SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.

127325; 19 Mar 1997]

Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Private

respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples

Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Santiago vs COMELEC
on December 12, 2011

Political Law Separation of Powers

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendment s to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case. HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC

made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.

CASE DIGEST ON IBP V. ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 [GR.NO. 141284] CASE DIGEST ON IBP V. ZAMORA Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners

(Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for

an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameralparliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issues:
complies

(1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution onamendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA

6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the

basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose onlyamendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) Digest
Published by Atty. Fred October 25th, 2006 in Digests and Elections and Constitutional Law. 8 Comments

digg On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.

1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the people Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment.

This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general

or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. 2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly

implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an

amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-andbalances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The

court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature andArticle VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There

is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735: a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition. b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.

Tolentino vs COMELEC
41 SCRA 702 Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F.

Ortega and Juan V. Borra

Facts
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Issue
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

Decision
The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying

therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The
injunction.

case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House seats of Representatives to in become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:
assembly,

Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent violates the Constitution.

Held:

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of

declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs as therein to prayed costs. for It denied, is without so special ordered. pronouncement

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments Article and XV among of the integral the or constituent Constitution units thereof." provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of

all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments aresubmitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This

is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of

Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper

circulated provides:

in

the

City

of

Baguio

and

the

Cordilleras,

assailed

the

constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether
unconstitutional.

or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and

space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.

on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of suchame ndment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, MylaRuth N.Sara

amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially

convene the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country.When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they wereaware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of theinterim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution wassubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold thecon vening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, becausesome of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemedautomatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment toa Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged inthe amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental MylaRuth N.Sara

charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for theinterim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approvalof the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approveor disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do withproposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art.

VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or

lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaignare merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of thenecessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
lawless

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve

the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out thearmed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment ofthe Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

>FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTEATIVES G.R. NO. 160261

Posted on May 7, 2010 by krizsexzy

>FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was

the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis. HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against

the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]
Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Impeachment

proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief

Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

Issue: Whether
against Chief

or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of

Representativesfalls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

Held: In

any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is

sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extraconstitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying theirindispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

When

suing

as

a citizen,

the

interest

of

the

petitioner

assailing

the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by

taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings have because the Section 3 (1) to says "The House of Representatives shall exclusive power initiate all cases of

impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning ofSection 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed oneyear time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assertjudicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the highprofile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. G. R. No. 118910 FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSOs charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 andMakati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And

was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure. (2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held: Petitioner

maintains that as a career executive service officer, he

can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful

study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

MALALUAN vs. COMELEC Case Digest

MALALUAN vs. COMELEC 254 SCRA 397 Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor with a winning margin of 706 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court. Subsequently the First Division of the Comelec ordered Malaluan to vacate the office. The Comelec en banc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioners right to the mayoralty seat because expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent. Held: The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of damages is that the same is in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to damages. The Omnibus Election Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law. Comelec Rules of Procedure provide that in all election contests the Court may adjudicate damages and attorneys fees as it may deem just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings. Notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the Comelec as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of office is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for that position. The emolument must go to the person who rendered the service unless the contrary is provided.