Rek Hess Arab Minority

DOROTHY AND JULIUS KOPPELMAN INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
THE ARAB MINORITY

in
ISRAEL
Elie Rekhess
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
An Analysis of the Future Vision Documents
DOROTHY AND JULIUS KOPPELMAN INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL

An Analysis of the Future Vision Documents
Elie Rekhess
The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of
Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. To learn more about our mission, programs, and publications, and to join and contribute to our efforts, please visit us at www.ajc.org or contact us by phone at 212-751-4000 or by e-mail at contribute@ajc.org.
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Contents
Prof. Elie Rekhess is a senior research fellow at the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies and director of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at Tel Aviv University.
Foreword Introduction Historical Perspective 1948-67: Accommodation 1967-93: Palestinization 1993-2006: Localization The Future Vision Documents Background Contents Arab Responses Jewish Responses Implications Conclusion Appendix: The Arabs in Israel Abstract of Statistical and Demographic Data Notes
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Copyright 2008 American Jewish Committee All Rights Reserved. April 2008
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Foreword
The Israeli Knesset recently debated a bill requiring national service for Arab Israeli citizens. The leaders of the Arab community oppose national service, declared one Arab legislator, citing the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) communitys exemption from service as a parallel. Jewish MKs, however, cited surveys indicating that threequarters of Arab Israelis favored some sort of national service. More radical statements uttered in the debate referenced an Arab fifth column and incitement against the Jewish state. The debate epitomized how the issue of Arab Israelis has been so divisive within Israeli society and, perhaps for the first time, has given rise to intense interest in the subject within American Jewish circles as well. American visitors to Israel, particularly academics and minority rights advocates, often perceive the situation of ArabIsraelis primarily as a civil rights issue. Beyond the civil rights issue, however, lies the question of Israel as a Jewish state. Often overlooked are the questions of demography and birthrate. Arabs today comprise approximately 17 percent of the total population of Israel within the 1949 armistice lines. Given current fertility patterns3.68 for Arab Israeli women as compared with 2.75 for Jewish Israeli womenthe specter of a future Arab majority within pre-1967 Israel cannot be dismissed. Certainly Israeli Jews, of whatever religious or political ideology, generally insist that the Jewishness of Israel as a state must remain nonnegotiable. By contrast, Israeli Arabs have noted that the current gulf between Arabs and Jews will remain until Israel rids itself of its Jewish character. Among Israeli post-Zionists such arguments have garnered some limited credibility in recent years. For most Israeli Jews,
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however, these arguments are simply unacceptable and reflective primarily of the growing radicalization of the Israeli Arab leadership. In this context, one can well understand the passions raised in the debate over national service. In effect, by rejecting national service as an option, Arab leaders are giving voice to their view that, irrespective of the question of civil rights, they cannot and will not identify with a Jewish state flying a Jewish flag and maintaining the Jewish character of Israeli society. It is on this point that dialogue over the future of Arabs within Israeli society often collapses. To clarify these issues, the American Jewish Committees Koppelman Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations commissioned perhaps Israels foremost expert on Arab affairs, Professor Elie Rekhess, to author a background paper and analysis of the position of Arabs within Israel. In this paper Dr. Rekhess attempts to fulfill three distinctive purposes: First, he paints an historical survey of how Arab Israelis have fared within Israel since 1948, highlighting, in particular, the nature of military occupation until 1966, the growing awareness of the favored position of Israeli Jews after 1967, and the radicalization of the Israeli Arab leadership since the collapse of the Oslo process. Second, Dr. Rekhess analyzes the range of recent vision statements of Arab intellectuals and political leaders and what, in their view, a future State of Israel should reflect. Here Dr. Rekhess sounds a warning note that Israels very existence as a Jewish state is challenged by these statements, which favor a binational solution for Israel and its delegitimation as a Jewish state. Lastly, Dr. Rekhess concludes by noting that Israel and its American Jewish supporters cannot afford to ignore this issue. Tensions will only simmer and reach a boiling point at some point in the future unless adequate attention is given to them now. The Koppelman Institute, dedicated to building ties between American Jews and Israel, perceives the question of Arab Israelis as an ascending issue within Israel-Diaspora relations. American Jews identify with Israel as a Jewish democracy. Initiatives that compel choices between democracy and Judaism are likely both to sow divisions within Israeli society and to push American Jewry away from
its traditional position of pro-Israel support. By presenting this background paper, the Koppelman Institute hopes to demystify the variety of future vision statements and spur discussion within leadership circles of what needs to be done to preserve Israels Jewish and democratic character.
Dr. Harold Shapiro, Chairman Koppelman Institute
Dr. Steven Bayme, Director Koppelman Institute
Introduction
Ethnic conflicts are endemic in many areas of the world, and the inherent tension between democratic norms and ethnic diversity is perhaps one of the greatest challenges for democracies today. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been impacted by its engagement in an intractable conflict with its neighboring states. This conflict, in turn, is a pivotal factor in the complexity that characterizes the relationship between Israels Jewish majority and its growing Arab population. The following essay presents a historical overview of majorityminority relations in Israel, analyzing two developmental processes experienced by the Arab community in Israel: integration into Israeli society (Israelization, socioeconomic growth) and national/religious awakening (Palestinization, Islamization). Tracing these developments over three periods (1948-67, 1967-93, 1993-present) offers a context to understand the recently published Future Vision documents, which are an attempt to represent the local Arab viewpoint on the status and prospects for the Arab national minority in Israel.
Historical Perspective1
1948-67: Accommodation
The 1948 war created a unique situation of an Arab minority within the Jewish state of Israel.2 Israel was thus established as a Jewish state, but not exclusively so. In 1948 the Arab population in Israel was 150,000, and by 2006, had grown to more than 1.4 million, constituting 20 percent of the countrys total population.3 The 150,000 Arabs who chose to stay in their homes in 1948 and to assume Israeli citizenship, nevertheless retained strong emo1
2 the arab minority in israel
historical perspective 3
tional, national, cultural, and religious ties to the outside Arab world. This necessarily resulted in an acute national identity crisis for the Arabs, who, due to conflicting loyalties, were torn between Israel and the Arab world. Israel, for its part, also faced the difficult dilemma of how to accommodate the needs of the Jewish-Zionist State of Israel, first and foremost, with principles of liberal democracy that implied equal status for all citizens, Jews and Arabs alike. The first official Israeli reference to the Arab population within its borders appeared in the Declaration of Independence of May 14, 1948, which called upon the members of the Arab nation, inhabitants of the State of Israel, to preserve the ways of peace.4 The state committed itself to full and equal citizenship of the Arab population and representation in all its bodies and institutions. It granted civil rightsindividual rightsto its Arab residents.5 Concurrently, the state promised to uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or sex, and guaranteed full freedom of conscience, worship, education and culture [and to] safeguard and sanctity the shrines and Holy Places of all religions.6 Noticeably, the proclamation did not address the Arabs as a minority, nor did it make any reference to national or collective rights. The omission from the Declaration of Independence of the term nationality or national rights in reference to the Arab population was not accidental. It reflected the unique designation of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people and as a state in which nationality derived from Jewish identity. The proclamation drove a critical wedge between the states Arab inhabitants, who enjoyed civic status although they lacked national recognition, and the states Jewish citizens, who enjoyed national rights by virtue of the very legal definition of the state as a Jewish state, in addition to collective rights (such as the Law of Return). This division was perpetuated over time, with far-reaching repercussions, by the absence of a state constitution to replace the formulation contained in the declaration.7
Although Israel refused to recognize the Arabs as a national minority, several quasi-collective rights were anchored in its legal system. These rights included the status of Arabic as an official language, a separate educational system with Arabic as the language of instruction, group exemption from compulsory military service, recognition of Muslim personal status laws and the Muslim religious court system, the right to observe days of rest and holidays, and partial implementation of the principle of appropriate representation in the Israeli civil service.8 While this policy guideline reflected the states liberal and democratic principles, Israel concurrently adopted a diametrically opposed policy based on security considerations and representing the Jewishness of the state. This security-oriented policy approach viewed the Arabs as an enemy-affiliated minority and potential fifth column. The security orientation manifested itself in extensive expropriation of Arab lands and the institution of a military government regime in areas densely populated by Arabs, which lasted for eighteen years (1948-66). What was the Arabs perspective on their national identity and legal status in the State of Israel? Between 1948 and 1967, most Arabs were affiliated with one of two major political groupings. The first represented a nationalist orientation and was led by the Israeli Communist Party (ICP, the Hebrew acronym of which is Maki), while the second was a statist-oriented group that came to be known as the Moderate Camp. The latter comprised political activists from Mapai, the ruling party; the left-wing Mapam Party; and members of the Mapai-affiliated satellite lists who stood for Knesset elections separately, but identified fully with the ruling party. The moderates adopted a pragmatic, accommodating policy on the status of the Arab population in Israel, and were mostly concerned with socioeconomic issues pertaining to the daily needs of the Arab community. Their advocacy focused on promoting education and health care services, providing public utilities for domestic and agricultural uses, and mediating between the military authorities and
the local population. In stark contrast to the National Camp, the Moderate Camp did not concern itself with national-political issues or ideological dilemmas arising from conflicting allegiances. The National Camp was comprised mostly of members and supporters of the Israeli Communist Party (ICP), which split in 1965 into a Jewish faction and Rakah (the Hebrew acronym for the New Communist List). Rakah soon became the dominant of the two parties and enjoyed the massive support of Arab Communist Party members and voters. Rakahs strong identification with the Arab national cause was well reflected in its conceptualization of the national identity of Arabs in Israel. It argued that their national identity was structured on three principles: a distinct status as a national minority (aqalliyya qawmiyya), a sense of belonging to the Palestinian Arab nation, and Israeli citizenship. Party spokespersons nevertheless emphasized that these features did not require a separate right of self-determination for the Arabs in Israel. Such a separatist demand would have provoked a harsh response from the Israel authorities. The rise of Arab nationalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s under Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, inspired the Arab community in Israel to establish Al-Ard (The Land), a new local political organization. Al-Ards platform called for a just and indivisible solution to the Palestinian problem in its entirety through self-determination for Arabs in Israel and the establishment of one indivisible Palestinian-Arab state over all of Mandatory Palestine. After a prolonged legal battle, Al-Ard was outlawed in 1964, leaving no discernible imprint on the political discourse, beyond a small circle of loyal supporters.
1967-93: Palestinization
This period was strongly influenced by the Six-Day War, which became a critical milestone in the consolidation of Israeli-Arab selfidentity as a national Palestinian minority. Renewed contact with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza spurred a return to Palestinian roots. The elimination of the Green Line (the 1949
armistice lines with Israels neighbors) and unrestricted passage to and from the occupied territories put an end to nineteen years of isolation for Israeli Arabs, by reuniting two parts of a nation that had been arbitrarily separated in 1948. The dramatic events and developments between 1967 and 1993 left a deep imprint on the coalescing national identity of the Arabs in Israel, as Israeli Arabs gradually reclaimed their Palestinian identity in a process that came to be known as Palestinization. The Moderate Camp was most strongly influenced by these events, although their effects were not immediately evident. The national Palestinian movement consolidated under Yasir Arafats PLO leadership, which instigated civil resistance and military confrontations in the territories, in Israel proper, and in the international arena. In the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the global oil crisis, the PLOs demand for self-determination for the Palestinian people gained increasing recognition. The 1974 Rabat Summit recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO was granted UN observer status in 1975. The following year, a pro-PLO leadership captured power in the West Bank municipal elections. Although the 1982 war in Lebanon and its ramifications led to the relocation of PLO headquarters to Tunis, the national Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the territories continued to grow and finally erupted in the 1987 intifada (popular uprising). These developments caused a collapse of the delicate balance between the Arab-Palestinian and the Israeli-civil components of national identity that Arabs in Israel had characteristically maintained during the first period of their developing national consciousness (1948-67). The dramatically changed circumstances forced the Moderates to address the growing awareness of the contradictions between the Israeli and Palestinian components of their identity, a dilemma they had successfully avoided for nineteen years. Although contacts with Arabs in the territories heightened their sense of belonging to the Arab-Palestinian nation, the Moderates did not revise their ideological-political program. Neither did they
establish new political frameworks, independent of the major Jewish parties (Mapai, for example). The single ideological outcome of their growing national consciousness was manifest in opinion statements expressed by individuals on various national issues. Rakah became the standard-bearer of the Palestinization process by calling Israel to withdraw from the territories and to recognize the PLO and the rights of the Arab Palestinian nation to self-determination and a state of their own alongside Israel. The partys platform won widespread support from the Arab public in Israel. Although the partys program focused mainly on the external aspects of the Palestinian issue, the party did not neglect the national status of the Arab minority in Israel. Palestinization was not a mutually exclusive process that categorically replaced Israelization. On the contrary, parallel to the reformulation of national identities and political affiliations, the Arab minority underwent an intensive process of socioeconomic change, modernization, and Westernization. The substantial rise in living standards was accompanied by a parallel rise in the level of expectations, especially among the younger generation raised and educated in Israel. The Arab sectors almost exclusive model for evaluating its own situation was the level of development of the neighboring Jewish population. Comparisons revealed sizable differences in almost every socioeconomic sphere, including industrialization, housing, land, education, local infrastructure, and employment. It was this combination of increasing socioeconomic stress and growing Palestinian consciousness that profoundly altered the Arab Israelis political behavior. Political activism replaced a more passive, acquiescent approach. Since the 1970s, this more militant approach has manifested itself in the organization of full-scale mass protests, rallies, demonstrations, strikes, campaigns against the government, and the establishment of countrywide, action-oriented organizations such as the Arab Mayors Forum. Occasionally, the line separating a struggle for civil equality from a struggle for national rights became blurred, as was the case in March 1976, when thousands of demonstrators
clashed with security forces over a government decision to expropriate land in the Galilee. Six Arab citizens were killed in the course of this violent confrontation, which came to be known as Land Day. When President Anwar Sadats dramatic visit to Israel in November 1977 launched Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that ultimately led to a peace agreement, the reactions of the Arab population in Israel quickly crystallized into two main trends. One camp believed that the Arabs in Israel would now, at long last, be able to serve as a bridge linking the Jewish population with the Arab world. Senior Arab figures identified as moderates suggested that the breakthrough would lead to the final elimination of the psychological barriers and security considerations that had prevented the full integration of the Arab population into Israel. This optimistic view was not shared by the Communists or the more radical circles, who both denounced Sadats initiative and labeled it a tragic stageshow. They insisted that no progress could be achieved as long as both Israel and Egypt continue to bypass the PLO and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.9 Despite this criticism, the accommodative view apparently enjoyed wide support. Generally speaking, the Arabs in Israel welcomed the peace with Egypt warmly. It enabled them to visit this major Arab state freely and to reestablish cultural ties with the Arab world, and, in some cases, to establish economic ties with their Egyptian counterparts. The intifada that broke out in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in December 1987 added impetus to the growth of Israeli Arabs feelings of brotherhood with the Palestinians in the territories. They shared with the people of the West Bank and Gaza their pride in the very outbreak of the uprising and in its successes; their pain at the killed and the wounded; their fury at Israels iron fist policy; and the great upsurge of national sentiment. However, the intifada remained outside the Green Line during this period.
1993-2006: Localization
The peace process of the 1990s had a far-reaching impact on the political and ideological orientation of the Arabs in Israel. The lack
of reference to the Arabs in Israel in the Oslo Accords heightened their sense of exclusion. Israeli Arab intellectuals and the political elites acutely realized that a future Palestinian state would not necessarily fulfill the national aspirations of the Arabs in Israel. This understanding and the swift developments in the international arena compelled them to urgently focus on their own status within Israel. From this point, the national resources of the Arab population were directed inward in a process that became known as the localization of the national struggle of the Arab citizens of Israel.10 The definition of Israel as a Jewish state, with its pronounced privileges for the Jewish majority, created inherent discrimination against Israeli Arab citizens. Socioeconomic gaps between Jews and Arabs widened over the years. Although a series of Israeli governments in the early 1990s declared their commitment to improving Jewish-Arab equality, their declarations remained no more than political slogans and were not backed by significant action. In this period, political-ideological discourse in Arab society focused on what Arabs in Israel perceived to be a built-in contradiction between the nature of Israel as a Jewish state and its definition as a liberal democracy committed to the equality of all its citizens. For the first time since 1948, Arab academics and politicians across the political spectrum addressed the inherent weakness of the Jewish and democratic state model. They spoke openly of the acute dilemma of Arab citizens who were torn between loyalty to the state and difficulty in identifying with its Jewish symbols, such as the flag and anthem, or with its ethnocentric worldview. In their debates about how to resolve the incompatibility between Israels Jewish and democratic nature and on the desired nature of the State of Israel, Arab elites developed alternative, more equitable models that would be more responsive to and representative of the national needs of the Arab minority. Public discourse focused on three models: a state for all its citizens, autonomy, and a binational state. These alternative models underscore the major ideological transformation of Arabs in Israel in the 1990s in relation to their
self-perception as a national minority. The Arabs specifically began to reject the term minorities typically used by Israeli authorities to relate to all non-Jewish populations, which the Arabs viewed as indicative of Israels intention to sow internal disunity along religious-ethnic lines among the Muslim, Druze, Christian, Circassian, and Bedouin communities. Instead, the Arabs began to conceptualize themselves as a national minority that deserved distinct collective rights. A central pillar in this new self-definition was the reference to the Arabs in Israel as an indigenous minority or a homeland minoritya term generally used in contrast to an immigrant minority. One of the most impressive aspects of this process, which acquired the name the reopening of the 1948 files, was the reclamation of the collective historic memory of the Nakba, the perceived catastrophic loss of Palestine in the 1948 war. This reintroduction of the notion of Nakba into public consciousness was molded by three major factors: (1) the emergence of a new generation of Arabs who, unlike their predecessors, chose to highlight rather than dilute their national identity; (2) the implications of the Oslo process and discussions of a permanent settlement, the resolution of the refugee question, and the right of return; (3) the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the State of Israel in 1998, which served as a powerful spur to the process. In October 2000, violent confrontations erupted in the Galilee and the Triangle area between Arab demonstrators and police forces. In the course of these unprecedentedly harsh clashes, twelve Arab citizens, one resident from Gaza, and one Jewish citizen were killed. Threatened by Knesset Member Ariel Sharons visit to the Temple Mount on the eve of the Jewish New Year, September 28, 2000, the Arabs of Israel expressed solidarity with their brethren in the territories. Many adopted the Islamic movements call to protect the AlAqsa Mosque, claiming that Israel was trying to exert its authority over the third holiest site in Islam. The swift response of the Arabs in Israel reflected their growing sense of identification with the Palestinian cause. Even so, the major
cause for the outburst of violence was largely attributable to domestic factors. Signs of rising tension in the Arab sector were already evident during the first half of 2000. Spokespersons for the Arab population pointed out that most of the Arab local councils suffered from paralyzing budgetary deficits, the Arab villages had become foci of unemployment, and the problem of the unrecognized villages, especially in the Negev, had worsened. (Unrecognized villages are illegally constructed Arab villages/settlements, built outside official state zoning districts and consequently lacking basic municipal services. In 2007, ninety-two Arab settlements were defined unrecognized, fifty-nine of which were Bedouin settlements in the Negev.) The October 2000 riots reflected the personal disappointment of the Arabs in Israel with Prime Minister Ehud Barak and with his governments policies toward the Arab sector in general. While 95 percent of the Arab electorate had voted for Barak in the 1999 prime ministerial elections, many felt betrayed when he declined to invite Arab parties to join his coalition and did little to redress the long-standing socioeconomic grievances of the Arab sector. The uprising represented the culmination of a process of growing alienation and discontent over unfulfilled expectations to attain equality, especially among the younger generation. Following sustained criticism on the part of the Arab leadership over the harsh conduct of the police during the riots, Prime Minister Barak announced the establishment of a state commission of inquiry to investigate the October 2000 events, headed by Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or, with a mandate to investigate the behavior of the security forces and the instigators and organizers of the clashes. The decision was welcomed by the Arab leadership. In its findings and recommendations, published on September 1, 2003, the Or Commission report identified the root causes of the events as government discrimination, police behavior, and radicalization of the Arab sector.11 In this third phase (localization), developments in the political arena were characterized by an electoral shift in Arab sector voting
patterns from Zionist to Arab parties. The transition confirmed the growing appeal of Arab party platforms that increasingly focused on communal issues and the collective rights of the Arab population as a national minority. By the Seventeenth Knesset elections (2006), the political and ideological platforms of all Arab participating parties highlighted the national character of the Arabs in Israel.12 Nonetheless, participation of the Arab population in the 2006 elections dropped significantly: Only 56.3 percent of all Arab eligible voters participated, reflecting a 6 percent decline compared to the 2003 elections, and a 21 percent drop compared to 1996. Although Arabs declining participation in the national elections signaled an indifference, weariness, and disinterest in the political scene that characterized Israeli society as a whole in 2006, Arab voters were particularly disillusioned with their leadership for their failure to engender any real improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the Arab population. Nonparticipation was also an expression of criticism of the Arab political parties and a protest against internal schisms that had prevented the formation of a united front that could effectively exploit the electoral potential of the Arabs in Israel. Also contributing to the declining Arab vote in 2006 was a public call to boycott the elections. This was not the first time such calls were voiced. Following the massive abstention of Arabs in the 2001 elections for prime minister, when only 18 percent of Arab voters showed up at the polls, demands mounted for alternative representative bodies, including a separate Arab parliament. (The dogmatic faction of the Islamic Movement also preached for an alternative, autonomous network of social and economic institutions for the Muslim community in Israel.) In 2006, the calls to boycott the forthcoming elections gathered momentum. The newly established Popular Committee for the Boycott of the Elections argued that participation in Knesset politics was a futile effort and a waste of time. The committee called for the establishment of a separate Arab parliament that would organize our masses on national grounds, and argued that the national
the future vision documents 13
cause required Arabs to refrain from supporting the legitimacy of the Knesset, which represented the state founded on the ruins of our nation. The declining turnout, the strong public call to boycott Knesset elections, and the calls for alternative autonomous representative bodies in the 2006 elections all attested to the growing weight of the Palestinian element in the national sentiments of the Arab minority in Israel. These recent developments blended with the general trend of growing national consciousness discussed thus far. The Second Lebanon War of summer 2006 aggravated national tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel even further. Katyusha rockets exacted a heavy toll on the Arab population in the Galilee, which suffered eighteen of the thirty-nine fatalities of those hostilities. Despite some expectations in the Jewish sector that the shared fate would increase solidarity and partnership between Jews and Arabs, the opposite occurred. In fact, the loss of life aggravated the national identity dilemma of Arabs in Israel and the acute conflict between their Palestinian and Arab identity and their Israeli citizenship, and led to an unmistakable regression in the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel.13
not relate to it directly. The third document, The Democratic Constitution, was published by Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.16 The fourth, The Haifa Declaration, was published on May 15, 2007 (Nakba Memorial Day), by Mada alCarmel, the Haifa-based Center for Applied Social Research, headed by Prof. Nadim Rouhana.17
Background
In their inward convergence, which was referred to earlier as the localization of the national process, intellectual-political Arab elites introduced Palestinian national content into their Israeli affiliation, anchoring the Palestinian foundation of their identity in their Israeli experience. However, in the wake of the Oslo Accords and subsequent diplomatic developments, the Arabs in Israel felt an urgent need to reconceptualize the national status of the Arabs in Israel in response to current events. This need was perceived to be all the more pressing in light of internal Israeli political developments that had gained in intensity over the past five years: namely, the debate on the future borders of the State of Israel, Ariel Sharons disengagement policy, the construction of the security fence, the evacuation of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip (Gush Katif ) and the intention to settle the evacuees in the Galilee and the Negev, and finally, the convergence policy propounded by Ehud Olmert. The Arabs growing sense of exclusion from mainstream political discourse in Israel was reinforced by attempts of Jewish intellectuals and politicians to shape the future image of the State of Israel, as expressed in the Kinneret Covenant,18 which was drafted in 2001 under the auspices of the Rabin Center for Israel Studies. The fact that no Arab participants were included in this endeavor was conceived as an assertion of Jewish hegemony in this discourse. Even the intensive efforts by the Israel Democracy Institute to draft a Constitution by Consensus19 evoked Arab anxiety and concerns, as the draft proposal sanctioned Israels definition as a Jewish and democratic state, committed to the civil equality of the
The Future Vision Documents

Four position papers concerning the civic and national status of the Arabs in Israel were published between December 2006 and May 2007, marking yet another milestone in the developing national consciousness of Israels Arab community. The first document, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, was drafted by a group of forty Arab academics and intellectuals, and was published on behalf of The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel,14 under the auspices of the Supreme FollowUp Committee for the Arabs in Israel. The second document, An Equal Constitution for All: On a Constitution and the Collective Rights of Arab Citizens in Israel, by legalist Dr. Yousef Taysir Jabareen, was published by the Mossawa Center.15 A summary of this paper was included in the Future Vision document, and therefore we will
Arab minority. Similar attempts to finalize a constitution were made by the Knessets Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. (Arab Knesset members declined to participate in the committees deliberations, assuming that their impact would be minimal.) The absence of Palestinian input in the constitutional debate increased the frustration experienced by the Arab community, which interpreted the constitutional endeavor as yet another attempt to perpetuate Jewish exclusiveness within the state20 and an inferior constitutional status for Arabs in Israel. Statements by right-wing Member of Knesset (MK) Avigdor Lieberman, conceived by the Arabs as racist,21 and growing public support for population exchange and potential territorial swaps in the Triangle region22 exacerbated their sense of suffocation. The fears that such actions would also involve acts of transfer and revocation of citizenship for some Arabs in Israel further highlighted the necessity, from an Arab perspective, to embark on the Future Vision initiative. Finally, the Future Vision documents were also the result of Arab disappointment with the governments failure to resolve the growing socioeconomic gaps between the Arab and Jewish populations in Israel, and of the state of what Palestinian sociologist Majid al-Hajj called double peripheralityboth vis--vis the Israeli and the Palestinian scenes. The blatant disregard for the conclusions of the Or Commission, or even the minimalist interpretations of these conclusions drafted by the Lapid Committee (appointed by the government to implement the Or Commissions recommendations), aggravated the Arabs sense of alienation even further and spurred their search for alternatives. The Future Vision documents, then, developed as a collective outcry in the political darkness designed to bring the Jewish society in Israel to a real and sincere handling of the social and political deformations which it created over the years.23
Contents
The first (2006) Future Vision document, partially funded by the European Union, discusses eight major issues: 1) the relation of the Arabs in Israel to the state; 2) legal status; 3) land planning and housing; 4) economic affairs; 5) social issues; 6) educational vision; 7) Arab culture; and 8) institution-building and political action. The document contains operative proposals for domestic actions to remedy the unequal social, economic, and cultural status of the Arab population. Among these are calls to reduce poverty among Arab families, provide aid for those who are unable to attain an acceptable standard of living, prioritize educational issues including professionalization of the educational staff, and establish a high board for cultural affairs. The document is refreshing in its self-criticism and its piercing self-scrutiny of the faulty conduct of local Arab society in several areas. It calls for anti-corruption campaigns and an end to the politicization of the educational system by the Arab local authorities; enhancement of the status of women by empowerment, equating the status of women to men, encouraging women to join the work force, and an end to the patriarchal system of excluding women from loci of power in clan politics. Public attention, however, has focused mainly on those sections of the Future Vision document that concern the national-political future of the Arab minority in Israel, primarily because the document represents one of the most radical ideological and political platforms ever drafted by a representative Arab organization in Israel. The documents proposals surpass previous demands to recognize the Arab community as a national minority. This new call is now integrated into a much broader context, challenging the very existence of Israel as a Jewish state. The new approach is manifest in six spheres. a. The Narrative: The document endorses the Palestinian historical narrative. Israel is conceived in the document as the outcome of a settlement process [the Hebrew version translates this literally as colonial action] initiated by the Zionist elite[s]
in Europe and the West. According to this narrative, Israel continued after 1948 to apply policies derived from its vision as an extension of the West in the Middle East and pursued colonial policies against its Palestinian Arab citizens. Israel is required to officially acknowledge the historical injustice inflicted upon the Palestinians in the country, and various events that have been erased from the official Israeli versions of the countrys history. Thus, the document poses the following demands: present absentees, also known as internal refugees,24 should be allowed to return to their original lands; Islamic Waqf (religious authority) property, administered since 1948 by the Israeli government, should revert to the control of the Muslim community; unrecognized villages should be granted official status and confiscated land be restored to its original owners. Furthermore, Israel should acknowledge responsibility for the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and its disastrous consequences for the Palestinians. b. The Nature of the State: The document rejects Israels definition as a Jewish state, and its perpetuation of an inferior status for its Arab citizens. The Jewishness of the state places Palestinian citizens in confrontation with the very essence of their state of residence. Israel therefore is, in effect, an ethnocratic rather than a democratic state. In an ethnocracy, Arab spokesmen claim, the states resources are harnessed to the interests of the predominant ethnic group, to guarantee the hegemony of the majority (also referred to by Arab speakers as a majoritarian tyranny) and to marginalize the minority. The ethnocratic system is maintained, inter alia, by forcing the Arab minority to accept resource allocations on the basis of ethnicity rather than citizenship. c. Indigenous Minority with Collective Rights: The state should recognize the Palestinian Arabs in Israel as an indigenous group (and as a minority under the international conventions) with collective national rights. These include the right
to choose their representatives directly and be responsible for their religious, educational, and cultural affairs, as well as the right to establish their own national institutions pertaining to all aspects of life. d. Consociational Democracy: The authors call for supplanting the present regime in Israel with a consociational democracy, namely a binational state model based on full power-sharing between the two national groups in government, distribution of resources, decision-making, proportional representation, and the mutual right of veto on crucial decisions. The countrys national symbols, such as the anthem, flag, and emblem, should be modified to reflect the binational nature of the new state. e. Equality: The document calls for full equality in civic, national, and historical spheres, including, inter alia, equal rights of immigration and citizenship quotas, a demand that possibly implies the elimination of the Law of Return, which allows Jews to immigrate freely to Israel. Special reference is made to the need to rectify the unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources between the Jewish and Arab sectors, particularly with regard to land, urban planning, housing, infrastructure, economic development, social change, and education. f. Institutions: The document proposes structural-institutional changes, including specifically the establishment of self-rule (autonomy) in education, religious and cultural affairs, and the media, to guarantee the unrestricted development of the Arab minoritys specific collective identity. It also proposes the formation of an elected national representative body for the Arabs in Israel. The second document, Adalahs draft Democratic Constitution, is a legalistic proposal to replace the Jewish, democratic State of Israel with a democratic bilingual multicultural state. The authors emphasize that the proposal is based, inter alia, on the constitutional and legal experience of a number of democratic states, particular-
ly those with significant national linguistic and indigenous minorities, as well as on international human rights covenants and declarations. The draft constitution contains four chapters. Chapter One, the introduction, calls upon Israel to recognize its responsibility for past injustices suffered by the Palestinians, both before and after its establishment, including the Nakba. It maintains that the Arab citizens in Israel are a homeland minority excluded from the Jewish state. Chapter Two discusses the foundations of current and proposed regimes. It establishes Israel within the pre-1967 lines, and considers Israel to be a democratic state (not a Jewish one), a bilingual state, with Hebrew and Arabic as its official languages, and a multicultural state where a national minority is entitled to educational, religious, and cultural institutions, and separately elected representative bodies. Universal laws of citizenship and immigration will be established on the principle of antidiscrimination (and would replace the Law of Return). As for power-sharing, participation of the minority in the decision-making process will be ensured in one of two ways: by a Parliamentary Committee for Bilingual and Multicultural Affairs, half of whose members would be members of Arab parties. The committee would be able to veto any law related to symbolic, bilingual, and multicultural issues. The Knesset plenum would be able to overrule the committee decisions by an extraordinary majority of no less than two-thirds of the members. The second model suggests that no bill can be approved by the plenum of the Knesset if 75 percent of Arab members vote against it. Chapter Three deals with rights and liberties. It refers to fundamental liberties, distributive and restorative justice, social and economic rights, and rights in courts and criminal justice. Noteworthy are the articles on the restitution of expropriated Arab property, the return of uprooted Arab citizens of Israel during and after 1948 to their villages, and the reinstatement of Muslim Waqf property, including its revenue. The fourth chapter entitled Miscellaneous
refers to diverse issues including amending the constitution, transitional orders, and interpretations. The Haifa Declaration, drafted by Mada al-Carmel (The Arab Center for Applied Social Research) and funded by the European Union, was published symbolically on May 15, designated as Nakba Day. Unlike the Future Vision document or Adalahs Democratic Constitution, large parts of which are pragmatic and policy-oriented in essence, the Haifa Declaration represents a political-national manifesto, calling for the establishment of a new democratic state founded upon justice, freedom, and mutual respect between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Israel. The document strongly condemns the traditional social paradigms in local Arab society that undermine social solidarity, including sectarian zeal and physical violence. It clearly states that most women in the Arab society, especially the economically disadvantaged, are still subject to multifaceted oppression: class, national, social, and gender. In the national sphere, the declaration subscribes to the Palestinian narrative reflected in the earlier documents. Accordingly, the Zionist movement is blamed for initiating its colonial-settler project in Palestine in concert with world colonialism, and 1948 is referred to only as the year of the Nakba, when the Zionist movement committed massacres against the Palestinians. The Nakba is considered a formative event through which the Palestinians in Israel were made citizens without the genuine constituents of citizenship, especially equality. Furthermore, the Palestinians in Israel are defined as a homeland minority driven out of its homeland. The declaration, nevertheless, speaks of the need for a historic reconciliation, which would require recognition of the right of the Jewish Israeli people to self-determination. It also acknowledges the horrific human crimes in the Holocaust. The future vision of the Haifa Declaration is the establishment of a democratic state founded on equality between the two national groups. This would require a change in the definition of the State of Israel from a Jewish state to a democratic one, and would entail
annulling laws and citizenship based on ethnicity (namely the Law of Return), establishing Arabic and Hebrew as official languages of equal status, guaranteeing the Palestinian citizens the right of veto in all matters that concern their status and rights, and ensuring their right to cultural autonomy. It is these principles that can guarantee our right to self-determination as a homeland minority, the declaration concludes.
Arab Responses
Many Arab spokesmen from all quarters of the political spectrum applauded the Future Vision documents, highlighting their representative nature. They stated that the documents realistically express the claims of the Palestinians in Israel and their desire for integration, equality and equity withinrather than outsidethe framework of Israel.25 Some emphasized that the documents contained minimal demands representing relatively moderate views. Along these lines, the Journal of Palestine Studies asserted that the documents were more reformist than radical, that the calls for restitution were measured, and that instead of emphasizing exclusion only, the documents also placed emphasis on inclusion.26 Shawqi Khatib, chairman of the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, defended the documents opposition to a democracy dictated by the majoritarian tyranny, and hoped that it would stimulate a sincere and courageous dialogue with the Jewish public.27 Hussam Abu Baker, a member of the working group, further suggested that the Jewish public should see this document as an invitation to a meaningful, focused public debate among equals, a debate that demands more than a small degree of tolerance and ideological pluralism.28 However, some voices in the Arab sector criticized the documents for an array of reasons. Some, representing the national trend, thought that the documents expressed a move toward Israelization, an orientation that should be deplored. Others denounced the Supreme Follow-Up Committees vision for its disregard of the Palestinian issue, in contrast to the excessive treatment of
this issue in the Haifa Declaration. The Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement rejected the documents on procedural grounds, claiming that it had not gained the formal support of all members of the Supreme Follow-Up Committee. Similarly, political figures such as MK Ahmad Tibi argued that the committees document was drafted by academicians and private persons, not by political parties.29 Finally, several Arab voices condemned the extremist nature of the documents. Most salient among this group was Nazir Majali, a journalist and commentator, who argued that the demand for autonomy concealed a call for separatism, which was inappropriate for the situation of the Arabs in Israel. Majali claimed that by supporting this call for separatism, Arabs were effectively encouraging Jewish right-wing extremists.30
Jewish Responses
Several Jewish commentators and scholars expressed empathy for some of the demands raised in the documents, mostly in the civic sphere. Ilan Saban, for example, while critical of the national dimensions of the Democratic Constitution draft, applauded its constructive provisions grounded in liberal democratic norms, universal principles, and international conventions on human rights.31 The general Jewish response was, however, militant and defensive, responding to what was understood as the authors separatist intentions. Some columnists interpreted the Future Vision documents as a declaration of war against the Jewish majority and branded the Arabs as enemies of the State. Others attacked the documents harsh, arrogant shameless language. Readers are surprised, wrote Israeli legal scholar (and former dean of the Radzyner School of Law of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya) Amnon Rubinstein that [the Future Vision document] contains no explicit mention of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.32 Criticism focused on three major issues: the narrative, delegitimization of the Jewish state, and the consociational democracy proposal.
a. Narrative: The common impression among Jewish observers was that the documents represented an attempt to impose the Arab-Palestinian national narrative over the Jewish one. Much of the critique focused on the definition of the Zionist movement as a colonial enterprise and as the creation of world imperialism, totally ignoring the Jewish peoples historical roots in Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) and the centuries of Jewish yearning for Zion. To do so, wrote Asher Susser, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, was groundless, reductionist, and demeaning.33 Critics vigorously denounced the one-sidedness of the documents historical approach. The full responsibility for the 1948 war was laid on Jewish shoulders, with total disregard for the Arabs armies attack on the newly established State of Israel. No mention was made of the historical context preceding the 1948 war, namely the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution on the Partition Plan, establishing a Jewish state, and the Arab rejection of this resolution. Loran Cohen summarized the documents main message as: Palestine remains Palestine, even though for the time being and as a result of a cruel historical accident, an identity with an esoteric name (Israel) occupies part of its land.34 b. Delegitimization: The major argument raised against the documents by Jewish reviewers was that they undermine the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state, and furthermore reject the Jews right for self-determination. It should be said that while the first Future Vision document lacks express recognition of the Jewish peoples right for self-determination, the Adalah Constitution draft and the Haifa Declaration do confirm the Jewish peoples right for self-determination within the pre1967 borders.35 The call for a consociational democracy, which actually implies a binational state to replace the Jewish state, it was
argued, undermined the moral-historical justification for its existence. To relegate the Jewish nation to the status of an ethno-religious group meant the de-Judaization and de-Zionization of Israel. Instead of the more commonly accepted principle of two states for the two nations, the document demanded one-and-a-half states for the Palestinians and onehalf a state for the Jews. Commentators argued against the imbalance and asymmetry ingrained in the documents. How can minority rights only be recognized in exchange for nonrecognition of the majority rights? asks Susser. The documents, many concluded, had totally ignored the other.36 c. Consociational Democracy: Commentators noted that the binational experiments of the twentieth century, based on the model of consociational democracy, had ended in resounding failure: Cyprus broke up quickly and violently; Czechoslovakia split into two nation-states with the reinstatement of democracy. Even implementation of the binational concept in the West, as demonstrated in the case of Belgium, is far from a success story.37 It is doubtful, asserted Professor of Middle Eastern Studies Yitzhak Reiter, whether one can maintain a democracy based on wide consensus between two societies as alienated and polarized as the Jews and the Arabs in Israel. Furthermore, he argued, the Arab proposal replaces the idea of majoritarian democracy with a model based on disproportion and imparity. It demands full equality between two groups, one of which constitutes a minority of only 15 percent of the population (excluding the Druze and the East Jerusalemites).
Implications
The Future Vision documents represent a new phase in the national history of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel. They reflect a significant transition from passive or reactive policies to proactive political action.38 The recent development symbolizes
conclusion 25
the further crystallization of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel as a self-perceived homeland or indigenous minority with collective national rights. For the first time in their political history, the Arabs in Israel have formulated an agreed-upon national platform, the product of collaborative work. True, these documents are representative mostly of a rather limited number of Arab intellectuals and political activists, and results of various polls indicate that the Arab rank and file, the general public often referred to as the silent majority, do not necessarily support the demands raised in the documents.39 These findings notwithstanding, the innovative element of the proposalsthe demand to replace the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state with a consociational democracycannot be ignored. The demands enumerated in the Future Vision documents are categorical and conclusive. Although they preach for reconciliation, dialogue, cooperation, and integration, the general spirit of the documents is confrontational. The delegitimization of Israel as a Jewish state conveys a message of conflict between two national groups that are bound to clash. There is a glaring absence of any reference to coexistence or to Jewish-Arab partnership in the framework of a civic society grounded on joint affiliation and partnership. The drafters original intention, to present a platform for a Jewish-Arab dialogue, seems to have utterly failed of its target. On the contrary, the calls to dismantle the Jewish state using a sophisticated binational state mechanism have widened the gulf separating Jews and Arabs in Israel. The documents considerably exacerbated Jewish fears, mistrust, and anxieties. Politically, the national demands of the Arab community have had far-reaching results. On one hand, they have alienated the Israeli Jewish left, which felt betrayed by its Arab counterparts. This segment of the Israeli political map feels particularly frustrated since many of its members strongly support many elements of the Arab quest for civil equality. On the other hand, the documents reinforced the anti-Arab Jewish right wing, which has now been provid-
ed with definitive proof that the Arabs in Israel are no more than a fifth column. Consequently, the shift in the Jewish public opinion may have an affect on government policies in that it discourages officials from engaging in promoting equality. Many sections of the Future Vision documents are based on international treaties and conventions on national minority rights. The Adalah draft for a Democratic Constitution, in particular, relies heavily on international law and covenants. Indeed, the documents largely target not only the local Israeli scene, but also, to a large extent, the Palestinian Arab world and the international arena. They constitute an attempt to internationalize the local problem of Arabs in Israel by ascribing to it the global issue of national minorities. The documents may thus be viewed as part of comprehensive efforts to gain international recognition for the domestic Palestinian cause. In recent years, Arab NGOs in Israel have appealed increasingly to international bodies and agencies requesting funds and international recognition.40 Among these organizations are the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the UN International Court of Justice, UNESCO, and the European Union, the European Parliament.
Conclusion
The Future Vision documents constitute a watershed in the history of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. These definitive documents reject the original paradigm of Jewish-Arab relations formulated by the state in 1948. The essence of the Jewish-Arab divide in Israel has moved from the socioeconomic sphere, characteristic of the 1950s to 1970s, to the political-national arena. The documents demonstrate how enhanced Palestinian nationalism and nationalist consciousness have found expression in the rejection of the fundamental definitions and legitimacy of the Jewish State of Israel.
conclusion 27
These alarming developments require immediate attention. The Arab minority in Israel is subject to deprivation and discrimination. The Future Vision documents authentically reflect this reality. Suffice it to cite Resolution 52 of the Thirty-fifth World Zionist Congress in June 2006:
There is no dispute on the major gap between Israeli Arab, Druze and Circassian citizens, and Jewish Israeli citizens in a wide range of measurements of quality of life, economy, public sector resources, and integration within governmental and public institutions. These gaps were specifically noted in government decisions and in the Government Committee of Inquiry headed by Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or.41
Israels official policy toward the Arab minority over the years was based on short-term considerations. No long-range strategies have ever been systematically developed, in an organized decisionmaking process. The common argument raised by government officials was that as long as the external conflict with the Palestinians was not resolved and peace was remote, there was little chance to settle the domestic conflict. This resulted in an ad hoc denial policy, often described as extinguishing fires, or sweeping the issue under the rug. Ethno-national conflicts tend to become exacerbated when fueled by social discontent and pent-up anger. In Israel, continuous denial and neglect of the problem may well have deepened the divide between Jews and Arabs in Israel and may have led to the growing inclination toward separatism on the Arabs part. The distressing combination of socioeconomic deprivation and nationalist fervor is destined to explode. Therefore, a revised framework for minority-majority relations must be devised, and an integrated model based on equality, coexistence, tolerance, and mutual respect must be developed. A fundamental principle of this new framework should be appreciation of diversity and acceptance of the legitimacy and right of existence of both national groups. The first step needed is government recognition and public awareness of the importance of the issue as a top priority objective
of Israeli society. In practical terms, the response to the Future Vision documents should be on two policy levels. On the civic level, the documents should trigger a new dynamic that allows the government and civic society in Israel to take action to promote the status of the Arab population, thereby disproving those who argue that the democratic element in the identity of the State of Israel applies exclusively to Jews. Recommendations and programs for such actions have already been prepared and are outlined clearly in the Or Commission report. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. The principle of civil equality should be fully endorsed. Due to the underprivileged status of the Arab sector, affirmative action should be favorably pursued in particular areas. Concurrently, the issue of civic obligations (such as community service) should also be urgently revised, within the context of a comprehensive policy. In addition to the general requirement to close gaps in economic development, employment, education, health service, and infrastructure, two areas deserve special consideration: land and inclusion. The land issue is particularly pressing. There is a severe housing problem; settlements for the Negev Bedouin remain unresolved; more than 20,000 illegal structures exist in the Arab sector, as well as dozens of unrecognized villages. Since 1948, not a single Arab city has been established (other than a few Bedouin villages), even though the Arab population has grown tenfold. The state must urgently adopt a more egalitarian land policy that will include a more balanced allocation of land resources for housing, development, and public purposes. As for inclusion, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel called upon the Arab inhabitants of the State to participate in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions. This principle has yet to be fully implemented. Appropriate representation of Arab citizens in government ministries (including in senior positions), along with more comprehensive integration and inclusion, will undoubtedly weaken separatist tendencies.
conclusion 29
The national sphere is far more complex, since it relates directly to the character of the Israeli state and is strongly influenced by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The attempt in the Future Vision documents to disestablish Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and to depict Zionism as a colonial enterprise, is unacceptable. The right of the Jewish people to self-determination in a nation-state of their own, and the valid Law of Return, are inalienable rights. Furthermore, the model of a Jewish, democratic state is sustainable. The value of equality is deeply ingrained in the Jewish tradition. This, however, does not mean that the boundaries of Israels nature as Jewish and democratic cannot be debated. Israel is not a flawless democracy. Some imbalance undoubtedly exists between its Jewish and democratic components, requiring adjustment. For example, although officially committed to the principle of equality, the state does not provide sufficient protection for the rights of its non-Jewish minorities. Israel has already granted several collective rights to the Arab minority in Israel. Considerable experience regarding minority rights and other issues raised in the Future Vision documents has been gained based on recent experience, particularly in Europe. An effort should be madeeither by NGOs or academic research institutions or think tanksto learn what is applicable to the Israeli case, so that the state can endorse a more liberal and open-minded attitude toward the Arabs in Israel as a national minority within the Jewish nation-state. On a more optimistic note, it is doubtful whether the Arab community in Israel at large seeks separation. It is more likely that the vast majority of Arabs in Israelthe general public rather than the intellectual eliteswould accept a Jewish democratic state of Israel, provided that equality and shared citizenship rights to all were guaranteed. American Jewry can play an important role in this process. Stabilizing Jewish-Arab relations inside Israel will undoubtedly contribute to Israels inner cohesion and internal security. In the past,
American Jewry focused on the Jewish part of Israeli society. However, one cannot ignore the complex composition of the State of Israel, with Arabs and Druze constituting 17 percent of the population. Therefore the traditional, perhaps even conservative, viewpoints representative of American Jewry should be reconsidered. In fact, such a transition has already begun with the recent and growing involvement of Jewish NGOs and United Jewish Communities (UJC) in projects supporting the Arab citizens of Israel. One of the highlights of this process was the establishment in 2006 of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues. This diverse, broadbased coalition is comprised of seventy North American Jewish organizations, foundations, federations, and private philanthropists. The task force works to increase awareness of the needs of Israels Arab citizens and to promote civil equality in Israeli society. The recent radicalization of the Arab minority in Israel, as reflected in the Future Vision documents, underlines the dual nature of the grievances brought by the Arab population in Israel, combining support for national demands as well as economic, social, educational, and cultural stresses. As the Future Vision documents of the Palestinian society in Israel make piercingly obvious, this combination of national and civic platforms has now escalated into a serious challenge to Israels national identity that requires an urgent response by Israels Jewish majority, the state establishment, and world Jewry.
appendix 31
Appendix: The Arabs in Israel: Statistical and Demographic Data

1. IsraelSize of Population (End of 2006)
Population Total Jews Arabs and Druze Non-Jews Numbers 7,116,700 5,393,500 1,413,300 309,900 Percentage 100.0 75.8 19.9 4.3 1948 1961 1972 1983 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006
3. Size of Arab PopulationSelected Years

Year Size of Arab population 156,000 252,500 472,200 706,100 1,004,900 1,105,400 1,227,500 1,340,200 1,377,100 1,413,300 Percentage of the total population 17.9 11.3 14.6 17.1 17.9 18.3 18.9 19.5 19.7 19.9
2. Arab Population by Religion (End of 2006)

Religion Muslims Christians Druze Total Numbers 1,173,100 122,700 117,500 1,413,300 Percentage 83.0 8.7 8.3 100.0
4. Life Expectancy (2006)

Christians (by sect) Greek Catholic Greek Orthodox Catholic Others Total Percentage 37 30 23 10 100% Jews Male 1948 2005 65.0 78.1 Female 65.0 82.0 Male 49.0 74.4 Arabs Female 52.0 78.4
appendix 33
5. Live Births, Deaths, Natural Growth, Infant Mortality Rates, and Fertility Rates (1998, 2006)
Live Birthrates 1998 Jews Muslims Christians Druze 18.4 37.6 21.6 27.2 Death Rates Natural Growth Fertility (per 1000 newborns) Rates 1998 2.67 4.76 2.62 3.10 2006 2.75 3.97 2.14 2.64 Infant Mortality
7. Socioeconomic Indices
Under the Poverty Line, by Percent (1995, 2005) 1995 Jews Families Children 15.1 18.6 Arabs 31.2 40.6 Jews 17.2 24.4 2005 Arabs 55.4 64.2
2006 1998 2006 1998 2006 1998 2006 19.5 29.7 16.9 22.4 7.0 2.9 4.5 3.0 6.3 2.7 4.8 3.1 11.4 34.7 17.1 24.2 13.2 27.0 12.1 19.3 5.0 9.7 3.6 8.4 2.9 7.2 3.2 5.0
Socioeconomic Classification (2004) (Of towns and villages in Israel acording to 10 clusters: 1 = lowest, 10 = highest) Percentage of Arab localities in cluster 1 (lowest): Percentage of Arab localities in cluster 2: Percentage of Arab localities in cluster 3: Percentage of Arab localities in clusters 7 to 10 (highest): 87 81 93 0
6. Age Structure (Average Figures for 2006)

Years 0-14 0-19 0-24 0-34 Median Age Jews 27.1% 29.8% 38.1% 53.8% 30.8 Arab Christians 26.9% 35.8% 43.6% 59.5% 28.6 Muslims 42.3% 52.2% 60.5% 75.6% 18.8 Druze 33.3% 43.3% 52.5% 70.1% 23.8
8. Housing Density, by Percent (2006)

Persons per room 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 and above Total Average persons per household Arabs 4.8 10.9 12.1 16.8 17.7 16.7 21.1 100.0 4.90 Jews 19.9 25.4 16.8 17.0 12.3 4.8 3.9 100.0 3.10
appendix 35
9. Employed Persons and Employees by Occupation, by Percent (2006)

Arabs Occupation Academic professionals Associate professionals and technicians Managers Clerical workers Agents, sales, and service workers Skilled agricultural workers Manufacturing, construction, and other skilled workers Unskilled workers Employed persons 8.1 11.6 2.3 6.6 16.3 2.0 39.8 13.3 Employees 7.7 12.7 1.6 7.5 13.3 1.9 40.3 14.9 Jews Employed persons 15.1 16.6 6.8 17.5 20.7 1.2 15.0 7.0 Employees 15.1 16.7 6.8 19.7 19.6 0.7 13.8 7.8
11. Arab Educational System: Schools and Students

Elementary Schools 45 219 312 401 438 475 493 Students Students Secondary High Total in Elementary in Secondary Schools Schools Students* Schools and High Schools 4 43 106 135 136 139 1 35 49 136 188 208 215 11,129 110,537 177,226 297,095 419,021 451,791 466,916 9,991 85,449 121,985 168,298 208,029 221,133 230,646 14 10,507 37,276 98,180 127,141 136,804 141,370
Years 1948-49 1969-70 1979-80 1998-99 2003-04 2005-06 2006-07
* Includes kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and post-secondary students
12. Median Years of Schooling, by Percent (Selected Years)

Year 1961 1.2 8.4 1970 5.0 9.3 1975 6.5 10.3 1980 7.5 11.1 1985 1990 8.6 11.5 9.0 11.9 1995 10.2 12.2 2000 11.1 12.5 2005 11.1 12.7 Arabs Jews
10. Arab and Druze Vote in 2003 and 2006 Knesset Elections, by Percent
Party United Arab List and the Arab Movement for Change Democratic Front for Peace and Equality National Democratic Alliance Labor Kadima Meretz Shas Likud Others Total 2003 20.0 28.3 20.9 8.8 4.8 3.6 4.1 9.5 100.0 2006 27.4 24.3 20.2 12.8 6.8 2.8 2.9 0.9 1.9 100.0
notes 37
Notes
1. This section is based on the following: Elie Rekhess, Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political Affinity and National Solidarity, Journal of Asian and African Studies 23: 2-3 (1989), pp. 119-54; idem, The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the National Struggle, Israel Studies 7:3 (2002), pp. 175-98; Arik Rudnitzky and idem, Israel, State of: Arab Population, Encyclopaedia Judaica, second edition, vol. 10 (2006), pp. 728-37; Rekhess, The Evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian National Minority in Israel, Israel Studies 12:3 (2007), pp. 1-28; idem, In the Shadow of National Conflict: Intergroup Attitudes and Images of Arab and Jews in Israel, TriQuarterly, 131 (forthcoming). 2. While the 1947 UN Partition Plan envisaged Arabs living in the Jewish state and vice versa, the topic of the status of the ethnic minorities in each state never reached the stage of practical discussions. The plan itself remained an unfulfilled platform. 3. This figure includes some 261,400 Arab residents of East Jerusalem. The ethnic-religious division is as follows: Muslims, 83 percent; Christians, 8.7 percent; and Druze, 8.3 percent. The Arab population in Israel (Muslim and Druze), excluding the Druze and the East Jerusalemites, constitutes approximately 15 percent of the population. 4. See http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/heb/megilat.htm (accessed: June 21, 2007). 5. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., Israel in the Middle East (Oxford, 1984), pp. 1415. 6. Ibid. 7. Elie Rekhess, Initial Israeli Policy Guidelines toward the Arab Minority, 19481949, in Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the State (New York, 1991), pp. 10323; Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, Subtenants, Part 2 (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 101210 (Hebrew). 8. Cited in the State Investigative Commission, by Justice Theodor Or, which was established to examine the October 2000 Events. The State Investigative Commission on the Confrontations between Security Forces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000Report, Part 1, Article 10 (Jerusalem, 2003) 29 (Hebrew). 9. Elie Rekhess, The Arabs in Israel, in Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, eds., Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1977-1978, vol. 2 (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1979), p. 567.
10. , The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the National Struggle, Israel Studies 7:3 (Fall 2002), p. 33. 11. See Justice (ret.) Theodor Or, A Year to the State Investigative Commission on the October 2000 Events (Tel-Aviv University: Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, 2004), pp. 13-24. 12. Elie Rekhess, The Arab Minority in Israel and the 17th Knesset Elections: The Beginning of a New Era? in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., The Elections in Israel2006 (Jerusalem, 2007) forthcoming (Hebrew). 13. Elie Rekhess and Arik Rudnitzky, eds., The Arabs in Israel and the War in the North (Tel Aviv, 2006), http://www.dayan.org/kapjac/files/War_ North1_EN.pdf (accessed: June 21, 2007). 14. The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel (Nazareth, 2006), http://www.arab-lac.org/tasawor-mostaqbali-eng.pdf. 15. Yousef T. Jabareen, An Equal Constitution for All: On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in IsraelPosition Paper (Haifa: Mossawa Center, May 2007), http://www.mossawacenter.org/files/files/File/An %20Equal%20Constitution%20For%20All.pdf (accessed November 28, 2007). The Mossawa Center is the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, an NGO working to promote equality for Arabs in Israel. 16. The Democratic Constitution (AdalahThe Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2007), http://www.adalah.org/eng/democratic_ constitution-e.pdf (accessed June 21, 2007). 17. At http://www.mada-research.org/archive/haifaenglish.pdf (accessed June 21, 2007). 18. The Kinneret Covenant, also called the Kinneret Agreement, is discussed in an American Jewish Committee publication, Renewing the Jewish Social Contract: Bridging the Religious-Secular Divide (New York: AJC, 2003). 19. For more on this endeavor of the Israel Democracy Institute, see http://www.idi.org.il/english/article.asp?id=2736. 20. The Status and Future of Israels Palestinian Minority, Journal of Palestine Studies 36:4 (Summer 2007), p. 74. 21. See, for example, the following statement by Avigdor Lieberman in the Knesset in early May 2006, referring to Arab Knesset members: At the end of the Second World War, not only criminals were executed in the Nuremberg trials, but also those who collaborated with them. I hope that will be the fate of the collaborators in this house. Arab MKs reacted furiously. MK Ibrahim Sarsur (United Arab List) filed a complaint with the
notes 39
Knesset Ethics Committee against the racist comments made by Avigdor Lieberman. MK Raleb Majadele declared, Lieberman continues to provide racist slogans in order to create a divide between Jews and Arabs. See http:// www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3247068,00.html (accessed January 8, 2008). 22. The Triangle is an area in central Israel containing a concentration of Israeli Arabs towns and villages adjacent to the pre-1967 Green Line, which delineated the 1949 armistice agreement border line between Israel and Jordan. 23. Amal Jamal, Outcry in the Political Darkness, Eretz Acheret 39 (April-May 2007), p. 25. 24. Palestinians whose villages had been ruined in the course of the 1948 war, but remained in Israel and moved to adjacent villages and became Israeli citizens. 25. See, for example, sociologist Asad Ghanems article in Haaretz, December 18, 2006, and his op-ed piece in www.alarab.co.il, December 22, 2006 (accessed: June 21, 2007). Ghanem is one of the major contributors to the Future Vision documents. 26. Journal of Palestine Studies 36:4 (Summer 2007), p. 75. 27. Rekhess and Rudnitsky, eds., The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, p. 10. 28. Haaretz, December 28, 2006. 29. Rafiq Jabareen, Kul al-Arab, January 19, 2007; Ali Zubaydat, http:// sakhnin2005.blogspot.com, December 19, 2006; MK Jamal Zahalka, Fast al-Maqal, December 12, 2006; Islamic Movement (North), www.panet. co.il, December 17, 2006; MK Ahmad Tibi, Jerusalem Report, January 22, 2007. 30. Nazir Majali, This Is not the Way to Represent Us, Eretz Acheret 39 (April-May 2007), p. 57. 31. Ilan Saban, Response to the Adalahs Proposal for Democratic Constitution for Israel, March 13, 2007, at http://haifalawfaculty.blogspot. com/2007_03_01_archive.html [Hebrew]; Oren Yiftachel, Take Slovakia for Example, Haaretz, December 21, 2006. 32. Maariv, January 5, 2007. 33. See debate between Asher Susser and Asad Ghanem, at http://www. bitterlemons-dialogue.org/dialogue6.html, No. 6, March 2007 (accessed June 21, 2007). 34. Loran Cohen, Within an Outburst of the Soul, Eretz Acheret 39 (April-May 2007), p. 61.
35. Amal Jamal, Outcry in the Darkness, Eretz Acheret, vol. 39 (AprilMay 2007), p. 26. 36. See the debate between Asher Susser and Asad Ghanem, at http://www.bitterlemons-dialogue.org/dialogue6.html (accessed June 21, 2007). 37. Yitzhak Reiter, Our Turn, Haaretz, December 28, 2006. 38. The Status and Future of Israels Palestinian Minority, Journal of Palestine Studies 36:4, p. 74. 39. See results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at http://www.dayan.org/ kapjac/arab_survey_2007.pdf (Hebrew) (accessed June 21, 2007). Compare to poll findings included in Sammy Smooha, The Arab Vision DocumentsA Strategic Threat or a Basis for Dialogue?, Daf Emda 6 (Beit Berl, June 2007). For opposing Arab views see Ali Zahalqa, Our Sheeps Silence, September 10, 2006; Nabil Awda, The Arab Public in Israel Is More Moderate than its Leaders, at www.metransparent.com, January 13, 2007 (accessed June 21, 2007). 40. See, for example, Adalahs appearance at the recent meeting of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Geneva in February 2007, New York Sun, February 22; 2007; Haaretz, February 26, 2003; The Internationalization of the Israeli Arabs Issue, Reut Institute 14 (June 2005) (Hebrew). 41. At http://www.givathaviva.org/fx/newsletter/newsletter_fall2006.pdf.
Dorothy and Julius Koppelman Institute on American JewishIsraeli Relations of the American Jewish Committee The Dorothy and Julius Koppelman Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, founded in 1982 as an arm of the American Jewish Committee, is an interpreter of Israeli and American Jewry to each other, and seeks to build bridges between the worlds largest Jewish communities. Specifically, its goals are achieved programmatically through a variety of undertakings, including: An intensive immersion seminar for American college faculty in the history, politics, culture, and society of modern Israel, conducted by Brandeis University. The goal is to enable college professors to teach courses on their home campuses on modern Israel, in all its complexity, as a Jewish and democratic state. Exchange programs over the years bringing Israeli politicians, academicians, military officers, civil servants, and educators to the United States to study the diversity of the American Jewish community and its role in American politics and society. Hundreds of Israelis have participated in these dialogueoriented missions cosponsored by the Institute and its Israeli partners, the Jerusalem Municipality, the Oranim Teacher Training Institute, the Jewish Agency, the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Ministry of Education, Government of Israel. Studies of the respective communities, particularly of their interconnectedness, published in both Hebrew and English. These have included monographs, among others, on Who Is a Jew, Post-Zionism, and Reform and Conservative Judaism in Israel. The Koppelman Institute has succeeded in reaching out to leaders who ultimately will shape the minds of thousands of followers in developing a more positive and productive relationship between Israel and American Jewry. Harold T. Shapiro, Ph.D. Chairman Steven Bayme, Ph.D. Director
American Jewish Committee

The Jacob Blaustein Building 165 East 56 Street New York, NY 10022 American Jewish Committee publishes in these areas: Hatred and Anti-Semitism Pluralism Israel American Jewish Life International Jewish Life Human Rights www.ajc.org April 2008
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DOROTHY AND JULIUS KOPPELMAN INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

THE ARAB MINORITY

An Analysis of the Future Vision Documents

DOROTHY AND JULIUS KOPPELMAN INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Dr. Harold Shapiro, Chairman Koppelman Institute

Dr. Steven Bayme, Director Koppelman Institute

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the future vision documents 13

The Future Vision Documents

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the future vision documents 15

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the future vision documents 17

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the future vision documents 19

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the future vision documents 21

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the future vision documents 23

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Appendix: The Arabs in Israel: Statistical and Demographic Data

3. Size of Arab PopulationSelected Years

2. Arab Population by Religion (End of 2006)

4. Life Expectancy (2006)

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6. Age Structure (Average Figures for 2006)

8. Housing Density, by Percent (2006)

34 the arab minority in israel

9. Employed Persons and Employees by Occupation, by Percent (2006)

11. Arab Educational System: Schools and Students

Years 1948-49 1969-70 1979-80 1998-99 2003-04 2005-06 2006-07

* Includes kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and post-secondary students

12. Median Years of Schooling, by Percent (Selected Years)

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38 the arab minority in israel

American Jewish Committee

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