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Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, Bk 1, Chapter 1, (Cahn p.293).

. What does Rousseau mean by this statement?

We must consider what state all men are naturally ina state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.1 The notion of an original natural state of freedom is ancient and recurrent both in the Christian and the non-Christian traditions. Its politicisation and emergence as a social concept happens only in modern times with the Enlightenment. The religious idea of an age of innocence antedating the fall and consequent slavery of mankind is replaced by the historical idea of a natural state antedating the rise of society a pre-social age of humanity. The question of human freedom is no longer theological or anthropological, but purely social. Certain philosophers, Hobbes and Locke in particular, draw a sharp distinction between what men are by nature and what society does to them. This is true of Rousseau, who in the opening sentence of the first Book of his Social Contract famously writes: Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. To understand what Rousseau means by this statement we must analyse his notion of natural freedom, and examine how it differs from the social liberties one normally enjoys. We must also investigate what kind of chains could possibly hold man everywhere, and whether these are necessarily evil or could be legitimate2. Discussing Rousseaus dialectic of natural freedom versus social alienation, it may be argued that the very chains of a just society are instrumental to attain human freedom, or at least the natural conditions to a good, and indeed to any, human life.

What freedom? If man is born free then innate freedom belongs to man by nature. We must define Rousseaus idea of the state of nature in order to understand what man is born
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John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.247 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.49: Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chainsHow did this transformation come about? I do not know. How can it be made legitimate? That question I believe I can answer.

free means. Under layers of supernatural gifts and artificial faculties, Rousseau thought that man could be considered just as he must have come from the hands of nature3: Wandering up and down the forests, without industry, without speech, and without home, an equal stranger to war and to all ties, neither standing in need of his fellow-creatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps even not distinguishing one from another.4 The naturally free man portrayed by Rousseau is hardly recognisable, since he is stripped of purpose, work, language, property and family, and universally indifferent to his kind. His only concern is to satisfy his own hunger and other appetites5, and to resume his aimless wandering. Even family ties dissolve when the individual is capable of self-preservation6. Rousseaus natural man is completely free because he is fundamentally asocial. He is also naturally good though he is the only possible recipient of his own goodness. Unlike Hobbes natural man, he is not warring with his neighbours.7 Could that natural freedom find a parallel in the definition of Aristotle and Aquinas? A slave differs from a free man in that the latter exists for his own sake, as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics8. After all for Aquinas, all human beings are both free and equal by nature, and to be free is to be unlike a slave an end in oneself.9 Rousseaus natural man is in and to himself the only possible end, since he consistently avoids all others. He is supremely free. Freedom as independence

There is, however, a fundamental difference between freedom according to Rousseau and freedom according to Aristotle and the Christian tradition. Rousseau indeed considers true freedom incompatible with Christianity: Christianity preaches only servitude and submissionTrue Christians are made to be slaves10

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy p. 278 4 ibid. p. 283 5 ibid. p. 285 6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.50-51 7 Rodger Charles, Christian Social Witness and Teaching, vol. 1, p.287 8 Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, p.4 9 John Finnis, Aquinas, p.170 10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.184

Rousseau and Hobbes agree in defining liberty as the absence of external impediment11, understanding natural freedom as total independence from any ties or bonds. The bonds of servitude are formed merely by the mutual dependence of men on one another12. The confusion between servitude and dependence entails the equation of freedom and independence. This definition of freedom as absolute lack of constraint rules out even beneficial ties, since they are perceived as limiting and constraining natural independence. The equation of freedom with independence finds its ultimate development with Nietzsche, who considers every other person a danger13 since one becomes dependent through love. Even the most natural dependence of the child towards his mother is already servitude. Without reaching such extremes, modern liberalism is built on the individualistic idea of freedom as independence, of free human beings as unencumbered selves and sovereign wills, subject to no order of obligations not of their own creation14. Man therefore is in the state of nature pure freedom -, as long as he remains independent of everything property, and everyone - society. By exalting individual solitude and selfsufficiency, Rousseau set himself apart from his fellow moderns, anticipating the hyperindividualism of a much later ageour own.15 Freedom as unbridled affirmation of self-interest implies solitude. Yet, it is surely paradoxical to represent the man of perfect happiness as a solitary16. In the Christian tradition, human freedom is considered a gift ordained to an end that of making right choices, using the light of reason. Freedom is not pure independence without any form of co-responsibility, but the ability to choose knowingly and willingly what is good, for self and for others. When it becomes an end in itself, and is made absolute in an individualistic way; it is emptied of its original content, and its very meaning and dignity are contradicted17. The logic of freedom as absolute leads to the

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Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.226 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.284 13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, READER p.77-78 14 Kenneth Grasso, Beyond Liberalism, in Kenneth Grasso, Gerard Bradley and Robert Hunt (eds.), Catholicism, Liberalism and Communitarianism, p.45 15 Mary Ann Glendon, Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason, in First Things, October 1999, p.42-47 16 Aristotle, Ethics, p.280 17 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 19

existential enjoyment of independence without purpose or meaning, which death renders eventually absurd18.

Natural freedom and conventional freedom Rousseau argues further that it was iron and corn which first civilised men, and ruined humanity.19 Man is born free, yet since he cannot live without the ties of society, he is everywhere is chains. In so saying, Rousseau abstracts natural man from social man20 and natural freedom from social liberty. Natural freedom disappeared completely the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another21. Rousseau however recognises the need for another kind of freedom, preserved through the social contract, which is devised through artificial convention: The social order is a sacred right which serves as a basis for all others. Yet this right does not come from nature; it is therefore based on conventions.22 While we cannot preserve or reclaim our original, natural freedom, since the primitive condition can no longer subsist23; it is still possible to enjoy a sort of social freedom available through human conventions. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to anything which tempts him and which he is able to attain; what he gains is his civil liberty and the ownership of all that he possesses.24 These two kinds of freedom are clearly incompatible. Their causes and ends are fundamentally different. One is innate, the other devised by human convention. One allows full and complete independence, the other allows men to live together in relative dependence. One is potentially unlimited, the other actually limited by laws and regulations. Rousseau has in mind natural freedom when writing man is born free, aware that none can exercise it. Human life has essentially been denatured and transformed through the artefact of society25.
Albert Camus, The myth of Sysiphus, p.50: In truth, he acts as if he [man] were free, even if all the facts make a point of contradicting that liberty. 19 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.289 20 Robert Wokler, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: moral decadence and the pursuit of liberty, in Brian Redhead (ed.) Political thought from Plato to Nato, p.126 21 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.288 22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.293 23 ibid. p.295 24 ibid. p.298 25 Robert Wokler, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: moral decadence and the pursuit of liberty, in Brian Redhead (ed.) Political thought from Plato to Nato, p.122
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Rousseaus position could be seen as relevant in contemporary life, since human governments sometimes take on themselves to provide or protect a long list of positive and negative freedoms, covering all aspects of human life. If we enjoyed pure freedom, there would be no need for them to define and delimit the breadth and width of our independence. Therefore, what is conventionally enjoyed within societys boundaries is not natural, innate freedom. The transition from this primitive state into civil society represented a "loss of real felicity," in Rousseaus view, rather than an unambiguous step forward.26 Nowhere can man be free; nowhere can he taste the original happiness of his forestry wanderings: everywhere he finds himself in society, in chains.

The chains of society

As Rousseau makes evident, Society and law irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery, and wretchedness.27 Society and law are the presented as real chains of slavery, embodying, justifying and securing the unjust economic dependence the rich impose on the poor. Profit and affluence are the origin of many of the ills and torments of civilisation28. Society itself is the unfortunate consequence - and not the cause - of an unnatural desire for private property, as is made explicit in one of Rousseaus most quoted passages: the first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying this is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of society. Private property is at the origin of inequality, and inequality is the source of all other types of alienation, the primary cause ofcorruption, duplicity and tyranny29. With private property, protections are needed, and forms of servitude multiply. Now the chains of civil society become necessary, even inevitable. These oppress free men as soon as they are born. Hence Rousseaus assertion that

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Mary Ann Glendon, Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason, in First Things, October 1999, p.42-47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.292 28 Robert Nisbet, The Twilight of Authority, p.83 29 Robert Nisbet, The Twilight of Authority, p.189-190

It was civil society, not nature, that gave rise to a state of affairs that was always in danger of degenerating into war. Civil society begat governments and laws, inequality, resentment, and other woes.30 Any kind of relations kinship, personal, institutional, economic -, precisely because they are social, deprive man of his original freedom. They embody hierarchical dependences which are impossible to escape. Society is an unnatural state of inequality.

Evil chains?

Accordingly, the chains imposed on all by society must be evil if men are considered to be fundamentally independent, living alongside each other without any meaningful commonality. This theory encourages the rankest individualism31, which finds expression in political and economic liberalism and prompts Rousseau to add: I would like to know which is the more likely to become insupportable to those who take part in it: the life of society or the life of nature.32 Governments should render the inevitable chains of society as light as possible, a view echoed by John Rawls, a modern exponent of liberalism, which tends to circumscribe individual liberties in the least possible way33. Admittedly, social chains can appear evil, allowing the wealthy and powerful to subdue the weak and poor into slavery. This is a fitting portrayal of the Ancien Regime, whose structural abuses and injustices Rousseau implicitly denounces. One author affirms that in unveiling the corruption and alienation brought about by wealth and technical progress, Rousseaus reservations about the Industrial Revolution find parallels in Evangelium Vitaes concern over the effects of the technological revolution.34 Rousseau may be right, if we consider the scale of injustices accompanying globalisation35, and the new feudalism in the kind of economic pluralism36 imposed by multinational corporations.

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Mary Ann Glendon, Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason, in First Things, October 1999, p.42-47 Rodger Charles, Christian Social Witness and Teaching, vol.1, p.285 32 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.279 33 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.484 34 Julie Clague, The Gospel of Life, in Paul Vallely, (ed.) The New Politics, p.123 35 cf. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents 36 Robert Nisbet, Twilight of Authority, p.9

The idea of society as evil is widespread. Rousseau is not alone in holding it. Reinhold Niebhur saw men in society as victims of the individuals, classes and nations by whose force a momentary coerced unity is achieved37, while Durkheim declared that increase in unhappiness, boredom, and alienation was a demonstrable part of the progress of civilization.38 Yet social alienation is usually understood to be accidental though inevitable , due to mens disordered behaviour and desires; whereas Rousseau considers society to be essentially alienating: everywhere is man in chains.

Saving chains?

Paradoxically, the social liberalism of independent, self-governing freedom cannot quite claim the paternity of Rousseau. If society is naturally alienating, liberalism can only accentuate that tendency. If the weak and poor suffer under servitude, is it not because the greedy and powerful are free to impose their claims? The only remedy is to legitimise the chains of society39 through the social contract, wherein people freely surrender their will and possessions to the General Will. Indeed, the clauses of the social contract rightly understood, are all reducible to one only, namely, the total alienation of each associate, with all his rights, to the whole community.40 Within the social contracts total alienation, Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains can be a good thing. The contract alienates all men equally into servitude. Moreover, the cause of inequality disappears by abolishing private property. Unnatural, though just, social chains are better than precarious, though natural, independence41. Rousseaus theory turns into a recipe for democratic totalitarianism42. The extreme equalitarian measure prescribed in his theory made, unsurprisingly, a deep impression on the young Karl Marx.43
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Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p.19 quoted in Robert Nisbet, Twilight of Authority, p.83 39 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.49: Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chainsHow did this transformation come about? I do not know. How can it be made legitimate? That question I believe I can answer. 40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.296 41 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.302 42 Rodger Charles, Christian Social Witness and Teaching, vol.1, p.286 43 Mary Ann Glendon, Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason, in First Things, October 1999, p.42-47

Radicalism - rather than liberalism - now originates in Rousseau and his worship of equality44. In order to secure universal freedom from social oppression, Rousseau requires the establishment of an absolute and pervading system of political power that would be rooted in the people45. The omnipotent State has a certain affinity with the dictatorship, but its historical roots are to be found inRousseaus Contrat Social, in his principle of alienation totale46 Liberalism (more freedom, more alienation) and radicalism (less freedom, less alienation) implicitly recognise that society is by definition alienating47. Both understand freedom essentially as the use of independence without responsibility. Both can claim the influence of Rousseau. Society is inevitable, yes. But is it necessarily alienating? Is not society the natural means for men to live in true freedom?

Chains making life possible

Man is always alone, and yet men are always with each other. The individuality and commonality of the human person, an inevitable antinomy, is given by Rousseau a moral connotation which perverts it. This moral ingredient is particularly striking in man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. The social aspect of human life is in itself neither alienating nor liberating. It is a natural component without which human life would be impossible48. Rousseaus perfectly free good savage cannot be human: The man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the city, and must be therefore either a beast or a god.49 Defining freedom as total independence requires that man be a naturally solitary animal, in complete opposition to the traditional view that man is a political or social

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Robert Nisbet, The Twilight of authority, p.42 ibid. p.190 46 Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p.126 47 Even though a mystic of true freedom through the State can be put forward in the most totalitarian setting: there the state can become the actualisation of freedom. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, READER p.55 48 Catholic Encyclopaedia, READER p.61 49 Aristotle, Politics, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.135

animal. Consequently and consistently, Rousseau must strip man of language, family, property and work50. Yet no human life is possible without them. These are not accidental consequences of unfortunate and unnatural necessities, but essential characteristics of the human nature. Aristotle argued that we all consider the perfect good to be self-sufficient, one which by itself makes life desirable and in no way deficient; and we believe that happiness is such a thing. This is what Rousseau did: to be perfectly happy, man must be perfectly self-sufficient, therefore perfectly free. Yet, unlike Rousseau, Aristotle understood that By self-sufficient we mean not what is sufficient for oneself alone living a solitary life, but something that includes parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in general; for man is by nature a social being51 The proper good of an act cannot be contrary to its nature. The proper good of man cannot be contrary to the social nature of man. The family is the first requirement to any human life, the first natural form of association52 antecedent to, and more necessary than, political society: Human beings are by nature more conjugal than political.53 And the state is an association of families, not of discrete individuals.54 Man comes to life and lives only within a community, not out of unnatural choice, but out of natural necessity. Language is an expression of this natural social condition, which goes far beyond the mere exchange of biological necessities. In fact, community life is a characteristic that distinguishes man from the rest of earthly creatures.55 More recently, the Vatican Council has reminded us that life in society is not something accessory to man 56. Not only the family and the wider community, but also property is natural and even indispensable for human life. Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum, claimed that every man

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p. 285 51 Aristotle, Ethics, p.74 52 Aristotle, Politics, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.134 53 John Finnis, Aquinas, p.243 54 Robert Nisbet, The Twilight of authority, p.72 55 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 149 56 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, 25 quoted in Kenneth Grasso, Beyond Liberalism, in Kenneth Grasso, Gerard Bradley and Robert Hunt (eds.), Catholicism, Liberalism and Communitarianism, p.34

has by nature the right to possess property as his own57. This claim undermines the whole social program of Rousseau. If the family and the wider community, if property itself, which Rousseau considers the source of all evils, are natural characteristics of human life, then Rousseau is greatly mistaken in his first analysis of nature and end of the human person. Rousseaus political thesis might be fair in its critics of inequality and injustices, yet it is ultimately flawed, because it relies on premises which are not social or political, but anthropological and moral: on a distorted and incoherent understanding of human nature.

Chains making life good

Life in society is not only natural, but fundamentally good. As Aquinas reminds us, each law58, each association, is ordained and oriented towards the common good, towards making human life better. Any harm suffered or brought about as a consequence of life in society points to the absence of a social good, rather than to an intrinsic evil. Social sinfulness and social structures of sin59 are expressions of human sinfulness; the fact that they exist does not mean human society is bad or alienating in itself. Indeed the only real alienation is brought about by sin60. Adam Smith observes that the economic interdependence between thousands of people allows entire civilised countries to be provided for. Life, family, property, labour, trade, education, healthcare, community and cultural life, religion, leisure, are fundamental human goods which can only be enjoyed in and thanks to society. Life in society is instrumental to securing human goods which are basic. Isolated from society, we cannot live reasonably and well61. Consequently, a society which is faithful to its nature and purpose cannot be alienating, because its natural purpose is to strive for the good of its members: the good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually62

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Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 5 in David O Brien and Thomas Shannon (eds.), Catholic Social Thought, p.16 58 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 90: of the essence of the law. Art. 2: the law is always oriented towards the common good. 59 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 12 60 St Augustine, The City of God, READER p.20 61 John Finnis, Aquinas, p.247 62 Aristotle, Politics, in Steven Cahn (ed.), Political Philosophy, p.145

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Society will be alienating only if it deviates from the end consistent with its proper nature: Of its very nature, the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them.63 While all should act responsibly according to the virtue of solidarity, which is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good64, the common good can only be defined in reference to the human person65. Life in society, therefore, cannot be pursued as an absolute good in itself, but only insofar as it promotes, protects and sustains the good of the human person. Consequently, far from being detrimental, the chains of society are instrumental to the good of the human person. In that light, governments classically and popularly considered the source of many evils and obstructions - are good, when they are legitimate and strive towards the common good, as their nature requires. If, therefore, it is natural for man to live in fellowship with many others, it is necessary for there to be some means whereby such a community of men may be ruled, for one or many must have responsibility for the good of the community as a whole66 Aquinas even argued that to be ruled by one man was not contrary to the dignity of the state of innocence67. A statement Rousseau would have strongly rejected

Chains making life free

If freedom is a human good, and if society is instrumental to human good, then society must be instrumental to human freedom. It is true theologically, for the freedom of the children of God is enjoyed only within and thanks to the society of the Church the City of God -, in perfect obedience to her Head, Jesus Christ. Philosophically, it is recognised that society does indeed limit freedom. Human choices are circumscribed, given particular social contexts and the people with whom or under whose authority we live. Yet society is the first condition and only setting for human freedom to be exercised. There is no sustainable life without society; hence there
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Francis Canavan, The Image of Man in Catholic thought, in Kenneth Grasso, Gerard Bradley and Robert Hunt (eds.), Catholicism, Liberalism and Communitarianism, p.24, quoting Quadragesimo Anno 64 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, READER p.89 65 Catechism of the Catholic Church, READER p.90 66 Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, p.7 67 ibid, p.3

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can be no human freedom without society. The life within which freedom is situated represents for it, at one and the same time, both a limitation and a possibility68. Unlimited freedom, like Rousseaus state of nature, is a utopian mental construction that never was and never can be realised. As humans, we exist only in communities. This fact fundamentally conditions the scope of our effective freedom and the likelihood that we can realize the completeness of our humanity.69 It is society that also provides the tools with which the individual may exercise and widen the scope of his freedom far beyond that of the solitary savage. Family, culture, education, justice, care, friendship, work, security and peace: all these goods necessitate interdependence in order to be enjoyed. Yet they render life more free in making it better. Knowing three different languages widens the scope of freedom. Yet language can be considered alienating: certain words and certain rules must be used. But there is more freedom in using and therefore obeying three languages than one, or none at all. Freedom must be ordered to the good to be rightly exercised, but also in order to grow and be enjoyed fully. Human freedom must also unfailingly submit to the truth: knowing what is good precedes and conditions doing what is good. Because [man] is free, he shapes his life and destiny by his own selfdetermining choices. But because he is intelligent, he is obliged to shape them in obedience to the truth70 Freedom not only endows rights, but also implies responsibilities. Knowing what is right imposes a moral responsibility to act, precisely and only when the person possesses freedom to act. Moreover, human freedom and responsibility always have a social dimension, since they are exercised in relationships between human beings71. This is why the principle of subsidiarity, pre-eminent in Catholic teaching, is vital for life in society72.

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Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 138 Thomas Kohler, Quadragesimo Anno, in George Weigel and Robert Royal (eds.), Building the Free Society, p.41 70 Francis Canavan, The Image of Man in Catholic thought, in Kenneth Grasso, Gerard Bradley and Robert Hunt (eds.), Catholicism, Liberalism and Communitarianism, p.26 71 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 199, quoting the Catechism of the Catholic Church 72 Thomas Kohler, Quadragesimo Anno, in George Weigel and Robert Royal (eds.), Building the Free Society, p.36 The notion of subsidiarity is key in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno

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The fullness of freedom consists in the capacity to be in possession of oneself in view of the genuine good, within the context of the universal common good.73 The context of human freedom will always be social, and this is good. Interdependence rightly exercised does not make us weaker, but better and freer.

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Rousseaus intransigent notion of freedom and his vivid sense of human alienation resonate still in our days. His writingsbecame a reservoir of ideas and slogans from which individualists and communitarians, revolutionaries and conservatives, moralists and bohemians, constitutionalists and Marxists drew freely and selectively.74 Yet his dialectic is built on a false dichotomy, which cannot ultimately avoid a contradictory notion of the human person, naturally free from unnatural social dependence, yet unable to live without it.

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Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 200 Mary Ann Glendon, Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason, in First Things, October 1999, p.42-47

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THOMAS AQUINAS. Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 THOIMAS AQUINAS. Summa Theologiae, Texas: Christian Classics, 1981

ARISTOTLE. Ethics, London: Penguin, 1986

BRUNNER, Emil. Justice and the Social Order, London: Lutterworth Press, 1946

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GRASSO, Kenneth, BRADLEY, Gerard and HUNT, Robert (eds.) Catholicism, Liberalism and Communitarianism, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,1995 NIEBUHR, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1960

NISBET, Robert. Twilight of Authority, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000

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OBRIEN, David and SHANNON, Thomas (eds.) Catholic Social Thought, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2003

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WEIGEL, George and ROYAL, Robert (eds.) Building the Free Society, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993 GLENDON, Mary Ann. Rousseau and the Revolt against Reason. First Things, 10/1999, p. 42-47

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ST AUGUSTINE. The City of God, READER p.16

HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Philosophy of Right, READER p.53-55

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, READER p.77-78

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