The Taliban in Afghanistan

Author: Jayshree Bajoria Updated: October 6, 2011

Introduction Rise of the Taliban Opposition, Then and Now Early Supporters Leadership and Structure Afghan Public Opinion of the Taliban The Road Ahead

Introduction
The Taliban, an Islamic extremist group, took control of Afghanistan's government in 1996 and ruled until the 2001 U.S.-led invasion drove it from power. The group is known for having provided safe haven to al-Qaeda and its erstwhile leader Osama bin Laden, as well as for its rigid interpretation of Islamic law, under which it publicly executed criminals and outlawed the education of women. Though the group has been out of power for several years, it remains resilient in the region and operates parallel governance structuresaimed at undermining the U.S.backed central government. Pakistan's support and safe havens for the Taliban have stymied international efforts to end the insurgency in Afghanistan; the United States is set to withdraw its combat forces from the country by 2014. Since 2010, both U.S. and Afghan officials have been pursuing talks with members of the group for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. But prospects for such a settlement remain uncertain and have raised concerns among Afghanistan's minorities and women who worry their rights and freedoms may be compromised.

Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban was initially a mixture of mujahadeen who fought against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, and a group of Pashtun tribesmen who spent time in Pakistani religious schools, ormadrassas, and received assistance from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). The group's leaders practiced Wahhabism, an orthodox form of Sunni Islam similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. With the help of government defections, the Taliban emerged as a force in Afghan politics in 1994 in the midst of a civil war between forces in northern and southern Afghanistan. They gained an initial territorial foothold in the southern city of Kandahar, and over the next two years expanded their influence through a mixture of force, negotiation, and payoffs. In 1996, the Taliban captured capital Kabul and took control of the national government. Taliban rule was characterized by a strict form of Islamic law, requiring women to wear head-to-toe veils, banning television, and jailing men whose beards were deemed too short. One act in particular, the destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan, seemed to symbolize the intolerance of the regime. The feared Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice authorized the use of force to uphold bans on un-Islamic activities.

Before its ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001, the Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory, although it was never officially recognized by the United Nations. After its toppling, the Taliban has proved resilient. In June 2011, the International Crisis Group reported that the Taliban had expanded (PDF) far beyond its stronghold in the south and southeast to central-eastern provinces. "Insurgent leaders have achieved momentum in the central-eastern provinces by employing a strategy that combines the installation of shadow governments, intimidation, and the co-opting of government officials," it noted.

While a surge in U.S. troops in 2010 and improved capacity of the Afghan security forces has put increasing pressure on the Taliban, in March 2011, the U.S. military viewed the security gains achieved in the last year as

"fragile and reversible." A February 2011 report from the London-based International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) noted that insurgents are adapting their tactics. "Insurgents are now avoiding firefights and direct attacks on NATO-ISAF/Afghan positions, and are focusing on using roadside bombs and targeted killings instead," the report says. Assassinations of high-level Afghan officials, experts say, are designed to intimidate Afghan civilians and erode public confidence in their security forces. In its report to Congress in September 2011, the White House cited polls showing only 33 percent of the Afghan population considered security in their communities to be good, compared to 50 percent in June 2010. "This change," it noted, "appears to affirm the effectiveness of the insurgents' strategy of perception-oriented targeting."

Opposition, Then and Now

Western governments and anti-Taliban elements inside Afghanistan have countered the group through varying tactics since 2001. Factions opposed to the Taliban's policies in northern Afghanistan coalesced around their mutual disdain for the fundamentalists, and formed the so-called Northern Alliance. Made up predominantly of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara Shiites, the alliance opposed the Taliban after its formation and assisted U.S. forces in routing the group after 9/11. According to some reports, the group started rearming in 2010 (Telegraph) following efforts by the Afghan government to strike a peace deal with the Taliban.

Taliban propaganda has convinced a segment of Afghan public opinion that foreign troops and the Afghan government are the main threat to their physical security. -ICG

Prior to September 11, 2001, Western dealings with the Taliban involved a mix of diplomacy and soft power. In its final years in power, the Taliban became increasingly isolated and faced severe UN Security Council sanctions. The administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton held direct talks with the group, though Washington never recognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. A series of Security Council resolutions urged the Taliban to end its abusive treatment of women, and in August 1997, the U.S. State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington closed. In October 1999, the Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, freezing funds and restricting travel of the groups' members. The sanctions have been updated nine times since, most recently with Resolution 1988 and Resolution 1989 adopted in June 2011.

Early Supporters
Prior to the group's ouster in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban's main supporters were Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Along with the United Arab Emirates, they were the only countries to recognize Taliban-led Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan cooperated in efforts by the CIA to arm the anti-Communist mujahadeen. After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan ceased to be a priority for U.S. strategists, but Saudi Arabia and Pakistan continued their support. Involvement in Afghanistan served a strategic interest for Pakistan, which also has a large ethnic Pashtun population, and appealed to the conservative Wahhabi Muslims who hold substantial political clout in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan also supported the Taliban in its quest for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan in order to balance its foremost rival, India. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia became partners in the U.S.-led "war on terrorism" and halted their official support of the Taliban.

But several U.S. officials and experts believe the Taliban is still receiving support from the Pakistani security establishment, which, they say, sees these groups as proxies for their influence in Afghanistan once the international forces withdraw. Pakistani officials have repeatedly denied offering support to the Taliban and point to a buildup of tens of thousands of forces on their border with Afghanistan as proof of their commitment to stopping infiltrations. The Pakistani Taliban, organizationally distinct from the Afghan group, rose up in 2002 in response to the Pakistani army's incursions into that country's tribal areas to hunt down militants. Beyond Pakistan, U.S. officials have accused Iran of abetting the Taliban by supplying militants with Iranianmade weapons--including deadly roadside bombs that have killed a disproportionate number of U.S. service members. In 2001, Tehran helped Washington todismantle the Taliban regime, but in recent years, experts say, Tehran's strategic interests have aligned with the Taliban's. "From a strategic perspective, the Iranian government looks at the Taliban as a useful enemy that is undermining the interests of its other enemy, namely the United States," says Iran expert Mohsen Milani. Experts disagree on the extent of Iranian involvement.

Leadership and Structure

The Taliban is not a monolith; it has various factions and includes people who join it for varied motives, ranging from global jihad to local grievances, say experts. Mohammed Omar, a cleric, or mullah, led the group during their rise to power. Omar is also a military leader, and he lost his right eye fighting the Soviets. From 1996 to 2001, he ruled Afghanistan with the title "Commander of the Faithful." The Taliban movement remains loyal (PDF), to varying degrees, to Omar, writes Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Omar, and many of his top advisers, reportedly are based in the Pakistani city of Quetta, and are usually referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). U.S. and NATO forces have had success killing or capturing Taliban leaders since the start of the war. Mullah Omar's chief of security, Naqibullah Khan, was arrested in December 2004, and spokesman Latifullah Hakimi was apprehended ten months later. A U.S. airstrike in December 2006 killed Mullah Akhtar Usmani, a top commander. In May 2007, coalition forces killed the leader of the Taliban insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, during an operation in Helmand Province. And Mullah Ismail, a key Taliban figure in Kunar Province, was apprehended in April 2008. Even Afghan security forces have successfully targeted top Taliban leaders; in May 2009, Mullah Salam Noorzai was killed during a raid in Helmand Province (LongWarJournal). Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (NYT), commander of Taliban's military operations in Afghanistan, was captured in February 2010 in Karachi.

As long as the Taliban believe that they have a backer in Pakistan, even if it is passive backing to provide safe havens, they are inclined to play the long game with the United States, which is to wait it out in Afghanistan. --Dan Markey, CFR
But Omar has made appointments to replenish the QST leadership ranks and numerous Taliban commanders continue to evade capture. Chief among them, in addition to Omar, are spokesmen Qari Yousef Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, as well as leaders of the Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons Siraj and Badruddin. The Haqqani network--largely independent but with close ties to the Taliban--has become a major threat to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. By some estimates, there are about three thousand Haqqani fighters (PDF).

Jalaluddin Haqqani, a mujahadeen commander during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet Union, served as minister of tribal affairs during Taliban rule. The Haqqani network remains a central partner for the QST, acting as a regional platform for the Taliban to project power and influence in southeastern Afghanistan and acting as a force multiplier for the Taliban, write Don Rassler and Vahid Brown. The group's effectiveness and operational sophistication is most apparent in Kabul, they argue, saying it is "tied to most, if not all, complex and strategic suicide attacks there." Siraj Haqqani stated in October 2011 that the group considers Omar as its leader. CFR's Dan Markey says the statement was directed at the Afghan audience to show a unified face of the Taliban. "It's to show that they are genuine, nationalist Afghans looking to liberate their country from occupiers. Just before he stepped down, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen blamed the Haqqani network for the September 2011 attacks on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, calling it a "veritable arm" of the Pakistani ISI. But the U.S. government has shied away from adding the Haqqani network to its list of terrorist organizations. Experts say such a move would complicate U.S. cooperation with Pakistan, given U.S. accusations of ISI's collusion with the militant group and scuttle any chances for a peace deal with the group.

Afghan Public Opinion of the Taliban

Public reaction to the Taliban's rule was not wholly negative. While the rigid social standards fostered resentment, the Taliban cracked down on the corruption that had run rampant through the government for years. The new leaders also brought stability to Afghanistan, greatly reducing the infighting between warlords that had devastated the civilian population.

Ten years after being ousted, the Taliban continues to enjoy political and psychological support in the south, experts say, largely because the international community has not coupled its military gains with equally robust efforts in development or governance."The impact of the conflict, coupled with chronic poverty, unemployment, and corruption," has made it easy for the Taliban to manipulate the population, notes a May 2011 survey from ICOS (PDF). Almost 42 percent of survey respondents in the south said working with the Taliban is right. The ICG report (PDF) says the "Taliban propaganda has convinced a segment of Afghan public opinion that foreign troops and the Afghan government are the main threat to their physical security." The insurgents are also increasingly adopting technology for propaganda; they use Twitter and text messages (Dawn) to communicate with media, operate a clandestine radio station, "Voice of Shariat," and publish videos.

The Road Ahead

The 2011 UN resolutions split the Taliban and al-Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. In July, fourteen Taliban figures were removed from the original sanctions list. These measures were to help Afghan and international efforts to engage in negotiations with the Taliban. There have been some international and Afghan-led efforts since 2003 to reintegrate low- and mid-level insurgent fighters into communities by offering them incentives and jobs if they disarm and disavow the Taliban. These efforts have had limited results.

Since 2010, Washington has expanded the endgame in Afghanistan to include a negotiated settlement with top Taliban leaders who break ties with al-Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution. But the talks have suffered several setbacks; most recently in September 2011 when the Afghan government's chief negotiator with the Taliban, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was assassinated. Plus, they have raised concerns for women's rights in Afghanistan. "A looming question is whether Afghan women will play a substantive role in a nascent reconciliation process," says CFR's Gayle Tzemach Lemmon. Some analysts believe the death of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 may have offered an opening to strike a deal with the Quetta Shura Taliban and its leader Mullah Omar. This is because, says CFR's Stephen Biddle, "Mullah Omar pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden, not to al-Qaeda." But Biddle adds it is uncertain if Omar has really broken with al-Qaeda. Some experts believe the group is riddled with internal divisions on questions of negotiating with the United States and cooperating with international terrorists, including al-Qaeda.

Even before bin Laden's death (PDF), Katzman notes, some U.S. officials argued that the successes produced by the U.S. military surge in Afghanistan were causing some Taliban leaders to mull the concept of a political settlement. In August 2011, Mullah Omar acknowledged talks with Washington, although only over prisoner exchanges. Siraj Haqqani also said (BBC) his group would support any talks that Omar pursued. News reports revealed that U.S. officials secretly met with leaders of the Haqqani network (WSJ) in the summer of 2011 to draw them into talks. But experts caution against a deal with the Haqqani network, saying the group still has links to al-Qaeda. Pakistan's support (Atlantic) for the Haqqani network prevents any changes in the group's behavior, says Joshua Foust. The country's support for the Quetta Shura Taliban also makes it difficult to strike a deal with the group. Markey says: "As long as the Taliban believe that they have a backer in Pakistan, even if is passive backing to provide safe havens, they are inclined to play the long game with the United States, which is to wait it out in Afghanistan." In October, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said it is Pakistan, not the Taliban (CNN), that Kabul should pursue peace talks with, implying Pakistan was in bed with the Taliban leadership. Greg Bruno and Eben Kaplan contributed to this Backgrounder.

Afghanistan 1996-2001
Taliban regime, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Last modified: 2011-06-10 by ian macdonald Keywords: afghanistan | taliban | taleban | islamic emirate | plain (white) | text: arabic (black) | shahada | Links: FOTW homepage | search | random flag | disclaimer and copyright | write us | mirrors

image by Marcus Schmger | 2:3 or 1:2?

Flag adopted 27th October 1997, abolished 2001

Introduction Description Taliban Flag 1996-1997 Flag with green Shahada, probably mistaken Unidentified Flag with Coat-of-Arms Unidentified Afghan flags Al-Qaeda Flags Discussion on Islamic Emirate

See also:

Afghanistan 1992-1996 Flag (used 1996-2001 by the Northern Alliance) Mujahideen and anti-Taliban groups 1980's-2001 The Shahada or Kalimah Historical Flags (Afghanistan) Afghanistan Afghanistan: Index of all pages

Introduction

In 1996 the Taliban regime, which had been waging a guerrilla war throughout Afghanistan since the Russians left, took over the capital, Kabul. The United Nations Organization never ceased to recognize the previous regime (the so-called 'Northern Alliance' which kept in control of some territory during 19962001) and flew thegreen-white-black tricolour with gold arms. From contributions by Ivan Sache, Dave Martucci, Jaume Oll and Jan Oskar Engene, October 1997 - April 1998 Reuters news agency reported on 26 October 1997 that the Taliban government changed the name from Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. According to Reuters, the name change was announced by a Talibancontrolled radio station, "in an order issued by the Emir al-Momineen Mullah Mohammed Omar", thus formalising the position as head of state in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan of Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban, who is known asEmir al-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful). Reuters noted that this was the third time in five years that the official name was changed. The communist regime used the name Republic of Afghanistan, while the insurgents that overthrew that regime changed the country's name to Islamic State of Afghanistan. The Taliban government was only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The former government kept the seat at the United Nations. In August 1997 the United States was to close the Afghan embassy in Washington, because of a dispute between a staff member supporting the Taliban government and another staff member supporting the former government, who clashed on 28 May 1997 over which flag should fly over the embassy. Sources: Taliban change name of Afghanistan to Emirate, Reuters, 26 October 1997; U.S. Closing Afghan Embassy, ABC News, 15 August 1997. Jan Oskar Engene, 28 October 1997 In September 1996 the Taliban took over the capital, Kabul, and soon thereafter most of Afghanistan. From then until the war that followed the 11th September 2001 attacks against New York and Washington, the green-white-black flag was only used in Northern Afghanistan, the United Nations building plus some embassies (e.g. Iran).

After the Taliban defeat in November-December 2001, both the 1992 flag and the 1973 flag and even the earlier April 1992 flag were flown by different factions within the anti-Taliban forces. Santiago Dotor, 12 December 2001

Description

Smith 1997k (...) said that Afghanistan flied a white flag with the Shahada inscribed on it in green. This may have been introduced officially on 27 October 1997 along with the official name change (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan). We are not even sure when the change occurred, only that it is being used at border posts and when the emir visited Pakistan. From contributions by Ivan Sache, Dave Martucci, Jaume Oll and Jan Oskar Engene, October 1997 - April 1998 According to information supplied by Abu Mujahid of the Taliban about the national flag, the ratio is 1:2 and the Arabic writing on it is black not green. This source said that the one in black is the official flag, and that it was introduced two days before the date in Smith 1997k, i.e. on October 25th 1997. It was shown at theTaliban's New York Office website [broken link as of April 2001]. Jaume Oll, October 1997 - April 1998 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Official Website [broken link as of April 2001] displays a different flag to the one above. Gvido Petersons, 7 November 2000 The outermost third of the writing seems to be the same as above. Maybe this version of the shahada has a differing beginnings, missing "ashhadu" (I testify)? Ole Andersen, 7 November 2000 The word "ashhadu" is not written on either of the image above or on the fluttering flag on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Official Website [broken link as of April 2001]. The first word, which looks like a large "V" starting at the right end of the flag is "la," meaning "[there is] no." Joseph McMillan, 7 November 2000 Almost two weeks ago I saw the Taliban flag in the German TV news (ZDF, HeuteJournal, 8th August 2001, ca. 21.15 CEST). Unfortunately I had no video recorder ready. The flag was a table flag on the desk of the Afghanistan (Taliban) ambassador to Pakistan. It differed from the [former] image [by Jaume Oll] on FOTW in that:

The proportions seemed to be ca. 2:3, not 1:2. The Shahada was bigger: the height in the image [by Jaume Oll] is about 30%, I guess it was about 40%. The Shahada seemed to me more complex, i.e. I had the impression that there were more of the 'small' characters (if you know what I mean).

Marcus Schmger, 21 August 2001 During the German vexillological meeting at Goslar (13/14 October 2001) Michel Lupant showed several flags he had brought from Pakistan. Three of them were Afghan flags. The first and most interesting (...) was a 'real' Taliban flag. Michel Lupant had bought it in Pakistan, so we cannot be absolutely sure that it corresponds to the flags in real use by the Taliban. However, it is quite similar to the pattern I had reported earlier from TV news. I took a photo of Michel Lupant's flag and from that I

made the above image. Marcus Schmger, 14 November 2001 The image and description in Baert 2001 are similar to the above image (af-1997.gif by Marcus Schmger), but Baert 2001 states that the flag was 1:2. Writings onBaert 2001's image are a bit different, too. Ivan Sache, 12 April 2002 This is a Caliphat flag/Islamic State (not the Taliban flag but used by them). It is the al-LIWAA, the flag of the Islamic State, the Caliphat, a country where Islamic law is observed. Every Muslim nation can raise this flag if they become an Islamic state, and its supposed to be the flag of the worldwide Caliphat for all the Muslims if a new Emir of the Muslim Ummah (Community) rise again as an international leader for them. When a Muslim country becomes an Emirate they can raise this flag, the Taliban regime was an Emirate so they used this flag as the proper Muslim flag for the Islamic State. The flag has to be white and the Shahada always remains in Black. Gontzal Royo, 8 April 2003

Taliban Flag 1996-1997

image by Antnio Martins In 1996 the Taliban regime, which had been waging a guerilla war throughout Afghanistan since the Russians left, took over the capital, Kabul. The flag (at least initially) was a plain white banner. The white flag was displayed by the Taliban's military vehicles, as could be seen in several television images. From contributions by Ivan Sache, Dave Martucci, Jaume Oll and Jan Oskar Engene, October 1997 - April 1998

Flag with green Shahada, probably mistaken

by Jaume Oll 2:3

Smith 1997k (in The Flag Bulletin no. 177, reprinted in SAVA Newsletters) said that Afghanistan now flies a white flag with the Shahada inscribed on it in green.Smith

1997k showed the new flag as 2:3 but gave no figure. From contributions by Ivan Sache, Dave Martucci, Jaume Oll and Jan Oskar Engene, October 1997 to April 1998 This flag was used to illustrate November 2001 articles on Afghanistan in the news magazine Der Spiegel. I wrote an e-mail to them pointing to the error; as an answer they told me, that (my translation) "from our documentation we can tell, that both versions (with green or black inscription) have been used. However, it is true, that the black inscription seems to be used more frequently now" . Marcus Schmger, 18 November 2001 It appears to have been used in several works which use the 'authentication' of the Flag Research Center editors of The Flag Bulletin and hence the same original source for instance the Shipmate 2000 chart. Santiago Dotor, 19 November 2001

Unidentified Flag with Coat-of-Arms

image by Marcus Scmger During the German vexillological meeting at Goslar (13/14 October 2001) Michel Lupant showed several flags he had brought from Pakistan. Three of them were Afghan flags. One of them was a small table flag: white with (presumably) the Taliban coat-of-arms in the center. I took a photo of the flag and from that I made a GIF. Any graphic irregularities come from the actual flag (see for instance the sabres). No idea, what the actual purpose of the flag was, sorry. Marcus Scmger, 18 February 2002 Almost at the bottom of this webpage there is an image of the Taliban coat-of-arms, that was also used on flags. Marcus Scmger, 27 July 2002 On 11 September 2004 at 10:25 PDT, MSNBC Investigates aired an hour long program on the 11 September 2001 events. On two different film clips, I saw a truck with a bed full of armed men with guns, and another clip with only about 3 men in it, and both trucks were flying the flag pretty much as Michel Lupant has described it. Hubert Frick, 13 October 2004

Unidentified Afghan flags

image by Santiago Dotor

image by Santiago Dotor As far I know no flag of the emirate of Afghanistan could be seen in the television images of the [hijacked] Indian plane in Kandahar. But I saw several images with aplain white flag. I could also see two more flags:

striped horizontally green, white, red white-red horizontal flag; the line between white and red was serrated, like Bahrain, but at less [as it appeared] in television divided exactly into two parts.

Jaume Oll, 2 January 2000

Discussion on Islamic Emirate

Andrew Rogers asked whether Islamic Emirate was not redundant. There may not be any non-Islamic emirates in a cultural sense, but that is not the point. When a modern nation state calls itself Islamic it means that the Sharia is the law. Pakistan on its founding was the first such state. Revolutionary Iran and much Islamic fundamentalism since then have also striven for this ideal. But the Sharia is ill-suited to modern political and economic organization, so real implementation of the ideal is almost impossible. Even conservative Saudi Arabia, guardian of the most holy places, does not pretend to be an Islamic state in name. An Islamic state today is akin to John Calvin's Geneva, a theocratic state par excellence there is a big difference between a theocratic state and one that is culturally Christian or even religiously so. T. F. Mills, 28 October 1997 Although Emir is a term from the Muslim political world, in theory it is not a religious designation. In fact, terms like Emir, Sultan, and Malik (king) were first used when the political power of the Caliphs were on the wane they were meant to serve as a title of political authority without claiming to supplant the Caliphs' religious authority.

This is ironic considering the use that the Taliban is putting it to. Joshua Fruhlinger, 28 October 1997

Encyclopedia Dictionary

Taliban

Participant in the Civil war in Afghanistan (1992-2001), theWar in Afghanistan (2001-present) and the Waziristan War

Taliban flag

Active

since September 1994

Ideology

Islamic fundamentalism and Pashtun nationalism

Leaders

Mullah Mohammed Omar Mullah Obaidullah Akhund (captured) Afghanistan and Pakistan[1]

Area of operations

Strength

12,000 (self-claimed)

Originated as

Mujahideen groups in the Soviet war in Afghanistan

Allies

al-Qaeda Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Islamic Emirate of Waziristan Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Opponents

Iran Afghanistan Northern Alliance ISAF (led by NATO) Operation Enduring Freedom Allies

The Taliban (Pashto: libn, also anglicised as Taleban) are a SunniIslamist movement

[2]

that ruled most

of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, when their leaders were removed from power by a cooperative military effort between theNorthern Alliance and NATO countries. Committed fundamentalist insurgents,
[3]

often

described

as

"Taliban" in the media, originating

in the Frontier Tribal Areasof Pakistan, are currently engaged in a

protracted guerrilla war against the current government of Afghanistan, allied NATO forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.
[4]

The Taliban movement was headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar. Beneath Mullah Omar were "a mixture of former small-unit military commanders and Madrasahteachers"
[5]

and then a rank and file most of whom had studied

in Islamic religious schools in Pakistan. The overwhelming majority of Taliban movement were ethnic Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, along with a smaller number of volunteers from elsewhere, for example Europe or China. The Taliban received valuable training, supplies and arms from the Pakistani government, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)[23], and many recruits fromMadrasahs for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, primarily ones established by theJamiat Ulema-e-Islam JUI. Although in control of Afghanistan's capital (Kabul) and much or most of the country for five years, the Taliban regime, or "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Human rights abuses denied it United Nations recognition and most of the world's states, including Iran, India, Turkey, Russia, USA and most Central Asian republics opposed the Taliban and aided its rival (Afghan Northern Alliance). While in power, the Taliban implemented the "strictest interpretation of Sharia lawever seen in the Muslim world,"
[6]

and became notorious internationally for theirmistreatment of women.

[8]

[7]

Women were forced to wear

[7]

the burqa in public.

They were allowed neither to work nor to be educated after the age of eight,
[7]

and until then

were permitted only to study the Qur'an. Women seeking an education were forced to attend underground schools, where they and their teachers risked execution if caught.
[7]

They were not allowed to be treated by male doctors

unless accompanied by a male family member or husband chaperone, which led to illnesses remaining untreated. They faced public flogging in the street, Taliban's laws.
[10][11] [9]

and both men and women faced public execution for violations of the

Contents

1 Etymology 2 Origin 3 Taliban ideology and its application

o o o o

3.1 Governance 3.2 Consistency 3.3 Criticism of ideology 3.4 Explanation of ideology

4 Life under the Taliban regime

o o o

4.1 Treatment of women 4.2 Prohibitions on culture 4.3 Ethnic massacres and persecution

o o

4.4 Economy 4.5 Conscription

5 War with the Northern Alliance 6 International relations

o o o

6.1 Relations with the United Nations and aid agencies 6.2 Relationship with Osama bin Laden 6.3 Taliban in Pakistan

7 Buddhas of Bamiyan 8 Opium 9 U.S.-led invasion and displacement of the Taliban

o o

9.1 Prelude to invasion 9.2 American attack

10 Resurgence of Taliban

o o

10.1 Human rights violations 10.2 Timeline

11 References

10.2.1 2006 10.2.2 2007 10.2.3 2008

12 Further reading 13 See also 14 External links

Etymology
The word Taliban is from the Arabic libn, " students", loaned from Arabic, lib, the Arabic plural being ullb. Since becoming a loanword in English,Taliban besides a plural noun referring to the group is also used as a singular noun referring to an individual. For example, John Walker Lindh has been referred to as "an American Taliban" besides the more correct "an American Talib".
[12]

Origin
The Taliban initially had enormous goodwill from Afghans weary of the corruption, brutality and incessant fighting of Mujahideen warlords. Two contrasting narratives of the beginnings of the Taliban
[13]

are that the rape and murder

of boys and girls from a family traveling to Kandahar or a similar outrage by Mujahideen bandits sparked Mullah Omar and his students to vow to rid Afghanistan of these criminals.
[14]

The other is that the Pakistan-based truck

shipping mafia known as the "Afghanistan Transit Trade" and their allies in the Pakistan government, trained, armed and financed the Taliban to clear the southern road across Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics of extortionate bandit gangs.
[15]

Though there is no evidence that the CIA directly supported the Taliban or Al Qaeda, some basis for military support of the Taliban was provided when, in the early 1980s, the CIA and the ISI (Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Agency) provided arms to Afghans resisting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the ISI assisted the process of gathering radical Muslims from around the world to fight against the Soviets. Osama Bin Laden was one of the key players in organizing training camps for the foreign Muslim volunteers. The U. S. poured funds and arms into Afghanistan and "by 1987, 65,000 tons of U. S. -made weapons and ammunition a year were entering the war".
[16]

The Taliban were based in the Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan regions, and were overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtuns and predominantly Durrani Pashtuns. They received training and arms from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia as well as other Middle Eastern countries who had been recruited by the U. S. to thwart the Soviet invasion of this region.

The first major military activity of the Taliban was in October-November 1994 when they marched from Maiwand in southern Afghanistan to capture Kandahar City and the surrounding provinces, losing only a few dozen men.
[17]

Starting with the capture of a border crossing and a huge ammunition dump from warlord Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar, a few weeks later they freed "a convoy trying to open a trade route from Pakistan to Central Asia" from another group of warlords attempting to extort money.
[18]

In the next three months this hitherto "unknown force" took

control of twelve of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with Mujahideen warlords often surrendering to them without a fight and the "heavily armed population" giving up their weapons. capital, Kabul.
[19]

By September 1996 they captured Afghanistan's

Taliban ideology and its application

The Taliban's extremely strict and "anti-modern" ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia combining Pashtun tribal codes",
[20]

or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favored

by members of the Pakistani fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) organization and its splinter groups. Also contributing to the admixture was the Wahhabism of their Saudi financial benefactors, and the jihadism and panIslamism of sometime comrade-in-arms Osama bin Laden.
[21]

Their ideology was a departure from the Islamism of

the anti-Soviet mujahideen rulers they replaced who tended to be mystical Sufis, traditionalists, or radical Islamicists inspired by the Ikhwan.
[22]

Sharia law was interpreted to ban a wide variety of activities hitherto lawful in Afghanistan, see below. Critics complained that most Afghans were non-Pashtuns who followed a different, less strict and less intrusive interpretation of Islam. Despite their similarity to the Wahhabis, the Taliban did not eschew all traditional popular practices. They did not destroy the graves of pirs (holy men) and emphasized dreams as a means of revelation.
[23]

Taliban relationship with ethnicity was mixed. Following Deobandi and Islamist anti-nationalist belief, they opposed "tribal and feudal structures," and eliminated from "leadership roles" traditional tribal or feudal leaders.
[24]

On the

other hand, since they were very reluctant to share power and their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtuns, their rule meant ethnic Pashtuns controlled multi-ethnic Afghanistan, where Pashtuns made up only 42% of the population.
[25]

At the national level, "all senior Tajik, Uzbek andHazara bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns,
[26]

whether qualified or not. As a result of this loss of expertise, the ministries by and large ceased to function. " local units of government like city councils of Kabul
[27]

In

or Herat,

[28]

Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when

the Pashto-speaking Taliban could not communicate with the local Persian-speaking Afghans (roughly half of the population of Afghanistan spoke Dari or other non-Pashtun tongues. )
[28]

Critics complained this "lack of local

[29]

representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force. "

Like Wahhabi and other Deobandis, the Taliban strongly opposed the Shia branch of Islam. The Taliban declared the Hazara ethnic group, which totaled almost 10% of Afghanistan's population, "not Muslims. "
[30]

Along with being very strict, the Taliban were adverse to debate on doctrine with other Muslims. "The Taliban did not allow even Muslim reporters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the Qur'an. "
[31]

As they established their power the Taliban created a new form of Islamic radicalism that spread beyond the borders of Afghanistan, mostly to Pakistan. By 1998-1999 Taliban-style groups in the Pashtun belt, and to an extent in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, "were banning TV and videos . . . . and forcing people, particularly women to adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life. "
[32]

Governance
The Taliban did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained: The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.
[33]

Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from "Bay'ah" or oath of allegiance in imitation of the Prophet and early Muslims. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had the "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed", taken from its shrine "for the first time in 60 years. " Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the centre of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted `Amir al-Mu'minin`! (Commander of the Faithful), in a defacto pledge of support. Also in keeping with the governance of early Muslims was a lack of state institutions or "a methodology for command and control," standard today internationally even among non-Westernized states. The Taliban didn't issue "press releases, policy statements or hold regular press conferences," and of course the outside world and most Afghans didn't even know what they looked like since photography was banned.
[34]

Their regular army resembled "a lashkar

or traditional tribal militia force" with only 25,000 to 30,000 men, these being added to as the need arose. Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrassa education. " Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts to fight when needed. If and when military reverses trapped them behind lines or led to their deaths, this created "even greater chaos" in the national administration.
[35]

In the Ministry of Finance there was no budget or "qualified economist or

banker. " Cash to finance Taliban war effort was collected and dispersed by Mullah Omar without book-keeping.

Consistency
The Taliban ideology was not static. Before its capture of Kabul members of the Taliban talked about stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power and law and order were restored. The decision making process of the Taliban in Kandahar was modeled on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what was believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the believers.
[36]

However, as the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the jirga, and without Omar's visiting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.
[37]

In 1999, Omar issued a decree stating the Buddha statues at Bamyan would be protected because Afghanistan had no Buddhists, implying idolatry would not be a problem.But in March 2001 they were destroyed after the previous decision was reversed with a decree stating "all the statues around Afghanistan must be destroyed. "
[38]

Criticism of ideology
The Taliban were criticized for their strictness toward those who disobeyed the ( Bidah) rule. Some Muslims complained that many Taliban prohibitions - such as bans on clapping during sports events; kite flying; beard trimming; or sports for women - had no validity in the Qur'an or sharia. Another source of objection was that the Taliban called their 20% tax on truckloads of opium "zakat," when zakat is limited to 2. 5% of the zakat-payers' disposable income.
[39]

The bestowing of the title of Amir al-Mu'minin on Muhammad Omar was criticized on the grounds that he lacked scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the Prophet's family. Sanction for the title required the support of all of the country's ulema, whereas only some 1200 Pashtun Taliban-supporting Mullahs had declared Omar the Amir.
[39]

"No Afghan had adopted the title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan assumed the title before he

declared jihad against the Sikh kingdom in Peshawar.But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners, while Omar had declared jihad against other Afghans. "
[40]

Explanation of ideology
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) was important to the Taliban because the "vast majority" of its rank and file and most of the leadership, (though not Mullah Omar), were Koranic students who had studied at madrassas set up for Afghan refugees, usually by the JUI. The leader of JUI, Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman, was a political ally of Benazir Bhutto. After

Bhutto became prime minister, Rehman "had access to the government, the army and the ISI" whom he influenced to help the Taliban.
[41]

Journalist Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation and hardship of the war against the Soviet Union and the civil war that followed, was another factor influencing the ideology of the Taliban.
[42]

The young rank and file Taliban were

Koranic students in Afghan refugee camps whose teachers were often "barely literate," let alone scholars learned in the finer points of Islamic law and history. The refugee students brought up in a totally male society, not only had no education in mathematics, science, history or geography, they had no traditional skills of farming, herding or handicraft-making, nor even knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.
[42]

In such an environment peace meant unemployment, and domination of women was an affirmation of manhood. Rigid fundamentalism was a matter of political survival, not just principle, Taliban leaders "repeatedly told" Rashid "that if they gave women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they would lose the support of their rank and file. "
[43]

Life under the Taliban regime

Sharia law was interpreted to ban a wide variety of activities hitherto lawful in Afghanistan: employment and education for women, movies, television, videos, music, dancing, hanging pictures in homes, clapping during sports events. One Taliban list of prohibitions included: pork, pig, pig oil, anything made from human hair, satellite dishes, cinematography, and equipment that produces the joy of music, pool tables, chess, masks, alcohol, tapes, computers, VCRs, television, anything that propagates sex and is full of music, wine, lobster, nail polish, firecrackers, statues, sewing catalogs, pictures, Christmas cards. "
[44]

Men were required to have a beard extending farther than a fist clamped at the base of the chin. On the other hand, they had to wear their head hair short. Men were also required to wear a head covering.
[45]

Possession was forbidden of depictions of living things, including photographs of them, stuffed animals, and dolls.

[45]

Rules which according to some Muslims had no validity in the Qur'an or sharia included a ban on clapping during sports events, kite flying, beard trimming, and sports for women. These rules were issued by the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice (PVSV) and enforced by its "religious police", a concept thought to be borrowed from the Wahhabis. In newly conquered towns hundreds of religious police beat offenders typically men who shaved and women who were not wearing their burqa properly with long sticks.
[46]

Theft was punished by the amputation of a hand, rape and murder by public execution. Married adulterers were stoned to death. In Kabul, punishments were carried out in front of crowds in the city's former soccer stadium.

Treatment of women
Main article: Taliban treatment of women
A member of the Taliban's religious police beating a woman inKabul on September 13, 2001. The footage, which was filmed by RAWA, can be seen here.

Women in particular were targets of the Taliban's restrictions. They were prohibited from working; from wearing clothing regarded as "stimulating and attractive," including the "Iranian chador," (viewed as insufficiently complete in its covering); from taking a taxi without a "close male relative"; washing clothes in streams; or having their measurements taken by tailors.
[47]

Employment for women was restricted to the medical sector, since male medical personnel were not allowed to examine women. One result of the banning of employment of women by the Taliban was the closing down in places like Kabul of primary schools not only for girls but for boys, because almost all the teachers there were women.
[48]

Women were also not permitted to attend co-educational schools; in practice, this prevented the vast majority of young women and girls in Afghanistan from receiving even a primary education.

Women were made to wear the burqa, a traditional dress covering the entire body except for a small screen to see out of. Taliban restrictions became more severe after they took control of the capital. In February 1998, religious police forced all women off the streets of Kabul and issued new regulations ordering "householders to blacken their windows, so women would not be visible from the outside. " been allowed to continue, were forbidden. general hospitals,
[51] [50] [49]

Home schools for girls, which had

In June 1998, the Taliban stopped all women from attending

leaving the use of one all-women hospital in Kabul. There were many reports of Muslim

women being beaten by the Taliban for violating the Sharia.

Prohibitions on culture
Movie theaters were closed and music banned. Hundreds of cultural artifacts that were

deemed polytheistic were also destroyed including major museum and countless private art collections. A sample Taliban edict issued after their capture of Kabul is one decreed in December 1996 by the "General Presidency of Amr Bil Maruf and Nahi Anil Munkar" (or Religious Police) banning a variety of things and activities: music, shaving of beards, keeping of pigeons, flying kites, displaying of pictures or portraits, western hairstyles, music and dancing at weddings, gambling, "sorcery," and not praying at prayer times.
[47]

In February

2001, Taliban used sledgehammers to destroy representational works of art at the National Museum of Afghanistan.
[52]

Non-Western festivities were not exempt from bannings. The Taliban banned the traditional Afghan New Year's celebration of Nowruz as anti-Islamic, and "for a time they also banned Ashura, the Shia Islamic month of mourning and even restricted any show of festivity at Eid. "
[53]

The Afghan people were not allowed to have any

cultural celebrations if the women were there. If there were only men at the celebration it would be allowed to go forth, so long as it did not go over the curfew time of 9:00 pm. Taliban official Mullah Mohammed Hassan explained that "of course we realize that people need some entertainment but they can go to the parks and see the flowers, and from this they will learn about Islam. " The Education Minister Mullahs Abdul Hanifi told questioners that the Taliban "oppose music because it creates a strain in the mind and hampers study of Islam. "
[53]

Ethnic massacres and persecution

The worst attack on civilians came in summer of 1998 when the Taliban swept north from Herat to the predominantly Hazara and Uzbek city of Mazar-i-Sharif, the largest city in the north. Entering at 10 am on 8 August 1998, for the next two days the Taliban drove their pickup trucks "up and down the narrow streets of Mazar-i-Sharif shooting to the left and right and killing everything that moved shop owners, cart pullers, women and children shoppers and even goats and donkeys. " killed in Mazar-i-Sharif and later in Bamiyan.
[55] [54]

More than 8000 noncombatants were reported

Contrary to the injunctions of Islam, which demands immediate

burial, the Taliban forbade anyone to bury the corpses for the first six days while they rotted in the summer heat and were eaten by dogs.
[56]

In addition to this indiscriminate slaughter, the Taliban sought out and massacred

members of the Hazara, a mostly Shia ethnic group, while in control of Mazar. While the slaughter can be attributed to several factors ethnic difference, suspicions of Hazaras loyalty to their co-religionists in Iran, fury at the loss of life suffered in an earlier unsuccessful Taliban takeover of Mazar takfir by the puritanical Sunni Taliban toward the Shia Hazaras was instrumental. It was expressed by Mullah Niazi, the commander of the attack and governor of Mazar after the attack, in his declaration from Mazar's central mosque: "Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you. The Hazaras are not Muslims and now have to kill Hazaras. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. Wherever you go we will catch you. If you go up we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair. ";
[30]

Hazara also suffered from a siege by the Taliban of their Hazarajat homeland in central Afghanistan and the refusal of the Taliban to allow the UN to supply food to Hazara to the provinces of Bamiyan, Ghor, Wardak and

Ghazni.

[57]

A month after the Mazar slaughter, Taliban broke through Hazar lines and took over Hazarajat. The
[58]

killing of civilians was much less common there than in Mazar, but occurred nevertheless.

During the years that followed, rapes and massacres of Hazara by Taliban forces were documented by groups such as Human Rights Watch.
[59]

Economy
Peace did bring economic development to Afghanistan. The so-called "transportation mafia" operating out of Pakistan "cut down millions of acres of timber in Afghanistan for the Pakistani market, denuding the countryside as there was no reforestation. They stripped down rusting factories, . . . even electricity and telephone poles for their steel and sold the scrap to steel mills in Lahore. "
[60]

Conscription
Main article: Taliban conscription According to the testimony of Guantanamo captives before their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Taliban, in addition to conscripting men to serve as soldiers, also conscripted literate and numerate men to staff its civil service. Ironically, given the derivation of their name for themselves, some of the Taliban leaders were illiterate.

War with the Northern Alliance

Main article: Afghan Civil War (1996-2001)

Taliban in Herat, July 2001.

Taliban's strict policies and condescending behavior toward their local allied troops caused an uprising in which thousands of the Taliban's best troops were killed. In 1997, Ahmad Shah Massoud devised a plan to utilize guerrilla tactics in the Shamali plains to defeat the Taliban advances. In collaboration with the locals, Masoud had deployed his forces to be stationed at civilian dwellings and other hidden places. Upon the arrival of the Taliban, some locals, who had vowed pacts of peace with the Taliban, as well as Masoud's forces came out of hiding and in a surprise attack captured the north of Kabul. Soon after, the Taliban put a major effort into taking control of the Shamali plains, indiscriminately killing young men, uprooting and expelling the population. Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, had written a full report on these and other war crimes that further insinuated and inflamed the issue of ethnicity. In August 8, 1998 the Taliban again took Mazar-i-Sharif this time avenging their earlier defeat and creating more international controversy with mass killings of thousands of civilians and several Iranian diplomats. This offensive left the Northern Alliance in control of only a small part of Afghanistan (10-15%) in the north. The Taliban retained control of most of the country until the 2001 9/11 attacks. On September 9, 2001, a suicide bomber, posing as an interviewer and widely thought to be connected to Al-Qaeda,assassinated the Northern Alliance mujahideen military

leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. Despite his removal, the Taliban were driven from most of Afghanistan by American bombing and Northern Alliance ground troops a couple of months later in the 2001 War. Main article: War in Afghanistan (2001present)

International relations
During its time in power, the Taliban regime, or "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all of whom also provided aid. Most states in the world,

including Russia, Iran, India, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,

andTajikistan, and later the USA,

opposed the Taliban and aided their enemy the Northern Alliance. Officially Pakistan denied it was supporting the Taliban, but its support was substantial -- one year's aid (1997/1998) was an estimated US$30 million in wheat, diesel, petroleum and kerosene fuel, and other supplies.
[61]

The Taliban's influence in its neighbour Pakistan was

deep. Its "unprecedented access" among Pakistan's lobbies and interest groups enabled it "to play off one lobby against another and extend their influence in Pakistan even further. At times they would defy" even the powerful ISI.
[62]

Foreign powers, including the United States, were at first supportive of the Taliban in hopes it would serve as a force to restore order in Afghanistan after years of division into corrupt, lawless warlord fiefdoms. The U. S. government, for example, made no comment when the Taliban captured Herat in 1995 and expelled thousands of girls from schools.
[63]

These

hopes faded as it began to be engaged in warlord practices of rocketing unarmed civilians, targeting ethnic groups (primarily Hazaras) and restricting the rights of women.
[64]

In late

1997, American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright began to distance the U. S. from the Taliban and the next year the American-based Unocaloil company withdrew from a major deal with the Taliban regime concerning an oil pipeline. In early August of 1998 the Taliban's difficulties in relations with foreign groups became much more serious. After attacking the city of Mazar, Taliban forces killed several thousand civilians and 10 Iranian diplomats and intelligence officers in the Iranian consulate. Alleged radio intercepts indicate Mullah Omar personally approved the killings.
[65]

The Iranian

government was incensed and a "full-blown regional crisis" ensued with Iran mobilizing 200,000 regular troops,
[66]

though war was averted.

A day before the capture of Mazar, affiliates of Taliban guest Osama bin Laden bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa killing 224 and wounding 4500 mostly African victims. In the 1998 US Embassy bombings ( August 7, 1998) hundreds of people were killed in simultaneous Car bomb explosions at the United States The United States responded by launching cruise missiles attacks on suspected terrorists camps in Afghanistan killing over 20 though failing to kill bin Laden or even many al-Qaeda. Mullah Omar condemned the missile attack and American President Bill Clinton.
[67]

Saudi Arabia expelled the Taliban envoy in Saudi Arabia

in protest over the Taliban's refusal to turn over bin Laden and after Mullah Omar allegedly insulted the Saudi royal family.
[68]

In mid-October the UN Security Council voted

unanimously to ban commercial aircraft flights to and from Afghanistan and freeze its bank accounts world wide.
[69]

The regime's isolation grew in March 2001 with the destruction of Afghanistan's most significant archeological treasures, the 1500-year-old giant Buddha statues, (the two largest were 55 and 37 meters high) in Bamiyan. That month the Taliban also issued a decree ordering non-Muslims to wear distinctive yellow patches.

Relations with the United Nations and aid agencies

A major issue during the Taliban's reign was its relations with the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Twenty years of continuous warfare, first with the Soviets and then between mujahideen, had devastated Afghanistan's infrastructure and economy. There was no running water, little electricity, few telephones, motorable roads or regular energy supplies. Basic necessities like water, food and housing and others were in desperately short supply. In addition, the clan and family structure that provided Afghans with a social/economic safety net was also badly damaged.
[31][70]

Afghanistan's infant mortality

was the highest in the world. A full quarter of all children died before they reached their fifth birthday, a rate several times higher than most other developing countries.
[71]

Consequently international charitable and/or development organisations (NGOs) were extremely important to the supply of food, employment, reconstruction, and other services in Afghanistan. With one million plus deaths during the years of war, the number of families headed by widows had reached 98,000 by 1998.
[72]

Thus Taliban restrictions on women

were sometime a matter not only of human rights, but of life and death. In Kabul, where vast portions of the city had been devastated from rocket attacks, more than half of its 1. 2 million people benefited in some way from NGO charity, even for water to drink.
[73]

The civil war and

its refugee-creation processes continued during the entire time the Taliban were in power. During that time, more than three-quarters of a million civilians were displaced by new Taliban offensives in the north around Mazar, on the Herat front, and in the fertile Shomali valley around Kabul. The offensives used "scorched-earth" tactics to prevent civilians from supplying the enemy with aid.
[74]

Despite the receipt of UN and NGO aid, the Taliban's attitude toward the UN and NGOs was often one of suspicion, not gratitude or even tolerance. The UN operates on the basis of international law, not Islamic Sharia, and the UN did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Additionally, most of the foreign donors and aid workers, who had tried to persuade the Taliban to change its strict policies and allow women more freedom, were non-Muslims. As the Taliban's Attorney General Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada expressed it: Let us state what sort of education the UN wants. This is a big infidel policy which gives such obscene freedom to women which would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic country where adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the infidels because their men become like women and women cannot defend themselves. Anyone who talks to us should do so within Islam's framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust itself to other people's requirements, people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the Holy Koran.
[75]

Frustrations of aid agencies were numerous. Taliban decision-makers, particularly Mullah Omar, seldom if ever talked directly to non-Muslim foreigners, so aid providers had to deal with intermediaries whose approvals and agreements were often reversed by Taliban higherups.
[76]

In September 1997, the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Emma

Bonino, and 19 Western journalists and aid workers were arrested and held for three hours by the Taliban religious police in Kabul when photographs were taken of women patients.
[77]

Around the same time the heads of three UN agencies in Kandahar were

expelled from the country after protesting that a female lawyer for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was forced to talk to Taliban officials from behind a curtain so her face would not be visible.
[78]

When the UN increased the number of Muslim women staff to satisfy Taliban demands for Muslim staff, the Taliban then insisted "all female Muslim UN staff traveling to Afghanistan to be chaperoned by a mahram or a blood relative. "
[51]

In July 20, 1998, the Taliban closed

"down all NGO offices by force" after those organization refused to move to a bombed out former Polytechnic College as ordered. down.
[80] [79]

One month later the UN offices were also shut

As food prices rose and conditions deteriorated, the Taliban Planning Minister Qari Din Mohammed explained the Taliban's indifference to the loss of humanitarian aid: We Muslims believe God the Almighty will feed everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs leave then it is their decision. We have not expelled them.
[81]

Relationship with Osama bin Laden

In 1996, Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan from Sudan. He came without any invitation from the Taliban, and sometimes irritated Mullah Omar with his declaration of war and fatwa to murder citizens of third-party countries, and follow-up interviews,
[82]

but relations between

the two groups became closer over time, and eventually bonded to the point where Mullah Omar rebuffed its patron Saudi Arabia, insulting Saudi minister Prince Turki and refusing to turn over bin Laden to the Saudis as Omar had reportedly promised to earlier. Bin Laden was able to forge an alliance between the Taliban
[83]

and

his Al-

Qaeda organization. It is understood that al-Qaeda-trained fighters known as the 055 Brigade were integrated with the Taliban army between 1997 and 2001. Several hundred Arab Afghan fighters sent by bin Laden assisted the Taliban in the slaughter at Mazar-eSharif.
[84]

Taliban-al-Qaeda connections, were also strengthened by the reported marriage of

one of bin Laden's sons to Omar's daughter. During Osama bin Laden's stay in Afghanistan, he may have helped finance the Taliban.
[85] [86]

Perhaps the biggest favor al-Qaeda did for

[52]

the Taliban was the assassination by suicide bombing

of the Taliban's most effective

military opponent mujahideen commander and Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud shortly before September 9, 2001. This came at a time when Taliban human rights violations and extremism seemed likely to create international support for Massoud's group as the legitimate representatives of Afghanistan.
[52]

The killing, reportedly handled by Ayman

Zawahiri and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad wing of al-Qaeda, left the Northern Alliance leaderless, and removed "the last obstacle to the Talibans total control of the country . . . "
[87]

After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, Osama bin Laden and several al Qaeda members were indicted in U. S. criminal court.
[88]

The Taliban protected Osama bin Laden

from extradition requests by the U. S. , variously claiming that bin Laden had "gone missing" in Afghanistan,
[89]

or that Washington "cannot provide any evidenceor any proof" that bin

Laden is involved in terrorist activities and that "without any evidence, bin Laden is a man without sin. . . he is a free man. "
[90][91]

Evidence against bin Laden included Bin Laden in turn, praised the Taliban

courtroom testimony and satellite phone records.

[92][93]

as the "only Islamic government" in existence, and lauded Mullah Omar for his destruction of idols like the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
[94]

Taliban in Pakistan
Main article: Islamic Emirate of Waziristan See also: 2004-2006 Waziristan conflict and Wana conflict Closely tied with JUI party in Pakistan, the Taliban received manpower from Madrasahs in Pakistans border region. After a request for help from Mullah Omar in 1997, Maulana Samiul Haq shut down his 2500+ student madrassa and "sent his entire student" body hundreds of miles away to fight alongside the

Taliban. The next year, the same religious leader helped persuade 12 madrassas in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province to shut down for one month and send 8000 students to provide reinforcements for the Taliban army in Afghanistan.
[95]

The Taliban returned the favor, helping spread its ideology to parts of Pakistan. By 1998 some groups "along the Pashtun belt" were banning TV and videos, imposing Sharia punishments "such as stoning and amputation in defiance of the legal system, killing Pakistani Shia and forcing people, particularly women to adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life. "
[96]

In December 1998 the

Tehrik-i-Tuleba or Movement of Taliban in the Orakzai Agency ignored Pakistans legal process and publicly executed a murderer in front of 2000 spectators Taliban-style. They also promised to implement Taliban-style justice and ban TV, music and videos.
[97]

In Quetta, Pashtun pro-Taliban groups

"burned down cinema houses, shot video shop owners, smashed satellite dishes and drove women off the streets".
[98]

In Kashmir Afghan Arabs from Afghanistan

attempted to impose a "Wahhabi style dress code" banning jeans and jackets. "On 15 February 1999, they shot and wounded three Kashmiri cable television operators for relaying Western satellite broadcasts. "
[99]

As of early 2007, Taliban influence in Pakistan continues in conjunction with the Taliban insurgency. Citing a suicide bombing of a restaurant in Peshwar in retaliation for the arrest of a relative of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, the Associated Press states ". . . in Pakistan's frontier regions, . . . scores of people have been executed over the past two or three years apparently for being too aligned with the Pakistani government or America allies in the U. S. -led war on terrorism. "
[100]

Buddhas of Bamiyan
The Taliban's destruction of the Buddhas of Bamyan in March 21, 2001.

In March 2001, the Taliban ordered the demolition of two statues of Buddhas carved into cliffsides at Bamiyan, one 38 metres (125 ft) tall and built in CE 507, the other 53 metres (174 ft) tall and built in CE 554. The act was condemned by UNESCO and many countries around the world. The intentions of the destruction remain unclear. Mullah Omar initially supported the preservation of Afghanistan'sheritage, and Japan linked financial aid to the preservation of the statues.
[101]

However, after a few years, a decreewas issued claiming all representations of humans and idols,

including those in museums, must be destroyed in accordance with Islamic law which prohibits any form of idol worship. The government of Pakistan (itself host to one of the richest and most ancient collections of Buddhist art) implored the Taliban to spare the statues. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates later denounced the act as savage. Sayed Rahmatullah Hashemi, a senior representative of the Taliban designated as the roving Ambassador visited the US in March, 2001. He represented the Taliban's action not as an act of irrationality, but as an act of rage over UNESCO and some western governments denying the Taliban use of the funds intended for the repairs of the war-damaged statues of the Buddha. He contended that the Taliban intended to use the money for drought relief.

Opium
Opium poppies have traditionally been grown in Afghanistan, and, with the war shattering other sectors of the economy, it became the number one export of the country.

The Taliban have provided an Islamic sanction for farmers . . . to grow even more opium, even though the Koran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing intoxicants. Abdul Rashid, the head of the Taliban's anti-drugs control force in Kandahar, spelled out the nature of his unique job. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the growing of hashish, "because it is consumed by Afghans and Muslims. " But, Rashid told me without a hint of sarcasm, "Opium is permissible because it is consumed by kafirs in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans. "
[102]

But in 2000 the Taliban banned opium production, a first in Afghan history. In 2000, Afghanistan's opium production still accounted for 75% of the world's supply. On July 27,2000, the Taliban again issued a decree banning opium poppy cultivation. According to opioids.com, by February 2001, production had been reduced from 12,600 acres (51 km) to only 17 acres.
[103]

When the Taliban entered north

Waziristan in 2003 they immediately banned poppy cultivation and punished those who sold it. Another source claims opium production was cut back by the Taliban not to prevent its use but to shore up its price, and thus increase the income of poppy farmers and revenue of Afghan tax collectors.
[104]

The official verdict of the Taliban however was otherwise. Mullah Amir Mohammed Haqqani, the Taliban's top drug official in Nangarhar, said the ban would remain regardless of whether the Taliban received aid or international recognition. "It is our decree that there will be no poppy cultivation. It is banned forever in this country," he said. "Whether we get assistance or not, poppy growing will never be allowed again in our country. "
[105]

However, with the 2001 US/Northern Alliance expulsion of the Taliban, opium cultivation has increased in the southern provinces liberated from the Taliban control, production was 87% of the world's opium supply,
[107] [106]

and by 2005

rising to 90% in 2006.

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U. S. -led invasion and displacement of the Taliban

Main article: War in Afghanistan (2001present)

Prelude to invasion
Taliban press conference in Pakistan after the September 11th attacks, declaring they will not extradite Osama bin Laden without evidence.

After the September 11 attacks and the PENTTBOM investigation, the USA delivered this ultimatum to the Taliban:

1. Deliver to the US all of the leaders of Al Qaeda; 2. Release all imprisoned foreign nationals; 3. Close immediately every terrorist training camp; 4. Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities; 5. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection.
[109]

On September 21, 2001, the Taliban responded that if the United States could bring evidence that bin Laden was guilty they would hand him over, stating there was no evidence in their possession linking him to the September 11 attacks.
[91]

On September 22, 2001, the United Arab Emirates and later Saudi Arabia withdrew their recognition of the Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan, leaving neighboring Pakistan as the only remaining country with diplomatic ties. On October 4, 2001, it is believed that the Taliban covertly offered to turn bin Laden over to Pakistan for trial in an international tribunalthat operated according to Islamic Sharia law.
[110][111]

Pakistan, recently recast as an ally of the west, is believed to have rejected the offer

(even though they still recognized the Taliban).

On October 7, 2001, before the onset of military operations, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan offered to "detain bin Laden and try him under Islamic law" if the United States made a formal request and presented the Taliban with evidence. U. S. as insufficient. Bin Laden for his part, maintained America's attack on the Taliban after 9/11 was motivated only by its hatred for Islam.
[113] [112]

This counter offer was immediately rejected by the

American attack
Shortly afterward, on October 7, 2001, the United States, aided by the United Kingdom, Canada, and supported by a coalition of other countries including several from theNATO alliance, initiated military actions in Afghanistan, and bombed Taliban and Al Qaeda related camps.
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The stated intent of military operations was to remove the Taliban from power because of the

Taliban's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden for his alleged involvement in the September 11 attacks, and disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.
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No proof of Bin Laden' involvement was

provided to the Taliban Government. On October 14 the Taliban offered to discuss handing over Osama bin Laden to a neutral country if the US halted bombing, but only if the Taliban were given evidence of Bin Laden's involvement in 9/11. operations. The ground war was mainly fought by the Northern Alliance, the remaining elements of the anti-Taliban forces which the Taliban had routed over the previous years but had never been able to entirely destroy. Mazari Sharif fell to U. S. -Northern Alliance forces on November 9, leading to a cascade of provinces falling with minimal resistance, and many local forces switching loyalties from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. On the night of November 12, the Taliban retreated south in an orderly fashion from Kabul. This retreat was so orderly, that on November 15, they released eight Western aid workers after three months in captivity (see Attacks on humanitarian workers). By November 13the Taliban had withdrawn from both Kabul and Jalalabad. Finally, in early December, the Taliban gave up their last
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The U. S. rejected this offer as an insufficient public relations ploy and continued military

city stronghold of Kandahar and retired to the hilly wilderness along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where they remain today as a guerrilla warfare operation, drawing new recruits and developing plans for a restoration of power.