards. An International Safety Management Code was adopted in 1994 and will become mandatory for tankers in 1998. The delay is needed because the Code will impose very strict standards on shipping companies which will take time to implement. Nevertheless many companies have already implemented the Code and after 1998 any that have not done so could find themselves unable to operate their ships. Although there have been many huge oil spills resulting from tanker accidents, in the open ocean oil generally disperses naturally, with relatively minor consequences for wildlife. The biggest disasters have happened when the spill has been near to land and IMO has developed procedures which are designed to help Governments respond to emergencies as quickly and effectively as possible. The Intervention Convention of 1969 is designed to enable Governments to take action when the threat occurs near their coastline but outside their territorial waters. Until the adoption of this Convention there were considerable legal difficulties involved in taking such action, since countries have always been prevented from acting against ships of other countries operating on the high seas. It was widely recognized by Governments, however, that it was essential to take action as soon as possible in the event of a major accident threatening pollution, and the Convention was designed to enable them to do so. Salvage operations at sea are normally arranged between the shipowner and a salvage company. Traditionally in the event of an accident the arrangement is based on a Lloyd's Open Form, meaning that the salvor will only receive payment based on the value of the ship and cargo if the operation is successful (a formula known as "no cure, no pay"). In practice this system did not prove suitable for salvage operations involving possible oil pollution since it does not take pollution into account. A salvor could avert a major pollution incident and, because the ship was not completely salvaged, receive no recompense. In 1989 IMO adopted the International Convention on Salvage which will enter into force on 14 July 1996.The Convention makes provision for "special compensation" to be paid to salvors when there is a threat to the environment. This consists of the salvor's expenses plus 30% if environmental damage is minimized or prevented, but this can be increased to 100% in certain circumstances. To help ensure that salvage operations are successful, since 1 January 1996 all new tankers of 20,000 dwt and above must be fitted with an emergency towing arrangement at either end of the ship. Similar arrangements must be fitted to existing ships at the first dry-docking scheduled after that date but not later than 1 January 1999. 3. Reducing the consequences of accidents MARPOL 73/78 stipulates that new tankers must meet certain requirements regarding subdivision and stability, which are intended to ensure that, in any loading conditions, the ship can survive after being involved in a collision or stranding.

The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced a further element. This is the concept known as protective location of segregated ballast tanks. It means that the ballast tanks (which are empty on the cargo-carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded with water ballast for the return leg) are positioned where the impact of a collision or grounding is likely to be greatest. In this way the amount of cargo spilled after such an accident will be greatly reduced. The 1983 MARPOL amendments ban the carriage of oil in the forepeak tank - the ship's most vulnerable point in the event of a collision. In 1992 MARPOL was amended to make it mandatory for tankers of 5,000 dwt and more ordered after 6 July 1993 to be fitted with double hulls, or an alternative design approved by IMO. Despite the measures introduced by IMO, tanker accidents continue to happen, as the Braer and Sea Empress incidents have shown. IMO is especially concerned about tanker safety because the world fleet of tankers is growing steadily older - and statistics show that there is a correlation between age and the accident rate. The bulk of the world's tankers were built in the 1970s at a time when it was anticipated that demand for oil would continue to rise. But instead dramatic increases in oil prices stopped this from happening. The industry was left with a surplus of tanker tonnage which has persisted ever since and has restricted the amount of new tonnage ordered. Apart from the fact that old ships tend to have more accidents than new ones, ships built in the 1970s do not have to comply with many of the stricter standards that have been introduced since. The principle that existing ships should be exempt from new regulations that involve major structural changes could be justified at a time when ships were replaced with new tonnage at a comparatively young age. It was felt that owners who built and equipped their ships according to the standards existing at the time should not be forced to modify them every time new requirements were introduced. But throughout the 1980s and 1990s the average age of ships including tankers has risen steadily (it is now 18 years) and the "safety gap" that has resulted has increased IMO's concern about safety and pollution and has resulted in a reversal of the traditional attitude. As a result many of the requirements introduced for new ships have now been extended to existing vessels. The requirement for double hulls that applies to new tankers has been applied to existing ships under a programme that began in 1995. All tankers built in the 1970s will have to be converted when they reach the age of 25. Within the next few years, therefore, the bulk of the world's tanker tonnage will have to be fitted with double hulls - or scrapped. This measure is being phased in over a number of years because shipyard capacity is limited and it would not be possible to convert all single hulled tankers to double hulls without causing immense disruption to world trade and industry. At present only a few hundred of the world's 3,500 tankers have double hulls. Calls for single hulled ships to be banned are therefore scarcely practicable from an economic point of view - there are not enough double hulled tankers to carry more than a small fraction of today's world trade in oil and most of those are already committed to fixed trading routes. In any case, it is generally felt that while double hulls can minimize oil spills in certain circumstances - such as a low-speed grounding - they would provide little protection in the event of a high-speed impact or a collision with another ship. A treaty designed to help Governments combat major oil pollution incidents became international law in May 1995. The treaty is the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) which was adopted in November 1990. The Convention is designed to facilitate international co-operation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to a major oil pollution incident and to encourage States to develop and maintain an adequate capability to deal with oil pollution emergencies. An oil pollution co-ordination centre has been
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operating at IMO headquarters since 1991. IMO has also established a centre in Malta to co-ordinate antipollution activities in the Mediterranean and this year established a Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Centre for the wider Caribbean. IMO has produced a Manual on Oil Pollution which consists of four sections: Prevention, Contingency Planning, Salvage and Combating Oil Spills. 4. Providing compensation for pollution Although the prevention of marine pollution is IMO's primary concern, the Organization has also taken steps to ensure that adequate compensation is paid to those who suffer when pollution does occur. The purpose of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) is to put the onus of paying compensation on the shipowner. The 1971 Fund Convention extends additional liability to oil importers, who pay into a central fund an amount which depends upon the amount of oil they import. The two-tier system works in the following way: under the Civil Liability Convention, those affected by oil pollution are able to claim damages from the shipowner whose ship is judged to be responsible for the pollution. But the shipowner is able to limit the amount of compensation payable to about $US 14.6 million or $US 140 per ton of the tanker. This is so that he can obtain insurance cover: if there were no limit on the amount of compensation payable, the shipowner would not be able to insure himself, and a major claim could prove financially disastrous. In the event of the shipowner being forced into bankruptcy there would also be the possibility of claimants not receiving any compensation at all. But it was recognized that the $US 14.6 million limit could very well prove to be inadequate if the pollution incident were a major one. It was also felt that the oil importers should shoulder their share of the burden. Thanks to the creation of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, victims of oil pollution can claim additional compensation, beyond the $US 14.6 million payable under the Civil Liability Convention, providing total compensation of about $US 90 million. Contributions to the Fund are paid by oil importers. Since 1978, the IOPC Fund has been involved in 72 claims for compensation and has paid a total of 120 million. Since the two Conventions were adopted, inflation and other factors have made even these sums inadequate to pay compensation in the event of a major disaster. In 1992 the liability limits in the two Conventions were increased by means of two Protocols. The maximum shipowners' liability limit was increased to $89 million for ships of 140,000 grt and above. When the damage exceeds the limit of the shipowner, the Fund Protocol will provide an additional source of compensation. The basic coverage (including the liability under the CLC Protocol) will rise to a maximum of $201 million and the procedure for increasing limitation amounts in future has been simplified. These Protocols will enter into force on 30 May 1996. The countries which have accepted them are: Australia, Denmark, Egypt (CLC only), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Spain (only CLC at present), Sweden and the United Kingdom. 5. Helping implementation The measures introduced by IMO have provided a framework for reducing marine pollution from ships. It could certainly be argued that if all of these measures were rigorously applied the problem would already have been virtually eliminated. Unfortunately, the problem is still with us and it is apparent that the most important requirement now is not to adopt new measures but to ensure that those which have already been adopted are implemented as
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rapidly and as effectively as possible. IMO has built up an effective programme of technical assistance to help Governments enforce conventions and other instruments. For where shortcomings do exist it is not because of lack of will or support for IMO measures. Their value and need is recognized throughout the maritime community but many Governments, particularly in the developing world, do experience some difficulties in putting those requirements into force. The impact of IMO's work By the 1990s there were encouraging signs that the measures adopted by IMO were having beneficial effects. A report on the State of the Marine Environment, produced by the United Nations Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) early in 1990 states: "It is difficult to assess how effective the OILPOL 54 and MARPOL 73/78 conventions have been in reducing marine pollution by oil, but it has been estimated that without the application of these regulatory measures as much as 8 to 10 million tonnes of oil would enter the sea directly each year as a result of pumping out oilcontaminated tank-cleaning or ballast water. The amount of oil entering the sea due to maritime accidents has also fallen greatly in recent years thanks to the development of improved standards, navigational aids, training and watchkeeping and traffic separation schemes." To put the above into perspective, a report issued by the United States National Academy of Sciences in 1990 indicated that oil pollution from ships had decreased by 60% since 1981 from 1.47 millions tons a year to 0.59 million tons. Further evidence that things were improving came in statistics issued by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) which showed that the number of major oil spills had fallen from the 36 recorded in 1979 to an average of around eight per year in the 1980s. In 1994, according to ITOPF, only 71,000 tonnes of oil was spilt into the sea as a result of tanker accidents - 60% of the average. Looking towards the future Despite the general improvement in shipping safety and pollution from ships that has taken place over the last twenty years, IMO is well aware that a great deal more needs to be done. The Organization has established a sound basis for future action by the following actions: 1. Improving flag State implementation There is general agreement that the effectiveness of IMO's measures depends on how well they are enforced. The responsibility for ensuring that this is done rests with Governments, who accept IMO conventions and thereby undertake to enforce their provisions. But too often this is not done, as is shown by the huge differences in the casualty rates of maritime countries. Ships flying the flags of the countries with the worst records are a hundred times more likely to be involved in a serious casualty than those flying the flags of the best. To help overcome this problem IMO has established a new Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation which is identifying problems and helping them to be overcome. 2. Extending port State control While flag States are responsible for enforcing standards, all countries have the right to survey ships visiting their ports to ensure that they meet IMO requirements. Experience has shown that port State control works best when it is organized on a regional basis. The first such agreement covering Europe and the North
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Atlantic was begun in 1982 and IMO has encouraged the establishment of similar regional systems in Latin America, Asia and the Pacific and the Caribbean. It is hoped that eventually other areas will be covered. By encouraging close co-operation between these systems it is hoped that pressure on the operators of substandard ships will be increased to such an extent that the ships themselves will have to be improved - or forced out of service. Because of the importance of crew standards to safety and pollution prevention, port State control has now been extended to operational requirements - in other words, the ability of crews to carry out their duties. 3. Improving management standards Although Governments have clear responsibilities for implementing IMO measures, nobody is more closely involved than the owners and operators of the world's ships. Although the vast majority are highly motivated and are dedicated to maintaining high standards, some are not and often seek to make economies at the expense of safety. IMO developed the International Safety Management Code as a voluntary code of practice but it is regarded as so crucial to safety and pollution prevention that in May 1994 the Code was added to the SOLAS Convention and from 1998 will become mandatory. 4. Improving seafarers' standards Statistical studies show that the majority of accidents at sea - as many as 80% - are caused by human error. IMO is focusing attention on this key area and is examining such factors as the effect of fatigue on crew performance. But the most important development in recent years was the adoption of the 1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978. 5. The need for a safety culture These measure will all make a major impact on shipping safety and benefit the health of the oceans by reducing marine pollution. But to be truly effective even more is required. In a speech given to the annual meeting of the British merchant navy officers' union in May 1995, the Secretary-General, Mr William A. O'Neil, said: "All of these measures are concerned with implementation, all of them are intended to improve shipping's human resources. If we add all of them together it can be seen that what we are really talking about is the creation of a safety culture in shipping - an environment where nothing is done or introduced without its safety implications being assessed and where safety becomes a way of life rather than an after-thought." The idea of a safety culture has already been accepted by IMO in relation to passenger ships. In November 1995 the IMO Assembly adopted resolution A.792(19) which calls upon "Governments and international organizations concerned to initiate work with the aim of establishing a safety culture in and around passenger ships under their flag addressing all persons working professionally or in relation to such ships, whether or not their work is covered by relevant instruments developed by the Organization." The adoption of a safety culture means making safety and the protection of the environment - IMO's two main concerns - central to every decision made in shipping, whether by IMO, a Government, a shipping company or an individual. It will require a major change of attitude in many sections of the shipping industry. But the benefits could be enormous. ________ L:\LED\INF\FOCUS\TANKERS26 March 19964809 words
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