CRIMINAL LAW 1 : Day 1: J Regalado, Articles 1 2. A. BASIC PRINCIPLES 1. Definition of Criminal Law Lacson vs.

. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 ( Jan. 20, 1999) Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Acting on a media expose that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. Panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case. (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute. (3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

Held: Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

NOTE: The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. Elementary Rule: Jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and information and not by the evidence presented by the parties at trial. The mode or right to appeal in not included in the prohibition of ex post facto considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. MULTIPLE MURDER CHARGED Section 4 of RA 8249, requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. People vs Montejo (INTIMINATELU CONNECTED) Intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official function. *Actual recital of FACTS US vs KARELSEN (the object of this written accusation) 1 Furnish the accused with discretion of charge Avail himself of his conviction of acquittal 2 Inform the Court of the facts alleged so that it may decide What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. 2. Two Branches of Law (Distinguish Substantive and Procedural Law) Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (Oct. 20, 1948) [See Motion for Reconsideration and dissent of J.Feria] Facts: The court denied the motion of the accused that the case be remanded to the court of origin, in order that he might coss-examine the complainant and her witnesses by reason the accused renounced his right to present evidence and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped. Held: The court said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. But made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. FERIA, J., dissenting:

I am sorry to dissent from the decision.The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said: It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary investigation. But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass upon it. Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is

not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails. This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the Constitution. Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void. The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it. Petition is therefore granted. Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights and duties regarding life, liberty or property which when violated gives rise to a cause of action \ Remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcing those rights and obligations created by substantive law by providing a procedural system for obtaining redress for the invasion of rights and violations of duties and by prescribing rules as to how suits are filed, tried and decided by the courts. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from remedial

Procedural Law

Substantive Law

Structure:

Elaborates on the steps which the case passes through

Deals with the structure and facts of the case

Enforcement:

Creates the machinery for the enforcement of law

Defines the rights and duties of citizens

Powers:

No independent powers

Independent powers to decide the fate of a case Cannot be applied in non legal contexts

Application:

Can be applied in non legal contexts

2. Definition of Crime 3. Theories in Criminal Law Positivist Eclectec Utilitarian

De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas, 417 SCRA 636 (Dec, 10, 2003) Facts: The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 Despite conviction in the two separate criminal cases filed against her, petitioner remained at large.In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Admin. Circular No. 12-2000. After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. She filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court was denied, asking it to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Arguments: Petitioner: Her detention was illegal. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.Respondent: The two (2) judgments of conviction against the petitioner had long attained finality and could no longer bemodified. The SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified Admin. Circular No. 13-2000 did not delete the penalty of imprisonment in BP 22 cases. Issue: WON Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by Admin. No 13-2001 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of BP Blg. 22 Held: No. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. Thecircular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternativepenalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.Blg. 22

such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistakeof fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon theJudge. Magno vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471 (1992) People vs. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). [See Justice Pablo Opinion also] 4. Common Law Crimes; Are there common law crimes in the Philippines? US vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599 at 604 Common Law crime is non-statutory crime. Crime that is not in a law or statute Based on precedents System of law based on custom and court decisions 5. Characteristics of Criminal Law a. General General Rule :Civil Code, Article 14 RPC, Article 2 Exception: Civil Code, Article 14 RPC, Article 2 b. Territorial General Rule : RPC, Article 2 Constitution, Article I U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 {Phil. 614 What is French Rule and English Rule Exception : RPC, Article 2 R.A. 9372, Human Security Act of 2007, Sec. 58 c. Prospective Civil Code, Article 2 RPC, Article 1, 21, 22. 366 Civil Code, Article 4 Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444 (1993) Ex post facto law People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380 Lacson vs. Executive Secretary supra same citation in number 1 Ignoratia legis neminem non excusat Lex prospicit, non respicit What are exceptions to prospectivity of penal laws? RPC,Article 22 referring to RPC Article 65 Rule 5 on Habitual Delinquency Tavera vs. Valdex, 1 Phil 663 5. Repeal of penal laws effects People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil 225

U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241 People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000 o---oOo---o