METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD) VS. J. KING AND SONS COMPANY, INC.

Facts: Petitioner, MCWD wanted to acquire a five (5)-square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of respondents property covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latters property. Respondent did not agree to petitioners proposal. After the negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution No. 015-2004 which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On 10 November 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion of respondents property. On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the amount to respondent during a rescheduled hearing which petitioners counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal Revenuehad pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot. On 26 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting respondents petition. It ruled that the board resolution which authorized the filing of the expropriation complaint lackedexactitude and particularity which made it invalid; that there was no genuine necessity for theexpropriation of the five (5)-square meter lot and; that the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 infixing the value of the property contravenes the judicial determination of just compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was rejected. Issue: Whether there was sufficient authority from the petitioners board of directors to institute the expropriation complaint. Held:

Petitioners charter provides that it has the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in it. All the powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board and that any executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and re delegated by the board to any of its officers or agents for such purpose. Being a corporation, petitioner can exercise its powers only through its board of directors. For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved on 27 February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval tothe filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondents lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case against the owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that upon compliance with the guidelinesthe court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment, the trial courthas a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs PUREFOODS CORPORATION This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[2] dated 07 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73460 which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated 17 September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 915-M-97 for eminent domain. The following factual antecedents are undisputed and are matters of record.

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395,[4] as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power generation, the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, and the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. It is also empowered to acquire property incident to or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which it was created,[5] enter private property in the lawful performance of its business purposes provided that the owners of such private property shall be indemnified for any damage that may be caused thereby, and exercise the right of eminent domain. To construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project, or particularly the the San Jose-San Manuel 500 KV Transmission Line Project, NAPOCOR had to acquire an easement of right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in the towns of Angat, San Rafael and San Ildefonso and in the city of San Jose del Monteall in the province of Bulacan. On 5 November 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for eminent domain[6] before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Named defendants were the vendors and vendees of the affected parcels of land, namely, Arcadio T. Cruz, Calixto Cruz, DeograciasC. Mendoza, Hacienda Sapang Palay, and herein respondents Purefoods Corporation (Purefoods), Solid Development Corporation (SDC), Jose Ortega, Jr., Silvestre Bautista, Alfredo Cabande, the Heirs of Victor Trinidad (Heirs of Trinidad) and Moldex Realty Incorporated (Moldex). The complaint also alleged the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land consisting of 62,426.50 square meters. It also averred that the affected properties had not been expropriated for public use and were selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and that the negotiations between NAPOCOR and the defendants had failed.[8] The complaint prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused entry to the affected properties.[9] Among the several defendants, only herein respondents Heirs of Trinidad,[10] SDC,[11] Moldex[12] and Purefoods[13] filed their respective answers.

For their part, respondent Heirs of Trinidad claimed that they should be indemnified for the value of the affected property based on the prevailing market purchase price of P750.00/sq m and that codefendant Alfredo Cabande, not being the owner of any of the affected properties, should not be compensated. They added that there are other parcels of land within the area which are more suitable for NAPOCORs project. Respondent Moldex, for its part, alleged that the expropriation of part of the landholding in which it has a propriety interest would divest the peripheral area of its value and render the same totally useless; thus, it should be compensated for the loss of the peripheral area as well.[14] In praying for the dismissal of the complaint, respondent SDC averred that the taking would not serve any public purpose and that the selection of its property for expropriation would not be compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.[15] Respondent Purefoods similarly prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of the failure of NAPOCOR to append copies of the pertinent Torrens titles to the complaint. It also averred that codefendants Arcadio and Calixto Cruz had no rights or interests in the affected properties as they both had already sold the properties to it. As to the amount of just compensation, it averred that NAPOCORs offer was excessively low, undervalued and obsolete and that its action had caused extreme prejudice to its investment and further delay in the construction and development of its piggery business, thereby adversely affecting its operation.[16] Meanwhile, NAPOCOR filed its Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession[17] on 19 December 1997 wherein it alleged that it had deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, NPC Branch, Diliman, Quezon City the amount ofP126,565.42 as provisional valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated and that it had sent a Notice to Take Possession[18]of said properties. On 06 January 1998, the RTC directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of possession.[19] After the pre-trial conference, the RTC issued an Order[20] dated 14 June 1999, reflecting the parties agreement to limit the issues to the amount of just compensation and to whether respondent Moldex was entitled to just compensation on the devaluation of the peripheral area within its property.

When the first set of appointed commissioners failed to discharge their duties, the RTC appointed a second set of commissioners namely, Ret. General Juanito Malto, Atty. Emmanuel Ortega and Atty. Antonio V. Magdasocwho took their oaths of office and forthwith conducted a hearing.[21] On 18 May 2001, the commissioners submitted separate reports to the RTC which formed part of the case records.[22] In the main, the commissioners recommended that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the fair market value of P600.00/sq m for properties belonging to respondent Moldex and P400.00/sq m for the undeveloped or underdeveloped properties belonging to the rest of the respondents.[23] The case was then submitted for decision. On 17 September 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision, Respondent Moldex sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision[27] but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order[28] dated 07 December 2001. Both NAPOCOR and respondent Moldex filed separate appeals before the Court of Appeals. Respondent Moldex argued that the RTC erred in the following instances: (1) in ruling that just compensation should be paid atP600.00/sq m and not P1,600.00/sq m; (2) in not imposing an interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the taking until the finality of the decision; and (3) in not ordering the payment of just compensation for the peripheral portion of the affected property. For its part, NAPOCOR assailed the RTCs valuations of the properties at P600.00/sq m and P400.00/sq m, contending that the same are not based on the value of the properties at the time of taking when the properties were still agricultural in nature. It claimed that only an easement fee, which should not exceed 10% of the declared market value, should be paid to respondents. It also questioned the award of interest of 12% per annum from the finality of the decision until the full payment of the amount adjudged. On 7 November 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, affirming the RTC decision in all respects except for the period during which the interest of 12% per annum would accrue.[29] Only respondent Moldex sought reconsideration of the 07 November 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals.[30] NAPOCOR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.[31] Respondent Moldex nonetheless filed a comment on the petition, stating that its motion for reconsideration of the 7 November

2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals was still pending and that hence taking cognizance of the petition would be premature.[32] Respondents Heirs of Trinidad,[33] Purefoods[34] and SDC[35] likewise filed separate comments on NAPOCORs petition. However, on 12 April 2004, NAPOCOR filed an Omnibus Motion To Withdraw Petition For Review On Certiorari And To Remand The Case To The Court Of Appeals,[36] informing the Court of the compromise agreement forged on 19 March 2004between NAPOCOR and respondent Moldex. NAPOCOR subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion,[37] praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition only insofar as respondent Moldex is concerned. Attached to the said pleading is a copy of the compromise agreement[38] dated 19 March 2004 and a copy of NAPOCOR Board Resolution No. 2003-13,[39] evincing that the proposed compromise settlement submitted by respondent Moldex has been duly approved. In a Resolution[40] dated 2 June 2004, the Court resolved to defer action on NAPOCORs omnibus motion and instead require respondent Moldex to comment thereon. On 7 July 2004, respondent Moldex filed a Comment,[41] confirming the existence of the compromise agreement and manifesting its conformity with the omnibus motion filed by the OSG. On 18 August 2004, the Court issued a Resolution granting the withdrawal of the petition only as regards respondent Moldex.[42] In the instant petition, NAPOCOR is assailing the Court of Appeals reliance on the commissioners report in fixing just compensation based on the full market value of the affected properties. NAPOCOR contends that only an easement of right-of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed, thus, only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be paid to the affected property owners. NAPOCOR cites Section 3A, R.A. 6395, as amended[43] and the implementing regulation of R.A. No. 8974[44] in support of this argument. Respondent Purefoods counters that the appellate courts determination of just compensation is a factual finding, which may be reviewed by this Court only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions to the prohibition against factual review. Since the instant

case does not fall under any of the exceptions, it argues that the issue of just compensation may not be reviewed in theinstant proceeding. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.[45] In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising a question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners. This issue does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented but rather the determination of whether the pertinent laws cited by NAPOCOR in support of its argument are applicable to the instant case. Now, to the core issue of just compensation. The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be traversed byNAPOCORs transmission lines has already been answered in National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation.[46] In that case, the Court held that because of the nature of the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected properties Also, in National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-Paderanga,[48] the Court noted that the passage of NAPOCORstransmission lines over the affected property causes not only actual damage but also restriction on the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property. While NAPOCOR in that case was seeking to acquire only an easement of right-of-way, the Court nonetheless ruled that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market value of the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion on the affected property. The Court explained therein that expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission

lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.[49] In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.[50] While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.[51] In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,[52] the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.[53] The executiv e department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.[54] NAPOCOR argues that the Court of Appeals should not have adopted the commissioners report hook, line and sinker because the same was based exclusively on relative prices of adjoining lots without showing evidence on their proximity and of the sales of similar classification. The duty of the court in considering the commissioners report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and to fulfill its duty in this respect, the

court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case may require. Rule 67, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that the trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners report in any of the following ways: (1) it may accept the same and render judgment therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it may [a] recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or [b] set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.[55] In the instant case, the Court finds no reversible error in the RTCs determination of just compensation even if the same was based on the commissioners report, there being no showing that said report was tainted with irregularity, fraud or bias. Based on the foregoing elucidation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs finding of the value of just compensation based on the majority reports valuation of P400.00 per square meter for the properties belonging to respondents with the exception of respondent Moldex. Both the Court of Appeals and the RTC were convinced that the commissioners recommendation was arrived at after a judicious consideration of all factors. Absent any showing that said valuation is exorbitant and unjustified, the same is binding on this Court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73460 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

RP vs Cancio FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the October 17, 2005 decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75092. Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation created and existing under and by virtue of RA 7916,[2] as amended. It is vested with governmental functions,[3] including the power of eminent domain, thus enabling it to

acquire private land within or adjacent to the ecozone for consolidation with land for zone development purposes.[4] On January 15, 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811[5] which reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner eventually laid out the development of the economic zone and subsequently leased out respondents 47,540 sq. m. lot to an investor in the economic zone, Maitland Smith Inc. (Maitland). On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents lot at P1,100 per sq. m. or P52,294,000 for the whole property. The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the proper court. Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City. Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu Lapu City, Branch 54 on August 27, 2001.[6] Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount or a total of P5,229,400 with the Land Bank of the Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50.[7] Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974,[8] specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession. In its January 14, 2002 order (first order), the trial court granted respondents motion. Petitioner moved for its reconsideration. It argued that RA 8974 was inapplicable as the payment required under the law applied only to instances where the property was still in the owners possession and had yet to be transferred to the government. It could not be validly invoked when the property was already in the governments possession, as in this case. It also averred that it should be made to pay only the

price of the land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it was ordered to pay the amount required under RA 8974, it would be unjustly penalized for its own improvements to the property. This time, the RTC agreed with petitioners position. On February 26, 2002 (second order), the court a quo granted petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that petitioner should make the required payment under the law because RA 8974, which took effect before the commencement of the expropriation case, applied to all actions of such nature regardless of whether the government agency was already in possession or not. The court a quo issued its September 5, 2002 order (third order) which reversed its second order and reinstated the first one. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the first and third orders of the RTC. The appellate court sustained the RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition. The issue before us is whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession.[9] It is petitioners stance that it is not. It cited A.O. No. 50 as its legal authority when it offered to purchase respondents property in an amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) higher than the zonal value thereof.[10] Consequently, petitioner prayed in its complaint for expropriation[11] that it be issued a writ of possession upon a showing that the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the offered amount has been duly deposited. Respondents, on the other hand, agree that RA 8974 is the controlling law in this case as the complaint for expropriation was instituted when said law was already in effect. We deny the petition. RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.[12] Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project a matter undisputed by both parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case. We note that this expropriation case is still in its initial stages. The trial court had yet to approve a writ of possession in petitioners favor when

the issue of payment of just compensation cropped up. Both parties seemed to have confused the requirement of paying 100% of the current zonal valuation of the property (as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession) with the payment of just compensation itself. Clearly, there was a confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession. InCapitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority,[16] we clarified that the payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property. There is therefore no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just compensation in resolving the issue of a writ of possession.[18] In fact, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ upon compliance with the requirements of Section 4[19] of the law. No hearing is required and the court cannot exercise its discretion in order to arrive at the amount of the provisional value of the property to be expropriated as the legislature has already fixed the amount under the aforementioned provision of the law.[20] It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may present evidence relative to the propertys fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974 This must be so as just compensation should take into account the consequential benefits and damages which may arise from the expropriation.[22] Furthermore, it is well to remember that the concept of just compensation does not mean fairness to the property owner alone. It must also be just to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.[23] Lastly, RA 8974 provides that the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case.[24] In this case, almost eight years have passed since petitioner commenced the expropriation proceedings on August 27, 2001. We, however, hold that it is still feasible to comply with the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in

accordance with the guidelines laid down in RA 8974 and its implementing rules.[25] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

JUSTA G. GUIDO vs.RURAL PROGRESS This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit: That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land. That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539. That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract. That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA. We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a decision on the other questions raised. Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows: o SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchaser or farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines. o SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose, the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation.

The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, copied verbatim, is as follows: o The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature and area? The answer is to be found in the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno, member of the Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted provision. No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's resolution was readily and totally approved by the Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may be taken as embodying the intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers. There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due process for public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.) Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic

security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country. The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal. In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain,

inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr. Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriation the then existing landed estates to be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein." In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La Guardia, 52 N.E. [2nd], 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S. [2nd], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken.

The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon. The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.

it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution asunconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required inexpropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking ofprivate property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known theirqualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commissionfor dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that