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Canadian International Council

The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations Author(s): Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis Source: International Journal, Vol. 62, No. 3, What Kind of Security? Afghanistan and Beyond (Summer, 2007), pp. 494-518 Published by: Canadian International Council Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40184857 . Accessed: 01/04/2011 12:50
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Michael Nicholas

W.

Doyle
Sambanis

&

The

UN

record

on

peacekeeping operations
UnitedNationspeacekeeping is the multidimensional Today, management of a complexpeace operation,usuallyfollowingthe terminationof a civil war,designedto provideinterim securityand assist partiesto make those that are essentialto institutional, material,and ideationaltransformations makepeacesustainable. Thatis a new roleforthe UN. UN peaceoperations during the Cold Warwere more limited and focused on monitoringor policingthe adherenceto a truceby hostile parties. This new, expandedrole for the UN representsan effortto respondto complexnew challengesto international securitythat have emergedsince the end of the ColdWar.An explosionof new internalarmedconflictsled to a similarexplosionin UN peacekeeping missions in the mid-1990s.The UN's new perspective on how to build sustainablepeace aftercivil war is
This article draws on Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). An earlier version was published in Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford University Press, 2007). The article was presented at an EKEM conference held in Delphi in the summer of 2006. The authors thank Kostas Ifantis, the organizers and panelists, and Olena Jennings for comments.

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- the "Brahimi" and "No exit without embodiedin two landmarkreports 2001 on 2000 and that built GeneralBoutros of Secretary reports strategy" s 1992 report"Agenda for peace"and its 1995 supplement. Boutros-Ghali' Whilethe UN has been generallyeffectivein its new role, importantand failureshavegenerated policydebateson how to improve highlypublicized the UN's peacebuilding capacity. This articleengageswith those policydebatesby analyzingthe record involvesa blend of and peacebuilding. of UN peacekeeping Peacebuilding severalintervention mediation, observation, practices,including policing, tacticalenforcement,conflictresolution,humanitarian assistance,recon- all helping to createsustainstruction,and institutionaltransformation able peace. Muchcriticismof UN peace missions in the popularpress or is basedon a claim that peacebuilding goals are not suffipolicyliterature interventions different actorssomelocal contexts and to by cientlyadaptive times have conflictingeffects. Differentintervention practicesare interdemay help shore pendentin complexways:while one form of intervention intervention the two for another the foundations strategy, togethermay up workbetteror,in some cases, they mayworkwell only if they are properly success may also vary of peacebuilding standards sequenced.Appropriate interto the war.If the goalof peacebuilding bycontextandbythe proximity ventionis socialjusticeand politicalinclusion,then best practiceswill be intervention is simthanin caseswherethe goalof peacebuilding different of war. the absence ply Forany conflictsituation,"sustainable peace"is the best measure of Efforts to achievethatmeasureare influencedby successfulpeacekeeping. the environmentof the postwarcivil three key factorsthat characterize the of of the factions,the extentof local capacities peace: degree hostility assistanceprovidremainingafterthe war,andthe amountof international these three constitutethe interdependent ed. Together, logic of a "peacethe morethe destruction of local the deeperthe hostility, buildingtriangle": in assistance to succeed estabneed international the more you capacities, lishing a stablepeace. triThis articlewill explainhow the dimensions of the peacebuilding and how the UN has been the the nature of affect postwarchallenge angle able to help countriestransitionfrom war to sustainablepeace. We will of peacebuilding success:the achievement standard focus on our preferred of what we call participatory peace a peace that includes not only the overall of its of the state'ssovereignty absenceof war,but also restoration of some and territory degree politicalopenness. Resolvingproblems of
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dividedsovereignty is an essentialpartof state-building that UN or other actors cannot afford to UN missions can have posipeacebuilding ignore. tive and lastingeffectsby keepingthe peacein the earlystagesof the peace process,when risksof a returnto warare greatest.1
OF UN PEACEOPERATIONS GENERATIONS

In the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War,the UN's agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded. At the request of the security council summit of January1992, Boutros-Ghalipreparedthe conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, "Anagenda for peace/'2 In addition to preventive diplomacy designed to head off conflicts before they became violent, the secretary general outlined the four interconnected roles that he hoped the UN would play in the fast-changing context of post-Cold War international politics: 1) peace enforcement, authorized to act with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a ceasefire. Mandatedby the security council acting under the authority of chapter VII of the charter, these military forces are composed of heavily armed national forces operating under the direction of the secretary general. 2) peacemaking, designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means such as those found in chapter VI. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. 3) peacekeeping, established to deploy a "United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned," as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials to implement an agreed peace. 4) postconflict reconstruction organized to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously war1 For an analysis of the long-term effects of UN missions and the importance of restoring the countries to fast economic growth, see Nicholas Sambanis, "Shortterm and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations," World Bank Economic Review. 2 Boutros Boutros-Chali, "Agenda for peace: Report of the secretary-general," UN document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. Quotes are from para. 20-21 and 55-99.

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ring parties, and developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace.3 "Anagenda for peace"is the culmination of an evolution of UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945. It combines in a radical way instruments of warlike enforcement and peacelike negotiation that were once kept separate and that evolved separately. A unique vocabulary separates distinct strategies that fit within the generic UN doctrine of building peace. These strategies, evolving over time, have encompassed three generational paradigms of peacekeeping.4They include not only the early activities identified in UN charter chapter VI (or so-called "6 and 1/2") first generation peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of second generation operations that rely on the consent of parties, and an even more ambitious group of third generation operations that operate with chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties' acquiescence.5 In today's circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more factions in domestic civil wars, not all of whom are clearly identifiable- and few of whom are stable negotiating parties. Current peace operations thus intrude into aspects of domestic sovereignty once thought to be beyond the purview of UN activity. Indeed, the charter emanated from World War II and can be seen as having been designed for interstate wars (e.g., article 39's threats to "international"peace), appropriatelyso since from 1900 to 1941, 80 percent of all wars were interstate and involved state armies.6 But from 1945 to 1976, 85
3 The secretary general and the UN often refer to this as "postconflict peacebuilding." To avoid confusion with the wider meaning of peacebuilding we use below, we will refer to this as "postconflict reconstruction." 4 The timeline of evolution has by no means been chronologically straightforward. One of the most extensive "third generation" operations undertaken by the UN was ONUC in the then-Congo, from 1960-64, which preceded the spate of "second generation" operations that began with UNTAC in Namibia in 1989. 5 The "6 and 1/2" refers to the fact that peacekeeping per se is described nowhere in the charter and thus falls between chapter Vl's peaceful settlement of disputes and chapter VM's peace enforcement. 6 Ernst B. Haas, The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict (New York: UNITAR, 1986), and Henry Wiseman, "The United Nations and international peace," in UNITAR, ed., The United Nations and the Management of International Peace and Security, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, 1987), 219.
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of one state and internally orientpercentof all warswere on the territory ed- of coursewith proxies. - were - or first generationpeacekeeping Traditional peace operations designed to respondto interstatecrises by stationingunarmedor lightly armed UN forces betweenhostile partiesto monitora truce, troopwithwent forward.7 As the late or bufferzone whilepolitical drawal, negotiations noted:monitorF.T.Liu,an eminent UN peacekeeping official,frequently - the and unarmed non-use of force, consent, neutrality, peacekeeping ing, - constituted of firstgeneration a staandpractices peacekeeping principles These keyprincipleswerearticulated combination. ble and interdependent andformerPrimeMinisterLester General by Secretary DagHammarskjold Pearsonin conjunctionwith the creationof the first peacekeeping operathe UN emergencyforce (UNEF)in the Sinaithatwas sent to tion (PKO), intervention separateIsraeland Egyptfollowingthe Franco-British-Israeli referred to the nationalorigin The principleof neutrality in Suez in 1956.8 of UN troops and precludedthe use of troops from the permanentfive intermembersof the council (P-5)in orderto quiet fears of superpower not in the disthat the UN would take sides vention.Impartiality implied of the consent of all the for the achievement pute and was a precondition the consentof all factionsin turn madeit easierfor monparties.Enjoying not to haveto use forceexceptin self-defence.9 itorsof peacekeepers Lastly,
7 The first peacekeeping operation was the UN emergency force (UNEF) in Egypt, deployed in October 1956 to maintain a truce between the Egyptian army and Israel, England, and France during the Suez crisis. UNEF's experience helped define the four principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, neutrality, and use of force only in self-defence. The UN treaty supervision organization (UNTSO) was deployed in 1948 in Palestine, but it was a limited observer mission. 8 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990), 57; and Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 1339 Traditional peacekeeping is a shorthand term that describes many but by no means all Cold War peacekeeping missions (the most notable exception being the Congo operation and possibly also the Cyprus operation, as we discuss later in this article). For cogent analyses of different types of peacekeeping, see Marrack Goulding, "The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping," International Affairs 69, no. 3 (1993): 451-64; F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-use of Force, International Peace Academy occasional paper series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); and Thomas C. Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

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the secretary generalexercisedcontrolof the forceand the securitycouncil authorizedit (or rarely,the general assemblyunder the auspices of the "Unitingfor peaceresolution").10 Impartialityand neutrality are frequently used interchangeably. as neutral,disinterScholars and practitioners often speakof peacekeepers for impartiality to mistake the need or unbiased; tend ested,impartial, they We define of with a policyof "strict and a neutrality" disposition passivity. with respectto peacekeeping as a synonymfor non-interference neutrality outcomesand impartiality as equalenforcementof unbiasedrules. "Good from when they stop one individual but not neutrally cops"act impartially to be for it is as another. We that important peacekeepers victimizing argue impartial concerning,for example,which partyin a freelyconducteddemocratic electionwins the electionas it is forthem to be non-neutral (i.e.,not abilobstructions to their with to violations of the and peace respect passive) to their mandate. ity implement of the fourthprincipleof This is closely relatedto the interpretation - the non-use of force. Peacekeeping soldiersaren'tused to peacekeeping must also prowin wars,but ratherto preserve the peace.Butpeacekeepers with the spiritof tect theirrightto discharge theirfunctions,in accordance the parties' consent as extendedat the outset of the operation.Raisingthe costs of non-cooperation for the partiesmust, on occasion,allowthe use of forcein defenceof the mandate.The limiteduse offeree to protecta mandateauthorized by a peacetreatyor to enforcean agreedupon ceasefire(as happenedin Cyprusin 1974 or Namibiain 1989), does not equatepeaceto imposean overall settlement), keepingwithpeaceenforcement (attempts but it does generateconcernswith mission creepif the need to use forceis extensive. the UN recordindicatedmuch success in interDuringthe ColdWar, state conflicts (littlein intrastate), settlemuch in materialand territorial ment (littlein valueor identityconflicts)." The success of traditional peacekeeping was also dependent on successful peacemaking: a strategy
10 A controversial resolution introduced in the context of the Korean War designed to circumvent the deadlock in the security council that resulted from the return of the USSR to the council, following the boycott that allowed, in Moscow's absence, the council to authorize the US led force in Korea in June 1950. It was applied to authorize the Sinai peace force in 1956. 11 Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 194s (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 185, 112-13; and Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 171.

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designed "tobring hostile partiesto agreement" throughpeacefulmeans VI of the UN charter. such as those foundin chapter upon judicial Drawing settlement,mediation,and other forms of negotiation,UN peacemaking initiatives wouldseek to persuadepartiesto arriveat a peacefulsettlement Traditional PKOsreferred to a UN presencein the field, of theirdifferences. with the consent of all the parties concerned,as a confidence-building measureto monitora truce while diplomatsnegotiateda comprehensive was thereforedesigned as an interim arrangement peace. Peacekeeping of aggression,and was frequentwheretherewas no formaldetermination monitor a establish and used to truce, policea bufferzone, and assist the ly missions had severalof the or observer of a peace.Monitoring negotiation same objectivesas traditional PKOs,though they were typicallyless well to the secuarmed(orunarmed)and focusedon monitoringand reporting the council and secretary rity general. Both monitoring operationsand traditionalpeacekeepingprovided - an impartial was not violating thatthe otherparty assurance transparency - andweresupposedto raisethe costs of defectingfroman agreethe truce ment by the threatof exposureand the potential(albeitunlikely)resistance force. The international of the peacekeeping legitimacyof UN mandates The with the peacekeepers. increasedthe parties'benefits of cooperation was in the as of operation, long Cyprus peacekeeping, price first-generation these monthanresolved. sometimespaidin conflictsdelayedrather Today role on the Golan Heights itoringactivitiescontinueto playan important on the borderbetweenKuwait betweenIsraeland Syriaand,until recently, and Iraq. of boundbythe principle PKOs werestrictly andtraditional Monitoring the of consent. Consentderivesfrom the parties'"perceptions peacekeepIt reduces the risk to the peaceand moral authority."12 ers' impartiality consentcan of the host state.Eroding the sovereignty keepersandpreserves to their the diminish mandate, ability discharge peacekeepers' significantly Since enhance the consent. an incentive to have so the peacekeepers parties' eroding consent could turn PKOs into multi-billiondollar "obsolescing that are easy hostagesto insincereparties,it followsthatthe investments"

12 William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analyses (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 12.

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is more This flexibility UN shoulddevelopstrategiesto enhanceconsent.13 in multidimensional easily provided second-generation, operationsthat involve the implementationof complex, multidimensionalpeace agreeof a self-sustaining ments designedto buildthe foundations peaceandhave been utilizedprimarily in post-civil war situations.In additionto the traditional militaryfunctions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various of which is a long-termsettlementof the and civilian the tasks, goal police underlyingconflict.These operationsare based on consent of the parties, but the natureof and purposesfor which consent is grantedare qualitativelydifferentfromtraditional peacekeeping. was the key strategy Beyondmonitoringand traditional peacekeeping, withthe purposeof buildingconto fostereconomicand socialcooperation fidence among previously warringparties,developingthe social,political, andeconomicinfrastructure to preventfutureviolenceandlayingthe founis aimed at dations for a durablepeace. Multidimensional peacekeeping capacities-expansion(e.g., economic reconstruction)and institutional transformation (e.g., reformof the police, army,and judicialsystem,elections, civil society rebuilding).In these operations,the UN is typically thatgo to the rootsof the coninvolvedin implementingpeaceagreements flict, helping to build long-termfoundationsfor stable,legitimategovernment. As Boutros-Ghali observedin "An agendafor peace,""peace-making to be and peace-keeping trulysuccessful,must come to include operations, whichwill tend to and efforts to identify supportstructures comprehensive consolidatepeace.. warring .[T]hesemay include disarmingthe previously of of order, the custodyand possibledestruction partiesand the restoration for and weapons,repatriating trainingsupport security refugees,advisory humanrights, effortsto protect elections,advancing personnel,monitoring institutionsand promotingforreformingor strengthening governmental mal and informalprocessesof politicalparticipation."14 The UN has a commendable recordof success,rangingfrom mixedto in multidimensional transformative, second-generation, peace operations as those in Namibia as diverse (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL),
13 Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTACs Civil Mandate, International Peace Academy occasional paper series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 85; Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press and Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 39. 14 Boutros-Ghali, "Agenda for Peace," para. 21.

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Cambodia(UNTAC),Mozambique(ONUMOZ),and Eastern Slavonia The UN's role in helping settle those conflictshas been four(UNTAES).15 a peacetreatyamongthe parties; fold. It servedas a peacemaker facilitating of milias a peacekeeper monitoringthe cantonmentand demobilization and transitional civilian authorforces, supervising tary resettlingrefugees, and in some cases the as a ities; monitoring organizing implepeacebuilder mentationof human rights, nationaldemocratic elections,and economic and in a verylimitedwayas peaceenforcerwhen the agreerehabilitation; ments came unstuck. - effectively war-makIn Boutros-Ghali's lexicon, "peace-enforcing" operations,which extend from lowing missions are third-generation of humanitarian assistance to protectthe delivery level militaryoperations assisto the enforcementof ceasefiresand, when necessary,authoritative As with chapterVII UN states." of so-called"failed tancein the rebuilding enforcementactionto roll back aggressionin Koreain 1950 and against of third-generation the definingcharacteristic operaIraqin the GulfWar, tions is the lackof consentby one or more of the partiesto some or all of havebeen of threetypes. In the first, These operations the UN mandate.16 forcesattemptto impose orderwithoutsignificantlocal coninternational sent, in the absence of a comprehensivepeace agreement,and must in effect conquerthe factions(as was attemptedin Somalia).In the second, forcesdo not haveunanimousconsentand choose to impose international on partiesin the midst of an ongoingwar (e.g., nodistinctarrangements of relief). In the third,international corridors fly zones, or humanitarian

15 Success is of course an ambiguous and contested term. We discuss its various meanings and how to measure it in Making War and Building Peace in both the data analysis and case studies. 16 Other recent categories include "preventive deployments" fielded with the intention of deterring a possible attack, as in Macedonia. There, the credibility of the deterring force must ensure that the potential aggressor knows that there will be no easy victory. In the event of an armed challenge, the result will be an international war that involves costs so grave as to outweigh the temptations of conquest. Enforcement action against aggression (Korea or the Gulf), conversely, is a matter of achieving victory - "the decisive, comprehensive and synchronized application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize and defeat opponents" and See the traditional zero-sum terrain of military strategy. Jarat John Mackinlay Chopra, "Second-generation multinational operations," Washington Quarterly^ (summer 1992): 113-31.

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forcesexerciseforceto implementthe termsof comprehensive peacefrom whichone or more of the partieshavechosen to defect. Enforcement drawupon the authority of charterarticle42, operations which permitsthe securitycouncilto "takesuch actionby air,sea, or land forcesas may be necessaryto maintainor restoreinternational peaceand article under which member states to security"; 25, "agree acceptand carry out the decisions of the SecurityCouncil"; and article43, in which they available to the Security forces, Council,on its call,...armed agreeto "make assistanceand facilities." just Insightfuldoctrinefor these peace-enforcing operationsappeared as Somaliaand Bosniaexposedtheir practical limitations.Recentstudies havethoughtfully terrainbetweentramappedout the logic of the strategic ditionalpeacekeeping and enforcementaction.Militarily, these operations seek to deter,dissuadeand deny.17 basedon the an outcome Byprecluding use of forcebythe parties, the UN insteaduses collective force(ifnecessary) to persuadethe partiesto settle the conflictby negotiation.In the former for example, the world organizationfollowing this strategy Yugoslavia, could have establishedstrongpoints to deterattackson key humanitarian corridors. did, but the Serbsbypassedthem.) Orit couldthreat(It actually in February en air strikes,as was done successfullyaroundSarajevo 1994, to dissuadea continuation of the Serbshellingof the city.Or,it couldhave in 1992 by denied (butdid not) the Serbforcestheir attackon Dubrovnik from the sea or bombingfrom the air the batteriesin the counter-shelling hills abovethe city. Forcinga peace depends on achievinga complicated in whichthe forces (UN and local)supporting a settlement preponderance to the international hold both acceptable community militarydominance and a predominanceof popular support that together permit them to local militaryforces and their popular impose a peace on the recalcitrant supporters. Countriesprovidetroops to UN peace operationsin various ways. countriesnegotiatein detailthe terms of the participaTroopcontributing tion of theirforceseitherunder UN commandand thus with the secretary with a regional organization general (as in El Salvadoror Cambodia); authorizedas delegatedin chapterVIII;or with the leaderof a multina17 For these distinctions, see John G. Ruggie, "The United Nations stuck in a fog between peacekeeping and peace enforcement," McNair Paper 25, Washington, DC, National Defense University, 1993.

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of the willing"authorizedunder chapterVII (as was the tional "coalition in Somalia).Manyoperations of UNITAF case of US leadership drawon a of authorizations: combination or peacetreatiesamongfactions,backed-up noby othermeasuresauthorized supplemented (suchas armsembargoes, and IFORoperVII,as did the variousUNROFOR fly zones)underchapter in of ations.18 as named honour its "Chinese And, sponsors, chapterVII" the use offeree for UNTAES) to authorize has emergedas a new (employed VI operation. In essence,howwayto signalfirmintentto enforcea chapter rule"of the ONUCoperation, which is the ever,it reaffirmsthe "Katanga that force can be in traditional used both the mission of principle (mobility the force)and in the self-defence of peacekeeping troops. The resultof these three "generations" operatingtogetherin the postColdWarworldwas an unprecedented expansionof the UN's role in the and in the of world order protection promotionof basic human rights in countriesuntil recentlytorn by costlycivil wars. Between1987 and 1994, the security councilquadrupled the numberof resolutionsit issued,tripled the peacekeepingoperationsit authorized,and multipliedby seven the numberof economicsanctionsit imposedperyear.Military forcesdeployed in peacekeeping increased from fewer than 10,000 to morethan operations 70,000. The annual peacekeepingbudget skyrocketed correspondingly from $230 million to $3.6 billionin the same period,thus reachingabout three times the UN's regularoperatingbudget of $1.2 billion.19 In the self-determination and were enhanced and a modicum process, sovereignty and self-sustainingself-determination of peace, rehabilitation, was introduced in Namibia, Cambodia,El Salvador,Mozambiqueand eastern - perhaps, - of thousandsof livesweresaved even hundreds Slavonia. Tens in Somaliaand the formerYugoslavia. But in 1993 and 1994, the more ambitious elements of third-generation peace enforcementencountered and imperialstrategies havefacedin manyof the problemsinterventionist freshproblemspeculiar the past,and discovered to the UN's globalcharacthen famously called for a retrenchmentof an overter. Boutros-Ghali in his supplementto "Agenda extendedUN commitmentto peacekeeping for peace" reportof January 1995.
18 For a valuable discussion of the international law on the use of force and its bearing on authority for peace operations see Karen Cuttieri's "Symptom of the moment: A juridical gap for US occupation forces," International Insights 13, special issue (fall 1997): 131-155. 19 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an agenda for peace," UN document A/5o/6o-S/i 995/1, 2 January 1995, para. 11. I InternationalJournal | Summer 2007 | 505 |

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The debaclesin Somaliaand Bosniaforceda radical of when rethinking and where the UN should get involved. Disingenuously,PresidentBill Clintontold the generalassemblythatit neededto learnwhen to say "no." Manycameto believethatthe UN was not well suitedto mountingeffective - no more suited to make peace than the lobbyistswho peace operations a tradegroupof hospitalswouldbe to conductsurgery.20 Others represented that such should be to thought operations delegated regionalorganizations, and NATO This last groupbegancallingfor a "fourth preeminently. generation" of delegatedpeacekeeping.21 The lessons of the 1990s wereembodiedin an eloquentpleafor strategic peacekeepingmade by in the reportof the panel on United Nations UN peacekeeper and former peace operationschairedby the experienced Brahimi. In Lakhdar reaction to a minister, Algerianforeign perceived pasin the faceof armedchallenges,the panel sivityin traditional peacekeeping advocated "robust doctrines"and "realistic mandates"together with forheadquarters andrapiddeployment.22 improved capacities management In the "Noexitwithoutstrategy" to report,the secretary generalresponded a requestfromthe securitycouncilfor comprehensive a to achieve strategy sustainable The own drew on the council's deliberapeace. report security tions to makea case for an ambitious,comprehensive, stratthree-pronged internaland externalsecurity," political egy:"consolidating "strengthening institutionsand good governance" and "promoting economic and social - the first operarehabilitation and transformation."23 The theme of both tional, focusing on peacekeepingoperationsand the second doctrinal, - was a pleafor strategically matchfocusingon the role of securitycouncil missions to ing capabilities.

20 Michael Mandelbaum, "The reluctance to intervene," Foreign Policy % (1994): 3-18. 21 For an account of the various positions and factors, see Ramesh Thakur, "UN peace operations and US unilateralism and multilateralism," in David Malone and Yuen F. Kong, eds., Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 153-79. 22 "Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations," UN document 21 August 2000. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 23 "No exit without strategy: Report of the secretary-general," UN document S/2001/394, 20 April 2001, para. 20.

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STRATEGIC PEACEKEEPING

tell us abouthow to planfor a sustainWhatcan politicalscienceliterature in fact realizable? able peace?Is strategicpeacekeeping The peacekeepers' is to properly firstconcernin designingintervention strategies identifythe the civilwar.Politicalscientistshaveexplored a typeof conflictunderlying wide range of theoriesaboutwhy and how partiesenter into and resolve theories variouskinds of conflicts.At the more abstract level, "neoliberal" actors over absolute valued for their rational conflicts goods among explore own sakes. Neorealistsexamineconflictsamong rationalactorsthat raise issues of securityand relativegains, basedon the assumptionthat relative power (dominance)alone providessecurityand thereforethe gains that relaxthe assumptionthat perceived identities trulymatter.Constructivists in whichconflictsand the circumstances andinterestsarefixedandexplore social relationsmore generallyconstituteand then reshapeidentitiesand We find aspectsof each of these threefactorsin the peacekeepinterests.24 and theirleadersseek absoluteadvantages we examine.Factions record ing actorsassist the as well as relativeadvantages.Sometimes,international factional actors old criminals, armies)or (war peaceprocessby eliminating international monnew actors voters, parties, political (domestic introducing all or of or itors,NGOs) fostering changes identity(reconciliation) by three the peace process analyticlens portrays together.But a more informative and each of coordination two classic situations, cooperation, game through andconstructivist neorealist whichincorporates neoliberal, dynamics. or cooperation, Thus, to simplify,conflicts can be over coordination dependingon the structureof the parties'preferencesover possible outa specifcharacterizes structure Eachpreference comes of the negotiations. are ic type of conflictand differentintervention strategies optimalfor differentconflicttypes.Some conflictsaremixed,reflectingelementsof both, and conflicts do change over time, evolvingfrom one to the other and,

24 The literature expounding the three is vast, but for central differences see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Joseph Crieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416.

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Well-chosen can maximizethe available sometimes,backagain.25 strategies for whereas that are space peace, poorlymatchedto the conflict strategies at a particular time can reducethe spacefor peace. thatgivesthe partiesno Coordination problemshavea payoffstructure incentivesto violateagreements.26 A classicexampleis drivingon the right side of the road(or on the left in GreatBritainor India).The best strategy to resolve coordinationproblemsis information-provision and improvement of the level of communication betweenthe parties.27 Communication the the to form common aboutthe likely ability conjectures gives parties outcomesof theiractions.28 contrast, By cooperation problemscreateincenif tivesto renegeon agreements, the particularly partiesdiscountthe benefits of long-term in favourof short-run cooperation gain. In one-shotgames of cooperation dilemmais a well-known (of whichthe prisoner's example), the partieswill try to trick their adversaries into cooperating while they renege on their promises. In the prisoner'sdilemma, for example,two in policecustodyareoffereda chanceto "rat" on theirpartner. accomplices The first to rat gets off and the "sucker" receivesa veryheavysentence.If evineither rats, both receive light sentences (based on circumstantial if than the sucker's both both receive sentences less rat, dence);and, (but penalty).Eventhoughtheywouldbe betteroff trustingeach otherby keepto get off and the fearof being the suckermake ing silent, the temptation difficult. These structural differences betweencoopcooperation extremely eration and coordinationproblems imply that different peacekeeping strategiesshouldbe used in each case. Differentstrategiesare needed to resolvedifferenttypes of problems. Transformative interventionstrategies,such as multidimensionalpeace25 For a theoretical discussion of the problem of providing assurance and building trust in conflicts that combine elements of both coordination and cooperation games, see Andrew Kydd, "Trust, reassurance, and cooperation," International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 325-57. 26 For a precise game-theoretic definition of coordination and collaboration games, refer to James Morrow, Came Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and David M. Kreps, Came Theory and Economic Modeling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 27 A useful summary of the literature is Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Introduction," and "Conclusion," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 28 Morrow, Came Theory, 222.

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withconsiderable international areneedauthority, keepingor enforcement ed to resolve cooperationproblems, whereas facilitativepeacekeeping are sufficient peacekeeping, strategies,such as monitoringand traditional has no enforceto resolvecoordination problems.Facilitative peacekeeping function.Transformative ment or deterrence peacekeeping throughmultifor the dimensionaloperationscan increasethe costs of non-cooperation partiesand providepositiveinducementsby helping rebuildthe country and restructure institutions so that they can support the peace. Enforcement may be necessaryto resolvethe toughest cooperation probNot all civil war transitionsare plaguedby cooperation lems.29 problems. we find Some wars resemblecoordination problems,whereasfrequently must be carebothtypesof problems,in whichcase intervention strategies fullycombinedor sequenced. have an impact and how? The literaturesuggests Can peacekeeping that peacekeeperscan change the costs and benefits of cooperationby virtueof the legitimacyof their UN mandate,which inducesthe partiesto attentionon non-cooperaby their abilityto focus international cooperate, their of andreporttivepartiesandcondemntransgressions, by monitoring with and their functionas a compliance agreements, by ing on the parties' to go throughthe UN troopsto change thatwouldforceaggressors trip-wire the militarystatusquo.30 Ultimatesuccess,however, maydependless on changingincentivesfor their and more on transforming within preferpreferences existingparties ences and even the partiesthemselves and thus turninga cooperation we will describethe institutionproblem.Later probleminto a coordination transformation in as a of revolutionary building aspects peacekeeping whichvotersand politiciansreplacesoldiersand generals:armiesbecome wareconomies,peaceeconomies. parties; is a labelfor these changedpreferences when achieved, Reconciliation, cannot of a transformative Tobe sure,the difficulty and capacities. strategy Mostpostwarsocietieslook a greatdeallike they did prebe overestimated.

29 Transformative peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement. The former can only deter or punish occasional violations. If the violations are systematic and large-scale, a no-consent enforcement operation might be necessary. 30 Two recent valuable contributions are Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) and Kimberly Marten, Enforcing the Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

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war.But, for example,if those that have committedthe worstwar crimes can be prosecuted, lockedup, and thus removedfrompower,the prospects of peacerise.Thevariousfactionscanbeginto individualize thancolrather lectivizetheir distrustand hostilityand, at the minimum, the worst individualsare no longerin control.31 Therefore,even where enforcementis used at the outset, the peace must eventually and consentneeds to be won if the becomeself-sustaining areeverto exitwiththeirworkdone.Andconsensualpeace peaceenforcers can erode,forcingall the partiesto adjustto the strateagreements rapidly of Their success or lack of success of doing so tends to be gies "spoilers." in decisive whethera sustainable peacefollows. knowwhichtypeof conflicttheyarefacing? How can the peacekeepers A first clue is the peace treaty.If a treatyhas been signed that outlines a postwarsettlement,then the parties'preferenceshave been revealedto some extent (thoughthe fact that some peace treatiesare quicklyundermined also means that only by observingthe parties' compliancewith the can we be more certain their true about treaty preferences).Patternsof fromextremists. with the can moderates compliance treaty help distinguish In othercases, such knowledgecannotbe attaineduntil the first (or severwith the parties.Wherea treaty is not in place,all partiescan al) encounters be assumed to be spoilers and strong peacekeepingmust be used. or conflictwith the peacekeepers can help distinSubsequent cooperation those who to from those who are cominducements guish parties respond mittedto a strategy of war.This also means that UN missions must be flexible to adjusttheirmandategivenobservations of cooperation or conflicton the groundand based on the peacekeepers' assessments about changing the natureof the conflict. A treatyis usually the outcome of a "mutually hurting stalemate," which is a necessarybut not sufficient conditionfor successful peace.32
31 See Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For the difficulties, see Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and errors: Principle and pragmatism in strategies of international justice," International Security 28, no. 3 (2003-04): 5-44; and Chandra Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violators (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 32 The mutually hurting stalemate is from Bill Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) where he discusses "ripe" conflicts. Additional conditions for conflict "ripeness" in Zartman's theory are a sense of crisis, a deadline for negotiation, a reversal in the parties' relative strength, a leveraged external mediation, and a feasible settlement that can address all the parties' basic needs. I 510 I InternationalJournal | Summer 2007 |

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Sucha stalemateexistswhen the statusquo is not the preferred optionfor while the status any faction, quo through militaryaction is overturning unlikelyto be successful.This conditionpushes partiesto the negotiating for peaceare more credibleas a result tableand theirdeclared preferences of theirinability to forcibly achievea betteroutcome.33 the partieswill not negotiatea settlementunless peaceis likeHowever, ly to generate higher rewardsthan continued fighting. This condition if "spoilers" are present.Spoilersare leadersor parbecomesunattainable ties whose vitalinterestsare threatened These by peace implementation.34 will undermine the and reduce the parties agreement expectedutilityof a In negotiatedsettlementfor all parties. terms of our previousarguments, structure" of a prisoner's the presenceof spoilersimpliesthe "payoff dilemma or an assurance"game" as spoilerswill not coordinate their strategies with moderates.Thus, if spoilers are present in a peace process, peacekeeperscan onlykeepthe peaceif theycan exercisesome degreeof enforcethe spoilersand preventing them fromundermining ment by targeting the The of deserve a closer look. negotiations. dynamics spoilerproblems analyzedspoiler problems,and Stephen Stedmanfirst systematically - according - total,greedy, andlimitedspoiler to their threetypes identified process.These strategiesand likely impacton the peace implementation in terms of their preferand Stedman defines them are behavioural types, use to undermine the all parences overthe strategies However, they peace. But ties can act as totalspoilersif conditionsdeteriorate markedly. parties whose ultimategoals over the outcomes of the peace are more moderate will haveincentivesnot to spoil the peaceprocessif they can get a reasonis to distinguishmodableoutcome.The difficulty facingthe peacekeepers erates from extremists,or total spoilers,when conditionsare such as to encourageall partiesto defectfrom agreements. will be to allow moderThe principalgain of good UN peacekeeping - and greedyopportunists - limitedspoilerswith specificstakes to act ates in the peaceprocesswithoutfearingreprisalsfrom total like peacemakers opposed to the peace settlement. Effective spoilers who are unalterably consent from those willing to coordinateand must combine strategies at those who arenot. We carrots and sticks directed with coercive cooperate
33 The settlement of El Salvador's civil war is a good example of a hurting stalemate. 34 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler problems in peace processes," International
Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 7.

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will suggest that the recordshows that by strategically combiningpeacereconstruction and peaceenforcement, postconflict making,peacekeeping, and unpromisingfoundations. peacecan be builtfrom problematic
A PEACEKEEPING TRIANGLE

International peacekeepingstrategiesand concepts of operations,therein the ordinarysense of that term, matching fore, should be "strategic" means to ends. Althougha peacekeepingstrategymust be designed to addressa particular thatfit most conflictscan be conflict,broadparameters identified.These strategiescombinepeacemaking, postconpeacekeeping, flict reconstruction, and (whereneeded)enforcement. Effective transitional must takeinto accountlevels of hostility strategy and factionalcapacities.Whetherit in fact does so depends on strategic commitment.Designs for transitions incorporate design and international in a variety of ways a mix of legaland bureaucratic thatintegrate capacities domesticand international commitments. lessons can be drawnfromeffortsto establisheffecalready Important tive transitionalauthority.35 First,a holistic approachis necessaryto deal with the character of factionalconflictsand civilwars.Successfulexercises of authorityrequire a coordinatedapproachthat draws in elements of "peacemaking" (negotiations), peacekeeping(monitoring),peacebuilding when needed,to createa and discreteacts of enforcement, reconstruction, holisticstrategy of reconciliation.36 Transitional strategiesshouldfirst addressthe localcauses of continufor change.Effective transitioning conflictand second,the localcapacities al authority is the residualdimensionthat compensatesfor local deficien- the (net)specificdegreeof cies andthe continuinghostilityof the factions international commitmentavailable to assistchange.Wecan thinkof effecx resourcesx international institutive transitional authorityas authority tionalcapacities.
35 See the chapter by Thomas Franck, "A holistic approach to peace-building," in Olara Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, eds., Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 275-95; and Elizabeth Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, eds., Peacebuilding as Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 36 See Alvaro DeSoto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to peacebuilding in El Salvador," Foreign Policy 94 (1994): 69-83. This is the coordinating role that Japan, for example, played in Cambodia in organizing the Tokyo conference and the international committee on the reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC).

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and effectivetransitional authoriLocalrootcauses,domesticcapacity, area is dimensions of a whose the are three triangle, "political ty space" or effective capacity forbuildingpeace.This metaphor suggeststhatsome quantumof positivesupportis needed along each dimensionbut that the - moreof one substitutes dimensionsalso substitutefor eachother for less of another, less deeplyrootedcauses of warsubstitutefor weaklocalcapaccommitment. In a worldwhereeach dimension ity or minorinternational will be necessaryin orderto is finitewe can expect,first,thatcompromises role must be designed achievepeacekeeping; second,thatthe international to fit each case;and, third,that self-sustaining peace is not only the right aim of it is the aim, necessary buildingpeacewhen the internapractically to committo long-termassistance. tionalcommunityis not prepared the the localcapacishould address local sourcesof hostility, Strategies commitment ties for change,and the (net)specificdegreeof international to assistchange.One can conceiveof the threeas the threedimenavailable - or effectivecapacisions of a triangle,whose areais the "political space" ty for buildingpeace. International peace operationmandatesmust take into account the to coorof the factionsand whetherthe partiesare prepared characteristics These mandates or coercedinto cooperation. dinateor must be persuaded operatenot upon stablestatesbut, instead,on unstablefactions.These factions (to simplify)come in variousdimensions of hostility.Hostility,in turn,is shapedby the numberof factions,includingthe recognizedstateas one (if thereis one). Numerousfactionsmakeit difficultfor them to cooperateand engendersuspicion.Too few or many factionscomplicateboth - casualties and coordinationand cooperation.In addition, harm done - createsthe resentmentthat makes jointlybeneficial refugees generated thatmuch moredifficult to envisandcooperation solutionsto coordination age. The more hostile and numerous the factions,the more difficultthe peaceprocesswill be.37

37 "Factions" refers to actual factions in a civil war. While the peacebuilding triangle measures hostility generated by these factions (e.g., it can measure the number of factions, whether or not they have signed a treaty, and the issues over which they are fighting a war), we cannot measure the factions' local capacities except at the national level, so we use country-level indicators of local capacities in our empirical analysis. This is not inconsistent with our analysis, as national-level capacities are crucially important for economic construction after civil war. In some cases, only a

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In less hostilecircumstances or (withfew factions,a hurtingstalemate, less harm done), international be suffiand facilitation might monitoring cient to establishtransparent trust and self-enforcing peace. Monitoring helps createtransparency amongpartners lackingtrustbut havingcompatible incentives favouringpeace. Traditional peacekeepingassistancecan also reducetradeoffs(helping,for example,to fund and certifythe cantonIn these and reintegration of formercombatants). ment, demobilization, - intercircumstances with few players,some reconciliation, less damage nationalcoordination and assistancecan be sufficientto overcome hostility and solve implementation An international presproblems. peacekeeping ence itself can deterdefectionsfrom the peacetreaty, becauseof the possible costs of violatinginternational furtherinteragreementsand triggering national involvement in an otherwise domestic conflict. International - such as foreignaid,demobilization of military forces,or capacity building - will assist partiesthat favourthe peaceto meet their institutional reform commitments. In more hostile circumstances,internationalenforcementcan help solve commitmentand cooperation implementingor problemsby directly the costs of from International enforcedefection raising peaceagreements. ment and long-termtrusteeship will be required to overcomedeep sources of distrustand powerfulincentivesto defectfrom agreedprovisionsof the situationssuch as the prisoner's peace. As in other conflict-cooperation dilemmaand mixedmotivegames,the existenceof deeplyhostileor many the problem factions,or factionsthat lackcoherentleadership, complicate of achievingself-enforcing Instead,consciousdirection cooperative peace.38 and enforcement an the funcinternational by impartial agentto guarantee tions of effective sovereigntybecome necessaryand peacekeepersmust includeactivitiessuch as conductinga free and fairelection,arresting war a collapsedstate.The more difcriminals,and policingand administering ficultit is for the factionsto cooperate, the greater the international authorand the international must wield. In addition to ity capacity peacekeepers
small part of a country is affected by civil war and local capacities are lower in that part as compared to the rest of the country. But even in those cases, the capacity of the central government to rebuild the wartorn region by redirecting resources to it is critical for the peacebuilding process. Our measure of national-level capacities captures this fact. 38 Axelrod and Keohane, "Introduction" and "Conclusion"; Kenneth Oye, "Explaining cooperation under anarchy," World Politics 38, no. l (1985): 1-24.

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bodies of troops,extensivebudgetsfor politicalreconstruction substantial international need to be broughtto bearbecause and substantial authority the partiesare so unlikelyto trusteach otherand cooperate. International mandatesmayneed to run frommonitoringto administration to executive full if and like authority sovereigntrusteeship supervision peaceis going to be maintained and becomeeventually self-sustaining. Wartorncountries also vary in economic and social capacity.Some wartorncountriesstartout with considerable economicdevelopment(the and retainlevelsof socialcapacity in an educated formerYugoslavia) population.Othersbegin poorand the warimpoverishes them further(Angola, Forbothtypesof cases,reconstruction is vital;the more Sudan,Cambodia). the largerthe multidimensional the socialandeconomicdevastation, international role must become, whether consent-basedmultidimensional followedby and includingmulor non-consentenforcement peacekeeping International economicrelief and productive tidimensionalpeacekeeping. jobs arethe firstsigns of peacethatcan persuaderivalfactionsto trulydisarm and takea chanceon peacefulpolitics.Institutionsneed to be rebuilt, includinga unified armyand police force and the even more challenging of a school systemthat can assist the reconciliation of future development In countrieswith low levels of local capacities,competition generations.39 overresourceswill be intense at the earlystages of the peaceprocess,and and collaboration this can furtherintensifythe coordination problemsthat will to resolve. be asked the peacekeepers Therethus should be a relationbetweenthe depth of hostility(harm and economiccollapse),on and factions)and localcapacities(institutional the one hand, and the extent of internationalassistance and effective from monitoringto enforcing,needed to build peace, on the authority, other.In a worldwhere each dimensionis finite we can expect,first, that success, and seccompromiseswill be necessaryto achievepeacekeeping rolewill be significantin generaland successful ond, thatthe international that when it is designedto fit the case. The extentof transitional authority to the international needs to be delegated communitywill be a functionof the level of postwar hostilityand localcapacities.
39 Having observed negotiations in El Salvador, Cambodia, eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Brcko (Bosnia), and Cyprus, it is our opinion that establishing a unified army or multiethnic police force, though difficult, is easy compared to agreeing on an elementary school curriculum.

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The relationsamong the three dimensionsof the triangleare compliassistanceand the exiscated.The availability and prospectof international of tence extensivelocal capacities,for example,can, if poorlymanaged, raise both the gains from victory(spoilsof war and rebuildingassistance) andreducethe costsof fighting(asthe assistanceservesto sustainthe fighthostilities can have dual effects. They ing). So, too, deep war-related increaserationalincentivesto end the conflict,but also make the peace harderto achieve. Wetest ourhypothesesaboutthe positiveimpactof international capacities using an extensivedataset for all peaceprocessesaftercivilwarfrom 1945until the end of 1999. We identify145civilwarsand estimatea statissuccessfor of "participatory ticalmodelthatgives us the probability peace" conflictsthathavejustended.Participatory peaceimpliesan absenceof war or lower-levelarmed conflict, undivided sovereignty,and a minimum This model includesvariousmeasuresof degreeof politicalparticipation. capacities.UN peace postwarhostility,local capacities,and international The modelhelps mandatesareour keymeasureof international capacities. civil for after broad war, givendifferent identify guidelines peacestrategies levels of localcapacities and hostility.40 Peaceprocessescan be dividedinto difficultand easy cases. In a hypotheticaldifficultcase, all the variableswith a negativecoefficientin our of participatory model (i.e..variables thatreducethe probability peacesucand all their would have values set them at 75thpercentile) cess) high (we the variables with positivecoefficientswouldhavelow values (we set them at their25thpercentile).41 Wecan explorethe impactof international capacities on the probability of success in hypothetical difficultand easycases.
40 These results are discussed at great length in our book and the two supplements that are available online (see the book, chapter 3, for URL). These estimates were obtained with logistic regression. Our estimates of the effects of UN operations are statistically significant using several different model specifications and econometric assumptions. The effects of UN missions also persist in the longer term, though they are felt more strongly in the first few years after the end of the civil war. 41 Easy cases imply a non-ethnic war, two factions, 75th percentile in net transfers per capita and electricity consumption per capita, and 25th percentile in primary exports as percent of GDP and deaths and displacements. Hard cases imply an ethnic war with four factions, electricity consumption, and net current transfers at the 25th percentile of their ranges and deaths and displacements and primary commodity exports at the 75th percentile of their ranges.

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The resultsarestriking: a difficultcase withouta treaty or UN mission, has a verylow likelihoodof success,seveven at the lowestlevelof hostility, eral times lower than with a transformativeUN mission and a treaty. does makea positivedifference,and earlyintervention Peacekeeping pays. Butat veryhigh levels of hostility,aftermassivecivilianslaughter, the two declines more rapidlyin the case decline and the probability probabilities with a UN mission and a treaty, althoughthere is still a greaterchanceof Forexample,a substantial multidimensionsuccesswith a PKOand treaty. al PKO made a positive difference in Cambodia,despite the massive thattookplacethere;an equivalent effortmight killingsand displacements in Rwanda. havebeen useful These resultsare almostthe oppositeof those for an easy case. There, of successis quitehigh at low levelsof hostility, eventhough the probability UN mission is deployedon the it is still slightlyhigherif a transformative andthe basisof a treaty amongthe parties.Butthe majoreffectof the treaty wherethey are crucialin maintaining UN occursat high levels of hostility, andtransformative UN mission, of success.Withouta treaty the probability at extremevaluesof hostility. the likelihoodof success dropssubstantially This appears,for example,to have mappedthe situationin Bosniaduring countriesamongthose thathave the late 1990s, one of the moredeveloped the UN, had a civilwarand one thathas sufferedmanycasualties.NATO, in held it of otherinternational anda plethora together peace. organizations for successsince the A treaty and UN mission areeven moreimportant UN mission gets much steeper slope of the curvewith a transformative much sooner than the slope of the curvewithouta UN mission or treaty of successwithouta treatyand UN mission is andthe resultingprobability low even at extremely very high levels of economicdevelopment. UN mission and a treatyis By contrast,the effect of a transformative neither a treatynor a low of whereas levels at development, very highest for success at veryhigh levseems international necessary presence strong els of development.Developedcountriesthat experienceminor civil vioThe UN is most neededelsewhere, lence can put themselvesbacktogether. in the less developed countriesthathavesufferedextensiveviolence.
CONCLUSION

of the peacekeeping that Our analysisidentifiesthe criticaldeterminants results in a participatory peace and finds that participatory peace is more likelyafternon-ethnicwars,in countrieswith relatively high development financialassistance levels, and when UN peaceoperationsand substantial
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- a simple end to Peaceswithoutan element of participation are available. - are more dependenton muscularthird-party intervention the violence levels ratherthan on the breadthof local capacities and on low-hostility economicsituationwill help create here,too, a rapidly improving (although for renewedviolence). disincentives aimedat facilitating a negotiatedsettlementis potentialPeacemaking sincewe findthattreatiesthatstickandresultin an end to the ly life-saving, with success, at least in the shortterm. The violenceare highlycorrelated the peacekeeping triangle seems to work. strategic logic underlying designed peacekeepingcombined with peace enforcement Strategically can fosterpeaceby substidoes makea difference.International capacities factorsthatfeed deephosand alleviating tutingfor limitedlocalcapacities the Such intervention improves prospectsfor peace, but only if the tility. is operationsalone designed. Enforcement peace operation appropriately democratic a cannotcreatethe conditionsfor self-sustaining peace. In the consent-based operationswith civilian peacekeeping right circumstances, functions(multidimensional contrast, are, by good not only in endPKOs) and political with the institutional in also but the violence, assisting ing intractable term secure reformthathelps conflicts,such peace.Truly longer as those in Bosnia, Kosovo,and East Timor probablywill requireboth enforcementand reconstruction activities,coordinatedand in the right order.

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