Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Italy
Page 1 of 34
This information was last updated on 03 DEC 2012, 8:55 AM EST (13:55 GMT)
Page 3 of 34
Page 4 of 34
To make matters worse, our new baseline assumption of Greece exiting the Eurozone by the third quarter of 2013 is expected to delay any significant recovery of the Italian economy until early 2014. Despite IHS Global Insight's assumption of a strong policy response from the EU/European Central Bank (ECB) policymakers to a Greek exit, we expect some contagion to fall on Italy. This could lead to a period of deep uncertainty engulfing Italy around the exit event, resulting in higher bond yields, financial market disruption, and a hit on sentiment. With the recent positive contribution from exports diminishing, the other sectors of the economy, damaged by a tough austerity plan, remain too weak to pick up the baton of the recovery. With consumer confidence bouncing around record lows in the first 10 months of 2012, cautious household spending will serve as a major obstacle to any recovery in economic activity during 201213. Despite the smaller value-added tax (VAT) hike now planned for July 2013 and proposed labor tax cuts from January 2013, IHS Global Insight remains downbeat about the near-term consumer spending outlook. The main drags are likely to be household disposable income retreating for a sixth successive year in 2013 as well as a steadily rising unemployment rate. Clearly, household demand conditions are expected to remain fragile in Italy, not helped by the government having to maintain aggressive fiscal tightening to keep the intensifying sovereign debt crisis at bay. The latest consumer confidence survey provides compelling evidence that households continue to refrain from non-essential spending. Overall, real GDP is expected to contract 2.2% in 2012 and 1.0% in 2013, according to the released November 2012 forecast.
Page 5 of 34
Economic Growth Indicators 2009 Real GDP (% change) Real Consumer Spending (% change) Real Government Consumption (% change) Real Fixed Capital Formation (% change) Real Exports of Goods and Services (% change) Real Imports of Goods and Services (% change) Nominal GDP (US$ bil.) Nominal GDP Per Capita (US$) -5.5 -1.6 0.8 -11.7 -17.7 -13.6 2010 1.8 1.2 -0.6 2.0 11.2 12.3 2011 0.6 0.1 -0.8 -1.3 6.7 1.2 2012 -2.2 -3.2 -1.2 -8.4 0.8 -7.5 2013 -1.0 -1.2 -2.6 -3.3 -0.2 -0.9 2014 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 0.8 0.3 2015 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.7 3.3 3.0 2016 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.8 3.5 3.6
2,111.2 2,055.3 2,197.4 2,011.5 1,886.3 2,004.5 2,187.4 2,363.1 35,042 33,944 36,149 32,995 30,879 32,766 35,718 38,558
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
Page 6 of 34
year-on-year (y/y) in the first. The annual comparison remained weak, with real GDP tumbling 2.4% y/y, the fourth successive fall on a y/y basis. ISTAT did not reveal any details about third-quarter GDP in terms of expenditure. Nevertheless, IHS Global Insight suspects that a stronger-than-expected boost from net exports helped to stem the rate of decline in economic activity while domestic spending conditions appeared to remain sluggish in line with the profound collapse in confidence as an austerity-hit Italy continues to pay a heavy price to pull clear from the Eurozone sovereign-debt storm. The real GDP performance in the third quarter was slightly better than anticipated, but failed to shake off our view that Italy is being engulfed by deep recessionary conditions. More recent survey data suggest that confidence-sapping conditions are likely to prevail, helping the downturn to continue throughout the remainder of 2012. We only have the breakdown of second-quarter GDP by expenditure component, which reveals that a strong growth impulse from net exports was offset by a notable slump in domestic demand. The main components of domestic spending (excluding a change in stocks and government consumption) retreated during the quarter, curtailing the q/q change in real GDP by 1.0 percentage points. In addition, a fall in the level of stocks (plus statistical discrepancy) represented a sharp drag on activity, knocking off 0.5 percentage point from the q/q change in real GDP during the second quarter, compared with a negative contribution of 0.2 percentage point in the first quarter. It is likely that companies paid even greater attention to their level of stocks given the gloomier economic outlook both in Italy and abroad. This, coupled with deteriorating domestic demand conditions, appeared to be an important factor behind a further drop in imports during the second quarter, alongside a modest rise in exports during the quarter, allowing net exports to contribute 1.0 percentage points to the q/q change in real GDP. Private consumption retreated by 1.0% q/q in the second quarter of 2012, compared with a 1.1% drop in the first quarter, the sharpest fall since the first quarter of 1993. The annual comparison was disappointing, with overall spending plummeting by 3.6% y/y, compared with a 2.8% y/y fall in the first quarter and a 0.2% rise in 2011 as a whole. Other spending indicators also provided a muted picture of consumer spending in the second quarter. First, the number of new car registrations was down by 18.9% y/y, compared with a 21.1% y/y drop in the first quarter of 2012. Meanwhile, the average nominal value of retail sales decreased by 2.8% y/y in the second quarter, after a 0.5% y/y drop in the first quarter. The slump in investment activity deepened in the second quarter. Gross fixed capital formation dropped back by 2.3% q/q during the second quarter of 2012, implying that it has fallen in six of the last seven quarters. Therefore, the y/y percentage change accelerated to -9.5% in the second quarter, after drops of 7.4% in the first quarter and 1.2% drop in 2011 as a whole. The slump in machinery and equipment spending deepened during the second quarter, when it contracted 3.1% q/q and 10.4% y/y. Furthermore, IHS Global Insight believes the investment climate is markedly tougher, with companies enduring uneven profitability and an uncertain economic outlook, still difficult access to credit markets, and lower than normal capacity utilization. Disappointingly, investment in transport equipment plunged by 3.8% q/q and 22.4% y/y in the second quarter. Finally, construction investment took a battering, falling by 1.5% q/q and 6.3% y/y. Clearly, the sector is under a cloud, with restricted channels to credit while construction activity has been curtailed by falling state infrastructure spending alongside weak demand for new housing. Meanwhile, government spending edged up 0.2% between the first and second quarters, but was still 0.9% lower than in the second quarter of 2011. This was stronger than expected, given that the government is under considerable pressure to contain expenditure and improve underlying public finances. Exports surprised on the upside but remain moderate in the second quarter. Exports of goods and services grew 0.2% q/q in the second quarter, after retreating moderately in the previous two quarters. However, the annual rate of growth slowed to 1.4% from 1.7% in the first quarter. Meanwhile, imports of goods and services fell for the sixth successive quarter, contracting 0.4% q/q in the second quarter. In addition, the y/y percentage change stood at -8.2% and -9.2% in the second and first quarters, respectively.
Page 7 of 34
Page 8 of 34
More recent indicators suggest consumer spending remained weak in the third quarter of 2012, with new car sales falling at an accelerated pace while spending on other consumer durables appeared to be sluggish. The average number of new car registrations contracted 22.8% year-on-year (y/y) in the third quarter after an 18.9% drop in the previous quarter. The nominal value of seasonally adjusted retail sales edged up 0.1% between August and September, which had been preceded by zero growth in the previous month and a 0.2% m/m drop in July, according to the National Statistical Office. On an unadjusted basis, retail spending in September fell 1.7% y/y, compared with a 1.1% y/y retreat in August. Furthermore, retail sales were considerably weaker during September when adjusted for consumer price inflation, which averaged 3.2% during the month. A breakdown by type of goods reveals spending on food items was up by 0.2% over the month but was 0.6% y/y lower in September in nominal terms. Spending on nonfood items was unchanged between August and September, and was 2.4% lower y/y. The latest national-accounts data revealed that private consumption retreated 1.0% q/q in the second quarter of 2012, compared with a 1.1% drop in the first quarter, the sharpest fall since the first quarter of 1993. The annual comparison was disappointing, with overall spending plummeting by 3.6% y/y, compared with a 2.8% y/y fall in the first quarter and a 0.2% rise in 2011 as a whole. Other spending indicators also provided a muted picture of consumer spending in the second quarter. First, the number of new car registrations was down by 18.9% y/y, compared with a 21.1% y/y drop in the first quarter of 2012. Meanwhile, the average nominal value of retail sales decreased by 2.8% y/y in the second quarter, after a 0.5% y/y drop in the first quarter. According to the National Statistical Office, Italy's seasonally adjusted consumer confidence index improved for a second successive month in October. The overall index stood at 86.4, compared with 86.2 in September, 86.1 in August, 86.5 in July, and 85.4 in June, the lowest level since the monthly series began in 2009. Consumers remain very anxious about the current economic climate, with the sub-index for this at a disappointing 71.7 in October, moving up from 71.1 in September, 69.6 in August, and a survey low of 60.3 in June. Households stayed downbeat regarding their personal situation in October, with the sub-index standing at 91.0, a new survey low that is unsurprising given higher-than-normal unemployment, squeezed real incomes, and a tougher tax regime. Finally, households expressed deep pessimism about their outlook, with the sub-index measuring an aggregate view on the future economic situation and personal finances at 76.0 in October, against 76.9 in September, and 76.7 in August.
Page 9 of 34
2013 is uncertain, with the prospect of still-fragile demand and tough credit conditions helping to limit the upside in business investment. Furthermore, the risks remain on the downside because of the lagged effect of the robust austerity measures planned from 2012 to 2014, and the potential impact of our baseline assumption that Greece will exit the Eurozone no later than the third quarter of 2013. The near-term outlook for construction activity is set to deteriorate in 2012, but will improve in 2013. Restraining factors, including still-disrupted access to mortgage loans, a recovering but still-fragile property market, and the prospect of muted growth in real household incomes are expected to remain acute throughout 2012. Consequently, we expect residential investment to fall for the sixth successive year in 2012, probably down by 5.3% in 2012 after a 2.3% drop in 2011. Residential construction is projected to recover in 2013 and 2014, up 1.0% and 1.8%, respectively, on the back of the reconstruction of the earthquake-damaged Emilia-Romagna region. The government has put aside EUR1 billion in both 2013 and 2014 to assist the reconstruction efforts, with the rest being obtained from EU.
Page 10 of 34
employment at both the central and local government level is likely to fall as a result of the need to curtail public spending. Meanwhile, we expect further notable industrial employment losses, as companies continue to tightly control their workforces amid falling profits and lower-than-normal output. In addition, the government will be under increasing financial pressure to rein back the use of the state-assisted "cassa integrazione scheme" in the next few quarters. The scheme allows firms to send workers home temporarily on reduced pay, which has helped to restrict the employment losses during the recession. Italy's seasonally adjusted unemployment rate rose to a new survey high in September, in line with soft labor demand conditions. According to the National Statistical Office (ISTAT), total employment contracted for a second successive month by 0.2% between August and September, to stand at 22.937 million, after an identical drop in the previous month. IHS Global Insight continues to argue that employment intentions have weakened progressively since mid-2011, with firms increasingly shaking out labor amid the deepening recession and very competitive trading conditions. Meanwhile, the labor force was unchanged between August and September, to stand at 25.712 million. This, accompanied by contracting employment, raised the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate to 10.8%, the highest level since the series began in 2004 Diminishing employment prospects are expected to result in higher unemployment in 2012/13. The unemployment rate is expected to develop more aggressively in the next few quarters given the deteriorating economic climate. Unemployment is projected to climb from 8.3% in 2011 to 10.7% in 2012, 11.4% in 2013, and 11.3% in 2014, according to the November 2012 forecast. Furthermore, it stands notably higher than the recent low of 6.1% in 2007, which was the lowest rate since 1975.
Inflation: Outlook
Page 11 of 34
Consumers are struggling to cope with a steady stream of adverse developments, particularly with stubbornly high inflation contributing to a squeeze on real wage income. Inflation is expected to drift down in the next few quarters, however, in line with Italian retailers and service providers struggling to attract new customers and lower global crude oil prices when compared with a year earlier. Inflationary pressures will also be limited by our baseline view that Greece will exit the euro no later than the third quarter of 2013. Despite our assumption of a strong policy response, some contagion will fall on Italy, with the impact on economic activity likely to be at its most acute in the second and third quarters of 2013, and Italy mired in recession until early 2014. This will heighten pressure on Italian retailers and service providers to price competitively to generate new business, while ongoing intense competition on the high street in the face of reluctant consumers will continue to contain the price of some services and durable goods, especially with regard to clothing, footwear, and electronics. Finally, wage pressures are projected to remain moderate during latter stages of 2012 and 2013. The industrial and service sectors are under pressure to control wage costs due to tight profit margins as companies are resorting to aggressive pricing to drum up new business against a backdrop of still-high non-wage input prices. Conversely, the consumer price inflation rate will be elevated (and distorted) by the planned 1.0-percentage-point rise in the VAT rates from 21% to 22% from the third quarter of 2013. Overall, consumer price inflation is expected to average 3.1% in 2012 and 1.6% in 2013, according to the November forecast. Wage inflation is projected to remain moderate during late 2012/13. The industrial sector is under pressure to control wage costs due to tight profit margins as companies are resorting to aggressive pricing to drum up new business against a backdrop of rising input prices. Labor costs must be contained in order to protect competitiveness. The Italian export sector has lost much of its dynamism thanks to a marked fall in price competitiveness with the euro and even slowed more acutely against non-euro countries after the euro recovered. This increase has created problems for Italian exporters, given the price-elastic products in which Italy specializes, notably clothing, footwear, and capital equipment.
Inflation Indicators 2009 Consumer Price Index (% change) Wholesale-Producer Price Index (% change) 0.8 -5.4 2010 1.5 3.1 2011 2.8 5.0 2012 3.1 2.7 2013 1.6 1.3 2014 2.2 1.6 2015 2.2 1.8 2016 2.1 1.8
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
Page 12 of 34
Page 13 of 34
the pressure on Spain and Italy, and reducing the possibility of a Greek exit from the Eurozone (as was the case in late November). Furthermore, ongoing very weak Eurozone economic activity and lower interest rates (the European Central Bank cut interest rates from 1.00% to a record low 0.75% in early July and we suspect a further reduction to 0.50% will occur in December), are also likely to weigh down on the euro. While the dollar should continue to benefit as a safe haven from all the problems in the Eurozone, its upside is likely to be limited by modest US growth and ongoing stimulative action by the Federal Reserve. Consequently, we expect the euro to soften from its September highs to largely trade under USD1.30 over the final weeks of 2012. We expect the euro to come under mounting pressure as 2013 progresses as Greece continues to struggle hugely and market expectations mount anew that it will leave the Eurozone sometime during the second half of the year. Eurozone economic activity already is expected to increasingly suffer because of the uncertainties and the hit to confidence coming from the Greek situation. Consequently, the euro is seen falling to USD1.20 by mid-2013. Greeces exit from the Eurozone, the initial turmoil following it, GDP contraction, and a further reduction in Eurozone interest rates to 0.25% by the ECB is seen sending the euro down to a low around USD1.15 during the third quarter. The euro is seen stabilizing and then starting to recover in the final months of 2013 on the assumption that European policymakers and the ECB make strong policy responses to the Greek exit, most notably including major progress on fiscal and banking union. Such developments would increase markets confidence in the longer-term future of the Eurozone. It would also provide a more settled and stable environment, which would hopefully significantly boost business and consumer confidence, and lift their willingness to invest and spend. On this basis, the euro is seen rising modestly to USD1.20 at the end of 2013 and then improving appreciably to USD1.31 at the end of 2014. Should Greece leave the Eurozone, its new currency is expected to devaluate sharply. IHS Global Insights forecasts now assume that there is a 75% chance of Greece exiting the common currency area over the next five years. Although the timing of this event is difficult to predictas it will largely depend on political decisionswe currently assume it will happen during the third quarter of 2013. We believe that it is likely that the new currency will be left to float at an initial state. Past experiences suggest that the devaluation is likely to overshoot initially, given the high uncertainly likely to prevail, but the government will surely have to introduce measures aimed to stabilize foreign-exchange markets (for example, it could oblige all export revenues above a certain amount to be sold to the central bank). We estimate that Greeces new currency will weaken by around 70% against the euro and remain at that level over the medium term. Exchange Rate Indicators 2009 Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, period avg) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, period avg) 0.69 0.72 1.00 1.00 2010 0.75 0.76 1.00 1.00 2011 0.77 0.72 1.00 1.00 2012 0.78 0.78 1.00 1.00 2013 0.83 0.83 1.00 1.00 2014 0.76 0.79 1.00 1.00 2015 0.73 0.75 1.00 1.00 2016 0.70 0.71 1.00 1.00
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
Page 14 of 34
Having largely traded in a USD1.301.35 range during the first four months of 2012, the euro sank to a 23-month low of USD1.2288 at the start of June. The euro moved below USD1.30 in early May as an election stalemate in Greece and the replacement of elections in France and Greece raised market concerns and uncertainty as to how measures dealing with the Eurozones sovereign debt crisis would proceed. The euro gained no relief from data in mid-May showing that Eurozone GDP had stagnated rather than contracted in the first quarter of 2012. It continued to soften as speculation mounted that Greece could leave the Eurozone and concerns increased over the state of the Spanish banking system. The euro managed to rally modestly as June progressed, but it remained fragile. The euro gained only limited support from the second Greek general election in mid-June that resulted in a narrow win for the pro-reform, pro-bailout New Democracy party. This election result was seen easing the risk of a Greek Eurozone exit in the near term, at least. Nevertheless, Greeces problems remain very serious. The euro was also supported to a limited extent by a relatively successful EU summit at the end of June, which came up with some concrete steps to reduce the borrowing costs of Spain and Italy, as well as an important first step towards greater banking integration in the Eurozone. Consequently, the euro traded as high as USD1.26 in early July, but it then fell back sharply after the European Central Bank (ECB) cut interest rates from 1.00% to a record low of 0.75% on 5 July and concerns over Spain mounted. Indeed, the euro sank to a 25-month low of USD1.2040 in late July before stabilizing and edging up from its lows after ECB president Mario Draghi said that the bank would do whatever is necessary to preserve the euro. The ECB followed this up by announcing plans at its 2 August policy meeting to make future Eurozone bond purchases (under certain conditions) in order to reduce the risk premia on the yields of pressurized countries. In addition, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande issued a joint statement saying that they are determined to do everything to protect the Eurozone. The euros rise from its late-July low gained momentum in September as it was helped by the ECB fleshing out its bond-buying plans and by the German constitutional court giving the go-ahead for the European Stability Mechanism. Meanwhile, the dollar was pressurized by the Federal Reserve announcing further aggressive quantitative easing to support the US economy and indicating that it was unlikely to raise interest rates before mid-2015. Consequently, the euro reached a four-month high of USD1.3173 in mid-September. The euro has since moved back below USD1.30 on occasion, influenced significantly by uncertainty over Spains situation and intentions. The euro was further hit in November by increased concerns over Greeces adoption of austerity measures and the disbursement of further aid; this caused it to trade as low as USD1.27. On the other hand, the euro was only modestly pressurized by the expected news that Eurozone GDP fell 0.1% quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter, thereby putting the single currency area officially into recession. Agreement in late November among Eurozone policymakers and the IMF on measures to cut Greeces debt over the long term and to release loans needed to stop Greece defaulting in the near term saw the euro trade back up around USD1.30 in early December.
Page 15 of 34
Page 16 of 34
Monetary Policy Indicators 2009 Policy Interest Rate (%, end of period) Short-term Interest Rate (%, end of period) Long-term Interest Rate (%, end of period) 1.00 1.23 4.27 2010 1.00 0.81 3.99 2011 1.00 1.39 5.29 2012 0.50 0.62 5.38 2013 0.25 0.18 5.20 2014 1.00 0.80 4.87 2015 2.25 1.84 4.59 2016 3.50 3.09 5.27
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
Page 17 of 34
The ECBs cutting of its key interest rate to 0.75% in July could be seen as a significant change of tack as the bank notably did not take interest rates below 1.0% even at the height of the 2008/09 recession. Indeed, the previous lack of a cut had implied that there was a significant core of ECB Governing Council members who had a strong aversion to taking interest rates below 1.00%. The ECB has appeared more flexible and pragmatic in its policy since Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as ECB President in November 2011, although many of the Governing Council members are the same as in 2008/09. Significantly, after the November ECB meeting, the banks president Mario Draghi appeared to ease open the door to a cut in the key interest rate from 0.75% to 0.50% over the coming months and potentially as soon as December. In particular, when asked at the press conference whether the ECB had discussed an interest-rate cut at their November meeting, Draghi commented that we always discuss all instruments. This contrasted to his comments after both the September and October meetings, when Draghi said that the bank had not discussed cutting interest rates. Draghi also commented that the ECB stands ready to act on standard monetary policy as well as on non-standard policy. Interestingly, though Draghi indicated that the ECB had not discussed negative deposit rates. Furthermore, Draghi acknowledged that the Eurozone growth situation and outlook had weakened recently, and hinted that the ECBs GDP growth staff projections would be revised down in their December forecasts. The ECBs statement observed that most recent survey evidence for the economy as a whole, extending into the fourth quarter, does not signal improvements towards the end of the year. Furthermore, the ECB considered that growth momentum is expected to remain weak in 2013, largely because of the need for balance-sheet adjustments in both the financial and non-financial sectors, combined with an uneven global recovery and high uncertainty. Draghi has also expressed concern recently over very high and rising Eurozone unemployment. Reinforcing this downbeat assessment of Eurozone growth prospects, the ECB statement observed that the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside. Meanwhile, the ECBs view on inflation does not appear to preclude an interest-rate cut in the near term. While the ECB expects Eurozone consumer price inflation to remain above 2.0% and at elevated levels for the remainder of 2012, the bank sees inflation declining to below 2.0% again in the course of next year. In fact, data released since the November MPC meeting show that Eurozone consumer price inflation dipped markedly to a 23-month low of 2.2% in November from 2.5% in October and 2.6% in September. The ECB regards long-term inflation expectations as well-anchored and believes that underlying price pressures should remain moderate, with the result that current levels of inflation should be transitory. Meanwhile, the ECB made no further announcements at either its October or November meetings on its bond purchase (Outright Monetary Transactions) program, although the bank indicated that it is ready to buy the bonds of pressurized countries once all the prerequisites are in place. The ECB had previously fleshed out its bond-buying plans at its September policy meeting after announcing the introduction of such a program in August. This followed Mario Draghis statement in late July that the ECB will do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough. It is very clear that it will be the success of governments in problem countries in undertaking structural reforms and other measures that lift their competitiveness and improve their underlying fiscal positions and in Eurozone policymakers ultimately taking major steps towards greater fiscal and banking integration that will be key to the Eurozones survival in its current form. Having said that, the risk premia in bond markets that have periodically sent the yields of Spanish, especially, and Italian bonds to dangerously high levels is a major threat to the stability of the Eurozone that needs to be tackled urgently. So the ECB is treading a fine line by trying to put in place a strong enough bond-buying program that impresses the markets and will potentially lead to a sustained, marked reduction in problem countries risk premia while at the same time keeping major pressure on the problem countries to commit to structural reforms and see them through.
Page 18 of 34
In many respects, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program seems to satisfy these conditions. The markets should be impressed by the fact that there are no ex ante size limits to the ECBs buying of a countrys bonds and that the ECB will accept the same (pari passu) treatment as private creditors in the case of a default. While there had been some speculation that the ECB could indicate a targeted ceiling for a countrys bond yields or a maximum spread differential, the unlimited size of the bond buying should be a powerful measure. The bond buying will be focused on sovereign bonds with a maturity between one and three years. It will be fully sterilized. To keep pressure on countries to commit to, and see through, major structural reforms and corrective measures, the ECB is imposing strict conditionality on its bond-buying program. The ECB will not buy a countrys bonds until its government has requested assistance from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)/European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and then signed up to either a full macroeconomic adjustment program or a precautionary program. Critically, the ECB will only consider bond purchase if a country fully respects its program. If non-compliance occurs, the ECB may terminate or suspend its bond buying. The ECB will also ask the IMF to help countries monitor compliance with the programs. The ECB has undeniably gone a long way towards providing an effective backstop. Ultimately, the success of its actions will depend critically on whether or not problem countries are prepared to first of all approach the EFSF/ESM for assistance, agree to specific corrective actions, and then see them through over a sustained period. Attention will now be focused on the Spanish government in particular, and also on the Italian administration.
Page 19 of 34
the new stability law paved the way for a new Tobin Tax of 0.5% on the purchase and sale of equities and derivatives. Later administrations are required to consider broadening the base on this taxable income. The government made no announcement about new spending cuts, which had been expected to fall mainly on the health budget. Disappointing recent fiscal data are a warning that the government faces significant challenges to deliver its fiscal goals. Indeed, the government has admitted that the recession is likely to be steeper than previously anticipated, and will result in missed fiscal targets, according to the latest update of the state's Economic and Financial document for 201215 (DEF). The economy is now projected to contract by 2.4% in 2012, a marked downward revision from the previous official projection of 1.2%. In addition, the government now expects a further contraction in 2013, with real GDP projected to shrink by 0.2%, a notable shift from the earlier forecast of a 0.5% gain. The growth forecasts for both 2014 and 2015 have been slightly raised to 1.1% and 1.3%, respectively. The gloomier economic outlook has been reflected in softer public-sector budget deficit targets, which are now expected at 2.6% of GDP (up from 1.7%) in 2012, 1.8% (up from 0.5%) in 2013, and will not balance in 2014 and 2015 as previously thought. This will result in greater upward pressure in Italy's public debt ratio, now projected to climb to 126.4% in 2012, compared with the previous forecast of 123.4%, but will trend down to 119.4% by 2015 (up from 114.4%). The government's new growth and fiscal projections are better aligned with our latest thinking. With regard to fiscal developments, IHS Global Insight predicts the public-sector budget deficit will narrow from 3.9% in 2011 to 3.3% of GDP in 2012, 2.3% in 2013, and 1.9% in 2014 and not balance until well into the medium term. Finally, we have produced more downbeat public-debt projections in the current forecast update, given a sharper squeeze on nominal GDP than previously anticipated. According to our fourth quarter detailed forecast, the public-debt ratio is projected at 126.1% of GDP in 2012 and 128.7% in 2013.
Page 20 of 34
The fiscal savings will be generated from the following measures: The government plans to reduce the number of public officials gradually, with the bill proposing a 20% and 10% cut in senior servants and standard-level employees, respectively. Ministerial budgets will be cut by EUR1.5 billion in both 2013 and 2014, followed by a further EUR1.6 billion in 2016, with the Ministry of Finance taking the largest hit. The central government intends to cut the cost of regional, local, and provincial government. First, it plans to halve the current number of 110 provincial governments. Second, transfers to regional and local governments will be reduced by EUR2.3 billion in 2012, EUR5.2 billion in 2013, and EUR5.5 billion in 2014. The bill also includes cumulative cuts to the national health fund, estimated at EUR0.9 billion in 2012, EUR1.8 billion in 2013, and EUR2.4 billion. Meanwhile, eight regions that have a shortfall on their health budgets can raise the local income tax to finance the imbalance. The government had passed its third fiscal-correction package since mid-2011 in early December 2011 to bolster its fiscal consolidation plan. According to the Ministry of Economy and Bank of Italy, the December 2012 austerity package will raise EUR32.1 billion in 2012, EUR34.8 billion in 2013, and EUR36.7 billion in 2014. Around EUR20 billion, or 1.3% of GDP, per year will be allocated to reinforce the multi-year budget-deficit reduction plan. The austerity plan announced at end-2011 was weighted towards tax hikes to bolster the budget-deficit plan. This anticipates net revenues to increase by EUR19.4 in 2012, EUR17.0 in 2013, and EUR14.9 in 2014, which will contribute more than two-thirds of the reduction in the deficit. The most important new revenue measure will be property tax reform, which is expected to raise an additional EUR11 billion per year. The other significant measure was the postponement of the planned VAT hike from October 2012 until July 2013. The austerity plan in early December also contained proposed expenditure cuts totaling EUR0.9 billion in 2012, EUR4.4 billion in 2013, and EUR6.5 billion in 2014, and will be sourced mainly from pension changes (EUR0.9 billion in 2012, EUR4.4 billion in 2013, and EUR6.5 billion in 2014). Overall, Italy has adopted a punishing austerity plan. According to official estimates, the fiscal measures passed in July and December 2011 will extract fiscal savings worth EUR28.6 billion in 2012, EUR54.4 billion in 2013, and EUR9.9 billion in 2014. The cumulative impact of all the measures taken since July 2011 should cut the deficit by 3.0% of GDP in 2012 and 4.7% in each of the following two years.
Page 21 of 34
Italian exports are projected to grow very modestly in the latter stages of 2012 in line with softer domestic spending across the Eurozone. Latest industrial-related indicators provide compelling evidence that Italy's export recovery is stuttering, highlighted by the Markit/ADACI manufacturing purchasing managers' index survey. A sub-index from the October survey reveals the inflow of overall new export orders stabilized, but this was preceded by a fall in 12 of the last 13 months. Italian exporters are struggling to sustain their recent impressive performance, which had helped to lift Italy out of recession. Italian exporters are struggling to sustain their recent impressive performance, which had helped to lift Italy out of recession. The main factor is likely to be a difficult second half of 2012 for the Eurozone as a whole, with domestic demand conditions expected to be soft. The recent financial turmoilresulting from the regions sovereign debt crisishas hurt consumer and business confidence across Italys key export markets. Furthermore, economic activity across the Eurozone and the United Kingdom will be curbed by increasingly restrictive fiscal policy, with several countries having to work hard to keep the sovereign debt crisis at bay. This, coupled with cautious French and German consumers, poses a significant threat to the Italian export outlook. The export outlook for 2013 is likely to be more challenging, with Eurozone trade flows disrupted around the middle of the year by our assumption that Greece will leave the euro no later than the third quarter of 2013. The Eurozone economy (with Greece) is projected to contract by 0.4% in both 2012 and 2013, according to the released November 2012 forecast. More encouragingly, Italian exports will receive a lagged boost in 201415 from the euro slipping to a low of USD1.15 in the third quarter of 2013 as expectations mount of a Greek exit, and it then occurs. Consequently, we expect exports of goods and services to expand 0.7% in 2012 and to contract by 0.2% in 2013 from a 6.3% gain in 2011, according to the November 2012 forecast.
Trade and External Accounts Indicators 2009 Exports of Goods (US$ bil.) Imports of Goods (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (% of GDP) Current Account Balance (US$ bil.) Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 406.2 405.1 1.1 0.1 -42.2 -2.0 2010 447.5 475.2 -27.7 -1.3 -72.7 -3.5 2011 523.5 546.6 -23.1 -1.1 -67.5 -3.1 2012 500.4 479.6 20.8 1.0 -11.5 -0.6 2013 475.2 441.9 33.3 1.8 -3.0 -0.2 2014 506.7 469.0 37.7 1.9 -1.3 -0.1 2015 564.6 517.9 46.7 2.1 -0.6 0.0 2016 619.9 568.2 51.6 2.2 -1.7 -0.1
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank.
Page 22 of 34
Page 23 of 34
Higher global crude oil prices led to another substantial current-account deficit in 2011. The current-account deficit stood at EUR50.554 billion, or an estimated 3.2% of GDP, compared with EUR54.072 billion in 2010.
Page 24 of 34
Italys largest problem remains its dismal public finances, with its public debt now estimated at 123.6% of GDP in 2012. Several items contribute to high levels of government spending, particularly the excessive cost related to the pension system. Future budgets will need to curtail more aggressively the large transfers to both local government and the health system, while reducing the high cost of the public sector employment. The government also needs to introduce more structural measures to bolster its receipts. Tax evasion is falling, but is still widespread, and entrepreneurial activity in some regions, particularly the south, is still conditioned by organized crime and corruption.
Page 25 of 34
agreements (IMF, 2009), which is high when compared with the rest of the EU. The lack of flexibility in Italy's centralized wage-bargaining system was illustrated by the Italian carmaker Fiat having to create new companies to manage its factories in Italy to circumvent national labor contracts in 2010.Furthermore, the current wage formation system is even more punishing for small enterprises, with the nationally negotiated wages having greater weight than those negotiated at the firm level. Italy's unemployment insurance system is too wide-ranging and also has "dual characteristics. Unemployment benefits are initially high, with a net replacement ratio of 60% before dropping to zero after eight months (12 months for workers aged over 50). In addition, tough eligibility rules restrict the number of individuals who qualify for unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the wage supplementation fund scheme (cassa inegrazione) is substantially more generous, both in terms of level and duration. The scheme makes up the pay of permanent employees affected by temporary layoffs (who are not considered unemployed) or under shorter working hours for a maximum of two years. It is limited to workers on certain contracts, with the participating firms mostly large and located in the north. Italy has a relatively high tax and social security wedge on labor income. According to IMF calculations, a single taxpayer at average earnings takes home less than 55% of what he or she costs the employer. This drops to 50% for workers on higher earnings. Overall, the average tax wedge in Italy is at least 10 percentage points higher than the OECD average, which remains a major reason for low labor utilization, and weighs down on both employment and growth potential. The technocratic government led by Mario Monti passed a new labor reform bill in 2012. The main goal of the new reform bill is to remove some of the dismissal restrictions currently specified in Article 18, which require firms with more than 15 employees to reinstate workers who have been wrongly dismissed, with full payment of lost salary. The reform bill does not scrap Article 18, but amend its scope by allowing firms to dismiss workers for business reasons on payment of compensation. In cases of wrongful dismissal for misconduct, it will be left up to a judge to decide if the worker should be reinstated or just receive compensation. The compensation for wrongful dismissal could range from 15 to 27 months' salary, based on the number of years worked. Automatic reinstatement would only remain for cases of proven discrimination. Finally, the planned changes to Article 18 would only apply to new hires. The reform also wants to introduce a special legal procedure for dismissal disputes in order to speed up decisions and overcome the current system, which allows workers to be reinstated after years of dispute. The reform also makes short-term contracts more costly for employers by raising the tax and welfare contributions they have to pay by 1.4 percentage points. Firms will be reimbursed the extra tax if the temporary contract is made permanent.
Page 26 of 34
Price stability is defined as a year-on-year (y/y) increase in the EU's preferred measure of inflation, defined by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below but close to 2%. Thus, the governing council of the bank has determined that medium-term price stability involves keeping inflation at approximately 2%. The HICP is used for measuring inflation in the context of international, mostly inner-European comparisons. Its calculation relies on harmonized concepts, methods, and procedures and is designed to reflect the development of prices in the individual states based on national consumption patterns. The HICP serves, among other things, to measure the convergence criterion of "price stability" as a basis for judging whether a member state can participate in the European EMU. The HICP is calculated for each EU member state, as well as Norway and Iceland. It is used to form aggregates for the Eurozone (Monetary Union Index of Consumer PricesMUICP), for the EU (European Index of Consumer PricesEICP), and for the European Economic Area (European Economic Area Index of Consumer PricesEEAICP). The ECB makes use of the MUICP in the context of its monetary policy to judge price stability within the Eurozone. The governing council effectively consists of the 6 members of the executive board and the 17 governors of the national central banks of the euro area. The key task of the governing council involves formulating the monetary policy for the euro area. The ECB has frequently come under political pressure over interest rates and, increasingly during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, other elements of monetary policy (such as liquidity provision and bond buying). Nevertheless, it has jealously guarded its independence and has refused to bow to outside pressures, despite the best efforts of member states. Indeed, it is to its credit that it has been able to steer a relatively influence-free trajectory for monetary policy given the Eurozone's peculiar makeup (i.e., an amalgam of several countries whose economies are, despite significant convergence, still relatively disparate). Until the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the bank tended to err on the side of inaction, earning itself a reputation for being unresponsive to conditions in the Eurozone. Nevertheless, the bank insists that its mandate is to keep the price level stable, and as such has remained immune to political demands. The ECB has certainly been highly active during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. While it has remained unwilling to take its key Eurozone interest rate below 1.00%in marked contrast, for example, to both the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Englandthe ECB has undertaken a number of non-standard measures to counter the problems. Most notably, this has included making massive liquidity available to banks and, to a lesser extent, buying sovereign bonds of the pressurized countries on secondary markets.
Page 27 of 34
by 1992 had shrunk to just 12.2% of GDP, at a time when there were 229 companies registered on the exchange. The Borsa nevertheless came to life dramatically in the late 1990s amid the banks' merger mania. Between 1995 and 2000 the Borsa's capitalization expanded by 378%growing to 70.2% of GDP. The creation of the Nuovo Mercato (equivalent to the German Neue Markt) helped fuel the financial sector, listing 42 new technology and hi-tech stocks by 2001. Subsequently, the Borsa has suffered from the international market downturn, dropping sharply. Combined with a banking sector seeking to make profits outside of its traditional savings and loans business, the capital markets look set to become increasingly important to the economy. If combined with structural reforms, particularly regarding labor taxation, the increasing medium-term importance of La Borsa could encourage greater corporate consolidation within the country.
Page 28 of 34
4. Health and social services 5. Retail trade - total 6. Construction 7. Education 8. Wholesale trade 9. Banking and related financial 10. Hotels and restaurants Top-10 total
Source: World Industry Service, IHS Global Insight, Inc. Updated: 18 Oct 2012
Page 29 of 34
During the 1970s and 1980s, Italy's trade with other European Union (EU) countries expanded dramatically. This has fallen back since the early 1990s, with Italy's still largest export markets Germany and France accounting for a smaller share of Italian commodity exports in 2010, at 13.2% (down from 19.2% in 1990) and 11.8% (down from 16.3%), respectively. The country's dependence on imported coal, oil, electricity, and other essential goods continues to weigh on the balance of trade. The imbalance is also partly offset by the tourism industry, remittances from Italian nationals abroad, and shipping revenues. Italy: Major trading partners, 2011 EXPORTS Country Germany France United States Spain Switzerland United Kingdom China Belgium Poland Turkey
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
IMPORTS Billions of USD 68.7 60.8 30.4 27.7 27.7 24.4 13.8 13.6 13.1 12.9 Percent share 13.3 11.8 5.9 5.4 5.4 4.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 Country Germany France China Netherlands Spain Belgium United States United Kingdom Switzerland Russia Billions of USD 86.9 46.5 40.6 29.0 24.9 20.3 16.1 15.0 13.9 13.4 Percent share 16.5 8.9 7.7 5.5 4.7 3.9 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.6
Italy: Major trading partners, 2000 EXPORTS Country Germany France United States United Kingdom Spain Switzerland Belgium Netherlands Austria Greece
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
IMPORTS Billions of USD 35.7 29.7 24.5 16.3 14.8 8.0 6.5 6.3 5.2 4.8 Percent share 15.1 12.6 10.4 6.9 6.3 3.4 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.0 Country Germany France Netherlands United Kingdom United States Spain Belgium Switzerland Russia China Billions of USD 41.2 26.8 14.0 12.8 12.5 9.7 9.5 7.8 7.6 6.5 Percent share 17.5 11.4 5.9 5.4 5.3 4.1 4.0 3.3 3.2 2.7
Page 30 of 34
Page 31 of 34
2.6 in 1991. Consequently, the median age in Italy has climbed from 33 years in 1975 to 41.77 years in 2005, and is projected to rise to 51 years by 2024. Further labor-market reforms are required to encourage higher labor-force participation in order to offset the decline in working population. Major labor-market reforms have produced encouraging results, but the employment ratio remains the lowest in the euro area. Increasing wage flexibility and reducing the tax wedge over time will be required to raise employment. Prime Minister Mario Monti also wants to address the inequality of pension entitlements across Italy, noting that the system "awards high pensions to some and low ones to others." High state pension expenditure remains a huge drain on government finances, accounting for most of the social protection budget, and is expected to remain at around 15% of GDP between now and 2040, according to the latest calculations from the Ministry of Economy and Finance. A heavy burden on the state's pension obligations is the high incidence of male workers who qualify for early retirement known as "seniority pensions" after satisfying the retirement eligibility of 35 years of social security contributions and a minimum age requirement of 61 years from 2010. An option for Monti could be to ratchet up the minimum age of requirement, or lengthen the "exit window," which is a postponed entitlement to early retirement. Another area of potential reform is to accelerate the transition from a defined-benefit system (based on final earnings to a less burdensome notional defined-contribution system, which will only be fully effective after 2030). According to government estimates, the stock of pensions calculated (fully or partially) according to the old defined-benefits rules will still be over 45% in 2050. Despite a flurry of reforms since the 1990s, Italy's pension-earnings ratio was the second largest in the Eurozone in 2007, behind only Greece, which in conjunction with a low effective retirement age does make considerable demands on Italy's welfare spending. Further reform will be needed, given that the pension system is facing a sizeable demographic shock. Given the low birth rate, Italy's population is set to age rapidly over the next 50 years. Assuming no sharp acceleration in net immigration, the working-age population is set to shrink markedly over the next 50 years. Currently, there are four working people available to support each pension, but this is expected to narrow to 1.63 workers by 2050, according to Eurostat estimates.
Page 32 of 34
Economic
Economic
3. Italian business confidence posts surprise improvement in November, but outlook still tough
30 NOV 2012
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
9. Italian merchandise exports slip back in September, according to latest custom trade data
16 NOV 2012
Country - Economic
10. Italian economy contracts at slower pace in Q3 but outlook remains challenging
15 NOV 2012
Created on 03 Dec 2012 Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited except by permission. All Rights Reserved Information has been obtained by sources believed to be reliable. However, because of the possibility of human or mechanical errors by our sources, IHS Global Insight Inc. does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of any information and is not responsible for any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from the use of such information. http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/
Page 33 of 34
Copyright of Italy Country Monitor is the property of IHS Global Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.