THE CITY OF NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007

June 15, 2004

Governor Thomas Kean

Chairman, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
26 Federal Plaza
Suite 13-100
New York, NY 10278

Dear Governor Kean:

Let me take this opportunity once again to express the City's appreciation for the
tremendously important work the Commission has undertaken. Understanding what led up to the
malicious attacks of September 11th and helping us all better prepare for any future possible
terrorist attacks are matters of the utmost importance.

I write to you now, however, both because of considerable concerns I have about the
Commission's proposed findings as they relate to the City's response to the attacks on 9/11, and
to reemphasize the need for a change in the terrorism funding formula so that the City can afford
to continue to make the major improvements in the Fire and Police Departments that will enable
it to better respond to the terrorism threat.

The concerns that prompt this letter are based on what I and many others believe was an
unfair and inaccurate description of the City's response to the attacks contained in the
Commission's Staff Statements 13 and 14 that were presented during the hearings of May 18 and
19, 2004. Many of these inaccuracies were later reflected in the questioning by the individual
Commissioners and, given the intense media scrutiny of the hearings, this inaccurate portrayal of
the City's response was thereafter widely disseminated. It is critical that these mistakes now be
corrected.

My staff has prepared a detailed report in response to the Commission's Staff Statements.
I am enclosing a copy for your review. As our report notes, the Staff Statements routinely draw
negative inferences regarding actions taken by the City's police and fire departments even when
there is significant evidence to the contrary. Compelling evidence supporting alternative and
favorable explanations is typically omitted. Ambiguities are always resolved in a negative
fashion without mention of other possibilities, even where those possibilities have strong bases in
fact or logic. Let me give you some specifics:

• Page 24 of Staff Statement 13 incorrectly reports that the FDNY evacuation

orders did not include a "Mayday," implying the most urgent order. These
Mayday directions are clearly heard on the French documentary made that day.
(City Report at 4).

• Dennis Smith's testimony was replete with errors that were adopted by the
Commissioners and repeated by the media. For example, we know for a fact that
many firefighters continued their rescue work despite hearing Maydays and
evacuation orders and knowing the South Tower had fallen. (City Report at 4).

• Much emphasis is given in the Statements to the alleged police/fire rivalry despite
the absence of evidence that such purported rivalry was an issue on 9/11 or
affected any operations on that day. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence of
the smooth and incredibly well orchestrated response to the 9/11 attack, an
event of unprecedented magnitude. Within minutes of the attacks that morning,
the Police and Fire Departments responded in a highly efficient and orchestrated
manner, the Fire Department immediately coordinating response and rescue
efforts at the Towers while the Police Department maintained the safety of those
fleeing the site and evacuated lower Manhattan, closed the bridges and tunnels to
all but Fire Department and emergency vehicles, and secured sensitive locations
like the UN, the Stock Exchange and City Hall. (City Report at 7-9).

• Staff Statement 13 incorrectly implies that the Fire Department dispatch system
lost control over firefighters arriving at the Towers because during a shift change,
some firefighters stayed on-duty and rode down with their companies. The
Statement fails to mention that the initial attack occurred during a shift change
and that some firefighters already at the firehouse and getting ready to go off-
duty, instead went to Ground Zero with their companies. The firefighters were
supervised by their commanding officers. Indeed, the McKinsey Report found
that only four companies self-dispatched, a positive statement omitted from the
Staff Statements. The French documentary shows an orderly flow of Fire
Department personnel into the North Tower lobby. (City Report at 1-2).

• Staff Statement 13 includes several inaccurate allegations, implications, and

conclusions regarding the Fire Department's failure to use the WTC repeater
system on 9/11. Evidence that the system was malfunctioning is omitted.
Recent reported comments by the WTC's privately employed deputy fire safety
director further support the contention that the system was not properly
functioning. (City Report at 2-3).

• Staff Statement 13 states that the failure to relay a 10:08 transmission from a
police helicopter regarding the condition of the north tower may have cost
firefighter lives. However, that transmission was made several minutes after the
Fire Department had already issued evacuation orders (clearly heard on the
 documentary) for the North Tower. The Staff Statement does not properly
emphasize that fact. (City Report at 5).

In addition to the above, the Staff Statements contain significant errors about the
effectiveness of Fire Department radios and the 9-1-1 emergency call system, as detailed in our
report.

Unfortunately, partly due to the media coverage on the matters described above; the
accomplishments of the Police and Fire Departments and the Office of Emergency Management
since 9/11 received insufficient focus. As Commissioner Scoppetta testified at the hearing,
under his leadership, the Fire Department has:

• hired and trained 2668 new firefighters to fill the vacancies left by the devastating
effects of 9/11;

• implemented a new communications system, which includes post radios that work
independently of building repeater systems, and new, more powerful radios that
have greater building penetration, and far greater interoperability with the Police
Department's communications system;

• trained over a thousand firefighters in the handling of hazardous materials;

• replaced millions of dollars of destroyed equipment;

• upgraded its operations center so that it is equipped to receive live feeds from
NYPD helicopters, is in the process of developing electronic command boards
permitting greater tracking of members and better wireless communications
between chiefs, and implemented a new recall plan to more efficiently mobilize
personnel in the event of a large scale emergency.

Commissioner Kelly, as he explained at the hearing, has made the Police Department an
active participant in counter-terrorism activities on a national and even international level. He
has created a Bureau of Counter Terrorism, with a new, state-of-the-art, secure facility equipped
with the latest computer and communication technology. He has expanded the scope of the
Intelligence Division and there are now over 1000 police officers engaged in counter-terrorism
responsibilities each day.

As you know, we recently adopted a City Incident Management System (CIMS). The
City has assigned individual responsibility for certain incidents to specific agencies, and joint
responsibility to two or more agencies for various major incidents. The assignment of joint
command is consistent with federal standards. The "unified command" concept, as recognized
by the Homeland Security's National Incident Command System, is premised on the notion that
various agencies each play significant roles in responding to certain major emergencies. A
unified command requires the agencies to work collaboratively in responding to the incident,
with each agency in charge of its core competencies. During the 9-11 Commission hearings,
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said that on preliminary review, he believed the City's
plan met federal requirements, although certain refinements might be warranted. We obviously
will take seriously the Secretary's suggestions and have no doubt that our current plan will be
even better as we make changes in it to reflect the wisdom of others and our own experiences,
including those we gain from the additional training exercises and drills we will conduct.

The cost of addressing terrorism is staggering. The City's counter-terrorism efforts cost
the Police Department alone over $200 million a year. I therefore urge, as I emphasized in my
testimony before the Commission, that the Commission address the terribly short-sighted
Homeland Security funding scheme, which has left New York City grossly underfunded as
compared to other states and municipalities. If we are serious in addressing the potential terrorist
threats, then we must be willing to allocate resources in a logical and realistic way. Having New
York rank 49th in per capita funding does not do that and increases the risk to all of us.

Finally, I must respond to the assertion in Commissioner Lehman's New York Time's
op-ed piece of May 26, 2004, that the City did not fully cooperate with the Commission's
investigation. Since August of 2003, the City has supplied the Commission with tens of
thousands of pages of documents, dozens of videos, hundreds of audio tapes, and over 125
people for interviews, even making arrangements to locate and bring in retired employees whom
the Commission sought. In all, the Commission interviewed eighty firefighters, thirty-five police
officers, and eleven employees of the Office of Emergency Management. Indeed, we have
continued to provide witnesses for the Commission to this day. We have fully cooperated with
the Commission.
Your staffs work involved an enormous effort. The task of analyzing tens of thousands
of documents and interviewing hundreds of witnesses is truly daunting and I believe that any
errors were not intentional but solely a result of the difficulties such a project presents.
However, for your final report to best assist the nation in the future, and for your overall findings
to have credibility, it is critical that its recommendations be based on factual findings that are
accurate and beyond reproach.
With that goal in mind, I suggest that your General Counsel Dan Marcus and my
Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo meet to discuss the enclosed report as soon as possible.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Michael R. Bloomberg
Mayor

MRB: ip

cc: Other Commissioners

Daniel Marcus, Esq.
John Farmer, Esq.
 June 15, 2004

COMMENTS BY THE CITY OF NEW YORK CONCERNING STAFF

STATEMENTS 13 AND 14 PRESENTED DURING THE PUBLIC HEARING
CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES ON MAY 18 AND 19,2004

The City of New York submits the following comments to Staff Statements 13
and 14 presented during the public hearing conducted by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") on May 18 and 19, 2004.

As detailed below, the Staff Statements contain numerous inaccuracies and

omissions. When factual matters are subject to differing interpretations, the Statements
often adopt the interpretation most unfavorable to the City's emergency responders,
usually without any indication that the chosen version of the facts is uncertain or in
dispute. The Statements include facts unfavorable to the City without including
favorable facts on the same subject or providing any indication that the unfavorable facts
were not typical. In addition, criticisms of the emergency response were included and
given an emphasis that suggests it had harmful or tragic consequences, even in the
absence of evidence that anyone was harmed as a result. Consequently, the Statements
give a misleading impression of many of the events of 9/11. That misleading impression
was reflected in questioning by Commission members, as well as the media coverage that
followed the hearing. To correct the historical record and the evident misimpressions
among members of the public and the press, and to avoid unfair criticism of the City's
emergency responders, we urge the Commission to consider the comments that follow in
preparing its final report, and that this submission be made a part of the record of the
Commission.

Pre-9/11 Emergency Preparations

On page 3,1 the Statement lists the numerous preparations the Port Authority
made for an emergency in the World Trade Center ("WTC"), from installing emergency
lights to running fire drills. There is no mention, however, of the extensive FDNY
training and drills in the WTC complex, nor of City-run interagency drills that trained
first responders to handle situations at the WTC and familiarized large numbers of first
responders with the layout of the complex. Indeed, the Statements fail to mention in any
fashion the many interagency disaster drills that the City conducted in the months and
years preceding September 11, 2001. In 1999, for example, a major drill of all the WTC
systems was conducted where several City agencies participated. In addition, on a daily
basis, the local fire companies responded to a wide range of incidents at the WTC
complex.

Unless otherwise noted, page references are to Staff Statement 13.

 FDNY Command and Control

The assertions on pages 8 and 20 that "significantly" more firefighters were at the
WTC site than were dispatched by FDNY dispatch constitutes an implicit criticism that is
unwarranted. The evidence is clear that the vast majority of units properly dispatched
and very few units self-dispatched. Thus the number of additional firefighters beyond
those dispatched was not in fact very large. The McKinsey Report found that only four
companies self-dispatched, a positive comment omitted from the Staff Statements, and all
were under the supervision of their commanders. Moreover, while some off-duty
firefighters who were present at their firehouses responded with their companies because
the incident occurred during a change of tour, these firefighters did so with the
permission and under the command of their officers. In addition, the Statement implies
there were too many fire marshals on the scene, or that it was somehow inappropriate for
fire marshals to respond to the site. This is without merit. Fire marshals are former
firefighters charged with investigating criminal activities associated with fires and were
appropriately at the scene. In sum, there is no evidence that the additional personnel
impeded operations, or were anything but helpful in handling the massive rescue
operation, and personnel who appeared at the WTC arrived under the full supervision of
their commanding officers.

On page 20, the allegation that "the overall command post's ability to track all
FDNY units was extremely limited" is overstated. While the command post could not
track every unit under the unprecedented circumstances, most units checked in at the
command post. Further, since the boards that tracked the units were destroyed with the
collapse of the towers, it is impossible to verify how many units were not successfully
tracked. The criticism that the ability to track units was "extremely limited" is
inaccurate, lacks adequate factual support and disregards the statements by surviving fire
chiefs who operated in the North Tower.

Repeater System

The Commission's definitive conclusion (p. 18) that the repeater was working
properly is contradicted by certain events that occurred on 9/11. The Statement fails to
mention that Chiefs Pfeifer and Palmer, who tested the system and concluded it was not
working properly, were both experienced in testing and using the repeater. The
Statement also fails to mention that, in addition to problems with the master handset,
there was also difficulty hearing transmissions on the repeater channel over handie-talkie
radios at 9:05. In addition, conversations over the repeater in the South Tower were
interrupted, incomplete or disjointed. The Statement also fails to mention that throughout
the time the repeater was allegedly working, debris was likely hitting the repeater antenna
which sat in the middle of the debris fields of both towers.

In fact, none of the evidence supporting Chief Pfeifer's contention that the
repeater did not operate properly was included in the Statement, nor was there any
indication in the Statement that there might be some doubt as to whether the repeater was
actually working. Moreover, recent comments by Deputy Fire Safety Director Lloyd
Thompson, an employee of the outside firm hired by Silverstein to supervise the Towers'
fire safety systems, further contradict the Commission's finding of a perfectly functioning
repeater system. Contrary to the theory in the Statement (p. 18) that the button to activate
the master handset was not pressed, according to press accounts Mr. Thompson has said
he observed the light for the handset on, indicating that both switches in fact were
activated. In addition, the Port Authority audiotapes confirm that the handset transmitted
a message but was not heard on Chief Palmer's handie-talkie, further indicating that the
handset was activated but the repeater not working properly. Thus it should be clear that
the repeater was not operating reliably on 9/11 or, at a minimum, that - as McKinsey
concluded - it cannot be determined from the conflicting evidence whether or not it was
working properly.

On page 19, in the third full paragraph, the Statement describes communications
breakdowns in the South Tower. The Statement is unclear as to the source of the
breakdown. Is the suggestion a failure of tactical channel 3, repeater channel 7, or both?
In the absence of any clarification, it implies an unexplained criticism of FDNY
communications.

Also, the assertion in the same paragraph that the "lobby chief [in the South
Tower] ceased to transmit on repeater channel 7" suggests that this experienced chief
switched off of a working repeater channel for no apparent reason. This conclusion
ignores the most logical assumption that the reason the chief suddenly disappears from
the recording of the repeater channel (Chief Burns is not heard after 9:21 a.m.) is that the
repeater channel had ceased to work and he was in fact unable to transmit on the repeater
channel. Any other interpretation would require drawing the almost inconceivable
inference that, in the middle of an emergency, this experienced chief abandoned a
working repeater channel in favor of ordinary handie-talkie communications that did not
permit him to communicate as well with Chief Palmer as he ascended Tower 2.

The Statement fails to mention that there is no evidence the repeater channel
worked at all after the collapse of the South Tower. In fact, it seems impossible that an
antenna on top of WTC 5 would have survived the wreckage caused by the collapse of
the South Tower. Thus, even if the repeater worked until that time, the repeater channel
could not have been used to transmit evacuation orders after the collapse of the South
Tower. Anyone operating on the repeater channel at this critical time would have had no
ability to communicate at all. Evacuations would have been further delayed almost
certainly causing the death of many more firefighters. Criticism of the Department for
not using the repeater is therefore illogical given evidence that it was not functioning
properly and that not using it ultimately saved lives. Accordingly, the Commission
should avoid any implication that lives would have been saved if the chiefs in the North
Tower had been using the repeater system. The opposite appears to be true.

The Commission's inaccurate report that the repeater system worked has been
followed by further inaccuracies by the media. According to Elizabeth Kolbert's
"Comment" in the May 31, 2004 issue of The New Yorker, "Typical of the Commission's
findings was the confusion surrounding the so-called repeater....In the early moments of
the disaster, a fire chief who didn't know how to activate the device decided - mistakenly
- that it was malfunctioning, a decision that may have cost some rescue workers their
lives." As the Commission learned, Chief Pfeifer certainly knew how to operate the
repeater, having been the Battalion Chief for the area since 1998 and having responded to
hundreds of incidents at the World Trade Center complex since that time. The Staff
Statement omits these important facts. Also, as stated above, there is no evidence to
support the inference that any firefighter died because of Chief Pfeifer's decision not to
use the repeater system in the North Tower. To the contrary, his decision not to use the
repeater may have enabled the numerous evacuation orders given upon the South
Tower's collapse to get through to firefighters in the North Tower. Since it seems
impossible that the repeater system would have continued to work after the South
Tower's collapse, it is fortunate that the firefighters were not on the repeater channel at
that time.

Given Chief Pfeifer's expertise with the repeater system, and the loss of his
brother in the North Tower, the incorrect conclusion and misleading implications of the
Staff Statement have a particularly unfortunate personal impact. The final report should
present the evidence that the repeater was not working properly and explain that, even if
the firefighters had been able to use the repeater in the North Tower, its being in use
when the South Tower collapsed would most likely have prevented the transmission of
evacuation orders. In addition, the report should state that evidence of the repeater's
functioning reliably in the South Tower is, at best, inconclusive.

FDNY Radios

The hearing also placed undue emphasis on trouble with FDNY handie-talkie
communications on 9/11. The implication repeatedly surfaced that had the FDNY radios
been different, i.e., had digital radios been used, lives would have been saved. This is
patently false. In reality, analog radios, while not always providing the clarity of the
digital radios, are better able to handle multiple, simultaneous transmissions. On 9/11
therefore, communications over digital radios would have been more hampered by the
high volume of traffic than the analog radios used by firefighters that day. This issue in
particular should be clarified by the Commission, as many of the victims' families are
under the mistaken impression that had FDNY radios been digital, their loved ones' lives
would have been saved. Former Commissioner Kerik and later Commissioner Scoppetta
both testified that no radio works perfectly all of the time. On 9/11, the FDNY handie-
talkie radios performed as well or better than digital radios would have. As the
Commission is aware, the Fire Department, since 9/11 has significantly improved its
radio communication capabilities, one component of which is an analog handie-talkie.

Evacuation Orders

During the hearings, the impression was given that the firefighters in the North
Tower died simply as a result of communications failures. According to Dennis Smith's
testimony, "Some people will say that the culture of bravado in the fire department
inspired firefighters to continue up into the buildings after receiving an order to evacuate,
but this is nonsensical and at odds with fire department experience." Smith's statement is
flatly contradicted by the evidence. Oral histories of firefighters who survived, all of
which were provided to the Commission, testimony by firefighters before the
Commission staff, and interviews on the French documentary, all verify that many
firefighters remained in the North Tower despite hearing the evacuation call because they
were assisting civilians to evacuate. To eliminate popular misconceptions, the
Commission should emphasize that it interviewed a large number of firefighters who
testified that they heard the evacuation order, many of whom continued to assist in the
evacuation of civilians. The Commission should also report that firefighters as high as
the 55th floor in the North Tower - the highest floor reached by any firefighters according
to recent Commission staff interviews - heard the FDNY evacuation order and
communicated that information to the NYPD ESU. A battalion chief went from floor to
floor with a bullhorn ordering firefighters to leave the building. We urge that the
Commission help dispel the misconception that the evacuation orders simply were
universally unheard due to some fault of the City. The heroism and sacrifice of those
firefighters who remained in the building to assist civilians after learning of the
evacuation order should be fully recognized.

On page 24, the Statement reports that the FDNY evacuation orders did not
include a Mayday, implying the most urgent order. In fact, many Maydays repeated over
FDNY radios after the collapse of the South Tower are audible on the French
documentary. In addition, many firefighters made clear during interviews that they fully
understood the urgency of the evacuation orders.

NYPD Helicopter Transmissions

On page 25, the Statement notes that at 10:08 a.m., an NYPD aviation helicopter
advised that the North Tower might not last much longer. The Statement comments that
"[tjhere was no ready way to relay this information to the fire chiefs in the North Tower."
A similar remark is included in Staff Statement 14, on page 7. The implication is that the
information was conveyed to police in the North Tower. This impression is misleading
and contrary to facts obtained by the Commission. In fact, police ESU personnel in the
North Tower were informed of the South Tower's collapse and the need to evacuate by
Ken Winkler, an ESU detective who relayed the information immediately after the South
Tower's collapse from where he was standing on Church and Vesey Streets. The NYPD
evacuation proceeded and was unrelated to the helicopter report. Moreover, the 10:08
helicopter transmission comes almost 7-8 minutes after several evacuation orders from
FDNY chiefs on the ground had already been given to firefighters in the tower.

The misconceptions about the role of the communications from the NYPD
helicopter were exacerbated by inaccurate testimony from Dennis Smith. According to
Smith's testimony, "A NYPD helicopter reported early, before the fall of the South
Tower, that the North Tower was going to fall, but the fire chiefs did not hear of this.
When the pilot saw that the South Tower was falling his announcement to police
command was instant, and police command issued a forceful and robust order to evacuate
the remaining building and to move all department vehicles to safety. Notwithstanding
that this was a successful communication that saved many lives, the fire chiefs did not
hear this order."(see Smith Testimony, p. 4). Almost every word of this testimony is
contrary to evidence obtained by the Commission. ESU did not evacuate from either
tower as a result of any communication from the NYPD helicopter. Also, the Aviation
Unit never predicted the North Tower was going to collapse prior to the collapse of the
South Tower. The Commission should specifically address the discrepancy between its
own fact finding and the erroneous statements of Mr. Smith.

The discussions of the 10:08 call in the Statements and during the hearing
certainly left those who viewed the hearing with misconceptions. According to an
editorial in the New York Times on May 20, 2004, "Firefighters' lives might have been
saved, for instance, if they had received warning from police aircraft when each tower
seemed ready to collapse. But the information never went out on the Fire Department's
separate communications system; no fire official was in the loop to make sure the alarm
was spread." (Emphasis added). This writer not only took away from the Commission
hearing the false impression that the NYPD had advance warnings of the collapse of both
the South and the North Towers, but also the misconception that the NYPD evacuated the
North Tower as a result of warnings from NYPD's aviation unit.

The misconceptions about the role of the NYPD helicopter warnings appear to be
among the most significant and widely-held misconceptions concerning the events of
9/11. Unfortunately, the Staff Statements failed to eliminate those misconceptions and, if
anything, added to them. We strongly urge that these points be clarified by the
Commission.

FDNY Dispatching and Operations

On page 17, the Statement claims that in answer to Chief Ganci's second fifth
alarm, units from further away were dispatched to the site, rather than nine units staged
on the Brooklyn side of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. The implication here is that the
staged units would have been more appropriate. In fact, as the Fire Department explained
to the Commission staff in a meeting prior to the hearings, some of the units dispatched
instead of the staged units came from Brooklyn Heights and nearby areas, even closer to
the WTC site than the staged units. Furthermore, these other units were more
appropriately dispatched, particularly due to the traffic problems that existed in the tunnel
at that particular time. While this decision is cast negatively in the Statement, there is
significant evidence - all of it omitted - that it was proper. Also, rather than point out
that the dispatch system worked very well despite the unprecedented magnitude of the
event, only negative implications are included in the Staff Statements.

Similarly, on page 7 of Staff Statement 14, dispatching decisions to the South

Tower are questioned with the implication that new units were inappropriately dispatched
to the South Tower rather than units already in the North Tower being sent over. The
Statement says that as a result "the number of firefighters available to help evacuees in
[the South] Tower was relatively small for at least the first twenty minutes after the
Tower was hit, though that number was sadly rising in the minutes before that tower
collapsed." Once the second tower was hit 16 minutes later, it made complete sense to
call in new units to that tower. The Statement simply replaces the judgment of
experienced fire department commanders with that of the Commission staff. The
comment about "the number was sadly rising" just before the South Tower's collapse
implies a tragedy to the commanders' decision, whereas had those in North Tower been
sent to the South Tower instead of new units, those sent over would have perished
instead. Moreover, the Department had units staged and waiting within minutes of the
South Tower, and there is no evidence that firefighters in the North Tower were not fully
engaged as they arrived on the scene.

As in many other places in the Statement, there is a complete lack of

acknowledgement of the unprecedented challenges the Fire Department was forced to
address in an ever-escalating crisis. In the absence of any evidence that the situation in
the North Tower had somehow stabilized, thus freeing up personnel to respond to the
South Tower (evidence which of course does not exist), the Commission's commentary
on the dispatching decisions is misleading at best.

On page 17, the Statement praises the Port Authority and NYPD for assisting in
the evacuation of civilians from the lobby. NYPD and PAPD evacuation efforts are also
noted on pages 21 and 22. While the praise of these agencies is well-earned and
appropriate, it is striking that despite the magnitude of the FDNY's rescue operations
throughout the entire building, only oblique references are included about the
extraordinary efforts of its personnel throughout the Towers.

According to Staff Statement 14, page 7, "Even after the South Tower collapsed,
another senior [FDNY] chief reportedly thought that the North Tower would not collapse
because its corner frame had not been struck." This statement, which apparently is
intended to show yet another misstep by the Fire Department, is set forth without citing
contrary evidence. The statement is attributed to Chief Downey, who, contrary to the
Staff Statement, told other chiefs earlier in the day that both buildings could eventually
collapse. The Commission should reject the use of this statement in the final report.

9-1-1 Operators

On page 6, the Statement describes 9-1-1 operators' and FDNY dispatchers' lack
of situational awareness. While technically true - given the circumstances - the assertion
is nevertheless misleading. For much of the operation, no one knew exactly which floors
were impacted or whether rooftop rescues would eventually be possible. It should be
explained then, that for much of the operation, there was no way 9-1-1 operators or
FDNY dispatch could possibly have had that information. In addition, according to the
Statement, 9-1-1 and FDNY dispatch advised callers both above and below the impact to
remain in place according to standard operating procedures for high rise fires. In fact,
only a small number of callers below the impact were advised to remain where they were,
while the vast majority were instructed to evacuate.

On page 16, according to the Statement, "At least a hundred people remained
alive on the 88th and 89th floors [of the South Tower], in some cases calling 9-1-1 for
direction. The 9-1-1 system remained plagued by the operators' lack of situational
awareness." The Statement fails to acknowledge the painful fact that since these callers
were above the impact zone in the South Tower, no amount of situational awareness by
the operators could have saved them. Also, no first responder at that point in time could
possibly have had situational awareness about the 88th and 89th floors. Even with the
most advanced protocols for providing information from the field to 9-1-1, these
operators could not have offered any information to callers above the impact. The
implication, however, of this paragraph of the Statement is that with better situational
awareness, people above the impact could have been saved. This is not true and creates a
potentially painful misimpression for the families of those above the impact zone who
perished.

Also on pages 16-17, the Statement includes a story regarding a Mr. Clark's
unsatisfactory experience with 9-1-1. Rather than include any of the helpful information
passed on by many 9-1-1 operators handling an unprecedented volume of calls, which
entailed creative and quick thinking, and great sensitivity under very high pressure and
tragic circumstances, the Statement includes only negative information concerning how a
handful of 9-1-1 calls were handled. Mr. Clark's story of being placed on hold, while
important to consider, is not typical, and does not fairly represent the extraordinary work
of the 9-1 -1 operators on 9111.

According to page 17 of the Statement, no one in the first responder community

knew that Stairwell A in the South Tower remained passable and no callers were advised
that helicopter rescues were not feasible. The assertions unfairly imply that the City was
at fault for this lack of situational awareness. First, there is no reason to believe the first
responder community could have known about Stairwell A even had there been perfect
communications. It should also be noted that Stairwell A remained passable for only a
very short time, as indicated by the four people who were able to descend. Second, the
NYPD Aviation Unit never made a final determination that rooftop rescues were not
feasible and they continued to evaluate that option. This is an example of an implication
- perhaps unintended - that people would have been saved had callers been informed that
rooftop rescues were not feasible, when in fact there is no basis to conclude that it would
have made any difference.

NYPD/FDNY Rivalry

The allegations of NYPD/FDNY rivalry are overstated and give the misleading
impression that the rivalry had a serious, deleterious effect on the operations on 9/11.
The Statement notes that according to some interviewees "the problem has escalated over
time and has hampered the ability of the City to respond well in emergency situations."
(p. 5.) One gets the impression from the Statement that there is a daily ongoing battle
between the two agencies, when in fact they work together tens of thousands of times
each year supportively and cooperatively. The Statement creates an inaccurate
impression by referring to "fistfights at the scenes of emergencies" (p. 5) - something
that is extremely rare and more importantly, did not occur during the 9/11 response.

The Statement further states that the Fire and Police Departments "each
considered itself operationally autonomous," presenting this in a negative light when
none is warranted. Each agency, while having a small contingent of elite rescue units
that have some overlapping authority, has autonomous and differing responsibilities. Yet
the Statement ignores their different responsibilities, as well as how well they routinely
work on a daily basis and how well they worked on 9/11.
 On 9/11, the FDNY and the NYPD immediately began performing their assigned
roles not only without impediment from each other, but cooperatively. FDNY went
directly to the towers to begin a firefighting/rescue operation while NYPD immediately
began evacuating lower Manhattan, closing all bridges and tunnels to all but emergency
vehicles, securing sensitive locations like the UN, stock exchange and City Hall, and
responding to various bomb and terrorist threats throughout the City. The extraordinary
implication in the Statement, as well as in questions from the Commission, is that if only
the FDNY and NYPD got along better, people in the towers would have lived. There is
simply no evidence to support this conclusion.

The assertion on page 5 that Mayor Giuliani created OEM to address "the long-
standing rivalry between the NYPD and the FDNY" gives the erroneous impression that
OEM was created because of NYPD/FDNY rivalry, rather than for the primary purpose
of coordinating state-of-the-art emergency management throughout the City. Thus, the
Statement again exaggerates the significance of any rivalry.

Also on page 5, the Statement reports that the NYPD and FDNY were
"accustomed to responding independently to emergencies," and that "neither had
demonstrated the readiness to respond to an 'Incident Commander' if that commander
was an official outside of their Department." This statement suggests a defiance of
authority on the part of NYPD and FDNY that is baseless. In reality, as the Commission
staff was informed, Police and Fire Department jointly responded to incidents and
emergencies each and every day. Before and after 9/11, the two Departments have
worked and drilled together continually and the impression created by the Statement is
erroneous and unwarranted.

Page 20 of the Statement asserts that an ESU team attempted to check in with
FDNY chiefs but was "rebuffed." The assertion is at best overstated. The French
documentary footage, which shows the ESU officers standing by the fire chiefs in the
lobby, does not support a finding that the Fire Department chiefs refused to permit the
ESU officers to check in. At most, it shows that the Fire Department Chiefs were
engaged at the time. In addition, the subsequent assertion in the Statement that OEM "did
not intercede" is completely without basis. Even if the ESU officers' efforts had been
"rebuffed," there is no evidence that OEM was aware of it.

Dennis Smith testified at the public hearing, although he retired from the FDNY
nearly 20 years ago. According to Smith's written testimony, "the crisis at the World
Trade Center was worsened by the uncooperative connection that exists between fire and
police departments . . .." He provides no support for this - giving only an example of an
incident in 1988 when the NYPD and FDNY failed to cooperate, as well as
misinformation about helicopter transmissions (discussed above). Smith fails to offer a
single example based on accurate information of NYPD and FDNY's alleged rivalry
having any effect on the 9/11 response.

During the public hearing, the questioning served to exacerbate the

misconceptions about NYPD/FDNY rivalry. Secretary Lehman stated to the former City
Commissioners that there needs to be an overarching agency so that "[NYPD and FDNY]
don't get into fistfights when there is an ambiguous situation." He added, "Why do we
have to live with this lack of line authority and hope that everyone is going to get along
and work it out." Drawing upon the misleading factual narration of the Staff Statements,
Commissioner Lehman's comments exaggerate the occasional rivalry between the NYPD
and FDNY and implies that the two agencies refuse to cooperate with disastrous results.
The Staff Statements and the Commissioners' questions ignored the routine cooperation
of FDNY and NYPD, not only on 9/11, but in dealing with the post-9/11 anthrax attacks,
the air crash two months after 9/11 in Queens, the Port Mobil fire, the Staten Island ferry
crash, and thousands of other incidents, large and small.

Following the public hearing, on May 20, 2004, the New York Times published a
four-part editorial under the heading "Continuing Lessons of 9/11." (See p. A26). Three
out of the four discussed NYPD's and FDNY's rivalry or purported difficulty in
cooperating. Clearly the Commission's hearings left the inaccurate impression that on
9/11 the FDNY and NYPD failed to cooperate, and thus the City failed to save lives.

An unfortunate consequence of the exaggerated impression of NYPD/FDNY

rivalry was shown in the response to the City's new protocols for incident management
(CIMS). The false assumption that the Police and Fire Departments are in constant
battle, and were so on 9/11, has led to undue concerns about the new protocols. It is
perfectly appropriate to critically evaluate the City's new incident management system,
but such an evaluation should be based on an accurate factual record.

While the Commission heard evidence of a rivalry between FDNY and NYPD,
there is no evidence such a rivalry had any effect on the response to 9/11 - and certainly
no evidence that lives were lost as a result. To eliminate further misconceptions on this
subject, we urge that the Commission correct and clarify this point in its final report.

Conclusion

Serious factual errors relating to the City's response to the attacks on the World
Trade Center were presented at the hearings of May 18 and 19, 2004 through the Staff
Statements, certain witnesses' testimony and several questions and comments by
Commission members. Although these inaccuracies were often contradicted by evidence
provided to the Commission before the hearings, such evidence was omitted from the
Staff Statements. We urge that the Commission's narrative of the events of 9/11 be
modified in accordance with these Comments and that the Comments be included in the
final report of the Commission. This will help ensure that the historical record accurately
reflects what occurred on 9/11 and that the Commission's findings and recommendations
are credible and useful in helping the nation address its short and long-term security
needs.

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