TS

NORSOK STANDARD
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
TECHNICAL SAFETY
S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994
Technical Safety
CONTENTS
1. FOREWORD 2. SCOPE 3. NORMATIVE REFERENCES 4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS 4.1 Definitions 4.2 Abbrevations 5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 5.1 General 5.2 Safety Management 5.3 Analyses and Optimisation 5.4 Risk Reduction Principles 6. EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 7. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT 7.1 General Requirements 7.2 Escape Routes 7.3 Safe Area 7.4 Living Quarters 7.5 Helicopter Deck 7.6 Utility Area 7.7 Emergency Service Areas 7.8 Process Area 7.9 Riser Area 7.10 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent 7.11 Drilling and Wellhead Area 8. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN 8.1 General Requirements 8.2 Accidental Design Load Protection 9. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES 9.1 General Requirements 9.2 Safety Systems 9.3 Process Safety 9.4 Depressurisation 9.5 Relief and Venting 9.6 Flaring 9.7 Cold Vent 9.8 Drainage Systems 10. REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 10.1 General Requirements 10.2 Fire and Gas Detection 10.3 Ignition Source Control 10.4 PA/Alarm System 10.5 Emergency Power 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 15 16 17 18 18 19 19 19 30 30 30
________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 1 of 53
Technical Safety
11. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION 11.1 General Requirements 11.2 Fire Protection Philosophy 11.3 Protection of Pressure Vessels and Process Piping 11.4 Passive Fire Protection 11.5 Active Fire Protection 11.6 Explosion Protection Philosophy 12. SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING INSTALLATIONS 12.1 General 12.2 Marine industry standard 12.3 Crude Storage 12.4 Layout 12.5 Turret 12.6 Drainage 12.7 Emergency re-positioning 12.8 Topside/floater interface 12.9 Escape and evacuation 13. NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS 13.1 General 13.2 Common requirements 13.3 Supporting structure 13.4 Welhead system 13.5 Life-saving appliances 13.6 Emergency shut-down ANNEX A Fire Protection Data Sheet (Informative) ANNEX B1 Type A of Normally not Manned Installations (Informative) ANNEX B2 Type B of Normally not Manned Installations (Informative) ANNEX C Informative References (Informative)
32 32 32 33 36 37 37 37 37 37 38 38 38 39 39 39 40 40 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 45 49 52
Technical Safety
1.
FOREWORD
This standard is developed by the NORSOK Standardisation Work Group. All annexes are informative.
2.
SCOPE
This standard applies to design, construction and modifications on installations for offshore drilling, production and transportation of petroleum. The objective of this document is to achieve implementation of technology which establishes and maintains an adequate level of safety for personnel, environment and material assets. This standard defines Safety Design Principles for installations, arrangements and systems.
3.
NORMATIVE REFERENCES
API RP 521Guide for pressure-reliving and depressing system. ISO 13 702 ISO 10418 prEN 50145 IEC 79-10 IEC 79-13 API 500 B S-DP-003 Requirements and Guidelines for the prevention, control and mitigation of fires and explosions. The standard is in current development. Analysis, Design, Installations and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms (Replaces API RP14C). Electric apparatus for potentially explosive gas atmosphere Classification of hazardous areas. International Electrotechnical Commission Publication. Area Classification. International Electrotechnical Commission Construction and use of rooms or buildings protected by pressurization. Guide for Area Classification. Environmental Care.
Technical Safety
4.
4.1
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS

Definitions All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the regulations and international codes and standards referred to in this document.
4.2
Abbrevations APS CCR ESD ESDV F&G LEL LQ PA HVAC HC PSD NPD IR UPS DHSV UV Abandon Platform Shutdown Central Control Room Emergency Shut Down Emergency Shut Down Valve Fire and Gas Lower Explosion Limit Living Quarter Public Address Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Hydrocarbons Prosess Shutdown Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Infra Red Uninterrupted Power Supply Downhole Safety Valve Ultra Violet
5.
5.1
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
General Governing documents, in the form of Acts, Regulations, Standards and Recognised Practices shall be identified and applied in the design process. Use of international standards and codes shall be preferred to non-standard solutions unless it is documented that the alternative solution altogether will be optimal from a safety and cost point of view. Any implications of Safety objectives established by project with respect to the design shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectives and requirements. The technical safety requirements shall comply with the established risk acceptance criteria.
Technical Safety
The main goal is to develop cost optimum concepts which shall give sufficient protection for personnel, environment and material assets. Risk analyses are acknowledged as vital tools which provide input to the decision processes in both the design and during the operation of the installations. Analyses of scenarios that have been adequately covered by relevant previous analyses or of recognised standard designs, should be avoided. 5.2 Safety Management This standard presumes that each project establishes a Safety Program that includes or addresses : Scope and purpose of the program System for identification and asessment of risk Risk Acceptance Criteria Organisation and responsibilities in terms of safety System for keeping track of assumptions,decisions and corrective actions related to safety Procedures for Handling of deviations and nonconformances Work program specifying all planned safety activities for each phase, including risk analysis and safety verification plan.
5.3
Analyses and Optimisation The design principles presented in clause 6 to 13 reflect a normally adequate standard for safe design, whereas the Project Risk Acceptance Criteria are reflecting the maximum risk level, not necessarily achieved through a standard design. This is because the safety level depends on several factors, partly outside the range of standardisation, e.g. operational aspects, environmental conditions, new applications or new technology. In this connection risk analysis shall be applied in order to evaluate alternatives and provide necessary information for decision making.
5.4 5.4.1
Risk Reduction Principles Overall Principles Cost/benefit evaluation shall be applied to study different design alternatives. This principle shall be considered in connection with items below.
Technical Safety
5.4.2
Inherent safety The design shall aim at a sufficant level of inherent safety, e.g. through: Eliminating or replacing hazardous materials Reducing the quantities of hazardous materials Selecting a process with a lower risk potentia Reducing numbers of leak sources (flanges, valves, instrument connections etc.) and ignition sources. Sufficant material corrosion properties and toughness factors.
5.4.3
Failure mechanisms A systematic and documented identification of relevant failure mechanisms shall be performed. Relevant subject disciplines shall be involved. In particular this applies to: Failure mechanisms which can cause leaks and releases of hazardous substances, including all types of corrosion, erosion, cavitation, material fatigue and ageing Failure mechanisms which can cause ignition, e.g. ageing of electrical materials or components, self heating of rotating machinery, current leakage due to water, static electricity, earthing faults potential Failure mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety systems
5.4.4
Escalation Prevention Possible escalating events shall be identified and relevant measures taken to reduce this risk. The need for establishing safety barriers to avoid escalations shall be considered as part of the design.
5.4.5
Simplicity, Comprehensibility and Recognisability System and equipment complexity which may lead to human error shall be avoided by: Limiting the amount of equipment Avoiding unnecessary functional dependency, especially in or between control systems, safety systems and barriers Selecting simple and logical solutions Standardisation of codes, controls, colours, work methods and components Designing with due attention to the 'human factor'
Vital systems shall be properly marked and easily recognisable and understandable.
Technical Safety
6.
EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The installation shall have satisfactory access and evacuation facilities and be adequately equipped with rescue equipment. The emergency prepardeness of any activity shall be established on the basis of defined situations of hazard and accident. An emergency prepardness analysis shall be carried out to design the emergency prepardness so as to meet the specific requirements for the activity in question. The emergency preparedness required in any activity shall form the basis for design and modification of the installation and the selection of equipment. In the establishment of emergency preparedness measures which prevent a hazardous situation from developing into an accident situation shall be given priority over measures which reduce the consequences of an accident situation. An Emergency Preparedness Plan covering the operational phase shall be developed at an early stage of the Conceptual Phase. The plan shall be in accordance with chapter 10 in ISO/WD 13 702. The plan shall take into account the following evacuation principles: The muster area and the access to the evacuation station shall be arranged and protected in order to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and efficient way. Area allocation: 0.4 m2 per lifeboat seat.
Main evacuation area. Gravity/free fall life boats with minimum life boat capacity of 100 % of personnel on board the installation.
Other evacuation areas. One additional lifeboat in the far end of the installation shall be considered if escape to the main evacuation area is impossible For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on the helideck is within acceptable limits, helicopter may be considered as the primary means of evacuation For bridge connected installations and flotels the primary means of evacuation shall be the bridge. One additonal lifeboat in the oposite end of the installation shall be considered if escape to bridge is impossible in credible accident scenarios. Evacuation chutes with rafts shall be used as a secondary means of evacuation, with one located in the main evacuation area. The Emergency Preparedness Assessment shall be applied to identify any need for additional evacuation means and the optimum location of these. ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 7 of 53
Technical Safety
7.
7.1
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT

General Requirements The installation shall be divided into main areas which shall be designed and located so as to minimize the risk to people, environment and material assets. The division of areas shall be made based on the risk they represent in the operations. Living quarters, control centre and equipment of major importance to safety shall be located in non-hazardous areas. Gas release points, e.g. flare/cold vent, shall be located and designed so that release of gas does not entail increased level of risk in the operations. Risers shall be located and designed so that fracturing will have acceptable consequences. Reference is given to chapter 5 and 10 in ISO/WD 13 702 for layout, orientation and location of equipment and functions.
7.1.1
Area Classification Installations shall be classified in terms of explosion risk, and divided into zones according to degree of risks. The definition of zones shall be in accordance with IEC 79.10. The extent of zones should be in accordanse with API 500B for small and open concepts. References are also given to draft EN Standard pr EN 50145. The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated with normal platform operations, e.g. continuous or periodic venting, evaporation from open handling systems, small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of flammable substances during maintenance and work-over operations. "Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of material weakness, design error, falling loads, collision or sabotage, shall not be regarded as giving rise to a higher classification. This shall be reflected in the risk analyses, and may impose stricter requirements to arrangements and equipment than defined by the area classification alone. The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements to:
Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets Ventilation system requirements Location of combustion air inlets and exhaust outlets for internal combustion engines and fired units Location and use of ignition sources Location of emergency equipment Location and design of doors and other connections between areas ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 8 of 53
Technical Safety
Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas. Selection of equipment.
For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms, alarms and disconnection upon loss of pressurisation, ref. is made to IEC 79-13. 7.2 Escape Routes The total time needed for escape to safe area , including time for safe termination of critical tasks, rescue operations, etc., shall be estimated and efforts shall be made to minimise this time. For large manned installations the escape route system and the safe area shall be available for at least 1 hour. The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1 m width (0,9 m for doors) and 2,1 m height. Escape routes intended use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to 1.5 m (1.2 m for doors) width and 2.2 m height. Other general principles are listed below: There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from every regularly manned area outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows: Living Quarters Shelter Areas Life Boats and Life Rafts-stations Boat Landings Helideck Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way Escape routes shall preferably be part of the daily used transport- and passageways. Where appropriate, main escape routes shall be provided on the outside along the periphery of the installation. Doors shall normally open in the escape direction, but not block the outside escape route. Opening of doors should not require electric, hydraulic or pneumatic power. If such power is required the power supply shall be local. Any dining room, recreation room in L.Q. etc., where more than 15 persons may be assembled shall have at least 2 exit doors. Internal room arrangement shall be evaluated for possible blocking of exits following an accident as well as external blockings. For all areas where there is a risk of congestion and panic, the doors shall be provided with panic bars. Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level shall be provided by stairways. The number of these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size, configuration of areas and equipment layout. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where the work is of such a nature that only a few persons (max. 3) are in the area on short time basis. It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a wellhead area.
Technical Safety
A dead end corridor of more than 5 metres length is not acceptable. Stairways included in escape routes shall be designed to allow for transport of injured personnel on stretcher. Lifts shall not be considered as a part of escape ways. However, it shall be possible to escape from the lift and the hoist way with the lift at any elevation. Escape from legs/shafts/coloumns of an installation shall be considered separately. If use of lift is necessary to ensure adequate and effective escape, the lift system shall satisfy special requirements, e.g. concerning transport of injured personnel on stretchers, protection, ventilation, power supply. Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. Escape routes shall be provided with adequate emergency lighting. Emergency station should have minimum 15 Lux, Escape routes minimum 4 Lux. Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarter shall be marked by yellow painting. The escape routes within the living quarter shall be provided with low level directional lighting, showing correct escape direction. Other enclosed and regularly manned utility and process areas shall be considered separately. Escape routes shall be arranged from the drillfloor to adjacent modules and also down the substructure. Protection of these escape routes from radiation heat shall be considered.
7.3
Safe Area The Safe Areas shall be in accordance with ISO WD 13702 14.
7.4
Living Quarters The living quarters shall be designed, equipped and located so that acceptable safety for all accomodated personell is achieved. Special emphasis shall be given to separation of the areas with drilling, production and auxiliary systems from areas for living quarters. Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the functions they are designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event. The living quarters shall be equipped with a reliable smokedetection and alarm system. The ventilation system shall be designed to vent out smoke in a fire scenario.
7.5
Helicopter Deck The helicopter deck shall be subject to approval by the National Civil Aviation Administration.
Technical Safety
7.6
Utility Area The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/Emergency Service Areas. Routing of hydrocarbon piping to, or through, the utility area shall be minimised.
7.7
Emergency Service Areas An emergency service area is defined as an area containing equipment and systems required during emergency conditions. This includes firewater systems, emergency generators and emergency power distribution systems, main control and communication equipment, emergency ventilation equipment, ballast system and position keeping system. The location and protection of these systems as well as system design shall secure operations during and after an emergency condition. The equipment necessary during evacuation is of particular importance. Routing of hydrocarbon piping within Emergency Service Areas shall be limited to diesel fuel supply lines for the emergency services themselves. The emergency stations shall be provided and located in accordance with ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 10.
7.8
Process Area The separation philosophy for different parts of the process systems shall be that equipment items of relatively high integrity but containing large volumes of liquids and low pressure hydrocarbons (separator vessels) shall be separated from equipment with high pressure which are the most likely sources of leakage (gas compression plant). Process equipment containing larger volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons should be located above main loadbearing structures to minimise the potential fire and explosion loads on such structures. Process piping, pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external impact, e.g. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery or as found required through analysis. ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure to fires and explosions are minimised. Electric cables, pneumatic tubings and hydraulic systems shall be protected from fire and explosion loads until they have completed shut down sequence time.
7.9
Riser Area For risers which may release larger amounts of hydrocarbons, protection from external impact due to ships and drifting objects shall be evaluated by locating the risers behind main support structures or by dedicated protection structures able to resist the
Technical Safety
dimensioning impact energy. Impaced energy of 14MJ may be assumed until a detailed collision risk study is available. The following means of protection to be considered: 7.10 For two or more gas risers, or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive fire protection Pig launchers and receivers: location in open, naturally ventilated areas, at the periphery of the platform, and with hatches directed away from equipment and structures. ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practical.
Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and dimensioned with due attention to all relevant flaring rates and wind situations to ensure that the heat radiation level (Ref. Clause 9.6 Flaring) will be within acceptance limits at all relevant locations on the platform, with regard to the operators, the structures such as cranes and towers and the electrical and mechanical equipment and pipes. The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a hazard due to increased surface temperature to crane operators, crane structures and drill tower structures. Cold vents shall be designed in such a way that ignition of the gases will not represent unacceptable risk. A flare/vent study is required, showing the potential effects on all exposed areas.
7.11
Drilling and Wellhead Area The drilling and wellhead areas shall be located with maximum distance to the safe areas and be separated from processing areas in order to minimisce the concequences from a blow out. The areas shal be arranged such that where practically possible it allows for external fire fighting assistance from two different directions in order to fight a burning blow out. Alternatively, the area shall be provided with a fire fighting system upgraded to provide a substitute for external fire fighting. The activities in this area will also be of a critical nature in case of emergencies, and it is of vital importance that escape routes are available to the personnel in the area.
Technical Safety
Furthermore the wellhead area shall be located so as to: Avoid storage of combustible fluids Facilitate access and emergency work in the wellhead area in the event of a blowout Minimise hydrocarbon piping not connected to the well Ensure that the wellhead area is separated or protected from sources of ignition The wellheads shall be located as high as practical and above the main frame in order to minimise exposure of the main frame from a wellhead fire, and to facilitate control of a blow out on the platform
Consideration should be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment, such as control panels and hydraulic systems and their related signal paths. When simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production is planned for, operational procedures shall ensure an acceptable safety level of the installation.
8.
8.1
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN

General Requirements Installations, equipment, systems and components shall be designed, equipped and located so that they can be operated safely and withstand anticipated loads. Structures, systems and operations shall be planned, designed and implemented in such ways that no single failure during design, fabrication or operation may lead to hazard or accident. This applies both to operational failure as well as to faults/deficiencies related to structures and equipment used directly in operations, or to equipment with auxiliary functions.
8.2
Accidental Design Load Protection Accidental loads shall be identified and taken into account in the structural design. The probability, magnitude and potential consequences of identified loads shall be assessed and analysed. Main principles concerning structural protection and hazards that may have a critical effect on the structure are listed below. The requirements below are only subject to deviations if documented by risk and cost benefit analyses.
Technical Safety
Relevant loads are: Impact loads caused by explosion, dropped object, ship collision or others. Explosion: Ref. is given to ISO/WD 13702. Dropped objects: Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container, pipes etc. based on estimated weight, probability drop height, vulnerability and criticality of the exposed areas. Ship collision: The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for adequate Sea Traffic Surveilance System should be evaluated. For supply vessels operating beside the installation, a collision load of 14 MJ shall be assumed.
Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the platform or adjacent platform, from risers or from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of subsea gas releases. Fire: Fixed installations shall be able to withstand a dimensioning blowout/fire on sea for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. The endurance shall not be less than 1 hour. Fixed installations shall be against fire on sea, as identified by risk analyses. For blowout/fire on sea concerning floating installations, see clause 12.2.6
protected
Loads caused by extreme weather, earthquake, damage to structural elements (damaged condition) or extreme temperature tension.
9.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES

General Requirements Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed, manufactured, equipped and installed in such a way that the installations can be operated safely. Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during operations can lead to unacceptable hazardous situations. This principle shall apply to operational errors as well as equipment failure.
9.1
Technical Safety
9.2
Safety Systems A Safety Shutdown System shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and equipment used for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall act as a safety barrier in case of malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment. The Safety Shutdown System is logically divided into three main levels of shutdown: Process Shutdown (PSD) Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Abandon Platform Shutdown (APS)
Basic system philosophy is that a shutdown on a certain level shall never initiate shutdowns on higher levels, but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels. For more details reference is given to Clause 10.3 Emergency Shutdown. 9.3 Process Safety Abnormal operating conditions leading to potential hydrocarbons release shall be controlled by two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 (API RP 14C): Primary level of protection Secondary level of protection
As far as possible, the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis. Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points shall not be regarded to satisfy the requirement of two levels of protection. The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operation conditions within systems or equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented. The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within PSD, i.e. shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not developed as a result of the initial trip action. The system philosophy also implies that the fail safe principle shall apply. I.e. components shall move to, or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power. The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality, and may vary from equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate, to a total process shutdown. 9.4 Depressurisation Fast depressurisation shall be the primary mean of avoiding rupture of pressure vessels/piping which may cause escalation. Active and passive protection are secondary means. ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 15 of 53
Technical Safety
All pressure vessels and piping segments, which during shut down contains more than 1.0 ton of produced hydrocarbons or unprocessed crude, shall be equipped with a depressuring system. Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the loss of material strength during a fire. Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain flammable or toxic materials by passive means alone. Loss of the active method of containment will require depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e.g. centrifugal compressor's dependence on seal oil systems). The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation, steel thickness, active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure vessel/piping segment does not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario beyond the control of the protective systems and arrangement. This may call for a detailed study of each ESD segment in particular. The design procedure outlined in clause 11.3. The depressuring, manually or automatic, shall be applied the following way: Manual field depressurisation sequence is considered initiated after 3 minutes from detection of initial fire Automatic depressurisation sequence is considered initiated immediately after detection of initial fire.
API RP 521 may be used as a guidance in the design of depressurisation systems. 9.5 Relief and Venting The release of hydrocarbons from relief and depressurisation systems shall be routed through a closed system terminating at a liquid's disengagement vessel and with the liquid free gas being safely flared. Vents which are not suitable for routing to flare (e.g. due to back-pressure) shall be terminated outside the platform perimeter in such a way that accumulation of gases due to "dead pockets" etc. is avoided. Local venting of hazardous gases shall not be permitted unless it can be done without hazard to the personnel or the platform, e.g. for small and normally not manned installations local venting may be found acceptable. Flare K.O. drums shall be sized for two criteria: Disengagement of entrained liquid droplets Containment of liquid carry over
The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. The objective is to avoid condensate dropping from flare. The particle size shall be less than 400 microns. In case of ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 16 of 53
Technical Safety
vertical flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size shall be less than 300 microns. The K.O. Drum liquid containment capacity shall be based on the largest foreseeable liquid condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. This period shall provide realistic time to identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. Longer periods may be required, e.g. for subsea flowlines and interfield pipelines. This shall be evaluated for each case. In addition the knock-out drum shall provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry over from the largest source (assuming overfilled vessel). Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause significant escalation of a fire, shall be avoided. As a minimum, the piping system and the pressure vessels shall maintain their integrity during depressurisation. The depressuring system itself (blowdown valves, branch piping and headers and K.O. Drums) is of particular importance. The ability to maintain integrity when exposed to the fire loads depends on selection of material, wall thickness, pressure rating and applied fire protection. 9.6 Flaring The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. Ref. Design Principles Environmental Care, NORSOK S-DP-003. Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the platform for critical flare conditions. Flare radiation calculations shall account for variations in flaring quantities and wind conditions. Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on locations where structures and equipment are exposed shall be as follows: Permissible radiation levels to personnel shall follow radiation levels as given in API RP 521. The heat loads from planned continuos flaring conditions on areas where personnel are supposed to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working environment requirements for exposed areas shall be considered and ample protection provided as required. For long periods of flaring (continuos flaring) , consideration shall also be given to the radiation level on the helideck., i.e. the radiation/temperatures on the helideck shall not become intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter operations. Unless otherwise accepted by the responsible for helicopter operations, max. 1.9 KW/m2 is allowed on helideck. Max heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat loads shall be limited to meet the requirements below. Higher exposure for short times, e.g. during emergency flaring conditions, that will not harm the structure or equipment can be accepted. Such deviations shall be documented.
Technical Safety
Protection of exposed areas may be necessary to meet these requirements. Heat loads on steel- or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that results in loss of structural integrity. Heat loads on wires in drill tower and cranes shall be limited depending on type of lubrication and inspection- /replacement frequency. Heat loads on areas classified as zone 2 shall be kept below 200oC. Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation shall not give temperatures exceeding 40C.
Based on a case to case evaluation of protective clothing, provision of local radiation shields, etc., the limits for acceptable heat loads can be adjusted as applicable. Such deviations shall be documented. 9.7 Cold Vent The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the foreseen gas rates can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the installation or in its vicinity. Further, the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design and dimensioning of the cold vent, i.e. ignition of foreseen gas rates shall not give unacceptable heat loads or other consequences on the installation. The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent shall be considered. 9.8 Drainage Systems The platform shall be equipped with the following drainage systems: One closed drainage system One open drainage system from non-hazardous areas One open drainage system from hazardous areas Where applicable, a separate mud drainage system shall be provided covering the drill floor and mud treatment areas
Open drainage systems from areas where there is no pollution, e.g. rain water drain from roofs and helideck shall be routed directly to the sea. Reference to ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 8.
Technical Safety
10.
10.1
REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

General Requirements The general requirements to safety and communication systems are to be in accordance with ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 10. Safety and communication systems shall be designed and protected so as to retain their operational capability for the required period of time during an accidental event. Safety systems shall be designed to operate independently of other systems or with a safety equivalent to an independent system.
10.2 10.2.1
Fire and Gas Detection General All F&G detection system display- and information facilities shall be centralised, and located in a continuously manned area, normally the Central Control Room. With the installation divided into "fire areas" the design of F&G System shall presume that each fire area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors. The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDU's) be given on a simple fire and gas mimic. Only essential information shall be shown on the mimic, i.e. with fire area status, unless for areas or equipment where a more detailed alarm identification is appropriate, e.g.: Around helifuel package. In or at ventilation inlets. Inside critical equipment enclosures.
Local F&G display - and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area incorporating F&G control of the drilling facilities. 10.2.2 Gas detector layout and alarm initiation The following principles shall apply concerning detector layout and alarm initiation: Location, type and number of gas detectors shall take into account: leakage sources within the area borders between non-hazardous and hazardous areas gas density relative to air detection principles and voting logic ventilation air flow patterns
Technical Safety
wind-direction and velocity critical reaction time/detector response time size of the area criticality of the area with regard to safety
HVAC intakes Gas detectors in HVAC supply shall be located at the air intake, alternatively in the duct as close to duct opening as possible. Detectors in a duct shall be positioned as near as practicable to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and where the response time to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. At big intakes, the flow patterns around the opening shall be determined to achieve an optimum position of the detectors with regard to response. HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by minimum two gas detectors. "Confirmed Gas" Is activation of two detectors arranged in one voting area, one at "high" and the other at "low" LEL set point. . Each project shall define the high and low set points, considering the distance between individual detectors working in a voting area, ventilation conditions, etc. However, the "high" level shall be set not above 60% LEL. Where single detector logic is employed, single detector at "high" gives "Confirmed Gas". . Areas covered by two detectors should be arranged in a voting logic with detectors in adjacent hazardous area. Alarm on Gas detection Alarms shall be automatically initiated according to table 10.1
Technical Safety
Table 10.1 Automatic alarm in area CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling Quarter utility area area area Confirmed gas detected at : HVAC intake LQ Non-hazardous utility area HVAC/air intakes Process area incl. HVAC outlets Drilling area incl. HVAC Any single dete ctor "low" LEL
Drill control cabin/office
X X X X X
X X
X X
X X X
X X
X X X
X X (detector in drilling area)
Beam Gas Detectors Beam detectors are preferred where the layout enables good coverage by such detectors. Beam detectors should be used in combination with point detectors in a voting. This can be a way of limiting the number of detectors.
10.2.3
Fire detector layout and alarm initiation Fire detector type The selection of fire detectors shall be based upon an evaluation of the nature of the fire that is to be detected and the operational conditions that may exist. Early smoke detection systems, sensitive to small concentration of combustion products shall be considered in all rooms without automatic fire fighting, such as: Central Control Room Instrument Room Switch Board and Electrical Rooms
IR or dual IR/UV fire detectors shall be used in process areas Manual detection Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations, e.g. exits from process areas, escape routes, fire stations.
Technical Safety
"Confirmed Fire" Is activation of two fire detectors working on a voting principle in a fire area. "Confirmed Fire" is activation of one single fire detector when no voting is employed.
Alarm on Fire detection Alarms described in table 10.2 shall be automatically initiated. Alarms in other areas to be manually initiated for CCR. Automatic alarm in area Living Non-haz. Process Quarter utility area area
CCR Confirmed fire detected at : LQ Non-hazardous utility area Process single wellhead Conf. process Conf./Drilling Any single detector
Drilling area
Drill control cabin/office
X X X X X X
X X
X X
X X X X X X X Detector in drilling area
Table 10.2 Automatic alarms upon fire detection. Table 10.3 below presents normative examples of fire- and gas detection in the various areas on installations. Alarms are described in the text above, and is not repeated in the table. The solutions presented in the table can be deviated upon an evaluation of the specific risks in an area. Reference is also made to Figure 10.1 regarding the Emergency Shutdown Philosophy, and clause 11.5 regarding Active Fire Fighting.
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Automatic ShutFire detection down Action Wellhead Area Flame or Heat ESD II (fusible plugs*) Manifold Area Nat. vent./ outdoor H.C. Process Area Mech. vent. Process Area (separation/gas compression) Water Injection Treatment Area Flame Flame Flame ESD II ESD II ESD II
Area/room
Automatic Gas detection Area Area Area, leak detection
Shutdown Action ESD II ESD II ESD II
Comments * Not normally manned installations
Area + ESD II HVAC extr. duct HVAC intake* None ** ESD I* Area assumed non-hazardous *Mech. ventilated area ** Nat.vent/outdo or area
Flame or smoke *
ESD II
Gas Compres- Flame sion Area Drill Floor None Drillers Cabin Smoke Degasser Room Shale Shaker Room Active Mud Tank Room Flame Flame Flame
ESD II Manual Manual Manual Drillers cabin Manual Drillers Cabin Manual Drillers cabin None None
Area Area HVAC intake HVAC extract
ESD II Manual* Manual* *See 10.3.5 *See 10.3.5 *See 10.3.5 * If sour service **See 10.3.5 *See 10.3.5
Sack/Bulk Heat Storage Room Mud Lab Smoke
Manual* Drillers cabin Area, H2S* Manual Drillers cabin** Area + Manual* HVAC Drillers extract cabin HVAC ESD II intake HVAC ESD II intake HVAC intake Manual Drillers Cabin
Assumes no piped connection to mud system
Cementing Unit Room
Flame
None
Table 10.3: Fire and gas detection/Shut down actions 1 of 3 Area/room Automatic ShutGas ShutComments ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 23 of 53
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Fire detection down Action Central Smoke in Manual Control Room cabinets * and/ (CCR) or at roof level Instrument Smoke * Manual room adjacent to CCR Central Tele Smoke * Manual Eq. Room Local Equipment Room (LER) Turbine hall Turbine hood
Turbine Switch board and electrical room
Battery room (lead acid)
Fire pump room with diesel engine Air compres.
* Fire detection Early warning system HVAC ESD I * Fire detection intake Early warning system HVAC ESD I * Fire detection intake Early warning system Smoke Manual HVAC ESD II* *Shut down of intake internal equipment to be evaluated Flame * Manual HVAC ESD I * Fuel system Smoke ** intake **Electric equipm. Flame and heat* Unit Area Unit ** * Supplier to shutd. (hood) shutd.upon confirm. upon area gas ** Continue area fire detect ventilation. detect Block and bleed fuel gas system Combust. ESD I air intake Smoke * El. ** HVAC ESD 1 * Fire detection power intake Early warning switch system off ** Manual or automatic with timer to be decided Smoke HVAC ESD intake Shutd. H2 gas boost detector at charge extract Flame Manual HVAC ESD I, * Running fire intake Close fire- pump will be damper * shut down only on overspeed Smoke or heat Manual Air intake ESD I* *Incl. unit shut down 2 of 3
detection down Action HVAC ESD I intake
Table 10.3: Fire and gas detection/Shut down actions
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Area/room
Automatic Fire detection
Shut- Gas down detection Action
Shutdown Action ESD I ESD I ESD I ESD I
Comments
Mechanical workshop Instrument Workshop Paint Storage HVAC intake common for LQ. LQ, cabins/rooms/ areas
Smoke or heat Manual HVAC intake Smoke or heat Manual HVAC intake Heat or flame HVAC intake Smoke at HVAC Air intake intake and in shut HVAC room down Smoke Manual *
Separate welding HVAC extract
*Covered by gas detector in HVAC intake (see above line)
Vent extract Heat from galley General galley Heat area Crane engine Heat room Helideck Hangar None Smoke and flame Chain locker None Turret Area Flame Pump room in Smoke, heat column
Manual Manual Manual Combustion ESD * Unit * Depend on air intake * s.d. timer crane location delay 30sec None None None ESD II Area HVAC intake
ESD II ESD I
Table 10.3 Fire and gas detection/shut down actions.
3 of 3
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10.3 10.3.1
Emergency Shutdown General References are given to ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 6. The installation shall be analysed to identify all hazardous conditions and their consequences. The critical operating parameters shall then be selected and an emergency shutdown logic developed. Due consideration shall be given to the event sequence in relation to the overall installation safety. In the detail assessments of ESD philosophy, actions associated with time delays in the achievement of a state of no escalation potential shall be identified and the implications on ESD philosophy determined. The ESD principle hierarchy presented in figure 10.1 shall be applied for complex installations and used as guidance for simpler installations. For drilling operations see clause 10.3.5.
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Figure 10.1 Emergency Shutdown Principle Hierarchy ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 27 of 53
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10.3.2
Abandon Platform Shutdown (APS) The APS shall be provided for manual operation in case of total evacuation from an installation. The intent of an APS is to ensure that an abandoned platform is: Depressurised Electrically dead
Firepumps if running shall be allowed to run empty the diesel daytank. Emergency Support Systems with self-contained, built-in power supply shall be left operational. Such systems may be: Navigational aids Helideck perimeter lights Emergency lights
Shutdown of other emergency systems shall be via 'timer' to ensure that systems are operational as long as required, for ensuring a safe shutdown, evacuation and abandonment (see fig. 10.1). 10.3.3 ESD With a few exceptions as further described below, initiation of ESD I shall only leave the Emergency Systems active. Typical Emergency Systems are: F&G Detection Fire Fighting ESD Radio/External Communication UPS PA Blowdown and Flare Bilge/Ballast Water Emergency Generation & Distribution Emergency Lighting Evacuation Vital Equipment required in an Emergency Situation
Personnel lifts and hydraulic work platforms must be kept operable to ensure that personnel can escape safely from such equipment after a shutdown. Shutdown of utility systems and activation of emergency systems are shown in fig. 10.1. Initiation of ESD II shall shut down the process; close riser/flowline valves and wellhead valves and switch over turbine generators from fuel gas to diesel. Welding sockets and ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 28 of 53
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other sockets which serves areas where hot work permit are required shall be disconnected in all areas upon ESD II as well as upon gas detection (single detector). Depressurisation upon fire in the process or wellhead area shall be manual or automatic subject to the evaluations outlined in Clause 9 10.3.4 Manual APS/ESD stations Manual APS stations shall in principle be distributed at strategic positions such as Muster/escape areas, e.g. lifeboat stations, helideck, bridge connections CCR
Manual ESD stations shall in principle be distributed in essential areas such as: 10.3.5 Exits from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment, e.g. wellheads, drilling, process etc. Along major escape routes, muster areas, eg. life boat stations, helideck Control points, e.g. central control room, drillers cabin, local manned control room, emergency operation centre, radio room etc.
Shutdown of Drilling and Work-over Operations Automatic initiated shutdowns of drilling and work-over operations shall only be activated from the F&G detection system at confirmed fire or gas detected in rooms critical for the drilling and work-over operations. The adverse effects of automatic shutdowns shall be thoroughly evaluated for each case of automatic action that are accepted. Loss of overpressure in these rooms shall not give an automatic shutdown, but give alarm to the responsible drilling personnel. By any other ESD, the drilling and work-over operations shall not be automatically affected, except for burning on the burner boom, which shall be stopped automatically. Supply of emergency power to drilling plant in case of main power generation shutdown shall be subject to evaluation by the project. An ESD push button for initiation of ESD I shall be provided at Drillers Cabin and Drilling Supervisor's Office. Responsible drilling personnel shall in addition have a Manual Drilling Shutdown switch available to stop drilling and work-over operations. The BOP system, the draw work brakes and cementing unit are not affected by this switch.
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10.4
Ignition Source Control Equipment left live in the APS situation shall be certified for operation in zone I areas. Excepted is only equipment required for the safety operations, see figure 10.1., that are located in rooms continuously manned or monitored in emergency situations. Such equipment shall be easily shut down manually from the manned area/room. Equipment left live in the ESD I situation shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas. Excepted is emergency equipment in LQ and other areas subject to special considerations. Examples of equipment that can be accepted without certification for zone 1 areas are: Emergency generator Emergency switch gear Central equipment for internal/external communication
Upon ESD II, all equipment operated under "hot work permits" shall be disconnected. 10.5 PA/Alarm System The objective of a PA/ Emergency Alarm System is to warn and guide personnel as quickly as possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation and to promote quick response. Location, number, type and effect of alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be so that the alarm condition is easily recognised in any area where distribution of the alarm is required. The Emergency Alarm System shall be designed in accordance with table 10.4. Alarm Type Muster Alarm General Alarm Toxic Gas Alarm Alert Signal Continuous audible signal. Yellow flashing lamp Intermittent audible signal. (1sec. on, 1 sec. off) Yellow flashing lamp Intermittent audible signal (0.1 sec. on, 0.1 sec off). Yellow flashing lamp Two level audible tone on P.A. system. Yellow flashing lamp Indicates Prepare to abandon installation Fire, or fire related situations, gas leak or other serious situations Toxic gas Important announcement to follow on PA system
Table 10.4 Alarm Signals The system shall be designed to give appropriate access priorities. 10.6 Emergency Power The Emergency Systems listed in Clause 10.3.3. shall be supplied with emergency power. ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 30 of 53
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The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator located in an unclassified area. The consumers shall be supplied with emergency power for at least 18 hours. An uninterrupted power supply for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed. Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum period of 30 minutes. The emergency generator shall be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power. The emergency generator system shall be selfcontained. Arrangements for black start shall be provided. Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR where a matrix panel shall display the status of the generator. The time required for the emergency generator to accept electrical loading after initiation of start signal shall be evaluated. In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be provided. The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and explosion to operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been performed. In special cases, fire pumps can be fed by emergency power. Such solutions are to be subject to special considerations, e.g. of the size and complexity of the emergency generator system, the need for load shedding, start-up time etc. For operational reasons, the following systems should also be supplied with emergency power : Process control and data acquisition system PSD system
Technical Safety
11.
11.1
REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION

General Requirements The general requirements to explosion and fire protection are given in ISO/WD 13 702
11.2
Fire Protection Philosophy The requirement for protection against fire on a installation is directly related to the actual fire potential in the area. Active and passive fire protection shall be arranged in such a way that a fire is prevented from spreading to other areas within a certain time specified and to protect load carrying structure against critical heat loads. The fire protection philosophy shall be established and shall as a minimum reflect the aspects listed below: Accidental loads Relevant fire scenario Fire water capacity Manning Availability of fire protection equipment during emergencies Requirements for automatic detection Mutual aid Compatibility of equipment System availability during maintenance For utility areas, including el. - and instrument. rooms, choice of fire retarding materials, for sectioning of switch boards, etc.
The fire load shall be established based on fire load analyses where due attention is given to: Leak and ignition probabilities Leak source parameters, leak rate vs duration, gas/oil ratio Fire characteristics, pool fire, flash fire, jet- or diffuse fire Air/ventilation conditions/limitations Distances, separation or shielding The effects of ESD and depressurization Active fire protection, availability and efficiency
In addition to requirements given in ISO Standard, the fire protection design shall be documented by Fire Protection Data Sheets, Annex A. Credit for fire water can be taken in the protection of equipment piping and (secondary) structures, subject to considerations outlined in 11.3. such credit shall not affect design of primary firepartitions segregating areas or design of load carrying structures. It is a ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 32 of 53
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condition that escallation within an area due to failure of the fire water systems does not affect the main fire partitions and load carrying structures. 11.3 Protection of Pressure Vessels and Process Piping The procedure described below shall be followed unless more detailed evaluations are performed. The design procedure includes the following principal steps. Figure 11.1 gives an overview of the procedure. Step 1. Identification of fire types. The initial step is to decide which type of fire the pressure vessel/piping can be exposed to. Fuel supply and ventilation conditions shall be determined: Types of fire: Pool fires in open or enclosed areas, fuel controlled Pool fires in enclosed areas, ventilation controlled Jet fires Step 2. Effect of fire water Water applied for controlling the fire and cooling of pressure vessels and piping is very effective when evenly distributed over the exposed areas. Credit for fire water can be taken when the design provides : Spray of deluge water from nozzles from below, from both sides and from above Spray nozzle location ensuring that water spray projection covers all surfaces of the protected equipment/piping Supply of deluge water to a module is arranged so that accidents can not damage the supply Coverage of fire detectors that ensures immediate detections of small fires in all parts of the fire area Operation procedures shall ensure high availability of these systems
Alternatively, heat loads shall be based on detail evaluation of the credible fire scenarios. Application of predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the evaluation. Step 3. Heat flux values for the next step are then selected from the following table:
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Type of fire
Initial heat flux density max. point loads
Initial heat flux Reduced Average density initial heat load average load due to fire water credit 100 kW/m2 80 kW/m2 100 kW/m2 200 kW/m2
Pool fire (crude) open or enclosed area 150 kW/m2 fuel controlled Pool fire enclosed area ventilation controlled 200 kW/m2 Jet fire Table 11.1 Heat flux values.
130 kW/m2 250 kW/m2
The reduced average initial heat loads shall only be applied if the conditions outlined in step 2 is fulfilled. Step 4. Depressuring / rupture calculations Perform depressuring calculations for each major pressure vessel and piping segment, establishing internal pressure fluctuation, wall material temperature and residual strength, as a function of time. Determine whether rupture will occur during depressuring, and identify time to rupture if this will occur. The effect of manual versus automatic initiation is specified in clause 9.4. Step 5. Evaluation of failure mode In areas where the pressure vessels and piping segments withstand the fire, without rupture, for or the time required to depressure all pressure vessels and piping systems to 50 % of initial pressure or 4.5 barg whichever is the lowest, the protection is considered acceptable. If a rupture occurs before this state of depressurisation has been reached, an acceptance of the situation will have to be judged based on the risk analyses. Residual quantities, escalation potentials both within the area and towards adjacent areas shall be evaluated. Where rupture can not be accepted, i.e. the risk acceptance criteria are not met, the provision of additional protective systems and arrangements shall be implemented. This can be: Upgrading of active fire water system so that credit from fire water can be taken Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed pressure vessels/piping Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material , wall thickness etc.) Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture Change from manual to automatic depressuring
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The procedure will then have to repeated from step 1, 2 or 3 as applicable.
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Figure 11.1 Flowdiagram for deciding of use of passive fire protection on pressure vessels and piping. 11.4 Passive Fire Protection Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the functions they are designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event. If fire technical calculations indicate that the outer surfaces of living quarters in the event of a dimensioning fire may be subjected to at heat fluc exceeding 100 kW/m2, they shall be fitted with fire divisions of minimum class H-60. The choice of materials and interior design of living quarters shall be decided in relation to the fire risk, and shall prevent fire from spreading. ________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 36 of 53
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The choice of materials and interior design of living quarters shall be decided in relation to the fire risk, and shall prevent fire from spreading. Windows should not be installed in H-rated fire divisions. 11.5 Active Fire Protection For large integrated installations shall be based on 2 independent pump systems. Each pump system should have the capacity to supply 100% of the largest fire water demand. It is recommended that each pump system consists of 2x50% pump units, unless other solutions are found to comply with the over all Fire Protection Philosophy based on thorough evaluation, including pump standard, favourable effects, compensating measures, alternative fire water supply. Ref. clause 11.2 Fire pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall not be selected without special reason.
11.6
Explosion Protection Philosophy Reference is given to ISO/WD 13702 Standard Clause 13.
12.
12.1
SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING INSTALLATIONS

General This clause contains additional safety design principles related to Floating production/ drilling/storage installations. Installations intended for short term drilling and general service are not covered by this standard.
12.2
Marine industry standard This standard assumes that structure, marine systems and marine equipment on floating installations do comply with relevant requirements in the marine industry, i.e. international codes and conventions, authority requirements and class society rules.
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12.3
Crude Storage Crude storage tanks, and in particular large tanks, shall be subject to special safety considerations in light of their fire- and explosion potential. Main principles for such tanks are described below: Large crude storage tanks shall be provided with an adequate and safe vent system, and gases shall be routed to either cold vent, flare or re-cycling system. Pumping units shall be of the 'deep well' type.
12.4
Layout The following additional requirements shall apply concerning the layout of floating installations: Vital control functions, e.g. maritime control/bridge, process control and special emergency preparedness functions, should be arranged in one common control centre for the entire installation. Turret location/arrangement shall be based on evaluations including leak frequencies and potential leak quantities. Hydrocarbon pressure vessels and heary duty equipment shall not be located within main hull structure unless it is verified that: the explosion venting is sufficient to prevent unacceptable overpressure. the fire loads do not cause structural collapse. Process decks and relevant parts of the floater deck shall be arranged with the aim of minimising the risk of large pool fires on decks and tank tops. Process areas, turret areas and piping shall be designed to minimise the risk of jet fires towards tank tops.
12.5
Turret The following design principles applies to turret design: 1. The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas and minimising explosion pressure. Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas shall be restricted to containers or small rooms with control- and special equipment that requires special protection or cannot be located in outdoor environment. Such enclosed premises shall have overpressure ventilation, with air taken from a nonhazardous area. Location of the premises themselves as well as their ventilation intakes shall take into account the prevailing wind directions. Equipment that can be ignition sources, e.g. electric equipment shall not be arranged in moon pool area. 2. Anchor handling winches should be located in open areas. If located in hazardous area, suitability for operation in hazardous area shall be ensured. Sea water spraying (deluge) for spark suppression may be applied for equipment that are exposed to sea
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water under normal operations. For spraying of other equipment, fresh water shall be applied. Where winches are arranged on the deck below Riser Termination and ESD valves, the deck separating the areas shall be solid and gas tight. 3. The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer, within the turret and between turret and ship, should be minimised. Turrets based on swivels are preferred in stead of drag chain turrets. Fire protection of turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located on the ship, e.g. on gantry structure. Portable equipment and fixed systems for enclosed rooms shall be arranged according to Clause 11. Production or export/ gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret by passive means. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design principle. At riser termination end, the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be protected by passive means. For protection of other parts of the structure, please refer to other relevant parts of this standard. Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring. Arrangements that provides both protection against such loads as well as fire protection are preferred. Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate drain routed to a collection tank.
4.
5.
6.
7.
12.6
Drainage Drainage systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all sea states in which the installation is intended to be operable. Drainage systems for the process systems shall be designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the process system is intended to be operable.
12.7
Emergency re-positioning The need for quick re-positioning of the floater in case of specific emergency situations shall be evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser pressures, subsea ESDV and mooring arrangement. Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able to move 150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes, or as specified through adequate risk analyses.
12.8
Topside/floater interface All interfaces between the typical maritime 'floater technology' and offshore 'petroleum technology' shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process, and be monitored during the project to ensure compatibility and consistency in the total design.
Technical Safety
12.9
Escape and evacuation For floating installations it shall be verified that effective escape and/or evacuation can be performed at dimensioning heel angles and motions
13.
13.1
NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS

General This section outline the design principles to the design of process, safety and auxiliary systems for production installation which are normally not manned. The design principles only apply to installations which are designed as remote-controlled units with no requirement for permanent manning. The personnel will usually only be present during daytime. It is recognised that a large variety of designs can be developed. Specific design. requirements will have to reflect the special conditions. Examples of design is given in ANNEX B.
13.2 13.2.1
Common requirements Risk evaluations Risk evaluations shall take into consideration drilling and process data weather conditions, ship traffic or the environmental acceptance criteria.
13.2.2
Design principles Simple, reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimizing maintenance activities on the installation shall be emphasised. The following special activities related to manned operations onboard shall be evaluated during design: weather conditions for boarding and departing of the installation allowable weather and sea state conditions and weather monitored while the installation is manned arrangement for boarding and departing of the installation activities that may take place during production or need a shut-down of the installation
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13.2.3
Supporting structure The minimum requirements to the design concerning resistance to impact from collisions with ships, shall be based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation shall take into consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the installation, boarding procedures (boarding zone, weather restrictions, loading requirements, call frequency, anchoring philosophy etc.) and the layout and arrangement of the installation.
13.3 13.3.1
Welhead system Welhead system The wellhead system includes the wells, the X-mas trees and the flowlines up-stream to and including choke valves. The wellhead system shall be designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature occurring during operation, shut-down and maintenance of the wells. In addition to local operation, wing control valves may be controlled from the remote control center, allowing remote shut-down and restart of the production. Blocking of remote start-up of production shall be possible while the installation is manned.
13.3.2
Piping systems and pressure vessels While allowing for safe operation, piping systems and pressure vessels shall be designed to minimize the instrumentation and control equipment. Piping systems designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature to which the systems are expected to be exposed, need not be provided with full flow pressure relief valves. If the total inventory cubic content of process pipes and pressure vessels between X-mas tree and the riser emergency shut-down valve does not exceed 6 m3 , automatic depressurization is not required. In that case, personnel safety shall be ensured by proper evacuation procedures in case of fire. The need for thermal relief of piping systems and pressure vessels as well as the need for an automatic depressurisation system for systems with an inventory of more than 6 m3 shall be considered in the individual design.
13.3.3
Drain and vent systems Drain for liquid hydrocarbons either to supply boat or to a drain tank shall be installed. Manual depressurisation of all pressurised systems shall be possible.
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Vent pipes from systems containing hydrocarbons shall be terminated at a minimum of 3 m above or outside decks. The location of vent pipe termination shall take into account helicopter operations. Vents on atmospheric vessels which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside explosion pressure shall be provided with adequate flame arrestors. 13.3.4 Risers Production and lift gas risers shall normally be equipped with a riser emergency shut-down valve. On risers for stable fluids which may be depressurised from the main installation, omission of riser emergency shut-down valves may be considered. 13.4 Auxiliary systems Engines shall be certified for operation in hazadous areas. 13.5 Escape routes Muster areas and the primary escape routes shall have radiation shielding from fire in the wellhead and process areas in order to allow evacuation of the installation. 13.6 Life-saving appliances When the installation is manned, life-saving appliances with a capacity of 2 x 100% of the crew on board shall be available. Life-saving appliances may be lifeboat(s), liferaft(s) to be lowered into the water or motor-driven rubber dinghies operated from standby vessel. 13.7 Emergency shut-down Provisions shall be made for emergency shut-down and operational shut-down of the installation to be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre. The emergency shut-down signal from the remote control centre shall be by a fail-safe signal (e.g. by means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not manned installation. A possible time delay in shut-down due to a link failure shall not exceed 5 min. Emergency shut-down of the remote control centre or plant shall result in operational shutdown of the not normally manned installation. It shall not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shut-down system from the remote control centre. The emergency shut-down system shall be in operation when the installation is unmanned.
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ANNEX A FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET (Informative)
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Insert excel datasheet here.
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ANNEX B TYPE A OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS (Informative)
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ANNEX B1 TYPE A OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS General This paragraph defines the design principles to safety systems on type A installations. Example of Type A installation Type A, which includes installations that are manned only during daylight and under weather conditions that allow safe access and escape by boat. The requirements to this type of installations are based on the assumption that the installation will be manned only occasionally. A type A installation will typically be arranged with means for access, an access deck for the X-mas trees and a helicopter winch deck, primarly intended for materials handling. The process equipment will typically include X-mas trees, production manifold and a removable spool for pigging. The safety equipment will typically include an inflateable liferaft, fire detectors, portable gas detectors as well as portable fire extinguishers. The main power source may be a battery pack with recharging and by a small dieselgenerator or by a power cable from the service installation. A hoist may be installed. When manned, shut-down of the installation shall be made on the installation. The installation will be manned in connection with scheduled maintenance jobs, well monitoring and start up of production following an emergency shut-down. Access to the installation will typically be by boat. Fire and Gas Detection Fire detection shall take place by means of fusible plugs or similar simple systems and shall results in automatic shut-down. Gas detectors with alarm functions shall be in operation when the installation is manned. If portable detectors with built-in alarm functions are used, these shall be placed in fixtures on approved locations by the crew when ascending the installation.
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Alarm systems Upon gas detection an audible alarm shall be activated. This alarm may be provided by portable gas detectors themselves. When the installation is manned, an APS signal shall be operable, which can be perceived by all on board. Communication equipment An emergency shut-down link between the remote control center and the not normally manned installation shall be established. Voice communication between the installation and the remote control center and directly between the installation and standby vessel shall be possible when the installation is manned. If voice communication is based on protable radios, a minimum of two radios shall be available on the satellite installation. Active and passive fire protection Primary protection of personell in case of fire, shall be effective evacuation. As a minimum, the fire fighting equipment shall consist of portable carbon dioxide and powder extinguishers. Escape routes A primary escape route to the boat landing via stairs shall be established. However, ladders can be accepted, if warranted by special circumstances. A secondary escape route to the boat landing shall be established if it can be provided at a distance form the primary escape route that effectively make a contribution to the evacuation options in an emergency situation. Life-saving appliances The installation shall be provided with at least one inflatable liferaft to be lowered into the sea and which hold the maximum crew of the installation. During manning of the installation a motor-driven rubber dinghy shall be available for evacuation of the installation crew. The dinghy shall be in the immediate vicinity of the installation in order that mobilisation of the dinghy will not increase the total time of evacuation. The rubber dinghy shall be able to hold the entire crew on board the installation at any time.
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Shelter The installation shall have a place at which the crew can take shelter from the rain. A lavatory shall be available. Helicopter hoisting deck A deck allowing emergency evacuation of personnel to hovering helicopter shall be arranged. Standby vessel A standby vessel shall be available near the installations when it is manned. The vessel shall be equipped with two motor-driven rubber dinghies and with a firewater monitor with a minimum capacity of 2500 m3/h with throw length of approximately 50 meter.
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ANNEX B2 TYPE B OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS (Informative)
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ANNEX B2 TYPE B OF NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS General This section defines the safety system requirements to type B installations. Example Type B Helicopter deck. The helicopter deck shall as a minimum be equiped with a dual agent extinguizing system based on 250 kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foram. Type B, which includes installations with helideck and which will be manned only under weather conditions that allow safe access to the installations by helicopter and evacuation of the installations by lifeboats. Type B installation will typically be designed with a wellhead area and manifolds in the wellhead side of the installation and a utility/shealter area to the opposite side. This area will normally function as a barriere and protect the lifeboat area. The installation will typically be equiped with X-mas trees, a production manifold, a test manifold, a test separator and a pig launcher. The installation will also have sheltered area with resting facilities. The control system may consist of a hydraulic wellhead control package and an integrated system with emergency shut-down functions, fire and gas detection as a well as control and monitoring of the process. The main power source may be diesel generators. The auxiliary systems may further consist of a methanol system, a closed drain system, a utility drain system and a seawater pump. Communication may be by a telemetry, via a line of sight system ( a radio link) and/or by stationary radios. The safety equipment may include a lifeboat, a liferaft, dry powder fire extinguishing appliances, portable fire extinguishers and gas and fire detection. The installasion will be manned in conection with scheduled maintenance jobs, well monitoring, switching wells on test, as well as start-up following emergency shut-down. Access to the installation will normally be by helicopter.
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Fire and gas detection Fire detection shall take place by means of fusible plugs or similare in the wellhead and process manifold areas and by means of a automatic fire detection system for rooms with flammable equipment or materials and resting rooms. Gas detection system shall also be provided. Alarm systems Fire alarm shall be automatically when the installation manned. A manually activated audible APS alarm shall be provided. Emergency shutdown stations Push buttons to activate the emergency shut-down shall be placed at lifeboat station, helideck, top of access ways to boat landing in resting area and in the welhead area. Emergency Power A emergency power supply shall be provided with a capasity of minimum four hours. Helicopter Deck The helicopter deck shall as a minimum be equipped with a dual agent extinguisher system based on 250 kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foam.
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ANNEX C INFORMATIVE REFERENCES (Informative)
Technical Safety
ANNEX C INFORMATIVE REFERENCES Norwegian Regulations Regulations relating to implementation and use of risk analyses in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Ministry of the Environment. Regulations relating to process and auxiliary facilities in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations relating to safety and communication systems on installations in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations relating to drilling and well activities and geological data collection in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations relating to helicopterdecks on drilling platforms. (Bestemmelser for sivil luftfard GSL D5-1.) Regulations relating to emergency preparedness in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Directorate of Health, the Ministry of the Environment and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations for fixed means of access, stains, ladders and railings on production installations stipulated by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations concerning explosion and fire protection of installations in the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulations concerning loadbearing structures in petroleum activities by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Regulation issued by Norwegian Maritime Directorate.
This NORSOK standard is considered to be in accordance with Norwegian regulations with the following exeptions: Clause 11.3 Credit for deluge Clause 11 Sprinkler in LQ Clause 13 Not normally manned installations.

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NORSOK STANDARD

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 1 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 2 of 53

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DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVATIONS

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 4 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 6 of 53

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EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas. Selection of equipment.

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 9 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 10 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 11 of 53

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SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 13 of 53

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SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 14 of 53

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 17 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 18 of 53

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REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 19 of 53

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________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 20 of 53

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Drill control cabin/office

X X (detector in drilling area)

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 21 of 53

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

Drill control cabin/office

X X X X X X X Detector in drilling area

________________________________________________________________________________ NORSOK Standard 22 of 53

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

Automatic Gas detection Area Area Area, leak detection

Shutdown Action ESD II ESD II ESD II

Comments * Not normally manned installations

Area Area HVAC intake HVAC extract

Sack/Bulk Heat Storage Room Mud Lab Smoke

Assumes no piped connection to mud system

Cementing Unit Room

S-DP-001 Rev. 1, December 1994

Turbine Switch board and electrical room

Battery room (lead acid)