MORAL FOUNDATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST ECONOMIC CRIME

BY

DAUD VICARY ABDULLAH President & Chief Executive Officer and Abbas Mirakhor First Holder INCEIF Chair of Islamic Finance International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) Lorong Universiti A 59100 Kuala Lumpur MALAYSIA

Daud Vicary Abdullah Tel: +603 7651 4141 Fax: +603 7651 4143 E-mail: dvicary@inceif.org

Abbas Mirakhor Tel: + 603 7651 4010 Fax: +603 7651 4143 E-mail: abbas@mirakhor.com

MORAL FOUNDATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST ECONOMIC CRIME

I.

I NTRODUCTION

By whatever definition or measure, economic and financial crimes are on the rise at such a rapid pace to resemble an epidemic 1. No country, society, culture or community seems immune to their devastating impact on victims, economies, governments and societies2. Not long ago, these activities were known as victimless crimes3. Consideration of these crimes has evolved over the last four decades. General concern about them however intensified post-9/11 and accelerated post-2007/08 financial crisis4. Activities that used to be thought of as developing country crimes, such as bribery, corruption and fraud, are now major concerns of rich countries as well. While the financial crisis focused attention on crimes of the white collar elite, empirical research was pointing to an alarming phenomenon: the everyday crimes of the middle class, crimes being committed by those at the very core of contemporary society.6 Much analysis of the growth in economic and financial crimes have focused on rapid economic changes resulting from globalization and the accelerated pace of global expansion of information technology.7 Very little attention has been paid to what a number of observers consider as the most fundamental of all changes: the erosion of morality.8 To be sure, there are classes of sociological, political, and psychological studies, theoretical and empirical, that have dealt with what is referred to as a market anomie, meaning the weakening market morality or normlessness.9 To our knowledge, however, there have been very few studies that relate directly the growth
2|P a g e

of economic and financial crimes to the erosion of morality worldwide, even in societies where the market does not have a dominant role in the economy.10 Some have focused their sight on the rapidly weakening general moral standards and admit that the humanity is facing a particularly acute moral confusion. The cause, however, is said to be the rapid changes that have undermined many of the institutions or traditions that previously formed and policed our values. Further, says Richard Holloway, the Bishop of Edinburgh, there can be little argument about the agent that has ca used this change; it is the dominance of the global market economy and the social and cultural movements that have accompanied its ascendance.11 Accordingly, globalization led to the emergence of conservative administrations, in the 1980s and 1990s, tha t radically restructured and removed traditional restraints on markets and on capital leading to unleashing of greed, self-centered and self-interested behavior. Importantly, this unfettering of the market has been accompanied by a number of cultural and social movements that questioned traditional approaches to human relations. The result has been described as the political triumph of the Right and the cultural tri umph of the Left.12 According to the above argument, causes of the particularly acute moral confusion are to be sought in the political triumph of the Right and the cultural triumph of the Left. There is no erosion, in other words, in the moral standard of humans. Holloway argues that there can be little doubt that our confusions are particularly acutenot because we are less interested in or committed to the moral life than we used to be but, presumably because of unfettered market and cultural changes. For long,
3|P a g e

however, causal direction has been assumed from erosion of mortality to crime. Those with weak ethics are naturally more likely to commit crime in all circumstances13, and that it is taken as axiomatic that weakening ethics is one cause of crime.14Moreover, concern with white collar crimes preceded by decades the strengthening of globalization, deregulation of the markets and cultural changes. Whatever the cause(s) of erosion of morality across cultures, recovering a universal moral principle, acceptable to all members of the human community, will have to form the foundation of effective mobilization of international cooperation in collective action against economic and financial crimes. For reasons that this paper hopes to argue, the demand for international co-operation in combating these crimes has not succeeded to elicit the desired results because of lack of a well-articulated, globally-shared moral basis for collective action against economic crime. The basic thrust of this paper is that such a moral foundation is urgently needed. Given the deep pluralism that characterizes contemporary humanity, this is a daunting challenge. Holloway provides two helpful suggestions by defining two characteristics for any emerging morality. First, the principle of harmis a useful guide in steering our way through the currents of debate about what is or is not allowable or moral behavior and, second, the emerging morality must be characterized by the principle of consent.15 This paper argues that unlike other complex moral issues facing human society, no one would deny the enormous, clear and unambiguous harm caused by economic and financial crimes. The outrage against these crimes are so strong that at least one

4|P a g e

observer refers to them as crimes against humanity.16 The extent, intensity and depth of the harm these crimes cause are well-described by their victims, according to which this paper classifies them as assault upon human dignity, trust, contract and property, all of which constitute fundamental elements of the institutional infrastructure of societies. Without these, no social cohesion or continuity would be possible leading to what Hobbes envisioned as a war of all against all. The paper argues that the first requirement suggested by Holloway is already met. The paper further argues that Holloways second requirement, integrally related to the first, can also be met. The paper suggests that a moral principle that can meet the requirement is the golden rule with its long history, in one form or another, in all known systems of thought, in all societies, cultures and religions. Accordingly, the next section deals with the first principle. It discusses the clear and unambiguous principle of harm as it pertains to the devastating damage caused by economic and financial crimes to human dignity, trust, contract and property. The third section argues that the changes brought about by globalization and technical progress in our time are not too dissimilar to those in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which also changed moral perception. The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers responded by envisioning a new moral sense. The section argues that, given the will, humanity can respond to the present state of moral confusion by redefining the prevailing moral sense in terms of the golden rule. The fourth section discusses the golden rule as a universal moral principle that could be adopted as a result of consent of a broad representation of all segments of humanity who would not want each other harmed
5|P a g e

by economic crime. Section four also discusses the golden rule, its history, its presence in all cultures and religions, its attribute of universalizability and potential for attracting global consent. Section five concludes the paper.

II.

E XTENT AND I NTENSITY OF H ARM C AU SED BY E CONOMIC

C RIME : M ANY
BROKEN WINDOWS

Analytic thinking about economic and financial crimes has evolved over the last four decades. The most important dimension of this evolution has been the change in focus on economic crime as victimless to the recognition of its far reaching, adverse impact on a broad spectrum of victims. In 1982, a leading American political scientist, James Q. Wilson, advanced an idea that became known as the broken windows theory. The metaphor argued that if a broken window in a vacant building in a given neighborhood is left unrepaired, soon most of the windows of that building would be broken. The first unrepaired broken window signals that no one really cared about the building itself and its integrity.17 Generalized, the idea suggests that tolerating crimes leads to epidemics and, eventually, to social disintegration. Recently, William Black, the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One, has contextualized the broken windows theory to elite white collar crime. He suggests that Wilsons idea that tolerating widespread smaller crimes would lead to epidemic levels of larger crimes because it undermined community and social restraint has been proven by the epidemics of elite white collar crime that have driven our recurrent, intensifying financial crises. He predicts corruption that is excused and tolerated by elites islikely
6|P a g e

to spread in incidents and severity because it undermines community and the rule of law. It is likely to grow more pervasive and harmful the more we tolerate it. Low tolerance for activities that would not appear very serious, such as consumer fraud, would soon create a Greshams effect in which businesses or CEOs that cheat gain a competitive advantage and bad ethics drives good ethics out of the market. These offenses degrade ethics and erode peer restraints on misconduct.18 In the same year that Wilson advanced his theory of broken windows, Tomlin suggested five basic typologies of victims of white collar crime: the individual, corporate or business enterprise, governments, society, and the international order. The consequences of inability to deal with white collar crimes, Tomlin suggested, were distrust of government and other institutions, a damaging effect on the moral fabric of society, and in the propensity of the populace to rationalize the existence of other types of traditional crimes.19 More than two decades later, these words were echoed by the Governor of the Bank of Thailand when he asserted that the consequence of economic crime go well beyond the financial loss and the economic well-being of society and the country. The Governor argued that what is more important than the economic wellbeing is the feeling of living in a fair and just society. If drug lords continue to live well on their ill-gotten wealth, corrupt politicians continue to exert influence in the political arena, fraudulent bank executives continue to go unpunished with no loss of status, and stock price manipulators continue to get wealthier at the expense of other shareholders, people would ultimately feel that the society in which they live is unfair and unjust. And, it was not only the domestic economic crime that needed prevention
7|P a g e

and prosecution, there were more subtle forms of economic crimewhere bigger nations exploit the natural resources of smaller nations where businessmen from large countries move into smaller countriesto exploit the latters natural resources and exploit the consumers in these countries when products which are hazardous to health in bigger nations, have been relocated for production and sale in less developed nations.20 Despite the plea over decades by many developing countries that they were victimized by economic and financial crimes perpetrated by politics and businesses of richer, bigger nations, no serious attempts were made by the international community to address these concerns. For decades, for example, the smaller countries pleaded, to no avail, for an international convention against illegal capital flight from their countries into rich, powerful states. This is in sharp contrast to the post-9/11 intense efforts by the United Nations and the multilateral financial institutions to address crimes such as money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In short order, these institutions, with their typical asymmetric representation and power structure, promulgated strong standards, codes and conventions, designed in rich, advanced countries and imposed them, often without much debate, on their entire membership. The language of these standards and that of their administrators, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), were that of power and displaying the one-sided concern with the crime of their choice. The language of threats and demand for international cooperation characterized much of the post-9/11 efforts to solicit international cooperation. Any failure, for whatever reason, to respond quickly to these demands to
8|P a g e

cooperate meant, at minimum, the naming and shaming and ev entually the threat of sanction including loss of membership rights in multilateral institutions. Here is a typical language: Governments also have to address the problem of countries and jurisdictions that are not cooperating in the combat against financial crime and abuses. Jurisdictions that are unwilling or unable to adhere to international standards for supervision and regulation, for transparency, and for international cooperation and information sharing constitute risk to other countries and a potential threat to global financial stability. These serious concerns have led governments to undertake a number of actions to encourage/pressure these jurisdictions. Recent experience has shown that public statements of concern listing of non-cooperating jurisdictions can bring strong pressure to bear. This language says, in effect, that if you do not, or are even unable to cooperate with me to implement the standards, codes and conventions that I have designed to prevent harm to me you become subject to encouragement/pressure and punished. Concurrently, with this thinly veiled language of threat to cooperate, the same statement calls for development of a new value-based system, a new morality: The challenges presented by the global economy are great and will require our being strongly-committed to maintaining and further developing a rules-and-values based

9|P a g e

system.21 The earlier part of the statement leaves little doubt whose rules, whose values and whose morality are to be developed as fundamental base of the new morality needed for international collective action against economic crime. Recall the statement of the Governor of the Bank of Thailand complaining that the international community has for decades turned a deaf ear to the plea of the poorer, less powerful nations for international standards, codes and conventions that mobilize global collective action against economic and financial crimes that harm their people, their economy and their society.22 The concerns of the Governor of Thailand resonates in the statements of other countries to various international fora.23 There is very little doubt regarding the devastating consequences of money laundering and terrorism financing. But, could not the international community develop a new value system, a new morality along the line suggested by Holloway and others? Could not a global-wide view based on the prerogative of global citizenship develop a moral principle based on consent rather than based on the language of power imperatives? Would not the call for international cooperation be more effective based on a globally agreed moral principle that harm in any form resulting from economic and financial crimes that assault human dignity, trust, contract and property against any member of the international community would be morally unacceptable and must be prevented? There is ample evidence that the present approach to forging international cooperation for global collective action against economic and financial crimes is neither as effective nor as successful as the potentials would indicate. It is not too unreasonable to assume that a vast majority of global citizens would agree that combating these
10 | P a g e

crimes is a moral necessity. Could not a global moral convention of equals, develop a universal moral principle in the design of which consent was forged using Gadamers conception of fusion of horizons to ensure effective presentation of all points of view? There is no denying that developing a universal moral principle to underlie global collective action against these crimes is an imperative.24 Such a principle would allow development of uniform legislation, law, standards and codes within nation states across the globe.

II.A. T HE V ICTIMS
Eight years after Tomlin had focused on the victims of white collar crime, Moore and Mills25 complained that there had been little research on the social impact of these crimes. Throughout the decade of the 1990s, much of the focus of analysis was on criminology, prosecution, and retributive justice for the offenders. Concern for the victims of economic and financial crimes did not manifest itself either in research or in judicial proceedings until the last decade when the victim rights protection advocacy movement became active.26 Even then, while progress was made on the rights of victims of violent crimes, the rights of victims of economic crimes did not fare as well. In the U.S., the victims rights movement turned attention to this problem only in 1999.27Even so; it is yet uncertain whether the victims of economic and financial crimes have a clear and unambiguous right to be heard in court proceedings against offenders.28

11 | P a g e

In the U.S. where there have been efforts to document the arm that economic criminals perpetrate on their victims, it is reported that many of the victims lose their entire savings and are devastated by the psychological and social impact. They feel robbed of not only their money, but also of their security, their self-esteem, and their dignity.29 Additionally, victims of economic and financial crimes suffer, inter alia, shame, guilt, sense of betrayal, sense of violation, social stigma, loss of trust in the system that was supposed to protect them and from health problems.30 These are the harms done to individual victims. Other crimes such as corruption victimize whole societies. They harm the legitimacy of and trust in government and public service. The World Bank has, over decades, conducted extensive research on the extent of harm and damages that corruption and other economic crimes cause,31 and has concluded, in part, that these crimes have devastating impact on the capacity of government to function properly; on the private sector to grow and create employment; on the talents and energies of people to add value in productive ways and ultimately on societies to lift themselves out of poverty.32 Recently, Krishan asserted that corruption and poor governance undermine both democracy and development. The poor are disproportionally hurt- the mother who cannot afford to pay a huge bribe to get medical attention for her dying child; the family who will be able to have safe drinking water if it pays a bribe; and the unemployed who remain jobless because public work projects are not implemented since corrupt officials have pocketed the funds that were allocated for them.33 Similar sentiments were expressed by Akinbo who argued that economic and financial crimes are among major challenges facing all countries of the world. They
12 | P a g e

have damaging effect on the economic and political system of a country. These crimes undermine development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends In a nutshell, they are the primary threat to good governance, sustainable economic development, domestic proble and fair business practices in the country.34 Not long ago, it was assumed by social scientists and politicians that some economic and financial crimes, such as corruption, were developing country phenomena.35 Researchers often considered corruption as a deterrent to economic development of poor and middle income countries in that it was thought that corruption conditioned development and good governance. As a result, indices of corruption were designed within this axiomatic framework.36 But, as Ades and DiTella note, no society is immune to corruption. Governments of all political colors in countries of all levels of wealth are affected by corruption scandals with a frequency and intensity that seems to be always on the increase.37 Specifically, they argue, Western democracies can no longer have pretentions of immunity to corruption they viewed as aberrant deviation from Western norms.38 Corruption, in its broadest sense of abuse of public office, is an economic crime and as such afflicts all societies.

13 | P a g e

II.B. B ANALITY

OF

E CONOMIC C RIME : A T

THE VERY CORE OF

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY .

As mentioned in the introduction, even before the global financial crisis, evidence had emerged pointing to crime and unfair practices committed at the kitchen table, on the settee and from home computers, from desks and call centers, at cash points, in supermarkets and restaurants, and in interaction with builders and trades peopleby people who think of themselves as respectable citizens. Karstedt and Farrall refer to these as every day crimes taking place in the centre of society, not at its margins.39 Their research in England and Wales and in Eastern Germany showed that in that respectable core of society, there is widespread offending and victimization. This is demonstrated by survey data showing that in these regions, a total of 75 percent of respondents reported at least one victimization (during their lifetime) while 64 percent had engaged in illegal or shady practices. More than half of the total sample (54 percent) reported experiences as both victims of small and large businesses and private transactions, and as offenders in such exchanges. They attributed these phenomena of crimes of everyday to rapid economic changes that have resulted in appearance of a syndrome of market anomie comprising distrust, fear and cynical attitude toward law. In turn, such attitude increases the willingness of respectable citizens to engage in illegal and unfair practices in the marketplace. These crimes, according to Karstedt and Farrall, are indicative of the moral state of society, much more so than violent and street crimes. Not atypical of this type of sociological analysis of crime, these authors

14 | P a g e

argue that massive economic changes are the cause of market anomie. They identify four economic cycles all of which push up levels of offending and unfair and unethical practices by business and consumers alike and thus link mass victimization and offending in markets.40

II.C. B ANALITY P ANIC

OF

E CONOMIC C RIMES A GAINST H UMANITY : M ORAL

Reading both religious and non-religious analysis of economic crime imparts a sense of panic that human societies are becoming morally unhinged. Karstedt and Farrall observed that the everyday economic crimes committed by ordinary citizens are so widespread to give an indication of massive moral failure. They located their research and analysis within the framework of moral economy, a term first used in the early 1960s by E.P. Thompson which has come to be understood as the collection of moral norms, and justice perceptions that characterize an economy. However, the sense imparted by studies that transcend sociological viewpoint is that the moral failure is deep and so widespread that it affects all parts of the society and is both prior to and post-market transactions. Nearly a decade before the massive moral failure that led to the global financial crisis, Holloway argued that it is probably true that our time is characterized by an almost uniquely turbulent assault upon tradition, and that it is difficult to exaggerate the moral confusion of our day characterized by bouts with moral panic that frequently afflicts us and that such moral confusions are particularly acute.41

15 | P a g e

In addition to the harm consequent of economic and financial crimes committed by official margins and the very core of society, devastating also is the impact of crimes perpetrated by financial institutions, corporations and business enterprises.42 The aftermath of the global financial crisis revealed the extent of fraud and other economic and financial crimes committed by financial institutions. For many, the knowledge led to manifestation of bouts with moral panic. Still reverberating in the occupy protest movement, the revelation of these crimes created intense moral outrage. Zuboff, for example, was so affected that in a piece she wrote for Business Week in 2009 she called them crimes against humanity43 She argued that the reasons usually given for the crisis, such as deregulation, lack of oversight, and flawed incentive structure, that established a link between executive compensation, share prices and shareholder value, have merit. However, what is ignored in these analyses is the terrifying human breakdown at the heart of the crisis.44 In an expression of her moral outrage, Zuboff likened the participants bankers, brokers, and financial specialists in the dominant business model to the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichman. She argued that the business model operative in the run up to the crisis was characterized by self-centeredness that celebrates what is good for organization insiders while dehumanizing and distancing everyone else45 She explains that at its heart, what drove the crisis was a sense of remoteness and thoughtlessness, compounded by a widespread abrogation of individual moral judgment. This is the reason she finds appropriate the philosopher Hanna Arendts formulation of the banality of evil in her observation of Eichman in his trial in
16 | P a g e

Jerusalem.46 Arendt observed that Eichman was not perverted and sadistic, but terribly and terrifyingly normal.47 He was motivated by nothing except an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement he never realized what he was doingsuch remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together.48 This is indeed a sobering thought given the evidence of how widespread is the growth of economic and financial crimes in their broadest sense. Are these crimes becoming banal in human societies? Zuboffs response is in the affirmative and is an echo of Wilsons broken windows theory as rendered by Black. Zuboff argues that those perpetrating these crimes operate at an emotional distance from their victims and from the poisonous consequences of their actions, similar to war situations. In the context of the crisis, Zuboff argues, the self-centered business model made it easier to operate in ones own narrow interests, without the usual feelings of empathy that alerts us to the pain of others and define us as humans. Thus, the narcissistic business modelpaved the way for a full-scale administrative economic massacreto the worlds dismay, thousands of men and women entrusted with our economic well-being systematically failed to meet minimum standard of civil behavior that says: you cant just blame the system for the bad things youve done.49 Zuboff refers to the present public outrage as a rebellion against this banal evil that reflects a sense of morality that points deeper and truer than laws devised to protect self-serving business practices. The call now is to take back our community to return to a place where people are capable of telling right from wrong because they
17 | P a g e

recognize themselves in one another50 In the moral failure of the narcissistic business model, Zuboff sees a serious violation of human rights that are now understood to include economic, social, and cultural rights as envisioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. She argues that the crisis has demonstrated that the banality of evil concealed within a widely accepted business model can put the entire world and its people at risk. She then concludes that in the crisis of 2009 the mounting evidence of fraud, conflict of interest, indifference to suffering, repudiation of responsibility and systemic absence of individual moral judgment produced an administrative massacre of such proportion that it constitutes economic crime against humanity.51

III. R ECOVERING A MORAL SENSE : T HE RETURN TO WHERE

WE CAN TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG
As mentioned earlier, scholars attribute the observed, widespread moral anomie, moral confusion, and moral failure to massive changes resulting from globalization and rapid progress in information technology over the last few decades. For some, these changes are not dissimilar to those that occurred in Europe in late seventeenth and in eighteenth centuries. An important consequence of these changes was the decoupling of morality from its theological moorings. Subsequently, a new morality, a new moral sense emerged anchored on the authority of society, self-love, moral sentiments and natural sympathy as its sources.52 There is a growing general perception of a nexus between the accelerating pace, and widening spectrum, of economic and financial
18 | P a g e

crimesas well as Zuboffs moral panic regarding the growing banality of these crimesand moral failure. This perception point to a need for emergence of new global moral sense that would motivate strong international cooperation and coordination to lead to collective action that would motivate development of unified legislative, judicial, legal, and other ways and means of preventing economic and financial crimes. The new moral sense would have to satisfy, at least, the two requirements posed by Holloway: it would have to be based on consent of all parts of humanity and it would have to be based on the principle of harm prevention. This papers objective, spirit and hope are directed to addressing these issues in what follows. First, however, a brief review of major elements that motivated the emergence of the moral sense in the eighteenth century is in order.

III.A. S COTTISH E NLIGHTENMENT

AND THE MORAL SENSE .

What made the eighteenth century similar to the present were the rapid changes taking place then that called for a synthesis between a number of developing oppositions that were increasingly being felt in social life.53 As Seligman observed, the developing opposition in the eighteenth century that were between the individual and the social, the private and the public, egoism and altruism, as well as between a life governed by reason and one governed by passion, have in fact become constitutive of our existence in the modern world.54 Major social change from a feudal society to a market society and the emergence of capitalist market relations, with its distinction between public and private, posed a new set of problems for the conception of the

19 | P a g e

social order in need of articulation of new moral vision. The freeing of labor and capital developed together with a new awareness of individuals acting out their private interests in the public realm.55 Social action and motivation were being based on selfinterest. A new moral order was required that was founded on rational self-interest rather than on a shared vision of cosmic order.56 Accordingly, the new moral sense, a term first coined by Francis Hutcheson, the first Scottish philosopher to approach the problem of the foundation of morals in an original way,57 was based on moral sentiments, self-love, and natural sympathy. Moral sentiments were an axiomatic property of the human mind and were what united humans by instinct, that they act in society from affections of kindness and friendship.58 Self-love is the natural inclination to pursue the pleasures provided by external objects, or the means that is used to satisfy it.59 Sympathy is a feeling through which we participate in others feelings.60 Fundamental to this moral sense is the idea of benevolence which according to Hutcheson was the object of moral sense, and is what drives individual to seek the natural good or happiness of others.61 Indeed, Hutcheson argued that human nature itself included a moral sense which recognized benevolence as the core of moral action; further that when the moral sense is enlightened and not distorted by selfish passion, a persons judgment and behavior will tend to contribute to the overall happiness of society and humanity. In other words, harmony between the moral life of the individual and perfection of moral community is a possibility and, hence, a moral, ultimately a religious, duty for humanity.62

20 | P a g e

In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith argued that recognition and appreciation by others were the primary motivator of all toil and bustle of the world and that it was mans interest in being the object of attention and appreciation that motivated all economic activity. This innate need for mutuality of sympathy and recognition constituted the foundation of morals for individuals and motivated their economic activity.63 It bears keeping in mind that, as Seligman points out, while Scottish Enlightenment thought decoupled morality from theology, it did not dispose of Deistic or transcendent source of all things; The Author of Nature in Adam Smiths terminology.64 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who influenced Hutcheson and Adam Smith greatly, argued in response to Hobbes theory that human nature is fundamentally selfishthat God provided human nature with a number of generous forms of affections that predisposed humans to live together. Humans are also provided with natural capacity to be attracted to positive affections and repelled by negative affections.65 In his book, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson argues that God is the source of moral sense to direct human action. Moral sense, he asserts, is common to mankind and is independent of individuals will, it is immediate, that is to say, its deliverances are not mediated by consideration of personal advantages or harmAs every man has a capacity to make moral distinctions, so the weight of moral virtue is within the competence of every man. Hutcheson concludes that moral excellence can be attained by any person, independently of this learning, power or riches.66

21 | P a g e

III.B. C ONTEMPORARY M ORAL S ENSE

In spite of (or perhaps because of) the evolution of thinking over the past two centuries about morality, the views of Scottish Enlightenment scholars have found resonance in contemporary thought. One of the most famous American contemporary thinkers, James Q. Wilson, whose theory of broken windows was discussed briefly earlier, makes a compelling, spirited and articulate case in his book The Moral Sense that humans do indeed have an innate capacity to make moral judgments. This is a counter position to that of moral relativists conviction that not only morality but also the human nature itself is a product of culture. As Geertz asserted in 1973, there is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture.67 Three years later, Foucault went even further suggesting that even man himself is an innovation of recent date and one perhaps nearing its end.68 Another philosopher, Richard Rorty, asserted that humans do not even possess anything like a core self and that there are no such things as moral facts. He posited further that there is no neutral ground on which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness is preferable to the other. Rorty argued that human beings must stop looking for some non-human or extra-human reality, such as God, nature, spirit, matter or even human nature; for something-in-itself that, though entirely independent of human knowing, would nonetheless provide us with universal laws for governing our actions and our thinking.69 To all this, Wilson replies that humans do have a core self, not wholly the product of culture70 that has a capacity to judge disinterestedly how its interests

22 | P a g e

ought to be advanced. He further argues that even in the face of moral confusion, most humans have no difficulty experiencing the world as an arena of moral choices in which humans moral sense asserts itself in their daily life. Reflecting Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson, Wilson contends that people have a natural moral sense composed of sympathy, fairness, self-control, and duty. These, he argues, make the moral sense universal because they exist in various degrees in every culture. He notes however that humanity has a moral sense, but much of the time its reach is short and its effect uncertain. He warns that humans take centuries to create a new culture of commitment to morality, but once created, such a culture can be destroyed in a few generations. And once destroyed, those who suddenly realize what they have lost will also realize that political action cannot, except at a very great price, restore it.71 George Kateb, another contemporary scholar, echoes Wilson in his book, Human Dignity. He argues that morality needs no justification, particularly against relativists. He considers relativism as meaning that there is no such a thing as morality; there are only different codes.There are no principles of morality that are universally accepted or nearly so, and there is no way of proving that one set of principles is correct and other sets are mistaken. In a counter-position, Kateb argues that there is sufficient continuity throughout recorded history in what counts as fundamentally right or moral, despite differences in interpretation and application. Given the fact of wide acceptance of morality, no proof is needed as there can be no other proof of the validity of a moral precept than the quite common and fairly steady acceptance of it by people all over the world, for as long as there has been moral reflectionsNo transcendent instruction is
23 | P a g e

needed: it is not even a question of human discovery, but a sensitive awareness of the obvious that gradually accumulates adherence. What is most relevant to the present discussion is Katebs position that: Pain and suffering are the central moral concern, and that efforts to prevent or reduce it preoccupy moral agents. Yes, the center of morality is remedy, where possible, for humanly caused suffering that seems needless and dispossesses human beings of what is their desire or that neglects to preserve them in it.72 As was indicated earlier in this paper, clearly enormous pain and suffering are perpetrated upon victims of economic and financial crimes. The moral principle advocated by Kateb, Holloway and others is preventing harm, pain and suffering as much as possible and remedying their effects whenever necessary. Kateb argues that this is such a self-evident principle that needs no justification and requires no proof. It is a moral precept which is quite common and acceptable by people in all cultures all over the world. Katebs own candidate for such a moral precept is the negative form of the golden rule. The question arises whether this principle meets the two requirements advocated by Holloway, namely, exclusive focus on harm and acceptance by consent. The paper turns to this question next.

IV.

A U NIVERSAL M ORAL P RINCIPLE .

While there are many issues and subjects of disagreement on moral grounds, there should be very little doubt about the moral clarity regarding the harm, pain and suffering caused by economic and financial crimes. Nor can there be strong pessimism regarding the emergence of a universal consent on the need to prevent them. It cannot
24 | P a g e

be beyond the realms of possibility to expect the emergence of a universal moral principle which would serve as the moral foundation of global collective action against these crimes. Simply stated, these crimes are harmful on so many levels to pose a threat to humanity. To motivate concerted, coordinated collective action on national and global levels aimed at their prevention and their successful prosecution when they occur as well as taking remedial, restorative action to assist the victims, there is a need for a universal principle that would attract the consent of moral plurality. The hope and aspiration of this paper is that a single moral principle of action can be forged with participation of representatives of all cultures and all moral persuasions, as members of a single humanity facing an ever-increasing, ever-strengthening threat to its survival. Up to now, attempts to create strong basis for international cooperation and coordination to combat these crimes has lacked a well-articulated universal moral foundation. Perhaps the assumption has been that one was not needed since the issues involved are clear. However, as reflected in the statement of the Governor of the Bank of Thailand, echoed in many other statements of representatives of governments in numerous international fora over the last decade dealing with the necessity of international cooperation in combating these crimes, much of the effort in soliciting international cooperation have aimed at selected crimes of interest mainly to a part of the international community. These representatives never deny the need for international cooperation in combating money laundering or the financing of terrorism. What they point to is the selectivity and self-serving character of standards, codes and conventions pushed on the
25 | P a g e

rest of the world community by international institutions with asymmetric representation and lopsided power structure creating a significant democratic deficit in these institutions. In essence, what is questioned is the moral basis of giving priority in demands for international cooperation to the economic crime of choice of the rich, powerful members of the international community while ignoring for the last four decades economic and financial crimes perpetrated against poorer, weaker and underrepresented members. That there is an urgent need for a universally accepted moral foundation to facilitate a global coordinated collective action program to combat these crimes, in whatever form, cannot be denied.

IV.A. T HE D EEP B EAUTY

OF THE

G OLDEN R ULE .

In the early 1950s, when humanity had experienced engagement in another devastating world war and had established the United Nations, it was a time to dream of a different world wherein the probability of another such horrendous occurrence could be avoided. Thus human beings entertained serious thought about a world government which had long been an ideal. Phillip C. Jessup, the then Professor of Law and Diplomacy in Columbia University, declared that this long held ideal has recently become a program of actionJudges, lawyers, bankers, businessmen, administrators, churchmen, scholars and plain citizens unite in asserting that world government is not only desirable but also attainable.73 The motive was clear. The impulse to establish world government is to be attributed to the insistent human yearning for peace. Fresh experience of war is requisite to provide the drive for active campaign to check this

26 | P a g e

greatest of all human ills. As each modern war has ended, people have insisted that there must not be another and for a time they have struggled to solve the problem. 74 The idea behind proposals to establish a world government was that wars could be eliminated only when sovereignty was abolished. Even though optimistic about the emergence of a world government, Jessup nevertheless warned that as the memory of the horror fades with passage of time, the impulse is blunted, the activity decreases. And the idea of a world government recedes.75 Concurrent with the dream of one world government, another dream was running: the dream that humans could think of themselves as members of single community on the basis of a single ethical system, while retaining cultural pluralism and individuality.76 As history witnessed, both dreams of establishing a world government and a single ethical system failed to materialize as the memory of war receded and urgency gave way to business and politics as usual. However, as part of the search for a single ethical system, one idea that has proved its enduring historical appeal to mankind resurfaced and has stayed on the moral radar for most of humanity. In an essay published in 1952 and titled: the Deep Beauty of the Golden Rule, 77 Robert M. MacIver, the then Professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology in Columbia University, raised the question that: given the plurality, diversity, and relativity of ethical, moral values, is a universal moral, ethical principle based on reason alone, and applicable to all in this world of irreconcilable valuation, possible? He responded that:

27 | P a g e

There is no rule that can describe both my values and yours or decide between them. There is one universal rule, and only one, that can be laid down, on ethical grounds that is, apart from the creeds of particular religions and apart from the ways of the tribe that falsely and arrogantly universalize themselves. Do to others as you would have others do to you. This is the only rule that stands by itself in the light of its own reason, the only rule that can stand by itself in the naked, warring universe, in the face of the contending values of men and groups.78 MacIver argued that the word universal, as he used it, is one of procedure. It describes a mode of behaving, not a goal of action. On the level of goals, of final values, there is irreconcilable conflict. Humans hold different principles which they wish them to become universal and try to convert others. Others will certainly resist and some will seek to persuade us in turn why shouldnt they? Then we go no further except by resort to force and fraud. We can, if we are strong, dominate some and we can bribe others. We compromise our own values in doing so and we do not in the end succeed; even if we were masters of the whole world we could never succeed in making our principle universal. We could only make it falsely tyrannous.79 How prophetic indeed when one considers the history of imposition of standards, codes and conventions

28 | P a g e

designed unilaterally by the rich and powerful then encouraged on the rest of humanity to sign on through sheer power, bribes, threats and intimidation. MacIver appeals for adoption of a different strategy: So if we look for a principle in the name of which we can appeal to all men, one to which their reason can respond in spite of their differences, we must follow another road. When we try to make our values prevail over those cherished by others, we attack their values, their dynamic of behavior, their living will. If we go far enough we assault their very being. For the will is simply valuation in action. Now the deep beauty of the golden rule is that instead of attacking the will that is in other men, it offers their will a new dimension. Do as you would have others As you would will others do. It bids you expand your vision, see yourself in new relationships. It bids you transcend your insulation, see yourself in the place of others, see others in your place. It bids you test your values or at least your way of pursuing them. If you would disapprove that another should treat you as you treat him, the situations being reversed, is not that a sign that, by the standard of your own values, you are mistreating him?

29 | P a g e

This principle makes for a vastly greater harmony in the social scheme. At the same time it is the only universal of ethics that does not take sides with or contend with contending values. It contains no dogma. It bids everyone follow his own rule, as it would apply apart from the accident of his particular fortune our sole concern is to show that the golden rule is the only ethical principle, as already defined, that can have clear right of way everywhere in the kind of world we have inherited. It is the only principle that allows every man to follow his own intrinsic values while nevertheless it transforms the chaos of warring codes into a reasonably well-ordered universe.79 MacIver ends his essay citing Jesus: All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so ye also unto them; for this is the law and the prophets.80

IV.B. T HE G OLDEN R ULE

Certainly much has been written on the golden rule both before and after MacIvers essay, but few as succinct, clear and forceful defense of the rule as a universal moral principle. There have been a number of credible research on the history of the golden rule dating back to the Babylonians.81 Other research has investigated philosophical, psychological, sociological, theological, and political implications of the
30 | P a g e

rule across cultures throughout history. Intense debates have taken place between opponents and proponents of the rule as a moral principle applied to issues such as abortion, euthanasia, sexual orientation and a host of other issues with moral implications. There has also been a growing literature on the application of the rule in legal and judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, the adequacy of the knowledge of and understanding of the golden rule by the general public is questionable. In the preface to his book The Golden Rule, Jeffrey Wattles asks: How is one to move beyond shock and cynicism as one confronts the evidence of moral decline in society? What reaction comes more easily than to blame them? We may be driven to act on the tendency to separate humankind into two camps the ones who are the problem and those of us with higher standardsbut such is not the ultimate solution. I believe that we can learn to relate more humanely and reach out more effectively by discovering the golden rule. The need even for morally active people to discover the rule is greater than I realized over a decade ago when I began my research. I used to assume that nearly everyone was raised so that when they heard the phrase the golden rule they could supply a principle worded, approximately, do to others as you want others to do to you. I also assumed that nearly everyone

31 | P a g e

who heard that principle spelled out had a roughly accurate initial grasp of its meaning. And I assumed that those who thought highly of the principle would occasionally spend time thinking about how to apply it. I have not made a scientific survey and would not hazard an estimate in percentage term, but my experiences talking about the rule with individuals and groups during the past years incline me to doubt these assumptions. A volunteer soliciting contributions for an environmental group guessed that the golden rule An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. A reporter misquoted the rule: Do to others as will be done to you. Given the correct formulation, two students debated at length with their professor that the rule meant the same as the motto Get even. A pastors wife doubted that the rule was biblical. Philosophers often distort the rule and dismiss it, while others who prefer a charitable interpretation find no reply.82 Wattles argues that the rule is intuitively easy to grasp, it has immediate intelligibility, is obvious and self-evident. I know how I like to be treated; and that is how I am to treat others. The rule asks me to be considerate of others rather than indulging in self-centeredness.83 Wattles reviews the historical development of the golden rule from Confucius, ancient Greece and Rome, the Jewish Tradition, New

32 | P a g e

Testament, European Middle Ages through to the writings of twentieth century scholars. He concludes that: The golden rule is, from the first, intuitively accessible, easy to understand; its simplicity communicates confidence that the agent can find the right waythe rule is a principle in a full sense. Even before it is formulated, its logic operates in the human mind. Once formulated, it shows itself to be contagious and quickly rises to prominence. It functions as a distillation of the wisdom of human experience and of scriptural tradition Much of the meaning of the rule can be put into practice without any religious commitment, since it is a non-theological principle that neither mentions God nor is necessarily identified with the scriptures or doctrines of any religion. The rule is an expression of human kinship, the most fundamental truth underlying moralityDo to others as you want others to do to you: is part of our planets common language, shared by persons with differing but overlapping conception of morality. Only a principle so flexible can serve as a moral ladder for all humankind.84 Once a universal principle is agreed upon to serve as the moral foundation of collective action against economic and financial crimes, legislative, legal, judicial processes and procedures relating to prevention and prosecution of those crimes too

33 | P a g e

would be based on that moral principle as well. Legislative and legal history of the rule as related to law have been reviewed by Duxbury who suggests that the courts have appealed to the Golden Rule, among other things, as a benchmark of good advocacy and legal probity, a principle of judicial (and interjurisdictional) as comity, a means of determining whether a claimant deserves an equitable remedy, as a rational for limiting forms of speech and expression, for the judicial review of legislative action, and as a basis for principles of equitable fair-dealing, restitution for unjust enrichment, general trusteeship, proprietary estoppel, specific performance (compelling the defendant to do to the claimant as he would have had the claimant do to him had their positions been reversed), and the duty of care in negligence.85 In addition to analyzing some court cases in light of the use of the golden rule, a number of issues with significant moral implications, such as abortion and euthanasia, have been presented and analyzed by Duxbury. In each of these, Duxbury considers the moral debates involving the use of the golden rule. He also analyzes the position of those who consider the golden rule not only as a moral principle per se, but also as a principle of fairness. He concludes that: The Rule provides us with standard according to which we might usefully test our intuitions regarding the moral quality and implications of particular legal principles and initiatives there is good sense in trying to examine the convictions motivating particular legal decisions, rules, and

34 | P a g e

reform proposals in the light of a robust principle of fairness such as the Golden Rule, and considering whether the convictions and the principles lead us to similar conclusions.86 It would be interesting to use the golden rule as a benchmark and standard of fairness to see if the present process of designing and implementing international standards, codes and conventions stand the scrutiny suggested by Duxbury.

IV.C. T HE G OLDEN R ULE A CTION

AS THE

M ORAL F OUNDATION

OF

C OLLECTIVE

Either in its positive or negative form, the golden rule can serve the purpose of forming the moral foundation of collective action against economic crime. Historically, the negative form of the rule is traced to Confucius who is reported to have been asked: is there a single word that can serve as the guiding principle for conduct throughout ones life? Confucius replied: Perhaps it is Shu, Consideration. Do not impose on others what you do not desire others to impose upon you.87 The rule appears in its negative and positive forms in all systems of thought throughout history.88 One of the most powerful appearances of the negative form is reported in the following incident involving Rabbi Hillel, a contemporary of Jesus: On another occasion it happened that a certain heathen came before Shammai and said to him, Make me a proselyte, on

35 | P a g e

condition that you teach the whole Torah while I stand on one foot. Thereupon he [Shammai] repulsed him with the builders square which was in his hand. When he went before Hillel, he [Hillel] said to him, what is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah, while the rest is commentary thereon; go and learn it.89 Not only did the rule resonate clearly and loudly among the followers of Jesus, in his words, especially in his sermon on the mount, it was raised to a much higher and more substantive pitch. In the words of Jesus, the rule transcended the reciprocity of a mutual relation with ones neighbor to extending love to that neighbor.90 Accordingly, Paul Ricoeur argues that the golden rule implies, or establishes, reciprocity between the doer of an action and the person acted upon. This reciprocity implies equality between the parties concerned: If I treat others as I would wish them to treat me, then that presupposes that they will treat me as I would treat them, creating a social contract between equal parties.91 Furthermore, in contrasting the golden rule with the principle of love your neighbor: Ricoeur suggests that the former is ethical and the latter is hyperethcial. The former, he argues, can be interpreted as being limited to a mutual reciprocal arrangement: I will only do this for you if you do something for me. The latter, however, has a logic of generosity, benevolence and altruism where one gives more than another deserves.92

36 | P a g e

In the context of economic and financial crimes, the selection of the golden rule as the universal principle of morality would mean that since these crimes do harm to everyone, in the global struggle against them, each member of the global community has a reciprocal duty to ensure that no other member of the community is harmed as a result of these crimes. Some of the important characteristics of the golden rule are its simplicity, impartiality, consistency, reciprocity and fairness. As Wattles suggests, the golden rule interpreted by moral reason requires an even-handed consistency and this consistency blocks hypocrisy and promotes harmony of thought, word and deed. In modern rational ethics, the special point of consistency is to be impartial in application of principles. He argues that impartiality can only be important and matter if the equal basic worth of each person has been a priori affirmed and that is what the golden rule does as it equates the value of the self and other.93 Contrast this to the present state of international combat against economic crime. Nearly all the standards, codes and conventions deal with the prevention of crimes that in the perception of powerful members of the international community harm them primarily. As evidenced by decades of ignoring the pleas of poorer and less powerful members for international cooperation in combating economic and financial crimes that harm them, it appears that the rich and powerful are saying: I demand that you cooperate with me to prevent what harms me but I do not care about what harms you. Be that as it may, the characteristics of consistency, impartiality, reciprocity and fairness become the foundation of moral reason and the justification for claims that the golden rule is the only moral principle that can attract universal adherence as was
37 | P a g e

argued by MacIver. The Oxford philosopher R.M. Hare is credited with being the first contemporary scholar to interpret the golden rule as a principle of consistency. He applied the golden rule to issues of abortion and euthanasia arguing that the golden rule possesses two logical features of moral language: universalizability and prescriptivity. The former implies that by making a moral judgment, one gives another person the right to the same thing in a similar situation. The latter, the prescriptivity of moral language, according to Hare, means that ones action is consistent with ones moral judgment.94 This means that by prescribing to myself, I commit myself to doing what my judgment requires. If no obstacle prevents me, I must act in conformity with my prescription, if I am to be a moral participant in the language of morals.95 In the context of economic and financial crimes, the above arguments would suggest a moral principle upon which international cooperation for collective action against these crimes could be based. The golden rule reasoning could be formulated as: a nation would not want that other nations are harmed by economic and financial crimes. Just as one nation would be pleased that it is not a victim of a particular economic crime, it should want to participate in international efforts to prevent other nations from being harmed by that same crime. Given this moral foundation, domestic and international legislation, law, standards, codes and conventions can be created that stipulate how specific crimes are to be treated, prevented and prosecuted.

38 | P a g e

IV.D. T HE G OLDEN R ULE

AND

E CONOMIC C RIME .

A number of scholars have developed dimensions of behavior subject to application of the golden rule. For example, the rule could be applied to specify the rights of personhood. Alan Gewirth suggests that the golden rule could be interpreted as: Do unto others as you have a right that they do unto you. He defines a set of rights he refers to as generic rights. They include life and physical integrity and prohibition against lying, stealing, and promise-breaking.96 In the context of generic rights, Gewirths formulation of the golden rule becomes: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipient as well as of yourself.97 John Finnis goes further in specifying rights in terms of what he calls basic human goods that are irreducible aspects of the fulfillment of human person. These are substantive basic goods which correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature, as is manifested both in individual and in various forms of community. The important function of moral norms is to identify these basic goods. Moral norms being prohibitions on killing, theft, acts of dishonesty, and other similar negative and positive precepts the capricious contravention of which anyone would consider immoral.98 One category of such basic goods is human life in itself, in its maintenance and transmission, health and safety. There are other basic goods Finnis calls reflexive basic goods. These goods allow humans to become active persons, acting through deliberation and choice. They include goods are various forms of harmony and peace. In turn, these include peace of conscious which allows one to create consistency

39 | P a g e

between ones self and its expression, inner peace, peace with others and peace with whatever more-than-human source of reality, meaning, and values one can discover. These two types of basic goods constitute the integral human fulfillment.99 Finnis formulates a version of the golden rule which he calls the first and most abstract principle of morality as follows: In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with integral human fulfillment.100 He argues that to do evil is to destroy, damage, or impede a basic human good. 101 To intentionally harm a basic human good is never acceptable for God or man.102 In the present context, generic rights and basic goods defined by Gerwith and Finnis, respectively, to specify the rights of the human person would be violated by economic crime. These ideas can be further tailored specifically to reflect what the victims of economic and financial crimes have described as their rights that have been violated. As earlier mentioned, the long list of harms that victims suffer can be classified into four categories: assault upon human dignity; assault upon trust; assault upon contract; and assault upon property. These four categories would then define the generic rights and the basic goods that constitute the integral human fulfillment. The same degree of universality inherent in the golden rules exists for these basic human goods and generic rights. Every system of thought ancient or contemporary, religious or secular, contains moral norms prohibiting their violation. In one form or another, in one degree or another, their sanctity is affirmed by all cultures

40 | P a g e

and societies constituting humanity. Reference was made to Confucius and his advice to avoid harm. Rabbi Hillel defined the essence of the teaching of Torah as avoiding harm to others. A study of prophecy in ancient Israel reveals the intense concern of the prophets with harm to human dignity, trust, contract and property.103 The teachings of the rabbis reinforced and further explained the concerns of the prophets. The teachings of Jesus transcended not doing harm to ones neighbor to extending love to that neighbor.104 Just as in other Abrahamic traditions, Islam, clearly and unambiguously, considers violations of these four basic goods as transgressions against moral norms, laws, prohibitions ordained by the Creator.105 Similar positions on non-violability of these rights are discernible in Hinduism,106 Buddhism,107 Zoroastrian,108 ancient Greece and Rome109 , and ancient Egyptian 110 thought. Earlier, references were made to non-religious, secular thought where harm, and its avoidance, were crucial pivot of universalization of moral principles.111 Whatever the intensity of disagreements and debates regarding issues of deep moral conflicts, such as abortion, euthanasia and the like, it is not difficult to envision a globally unified position emerging on the acceptability of the golden rule as the universal moral foundation of collective action against violations of human dignity, trust, contract and property. These are, after all, how the victims of economic and financial crimes define the harm done to them.

41 | P a g e

V.

S UMMARY AND C ONCLUSIONS

Economic and financial crimes are growing and globalizing at an alarming rate. The expansion of these crimes both geographically and in variety calls for urgent global action. Yet, repeated calls over the last decade for international cooperation to stem the tide have failed to illicit the strong and comprehensive cooperation needed for this purpose. This lack of success to mobilize effective collective action is not only evidenced by the rapid growth and expansion of these crimes within and across borders, but also by the continuous expression of disappointment at lack of effective response to pleas for broader, deeper and stronger international cooperation displayed in international conferences, seminars, official and unofficial fora year after year. This paper suggests that perhaps the reasons for this failure are not far to seek. It posits that the main reason may well be the fact that the lack of a clearly articulated moral foundation has led to a one-sided promulgation of standards, codes and conventions designed by and for prevention of selected economic and financial crimes, such as money laundering and terrorism financing, that the designers believe themselves to be the primary victims. Thus, the rich and powerful states design and develop these instruments and then demand international cooperation from the rest of the human community. This, while the same international community has ignored for decades the plea of the poorer and less powerful member states of the international community for

42 | P a g e

cooperation in preventing economic and financial crimes, such as illegal capital flights and criminal behavior of multinational corporations, that harm them and their citizens but benefit the rich and powerful states. A strong, universally agreed moral principle would avoid this manifestation of unfairness. It is also worth noting that promulgations of laws and standards have traditionally appealed to some moral foundation. Given the need for a universal moral principle that would serve as the moral foundation for cooperation and coordination of global collective action, the paper presented views of those who argue that in the environment of moral pluralism that characterizes todays world, finding one unique moral principle consented to by the plurality of moral persuasions is a challenge. The paper then presented the view that poses two conditions for such a universal moral principle: first, it must be primarily concerned with harm and its prevention, and second, it must attract universal consent. The paper then presented the views of those that argue the only moral principle that has the full potential of universizability is the Golden Rule. Their justification and the history of the golden rule were briefly reviewed. The paper concluded that the golden rule satisfies the two requirements stated earlier. To give the rule greater specificity in the context of economic and financial crimes, the paper followed the guidelines suggested by two scholars who specified generic rights and basic goods that constituted the rights that define integral human fulfillment. Accordingly, the paper suggested four categories of generic rights and basic
43 | P a g e

goods which include the spectrum of harm and violations of rights , the victims of economic and financial crimes themselves named as the impact of these crimes. Based on these, the paper gave a formulation of the golden rule as avoidance of harm to any and all of the four categories. Based on the discussion of this paper, it can be concluded that to mobilize effective international cooperation and coordination for collective action against economic and financial crime, a global convention in which all systems of thought are represented, where there would be a fusion of horizons on various perceptions of morality, could agree on a moral foundation for collective action. The golden rule of no harm buttressed by the specificity of the four categories of generic rights and basic good, i.e. human dignity, trust, contract, and property, could well emerge as a consensual global moral principle. This would then allow development of legislation, law, standards, codes and conventions that would be accepted and respected by all in the international community.

44 | P a g e

N OTES
1. For definition, evolution, impact and growth of economic and financial crimes see: Southerland, 1949; Walsh and Schram, 1980; Tomlin, 1982; Wells, 1989; Moore and Mills, 1990; Wells, 1991; Welford and Ingram, 1994; Geis, et. al, 1995; McAuly, 2001; Shover and Wright, 2001; Croall, 2001; Pratt, 2001; Rebovitch, 2002; Korsell, 2002; McCarthy and Cohen, 2002; Tombs and White, 2003; Levi, 2005; Pratt, 2005; Tombs and White, 2007; Folsom, 2007; Croall, 2007; Berman, 2007; Al-Agha, 2007; Arowosaiye, et. al., 2008; Akinbo, 2009; Smith, 2010; Travers, 2010; Price Waterhous Coopers, 2011; Samavati, Koosh, 2011; Cassell and Joffee, 2011; Yasin and Hamid, 2011. 2. United Nations, 2006; McAuley, 2010. 3. Beloof, et.al., 2010. 4. Zuboff, 2009; Cassell and Joffee, 2011. 5. Karstedt and Farrall, 2006. 6. Karstedt and Farrall, 2007. 7. Serio, 1998; United Nations, 2006. 8. Holloway, 1990; Porpora, 2001; Kateb, 2011. 9. Durkheim, 1960; Merton, 1938, 1964; Dean, 1961, 1968; Marx, 1966; Lukes, 1967; Lee and Clyde, 1974; Sirico, 2001; Calabrese, 2005; Karstedt and Farrall, 2007; Berkatzki, 2008; Adriaenssen and Maes, 2008. 10. Akinbo, 2009. 11. Holloway, 1999, p.188. 12. Ibid, p. 89. 13. Conley and Wang, 2006; Berman 2007; Shavell, 2002. 14. Conley and Wang, 2006; Sah, 1991. 15. Holloway, 1999, p.33. 16. Zuboff, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/print/managing/content/mar2009/ca200903 19_591214.htm 17. Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Economist, 2008. 18. Black, 2012. 19. Tomlin, 1982. 20. Devakula, 2005. 21. Witherell, 2004. 22. Devakula, 2005. 23. Wang, 2002; Devakula, 2005. 24. For the concept of fusion of horizons see Gadamer, 1991. 25. Moore and Mills, 1990. 26. Eaton, 1990. 27. Croall, 2007. 28. Moore and Mills, 1990; Bernard, 2001; Croall, 2001; Dingan, 2005; Levi, 2005; Kenny and OBrian, 2007; Croall, 2007; Commonwealths Attorney, 2012.
45 | P a g e

29. Commonwealths Attorney, 2012. 30. Ibid. 31. McCarthy, 2011; Banuri and Eckel, 2012. 32. Folsom, 2007. 33. Krishnan, 2011. 34. Akinbo, 2009. 35. Jain, 2001. 36. Doig, 1995; Gupta, 1995; Sissner, 2001; Rothstein and Uslander, 2005; Thompson and Shah, 2005; Galtung, 2007; Azra, 2007; Andersson and Haywood, 2009; Arvate, et.al., 2010. 37. Ades and DiTella, 1997. 38. Ibid, pp.496-497. 39. Karstedt and Farrall, 2006. 40. Karstedt and Farrall, 2007. 41. Holloway, 1999. 42. Benson and Cullen, 1998; Pearce and Tombs, 1998; Gilbert and Russell, 2002; Croall, 2005. 43. Zboff, 2009; Black , 2012. 44. Zuboff, 2009. 45. Ibid. 46. Arendt, 2006; Zuboff, 2009. 47. Zuboff, 2009. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Turco, 2003. 53. Seligman, 1992, p.25. 54. Ibid, p. 25. 55. Ibid, p.26. 56. Ibid, p. 25-26. 57. Turco, 2003, p.138. 58. Adam Ferguson, cited in Seligman, 1992, p.27. 59. Turco, 2003, p.138. 60. Ibid, p.145. 61. Ibid, p. 141. 62. Haakoson in Bradic, ed., 2003, p. 209. 63. Adam Smith, 1982, p.50; Seligman, 1992, pp.27-28; Hirchman, 1979; Evankey, 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Butler (1792) in Brandt (ed); Beisner, 2012. 64. Adam Smith, 1982. 65. Robertson, 1964. Earl of Shaftesbury. Cited in Turco, 2003, p.136. 66. Hutcheson (1725), cited in Turco, 2003. 67. Geertz, 1973. 68. Foucault, 1973, p. 387. See also Robinow, 1984.
46 | P a g e

69. Metcalf, 2007. 70. Decades earlier Noam Chomsky, 1974, had reached the same conclusion. He argued that there must be a mass of schematics, innate governing principles, which guide our social and intellectual behavior there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is that we do with our mental capacity. Therefore, there must be a human nature (Chomsky, 1974, pp. 136-140). For Chomsky, Unless there is some form of relatively fixed human nature, true scientific understanding is impossible. Robinow, 1984, p.1. Some scholars go further to argue that humans have a moral conscious that draws its existence rather from that ethical totality which derives from the inner law of our being permitting us to fulfill our entelechy, to become what we are, and what we dare not betray. The moral conscious is that ontological truth of mans nature, the microcosmic reflection of the cosmic principle, the inner law of universe, which is the ethical demand we must have the courage to face, naked and unafraid. Anshen, 1952, p.3. 71. Wilson, 1993; Kimbal, 1993; Raksin, 1993. 72. Kateb, 2011, p.43. 73. Jessup, 1952, p. 303; McKeon, 1952; Jackh, 1952. 74. Jessup, 1952, p. 303. 75. Ibid, p. 303. 76. Anshen, 1952, p. xi. 77. MacIver, 1952, p.. 41. 78. Ibid, pp. 41-42. 79. Ibid, p. 42. 80. Ibid, p. 42. 81. Ibid, p. 47. The quote is from Matthew 7:12. 82. Wattles, 1996, pp. v-vi. 83. Ibid, p.3. 84. Ibid, pp. 188-189. 85. Duxbury, 2009, pp. 1531-1532. 86. Ibid, pp. 1604-1605. 87. Allinson, 1985; King, 1928; Hummel, 1952; Confucius; Czikszentmihalyi, 2008. 88. Rost, 1986; Wattles, 1996; Duxbury, 2009; Wikipedia: The Golden Rule; Dewald, 2008; Neusner, 2008; Berchman, 2008; Moazami, 2008; Chilton, 2008; Homerin, 2008; Hallisey, 2008; Sheible, 2008; Davis, 2008. 89. Wattles, 1996, p. 48; Muilenburg, 1952; Allinson, 2003; Levine, 2008; Samuels, 2011. 90. Wattles, 1996, pp. 52-66; Kirk, 2003; Chiton, 2008. 91. Ricouer, 1992, 1995; Simms, p. 117. 92. Simms, 2003, p. 117. 93. Wattles, 2003, p. 180; p. 80, pp. 122-140, p.7. 94. Hare, R.M., 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 86-125. Cited in Wattles, 1996, pp. 127-33; see also Duxbury, 2009, pp. 1569-1574.
47 | P a g e

95. Hare, 1963, pp. 89-90; see also Wattles, 1966 and Duxbury, 2009. 96. Gerwith, Alan, 1978. The Golden Rule Rationalized. Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 133-147. See also Duxbury, 2009, pp. 1565-1568. 97. Gerwith, 1978, p. 135; Duxbury, 2009, p. 1567. 98. Finnis, 1999, p. 42. 99. Ibid, p. 45. 100. Ibid, p. 45. 101. Ibid, pp. 54-55; 71. 102. Ibid, pp. 74-75. 103. Lindblom, 1967; Unterman, 1959; Tamari, 1987; Sacks, 2012. 104. Dodd, 1952; Neibur, 1952; Ricoeur, 1990; Finnis, 1991; Ricoeur, 1995; Ricoeur, 2000; Kirk, 2003; Donders, 2005; Chilton, 2008. 105. Khan, 1952; Hakim, 1952; Rahman, 1985; Engineer, 1990; Fakhry, 1991, Al-Attas, 1992; Michon, 1999; Zaroug, 1999; Naqui, 2003; Oh, 2007; Abuarqub, 2009; Mirakhor and Hamid, 2009. 106. Nikhilananda, 1952. 107. Suzuki, 1952; Hummel, 1952; Hallisey, 2008; Scheible, 2008. 108. Moazami, 2008; Rost, 1986. 109. Rosemont, 1999; Dewald, 2008; Berchman, 2008. 110. Rosemont, 1999; Dewald, 2008; Berchman, 2008. 111. Northrop, 1952; Sacks, 1952; Linton, 1952; Von Fritz, 1952; Maritian, 1952; Baier, 1958; Brandt, 1961; Gellner, 1992; Gensler, 1996; Holloway, 1999; Blackburn, 2001; Epstein, 2010; Kateb, 2011.

48 | P a g e

R EFERENCES
Anshen, Ruth Nanda. Moral Principles of Action: An Ethical Imperative. New York: Harper, 1952. N. pag. Print MacIver, R.M., 1952. The Deep Beauty of the Golden Rule, In Anshen (ed.), pp.39 -47. Jasper, K., 1952. Nature and Ethics, in Anshen (ed.), pp. 48-61. Maritian, J., 1952. Natural Law and Moral Law, In Anshen (ed.). pp. 94-121. Von Fritz, K., 1952. Relative and Absolute Values, In Anshen (ed.), pp.62-76. Northrop, F.S.C., 1952. Criterion of Universal Ethical and Legal Norms, in Anshen(ed.), pp. 122-139. Niebuhr, H.R., 1952, The Center of Value, in Anshen (ed.), pp. 162-175. Sachs, A., 1952, Rights, Promises and Property, in Anshen (ed.), pp. 228-302. Jessup, P.C., 1952. World Government and Mankind, In Anshen (ed.) pp. 303-342. McKeon, R., 1952, International Relations and Morality, in Anshen (ed.) pp. 343-377. Jackh, E., 1952. Spatial Consciousness: Toward Global and Cosmic Universalism, in Anshen (ed.) pp.481-511 Muilenburg, J., 1952. The Ethics of the Prophet, in Anshen (ed.) pp.524-542 Dodd, C.H., 1952. The Ethics of the New Testament, in Anshen (ed.) pp. 543-558. Khan, M.Z., 1952. Moral Principles as the Basis of Islamic Culture, in Anshen (ed.) pp.559-578. Hakim, K.L., 1952. One God, One World, One Humanity, In Anshen (ed.), pp. 578-597. Hummel, A.W., 1952. Some Basic Moral Principles in Chinese Culture, In Anshen (ed.), pp. 559-578 Suzuki, D.T., 1952. Ethics and Zen Buddhism, In Anshen (ed.), pp. 606-615. Nikhilananda, Swami., 1952. Hindu Ethics. In Anshen (ed.), pp. 616-644. Linton, R., 1952.Universal Ethical Principles: An Anthropological View, In Anshen (ed.), pp. 645-660. Robinow, P. (ed.), 1984. Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books Chomsky, N., 1974. Human Nature: Justice Versus Power, in Fons Elders, (ed.), Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind. London: Souvenir Press. Akinbo, T.O., 2009. Understanding Economic and Financial Crimes, Paper presented to: EFCC/NYSC Integrity Club, March 14, 2009. McCarthy, B. and L.E. Cohen, 2002. Economic Crime Theory. Encylopedia of Crime and Justice.Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011. The Global Economic Crime Survey. Travers, H. (ed.), 2010. Serious Economic Crime. London: White Page Ltd. McAuley, B., 2011. Inter-agency and International Cooperation in Fight Against Financial Crime. In Travers (ed.). pp. 47-54. Krishnan, C., 2011. Transparency International and the Fight Against Corruption. In Travers (ed.) pp. 47-54. McCarthy, L.F., 2011. The Reality of Fighting Global Corruption: A World Bank Perspective, in Travers (ed.) pp. 57-83. Smith, R.G., 2010. Restorative Justice Approaches to Economic Crime Control, Australian Institute of Criminology.
49 | P a g e

Kenney, M.S. and E. OBrian, 2007. Access to Restorative Justice for the Victims of Fraud. Paper presented to: Offshore Alert 5th Annual Financial Due Diligence Conference, Miami, Florida, USA. Pratt, R., 2001. Economic Crime The Financial System as a Victim. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 12, no.1. Moore, E. and M. Mills, 1990. The Neglected Victims and Unexamined Costs of White Collar Crimes. Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 36, no. 3. Pp. 408-418. Sutherland, E.H., 1983. White Collar Crimes: The Uncut Version. Yale University Press. Serio, M., 1998. Italy: Economic Crime and International Cooperation. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 6, Issue 2. Karstedt, S. and S. FarraII, 2007. Law-abiding Majority? The Everday Crimes of the Middle Class. UK: Centre for Crime and Justice, June. Karstedt, S. and S. FarraII, 2006. The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime: markets, Consumers and Citizens British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46, no.6. Adriaenssen, S. and A. Maes, 2008. Between Market Anomie and Distrust HogeschuleUniversiteit Brussell (HUB) Research paper 2008/30, September 2008. Thompson, E.P., 1963. The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. Past and Present, Vol. 50, pp. 76-136 Witherell, W. 2004. Combating Financial Crime Through International Standards and Cooperation. Address to the Fifth Ifex International Fraud and Financial Crime Convention. London: November 1-3, 2004. Deva Kula, M.R. p. 2005. Economic and Financial Crimes Challenges to Sustained Development, presentation at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, 19 April 2005. United States Court of Appeals for the First District, 2010. United States of America v. Alvin F. Aguirre-Gonzalez, March 2, 2010. Barnard, J.W. 2001. Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 77, No.1, pp.39-86. Cassell, P.G. and S. Joffee, 2011. The Crime Victims Expanding Role in a System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims Rights Act, North Western University Law Review, Colloquy. http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/1/index.html. Eaton, L. 1999. Assault with a Fiscal Weapon: As Swindlers Branch Out, Victims Want to be Heard, New York Times, May 25, 1999. Naqui, S.N.H. 2003. Perspectives on Morality and Human Well-Being. Markfield, Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation. Mirakhor, A and I.S. Hamid, 2009. Islam and Development. New York: Global Scholarly Publications. Black, W.K., 2012. What if the Broken Windows Theory were Applied to Wall Street? Alternet. Posted March 6, 2012. Oh, I. 2007. The Rights of God: Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Engineer, A.A. 1990. Islam and Liberation Theology: Essays on Liberation Elements in
50 | P a g e

Islam. Gadamer, H-G. 1991. Truth and Method 2nd Revision. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshal. New York: Crossroad. Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. The Economist, 2008. Can the Can, November 20. Wilson, J.Q. and G. Kelling, 1982. Broken Windows Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 249, No. 3 pp.29-38. Robertson, J.M. (ed), 1964. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtues of Merit, in his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Turco, L. 2003. Moral Sense and the Foundation of Morals, in Alexander Brodie (ed.) pp. 136-156. Smith, A. 1982. Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Library Classics. Kimbal, R. 1993. James Q. Wilson on Moral Sense, The New Criterion, September 1993. Arendt, H. 2006. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin Group. Metcalf, S. 2007. Richard Rorty: What Made Him a Crucial American Philosopher? Slate Magazine, posted June 18, 2007. http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2007/06/richard_rorty.single.ht ml#pagebreak_anchor_5 Rebovitch, D.J. and J. Kane, 2002. An Eye for an Eye in Electronic Age: Gauging Public Attitude Toward White Collar Crime and Punishment. Journal of Economic Crime Management, Vol. 1, No. 2. Shavell, S. 2002. Law vs. Morality as Regulator of Conduct American Law and Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002. Buonanno, P., D. Montolio and P. Vanin, 2009. Does Social Capital Reduce Crime? Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 52, No.1, pp. 171-196. Conley, J.P. and P. Wang, 2006. Crime and Ethics, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 60, No. 107-123. Burkatzki, E., 2008. Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-analytic Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 268-287. Berman, M.N., 2007. On the Moral Structure of White Collar Crime, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 5. Ricoeur, P. 1992. Oneself as Another. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 203 Ricoeur, p. 1990. The Golden Rule: Exegetical and Theological Perplexities. New Testament Studies, Vol. 36, pp. 392-395. Kirk, A. 2003. Love Your Enemies, The Golden Rule, and Ancient Reciprocity (Luke 6:3235). Biblical Literature, pp. 673-686. Samuels, M.L. 2011. Did Hillel Invent the Golden Rule in Judaism? Webarchive, http://rabbimichelsamuel.com/25 . Posted Aug. 5, 2011. Schweiker, W.M. Johnson and K. Jung (eds.) 2006. Humanity Before God: Contemporary
51 | P a g e

Faces of Jewish, Christian and Islamic Ethics. Minneapolis, MN: Augustus Fortress. Rahman, F. 1985. Law and Ethics in Islam, in Ethics in Islam, Edited by Richard G. Horannisian. Malibu, CA: Undena Pulications. Zaroug, A.H. 1999. Ethics From an Islamic Perspective: Basic Issues. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 16, No. 3 pp. 46-63. Fakhry, M. 1991. Ethical Theories in Islam. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Lukes, S. 1967. Alienation and Anomie in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc. Rosemont, H.Jr., 1999. The Vocation of Man According to the Koran, in Arvind Sharma, ed. Allinson, R.E., 2003. Hillel and Confucius: The Perspective Formulation of the Golden Rule in the Jewish and Chinese Confucian Ethical Tradition, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Vol. III, No. 101, pp. 29-41. Wikipedia: Golden Rule Stace, W.T., 1937. The Concept of Morals. New York: The MacMillan Company. (Reprinted in 1990 by Peter Smith Publisher, Inc.) Confucius: Analects xv.24; v.12; v.30. Chinese Text Project at: whttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Tex_project. Blackburn, S., 2001. Ethics: A Very Short Introduction: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Epstein, G. 2010. Good Without God: What a Billion Non-Religious People Do Believe. New York: Harper Collins. Sah, R.K., 1991. Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 1272-1295. Wang, C.J. 2002. Combating Economic Crime and Carrying out International Cooperation: Role of the State in Combating Economic and Financial Crimes statement by H.E. Jia Chun Wang, Minister of Public Security of Peoples Republic of China at Monaco World Summit on Government and Private Sector Fighting Economic Crime Monaco, 24 October 2002. Folsom, S.R. 2007. Forwards to the Annual Integrity Report. World Bank Group: 20052006. Abuarqub, M. 2009. Islamic Imperatives to Curb Corruption and Promote Sustainable Development. Secours Islamique. Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide. Yasin, N.M. and M.H. Bin Abd Hamid, 2011. Public Interest as the Paramount Consideration in Sentencing for Money Laundering Offences: A Comparative Analysis Shariah Law Reports, Kuala lumpur, Malaysia. Raksin, A. 1993. Book Review: Chartin the Dark Side of Enlightenment: The Moral Sense by James Q. Wilson. Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1993. Banuri, S. and C. Eckel, 2012. Experiments in Culture and Corruption: A Review. Impact Evaluation Series No. 56. Policy Research Working Paper 6064. The World Bank. Calabrese, A. 2005. Communication, Global Justice and the Moral Economy Global Media and Communication, Vol. 1, No. 3 pp. 301-315.
52 | P a g e

Beisner, C. 2012. Recovering the Moral Foundations of Economics Religion and Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 5, Action Institue. Webarchive. Sacks, J. 2012. Judaisms Religious Vision and the Capitalist Ethics. Religion and Liberty, Vol. ii, no. 6, Action Institute. Webarchive. Evensky, J. 2005. Adam Smiths Theory of Moral Sentiments: On Morals and Why They Matter to a Liberal Society of People and Free Markets. Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 109-130. Evensky, J. 2005. Adam Smiths Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, J.R. 2007. A Review Essay of Adam Smiths Moral Philosophy by Jerry Evensky. Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, Vol. 25-A, pp. 61-69. United Nations, 2006. Cross-Cutting Issues: International Cooperation. Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit, 4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna. Rothstein, B. and E.M. Uslunder, 2005. All for All-Equity, Corruption, and Social Trust. World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 41-72. Ades, A. and R. DiTella, 1997. The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results. Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 496-515. Andersson, S. and P. Haywaood, 2009. The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency Internationals Approach to Measuring Corruption; Political Studies, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 746-767. Arvate, P.R., A.Z. Curi, et.al, 2010. Corruption and the Size of Government: Causality Tests for OECD and Latin American Countries. Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 17, No. 10, pp. 1013-1017. Azra, A., 2007. Religious-based Civil Society and Anti-Corruption Campaign: The Indonesian Experience in the Creation of Good Governance. In H. James. Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance. London: Routledge, pp. 288.299. Doig, A., 1995. Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 151-165. Gupta, A., 1995. Blurred Boundaries The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State. American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 375402. Thompson, T. and A. Shah, 2005. Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index: Whose Perception Are They Anyway? Unpublished Discussion Draft. Samavati, P. and J. Koosh, 2011. Distinctive Features of Economic and Financial Crimes: A Study on Iranian Act. International Journal of Global Business, VOl. 4, NO. 1, pp. 1-22. Al-Agha, S. , 2007. Money Laundering From Islamic Perspecitve. Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 406-411. Durkheim, E., (1863, 1960). The Division of Labor in Society. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. Neusner, J. and B. Chilton (ed.), 2008. The Golden Rule: The Ethics of Reciprocity. Merton, R.K. 1938. Social Structure and Anomie. American Sociological Review. Vol. 3, pp. 672-82.
53 | P a g e

Merton, R.K.1964. Anomie, anomia, and social interaction: Context of Devian Behavior, in M.B. Clinard (ed.) Anomie and Deviant Behavior, Glenco, Illinois: Free Press. Dean, D.G., 1961. Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement. American Soci ological Review, Vol. 26, pp. 753-785. Dean, D.G., 1968Anomie, Powerlessness, and Religious Participation. Journal of Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 18, pp. 252-284. Lee, G.R. and R.W. Clyde, 1974. Religion, Socio-economic Status and Anomie Journal of Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 13, pp. 35-47. Marx, R.J., 1966. Anomie and the Community of the Faithful Journal of Religion and Health. Vol. 5, pp. 291-295. Arowosaiye, Y.I., et.al., 2008. Economic and Financial Crimes and ICT Infrastructure: The Islamic Criminal Law Perspective. Paper presented in the 3rd International Conference on Postgraduate Education. Penang, Malaysia. Baier, K. 1958. The Moral Point of View: A rational Basis of Ethics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted in part in Brandt, 1961, pp. 133-140. Brandt, R.B. (ed.), 1961. Value and Obligation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. Butler, J. (Bishop), 1792. Sermon XI Upon Love of our Neighbor. In Fifteen Sermons Upon Human Nature. Reprinted in Brandt, 1961 pp. 158-167. Holloway, R. 1999. Godless Morality. Edinburgh: Canongate. Lindblom, J. 1967. Prophecy in Ancient Israel. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Unterman, I. 1959. A Light Amid the Darkness: Medieval Jewish Philosophy. New York: Twayne Publishers. Tamari, M. 1987. With All Your Possessions: Jewish Ethics and Economic Life. New York: The Free Press. Neusner, J. and B. Chilton (ed.), 2008. The Golden Rule: The Ethics of Reciprocity in the World Religions. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Levine, B.A., 2008. The Golden Rule in Ancient Israelite Scripture, in Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 9-25. Dewald, C. 2008. Alternatives to the Golden Rule: Social Reciprocity and Altruism in Early Archaic Greece, In Neusner and Chilton (eds) pp. 26-39. Berchman, R.M. 2008. The Golden Rule in Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 40-54. Neusner, J. 2008. :The Golden Rule in Classical Judaism, In Neus ner and Chilton (eds.), pp. 65-75. Moazami, M. 2008. The Golden Rule in Zoroastrianism, In Neus ner and Chilton (eds.), pp. 65-75. Chilton, B. 2008. Jesus, the Golden Rule and Its Application, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 76-87. Homerin, Th. E., 2008. The Golden Rule in Islam, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 99 115. Hallisey, C. 2008. The Golden Rule in Buddhism, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) p p. 129145.
54 | P a g e

Scheible, K. 2008. The Formulation and Significance of the Golden Rule in Buddhism, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 116-128. Davis, R. 2008. A Hindu Golden Rule, In Context, In Neusner and Chilton (eds.) pp. 146 156. Csikszentmihalyi, M.A. 2008. The Golden Rule in Confucianism, in Neusner and Chilton (eds.), pp. 157-169. Donders, J.G. 2005. John Paul II: The Encyclicals in Everyday Language. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. Sirico, R.A. 2001. The Mystery and Morality of MarketsExplained, Acton Commentary, October 17, 2001. Duxbury, N. 2009. Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 1529-1605. Rost, H.T.D., 1986. The Golden Rule: A Universal Ethic. UK: G. Ronald Publisher, Ltd. Allinson, R.E. 1985. The Confucian Golden Rule: A Native Formulation, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 12, pp. 305-311. King, G.B. 1928. The Negative Golden Rule, Journal of Religion, Vol. 8. Gensler, H.J. 1996. Formal Ethics (Second Edition): New York and London: Routledge, pp. 313-335. Seligman, A.B. 1992. The Idea of Civil Society. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Broadie, A. (ed.), 2005. The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Finnis, J. 1991. Moral Absolutes. Washington, D.C. The Catholic University of America Press. Wattles, J. 1996. The Golden Rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gellner, E. 1992. Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge. Simms, K. 2004. Paul Ricoeur. London: Routledge. Al-Attas, S.M.N., 1992. Islam: Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality. Kuala Lumpur: Dwan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pendidikan, Malaysia. Ricoeur, P. 1995. Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule, in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Mark I. Wallas (ed.), translated by David Pellauer. Minneapolis: Augsburg-Fortress, 1995, pp. 298-302. Ricoeur, P. 2000. The Just. Translated by David Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Porpora, D.V. 2001. Landscape of the Soul. New York: Oxford University Press. Kateb, G. 2011. Human Dignity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press. Dingan, J., 2005. Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice. Buckingham: Open University Press. Gilbert, M. and S. Russel, 2002. Globalization of Criminal Justice in the Corporate Context, Crime, Law, and Social Change. Vol. 38: pp. 211-38. Levi, M., 2005. The Victims of Fraud. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pearce, F. and S. Tombs, 1998. Toxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical Industry. Aldershot: Ashgate.
55 | P a g e

Sutherland, E., 1949. White Collar Crime. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston. Tombs, S. and D. Whyte, 2003. Scrutinizing the Powerful: Crime, Contemporary Political Economy and Critical Social Research, in S. Tombs and D. Whyte (eds.) Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful. New York: Lang pp. 3-48. Gianaris, W.N., 1992. The New World Order and the Need for International Criminal Court. Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 16., Issue 1. Commonwealths Attorney (2012). Emotional Impact of Fraud. York County Virginia, USA, Website. Zuboff, S., 2009. Wallstreets Economic Crimes Against Humanity. Businessweek, March, 2009. http://www.businessweek.com. Geis, G., R.F. Meier and L.M. Salinger, 1995. White Collar Crime: Classic and Contemporary Views. New York: The Free Press. Friedrichs, D.O., 1995. Trusted Criminals: White-Collar Crime in Contemporary Society. Albany: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Benson, M.L. and F.T. Cullen, 1998. Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutor at Work. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Tomlin, J.W. , 1982. Victims of White Collar Crimes, In H.J. Schneider (ed.) The Victims in the International Perspective. New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishing. Walsh, M. and D. Schram, 1980. The Victims of White Collar Crime: Accuser or Accused, in G.Geis and E. Stotland (eds.). White Collar Crime. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications. Welford, C.F., and B.L. Ingraham, 1994. White Collar Crime: Prevalence, Trends, and Costs, in A.R. Roberts, ed. Critical Issues in Crime and Justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Wells, R.C. 1991. Your Best Evidence. Police Magazine, 47. Beloof, D.E., and P.G. Cassell, and S.J. Twist, 2010. Victims in Criminal Procedures (Third Edition). Carolina Academic Press. Shover, J. and J.P. Wright (eds.), 2001. Crimes of Priviledge: Readings in White Collar Crime. Oxford University Press. Tombs, S. and D. Whyte, 2007. Safety Crimes. Cullompton: William Publishing. Croall, H., 2001a. Understanding White Collar Crime. Buckingham: Open University Press. Croall, H., 2001b. The Victims of White Collar Crime, in L. Sven-Ake (ed.), White Collar Crime Research: Old Views and Future Potentials: Lectures and papers delivered in a Scandinavian seminar. National Coucil for Crime Prevention, Sweden Bra-Report, 2001:1. Croall, H., 2005. Penalties for Corporate Homicide. Annex B to Scottish Executives: The Finding and Recommendations of the Expert Group Report on Corporate Homicide. http://www.scotland.gove.ute/publications/2005/11/14133559/35592. Croall, H., 2007. White Collar Crime, Consumers and Victimization, in G. Geis and H. Pontell (eds.), International Handbook of White Collar Crime. New York: Springer.

56 | P a g e