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GREECE AND THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR OF 1877-1878 Nicholas C. J. Pappas Sam Houston State University A draft paper presented at the conference on the Ottoman-Russian War of 18771878. Sponsored by Meiji University and Middle East Technical University Held in Ankara Turkey, 13-14 December 2005
Greek participation in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 was characterized chiefly by vacillation. King George and his successive governments had not been eager to involve Greece in a war over predominantly Slavic issues. However, with the outbreak of the war, a significant portion of the Greek press and public began to insist that Greece take advantage of the war in order to gain irridenta. The prospect of Slavic gains, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, prompted the Greek government to cooperate with Greek nationalist organizations to begin sending irregular bands into Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. In addition, an uprising on Crete broke out in expectation of Greek involvement in the war. Montenegro, Romania and Serbia rejoined the conflict by December 1878, shortly after the fall of Plevna. Greece, however, delayed in mobilizing its troops until January 1878 and did not start moving its forces across the border into Thessaly until 1 February 1878. By that time the war was over. The reasons for Greeces delay and ultimate tardiness in entering the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 will be the theme of this study. One of the most unusual episodes of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 was the unsuccessful attempt by Greece to play a role in the conflict and thus gain favourable territorial concessions from the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. Indeed, through much of the Eastern Crisis, Greece could not decide in its policies between remaining neutral or taking part in the war on the side of Russia.1 This indecisiveness and procrastination can be understood by looking at Greeces relations with Russia, the peculiar nature of politics and the military in the Greek Kingdom, the complex position of the Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire, and Greeces relations to Russia and the other powers. Let us first look at the condition of Greco-Russian relations during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, especially in comparison to Russian-Bulgarian relations. Greece and Russia had important cultural, religious, economic, political and military links going back to before the attainment of Greek independence. However, the years following the foundation of an independent Greek state witnessed a gradual weakening of GrecoRussian ties. In the nineteenth century, as Greek relations with western Europe broadened and as the real or perceived threat of Russian Pan-Slavism grew, the Greeks increasingly turned away from Russia in pursuit of their national goals. Greek aspirations often conflicted with Russian imperial policy in the Near East. Russia, in turn, sought other surrogates besides Greece among the other emergent Balkan states, such as Bulgaria and Serbia at different times. Nevertheless, ties between Russia and Greece remained intimate albeit complex and contradictory. Russia and Greece, for example, were coreligionist states, both adhering to the Eastern Orthodox communion. Yet Greek and Russian ecclesiastical interests often were at odds with one another in the Balkans and the
The most thorough study of Greeces role in the Eastern Crisis is Evangelos Kofos Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878 (Thessalonike, 1975). A copy of this important work was graciously made for me by the staff of the Institute for Balkan Studies and was used extensively in the preparation of this paper
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Near East. Greece and Russia also had dynastic links with the marriage of George I, King of Greece from 1863 and 1913, to Grand Duchess Olga, niece of Tsar Alexander II. The close relations of the two ruling houses did not prevent friction between the Russian Empire and the Greek Kingdom.2 Russian-Greek relations began to change in the period 1856-1878, especially with the growth of Russian-Bulgarian ties. Russian policy towards Bulgaria during this period was very different from that toward Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, or Greece, in that Russia was not dealing with an autonomous or independent state, but rather with a people who were still directly under Ottoman rule. One of the most striking changes in Russian foreign policy toward the Balkans in the era between the Crimean War and the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 was in its attitude toward the Bulgarians and their nascent national movement. This change was to affect relations with not only the Ottoman Empire, but with the other Balkan peoples, notably the Greeks and the Serbs. By the time of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, Russian foreign policy, as represented by Nikolai Ignatiev, had tilted in favour of the Bulgarian national movement over that of the Romanians, Serbs and the Greeks. Russian authorities were much more apprised as to the growth of Bulgarian nationalism than the representatives of the other Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire, and as such had both the wherewithal and inclination to harness this national movement. The Bulgarians participated in earlier Russian-Ottoman Wars, and the resultant political, social, economic and cultural ties from participation and subsequent immigration to Russia, made them the same type of surrogates that the Russians had in the Serbs and Greeks earlier in the century. The Bulgarians, unlike the Greeks, Romanians and Serbs, did not have their own autonomous or independent state open to the influence of other powers, such as the British, the French and the Austrians. Russia's policy toward Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the years 1856 to 1875 was guided by its earlier contacts with the Bulgarian National Movement, as well as by other factors. Among these factors was Russia's loss in the Crimean War and the need to undo the most onerous aspects of the treaty of Paris, notably the demilitarization of the Black Sea, the loss of Southern Bessarabia, and the loss of an exclusive Russian Protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and Serbia. This factor did not directly affect or was affected by Bulgarian affairs, only insofar that an increase of Russian influence over one of the major Christian groups in the Balkans, hitherto unrecognized and located along Russia's traditional invasion route to the straits, could enhance Russia's position vis--vis other European powers involved in the region, notably Austria, Britain and France. Russia would eventually successfully repudiate the provisions of the treaty of Paris by taking advantage of the changes in the European balance of power brought about by the Wars of German Unification. This policy to bring about revision of the setbacks of the Crimean War was brought about by prudent engagement in European affairs as advocated and followed by A. M. Gorchakov and the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 The Asiatic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, located in Moscow, was more involved in the development of relations with the Balkans than the chancellery and Foreign Minister Gorchakov. The most important individual involved in the development of Russian relations with the Bulgarians was N. P. Ignatiev, who served as minister, later ambassador to the Porte between 1864 and 1877. 4 Ignatiev already had a brilliant cursus
2 The process and other elements of Greek foreign policy are found in E. Driault and M. Lhritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grce de 1821 a nos jours, 3 vols. (Paris, 1925); and Stylianos Laskaris, Diplomatik historia ts Hellados, 1821-1914 (Athens, 1947). 3 On Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy, see: S. Bushuev, A. M. Gorchakov (Moscow, 1942); J. Klaczko, The Two Chancellors: Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck (New York, 1876); C. Roux, Alexandre II, Napoleon II et Gorchakoff (Paris, 1913); and S. Semanov, A. M. Gorchakov, russkii diplomat XIX veka (Moscow, 1962). 4 On Ignatiev, see: F. Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karamzin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870 (Washington, D.C., 1962); G. Hnigen, Nikolai Pavlovic Ignatev und die russische Balkanpolitik, 1875-1878 (Gttingen, 1968); N. P. Ignatiev, Zapiski Grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 1864-1874, Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, bks. 1-4 (1914-1915): 93-135; D. MacKenzie, Ignatiev, Nikolai Pavlovic, the Modern

publicus within the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry before assuming his post in Istanbul. At the age of 32, he had already led two successful embassies to the Central Asian khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and to Peking, where he negotiated the Russian acquisition of the Pacific Maritime provinces. Ignatiev had also served as the director of the Asiatic Department (which covered policy for Asia, the Balkans, and the Near East) from 1861 to 1864 and developed a great deal of influence in the department, which he used to further his policies during his years at his post in Istanbul. As the Russian representative to the Ottoman Empire, Ignatiev used his mastery of diplomatic relations with an activist and aggressive personal style to become the foremost foreign diplomat in the Ottoman capital and the restorer of Russian prestige in the Near East. His position as ambassador to the Porte and his connections to the Asiatic department and court circles made him infinitely more influential than the Russian consuls in Belgrade, Bucharest, or Jassy, or the Russian minister in Athens. He even challenged Gorchakov in influence over policy in the Near East. 5 Like Gorchakov and the those in the Chancellery, Ignatiev saw revision of the Treaty of Paris as one of the main goals of Russian foreign policy in the Near East. He also envisioned Russian domination of the Straits and Istanbul as an important long-term goal, achievable either by diplomacy or conquest. He looked forward to the overthrow of Ottoman rule by the Balkan peoples--in alliance with Russia--as the best means of achieving these goals. To this end, he advocated the formation of a Slavic league led by Russia that would liberate Southeastern Europe and aid Russia in its goals for the Near East. The members of this league would be affiliated with the Russian Empire, act as a bulwark against Austrian expansion, and would eventually incorporate the Slavs of East Central Europe. 6 In the first years of his tenure in Istanbul, Ignatiev worked towards forging an alliance of Slavic and other Balkan states and peoples, and exploiting the revolutionary activities of the mid-1860's as well as Austria's defeat by Prussia. He attempted to aid and influence the disparate movements of Serbia for greater autonomy, Montenegro for access to the sea, Greece for union with Crete, and the Bulgarians for a place in the sun. Ignatiev would have had them coalesce into a general movement to overthrow Ottoman rule under the leadership of Prince Mihajlo of Serbia. But at that time, attempts at fostering Balkan unity did not bear fruit. Indeed, there was a decrease in Russian influence in the Principalities, Serbia and Greece between 1866 and 1868. 7 In the Danubian Principalities, Russia's poor reputation for opposing change made during its earlier protectorate, and intermittent occupations was reaffirmed by its hesitancy over the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, the election of Carol I Hohenzollern as Prince in 1866, and the constitution of 1866. This opposition, together with its claims on Bessarabia, alienated Russia from the emergent
Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, vol. 14 (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1979), pp. 125-130; T. Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872: A study in Personal Diplomacy (Madison, WI, 1970); S. A. Nikitin, Diplomaticheskiie otnosheniia Rossii s iuzhnymi slavianami v 60-kh godakh XIX v., Slavianskii Sbornik (Moscow, 1947), 262-290; S. A. Nikitin, Russkaia politika na Balkanakh I nachala Vostochnoi Voiny, Voprosy Istorii, no. 4 (1946): 23-29; A. Onou, The Memoirs of Count Ignatyev, Slavonic Review 10 (1931): 386-407, 627-640, and 11 (1932): 108-125; A. Popov, Russkaia politika na Balkanakh, 1860-1878 gg., Avantiury russkogo tsarizma v Bolgarii (Moscow, 1935), 197-203; B. H. Sumner, Ignatiev at Istanbul, 1864-1874, Slavonic Review 12 (1933): 341-353, 556-571; B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880 (Oxford, 1937); and E. von Huszar, Die memoiren des Grafen N. P. Ignatiew, sterreichische Rundschau 41 (1915): 166-174. 5 On the division between the Chancellery and the Asiatic Department. See Russia. Minsterstvo Inostrannykh Del. Ocherk istorii Minsterstva Inostrannykh Del, 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902) and B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 18-35. 6 Ignatiev, Zapiski Grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 50-55; Onou, The Memoirs of Count Ignatyev, 390-391; and Sumner, Ignatiev at Istanbul, 1864-1874; 342-343. 7 Nikitin, Diplomaticheskiie otnosheniia Rossii s iuzhnymi slavianami v 60-kh godakh XIX v., 267-268; L. S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times (Northhampton, MA: Smith College Studies in History, 1944), 92-93, 273-274; and M. Piroanac, Knez Mihajlo I zajednika radnja balkanskih naroda (Belgrade, 1895).

Romanian state and assured unfavourable relations with the Romanians through most of the period up to the Eastern Crisis of 1875. 8 Russian influence in Serbia, which reached a high water mark in 1866 with a Russian military mission and encouragement of a Balkan alliance under Prince Mihajlo, likewise ebbed with an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic offensive, a Montenegrin withdrawal, and the assassination of Mihajlo. These events left Greece, which was involved in a large scale uprising on Crete, diplomatically isolated and estranged from both the Serbs and the Russians. 9 As mentioned above, Russian influence in Greece had been formally limited by a tripartite protectorate involving also France and Britain, since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1830. Even before the period under question, the Greek state weakened its ties to Russia in pursuit of its own national goals and strengthened its ties with other powers. Indeed, the Crimean War was the last major attempt at Greco-Russian political and military cooperation in the Balkans. During the Crimean War, Greece, as represented by both the king and popular opinion, clearly favoured Russia in its struggle with the Ottomans and their western allies. Uprisings were fomented in Epirus, Macedonia and Thessaly during the war, in which both Ottoman Greek and volunteers from the Greek Kingdom participated. 10 In addition to these movements, a provisional unit consisting of Greeks and other Balkan volunteers known as the Greek Legion or Greek Phalanx was organized in the Danubian Principalities and served with Russian forces there and in the Crimea at the siege of Sevastopol. 11 The Greek Kingdom came close to formally going to war as an ally of Russia but was prevented by an allied landing at Piraeus and by the forced restructuring of the Greek government. 12 Greece's failure to act effectively during the war lessened its value in subsequent Russian policy. The Russian role in the Greek coup detat in 1862 and the change of dynasty that followed, was eclipsed by that of Britain. Russia's support of the Cretan uprising of 1866 was lukewarm compared to earlier policy. It was qualified by the Russian need to cooperate with the other powers due to the revolt's distance from Russian territory and reluctance to commit Russia to a possible confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and the western powers. Ignatiev was particularly hesitant to support the Cretan uprising without the existence of a general Balkan movement. Indeed, one of the liabilities of Greece as a Russian
Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 119-122. D. MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 12-15; and Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 123-124. 10 On these risings, see: D. P. Karatzns, H epanastasis ts Arts tou 1854 (Athens, 1973); D. G. Kouroumpas, H epanastasis tou 1854 kai oi en Thessalia idia epicheirsis (Athens, 1976); I. P. Malamaks, H ekstrateia tou Dmtriou Tsam Karatasou st Chalkydik tou 1854 (Thessalonik, 1967); S. I. Papadopoulos, Oi epanastaseis tou 1854 kai 1878 st Makedonia (Thessalonik, 1970); 9-54; K. A. Papagergiou, H peirtik epanastasis tou 1854, peirtik Hestia 8 (1959): 441-447, 543-548, 640-646, 775-782, 861-866, 959-961 and peirtik Hestia 9 (1960): 16-20, 117-122, 192-196, 277-283, 374-381, 470-473; A. Vakalopoulos, Nea stoicheia gia tois epanastaseis tou 1821 kai 1854 st Makedonia, Epistmnik Eptris Philosophiks Schols tou Aristoteleiou Panepistmiou Thessaloniks 8 (1956): 63103; and I. Vasdravells, H epanastasis tou 1854 eis tn Chalkydikn Chersonsou, Makedonika 5 (19611963): 102-124. 11 On the Greek Legion, see: A. Chrysovergs, Oligoi lexeis peri tou Smatos tn Hellnn kai meta tauta Hellnik Legen tou Autokratros Nikolaou tou Prtou, 2 vols. (Odessa, 1887-1888); T. I. Gkaliours, Apomnmneumata tes Hellniks Phallangos tou tou Autokratros pasn tn Rssin Nikolaou to A (Athens, 1865); Hadzhi-Iskender, Raicho Nikolov (Epizod iz Krimskoi voiny), Russkii Arkhiv 2/5 (1897): 172-175; K. Ramphos, Ta tn Hellnikn Legena tou Autokratros Nikolaou to A tn kata to 1853 en Moldovlachia systtheisan aphronta (Athens, 1867); and M. Todorova, Greek Volunteers in the Crimean War, Balkan Studies 25 (1984): 539-563. 12 On the diplomatic and political ramifications of Greeces role in the Crimean War, see: D. Dntas, H Hellas kai oi dynameis kata ton Krimaikon Polemon (Thessalonik, 1973); John V. Kofas, International and Domestic Politics in Greece during the Crimean War (New York, 1980); and the doctoral dissertation by Eugenia Nomikos, The International Position of Greece during the Crimean War (Stanford University, 1962).
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ally was its distance from any real projection of Russian power, particularly after the dismantling of its Black Sea Fleet. Greece was especially vulnerable to intervention and invasion by naval powers in the Mediterranean, as is evidenced by the British intervention in the Don Pacifico affair of 1849 and the allied landing during the Crimean War. Furthermore, Greece neither had the ability nor the will to reorganize its antiquated navy to adequately defend its own islands and coastline. With these liabilities in mind, Ignatiev even criticized the marriage of Alexander II's niece Olga to King George of Greece in 1867 as a tacit commitment of Russia to the Greek Kingdom. Perhaps Ignatiev also held this view because of his pan-Slavic proclivities or as a part of his experience in dealing with the Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical question. 13 The Bulgarian-Greek Church dispute was one of the most complex and perplexing problems confronted by Ignatiev in his role as Russian ambassador prior to the Eastern Crisis. Involved in the dispute was the struggle of the Bulgarians to achieve ecclesiastical autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Patriarch, as leader of the Rum Milleti, was considered by Ottoman authorities as the spiritual leader and chief representative of all Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their ethnicity. However the Patriarch's authority did not extend to the Orthodox Church in Greece, the Danubian Principalities, Serbia or Montenegro. Indeed, schism often broke out between national churches and the Ecumenical Patriarchate at the time of each countrys declaration of ecclesiastical self government. The reorganization of the millet system in the wake of the Crimean War gave incentive to the Bulgarians to seek ecclesiastical reform and autonomy from the Greek dominated hierarchy. 14 The Bulgarian movement for church autonomy initially included demands for use of Slavonic in churches in Bulgarian lands, Bulgarian bishops for sees in Bulgarian lands; and Bulgarian representation in the synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The patriarch and his representatives, imbued with Greek nationalism, resisted these demands. As the dispute dragged on, both sides hardened their positions. 15 Bulgarians became divided over the extent of their desired autonomy. Conservative elements among the Bulgarian national movement wanted to settle for the terms mentioned above. Other Bulgarians wanted to have a separate Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization in Bulgarian lands, while others sought half of the representation in the Holy Synod and other governing bodies of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Bulgarians were also divided as to the tactics needed to achieve autonomy. Some conservatives or moderates sought a compromise with the Patriarchate, negotiated through the mediation of Ambassador Ignatiev. More adamant nationalists wanted to confront the Patriarchate with greater demands, using both Russian and Ottoman authorities. The Greek Patriarchate, together with the Ottoman Greeks and the Greek Kingdom, opposed the Bulgarian moves ever more vigorously, especially when neither party could agree as to what constituted Bulgarian lands in Macedonia and Thrace.
Fadner, 296; and B. Jelavich, Russia, Bavaria and the Greek Revolution of 1862/1863, Balkan Studies 2 (1967): 89-104. 14 On the attempts of the Ottomans to bring about a constitution for the Rum Milleti in the early 1860s, see R, Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1963), 126-129. On the relations between the Ecumenical Patriarch and the new Balkan national churches, see: C. A. Frazee, The Orthodox Chruxh and Independent Greece, 1821-1851 (London, 1969); L. Hadrovacs, Le Peuple serbe et son glise sous la domination torque (Parius, 1947); and S. Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity (Cambridge, 1968). 15 On the Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical dispute, see: S. Burmov, Blgarsko-Grtskata tsrkovna rasspra (Sofia, 1900); Chrysostomos, Archiepiskopos Athnn, Boulgaria, Ekklsia, Megal Hellnik Enkyklopaideia, 7 (Athens, 1927), 672-682; M. I. Geden, Engrapha patriarchika kai synodika peri tou boulgarikou ztmatos (1852-1873), (Istanbul, 1908); E. I. Karpathios, H Boulgarik Ekklsia, Thrskeutki kai Christianik Enkyklopaideia, 2 (1937), 628-686; Meininger, passim; P. Nikov, Vzrazhdane na Blgarskiia narod: Tsrkovno-natsionalni borbi I postizheniia (Sofia, 1929); K. Tanchev, Eksarkhiiski ustav (Sofia, 1904); P. Tessovskii, Greko-Bolgarskii vopros (St. Petersburg, 1871); G. Trubetskoi, Rossiia i Vselenskaia Patriarchiia, Vestnik Evropy, no. 6 (1902): 146-178; R. von Mach, The Bulgarian Exarchate: Its History and the Extent of Its Authority in Turkey (London, 1907);and S, Zankow, Die Verfassung der Bulgarischen orthodoxen Kirche (Zurich, 1908).
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Ignatiev, with his activist style of diplomacy, entered the fray as a mover and mediator for a settlement and was, in time, accused by the Greeks of fostering Pan-Slavic interests over PanOrthodox interests in his favouring of the Bulgarian view by the late 1860's. The policy of Ignatiev, however, was much more complex than the accusation of the Greeks. Initially, Ignatiev attempted to mediate a settlement of the dispute in an effort to maintain the unity of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire. He was generally sympathetic to Bulgarian desires for autonomy but saw the need to address the problem with tact so as not to alienate the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other non-Slavic churches. 16 The growth of a Catholic Uniate movement among the Bulgarians, led by the Russian-educated Dragan Tsankov, impressed Ignatiev with the urgency of settling the controversy in favour of full Bulgarian autonomy. 17 However, his efforts at ending the dispute were thwarted by obstinacy on both sides, and were finally preempted by an Ottoman firman in 1870 which established an autonomous church for the Bulgarians known as the exarchate. This Ottoman move, instead of leading to an end of the dispute, exacerbated the struggle between Bulgarians and Greeks, since disputed Bishoprics in Macedonia and Thrace would be fought over in plebiscites. Within two years, the Ecumenical Patriarch anathematized the Exarchate and a schism developed which lasted until 1950. Ignatievs efforts were rendered inconsequential by the Ottomans action. He believed that the Ottoman government issued the firman to exploit Greco-Bulgarian rivalry so as to divide the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and lead at least one group (the Greeks) to be estranged from Russia. The Bulgarians felt no special debt to Russia or Ignatiev for their efforts in establishing the Bulgarian church, while the estrangement did indeed occur with the Greeks. Greek and Russian ecclesiastical interests continued to be at odds with one another in the Balkans and the Near East into the twentieth century over the question of the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, and the status of Mount Athos. Ignatiev's personal, activist diplomacy did not enhance Russian prestige among the Bulgarians or Greeks, but instead alienated the Greeks and did not fully ingratiate the Bulgarians. In spite of the recriminations from the Greeks, and their inaction in the Eastern Crisis, Ignatiev called for Greek claims on Crete, Thessaly and Epirus to be brought to the fore at the negotiations with the Ottomans during the War of 1877-78. His suggestions were rejected by Gorchakov and the Tsar.18 Because of the perceived change in Russian policy, especially in the issue of the schism, most Greek leaders, both in the kingdom and in the Ottoman Empire, viewed Russian motives and goals with a great deal of suspicion. Even those who wanted to cooperate with the Russians only want to do so if it could produce the desired results, which would have included the incorporation of Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus into the Greek Kingdom, or at least their autonomy, as well as security for the Greeks of Macedonia, Thrace or other regions of the Ottoman Empire. Many Greeks felt that Russian goals in the Balkans favoured a Slavic solution that excluded Greeks from the equation. Thus they saw their interests better served by avoiding collusion with the Russians. They believed that Greek interests would thus receive favourable compensation for their neutrality from the Ottomans and the other great powers, notably Britain. Nevertheless the Greek body politic, both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Kingdom, was divided on the issue of the Ottoman-Russian War. Because of the differing locations and conditions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Greeks differed widely in their opinion as to the desirability of Greece entering
16 G. Trubetskoi, La politique russe en Oriente: le schism bulgare, revie dhistoire diplomatique 21 (1907): 186-187. 17 On the Uniate movement in Bulgaria, see: Kiril, Patriarkh Blgaski, Katolicheskata propaganda sred blgarskite prez vtorata polovina na XIX vek (Sofia 1962). 18 Ignatiev, Zapiski Grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 158. The most detailed account of Ignatievs efforts in the dispute is Meininger. Inspite of the recriminations from the Greeks, and their inaction in the eastern crisis, Ignatiev called for Greek claims on Crete, Thessaly and Epirus to be brought to the fore at the negotiations with the Ottomans during the War of 1877-1878. His suggestions were rejected by Gorchakov and the Tsar. On this see, Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 151.

the war on the side of Russia. Many Greeks in provinces adjoining the Greek Kingdom, such as Thessaly and Epirus, saw the chance of being incorporated into Greece during the Eastern Crisis and hoped that Greece would join the Russian war effort. The Greeks of Crete, with a tradition of rebellion against Ottoman rule, most recently in 1866-68, anxiously awaited the decision of the Greek Kingdom to join with Russian arms. Because of their distance from the potential war zone in the eastern Balkans, the Greeks in Crete, Epirus and Thessaly were dependent on how the Greek Kingdom acted. Many of those Ottoman Greeks nearer to the war zone viewed the Ottoman-Russian conflict with more apprehension than hope. Those Greeks in and around the Ottoman capital, in Thrace and in parts of Macedonia, feared that a Russian invasion and occupation of their regions would bring about an ascendancy of the Bulgarians under Russian sponsorship and a loss of their rights and privileges gained in recent years as a result of Ottoman reform. They also feared that Ottoman anger at the Russian and Bulgarian gains would ricochet against the large remaining Greek population in the empire. These differences in attitude can be seen in the responses of Ottoman Greeks to the initial movements of the Ottoman-Russian War. Those in Crete, Epirus and Thessaly welcomed the initial Russian successes; while those in Istanbul and Thrace looked upon them with foreboding. Ottoman Greeks had varied responses, depending upon their locality.19 Similar difference in views over the war can be seen among Greeks within the Kingdom. A significant number, especially those with ties to Ottoman provinces bordering Greece, Cretans, Epirotes, Thessalians, Macedonians and others, saw this war as an opportunity for the Greek Kingdom to redeem their Ottoman homelands. Many belonged to nationalist organizations such as Ethnik Amyna (National Defence), Adelphts (Brotherhood) and other smaller groups that had been organizing and raising funds and volunteers for insurrectionary activities in Ottoman territories populated by Greeks.20 The Koumoundouros government tried to reign in their activity and told them to prepare for action but not to precipitate it. The major organizations abided by the governments precepts, but some smaller organizations and individuals, notably Leonidas Voulgars, who had ties with the Serbs and the Russians, tried to engage in immediate action.21 Other groups, especially among those with ties to the western powers and to the Ottomans, advised caution in engaging in the conflict. In presenting their position, they called up the spectre of Pan-Slavism and Greeces vulnerability to naval attack by either the Ottomans or the British.22 One of the primary reasons for the Greek lack of resolve was its military and naval weakness, which was compounded by differences among Greeks as to how to achieve their national goals. During the nineteenth century, the concept that preoccupied much of Greek domestic politics and foreign policy on both an official and unofficial level was the form of irredentism known as the "Megal Idea" or Great Idea. It can best be described by the words of its instigator and main proponent in the early nineteenth century, Iannes Klletts:
The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part, the smallest and poorest, part of Greece. The Greek is not only he who lives in the Kingdom,
19 20

Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 115-116. On the activities of Ethnike Amyna in organizing bands, see Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 105-

21 On Voulgars activities from his point of view, see Leonidas Voulgars, Apokalyphtht h altheia (Athens, 1878) 22 Many Greeks equated Ottoman naval power with British naval power, since the modern Ottoman navy had been refitted and reorganized by the British. It was also officer by British officers in detached Ottoman service, such as Hobart Pasha and Baker Pasha. On the varied development of the Ottoman Navy, see: Bernd Langensiepen, Ahmet Gleryz, and James Cooper, The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1882-1923 (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 1-10. On the development of the Greek Navy in the same period, see: Vice-Admiral K. Pazs-Paradels, Ta Ploia tou Hellnikou Polemikou Nautikou, 1829-1999 (Athens: Astraia, 2000), pp. 1-27.

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but also he who lives in Iannina or Thessalonik, Serres or Adrianople or Istanbul or Trebizond or Crete or Samos or any other region belonging to Greek history or to the Greek race.23

It would be assumed that Greek aspirations in the Balkans, Asia Minor and the insular Mediterranean would have had as their main instruments a strong and efficient army and navy to back them up in the diplomatic arena. But throughout the nineteenth century, Greece had a small, generally inefficient army and navy whose record was far from noteworthy. The territorial growth of the Greek state from its independence up to the Balkan Wars was brought about not by military successes of the Greek state, but rather by the struggles and tenacity of the irregular bands of the unredeemed Greek regions and the diplomatic machinations of the Great Powers. A major factor in Greece's inability to independently act militarily in its foreign goals was that it was constricted by the major powers since its inception as a Kingdom. As early as the Treaty of London (1830), a tripartite protectorate consisting of Britain, France, and Russia was established over Greece. The control of the powers was maintained in various methods, one of the chief being the use of loans to have a binding influence over Greek finances, which would, in turn, affect the establishment and maintenance of the armed forces. For example, in 1832, the powers financed the imposition of German troops over native Greek forces through the guaranteed loan of that year.24 Likewise, the financial controls put upon Greece by the powers continued to affect and limit the modernization of the Greek armed forces until the twentieth century. In their management of the Eastern Crises, the powers, particularly Great Britain and France, interfered directly to prevent Greek involvement. During the Crimean War, for example, Greece was occupied by a naval force and was coerced into neutrality. Thirty years later, when Greece mobilized as a result of the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the powers (with France abstaining) placed it, a country dependent upon commerce, under blockade. Greece was often overlooked by the powers in diplomacy, because it was believed that the quasi-independent kingdom could be controlled. For example, during the crisis arising from the Cretan Insurrection of 1866-68, Greece was not allowed to attend a Paris conference for its settlement and was forced by the conference to accept a Turkish ultimatum that it had previously rejected. In their actions, however, the powers were expressing their assessment of the ability of the Greek Kingdom to back up its aspirations and claims with armed force. Their low estimation of the Greek army was, for the most part, quite justified. Up until the Balkan Wars, for example, the Greek army never reached over 30,000 men in peacetime numerical strength, or about 80,000 men during a wartime footing.25 Organizationally, the force was divided into battalions; during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, regimental units were initiated. It was not until the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, that the army was organized along divisional lines, and that only in time of war.26 Furthermore, the weaponry and technical aspects of the Greek army and navy remained behind that of the rest of Europe and the Ottoman Empire during most of its existence until the Balkan Wars. One basic reason for this weakness in the Greek armed forces in these areas was that the resources of Greece in manpower and finances were limited. Greece's population did
S. V. Markezines, Politike Historia tes Neoteras Hellados (Athens, 1966), vol. 1, p. 208. K. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Geschichte Griechenlands von der Eberung Konstantinopels durch die Trken in Jahre 1453 bis auf unsere Tage (Leipzig, 1874), vol. 2, p. 9. 25 Greece. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Dieuthynsis Historias Stratou, Historia tes Organoseos tou Hellenikou Stratou 1821-1954 (Athens, 1957), 29, 33, 36, 42, 47, 62, 66, 72, 84. 26 Greece. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Dieuthynsis Historias Stratou, Historia tes Organoseos tou Hellenikou Stratou 1821-1954, 53-54.
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not exceed one million until the 1860s and only attained the figure of two million after the acquisition of Thessaly in 1881. Furthermore, at the turn of the century, emigration to the United States began seriously to affect Greece's military manpower needs. In certain areas, up to two-thirds of those eligible for army service were abroad. This problem affected Greece more than it did the other Balkan states, since among Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs it was mostly those living under Turkish or Austrian authority that emigrated, while Greeks of the Kingdom made up a large part of Hellenic emigration.27 The economic condition of Greece, the main cause for emigration, affected the development of the armed forces. In spite of a large merchant fleet and thriving commercial colonies abroad, the Greek Kingdom's prosperity was marginal. Its industry remained in a fledgling stage, and most of its limited mineral resources were being developed by foreign concerns. Agriculture, besides that dealing with subsistence, was confined mostly to the export of currants. Greece, with little arable land, depended on food imports, commerce, foreign investment, and loans for its existence. Government revenues and expenditures were limited by the economy. Greece had difficulty sustaining a large standing army without indebting itself and adversely affecting its economy. Indeed, Greece's internal weaknesses and inability to achieve its external national goals made the "Megal Idea" a panacea for the problems of the Greek Kingdom. Some politicians, such as Klletts and Deliyianns, saw the expansion of Greece as a solution to all its problems, internal and external; though others, like Mavrokrdatos and Trikoups, maintained that sound internal development, not irredentism, would assure Greece's prosperity and future expansion. These different views on state policy, especially the former, were used too often for personal or factional aggrandizement, rather than for the Greek national interest.28 The vagaries of the Greek Kingdoms politics were another factor in Greek inertia during the Ottoman-Russian War. Greek politics featured an unstable parliament with a party system based upon personal leaders and patronage rather than policy and ideology. During the two-and-a-half year period of the Eastern Crisis, from the BosnianHerzegovinian revolts in July 1875, to the armistice that ended the Ottoman-Russian War in February 1878, there were no less than seven governments formed!29
The caretaker government of Charilaos Trikoups, July-October 1875. The first Alexandros Koumoundouros government, October 1875-December 1876. The second Alexandros Koumoundouros government, December 1876-March 1877. The Epaminndas Deligirgs government, March 1877-May 1877. The Ecumenical Ministry Government of Knstantinos Kanars 1877-September 1877 The Ecumenical Ministry Government without a head, September 1877-January 1878 The Third Alexandros Koumoundouros government, January1878.

Each of the Prime ministers of these governments had differing views of how to deal with the crisis. Charilaos Trikoups was the closest to developing a policy in his career. He believed that Greece ought to abstain from irredentist adventures until it set its own house in order in the long term, that is, until it developed a sound economy and an effective army and navy. As such, he was often seen as one who would follow a conciliatory policy toward the Ottoman Empire and defer to the British views on the Eastern Question. Nevertheless, he also believed that if circumstances merited it, Greece would have to act sooner than later.30 Koumoundouros, on the other hand, had a reputation of being in favour of irredentist activity, but his loyalty to the King and his realistic assessment of Greek assets for such ventures tempered his fervour. During his long tenure as prime minister, his range of action was limited by his relationship with the
Theodore Saloutos, The Greeks in the United States (Cambridge, MA, 1964), 31. On the growing pains of Greece in this period, see Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (London, 1979), 70-104. 29 Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, passim. 30 On Charilaos Trikoups, see D. Pournaras, Charilaos Trikoups. H z kai to ergo tou, 2 vols. (Athens, 1950).
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king, to whom he deferred on major issues.31 The long absence of King George and the royal family on a tour of Europe between April and November 1876 also prevented Koumoundouros from making any major decision for direct involvement. Epaminndas Deligirgs, on the other hand, was resolutely anti-Russian and anti-war. He believed that the Greek Kingdom and the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire had nothing to gain and everything to lose in such a venture. It should be noted that Trikoups was prime minister for a few months at the beginning of the crisis in 1875. Koumoundouros served through all of 1876 and into 1877 with two different cabinets, and was further unable to act due to the absence of the king. Even then, King George was undecided as to how Greece should act in the crisis and balked at any decisive move Koumoundouros wanted to make.32 The king forced upon the Koumoundouros government a policy of strict neutrality, believing from his sounding out of the Great Powers on his European tour that they would not allow a reconfiguring of the Balkans without taking Greece into consideration. He also placed little trust in forming alliances with other Balkan states, and so made the Koumoundouros government balk at such moves. This reluctance to act, either out of suspicion of Russian motives or out of a realization of Greeces lack of preparedness for war, led Greece to make military moves just as the Ottoman-Russian War was coming to an end. Ironically, for the first month of the war, Greece was governed by an anti-war and anti-Russian government under Deligirgs, which assiduously tried to extricate Greece from any sort of involvement in the conflict. He suppressed pro-Russian agitators such as Leonidas Voulgars and tried to initiate an understanding with the Ottomans over Greeces role in the impending conflict. The lack of a response from the Porte, together with a dropping of support by Trikoups and opposition by interventionists, led to the fall of his government in late May 1877.33 His government was replaced by a national allparty coalition, known as the Ecumenical Ministry, organized by the king and involving all major political leaders as ministers. This all-star team consisted of Koumoundouros as interior minister, Trikoups as foreign minister, Deligirgs as finance minister, Thrasyvoulos Zaims as justice minister, Theodoros Deliyianns as Religion and Education Minister, and Charalampos Zymvrakaks as war minister. All these stars were placed under the leadership of the aged naval hero of the Greek Revolution, Knstantinos Kanars, whose health and mental condition unfortunately made him unable to really act as a prime minister. Instead, he presided over the independent workings of each ministry with little or no coordination or oversight,34 As such, many ministries, notably those of finance and war, procrastinated in their preparation of Greece for a war footing, and infighting among the respective ministers made this unity government anything but unified. Kanars passing caused further disarray until a new government was formed by Koumoundouros in January 1878.35 While efforts were made by the foreign ministry under Koumoundouros, both in the ecumenical ministry and in his own government, to cement ententes with Serbia, Romania and Russia, finalization of these alliances was delayed by the lack of preparedness of Greece for military action and the fear that if Greece entered the fray prematurely, it would be open to naval attack by the Ottomans or blockade by the British before any territorial gains could be made. The Russian setback at Plevna gave the Greek
31 For descriptions of Koumoundouros, see Prince Nicholas of Greece, My Fifty Years, ed. 2 (London, 1927), 29; and K. Paraschos, Emmanoul Roids. H z, to ergo, h epoch tou, vol. 1 (Athens, 1942), 129. 32 On the affect of King Georges tour and his absence, see Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 72-75. 33 On Deligirgs and his government, see Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 100-103; and Paraschos, 131. 34 On the Ecumenical Ministry, see: T. Evangelids, Ta meta ton Othna (Athens, 1898), 389; and Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 108-110. 35 On the passing of Kanars and the drifting of the coalition government, see Evangelids, 430; Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 134-135; and Pournaras, 199..

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government the illusion that it had more time until spring to intervene. However the capture of Plevna and the subsequent Russian winter advance caught the Greeks still unprepared. They finally entered hostilities with a regular advance into, and occupation of, southern Thessaly, along with attempts to foment revolts in Crete, Epirus and Macedonia. The operations began on 1 February 1878, three days after the signing of a Ottoman-Russian armistice and a day after its formal announcement.36 The ill-timed operations caught the Greek government by surprise and caused no end of embarrassment. Greece had to explain its actions, which had occurred without a declaration of war, and within a week had to withdraw its troops from Thessaly under pressure from the Great Powers and from the threat of an Ottoman naval attack. The powers, however, did warn the Porte that any sort of reprisal against Greece or the Ottoman Greeks would be ill-advised. The Russians gave meat to the warning by advising the Ottomans that their armistice might be jeopardized by any action against the Greek Kingdom or Ottoman Greeks.37 The uprisings in Crete, Epirus, Macedonia and Thessaly continued, and were clandestinely supported by Koumoundouros, who understood this type of war. He was a veteran of revolution and guerrilla war on Crete and favoured this sort of action over regular military operations. Indeed, the revolts lasted until April and May, the Epirus operation had petered out by mid-April, but in Thessaly the rebels were able to hold their own against Ottoman forces in the mountainous west until the British brokered a truce in late April. The remnants of the Macedonian insurgents also joined the Thessalians in this truce. The Cretans uprising reached the point that the Ottomans, even though they were able to retake part of the island around major towns, nevertheless had to accept British mediation by mid-May. The partial success of these operations, which the Greek government had hoped would bolster its position after its embarrassing invasion in February, encouraged Koumoundouros and perpetuated the view that Greek national goals could be achieved by revolutionary activities and irregular warfare.38 There was a striking contradiction between the military values of Greek society and the requirements of a military establishment based on the prevailing norms of European standing armies. At the time of the struggle for Greek independence and the emergence of the Modern Greek state, the Greeks, at the same time, relied on two opposing concepts: the bandit/guerrilla tradition and the conventional European notion of a regular army of the philhellenes and certain westernizing Greek leaders. The latter tendency had its foundation in the developed European practices of military organization, strategy and tactics, while the former was a product of a military tradition that was prevalent throughout Greece and the Balkans. Since the change of dynasty in 1863, although some improvements were made, the development of the Greek army was haphazard. The Greek government changed its military policy with the proclivities of whoever was in power. The governments of Charilaos Trikoups, for example, took special concern for the firm growth of the armed forces, but were not in favour of flamboyant military expenditures or adventures. Conversely, though, other governments such as those of Deligianns and Koumoundouros, were aggressive in foreign policy, but did not spend as much for the army. They spent more funding irredentist organizations and irregular bands. Furthermore, the economic condition of the country through the 19th century constricted the growth of the armed forces. The weaknesses of the Greek army were demonstrated in the incompetent and clumsy occupation of Thessaly in the wake of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1878, and the sluggish mobilization in response to the Bulgarian annexation of
On this ill-timed invasion, see Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 153-158 Kofos, Greece and the eastern Question, 158-171. 38 On Greek irregular bands in 1878, see He epanastasis ts Makedonias kata to 1878, Evangelos Kofos, ed. (Thessalonike, 1969); Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Question, 172-184; Ioanns Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, 193-214; M. D. Seizans, H Politik ts Hellados kai h epanastasis tou 1878 en Makedonia (Athens, 1878).
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Eastern Rumelia in 1885. Yet, aside from Trikoups' efforts, no great improvements 39 were made until after the 1897 Greco-Turkish war. The shock of defeat in 1897 along with the realization that Bulgaria was a rival in the Macedonian guerrilla struggle of the years 1900-1908, awakened many political leaders and officers to the need for a strong 40 army and navy, which did not come about until the Balkan War of 1912-1913. Greece lost out diplomatically at the Russian-Ottoman Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878 and failed in gaining much from subsequent revision of the Berlin Congress in July. Russian policy toward Bulgaria was guided mostly by Ignatiev, who favoured at least autonomy for Bulgarian lands. While his position for a time was eclipsed by events in other South-Slav lands, it received new impetus with the collapse of the SerbianMontenegrin war effort and the later opening of the Russian campaign in Bulgaria. 41 At the Istanbul conference of 1876-77, he proposed the formation of a large, autonomous Bulgaria consisting of much of Macedonia and Thrace as well as undisputed Bulgarian territory.42 Later in 1878, in the presence of the Russian army on the outskirts of Istanbul, Ignatiev negotiated the Treaty of San Stefano with the Ottomans which, in effect, created a Great Bulgaria along the lines of his proposals over one year earlier. This Bulgaria, which was to be occupied by the Russians for two years, was to include territories in Macedonia and Thrace claimed by the Greeks and Serbs, and would have dwarfed all other Balkan states. This treaty became the bugbear not only of Austria-Hungary and England, who opposed Russian expansion in the Balkans, but also of the other powers, great and small. Greece and the other Balkan states felt short-changed and betrayed by the Russians with the San Stefano treaty. As is well-known, the treaty was revised at the Congress of Berlin after Ignatiev's resignation later in 1878.43 In conclusion, Greece lacked a strong policy toward the events of the Eastern Crisis and the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78. Greeces neutrality, passivity and lack of action can be attributed to several factors. One important factor was that in the perception of many in the Greek body politic, both in the Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, Russias war aims were not favourable to Greek interests, especially in Macedonia and Thrace. Another factor was the divided opinion on the war held by Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Those further away from the war zone favoured the war and Greek intervention (Crete, Epirus, Thessaly and southern Macedonia); while those closer were far less sanguine about the war and Russian war aims (Istanbul, northern Macedonia, Thrace). A similar division existed between those who believed that intervention would bring about the annexation of irridenta in the wake of Russian victories, while others saw it as a gamble that might work to the detriment of Ottoman Greeks (especially those in the north and east) and could threaten the Greek Kingdom itself. The critics of intervention brought up another factor that acted against Greek intervention. That factor was the deplorable condition of the Greek army and navy. The Greek armed forces were not in any condition to conduct a war except in coalition with Russia and other Balkan states whose imperial and national goals differed from that of Greece. Greece also had one of the most unstable and factionalized parliamentary governments in the region. The changes in leadership and governments made continuity in foreign and military policy in the Eastern Crisis and the Russian-Ottoman War difficult at best, and impossible in the worst situations. Finally, the powers gave conflicting signals to the Greek government as to the benefits or consequences of either their action or inaction.

A. Mazaraks-Ainian, Historik Melet 1821-1897 kai ho Polemos tou 1897 vol. 1 (Athens, undated), 308-313. 40 Mazaraks-Ainian, vol 2, 322-323. 41 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 212. 42 Sumner, 239-240. For a Greek view of the treaty of San Stefano, see Ch. Naltsas, He Synthk tou Agiou Stephanou kai ho Hellnismos (Thessalonik, 1953). 43 Sumner, 401-404, 418-422.

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