l-l

History

and Economics
Richard

of, and Prospects for,

Seebass

Commercial

Supersonic Transport

John R. Woodhull Professor and Chair, Aerospace Engineering Sciences Campus Box 429 University of Colorado Boulder CO 80303-0429, USA

Introduction
Commercial transport at supersonic speeds has been a reality since 1976. Indeed, it has been a great technical success. The Concorde fleet has flown approximately 350,000 hours, most of them at supersonic speeds, and it has done so with high reliability. The twelve Concordes operating today have accumulated more supersonic fight hours than all of the worlds military aircraft [ll. These Concordes will be in service for many years to come

CZI.
Scheduled Concorde flights are principally London - New York, Paris - New York. Reports on the Concorde indicate that the dozen now in service are well, but not always fully, utilized [3,41. The Concorde has been a success for the two airlines that operate this small fleet. Does a second generation SST make sense? This paper reviews the past programs and provides the authors own conclusion regarding the prospects for commercial supersonic transport.

one goal being their admission to the European Common Market, then dominated by France. A simple, irrevocable, two page treaty between the United Kingdom and the French Republic, was signed on November 29, 1963 [6]. Shortly thereafter de Gaulle vetoed British membership in the Common Market. Later attempts by Britain to cancel their participation in the Concorde were rebuffed by President de Gaulle who correctly insisted they were bound by an irrevocable treaty [71. In a 17 March 1960 address to the Royal Aeronautical Society, M. B. Morgan, the Scientific Advisor to the Air Ministry, foretold much of what was to become a realty in the Concorde, missing only the problems the sonic boom would cause [8]. Just short of 12 years later, with the pre-production Concorde then flying, Sir Morgan, then Director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, in the 60th Wilbur and Orville Wright Memorial Lecture recounted the aerodynamic decisions that shaped this remarkable aircraft [9]. Commercial flight operations began in January, 1976, with British Airways (then BOAC) flying between London and Bahrain, and Air France operating between Paris and Rio de Janeiro [lo]. In a carefully considered decision, Secretary of Transportation Coleman, on February 4, 1976, permitted limited scheduled flights of the Concorde into the United States, initially for a trial period of 16 months [6]. Two flights per day for each carrier were to be allowed into Kennedy, and one flight per day for each carrier was to be allowed for Dulles. Because the FAA operated Dulles, there was no difficulty in obtaining permission to operate there, and commercial service began at Dulles on May 24, 1976. The New York Port Authority banned such flights in March 1976, but this ban was overturned in court and commercial operations began there on November 27,1977.

The Concorde
The Concorde derives from parallel studies in Britain and in France on supersonic transport, following the introduction of the turbojet powered Comet aircraft. The British had the first meeting of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) on November 5,1956. Some members had privately concluded that the US Douglas DC-8 and Boeing 707 would capture so much of the subsonic market for commercial aircraft that the best options available were to go above the speed of sound or to give up the market [5]. In March 1959 STAC urged the controller of aircraft in the Ministry of Supply to consider the development of a supersonic transport, estimating a market of 125-175 aircraft. The British then approached the French about a joint program, with
Copyright 0 1998 by the author. This article derives from an earlier version that appeared in New Concepts for High Speed Transport Design, H. Sobieczky ed., 1997.

Paper presented at the RTO AVT Course on Fluid Dynamics Research on Supersonic Aircraj?, held in Rhode-Saint-Genkse, Belgium, 25-29 May 1998, and published in RTO EN-4.

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Important national goals were achieved by the Concorde program for both Britain and France. Perhaps the most important was the development of a successful European community aircraft consortium. It is unknown, and not knowable, whether the joint British-French venture to develop the Concorde was the best or the only route to this end. It was achieved, however, and this must be attributed, at least in part, to the joint venture to develop the Concorde. The French also gained a considerable technological advance in their aircraft. Together, they proved the reliability and safety of public transport at supersonic speeds. The programs cost, through March 1976, was put at between 1.5 and 2.1 billion in 1976 pounds sterling, or between $3.6 and $5.1 billion in 1977 US dollars (yearly weighted exchange rates) [Ill. The round trip fares from Kennedy International Airport to Heathrow Airport on British Airways, or to Charles de Gaulle Airport on Air France, for the summer season, 1998, are $9,239 for London, and $9,401 for Paris. The corresponding subsonic fares for London are: first class, $8,676; business class, $5,344; and full coach,$2,664. And for Paris they are: $7,637; $5,331; and $2,013 respectively. Discount coach fares are $388 for London and $795 for Paris. The two airline average of Concorde fares has increased 32% in the last two years; the average discount coach fare has decreased by 17% from the average 1996 fare. This reflects, presumably, strong demand for the Concorde flights. We can assume that this fare is covering the direct operating cost of the Concorde, exclusive of the depreciation or amortization of the aircraft itself. At these fares the market for supersonic travel is clearly limited, but no doubt considerably larger than that served by current Concorde operations.

Air France and British Airways had ordered eight Concordes each. A few days later President Kennedy followed up his commencement address with a formal message to Congress in which he said, In no event will the government investment be permitted to exceed $750 million [7]. Development costs were then estimated to be approximately $1 billion. This program soon evolved into two competitive aircraft designs, one by Lockheed and the other by Boeing, and two competitive engine designs, one by General Electric and the other by Pratt & Whitney. Boeing and General Electric were the eventual winners of this competition with the Boeing 2707100, a swing wing, Mach 2.7, 300 passenger aircraft with a presumed range of 3500 nautical miles, weighing 750,000 pounds, an aircraft that was not then - and perhaps is not now - technically realizable. The swing wing provided both airport noise reductions and improved aerodynamic performance at lower speeds. The weight of the mechanism used to pivot the wings, however, resulted in unacceptably low range, or inadequate payload, or both. The Boeing design evolved to a fixed wing, titanium aircraft, not unlike that proposed by Lockheed. The governments investment, including interest, was to be repaid with the delivery of the 300th aircraft by royalties on aircraft sales. The US SST Program died in the Senate in May 1971, in part from concerns about noise in the airport environs, in part from concerns about its impact on the stratosphere, in part due to politics, and in part because its economic success seemed far from certain. Today, twenty-seven years later, these remain legitimate concerns.

Air Traffic The US SST

The US SST program began in June 1963 when President Kennedy, in a commencement speech at the Air Force Academy, said, As a testament to our strong faith in the future of air power.... I am announcing today that the United States will commit itself to an important, new program in civil aviation.... a plane that will move ahead at a speed faster than Mach 2, more than twice the speed of sound, to all corners of the globe. The day before this speech the president of Pan American World Airlines had made the announcement that Pan Am was taking options on six Concordes. Prior to that The current trends in air traffic are well known [131. Growth has been positive for most of the past twenty-five years. International travel is growing faster than developed countries domestic travel, leisure travel is growing faster than business travel, and Asia-Pacific traffic had, until recently, the largest regional growth rate. Air travel has become a commodity in the following sense: 40% of the travel is discount coach travel; the remaining 60% of the travel is comprised of 20% full fare coach, 30% business class and 10% first class. One would be wrong to conclude, however, that fullfare passengers comprise 60% of travel. Due to

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frequent flyer upgrades and business and other traveller discounts, only 30% of the passengers on international routes pay full fare. In 1968 nearly eight million international passengers arrived at or departed from Kennedy International Airport with 97 thousand arrivals and departures. In 1982 over eleven million passengers arrived at or departed from Kennedy. The introduction of wide-body aircraft allowed this travel to be accommodated with under 55 thousand arrivals and departures. In 1993 fifteen million international passengers used Kennedy, requiring 92 thousand arrivals and departures. Once again aircraft arrivals and departures there are close to the airports capacity. Expected growth in air traffic cannot be accommodated for long with the worlds current airports and aircraft. In developed countries there are few airports that can be added. Thus, it is presumed that some of the increased traffic will be accommodated by larger aircraft. One SST configuration, a wing with passengers inside, flying obliquely, must be large and responds to both the SST and the large aircraft market.

range, and estimated perhaps a 50% increase in this market derived from its stimulation by the travel time saved [17]. The distinguished airline economist R. E. G. Davies, on the other hand, found it to be between 9 and 36 aircraft, depending on how optimistic one is [181. The enormous differences among these studies stems from what one projects for the fare required to cover the aircrafts total operating costs. It takes a long time to sell one thousand aircrafi. The first Boeing 747 began commercial flights in 1970; twenty-four years later one thousand 747s had been delivered. The challenge is to design, build, certify and operate an SST at marginally increased fares while providing the airlines a return on investment comparable to a similar investment in subsonic aircraft. The marginal increase in fares, however, depends upon many factors, including fuel prices. Marginally increased fares - what does that mean? Assume such transport effectively saves the traveler some fraction of a day, or at most, a whole day. Whatever that travelers expenses would be for that day, or, correspondingly, whatever their income might be for that day, provides a reliable guide as to what they would be willing to pay to save a fraction of a day of business travel, or have as extra time for their vacation. This intuitive judgment agrees with studies which predict little falloff in ticket sales for a 10% surcharge [ 16,171. As noted earlier, non-discount passengers comprise 30% of the international market. To secure a significant fraction of this market, most argue; an SST will need to provide three-class service. Current Boeing studies reflect this, and show an SST with about 9% of the passengers in first class, 19% in business class, and 72% in economy. Can an SST succeed if it fills empty seats with discount coach passengers? Can it succeed if it does not? The Concorde provides only one class of service. The flight I was on in May 1998 from New York to London was 80% full; the earlier flight that day was sold out. Technology has progressed steadily since the Concorde was conceived. But the Concorde was decades ahead of its time and today, nearly 40 years later, we cannot do significantly better than the Concorde PI. Reduced energy efficiency, the sonic bang, engine emissions, and airport noise remain deterrents to the economic success and acceptability of an SST. Let me now turn to the environmental barriers facing a future SST.

Market
Within a few months of the first flight of the Soviet Unions TU-144 and the French and the British Concorde prototypes (December 31,1968; March 2, and April 9,1969), the US SST finalist, the Boeing 2707, had booked 122 options from 26 airlines to purchase aircraft. The Concorde had booked 74 options from 16 airlines. Thus, nearly 200 SSTs were on order. A year later, in 1970, the FAA predicted 500-800 SSTs would be in operation by 1990. It is now 1998. Twelve Concordes operate today. These aircraft need only pay their operating costs exclusive of the amortization of their purchase; they were essentially free to the two airlines flying them. What happened? The fares required to pay for their operation deter their use. In 1994 British Airways officials said maintenance costs were seven times those of a 747 and fuel costs per passenger mile were several times those of the 747. Studies by Boeing and by McDonnell Douglas predict a market for 600 to 1500 SSTs [15,16], Mizuno of Japan AircraR Development predicted a market. for 600 Mach 2.5 SSTs with a 5500 nautical mile

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Energy

Consumption

The fuel consumed per passenger mile by SSTs of traditional design is several times that of subsonic transports. This derives in part from the addition of supersonic wave drag. Wave drag due to lift is inescapable except for an infinitely long swept wing, best approximated by the way, by an oblique wing. Volume can be moved through the air supersonically with no wave drag, but at considerable expense in skin friction drag. So iti too, entails a supersonic drag penalty. High speeds require high wing sweep, reducing the span and increasing induced drag. This increase in drag for a given lift more than offsets the improvement in propulsive efficiency with speed and results in increased fuel consumption. Sixty countries have ratified a treaty that commits them to better manage their generation of greenhouse gases 1191. Developed countries are to provide plans by the end of this century that show how they will return to 1990 levels of greenhouse gas generation. But as Secretary of Transportation Coleman said in his decision to let the Concorde operate: It would border on hypocrisy to choose the Concorde as the place to set an example... (for energy efficiency) while ignoring the inefficiency of private jets, cabin cruisers, or an assortment of energy profligates of American manufacture [6]. The Concorde achieves 17 seat miles per gallon and, at 67% load factor, is equivalent to a car achieving 12 miles per gallon with only the driver. But the Concordes passengers are going more than twenty times as fast and following nearly a straight line to their destination. A future SST should not and will not be rejected because of energy considerations. However, its economics are more sensitive to fuel costs than its subsonic counterparts and these are not only variable, but fuels may eventually be taxed for their carbon content. Sonic Boom Just as wave drag due to lift is inescapable so is the sonic bang. Adolf Busemann liked to illustrate this by depicting the conical shock wave system and its reflection from the ground as the crowbar that supported the weight of the aircraft [20]. In the US we call the sonic bang the sonic boom. The bang in the sonic boom derives from the abrupt pressure increases through the two, and sometimes more, shock waves emanating from a supersonic aircraft. We call the integral of the pos-

itive phase of the the impulse. The outdoor annoyance the bang and the sponse and indoor

pressure with respect to time bang is directly related to the of animals and humans; both impulse govern structural reannoyance.

The increasing acoustic impedance (i.e., the product of the density and the sound speed) below the aircraft in a real atmosphere freezes the shape of the pressure signature before it reaches the ground. In the approximation of an isothermal atmosphere this occurs in 1~12atmospheric scale heights, or at about 40,000 feet. This knowledge set me and my colleague Al George to tackle the minimization of various parameters of the sonic boom signature, including its bang and its boom, or any weighted average you might use of the parameters. Indeed, for the cruise characteristics of the proposed Mach 2.7 Boeing 2707 at 60,000 feet lifting 600,000 pounds, an aircraft 528 feet long need not have a sonic bang at all, i.e., the pressure field below the aircraft need not steepen into shock waves [21]. But as we noted then, reducing or eliminating the sonic boom increased the impulse, or total pressure loading, for obvious reasons: the bang part of the boom, that is, the shock waves, dissipates the energy in the signature. Consequently, reducing or eliminating the shock waves makes the impulse worse, increasing indoor annoyance. Very considerable studies by the NASA over the past decade have explored whether or not such shaping of the sonic boom signature would lead to an acceptable sonic boom. The NASAs conclusion reinforces ours of over two decades ago: commercial transport-size aircraft cannot be reshaped to have an acceptable sonic boom. Very small supersonic aircraft, such as a corporate supersonic transport, may well have an acceptable, indeed nearly inaudible, sonic boom. This would stem not only from their size and design, but also from the thickening of their very weak shock waves by vibrational relaxation. Commercial supersonic transports will be constrained to subsonic operation over populated areas, and perhaps to supersonic operation over the oceans alone. For aircraft traveling less than the speed of sound in sea water, this is simply a travelling source of acoustic radiation. Commercial transport at supersonic speeds over the oceans, and perhaps over unpopulated areas, is likely to continue to be acceptable. Flights over areas with significant wildlife may not be allowed. Through

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constraints on aircraft routes we can avoid the problems caused by sonic booms, but in doing so we reduce the market for a second generation SST.

Atmospheric

Impact

Whenever we burn hydrocarbon fuels using air, we impact the atmosphere and, in some cases, the local air quality. Whatever fuel we burn using air will produce oxides of nitrogen. A concern during the late 1960s was the effect of water vapor from SST engine exhausts on stratospheric ozone levels. It was soon realized, however, that the oxides of nitrogen were much more important 1221. This led the Department of Transportation, in 1972, to launch the Climatic Impact Assessment Program. This monumental and highly regarded 7200 page study, comprising the work of over 500 individuals, concluded that a limited fleet of supersonic transports, such as the 30 Concordes and TU-144s then envisioned, posed an insignificant threat to the atmosphere. This study also aided the extraordinary discovery of the reduction of atmospheric ozone by CFC refrigerants (Freon 11 and 12), culminating in the Montreal Protocol (1987) which will lead to the eventual elimination of these refrigerants. The oxides of nitrogen catalytically destroy ozone above about 42,500 feet at mid-latitudes. Aircraft emissions are the major unnatural source of these oxides in the stratosphere. They are also an important source of them in the upper troposphere, at least at mid-latitudes in the northern hemisphere [23]. Thus it appears that SSTs in the stratosphere may reduce our protection from ultraviolet radiation by ozone. The calculated ozone column change due to the injection of the amount of NO, expected from a full fleet of SSTs was about -12% in 1975. New knowledge changed this to +3% in 1979. Since that time, increasing knowledge provided a result of -lOs*r in 1988, about double the -5% predicted ozone depletion if CFC releases remained at their 1974 rate 1241. So we have yet to determine what their impact might be. Recent results show NO, to be less significant than was once thought, but raise the issue of the effects of engine emissions on stratospheric aerosol surface area. This could also play a role in depleting stratospheric ozone [25].

thrust 1261. Because much of this gain has come from higher bypass ratios, takeoff noise levels have fallen in some cases below those required by current noise regulations. Current SST engine concepts, without augmented suppression systems, are probably 15-20 decibels (equivalent perceived noise decibels) above these standards. Recent NASA data indicates that the required noise suppression adds about 6500 pounds per engine, which for four engines is equivalent to about 90 passengers for a 300 passenger HSCT. At the moment there are sound ideas, but no proven technologies, on how to accomplish this noise reduction with acceptable weight increases. Unlike the sonic boom, however, we are not up against a fundamental momentum balance. A breakthrough is possible. Given that subsonic transport noise levels continue to fall, and the near certainty that conventional supersonic transports will operate only from selected coastal cities, current noise regulations need to be examined to see what airport noise levels might be acceptable from a moderate size fleet of supersonic aircraft.

The Prospects
The development of a supersonic transport that can be operated at a profit by the airlines, and sold in sufficient numbers for the airframe and engine manufacturers to realize a profit as well, remains a challenge. The US and European supersonic research programs involve the companies that profit from the sale of their subsonic jets. It would take some bold competitive vision, not unlike that which led to the Concorde, for a supersonic transport production program to emerge from these studies. For unconventional configurations the technical and risk barriers are very high. It appears that an oblique flying wing could provide a Mach 1.4 -1.6 transport that operates with no surcharge over future subsonic transports and compete with them over land as well [27]. This could also be quite a large aircraft [281. But without further research, considerable experimentation, and flight tests, this remains a conjecture. Such an aircraft would also require rethinking of selected aviation regulations and perhaps even some minor reconfiguration of airports. Both were required with the introduction of the Boeing 747. A conventional configuration, operating at Mach 1.8 - 2.0, benefits from high productivity and substantially reduced travel times. Because of past and current government research programs, including that which led to the Concorde, the needed

Airport

Noise

Remarkable advances have been made in propulsion since jet engines were introduced. Over the past 25 years there has been about a 20% reduction in the amount of fuel required to produce a unit of

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research is largely done and the technology mature. Consequently, the development costs of such an aircraft appear to be quite reasonable. As a fleet, its contribution to the acoustic environment in and around selected airports may be small enough to deserve continued regulatory relief. A small, corporate, supersonic transport appears to have a significant market and, if small enough, might be certifiable for supersonic operation over most land areas. Military technology and excess production capacity provide the basis for making such an aircraft affordable. It may be a long time before we can fly twice current speedsat affordable fares. And we may even have to fly obliquely to do so. Long before this happens, someprill have travelled at Concorde speeds in corporate supersonic transports.

References
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nications Economics, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994. 1141 Grey, J., The New Orient Express, Discover, January 1986, pp. 73-81. Civil Transport Study, Boeing 1151 High-Speed Commercial Airplanes, NASA CR 4233, 1989. Study of High-Speed Civil Transports, DouWI glas Aircraft Company, NASA CR 4236, 1990. 1171 Mizuno, H. Operations and Market, High Speed Commercial Flight, H. Loomis ed., pp. 83-97, Columbus: Battelle Press, 1989. I331 Davies, R. E. G., The Supersonic Unmarket, Airways, pp. 41-46, September/October 1995. u91 Turning up the Heat, The Economist, March 19,1994, p. 15. [201 Busemann, A., The Relationship between Minimizing Drag and Noise at Supersonic Speeds, High Speed Aeronautics, Brooklyn: Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 1955. Seebass, A. R., and George, A. R., Sonic ml Boom Minimization, J Acoustical Society, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1972, pp. 686-694. LB1 Johnston, H., Reduction of Stratospheric Ozone by Nitrogen Oxide Catalysis from Supersonic Transport Exhaust, Science, 6 August 1971, pp. 517-522. 231 Enhalt, D. H., Rohrer, F., and Wahner, A., Sources and Distribution of NO, in the Upper Troposphere at Northern Mid-Latitudes, J Geophysical Research, Vol. 97, NO. D4, March 20, 1992, pp. 3725-3737. 241 Johnston, H. S., Prather, M. J., and Watson, R. T., The Atmospheric Effects of Stratospheric Aircraft: A Topical Review, NASA Reference Publication, 1250, January 1991. 1251 Fahey, D. W., et al., Emission Measurements of the Concorde Supersonic Aircraft in the Lower Stratosphere, Science, Vol. 270, October 6, 1995, pp. 70-74. D61 Koff, B. L., Spanning the Globe with Jet Propulsion, William Littlewood Memorial Lecture, May 1991, AIAA Paper No. 2987. 1271 Van der Velden, A., The Oblique Flying Wing H. Sobieczky, ed., pp. 29?316, Springer, 1997. W81 Li, P., Seebass, R., and Sobieczky, H., The Oblique Flying Wing as the New Large Aircraft, Proceedings, 20th International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences Congress, Transport, Transport New Design, Concepts in High Speed

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