Mnchner betriebswirtschaftliche Beitrge Munich Business Research

Organisational Interactions in Luhmanns Theory of Social Systems

David Seidl

# 2003-9

LMU Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Mnchen Munich School of Management

Organisational Interactions in Luhmanns Theory of Social Systems

David Seidl Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Munich Institute of Organization

Abstract:

This paper explores the form and function of organisational interactions from the perspective of Luhmanns Theory of Social Systems. After a short recapitulation of Luhmanns concept of organisation and interaction a suggestion on the conceptualisation of organisational interactions will be made. Organisational interactions are interactions that describe themselves as organisational and that select their own operations with regard to their implications for the organisational reproduction. A particular kind of organisational interaction is the deciding interaction in which decisions for the organisation are produced. The relation between organisation and deciding interaction is described as one of interpenetration. This means that organisations can make use of the interactional complexity for their own reproduction. Three functions of organisational interactions will be discussed: (1) complexity reduction, (2) deparadoxification and (3) memory. It follows a discussion of possibilities for organisations of conditioning interactions for their puroses. The paper concludes with a brief reflection on the advantages of the proposed conceptualisation of organisational interactions.

1. Introduction Luhmann distinguishes in his theory three types of social systems: society, organisation and interaction. While the functioning of each of the systems (as autopoietic systems) has been described fairly well1, the relation between the systems has received comparatively little attention. Particularly unclear remains the relation between organisation and interaction. Apart from a few remarks here and there (e.g. Luhmann 2000, pp. 25, 255, 373) Luhmann himself hasnt written anything on that issue. The only serious contribution comes from Andr Kieserling (1994; 1999: chapter 11), who isn't however very explicit on how to conceptualise the relation in the 'technical' terms of Luhmann's theory. Luhmann's systems theoretical perspective initially seems to oppose the idea of organisational interactions: organisation and interaction are conceptualised as two systems that are operatively closed with regard to each other; i.e. they cannot take part in the autopoiesis of each other - as they for example take part in the autopoiesis of society. Thus, what can be observed empirically - that there are interactions that make organisational decisions and in this way contribute to the reproduction of the organisation seems (at first) theoretically impossible. While the theory indeed excludes the possibility of interactions becoming part of the organisation, there are other more complex - ways of conceptualising the contribution of interactions to the organisational reproduction in terms of Luhmann's theory, which will be explored in this paper. In the following we will first explain Luhmann's concepts of organisation and interaction as two autopoietic systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of different operations. We will then explore ways of conceptualising organisational interactions using the concepts of re-

See for society e.g. Luhmann (1997; 1993b: part II; 1995: chapter10), for organisations e.g. Luhmann (2000; 1993b: part III; 1993c; 1992) and for interactions e.g. Luhmann (1995: 405-436; 1999) or Kieserling (1999).
3

entry and interpenetration. This will be followed by an exploration of functions that interactions might serve in organisations and the ways in which organisation can condition interactions for their purposes. We will close with a brief reflection on the advantages of the proposed conceptualisation of organisational interactions.

2. Organisation and interaction as two types of social systems According to Luhmann's theory organisations and interactions can be conceptualised as two types of social systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of different types of communication. Organisations on the basis of decision communications and interactions on the basis of communications among people present. Both systems are perceived as operatively closed in the sense that they can only operate in the context of their own operations (Luhmann 2000: 51-52): organisations can only reproduce themselves through (their own) decisions and interactions only through (their own) communications among people present.

Organisations are conceptualised as autopoietic "systems that consist of decisions and that themselves produce the decisions of which they consist through decisions of which they consist" (Luhmann, 1992b: 166; my translation). Three concepts are central to this understanding of organisation: the concept of decision, the concept of decision premise and the concept of uncertainty absorption. Decisions constitute the elements of the organisation. They are a specific kind of communication2: they are communications that communicate their own contingency3 (Luhmann 1993e: 339). That is, they communicate the decision as such and the alternatives to the decision. In this sense decisions are paradoxical communications: Every decision
2

For Luhmann decisions in organisations are communicative events. He thus contradicts the classical notion of a distinction between decision making and the communication of that decision. (Luhmann, 2000: 141-145).
4

communicates that there are alternatives to the decision - otherwise it wouldn't be a decision and it simultaneously communicates that there are no alternatives since the decision has been made otherwise it wouldn't be a decision (Luhmann, 2000: 142). Because of their paradoxical nature decision communications at first may appear as extremely improbable phenomena - they call for their own deconstruction (Luhmann, 2000: 142). Empirically however one can observe that decision communications do succeed, in fact in organisations decision communications are normality. How does the organisation prevent the constant deconstruction of its decisions? Firstly this happens through the totalisation of decision expectation (Luhmann 2000: 145; Kieserling 1999: 352). Any communication reproducing the organisation is forced into the form of a decision. Thus even the deconstruction of a decision would itself have to take the form of a decision. Secondly, organisational decisions take place in the context of other decisions which it refers to in order stabilise itself as decision. In other words every decision communicates also a meta-communication which says that the decision maker had the right, authority or other good reasons for deciding the way he did. (Luhmann 2000: 142). In general terms, decisions are stabilised through reference to organisational structures. With the concept of decision premise4 Luhmann captures the structural aspect of organisations. Every decision constitutes a decision premise for later decisions as it defines the structural conditions for it. Decision premises here serve a double function as both creating and restricting the decision. They create the decision situation in the first place. Without decision premises there is no occasion for decision making. At the same time, decision premises restrict the decision situation by restricting the decision possibilities. Decisions dont only serve as decision premises for immediately following decisions, but they
3

Contingency here in the modal sense of also possible otherwise.

can also decide on decision premises which are binding for a multitude of later decisions. Luhmann distinguishes between three types of such far-reaching decision premises: programmes, communication channels and personnel (Luhmann 2000; 1993; 1992).5 With the concept of uncertainty absorption6 Luhmann captures the processual aspect of organisations; the question of how one decision leads to further decisions and thus to a reproduction of the organisation. That is, uncertainty absorption describes the autopoiesis of the organisation (Luhmann: 1993c: 308). In the transition form one decision to the next one the uncertainty involved in the original decision disappears. In other words a connecting decision takes the result of a preceding decision as given (the decision was made!) and uses this result as premise for itself. One could also say, the first decision in-forms the following decision only about the result of the original decision but not about the uncertainty involved in the decision making. To bring the two concepts together one can define: uncertainty absorption takes place when earlier decisions are accepted as decision premises for later decisions (Luhmann 1993: 299; 2000: 193). The system of face-to-face interaction, in contrast to the system of organisation, does not consist of decision communications but on communications that are based on reflexive perception of the physical presence of its participants. Analogously to the communications of organisations interactional communications contain a meta-communication communicating

4 5

The concept originally was introduced by Herbert Simon (1957: 201) and Simon et. al (1950: 57 ff.). In fact Luhmann (2000; 1993, 1992) suggests to use the term decision premise only with regard to such decided decision premises. One could also distinguish between decision premises in a narrow sense and decision premises in a wider sense. The concept originally was introduced by March and Simon (1958: 165): Uncertainty absorption, they write, takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated.
6

that it is a communication amongst people present (Kieserling, 1999:67).7 In other words the communications carry the code presence/absence. With this code interactions refer to their system/environment distinction. Whoever is considered present is treated as participant in the communications (if not as speaker then as listener) and whoever is considered as absent is treated as environment. (Luhmann 1997: 815). The difference of presence and absence in this sense marks the difference of self-reference and hetero-reference for the operations of the system (Luhmann, 1997: 815-816). Like all social systems interactions are complex systems, which means that they are forced to make selections. Luhmann (1995: 415) distinguishes between factual, temporal and social structures:8 interactions usually produce topics for the communication; they place communications in a sequence and particularly also take the end of the interaction into account; they develop rules for turn taking in the communication - in particular when somebody speaks the others have to remain quiet. Analogously to the organisational reproduction, where every decision creates the necessity for further decisions, every interactional communication necessitates further interactional communications. Reflexive perception in the interaction enforces a continuation of the communication. It is almost impossible to evade communication in an interaction. As Luhmann writes: Even the communication of not wanting to communicate is communication. [] In practice, one cannot not communicate in an interaction system; one must withdraw if one wants to avoid communication. (Luhmann, 1997: 413; original emphasis) In interaction systems the person9 plays a very prominent role. While in organisations decisions are largely justified by reference to earlier decision premises mostly decisions are presented as a direct consequence of earlier decisions in interactions communications are

7 8 9

Who is considered present is determined by the interaction itself. In this sense presence is itself a social construct of the interaction. On these three dimensions of meaning generally see Luhmann (1995: 76-81). Defined as a bundle of social expectations (Luhmann 1995d).
7

primarily attributed to persons; the reasons for particular communications are primarily sought in the person and his particular intentions. More than in organisations in interactions the person as such is held responsible for what is communicated.10 Ensuing communications take the personal aspect of earlier communications into account and very often address that personal aspect explicitly; organisational decision communications, in contrast, tend to focus on the result of the decision and only in exceptional cases address the particular (personal) circumstances of the earlier decision situation.

3. Conceptualising organisational interactions

Organisation and interaction are two types of social systems reproducing theselves in very different ways. Nevertheless the (theoretical and empirical) literature speaks of interactions taking place within organisations. How is one to conceptualise the relation of organisation and interaction in such cases. Within first of all could be meant in a local sense, e.g. meetings take place in the offices, two workers at the conveyer-belt talk about the new working hours. From a Luhmannian perspective the locality of the interaction wouldnt matter. Organisation and interaction are two different systems that constitute environment for each other, i.e. the systems are operatively closed against each other. The solution however isnt that easy taking into account that such interactions might produce decisions for the organisation; that is to say interactions seem to play a role in the organisational reproduction and in this sense could seem to contradict the idea of operational closure. An alternative solution to this problem could be to conceptualise the relation between organisation and interaction analogously to that between society and organisation or society
10

We are only speaking of social constructions, not of any causal connection between psychic system and communication in an ontological sense (cf. Kieserling 1997: 67).
8

and interaction. Society constitutes the all encompassing system of communication in which organisation and interaction differentiate themselves on the basis of specific communications (Luhmann 1997). Thus organisation and interaction reproduce with every operation - decision communication and interactional communication respectively - both themselves as it constitutes a decision communication or interactional communication and the society as decision communication and interactional communication are communications. Society thus can be found both inside and outside of the organisation or interaction (Luhmann 2000: 59; 383; Luhmann 1995: 405 ff.). Analogously one might try to conceptualise organisational interactions as social systems that take place in organisations in the sense that they reproduce themselves by interactional decision communications; i.e. they would reproduce themselves by a specific kind of decision communications. In this sense they would reproduce both themselves and the organisation simultaneously. Such a conceptualisation, however, wouldnt be compatible with the empirical observation that decision communications within organisational interactions are relatively rare. Most communications even in formal meetings are non-decision communications. In fact, it is particularly the non-decision communication that is typical for (organisational) interactions; decisions constitute a kind of foreign matter to the interaction. 11 Often no decisions are made at all in such interactions. Furthermore, sometimes part of an interaction is organisation-related while other parts have nothing to do with the organisation. A business meeting ends in bed; during a board meeting some members of the board discuss the latest results of the Football World Cup; after their coffee break together colleagues make their way back into a meeting12. In all these cases it is not that one interaction is terminated and a new interaction is started but it is one and the same interaction. Thus the relation between organisation and organisational interaction has to be conceptualised differently from one of inclusion.

11

Cf. Kieserling (1999): 355 ff.; Kieserling (1994a).

9

Before we try a conceptualisation of organisational interactions in terms of Luhmanns theory we will first give a short overview of the different empirically observable forms of interactions in organisations. Firstly there are deciding interactions in which decisions for the organisation are made; one might think of board meetings, strategy meetings etc. Secondly there are decision-preparatory interactions in which the conditions for later decisions are laid. That is to say in the interaction itself no decisions are made but later decisions are prepared for; e.g. interactions in which relevant information for later decisions is exchanged, the participants deliberate later decisions without making decisions. Thirdly there are semidetached interactions with a merely loose relation to decision making; that is interactions which communicate about decisions without direct focus on influencing decision making. One might think of informal interactions between members of an organisation gossiping about organisational issues.13 Fourthly there are organisation unrelated interactions in which topics that are unrelated to the organisation are communicated about; e.g. members of an organisation talk during their work about their night out together. These different forms of interaction differ in the degree to which they contribute to the organisational reproduction: from a direct involvement in decision making to a complete detachment from the organisation. To start with we can exclude the fourth type of interaction from the list of possible forms of organisational interactions. It can be treated as a normal interaction in the environment of the organisation (cf. Kieserling 1997: 360). Their location within the physical boundaries of the organisation and the involvement of members alone doesnt grant them a specific status with regard to the organisational reproduction. The other three forms of interaction however have an organisational significance.

12

See the analysis in Atkinson et al. (1978).

10

If one cant conceptualise the relation between organisation and organisational interaction as one of inclusion there remains only the possibility of treating it as a special kind of structural coupling; i.e. the structures of two systems are adjusted to each other in a way that allows mutual influences on their respective reproductions.14 Organisational interactions reproduce themselves on the basis of their interactional communications but they take the organisational operations into account. That is organisational interactions allow for a conditioning of their own operations through the organisation in social, factual and temporal respects. In other words interactional communications orient themselves not only according to their interactional structures but also according to organisational structures, i.e. its environment. In terms of systems theory this has to be conceptualised as a re-entry (Spencer Brown 1979) of the interaction/organisation distinction (as the system/environment distinction) into the interaction (as system). The interaction observes its own communications with regard to their significance for the interaction and for the organisation. The interaction can of course only observe this distinction according to its own logic; its own construction.15 This for example means that the distinction is reconstructed with regard to the interacting persons16: as a distinction between their organisational roles (and generally: membership) and interactional roles.17 In other words the interactional communications take into account that the persons involved in the interaction have other roles outside the interaction in the organisation and that these roles have to be taken into account in the interactional communications. Or put the other way around, the interaction treats the difference between interactional and organisational roles
13 14

On such forms of communication see e.g. Cf. March and Sevn (1989), Drew and Heritage (1992), Boden (1994), Fuchs (1995), Kurland and Pelled (2000). Structural coupling constitutes a complementary concept to that of operative closure; it allows conceptualising the influence of systems in the environment on the autopoiesis of a system in question (Baecker, 2001: 219; Luhmann 1995b). The re-entered distinction isnt, of course, the original distinction it is mark and not cross as Spencer Brown (1979) would have it. Since interactional communications generally are primarily oriented according to the interacting persons.
11

15 16

of its participants as its distinction with the organisation. Interactional communications in this sense can be observed with regard to interactional roles and with regard organisational roles. In terms of Heinz von Foerster (1981: 304-305; 1993) the interaction uses the (re-entered) interaction/environment distinction in the form of a difference in roles as programme. The re-entry of the organisation into the interaction doesnt however mean that organisational structures the organisational logic are introduced into the interaction. First of all due to the different forms of reproduction organisational structures cannot serve as interactional structures they belong to different domains. The interaction, however, can reconstruct the structures in interactional terms. For example the hierarchical structure of decision communications can be translated into a stratified order of respect with regard to persons in different positions, a differential treatment of persons with regard to their contributions to the communication, e.g. with regard to turn-taking, granted speaking time, or with regard to possibilities of criticism. Apart from that the re-entry doesnt mean that the interaction is trying to translate the organisational structures into interactional structures trying a representation of the organisation. Even the opposite could be the case the interaction could counter the organisational structures, e.g. by an (explicit) suspension of the hierarchical order of positions. The important point however is that the interactional structures, whether imitating or contrasting the organisational structures, refer to the organisational structures. Without explicit reference to the organisation the interaction couldnt be treated as organisational. Although the re-entry of the organisation into the interaction is accomplished through the reference to the participating persons and thus the social dimension is ultimately central

17

On the consideration of organisational roles in the interaction see Kieserling (1999): 360 ff.
12

the organisation can be reflected into the interaction in all three dimensions of meaning18. In the social dimension as already addressed above the interaction takes the participants personal experiences and actions as organisational members (which largely result from their organisational roles) into account. In the factual dimension the interaction structures its communications according to organisational themes, e.g. the interaction might communicate about new strategies for the organisation or the official organisational self-description. Again, this doesnt mean that the themes have to be dealt with in the same way as they are dealt with in the organisation. The participants might treat the theme cynically, i.e. communicate about the other side19 of the theme; that which the official version of the theme disguises (cf. Luhmann 2000: 430 ff). What organisational themes are dealt with and how depends on the participating persons. As with all interactions the personal relation to the topic is decisive and contributions to a topic are attributed personally. In the temporal dimension the interactional communications might reflect the temporal structures of the organisation for example by scheduling the interaction as to coincide with external organisational events. The interaction might be terminated because the participants are needed elsewhere in the organisation, the participants in a meeting might wait for a latecomer who is held up in another meeting, an important topic on the top of the agenda might be moved to the end in order to allow for additional information to be provided by the organisation, e.g. the results of a parallel meeting; or vice versa a topic might be dealt with early in a meeting in order for its result to be available to other organisational communications. An interaction might also be intentionally protracted in order to obstruct certain organisational processes. Again, more than anything else the reflection of temporal structures of the organisation into the interaction is accomplished through the focus on the
18

On the three dimensions of meaning see Luhmann (1995): 75-81.

13

participating persons and their organisational roles. The structuring of the interaction is very much oriented according to the time available to the participants; the participants can bring the interaction to an end by referring to other organisational obligations that temporally coincide. In contrast, the reference to extra-organisational obligations e.g. one has to pick up ones children from the kindergarten is only in exceptional cases accepted as an orientation for the temporal structuring of the interaction (cf. Kieserling, 1999: 360). Of course, the organisational interaction to the extent that it takes place during working hours can count on the exemption of its participants from any other extra-organisational obligations for the time being; i.e. the availability of the participants is guaranteed by the organisation and only organisational obligations can thus count as reasons for terminating ones presence.20 Even if the temporal structuring isnt oriented directly according to the temporal availability of its participants temporal structures of the organisation are still transported into the organisational interaction through the participating persons. An agreement has to be reached until a certain time because it was promised by somebody, or because the personal career of one of the participants depends on it, or because it would make it easier for the participants to continue their ordinary work. Or an informal meeting on the corridor is terminated because the participants have to get back to their desks in order not to get sacked for laziness. So far we have described some features of organisational interactions, in particular the reentry of the organisation into the interaction. One could also say the re-entry of the

19 20

In Spencer Browns (1979) terms the unmarked state. In fact, cynical communication constitutes a re-entry. In the case of after-hour meetings the situation is somewhat different. Whether or not one can claim other obligations depends very much on the organisational arrangements. In many contemporary organisations, for example consultancy firms, working hours are not really predefined but depend on the particular tasks at issue. In other words, members are expected almost always to be available for the organisation. This doesnt mean that they will always be available, but that reasons for their non-availability have to be formulated as organisational reasons e.g. one has to take a weekend off to keep a clear head for an important meeting on Monday.
14

organisation into the interaction is the defining criterion21: to the extent that such a re-entry takes place it is an organisational interaction. But how can this re-entry be explained? Why would an interaction orient itself according to an organisation? An easy but somewhat unsatisfactory answer would be that an interaction as autonomous22 system is free to select its own structures and if it, thus, selects its structures with regard to an organisation then it does so - it is its own selection; and if it doesnt, it doesnt. In this sense only the interaction itself can determine whether or not it orients itself according to the organisation; in particular the organisational roles of its participants.23 It is the interaction itself that sees itself as organisational. It has to be understood as a self-attribution (Kieserling, 1999: 79; see also Luhmann 1999:64) of the interaction to the organisation. In order to ascertain whether an interaction attributes itself to the organisation one has to observe the interactional communications whether or not the interaction/organisation distinction serves as a guiding difference for the communications. What is of specific interest here is how the interaction describes itself, i.e. what selfdescriptions it uses in its communications. Interactions, in contrast to organisations (Luhmann 2000: chapter 14; Seidl: 2002a; 2002b) or societies (Luhmann 1997: chapter 5), usually do not possess very elaborate self-descriptions. Nevertheless some (at least rudimentary) selfdescriptions can always be found. An interaction might describes itself as strategy review, crisis meeting, board meeting or as chance encounter, flirt, class reunion etc.24 The

21 22 23

A re-entry pertaining to the interactional structures and not its autopoiesis (cf. Kieserling 1999: 79). Autopoiesis implies autonomy (Luhmann 2000: 51) Or put the other way around, to disregard any extra-organisational roles of its participants. Alternatively the interaction could for example include all other roles of its participants in that way creating an intimate interaction (cf. Luhmann 1995: 224 ff.) - not an organisational one. Often such self-descriptions are merely implicit, i.e. implied in the communication but could be made explicit if the members were asked about them.
15

24

self-attribution of an interaction to an organisation would normally be reflected in the selfdescription, as is evident in several of the above examples.25 The interactional self-attribution to an organisation as we indicated above neednt refer to the entire interaction.26 Interactions can in the course of their communication processes change their focus. An interaction might start as organisational and end as intimate (cf. Kieserling 1999: 162). Any change of self-attribution - this cant be emphasised enough is the interactions own decision.27 This however means that interaction first has to free itself from the organisation-related structures (from its guiding difference interaction / organisation) before it can switch to the structures of intimacy.28 Or an organisational interaction might suspend its organisational self-attribution for a tea- or lunch-break (during which the participants stay together) and resume its organisation-related communications afterwards (cf. Atkinson, Cuff and Lee, 1978). Beyond the mere establishment that an interaction attributes itself to an organisation, we can also try to answer why an interaction might attribute itself to an organisation. One reason is that for many interactions the reference to the organisation is close at hand.29 Often

25

One can also find explicit dissociations from the organisations in interactional self-descriptions This is not a business meeting - where the vicinity (in physical or temporal respects) otherwise would suggest a self-attribution to the organisation. See analogously the change of self-attribution of interactions to functional systems of society (Kieserling, 1999: 80 ff). There is however a difference in that in the case of a self-attribution to a functional system of society through specification of structures the interaction also uses the function-specific code as guiding difference for its communications; i.e. the interactional communications (partly) take place in the functional system of society. In the case of the organisational interaction, in contrast, the organisation remains environment for the interaction. This is not to say that there might not be external factors supporting a switch. One of the greatest obstacles to such a switch is the co-ordination of the change of structures. The change-over of structures has to take place simultaneously (in order to avoid a conflict between structures) if a break-down of the interaction and thus the end of its reproduction is to be avoided. In order to accomplish the switch the interactional communications might have to use their reference to the organisation; for example one might refer to the end working hours connected with the suggestion of having a drink together in a nearby pub. In terms of Goffman (1975) the organisation offers a frame for the interaction.
16

26

27 28

29

participants of an interaction know each other only as members of an organisation. They might even just know that the other person is a member of the same organisation. As such the orientation according to the organisational roles of the participants might be close at hand. This provides the interaction with a point of reference for establishing its structures. Most importantly it provides the interaction with topics of communication.30 Where participants who hardly know each other otherwise would struggle to find topics for communication, the orientation according to the organisational roles might provide an almost unlimited source of possible themes.31 In this sense the self-attribution to the organisation might serve as a facilitation of the reproduction of the interaction. In interactions among people who only know each other as members of the same organisation this self-attribution to the organisation might even serve as a kind safety-net to get hold on when no other topics are close at hand.32

Often interactions form as a response to organisation-related situations of double contingency. For example, two workers having to co-ordinate their interdependent tasks might instead of asking their superior resort to a mutual interaction as a means of co-ordination.. In such cases the reason for the interaction seems to precede the interaction. While it ultimately depends on the interaction (as autonomous, autopoietic system33) whether it forms at all34 and

30

Topics for interactional communication are mostly not only interactional topics but organisational or generally societal topics. The concrete definition of the topic, however, is interaction-specific (cf. Kieserling 1999: 181; 205). Organisational interactions, however, mostly would present the situation as if the topic was the reason for the interaction even where it were the other way around, i.e. that the interaction was first and had to look for a topic (cf. Kieserling 1997: 195) One might start to speak about the weather but after a while this topic might be exhausted and no other topic close at hand as one doesnt know the other person. In this case the common organisation (i.e. the respective memberships) might serve as orientation for the continuation of the communication (e.g. What do you think about the new CEO?) Interactions are no trivial machines in terms of Heinz von Foerster (e.g. 1984) which could be determined from outside. This is a paradoxical formulation (i.e. the interaction determines its own existence) for the fact that interactions are emergent phenomena.
17

31

32

33 34

what structures, in particular: what themes of communication, it selects.35 Nevertheless, the organisation almost forces itself onto the interaction. The self-attribution to the organisation is so close at hand that the interaction almost couldnt ignore it and would have to justify not focussing on the organisation. What one could rather find is that such interactions would start as organisational, i.e. attribute themselves to the organisation, and then later maybe change their self-attribution to something else with the difficulties described above.

4. Deciding interactions

In the following we want to focus on one of the forms of organisational interactions described above: the deciding interaction. The important point about such interactions is that they produce interactional communications that can be treated by the organisation as (organisational) decisions. That is the deciding interaction can contribute to the organisational reproduction. A particularly pressing question in this context is how to conceptualise the status of these communications with regard to interaction and organisation respectively. Are these communications elements of both systems, in the same way as interactional communications are also communications in the societal system (Luhmann 1995: chapter 10); or are they something completely different in both systems, as for example one and the same36 communication constitutes a legal communication (as contract) in the legal subsystem and a payment-related communication (as transaction) in the economic subsystem of society (Luhmann 1993a; Lieckweg, 2001). In order to answer this and other related questions we will apply the concept of interpenetration, that Luhmann (1995: chapt. 6; 1995c)

35 36

If an interaction forms the participants could ignore the organisation and talk about football knowing each other as football fans. To speak of one and the same communication in this context is in fact not entirely correct as it implies an ontological meaning which cant be meant here. See in this respect Luhmann (1995): 215.
18

used for describing the relation between social and psychic system37, to the relation between organisation and deciding interaction.38 Luhmann speaks of interpenetration between (autopoietic)39 systems, if the systems reciprocally presuppose the complex achievements of the autopoiesis of the respective other system and treat them as part of the own system (Luhmann 1995d: 153). That is to say, when systems reciprocally make their own complexity (and with it indeterminacy, contingency, and the pressure to select) available for constructing [the] other system (Luhmann 1995: 213; original emphasis). Luhmanns classical example is the relationship between psychic and social system: social systems can rely on psychic systems to be stimulated by communication and to process parallel psychic operations that allow them to irritate the social systems in suitable moments in order to trigger further communications reproducing the social system.40 Vice versa the psychic system presupposes complex achievements of social systems.41 Important in this respect is that both systems are operatively closed with regard to each other. It is not that the systems overlap in any way psychic operations cannot become part of social systems and vice versa. As Luhmann writes: This means that the complexity each system makes available is an incomprehensible complexity [] that is, disorder for the receiving system. (Luhmann 1995a: 214). In this sense social systems can presuppose the

37

A part from that he described also the relation between organism and psychic system, brain and the nervous system (e.g. Luhmann, 1995: 214, endnote 7), but not the relation between social systems. Another concept for analysing the relation between organisation and organisational interaction is that of medium and form by Fritz Heider (1959) instead of form he speaks of thing. For an application see Seidl (2001) and for applications to the relation between social and psychic system see Luhmann (1995c), Baecker (1992). The concept of interpenetration applies only to autopoietic systems (Luhmann 1995: 218). One of the most important achievements that the social system presupposes the psychic system to accomplish is perception in particular the perception of uttered sounds (Luhmann 1995a: chapter 6). But it is somewhat less dependent on social systems as it can also reproduce itself for a certain time at least without social systems (Luhmann 1995c: 39)
19

38

39 40

41

contributions of the psychic system to its autopoiesis without comprehending the functioning of the psychic system and vice versa. Analogously the relationship between organisation and deciding interaction can be described as one between two operatively closed systems, in which the interaction makes its own complexity available to the organisation and vice versa. That is the organisation can rely on its interactions to fulfil tasks necessary for the organisational reproduction, although the organisation cannot comprehend the logic of the interactional reproduction. Luhmann for example writes: Work processes that cannot be technisized, for example lessons at school or preaching in church, [] force the organisation to displace its performance conditions into interaction among people present and to entrust it to inscrutable processes. (Luhmann 2000: 373; my emphasis; my translation)42

In order to fully understand the concept of interpenetration in this context we have to have a closer look at the decision communications that come about in the course of deciding interactions. These communications (in some way) take place in both systems - they are elements in the interactional communications to the extent that further interactional communications connect to them and they are organisational communications to the extent that they serve as decision premises for further decisions. Luhmann writes about interpenetration in general: To be sure, interpenetrating systems converge in individual elements that is, they use the same ones but they give each of them a different selectivity and connectivity, different pasts and futures. Because temporalized elements (events) are involved, the convergence is possible only in the present. The elements signify
42

Beyond un-technisizible work processes there are of course many other occasions in which the organisation has to rely on its interactions (see below).
20

different things in the participating systems, although they are identical as events: they select among different possibilities and lead to different consequences. Not least, this means that the convergence to occur next is once again selection, that the difference of the systems is reproduced in the process of interpenetration. (Luhmann 1995: 215; original emphasis)43 If we look at decisions in organisational interactions this is exactly the case. We have one communication that is used in both systems, but has a different meaning in each. In the interaction it has to be understood in the context of other interactional communications in reaction to what other interactional communications did the communication come about, what other interactional communications can follow. In the interaction one is interested in who said what, in response to whom, with what reactions of the others. In this sense the content of the decision might be only of secondary importance. For the organisation the communication has a very different meaning. It has to be understood in the context of other decisions, which might even lie outside the interaction: earlier decisions that served as decision premises and later decisions for which this decision serves as decision premise. For the organisation the meaning of this communication results from its implications for connecting decisions, while for the interaction it results from the meaning for further interactional communications to connect to it.44 A concrete example might illustrate this idea. A university has decided to create a new position and in a later staff meeting a particular candidate is chosen for it. For the organisation the decision on the candidate connects directly to the earlier decision to create the position. In order to understand the relevance of the decision for the organisation it is

43 44

Luhmann speaks of interpenetrating systems also as systems that are operatively coupled in contrast to a mere structural coupling (Luhmann 1995c: 41). For Luhmann the elements of a system are only defined through their integration into the system, i.e. their relation to other elements (Luhmann 1995a: 20ff.). In this sense the same communication is for interaction and organisation a different one as it relates to other elements of the respective systems in different ways.
21

enough to relate it to this decision as its decision premise (and of course other decision premises, e.g. who has the authority to decide what etc.). For the continuation of the decision process (e.g. further decisions on concrete curricula etc.) it is only relevant which candidate has been chosen (and which ones havent). It is completely irrelevant who was for or against the candidate (for what personal reasons), how long it took the participants to reach the decision etc. What counts for the further decision process is the decided alternative, the process to the decision and the uncertainty involved in it are irrelevant or absorbed (cf. Luhmann 2000: 193). For the interaction, in contrast, it is exactly these personal aspects of the communication that are important and in the continuation of the interactional communication this personal aspect will be referred to (cf. Kieserling 1999: 385-386). The autopoiesis of organisations - as we explained above can be described with the concept of uncertainty absorption. In the transition from one decision to the next decision the original uncertainty of the initial decision is absorbed the ensuing decision only orients itself according to the chosen alternative. With regard to our argument above this means that the interactional circumstances - the pros and cons, the doubts etc which represent very much of the uncertainty involved in the decision making are left out in the ensuing decision communication. In other words the decision does not in-form later decision about these issues these issues to speak with Bateson (1972: 315) do not constitute differences that make a difference for the further reproduction of the organisation. Within the interaction in contrast these issues are the differences that make a difference. The interactional communication of a decision does in-form ensuing interactional communications in these respects. Thus in the interactional context such interactional decision communications (usually) do not absorb the uncertainty involved in the decision making. Even if the decision is not openly challenged the particular circumstances under which the decision was made will have a great influence on further communications.
22

We have to distinguish between two different foci of interactional decisions. Interactional decisions can refer exclusively to the organisation outside the interaction; for example a decision on a new strategy. Or they can refer to the interaction itself, i.e. concern the structures of the interactional communication; for example decisions about the topics on the agenda and their order, decisions to close or interrupt a meeting. In the first case the content of the decision communication (i.e. the chosen alternative) does not have any implications for the interaction. What is important for the interaction is that the decision has been made, but not what decision has been made. In such interactions, as Kieserling (1999: 372) writes, the decision is declared an output category that has to be delivered to the interactions environment. In the second case the interaction treats its own communication processes (partly) as decision processes. The communications are stylised as decisions and other communications connect to them as if they treated them as decision premises. The interaction however cannot but take the personal aspects of the communication into account as it is the basis of its autopoiesis. Thus, even where the interaction presents its communications as decision processes the communication in reality is reproduced differently. Thus, in order to understand the interactional communications one has to understand the interactional meanings behind the faade of decision communications.45 For example who decided what against whom and how does he react to it. The interaction puts its own communications into a (for the interaction) artificial form (Kieserling 1999: 373), but this artificial form is only the surface behind which different information is latently processed.46 Apart from that interactions can never present all their communications as decisions. A great part of the

45 46

See in this respect also Goffmans (1959) distinction between front and back stage. This doesnt mean that the interactional communication is more than the decision communications, i.e. decision communication plus the interaction-specific communication. Rather as we said before the reproduction of decisions follows a different logic than the interactional communications. Or as Kieserling (1999: 358) puts it, between organisation and its interactions there exist considerable differences in information.
23

communications resists being put in the form of decisions, e.g. the expression of surprise about particular opinions etc. (cf. Kieserling 1999: 355-358; Luhmann 2000: 255). Interactions stylise (some of) their own communications as decisions in order for the organisation to integrate them into the organisational decision process. That is to say the interaction observes its own operations with regard to its implications both for the interactional process and with regard to the organisation. This also means that the interaction can to a certain extent regulate what kind of communications become available to the organisation and what dont; or in other words the interaction can (to some extent) influence the organisational boundaries. In order to understand the influence of organisational interactions on the organisation it is important to understand how the boundaries of interaction and organisation relate to each other. Luhmann writes about the boundaries of interpenetrating systems referring in particular to the relationship of social and psychic system, which can however analogously be applied to our question: Decisively, boundaries of one system can be included in the operational domain of the other. Thus the boundaries of social systems [analogously: organisations] fall within the consciousness of psychic systems [analogously: the communications of interaction]. Consciousness [analogously: interactional communication]

intervenes and thereby acquires the possibility of drawing boundaries for social systems [analogously: organisations] precisely because these boundaries arent, at the same time, boundaries of consciousness [analogously: interactions]. The same holds conversely: the boundaries of psychic systems [analogously: interactions] fall within the communicative domain of social systems [analogously: organisations]. In the course of orienting itself, communication [analogously: decision communication] is constantly forced to use what psychic systems [analogously: interactions] have already assimilated in their consciousness
24

[analogously: interactional communications] and what they have not. This is possible because the boundaries of psychic systems [analogously: interactions] are not also boundaries of communicative [analogously: decisional] possibilities. (Luhmann
1995: 217; original emphasis)47

Organisational interactions can deal with the organisational boundaries in a differentiated manner. Not everything that is communicated in the interaction has to be put in decision form and thus made available to the organisation. On the contrary, interactions very often intentionally withhold communications from being interpreted as organisational decisions. In this way interactions often distinguish between official communications (that are presented as decisions) and unofficial communications which often (explicitly) are kept from being interpreted as decision. The organisational boundary often becomes an explicit topic of interactional communication: what is to be made available to the organisation and what not this communication is itself, of course, not intended to become an official communication. The boundary is often even drawn retrospectively; initially official (decision) communications are retrospectively withdrawn as illegitimate contribution this is usual practice in courts for example (see Kieserling 1999: 373). Apart from interactions offering communications as decisions to the organisation there is also the possibility of the organisation interpreting communications as decisions although they werent originally intended so. The interaction can only make suggestions to the organisation but cannot not determine what and how its communications are observed.48 In any relationship of interpenetration there have to be specific signs that indicate to the systems (potential) points of coincidence. That is to say the shared elements have to be

47 48

See analogously on the relationship between interaction and functional subsystems of society Kieserling (1999: 80-81) Because both systems are operatively closed with regard to each other.
25

marked in some way in order for the respective other system to be able to recognise them. In the case of the relationship between psychic and social system this function of coupling is served in the first place by language (and writing) (Luhmann 1995a: 272; Luhmann 1995c: 41). Articulated communication stands out from mere noise49 and captures the attention of psychic systems (Luhmann 1995a: 142-143). And the other way around, if a psychic system wants to contribute to the autopoiesis of a social system it tends to cast its utterance in linguistic form.50 Such a marker for shared elements can also be found in the case of the relationship between organisation and organisational interaction. The interaction can highlight certain culmination points (Luhmann 1993e: 339) in the flow of interactional communications in order to signal to the organisation possible points of connection. Such markers could be an explicit declaration of a communication as decision - I thus conclude: we have reached the decision to One can sometimes find that there exists a specific format for such declarations, as for example the announcement of a verdict at court or the granting of a doctorate at university. One of the most prominent markers however is the record51; if a communication is put on record it is a strong signal for the organisation that the communication lends itself to a treatment as organisational decision. Many organisations will only recognise something as organisational decision if it is put on record. For the interaction this means that it can regulate its relation to the organisation or better: the boundaries of the organisation by distinguishing between communications on record and off record.52 What is to be put on record and what is to be kept off record often is an explicit point of discussion in the interaction (Boden 1994: 85, Kieserling 1999: 385). Sometimes specific points can be even retrospectively erased from the records.
49 50 51

Articulated speech disturbs a person who is not addressed more than mere noise. (Luhmann 1995a: 142-143). There are, of course, also non-linguistic forms of communication. (Luhmann 1995a: 151) On the classical treatment of this point see Weber (1979).
26

5. Functions of organisational interactions

Interactions, as we argued above, can make their complexity available to the organisation and in this way contribute to the fulfilment of organisational functions. In the following we want to discuss three functions in particular: complexity reduction, deparadoxification and memory. (1) The possibility of a system of resorting to the complexity of another system as is implied in the concept of interpenetration has implications for the systems handling of its own complexity. At first on could say that it enables the system to increase its own given complexity by the complexity that the other system makes available53 - in the sense that more elements and relations between elements are involved in the processing of information.54 Based on Ashbys (1956: 202 ff.) law of requisite variety55 one could expect organisations with for them turbulent environments to increase their complexity by enlisting the complexity of organisational interactions. Thus, the more complexity is required the more organisational interactions would be initiated by the organisation. One could maybe interpret the empirical studies by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in that respect, if by organic structure is meant the use of interactional communications for coordinating operations. Furthermore, one can find that organisations initiate interactions when problems arise that cannot be handled on the basis of organisational decision processes

52 53 54 55

The distinction on record / off record is the second order observation according to which it observes its relation to the organisation. Not: the entire complexity of the other system, as only part of the complexity becomes available. See the definition of complexity as defined by the number of possible elements and the possible relations between the elements in Luhmann (1980). Variety can be understood as number of possible system states which is another expression for the number of elements and possible relations between them.
27

(cf. Schwartzman (1986), Schwartzman (1989), Weick (1995): 187, Kirsch (1992): 278). One could think for example of crisis meetings and similar interactions. However, in order to understand the mechanism by which the complexity of the organisation is increased through interpenetration with organisational interactions we have to look at this issue from a slightly different angle. Based on the notion of complexity as pressure to select (Luhmann 1995a: 23-28; 1993d) one can say that the more a system can use the complexity of another system for reducing its own complexity the less it has to do it itself.56 That is to say a system that can instrumentalise the complexity of another system for making selections amongst its possibilities doesnt need to make the selections itself; or in other words needs less structure. Luhmann in this sense writes with regard to specific case of interpenetration between social and psychic system: [A]n empirically proven hypothesis fits these considerations: social systems that can enlist more complex psychic systems need less structure. They can cope with greater instabilities and quicker structural change. They can expose themselves to chance and thereby relieve their internal regulation. This is comprehensible if one correctly understands complexity and interpenetration, namely, as a pressure to select that increases with size and as the ability to condition this pressure in an open way. (Luhmann 1995a: 217; endnote omitted) This hypothesis can be applied analogously to the relation between organisation and organisational interaction. The greater the complexity of organisational interactions that an organisation can enlist the less decision premises it needs. This line of argument finds support for example in the literature on team coordination in contrast to hierarchical coordination, which is also inherent in much of the literature on lean management or flat hierarchies, - if we
56

On the necessity of complexity for reducing complexity see Baecker (1999)

28

understand teams as succession of organisational interactions57. The more an organisation can rely on interactions to guide organisations in their decision making the less the organisation needs to develop its own decision premises or the less detailed they have to be; e.g. no elaborate rules about communication procedures, no detailed decision programmes, no detailed personnel planning. Apart from that one can often find that particularly at the apex of an organisation in business organisations: amongst the top management team decision processes are only to a very minor degree pre-structured in the form of formal decision premises. Instead the organisation mostly relies on organisational interactions for guiding the organisational decision process.58 On the basis of this second interpretation it becomes clear how the complexity of the organisation is increased by organisational interactions. The complexity of an organisation requires the organisation to select decision premises and in this way reduce its complexity. With the selection of structures the variety, i.e. the number of possible relations between elements, is reduced. Reduction of complexity, however, is necessary in order for the system to be able to operate otherwise the system wouldnt have enough internal guidance to make self-reproduction possible (Luhmann 1995a: 283). By relying on organisational interactions to make the selections, the organisation can do without a pre-selection of possible relations in the form of decision premises and in this sense allow for a greater variety. In other words organisational interactions increase the complexity of an organisation by relieving the organisation of having to reduce its complexity. To go back to our examples above, organisations with organic structures possess a greater variety as the possibilities of relations between elements is less restricted by (formal) decision premises. Instead the organisation

57 58

To be precise, teams may be defined as a succession of organisational interactions with identical composition which are perceived and expected as a unity (cf. Kieserling 1999: 221). See for example Mintzbergs (1973) empirical study on the work of top managers, who spend most of their time in interactions.
29

initially allows for a relatively greater variety of relations, which only in the concrete decision situation are then limited through interactional processes. (2) Organisations, more than any other types of social systems, have to deal with paradoxes.59 As explained at the beginning of the paper every single operation of an organisation constitutes an explicit paradox. In order for a system not to get paralysed by its paradoxes the paradoxes have to be deparadoxified. The main mechanism of deparadoxification of ordinary decisions within the organisation is the attribution to a decision maker (Luhmann 2000: 136; 147). The paradox of decision is in that way shifted from the operative level to the structural level. Instead of the undecidability of the decision (Von Foerster 1992: 14), the structures entitling the decision maker to make a specific decision come to the fore; instead of asking about the form of the alternativity of the decision (Luhmann 1993c: 289) one is led to ask about the decision premises that justify the decision - in particular the hierarchical orderings of positions (cf. Luhmann 2000: 138). While any such question if consequently investigated ultimately ends up again at the paradox of decision (i.e. the decision to put certain structures in place60), usually the organisational complexity inhibits such investigations as Luhmann (2000: 139; my translation) writes: the paradox is concealed by complexity. Thus, this basic form of deparadoxification in most cases is enough for preventing a paralysis. There are however cases where the shift of the decision complexity onto the level of structures isnt enough as a means of a deparadoxification; where the shift doesnt prevent the exposure of the paradox. This could be the case where the structures themselves are

59 60

Any self-referential system is paradoxically constituted. (Luhmann 1995a: 33) and beyond that the ultimate decision creating the organisation in the first place implying the paradox of its existence before its existence.
30

contradictory61, e.g. unclear decision competencies; thus instead of the operative paradox the organisation would have to deal with a structural paradox.62 It could also be the case where no clear decision premises exist. For example in connection with decisions on fundamental decision premises in the context of business organisation one also speaks of policies or strategies; or during major turbulences in the organisation. Closely related to this is the case where decisions pertain to the very structures that serve as their decision premises. These are primarily decisions on fundamental organisational change this could be a change of fundamental decision premises. In these cases the attribution to decision makers and their respective positions (as combination of the three general decision premises) cannot serve as a means of deparadoxification. In these cases organisations often use interactions as a means of deparadoxification. Decisions arent attributed to individual decision makers but to a deciding interaction. This could either mean that the interaction is perceived directly as the decision maker; one could think of a jury at court that announces its (!) verdict or corporate boards announcing their (!) decision on a new strategy. Alternatively it could also mean that one decision maker in an interaction is centrally held responsible for a decision but as other participants have assented the decision ultimately is attributed to the interaction. The attribution of decisions to interactions can serve as a means of deparadoxification to the extent that the interactional processes for the organisation are incomprehensible. This means that the concrete processes leading to the decision making remain in the dark for the organisation not the interaction. In this sense the decision paradox is shifted onto the mystery (Luhmann 2000: 135-140) of an interaction: the interaction has decided the undecidable but from outside one cant say how (cf. Schwartzman (1987), pp. 285-286). Usually one cant even ask as the interaction, in contrast to individual decision makers, as
61

Structural contradictions or paradoxes for Luhmann (2000: 147) have to be understood as derivatives of paradoxes on the operative level.
31

they cannot be addressed as a unity (Kieserling 1999: 383-384).63 Furthermore, interactions often actively contribute to the mystery by interactions withholding any information on the concrete processes involved in the decision processes (cf. Kieserling 1999: 382)64. One could again think for example of juries at court which at most disclose the number of votes for or against a particular judgement but no concrete reasons; or at corporate boards that might disclose reasons for a decision but keep their statements so general that they dont really say anything about the factual decision making. Decisions in this way defy any criticism; they are stabilised by reference to the incomprehensible complexity of the interaction. The only points for potential criticism are the (starting) conditions of the interaction: who participated in the interaction, what was the official agenda etc; in other words, criticism is re-directed toward the decisions and decision premises involved in setting up the interaction. This again can be evaded by drawing them as much as possible into the interaction i.e. participants and topics are chosen from within the interaction - and by presenting the interaction more or less as spontaneously formed so that the official justification for the initiation of the interaction can be provided retrospectively from within the interaction. Organisational interactions dont only serve as a means of deparadoxifying and thus stabilising decisions after they have been made, but they can also serve such a function in the decision situations themselves. In other words interactions can provide an orientation in decision situations where such guidance cannot be provided by the organisation itself.65 Thus, where the organisational decision premises are ambiguous or conflicting, or where decisions pertain exactly to the decision premises that could provide guidance, that interaction can take over the lead; the decision process is pressed ahead by the dynamic of the interaction.
62 63 64 65

Which again manifests itself in concrete operations. The participants can, of course, be asked but every participant might tell a different story. Cf. Goffman (1959) on secrets of and in interactions. This is just another perspective on the same point as above.
32

Decision making in this sense is less oriented according to organisational than interactional structures. Retrospectively, however, decision premise for the decisions can be and probably have to be searched for, reconstructed, re-interpreted or even invented. In other words decisions retrospectively can be presented as if they had been guided by decision premises decisions are post-rationalised. This line of argument to some extent runs counter to Kieserlings (1999: 368-359) hypothesis that normally interactions guide the organisational decision processes while in crisis situations the decision processes guide the interactions. We would rather say that under crisis situations in particular situations which lead to a fundamental ambiguity of the organisational structures interactions take the lead.66 (3) Organisational interactions can serve a memory function in the organisation. With memory Luhmann (2000: 192, passim; 1997: passim)67 refers to the fact that systems discriminate between forgetting and remembering: the memory selects what to sort out into forgetting and what to remember.68 In contrast to traditional conceptualisations memory is not understood as storage of information (Walsh and Ungson 1991: 61) but as a function that relates present situations to earlier operations of the system. One could say it defines the system-related reality of the concrete situation. In this sense the organisational memory determines in every concrete decision situation what earlier decisions to relate. In other words it remembers other decision situations and interprets the concrete decision situation in their context. In order to understand why certain situations or aspects of situations are remembered and others forgotten one has to understand the conditioning of the organisational memory. Luhmann writes about the organisational memory:

66 67 68

Which system takes the lead under normal conditions can be left open here. Luhmann here draws on the neurophysilogical and general cybernetic studies of Von Foerster (1949; 1985: 133-172; 1950; 1969) As Luhmann writes, the main achievement of the memory is forgetting; remembering consequently has to be conceptualised as inhibition of forgetting (Luhmann 2000: 192).
33

When it comes to organizations the memory is linked to the uncertainty absorption which connects decisions with decisions. It forgets the generally underlying uncertainty, unless it has become part of the decision in the form of doubts or reservations. But it forgets also the numerous contributing decisions (the invitation to a meeting, the unsuccessful attempts at pushing through a request); it represses also most of what contributes to the autopoiesis of the system. By and large [] it only retains what later decisions draw upon as decision premises. (Luhmann 2000: 193, my translation, footnote omitted) In this sense organisations tend to remember only results of decision processes and to forget their concrete developments. This radical forgetting although a lot of potentially useful69 references to earlier situations get lost is necessary for the organisation in order not to clog up its capacity for information processing (Luhmann 2000: 192). One could also say the memory serves as an important form of complexity reduction. Organisations cant however dispense completely with all that it forgets. Often it needs to remember for example information that was gathered in connection with a decision or concrete developments of a decision process or the concrete arguments for and against particular decisions by particular members of the organisation.70 Such references might be of particular importance in cases where the organisation experiences inconsistencies between its decision premises or where new decision situations are difficult to make sense of. Or it might just be that such references make specific decision situations easier to handle. In such cases and it might indeed be in almost all decision situations the interaction can provide the organisation with an appropriate memory. This is the case because the memory of (organisational) interactions is conditioned in a different way. The interactional memory in
69

Useful in the sense that they could make later decisions easier.
34

contrast to the organisational memory is not connected to the organisational uncertainty absorption. Kieserling in this sense writes: The memory of the organisation remembers only decisions and forgets everything else. The memory of the interaction and its participants, in contrast, is conditioned in a totally different way. They might remember the process more than the result and the defeated more than the finally victorious candidates. (Kieserling, 1999: 385-386, my translation) The interactional memory, thus, seems to be conditioned almost in the opposite way to that of the organisation. What the one tends to forget the other tends to remember. Because of their relationship of interpenetration the interaction can make its own memory available to the organisation. This doesnt of course mean that the organisational memory is enlarged by the interactional memory; the interactional memory doesnt become part of the organisational memory in the same way as the interactional complexity doesnt become part of the organisational complexity, as argued above. The organisation doesnt have direct access to the memory of the interaction, but it can expose its decisions to the interactional memory by having decisions take place within interactions. If a decision is discussed within organisational interactions the participants are likely to draw on past experiences in connection with similar decision situations, to arguments that they previously might have had and similar things. Although these communications are inconceivable for the organisation they have an effect on the communication that ultimately will be interpreted by the organisation as its own decision and, thus, will have an effect on the organisational autopoiesis. Organisations might in this sense instrumentalise interactions for remembering what they themselves have forgotten.

70

And to remember that it has forgotten what it has forgotten.

35

This memory function of organisational interactions can also be described as a form of complexity reduction to be precise: reduction of temporal complexity. Interactions by making their memory available to the organisational reproduction serve a function of complexity reduction for the organisation. Analogously to our argument above we can say that organisations can use organisational interaction for selecting relations between the present decision situation and earlier decision situations of the organisation. To the extent that the organisation can rely on interactions fulfilling this task in concrete decision situations they dont have to establish structures that pre-select the relations. Apart from the fact that organisations due to their particular mode of reproduction (i.e. uncertainty absorption) are always dependent on interactional memory without that they wouldnt be able to reproduce themselves -, we can find different degrees to which the interactional memory is drawn upon. Analogously to our argument above we can say the more an organisation can rely on interactional memory the less elaborate its own memory structures e.g. written documentation etc. - and vice versa.

Possibilities for conditioning organisational interactions

So far we have discussed functions that organisational interactions might serve for their organisation. We havent however asked how interactions can be brought to serve these functions. It probably wouldnt be enough for organisations to rely on interactions to form spontaneously and by chance in the right moment when they are needed. Rather, although interactions are operatively closed vis--vis organisations they nevertheless can be conditioned.71 That is to say organisations can create certain context factors that make it

71

Cf. Luhmann (2000: 373).

36

likely for interactions to reproduce themselves in ways that are of benefit to the organisation. This conditioning can be temporal, social and factual. Conditioning in the time dimension is particularly focused on beginning and ending of an interaction. The organisation can decide to start an interaction and it can also decide on a certain time limit after which the interaction is to come to an end. For example, a meeting can be scheduled for a certain time - from three to four o'clock. The organisation could also decide on a sequence of interactions - every Monday from three to four o'clock (cf. Luhmann 1997: 818). However, as the organisation has no direct access to the interactional operations, it cannot directly start or terminate them;72 only the interaction itself can produce its own beginning and its own ending. Yet, organisations can condition participation and, thus, indirectly 'stimulate' interactions to produce beginning and ending. That is to say, the organisation can decide on a certain time span for which members are to come together. The beginning of the interaction can be conditioned in so far as the organisation can arrange for members to come into face-to-face contact on the basis of which an interaction is likely to form.73 The ending can be conditioned through the decision to withdraw the participants after the time has run out. The interaction can observe this prospect of their participants being withdrawn after a certain time and in expectation of that produce its own end. When the time has run out, the participants of the interaction say 'good bye' to each other. In the social dimension the organisation can condition the interaction by deciding on participants. That is to say, the organisation can influence the interactional communications by deciding who is to participate and, thus, what perspectives become available in the

72

Unless the organisation, for example, decided to blow up the interaction with a bomb, in which case the interaction would not be terminated by the interaction itself, but by the elimination of its (necessary) environment of psychic systems (cf. Luhmann 1995c: 45) Kirsch (1992), pp. 271 ff., in this sense, speaks of the 'creation of necessary and sufficient initial and contextual conditions' for the emergence of interactions.
37

73

interaction (cf. Kieserling 1999: 378). Especially important in this context are the perspectives given through the particular organisational roles of the participants. For example, if the organisation decided that senior managers are to participate, the interaction is likely to be different from a meeting between shop floor workers only. Again, by deciding on the composition of the interaction the organisation can condition it, but it does not have any direct control over it. It is ultimately left to the interaction to determine who is treated as present and who as absent. In this sense, even people physically present might be considered absent by the interaction. Similarly, the formal organisational roles of the participants might not be referred to by the interactional communications. Conditioning in the fact dimension concerns the organisation's influence on the selection of topics. An explicit conditioning in this dimension would be a decision on the agenda of a forthcoming interaction. The selection of topics can also be indirectly influenced through decision on participants. For example, if many marketing managers were involved in the interaction, the communication is likely to focus on marketing issues.74 Another way of conditioning the selection of topics is to set in advance certain output categories for the interaction, e.g. certain decision have to be made. An important form of conditioning concerns the constraining of the range of possible topics. Instead of influencing the interaction in a way that makes the selection of a specific topic more likely, the organisation can also make the selection of certain topics more unlikely; for example by withholding information. Although we have treated the different dimensions of conditioning separately, here, they are to a large extent interdependent. For example, by starting an interaction for discussing recent sales figures, the organisation might condition the interaction in all three dimensions. In the
74

One has to be careful not to confuse the social and fact dimension. Here we are speaking of specific topics of communication - the sales figures are talked about. When we speak about the
38

object dimension the interaction is conditioned as the topic of the communications is preselected: the sales figures. In the social dimension the interaction is conditioned as particular persons might have to participate in the interaction - e.g. marketing managers. In the time dimension the interaction is conditioned as certain timing for the interaction is decided.

Conclusion

In this paper we have suggested a specific conceptualisation of organisational interactions based on Luhmanns social systems theory. The basic idea was to treat organisation and interaction as two different types of systems that remain operatively closed with regard to each other. In other words organisational interactions take place in the environment of the organisation. Although this strict distinction runs counter to our intuitions, which would see interactional communications as part of the organisation, it has important theoretical advantages. First, it is a perspective that allows perceiving (organisational) interactions where other theoretical perspective wouldnt even have concepts for referring to it which is probably one of the reasons why interactions in organisations so far have received relatively little attention by social scientists (Schwarzman, 1986). Secondly the strict separation between organisation and interaction allows analysing organisational and interactional phenomena in their own right. This mustnt be misinterpreted as disregard of the role of interactions in organisations. On the contrary and this is our third point through the differentiation between organisation and (organisational) interaction it can be clearly shown that, and in what way, both systems depend on each other.75 This conceptualisation forces the researcher to be

social dimension, we are looking at the particular ways in which a specific topic is communicated about.
75

See analogously with regard to the relation between social and psychic system Luhmann (1995): 212.
39

explicit on the achievements of each system and on the mechanisms through which they become available to each other. In this sense the conceptualisation can also help disciplining the researcher.

40

References

Ashby, W. Ross (1956) An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall. Atkinson, M. A., E. C. Cuff, and J. R. Lee (1978) "The Recommencement of a Meeting As a Member's Accomplishment." Pp. 133-275 in Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction, Ed. J. Schenkein. New York: Academy Press. Baecker, Dirk (1992) Die Unterscheidung zwischen Kommunikation und Bewutsein. In Krohn, Wolfgang and Kppers, Gnter Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Baecker, Dirk (1999) Fehldiagnose berkomplexitt. In Baecker, Dirk Organisation als System. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 27-37. Baecker, Dirk (2001) Editorial. Begriff und Phnomen der Strukturellen Kopplung. Soziale Systeme 7(2): 219-221. Bateson, Gregory (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine. Boden, Deirdre (1994) The Business of Talk: Organizations in Action. Cambridge: Polity. Burns, Tom and Stalker, G.M. (1961) The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock. Drew, P. and J. Heritage, eds. (1992). Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. Fuchs, Stephen. (1995). "The Stratified Order of Gossip." Soziale Systeme 1:47-73. Goffman, Erving (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Goffman, Erving (1975) Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Harmondsworth. Penguin. Heider, Fritz (1959) "Thing and Medium" Psychological Issues 1:1-34. Kieserling, Andr (1999) Kommunikation unter Interaktionssysteme. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Anwesenden. Studien ber

Kieserling, Andr (1994) "Interaktion in Organisationen." Pp. 168-82 in Die Verwaltung des politischen Systems: Neue systemtheoretische Zugriffe auf ein altes Thema, eds. K. Dammann, D. Grunow, and K. P. Japp. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Kirsch, Werner (1992) Kommunikatives Handeln, Autopoiese, Rationalitt. Sondierungen zu einer evolutonren Fhrungslehre. Mnchen: Kirsch. Kurland, N.B. and L.H. Pelled. (2000). "Passing the Word: Toward a Model of Gossip and Power in the Workplace." Academy of Management Review 25:428-38. Lawrence, Paul R. and Lorsch, Jay W. (1967) Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration. Boston: Harvard University Press. Lieckweg, Tania (2001) Strukturelle Kopplung von Organisation. In Soziale Systeme 7(2): 267-289 Funktionssystemen ber
41

Luhmann, Niklas (1980) Komplexitt. In Handwrterbuch der Organisation E. Grochla (ed.). Stuttgart: Poeschel, col. 1064-1070. Luhmann, Niklas (1992) "Organisation." Pp. 165-85 in Mikropolitik. Rationalitt, Macht und Spiele in Organisationen, Kpper and G. Ortmann (eds.). 2. edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1993a) Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Luhmann, Niklas (1993b) Soziologische Aufklrung 3: Soziales System, Gesellschaft, Organisation. 3rd. Edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag Luhmann, Niklas (1993c) Die Paradoxie des Entscheidens Verwaltungs-Archiv. 84(3): 287310. Luhmann, Niklas (1993d) Haltlose Komplexitt. In Luhmnan, Niklas (ed.) Soziologische Aufklrung 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven. 2. edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 59-76. Luhmann, Niklas (1993e) Organisation und Entscheidung. In Luhmnan, Niklas (ed.) Soziologische Aufklrung 3: Soziales System, Gesellschaft, Organisation. 3. edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 335-389. Luhmann, Niklas (1995a) Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1995b) Probleme mit operativer Schlieung. In Luhmnan, Niklas (ed.) Soziologische Aufklrung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 12-24. Luhmann, Niklas (1995c) Wie ist Bewusstsein an Kommunikation beteiligt?. In Luhmann, Niklas (ed.) Soziologische Aufklrung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 37-54. Luhmann, Niklas (1995d) Die Form Person. In Luhmann, Niklas (ed.) Soziologische Aufklrung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 142-154. Luhmann, Niklas (1999) Kommunikation ber Recht in Interaktionssystemen in Luhmann, Niklas (ed.) Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts. Beitrge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) Organisation und Entscheidung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. March, J.G. and G. Sevn. (1989). "Gossip, Information and Decision-Making." Pp. 429-42 in Decision and Organization, Ed. J.G. March. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. March, J.G. and H.A. Simon. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley. Mintzberg, Henry (1973) The Nature of Managerial Work. New York, London: Harper and Row. Schwartman, Helen B. (1987) "The Significance of Meetings in an American Health Care Centre." American Ethnologist 14:271-94. Schwartzman, Helen B. (1986). "The Meeting As a Neglected Social Form of Organizational Studies." Pp. 233-58 in Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 8, eds. B.M. Staw and L.L. Cummings. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
42

Schwartzman, Helen B. (1989) The Meeting Gatherings in Organizations and Communities. New York: Plenum Press. Seidl, David (2001) Organisation im Medium der Kommunikation. Zum Verhltnis von Organisation, Gesellschaft und Interaktion in Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme. Working paper, Ludwig-Maximilians-University. Institute of Organization, Munich. Seidl, David (2002a) Metaphorical Self-descriptions of Organizations. In Kieser, Alfred and Mller, Andreas (eds.) Communication in Organizations. . New York et al.: Lang. Seidl, David (2002b) Organisational Identity in Luhmanns Theory of Social Systems. In Hernes, Tor and Bakken, Tore (eds.) Autopoietic Organization Theory. Drawing on Niklas Luhmanns Social System Perspective. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. Simon, H.A. (1957). Models of Man - Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley & Son. Simon, H.A., D.W. Smithburg, and V.A. Thompson. (1950). Public Administration. New York: Wiley & Son. Von Foerster, Heinz (1949) Das Gedchtnis. Eine Quantenphysikalische Untersuchung. Wien: ?? Von Foerster, Heinz (1950) Quantum Mechanical Theory of Memory. In Von Foerster, Heinz (ed.) Cybernetics: Transactions of the Sixth Conference. New York: ??, pp. 112-145. Von Foerster, Heinz (1969) What is Memory that It may Have Hindsight and Foresight as well?. In Bogoch, Samuel (ed.) The Future of Brain Sciences. Proceedings of a Conference held at New York Academy of Medicine. New York: ??, pp. 19-64. Von Foerster, Heinz (1981) Observing Systems. Seaside, CA: Intersystems Von Foerster, Heinz (1984) Principles of Self-Organization in a Socio-Managerial Context in Ulrich, Hans and Probst, Gilbert J.B. (eds.) Self-organization and Management of Social Systems: Insides, Promises, Doubts, and Questions. Berin: Springer, pp. ?? Von Foerster, Heinz (1985) Sicht und Einsicht: Versuche zu einer Operativen Erkenntnistheorie. Braunschweig: ?? Von Foerster, Heinz (1992) Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics in Cybernetics and Human Knowing 1: 61-88. Von Foerster, Heinz (1993) "Fr Niklas Luhmann: Wie Rekursiv Ist Kommunikation?" Teoria Sociologica 2:61-88. Walsch, J.P. and Ungson, G.R. (1991) Organizational Memory. Academy of Management Review 16: 57-91. Weber, Max (1956) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tbingen. Mohr. Weber, Max (1979) Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. [translated from the German by Ephraim Fischoff ... et al]. Berkeley. London: University of California Press.
43

Weick, Karl (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations. London: Sage.

44