Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. M. No.

2104 August 24, 1989 NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority. In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case. On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983. Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice. On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following: FINDINGS Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute

usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it. Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00. When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person. Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage. Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of

P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants. After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against respondent. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases: (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings; (b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills. There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976). Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.). Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious. Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting: In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent. In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent.

Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question' Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment. Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z]. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants. It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants. At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him. Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say: With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.' Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722). A parting comment. All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless. Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied) and made the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In

those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process. We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to crossexamine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses. After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General. The following acts of respondent: 1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00; 2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest; 3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00; 4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality"; 5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and 6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time. constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude,

being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8 In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 6131 February 28, 2005

106 they were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as Criminal Case No. R-4013-A.1a\^/phi1.net "Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the house of Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by uttering the words ipaposil ta ka which means Ill have you shot. A complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[]ez before Municipal Trial Court of 3 Baybay, Leyte." In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, while respondent was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yet filed his answer to the Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. The hearing was thus 4 reset to June 26, 2002. On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was present. Respondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus 5 granted a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer. He denied that he had utilized his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there were already several pending cases involving the same issues raised by complainants in the present administrative action: "2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be best threshed out in the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled []The Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al[] for Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original complaint was filed in October 2001 at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of which is filed where one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity of the foregoing questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase because if this document is really valid and existing then why did complainant Eugenio Nuez [affix] his signature as one of the instrumental witnesses in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have protested at the time of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106, one of the properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O. Nuez to take control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the partition in 1969? xxxxxxxxx "[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestate estate but the same had been duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O. Nuez, namely, respondents wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan -Nuez who confirmed undersign[ed]s authority as administrator of the aforenamed estate; "[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to repurchase only recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as they now [refuse] to recognize the ownership and long time possession of the real
6

EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O. NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ-ALVARICO and IMELDA L. NUEZ, complainants, vs. Atty. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of disciplinary action; thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out 1 only for duly proven serious administrative charges. The Case and the Facts This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez, Eliza Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows: "Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nu[]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[]ez Lot No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq. ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said contract, the stipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978. That said period of vendors right to repurchase expired without any agreement of extending said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year after the execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez and her son Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[]ez, extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[]ez. Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to the present and it is also where his children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez, grew and [are] presently residing. "By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well as on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondents wife, as acknowledged natural child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent, on the pretext of administering the properties of the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession of complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same. With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez, sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez and Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No.
2

properties forming part of the aforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late Ricardo O. Nuez; "[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent the law. Complainants Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are actually renting the cornermost portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area only of 201 square meters, more or less, and when respondent was trying to eject them, complainants negotiated with the respondent to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed consideration until their father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existing document of sale with right to repurchase when they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil and administrative cases against respondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers, the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way of pressuring respondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No. 106[,] including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting of Lot No. 89; "4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa L. Nuez without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no longer pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for review to the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s] whereby this administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of that petition for review by the Department of Justice; "5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at the instigation of the complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same was filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But before the filing of this present action initiated by Mr. Caballes s counsel and complainants Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez required Mr. Caballes to execute a document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowing that the same has already been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legal redemption, and despite Amado Caballes having executed x x x a Deed of Resale which was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuez x x x, the complainants convinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial question and that further hearing of the present administrative action should be suspended until the outcome of this criminal case; "6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part of the Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar x x x. "7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of this complaint because this will be threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of the matter is that respondent had been already acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 x x x.

"8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there is also filed Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuez and now pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack of witnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicial question which necessarily will suspend further hearing of the present administrative action until the final outcome of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;" x x x x x x x x x.
7 8

On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply. Thereafter, IBP-CPD Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing on December 11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was a granted a period of fifteen (15) days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the case was to be considered 9 submitted for resolution. 1awphi1.nt Report and Recommendation of the IBP In her Report, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year. In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of Governors. The Courts Ruling We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but find respondents offensive language against complainants and their counsel unbecoming an attorney. Administrative Liability of Respondent The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the 11 12 discredit of the legal profession. In gr_ Gonzaga v. Villanueva, this Court, citing 13 Tucay v. Tucay, held thus: "A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership 14 therein."
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However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of disciplinary 15 action and must be imposed with great caution. The allegations in the Complaint were not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of respondents deceit and gross misconduct. The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent. Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold 16 the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good moral character. In the present case, however, while respondent has been charged with several criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them. Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them. Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBP 17 investigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation. As borne by the records, Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well as his Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the December 11, 2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges filed against him.1awphi1.nt While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincingly proven the charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive language in respondents pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In his Memorandum dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I. 19 Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer and the 20 Rejoinder of respondent. The latter suggested that complainants and their counsel had caused the filing of several baseless suits, including the present charge, merely 21 to harass and place him in a bad light. He hurled insulting language in describing 22 the opposing counsel and cast doubts on the latters integrity by implying that the
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lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on 23 non-forum shopping and committed malpractice. Indeed, these statements, particularly the words "who he is despite x x x his shortness not only in size but in arrogance," constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court. A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but respectful as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should use such language as may 24 be properly addressed by one gentleperson to another. WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand pesos. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000] ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent. DECISION MELO, J: This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with another woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share in their multi-million conjugal assets. The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when due to "marital strain that has developed through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in court. The complaint charged: DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the loans. . . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant. UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings. (Complaint, Rollo, p. 2) In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses: (1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents: That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262) (2) On the Charge of Forgery: That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that "the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person"(Annex "B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public documents because he intends to disinherit his children and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own mother. (3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage: That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence. Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them some financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant. (4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice: That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer." The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent summarizing the causes of action as follows: (1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and (2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family. (Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34) No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence attached to their pleadings. Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and recommended:

(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on the first charge; and (2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the second charge. (ibid., p. 57) The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence is necessary. The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of respondent were written by one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving. In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly, "I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say: 1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing, Silliman University. 2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City. 3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on July 19, 1990. 4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.

10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or be alone with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109, Records. SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT xxxxxxxxx 1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits to my father at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he left our home in Bindoy; 2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week; 3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father's place. This woman is now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching; 4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father's house is that during my visits, whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as well as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around the house in the manner of someone who lived there; 5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a working student living at my father's place; 6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records Respondent's son has this to say: "I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose and say: 1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City. 2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer.

5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child. 6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and one time, she was washing my father's clothes. 7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my father's daughter with Jocelyn. 8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased). 9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child's clothes in my father's room.

3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more. 4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it. 5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around. Josephus said my father was in his room. 6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.

7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.

12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on a Friday. 13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras." pp. 5657, Records. SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT xxxxxxxxx 1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental. 2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor of the said house which he shared with me. 3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. 4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying, to which I answered that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there was an available room at the said house which he could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter. 5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. 6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request. 7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor of the house I was also staying at. 8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stay overnight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our conversation. 9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room. 10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said room and depart from the house. 11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to another house. 12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in June 1989. 13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no one there. 14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. 15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the person in charge of the said resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at

8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to see my father, she was also there. 9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine. 10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p. 112, Records Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows: "I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that: 1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to January 1987. 2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide and performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house and room with the latter. 3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant. 4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant. 5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the latter. 6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more intimate with each other. 7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was going to meet someone. 8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room. 10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper. 11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.

Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier. 16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras. 17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home while knocking on the door. 18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room. 19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up from a nap. 20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee. 21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) years old, walking around the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching. 22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at this office at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter some more. 23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental. 24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records (ibid., pp. 44-52) The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo) The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by the evidentiary record. ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION: 1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person. 2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;) The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent. To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name. ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]). In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 4914 March 3, 2004

In a Resolution dated February 7, 1998, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In her Report and Recommendation dated March 3, 2003, Atty. Rebecca VillanuevaMaala, IBP Hearing Commissioner, made the following findings: "After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have committed gross misconduct. In the Civil Case No. U-6352 before the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, for Reformation of Instrument, respondent was not telling the truth when he alleged under paragraph 6 That although the document is captioned Deed of Absolute Sale, the true intention of the parties is not expressed by reason of mistake on the part of the person who drafted the document, because the instrument should be equitable mortgage x x x. Between the complainants and the respondent, it is the latter who knows about the law, be it the difference between a Deed of Absolute Sale and an Equitable Mortgage. And because he is the lawyer and he has a law office together with his son, it is presumed that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the consideration indicated was only P50,000.00. We believed complainants that the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent to lessen the amount of capital gain tax. Respondent cannot deny that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale as shown by his letters to Myrna Tugawin (sister of Jeneline Donato) dated 31 August 1994, 1 September 1994 and 20 December 1994. After the lapse of several years, respondent filed the complaint for Reformation of Instrument because he realized that the price paid to him by complainants was unusually inadequate in view of the fact that the same land was being purchased by NAPOCOR for P3,000,000.00. "The contention of respondent that this administrative complaint is a violation of the rule on forum shopping is without merit. There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another (First Phil International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259), or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition (Chemphil Export & Improt Corp. vs. CA, 251 SCRA 257)." and recommended that complainant be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In its Resolution No. XV-2003-345, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report of Commissioner Maala with the recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only six (6) months. We sustain the finding of the Hearing Commissioner that respondent was not telling the truth when he alleged in his complaint for reformation of instrument that the intention of the parties is not expressed therein; that what they intended to execute was a deed of equitable mortgage, not a deed of absolute sale; and that the mistake was committed by the person who drafted the instrument. We observe that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties on December 14, 1994. However, respondent filed Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument only on April 23, 1997, or after two years, four months and nine days. Why did it take him more than two years to realize that the previous contract did not express the true intention of the parties? The reason for this delay can be gleaned from the allegations in his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument. He alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale should have been an equitable mortgage since the consideration stated therein is only P50,000.00, while the

SPOUSES JENELINE DONATO and MARIO DONATO, complainants, vs. ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR., respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Jeneline and Mario Donato against Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr. The complaint alleges that on July 22, 1994, complainant spouses and respondent Atty. Asuncion, Sr. executed a Contract to Sell wherein the latter conveyed to the former his parcel of land with an area of 10,776 square meters (or 1.0776 hectare) situated at San Miguel, Pangasinan covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-12256. The parties agreed that the purchase price is in the amount of P187,500.00 payable by installments. On December 20, 1994, after the complainants had paid the last installment, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. This document was prepared by respondent wherein he made it appear that the consideration is only P50,000.00 in order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax. More than two years later, or on January 10, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, an action for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. U-6293. Among the parcels of land being expropriated was the lot purchased by complainants for which NAPOCOR was willing to pay P3,000,000.00. Respondent then offered his legal services to complainants and demanded 12% of whatever amount they will receive from NAPOCOR. When respondent learned that complainants intended to hire the services of another lawyer, he threatened them by filing with the RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument. In his complaint, he alleged that the contract executed by the parties is not a deed of sale but an equitable mortgage because the price of the lot (P50,000.00) stated in the contract is unusually inadequate compared to NAPOCORs offer of P3,000,000.00. The complaint further alleges that in filing Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument, respondent "has dragged them to useless and expensive litigation." His act is "contrary to law and morality" which warrants his disbarment. In his comment on the instant administrative complaint, respondent claimed that complainants violated the rule on forum shopping. According to him, the issue raised in this administrative complaint and in complainants answer to his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument is the same, i.e., "the legality and morality" of the filing of this civil case.

NAPOCOR has agreed to purchase the lot for P3,000,000.00. It is thus clear that it was only when he knew that the value of the lot suddenly increased by leaps and bounds that he thought of filing the complaint for reformation of instrument. At this point, it bears stressing that respondent does not dispute complainants contention that they paid him P187,500.00, not P50,000.00. As earlier mentioned, complainants explained that the latter price was specified in the deed of absolute sale in order to reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax. We likewise sustain the finding of Commissioner Maala that the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent himself, as shown by his letters to Myrna Tugawin, sister of complainant Jeneline Donato. In his letter dated August 31, 1994, respondent informed Myrna that "a Deed of Sale will be executed by us" (referring to him and the complainants). In his letter of September 1, 1994, respondent asked Myrna to bring P50,000.00 on September 3, 1994 "for the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale." And in his letter dated December 20, 1994, respondent requested Myrna to bring complainants "balance" on December 22, 1994. If it were true that the contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage, why did he prepare a different one a Deed of Absolute Sale? We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or 1 deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates: "SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. x x x." In SPO2 Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr., we explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In committing such gross misconduct, respondent violated his solemn oath as a lawyer imposing upon himself the following duties, thus: "I, ______________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
2

and I impose upon myself this obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God." By filing the unfounded complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain financial gain, respondent did not only abuse and misuse the judicial processes, but likewise harassed the complainants and forced them to litigate unnecessarily. Indeed, his act was intended to advance his own interest at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, a manifestation of flaw in his character as a lawyer. The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed 3 only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members 4 of the Bar. We expect them at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal 5 profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and 6 confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the 7 continuance of such privilege. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for gross misconduct. Incidentally, respondents defense of forum shopping is utterly bereft of merit. Suffice it to state that complainants did not institute two actions grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon them. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR. is found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from notice. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar; and be furnished the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.