San Juan vs.

Civil Service Commission April 19, 1991 | Gutierrez Facts: The petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). When the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal was left vacant, petitioner Reynaldo San Juan, then governor, requested Director Reynaldo Abella of the DBM Region IV to endorse the appointment of Dalisay Santos. DBM Regional Director Galvez wrote San Juan that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 and further required him to submit at least three other qualified nominees. San Juan filed a protest to Secretary Carague. However, unknown to San Juan, the DBM, through Undersecretary Cabuquit, subsequently appointed private respondent Cecilia Almajose to the position. San Juan later protested against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit was not legally authorized to appoint the PBO and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. The DBM ruled that it validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position. The CSC likewise ruled against San Juans protest, saying that the local chief executives recommending power is purely directory. San Juan invoked Section 1 of E.O. No. 112 (Placing All Budget Officers of LGUs under the Administrative Control and Technical Supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management), contending that he had the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO. Such recommendation must be made part and parcel of the appointment process. Thus, it must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. Issue: WON the appointment of Almajose by the DBM was in derogation of the governors power to recommend nominees to the position of PBO Held: YES. When the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. And the disregard by the DBM Secretary of the right of local governments to develop self-reliance in

handling their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated. Section 6 of Local Budget Circular No. 31 which gives the DBM the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements is ultra vires and void. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. This is why there should be a genuine interplay and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is also for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. Pimentel vs. Aguirre July 19, 2000 | Panganiban Facts: On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services items, along the following suggested areas: SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs. Issue: WON the AO 372 is valid exercise of the general supervision of the president

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. The Law of Local Governments

Held: PARTLY MERITORIOUS. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues;and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. The provision regarding the reduction to 25% is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Ganzon vs. CA August 5, 1991 | Sarmiento Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials like a clerk at the city health office, Assistant City Health

Officer, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod and a barangay tanod. Finding probable grounds, respondent Secretary of Local Government issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty (60) days. Thereafter, Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition in the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in 20 months. Petitioner Mary Ann Artieda on the other hand was similarly charged by the respondent Secretary. Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. Held: YES. Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. "Supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". However, the successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. Suspension is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case. Here, suspensions so far imposed by the Secretary indicate an abuse of power. They are unreasonable, contrary to the LGC, and tantamount to a punishment despite the fact that Ganzons guilt had not yet been proven.

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. The Law of Local Governments

Cordillera Board Coalition vs. COA January 29, 1990 | Cortes Facts:. EO No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras During the pendency of this case, RA No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature. Issue: a. WON E.O. No. 220 pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite b. WON the creation of the CAR contravenes the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR Held: a. NO. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. The creation of the autonomous will take time (procedure is outlined in Art. X, sec. 18). The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the President. E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group

of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the parties involved. b. NO. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning. Its an administrative region for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. Limbona vs. Mangelin February 28, 1989 | Sarmiento Facts: Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was the speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao, Region XII. The Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives invited petitioner to be one of the resource persons in the consultations and dialogues conducted by the by the House Committee. Petitioner instructed the Assembly not to hold session during the conference, saying that their presence therein took precedence over any pending business in the batasang pampook. However, the Assembly held a session in defiance of petitioner's advice. On a motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared the said seat of

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. The Law of Local Governments

the Speaker vacant. Petitioner filed a petition to nullify the abovestated acts of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings, the Supreme Court received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook expelling petitioner from the Sangguniang Pampook. Petitioner allegedly paid without authority from the Assembly the salaries of Odin Abdula who was considered resigned after filing his COC for Congressman for the First District of Maguindanao. Issue: WON the autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts Held: NO. But Batasang Pampook is not an autonomous government. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation. If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of

Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of selfimmolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. While the Court agrees that what was held was an adjournment of the session and not mere recess, the Court still invalidates the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. Also, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Lastly, the respondents opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. It doesnt appear that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster.

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. The Law of Local Governments