What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated

in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. (Pecho vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, 27 September 1996) CRIMINAL LAW I Title One FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY Chapter One FELONIES ARTICLE 3 I. FELONIES, DEFINED Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code. II. ELEMENTS OF FELONIES (1) That there must be an act or omission; (2) that the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code; and (3) that that act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo (dolus) or culpa. (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80762, 19 March 1990) III. MEANING OF THE WORD ACT By act must be understood any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient. (People vs. Gonzales, supra) But the act must be one which is defined by the Revised Penal Code as constituting a felony; or, at least, an over act of that felony, that is, an external act which has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed. (See Article 6) IV. ONLY EXTERNAL ACT IS PUNISHED The act must be external, because internal acts are beyond the sphere of penal law. Hence, a criminal thought or a mere intention, no matter how immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute a felony. V. MEANING OF THE WORD OMISSION By omission is meant inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty to which one is bound to do There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act. VI. THE OMISSION MUST BE PUNISHABLE BY LAW Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, is not punishable. (People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353)

VII. PUNISHABLE BY LAW Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. VIII. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES ACCORDING TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY ARE COMITTED (1) Intentional felonies; and (2) culpable felonies. IX. INTENTIONAL FELONIES AND CULPABLE FELONIES DISTINGUISHED In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) X. A PERSON WHO CAUSED AN INJURY, WITHOUT INTENTION TO CAUSE AN EVIL, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR CULPABLE FELONY It was held that while there was no intention to cause an evil but to provide a remedy, the defendant was liable for physical injuries through imprudence. (U.S. vs. Divino, 12 Phil. 175, 190) XI. IMPRUDENCE, NEGLIGENCE, LACK OF FORESIGHT OR LACK OF SKILL Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action. Negligence indicates a deficiency of perception. If a person fails to take necessary precaution to avoid injury to person or damage to property, there is imprudence. If a person fails to pay proper attention and to use due diligence in foreseeing the injury or damage impending to be caused, there is negligence. Negligence usually involves lack of foresight. Imprudence usually involves lack of skill. (Philippine Law Dictionary, Rex Bookstore, Inc.) XII. REASON FOR PUNISHING ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts, it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. (U.S. vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468, 470) XIII. IN FELONIES COMMITTED BY MEANS OF FAULT, THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS ARE VOLUNTARY The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of Victoriano Ranga. (People vs. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 206) A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. We cannot seize upon speculation or guesswork to overturn this presumption. . . . Fact prevails over assumption.

Absent an aboveboard explanation, the [act] must be declared voluntary and punishable. (People vs. Macalisang, G.R. No. L-24546, 22 February 1968) There is voluntariness in the act if the doer or performer was not compelled to refrain or prevented from taking the precaution necessary to avoid injury to persons. XIV. THREE REASON WHY THE ACT OR OMISSION IN FELONIES MUST BE VOLUNTARY (1) According to the Classical Theory on which the Revised Penal Code was based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will; (2) acts or omissions punished by law are always deemed voluntary, since man is a rational being; and (3) dolus and culpa presuppose the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence. XV. REQUISITES OF DOLO OR MALICE (1) The person must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act; (2) he must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act; and (3) he must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting to do the act. Intent is [a] determination to perform a particular act or to act in a particular manner for a specific reason; an aim or design; a resolution to use a certain means to reach an end. (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition 2, 2008) It is the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done, and with such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it. (Burrill, Circ. Ev. 284) Malice in legal contemplation signifies a wrongful act perpetrated without reasonable cause and the intention with which the act is done is an inference of law based upon a well known presumption that the man shall be regarded as intending the legitimate results of his act. (United States v. Coffin, 1 Sumn. 394) XVI. CRIMINAL INTENT IS PRESUMED FROM THE COMMISSION OF AN UNLAWFUL ACT Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (U.S. vs. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92, 93) XVII. BUT THE PRESUMPTION OF CRIMINAL INTENT DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE PROOF OF THE COMMISSION OF AN ACT WHICH IS NOT UNLAWFUL To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. xxx In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a

degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act. (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 508) XVIII. MISTAKE OF FACT (IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT) It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one can not be convicted under article 475 (similar to Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code) when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the crime. (U.S. v. Pealosa, 1 Phil. 109) Requisites: (1) That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488; People vs. Beronilla, 96 Phil. 566; U.S. v. Pealosa, supra); (2) that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605); and (3) that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused (People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257; People vs. De Fernando, 49 Phil. 75). In mistake of fact, the act done by the accused would have constituted (1) a justifying circumstance, (2) an absolutory cause, or (3) an involuntary act. Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, supra) In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to capture him that killing him would be justified. Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a) (Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Revised Rules of Court) The whole record shows that the resistance given by the defendant was done under the belief that the persons who had entered his house were tulisanes (bandits). The record also shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, that as soon as he had been informed that they were officers of the law, armed with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and accompanied them. We do not believe that the law contemplates the punishment of persons for resistance of the authorities under circumstances such as those which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant believed that those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified in calling his neighbors and making an attempt to expel them from his premises. (U.S. vs. Bautista, 31 Phil. 308) Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me invito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me

against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, supra) XIX. WHEN THE ACCUSED IS CHARGED WITH INTENTIONAL FELONY, ABSENCE OF CRIMINAL INTENT IS A DEFENSE All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. (People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48) XX. REQUISITES OF CULPA (1) The person must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act; (2) he must have intelligence while doing the act or omitting to do the act; and (3) he is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or SKILL while doing the act or omitting to do the act. In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) XXI. A PERSON CAUSING DAMAGE OR INJURY TO ANOTHER, WITHOUT MALICE OR FAULT, IS NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE . . .[I]f the gun was discharged through the defendants having stumbled against an embankment there, the shot causing the death of his companion, and this embankment cannot be attributed to a want of caution or precaution on the part of the defendant (he did not see it, for, as he himself testified, he was going along with his eyes fixed on the deer, and it is also understood that he would not have been looking down, as he had his companion near at hand), the death of the deceased can only be attributed to an unforeseen and unfortunate accident, for which the defendant can not be held criminally liable. (U.S. vs. Catangay, 28 Phil. 490) But the act of discharging a gun in a public place is unlawful. (Article 155, Revised Penal Code) XXII. DOLO IS NOT REQUIRED IN CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. . . . In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. x x x. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128) . . . The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. . . (People vs. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181) Care must be exercised in distinguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did

intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. . . (U.S. vs. Go Chico, supra) XXIII. NO INTENT TO PERPETRATE THE ACT PROHIBITED If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms. (People vs. Bayona, supra) XIV. IN THOSE CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS, THE ACT ALONE, IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS MOTIVES, CONSTITUTES THE OFFENSE In the case of People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321), the court said: It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. The redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience such taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge and of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577) XV. GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF CRIMINAL INTENT NOT VALID DEFENSES IN CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS . . . His good faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. . . (Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas, A.M. No. 74-MJ, 30 July 1976) Exceptions: (1) If the avowed purpose of the governments policy cannot be realized; (2) where the accused has a pending application for permanent permit to possess a firearm, and whose possession was not unknown to an agent of the law; and (3) The designation and appointment of the defendant-appellant as informer by the battalion commander was, therefore, within the latters lawful authority. . . Under the circumstances of the case, therefore, we find that the granting of the temporary use of the revolver to defendant-appellant, which was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the commander, must be deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of the battalion commander to effect the capture of the Huk chief. If the government has entrusted military officers with the capture and apprehension of offenders, we must presume that they have authority to employ such means as are necessary, convenient and useful in the accomplishment of their trust. . . (People vs. Lucero, 103 Phil. 500). Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience

designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles 3 rd Revision) XVI. WHEN THE ACTS ARE INHERENTLY IMMORAL, THEY ARE MALA IN SE, EVEN IF PUNISHED UNDER SPECIAL LAW If the act or omission disenfranchises a voter and violates one of his fundamental rights, then it is wrong per se. Thus, it must be shown that it has been committed with malice. XVII. INTENT DISTINGUISHED FROM MOTIVE Motive is an inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge the criminal act. It is resorted to as a means of arriving at an ultimate fact, not for the purpose of explaining the reason of a criminal act r which has heen clearly proved, but from the important aid it may render in completing the proof of the commission of the act when it might otherwise remain in doubt. With motives, in any speculative sense, neither the law nor the tribunal which administers it, has any concern. It is in cases of proof by circumstantial evidence that the motive often becomes not only material, but controlling, and in such cases the fact from which it may be inferred must be proved. It cannot be imagined any more than any other circumstance in the case. (Church, Ch. J., in People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137.) Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. . . [W]e are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of ones conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to ou r observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. . . (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255, 256) XVIII. MOTIVE, WHEN RELEVANT (1) Where the identity of a person committing a crime is in dispute, the motive that may have impelled the commission is very relevant. (U.S. vs. Mac Mann, 4 Phil. 561; People vs. Murray, 105 Phil. 591); (2) Motive becomes essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant (People vs. Yeban, G.R. Nos. 90279-81, 11 October 1990); (3) Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. (People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 135666, 20 July 2001); (4) [T]he absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killings. (People vs. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, 25 November 1974); (5) Such proof is necessary only when there are no eyewitnesses and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. (People vs. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 29 January 1988); (6) Disclosure of the motive is an aid in completing the proof of the commission of the crime. (U.S. vs. Go Foo Suy, 25 phil. 187, 204); and (7) Lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of the accused. (People vs. Taneo, supra) XIX. HOW MOTIVE IS PROVED . . . Generally the motive for the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense,

deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. . . (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649) Thus, again, in the recent case of People vs. Aquino (L-36020, Oct. 30, 1979, 93 SCRA 772), this Court reiterated that assuming arguendo that the accused had a very strong motive to eliminate Benigno Pascua, such motive cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the mainstay of our accusatorial system of criminal justice. As previously enunciated in People vs. Basuel (L-2815, Oct. 31, 1972, 42 SCRA 207), only by proof beyond doubt which requires moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it may the presumption of innocence be overcome. By reasonable doubt is meant doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. (People vs. Pisalvo, G.R. No. L-32886, 23 October 1981)