Peoples Liberation Army 7.

Navy

PLA Navy (PLAN)

From Wikipedia and Globalsecurity, 2010

People's Liberation Army Navy

The People's Liberation Army Navy [PLAN] remains more or less precisely what is implied by its rather paradoxical [at least to Western ears] sounding name -- the maritime force of a continental power. The Chinese sea-faring tradition largely ended with the demise of the 15th century Treasure Fleets, and half a century of Communist state power has done little to reverse the landward focus of Chinse security planning. Large numbers of aircraft and patrol boats armed with anti-ship cruise missiles provide a formidable coastal defense perimeter. But the PLAN remains little more than a "brown water" coastal defense with limited "green water" capabilities, and no pretense of "blue water" aspirations. Despite a few recent noteworthy additions, the Chinese fleet is overwhelmingly populated with elderly and evidently obsolete units. Even the most recently constructed ships are evdidently defficient in anti-air and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. While manifestly lacking in the robust blue-water power-projection capabilities of the United States Navy, the People's Liberation Army Navy is reasonably well postured to perform the brownwater and green-water sea denial missions with which it is tasked as a matter of national policy. The PLAN has not failed in an attempt to match the US Navy. Rather, it has made substantial progress towards mounting an assymetric sea-denial response to American power-projection capabilities, while at the same time deploying forces that are not inferior in overall combat potential to other regional maritime powers. Beijings early modernization efforts primarily will benefit the Peoples Liberation Army Navy and Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) over the next five years and those services can be expected to expand their areas of operations slowly as they absorb new equipment. Moreover, the frequency and duration of PLAN patrols in the East and South China Seas and the western Pacific will increase in a three phase, crawl, walk, run approach. By 2010, expect those operations to include frequent short duration show the flag ship deployments in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans; by 2025, long duration theater-wide deployments; and, by 2050, a significant PLAN operating presence throughout Asia. The PLA Navy is making efforts to improve its regional force projection options by improving the capability to deploy submarines on extended patrols, and outfitting surface ships with more capable air defense assets and more lethal anti-ship cruise missiles. In addition, the Navy is attempting to address weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare. Despite incremental gains, the PLAN still lacks fleet air defense, over-the-horizon targeting, and sufficient sea/air lift for major amphibious operations. The PLA is addressing these deficiencies, but does not appear likely to make significant gains in those areas until at least 2005. China's Naval Strategy The PLAN seeks to push its maritime defense perimeter further seaward. This change in operations will require newer, more modern warships and submarines capable of operating out to the Ryukyu Islands and into the South China Sea. At these extended ranges, the platforms will have to be better armed to enable defense from all methods of attack. The Navy has been conducting research and acquiring foreign technology in an effort to improve the broad range of naval warfare capabilities; it also is acquiring new classes of ships that will be better suited for operations out to the limits of the East and South China Seas. The PRC believes that the greatest potential for sea conflicts might erupt at the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Thus, the Emergency Mobile Force is assigned to the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet. Although the North Sea Fleet has a better equipment, yet generally speaking, the total combat capabilities of the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet are superior to others. Operations The semi-annual Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) out-of-area deployments and port visits are maritime diplomacy conducted as an integral part of Beijings global and regional engagement strategy. These goodwill deployments demonstrate Chinas slowly emerging blue water capability and presence. Although Chinas naval fleet is not on par with U.S. technological standards, these port visits highlight to lesser-equipped regional actors that next to the U.S. and India, it is China that can project regional influence and presence into the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. This recent voyage to European waters compliments Chinese diplomatic initiatives with the European Union geared towards securing entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), that is expected in November. Since 1980, 15 groups of Chinese naval ships have visited 20 countries. In 1989, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted its first port visit to a U.S. port since the 1949 Communist Revolution, when DAXIN AXT-81 Zheng He visited Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Zheng He was named after the head of the 15th Century Ming Dynasty trade fleet, who ventured as far as the African coast. With the US now Chinas 2nd largest trading partner and biggest foreign investor, the symbolism of sending Zheng He was fitting. The next U.S. port call wasnt until eight year later, when three PLAN warships visited Pearl Harbor and San Diego, California in 1997. Since then, PLAN warships have been conducting semi-annual out of area deployments. In 2000, PLAN warships conducted two major deployments, one that brought them as far as South Africa and the other to the U.S. West Coast. In the spring of 2001, PLAN warships conducted one deployment to India and Pakistan. China's Premier Zhu Rongji recently concluded a 4-nation trip to Europe where he furthered trade relations and was ensured European Union (EU) support for Beijings pending World Trade Organization (WTO) bid, which is expected in November this year. The EU and China are also in the process of negotiating a free access Sino-EU maritime pact. Two ships of the Chinese Navy left Shanghai August 23, 2001 for a goodwill visit to Germany, Britain, France and Italy. The two ships - the Shenzhen, a guided missile destroyer, and the Fengcang, a support vessel - were both designed and manufactured in China, and will visit the European continent for the first time. The ships will travel over 23,000 sea miles in 85 days, equivalent to circling the earth via the equator. Wu Fuchun, commander of the naval ships, said that this visit marks that Chinese naval ships have now journeyed to five of the world 's continents, across three oceans. The newest indigenously produced addition to the fledgling blue water fleet of China's People's Liberation Army Navy, the Luhai-class guided missile destroyer, Shenzhen, emerged from the Dalian shipyard in August 1998. Following the successful completion of sea trials in late 1998, Shenzhen joined the Zhanjiang-based South Sea Fleet on 1 January 1999. It previously conducted an out-of-area deployment to Africa in 2000.

People's Liberation Navy - History

In 1949 Mao asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy." The Naval Academy was set up at Dalian in March 1950, mostly with Soviet instructors. The Navy was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval forces under General Staff Department command. It then consisted of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Guomindang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By 1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in China--possibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personnel--and the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. With Soviet assistance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground forces. The Chinese Navy imported equipment and technology from the Soviet Union when it was first established in the 1950s and developed the ability to make naval equipment with Chinese parts in a short time. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet was under discussion. A procurement policy was set in August 1950 by the PLAN to build a light-duty surface warfare force. Such a force would consist of air, submarine, and torpedo boat elements. For the construction of new vessels, the Bureau of Shipbuilding Industry was created in October 1950 and was based in Shanghai . With the guidance of the Soviets, the Chinese developed a joint agreement with the Soviet Union for the license production of five different kinds of ships in the Soviet Navy in June 1953 those being: frigates, medium-sized torpedo submarines, minesweepers, large submarine chasers, and torpedo boats. The Shipbuilding Industry Management Bureau in 1954 created the Ship Product Design Branch, which later was renamed the First Ship Product Design Office. The Bureau built and operated six shipyards and two construction sites for the PLAN. From 1955 to 1960, the shipyards produced more than 100 ships. In 1954, the Ship Model Testing Institute was created by the First Ministry of Machine Building (MMB). The same institute was enlarged and renamed the Ship Science Research Institute of the First MMB and the Ministry of Communication. The MMB organized the Ship Product Design Institute with four additional institutes in 1958. The PLAN, in 1958 as well, developed research institutes dedicated to the study of ship design, underwater weapons, hydroacoustics, and navigation. The PLAN developed the Science and Technology Research Division. Universities in Shanghai , Xian, Dalian , and Wuhan developed research bodies dedicated to the study of shipbuilding, naval weapon systems, and training equipment. "The Agreement on the Assistance to the People's Republic of China by USSR for Building Warships by the Chinese Navy" was signed on February 4, 1959 between China and the Soviet Union , which allowed the Chinese to begin receiving designs and parts for the license production of submarines, two kinds of guided missile ships, and a hydro-foil torpedo boat. The Navy Party Committee submitted a report to the CMC to clearly define the policy goals of their naval modernization, which included: the development guided missile capabilities, and the continual development of the navys conventional equipment, the creation of a submarine force, the development of small and medium sized surface ships. The Ship Indus trial Management Bureau was absorbed by the Third MMB in 1960, whereas the Military Ship Overall Design Office, which was under the Ship Product Design Institute, was expanded into seven offices with new emphases on the development of torpedoes and navigational instruments. Additionally, a test base for the development of large ships was created in Wuxi , which helped lay the course for more research and development. Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the Navy remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the service largely avoided the turmoil. Although it paid lip service to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the Navy continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets. In August 1960, the Soviet Union retracted its support of the Chinese in the development of the PLAN by pulling its advisors and ceasing the supply of technology and materials, forcing China to develop its navy by itself. As a solution, the Chinese created research bodies to fill the gap that Soviet Union had left in research and development in order to continue the modernization and development of its navy. The Warship Research Academy , or the Seventh Academy of the Ministry of National Defence, was created in June 1961. The Seventh Academy focused the research and development of ships, weapons systems, equipment, and the assimilation of imported technology. The Seventh Academy was also responsible for the creation of other research institutes dedicated to creating various ship designs, including nuclear submarines and propulsion systems. Additional research institutions were created after 1963, when the Sixth MMB was created. These institutes were specialized in various aspects of naval research, such as machine building, instruments, technology, and information. The cumulative efforts of the various research bodies helped China become more capable of domestically developing a navy by duplicating imported technology and producing needed parts. By the mid-60s, the Seventh Academy became capable of developing China s first-generation of naval vessels, such as nuclear power submarines, survey ships, destroyers, frigates, and various naval weapons systems. In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense budget allocated to naval forces, the Navy grew dramatically. The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats, the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the production of larger surface ships, including support ships for oceangoing operations, increased. The Navy also began development of nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSN) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). However, the PLAN lacked surface-to-air missile (SAM) protection for its ships, which were equipped solely with guns and had no surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). And it had very little anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. In the 1980s the Navy was developing into a regional naval power with some green-water capabilities. Naval construction continued at a level somewhat below the 1970s rate. Modernization efforts encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and force structure in favor of more blue-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the expansion of China's blue-water naval capabilities were the 1980 recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the Navy conducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic missile; in 1986 the Navy's order of battle included at least one Xia-class SSBNs armed with twelve CSS-NX-4 missiles and five Han-class SSNs armed with six SY-2 cruise missiles. The Navy also had some success in developing a variety of ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, shore-to-ship, and air-to-ship missiles. In the late 1980s, major deficiencies reportedly remained in antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, naval electronics (including electronic countermeasures equipment), and naval aviation capabilities. Although naval personnel comprised only 12 percent of PLA strength, the PLA Navy ranked in 1987 as the third largest navy in the world in 1987. The Navy consisted of the naval headquarters in Beijing; three fleet commands - the North Sea Fleet, based at Qingdao, Shandong Province; the East Sea

Fleet, based at Shanghai; and the South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province - and about 2,000 ships. The 350,000person Navy included Naval Air Force units of 34,000 men, the Coastal Defense Forces of 38,000, and the Marine Corps of 56,500. China's 1,500-kilometer coastline was protected by more than 100 diesel-powered Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines, which could remain at sea only a limited time. Inside this protective ring and within range of shore-based aircraft were destroyers and frigates mounting Styx antiship missiles, depth-charge projectors, and guns up to 130mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate protection would be swarmed by almost 900 fast-attack craft. Stormy weather could limit the range of these small boats, however, and curtail air support. Behind the inner ring were Coastal Defense Force personnel operating naval shore batteries of Styx missiles and guns, backed by ground force units deployed in depth.

People's Liberation Navy - PLAN Commanders

Wu Shengli (2006-Present(as of July 2007)): Wu was born in Wuqiao, Hebei Province, in August 1945. As a senior officer, he served as chief of staff of the PLANs Fujian Base, commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, commander of the Fujian Base, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, and commander of the South Sea Fleet and concurrently deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region. In 2004, he was appointed as one of the deputy chiefs of the general staff. In August 2006, Wu replaced Zhang Dingfa as the PLAN commander. Zhang Dingfa (2003-2006): Zhang was born in December 1943 in Shanghai and joined the PLAN in 1960. From 1960-1964, he was a cadet at a PLAN submarine academy. After graduating, he served as a submarine CO, zhidui deputy commander, assistant to the chief of staff of the NSF, and chief of staff of the Qingdao Base. He then successively became the chief of staff, deputy commander, and commander of the NSF. In November 2002, Zhang was assigned as the first naval officer to be the president of the PLAs Academy of Military Science (AMS). In June 2003, he replaced Shi Yunsheng as the PLAN commander. In September 2004, Zhang was selected as a concurrent member of the CMC, making him the first PLAN commander to hold this position. Zhang became seriously ill in January 2006 and was replaced in August 2006. Shi Yunsheng (1996-2003): Shi was born in Liaoning Province in January 1940 and joined the PLA in 1956. In 1958, he graduated from an aviation preparatory school. He then attended the PLAAFs 7th Aviation School in Changchun, graduating in 1962. After graduating, he served as a Naval Aviation pilot, zhongdui commander, dadui commander, and deputy regiment commander. In 1976, he was appointed as the deputy commander of NSF Naval Aviation. In 1981, he became a Naval Aviation division commander. In 1983, he was appointed as the SSF Naval Aviation commander. In 1990, he became a deputy commander of Naval Aviation. In November 1992, he was assigned as a PLAN deputy commander and was promoted to commander in November 1996. Shi served as the commander until he was relieved of duty in June 2003 as a result of the death of the entire crew on a Ming submarine two months earlier. Zhang Lianzhong (1988-1996): Zhang was born in June 1931 in Shandong Province and joined the PLA in 1947. During 1948, he participated in several campaigns against the Nationalists. Beginning in 1949, he served in several junior officer positions in the Third an infantry school in 1956, he served in several ground-force billets until he enrolled in a PLAN submarine school in August 1960. After graduating in 1965, he served in various billets, including a submarine CO, deputy zhidui commander, zhidui commander, NSF deputy chief of staff, Lushun Base commander, and PLAN deputy commander. He succeeded Liu Huaqing as commander of the PLAN in January 1988, serving in that post until November 1996. As a submariner, Zhang was the first PLAN commander to have served at sea. Liu Huaqing (1982-1988): Liu was born in October 1916 in Hubei Province and joined the Red Army at age 14 in 1930. He participated in the Long March, where he established personal relations that would serve him well in the future. For the next 15 years, he served in political commissar positions with various Red Army and PLA units. His naval career began when he was appointed as the deputy political commissar of the 1st Naval College in 1952. From 1954-1958, he attended the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad, where he was influenced by the writings of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. After returning to China in 1958, he served as first deputy-commander, chief of staff, and commander of the PLANs Lushun base, and deputy commander of the NSF. The second phase of his naval career began in 1961, when he was assigned as the president of the Ministry of National Defenses 7th Research Academy, which was established in 1965, Liu became a vice minister of the 6th Ministry of Machine Building (shipbuilding). The following year, he became a vice minister of the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry of National Defense (COSTIND), which was responsible for guiding development of the militarys weapon systems. In 1970, he returned to the PLAN as a deputy chief of staff. It was during this time that he also broadened his influence by becoming a member of the Party leading group of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, assistant to Deng Xiaoping (who at the time was the PLAs chief of the general staff), and then deputy chief of the general staff. In August 1982, he was assigned as the third PLA Navy commander. This position also included being selected as a member of the CCPs 12th Central Committee. In November 1987, Liu moved from the navy to the final phase of his military career in the CMC, where he eventually became the senior vice chairman and one of the most powerful men in the PLA behind Deng, who was the CMC chairman. In 1992, he also became a member of the 10th CCP Central Committees Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee, where he helped shape the future of the PLA as a whole. Ye Fei (1980-1982): Ye was born in the Philippines and his family returned to China when he was four years old. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1928 and the CCP in 1932. During the 1930s and 1940s, Ye was involved in CCP activities in southeastern China and as a political commissar and commander of various Red Army units. In 1953, he held several concurrent positions, including the governor of Fujian Province, deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, and commander and political commissar of the Fujian Military District. At age 40, Ye Fei received the rank of general when ranks were first given to the PLA in 1955. In 1975, he became the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRCs) Minister of Transportation. In February 1979, Deng Xiaoping appointed Ye, who had never served in the PLAN, as the Navys political commissar for one year. Deng then appointed him as the commander until August 1982. After leaving his position as PLAN commander, he served as the vice-chairman of the standing committee of the 6th and 7th National Peoples Congress (1983-1993). Xiao Jinguang (1950-1979): Xiao was born in January 1903 in Hunan Province. At age 16, Xiao became involved in political activities and joined the Communist Party at age 17. He studied in Moscow from 1921-1924. In 1925, he served as a political officer during the Northern Expedition and was given the rank of lieutenant general. He went back to Moscow in 1927 and studied there until 1930. From then until 1949, he served in various Red Army and PLA command and political commissar positions. At the age of 46, Xiao Jinguang became the Navys first commander. Technically, he held the position until December 1979. In 1962, however, Xiao came under attack from Defense

Minister Lin Biao, and Lin relieved him of his PLAN duties in January 1967. When Lins plane went down over Mongolia in September 1971, Xiao was reinstated but came under immediate attack from Mao Zedongs wife, Jiang Qing. For all practical purposes, the PLANs political commissar, Li Zuopeng, ran the Navy from 1962 until he was arrested immediately after Lins plane crash. China @ World Navies Today by by Andrew Toppan The Chinese Navy @ warships1.com Military Matchups : PRC vs. ROC by Peter Wang a major site with links Chinese Security Homepage by James Mulvenon includes Chinese Military Links Modern Weaponry for the PLA by ZYY - rather nice The Rising Sea Dragon in Asia By Jeff Head, 06 January 2004 Modernization of the PLA Navy and East Asian Regional Security Issues David C. Johnson, July 1996 China's Naval Strategy Srikanth Kondapalli, Research Fellow, IDSA Strategic Analysis March 2000 [Offline] Chinese Navy's Political Work and Personnel - Srikant Kondapalli Strategic Analysis January 2000 [Offline] Continuity and Change in China's Maritime Strategy - Swaran Singh Strategic Analysis December 1999 [Offline] China's Naval Equipment Acquisition Srikant Kondapalli Strategic Analysis December 1999 [Offline] China's Naval Structure and Dynamics Srikanth Kondapalli, Research Fellow Strategic Analysis October 1999 [Offline] The Armed Forces of China by You Ji (New York: I.B. Tauris; 1999) China Today: Defence Science and Technology, Vol. 2. [Beijing: National Defence Industry Press, 1993], pgs. 657-660. References Directory of PRC Military Personalities November 2002 Directory of PRC Military Personalities Serold Hawaii Inc, June 2000 Bernard D. Cole. "The Organization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)" The People's Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang eds. (Santa Monico: RAND; 2002) The Armed Forces of China by You Ji (New York: I.B. Tauris; 1999)

Naval Bases

People's Liberation Navy - Doctrine

Doctrine, Theory, and Practice The PLA does not have one specific word for doctrine, and it does not use a word substitute for doctrine in referring to its own operational theory or operational concepts. What the PLA does write about is operational theory and operational practice. Therefore, understanding the linkage between operational theory and operational practice in the PLA is an important tool for identifying operational concepts.In the PLA, the field of military science, which is the link between theory and practice, has two broad components: basic military theory and applied military theory. Basic military theory articulates the fundamental laws that govern modern military operations for the PLA. The PLA presents these fundamental laws in its professional institutions, textbooks, doctrinal literature, and training as strategic guidelines, operational concepts, and tactical guiding principles. Applied military theory is the practical application of those fundamental laws, guidelines, concepts and principles. Whereas basic military theory articulates what will guide the PLA in the application of military force at each level of warfare in broad conceptual terms, applied military theory addresses the specifics of how to do it. The PLAs Three Levels of Conflict The PLA writes that warfare consists of three levels of armed conflict and combat: war, campaigns, and battles. Wars can be either local or total. Wars are fought to achieve a nations overall political objectives. Campaigns serve as the operational link between the conduct of battles, which are tactical engagements, and the achievement of the nations overall objectives in a war. Each of the three levels of con- flict is informed by a different level of basic military theory as shown below.

Active Defense Strategic Guidelines As a component of the greater PLA, much of the strategic and operational jargon of the PLAN, its constructs for the analysis of warfare and operations, and the basics of Chinese naval military science reflect the universally applicable PLA approach. In other words, it is couched in Army terminology. It is arguable that the PLANs theory does not start resembling a distinctly naval organization until one goes down to the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, all of the PLAs major strategic and operational concepts apply equally to the PLA Navy. The near equivalent in China of the USs National Military Strategy is called The National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period. These guidelines have two major components. The first is a reform and modernization component, referred to as Army Building. It provides direction to the totality of the PLAs modernization efforts: equipment development and procurement, and institutional and organizational reforms. The current guidance for Army Building for the entire PLA is the Two Transformations program, which calls for the PLA to transform itself: From an army preparing to fight local wars under ordinary conditions to an army preparing to fight and win local wars under modern, high-tech conditions From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality. A corollary that usually accompanies these two imperatives in PLA literature is that the PLA must also transform itself from an army that is personnel intensive to one that is science and technology intensive Since the early 2000s, the PLA has also begun focusing on building a military based on informationalization and mechanization. The second component is operational, which provides a broad and overarching set of fundamental approaches to the conduct of war. These national-level operational guidelines are general. They are not intended to provide specific direction for campaign- or tacticallevel operations or even specific contingencies. They are always keyed to an assessment of the most likely type of conflict China will face in the near term (total war or local war, nuclear war or conventional war). The current operational component of the National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period is known as Active Defense as adjusted for the conduct of Local Wars Under Modern High-Tech Conditions. Active Defense, therefore, is the highest level of strategic guidance for all PLA military operations during war and preparation for war during peacetime. It applies to all PLA services and branches, including the PLAN. Offshore Defense In 1985, the CMC approved a PLAN component of the Active Defense strategic guidelines known as Offshore Defense. The PLAN also refers to this concept as the Offshore Defense Strategy. For an in depth report on the PLAN Offshore Defense Doctrine click here PLAN Campaigns The PLA has identified 22 types of campaigns it could conduct during a conflict. Of these, the PLAN has six key types of campaigns that it may be called upon to engage in, either as part of a larger joint campaign or as a singleservice affair. They include: Sea Blockade Campaign: A campaign aimed at blocking or reducing the sea links between the enemy and the rest of the world. Anti-Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Campaign: A campaign to damage and paralyze enemy sea lines of communication. Sea-to-Land Attack Campaign: A campaign aimed at attacking enemy naval bases, ports, and other important landbased targets. These campaigns can involve either the use of conventional weapons or sea-based nuclear weapons. Antiship Campaign: A campaign to destroy or damage large surface warships. It is the most typical of all naval campaigns. Sea Transportation Protection Campaign: A Navy campaign to defend the safety of sea transportation and sea lines of communication. Naval Base Defense Campaign: A campaign to resist large-scale enemy attack, blockade, or occupation of friendly naval bases. This includes defense against a variety of attacks, including attacks with submarines, surface warships, water mines, air and land attacks, and attacks with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Three Attacks and Three Defenses Within its 22 campaigns, the PLA conducts training on specific types of combat methods for what it calls the Three Attacks and Three Defenses. Originally, the Three Attacks referred to attacks against tanks, aircraft, and airborne forces, and the Three Defenses referred to defense against chemical, biological, and nuclear attack. In 1999, the PLA initiated the concept of New Three Attacks, which refers to attacks against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters, and the New Three Defenses, which refers to defense against precision strikes, electronic jamming, and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. The PLAN is actively involved in developing and training with its own combat methods for the new Three Attacks and Three Defenses. Key Guidance Documents The PLAN disseminates its operational and training guidance via official documents, slogans, and books. The highest-level campaign guidance documents are known as gangyao.6 Other layers in the process include the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, military training guidance concepts, regulations, and teaching materials. What is significant is that the PLAN has published an entirely new set of revised guidance documents since the end of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). The Gangyao Campaign gangyao are an authoritative and official set of guidelines, often classified, which have a relatively long shelf life (5 to 10 years) and from which other more granular guidance, derived. Comparable US Navy documents would be a classified Naval Doctrine Publication. In 1999, the PLAN reissued its Campaign Gangyao at the same time the PLA reissued revised campaign gangyao for the Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery. At that time, the PLA also issued its first ever Joint Campaign Gangyao and Joint Logistics Campaign Gangyao Outline of Military Training and Evaluation In June 2001, the General Staff Department issued a completely revised Outline of Military Training and Evaluation or OMTE for the ground forces, which, as a set of classified documents, is simply identified in PLA writings as dagang. After three years of research and writing, the PLAN published its own completely revised set of OMTE in January 2002. In April 2002, the PLAAF reissued all of its OMTE. Of note, the word evaluation was not included until the revised OMTE were issued. According to PLAN writings, the OMTE consists of the standardized documents used by each branch and type of vessel unit to organize and conduct military training. The OMTE are divided according to branch, vessel type, specialized function, and specialized technology. Their content includes the guiding thought, training subjects, content, timing, and objectives of training. The OMTE stipulate the procedures for implementing training, the drafting of plans, the topics and programs, the training organization, and the examination and assessment of training. Some examples of PLAN OMTE are as follows: Units Equipped with Each Class of Naval Submarine and Surface Vessel Units Equipped with Each Type of Naval Aviation Aircraft, AAA, and SAM Naval Coastal Defense Artillery and Missile Units Marine Corps Logistics Units Chemical Defense Units Military Training Guidance Concepts Based on specific military training guidance concepts established by the four general departments, the PLA Navy has identified similar, if not the same, concepts as the basic principles for its military training. They are merely a set of 16 characters organized into four sets of four characters. A review of the PLAN writings identified the following PLAN military training guidance concepts: Closely adhere to actual combat situations Stress training against opposition forces Implement strict discipline during training Apply science and technology during training PLAN Regulations The PLAN has a wide range of documents with different names that can all be translated in English as rules and regulations. Different headquarters can issue different types of rules and regulations. Only the four general departments and service headquarters can issue certain types of regulations. Units as low as a regiment can issue various types of regulations. Teaching Materials The PLAN uses teaching materials based on the documents and training guidance concepts, which are written by organizations such as the PLAN Command Academy and the PLAs Academy of Military Science (AMS).

People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense

In 1985, the CMC approved a PLAN component of the Active Defense strategic guidelines known as Offshore Defense. The PLAN also refers to this concept as the Offshore Defense Strategy. Operationally, Offshore Defense adheres to the following basic tenets of Active Defense: Overall, our military strategy is defensive. We attack only after being attacked. But our operations are offensive. Space or time will not limit our counteroffensive. We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offensives. We will wait for the time and conditions that favor our forces when we do initiate offensive operations. We will focus on the opposing forces weaknesses. We will use our own forces to eliminate the enemys forces Offensive operations against the enemy and defensive operations for our own force protection will be conducted simultaneously Offshore Defense as a Strategic Paradigm Shift Adopting Offshore Defense represented a significant strategic paradigm shift for both PLAN operations and naval modernization. It revised the strategic-level operational guidance to the PLAN, directing it to shift from preparing for operations close to Chinese shores to preparing for maritime operations in the seas off the Chinese littoral. The PLANs previous strategic concept of Coastal Defense focused planning and operations on a close-in defense of Chinas coast in support of a major land war. Specifically, Coastal Defense addressed an anticipated Soviet land invasion from the north supported by operations against the Chinese coast by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Hence, the PLAN was landward-focused and was expected to play a supporting role in Chinas most likely assessed future contingency. As a result, with the promulgation of Offshore Defense in 1985, the PLANs strategic orientation was redirectedout to sea. As is usually the case in China, this major shift in maritime strategic reorientation was a response to a changed assessment of the international security environment and

changes in global military capabilities. By 1985, Beijing no longer believed that a Soviet land invasion was likely. Furthermore, Chinese assessments of the changes in naval warfare, especially the increasing reach of modern naval weapons, led to requirements for a naval service that could defend China by operating credibly further out at sea. The adoption of Offshore Defense also matched Chinas changing priorities, specifically Dengs focus on economic modernization and the realization that ocean resourcesfood and energy sourceswould be of increasing importance to Chinas future development. Moreover, the need for greater strategic depth for the maritime defense of Chinas coastline was clear given that the PRCs economic center of gravity was quickly shifting from deep in the interior to Chinas eastern seaboard. Finally, Offshore Defense and the PLANs move out to sea coincided with increased international of ocean resources, issues associated with the sovereignty of territorial waters, and, equally important, competing maritime claims among the nations of Asia. Offshore Defense as a Broad Strategic Concept According to PLAN writings, Offshore Defense is simply an overarching strategic concept that directs the PLAN to be prepared to accomplish its three key missions for the new period by engaging in maritime operations out at sea and building a naval service that is capable of sustaining operations out at sea. Those three key missions are to: Keep the enemy within limits and resist invasion from the sea Protect the nations territorial sovereignty Safeguard the motherlands unity and maritime rights The Changing Definition of "Offshore" Among many foreign specialists of the PLAN, the meaning behind Offshore Defense as a broad strategic-level operational concept has often become enmeshed with the associated questions of operational reach, strategic intentions, and PLAN modernization programs. An example is the idea of operating within the two island chains or out to the 200nauticalmile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The first island chain is usually described as a line through the Kurile Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Borneo to Natuna Besar). The second island chain runs from a northsouth line from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. Together, they encompass maritime areas out to approximately 1,800 nm from Chinas coast, including most of the East China Sea and East Asian SLOCs. Most commonly, the discussion about Offshore Defense has used terms that link it to geographic boundaries out at sea, future aspirations to control various zones of ocean, or intentions to dominate island chains. When the Offshore Defense concept was first being formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and for some time after its formal adoption in 1985, the PLAN engaged in a good deal of debate and produced a good number of studies on the issue of how far offshore Offshore Defense should be. Many of the internal debates did in fact argue in terms of geography. Moreover, PLAN officers have often explained the Offshore Defense concept to foreigners in terms that are justified by the right of China to defend its claims of sovereignty over its EEZ, thus confusing the issue by implying a 200-nm limit on the concept. It is clear, however, that Offshore Defense has evolved beyond the question of geography or geographic reach. Research strongly suggests that, today, the term Offshore Defense does not imply any geographic limits or boundaries. It does not appear that there is today, in fact, any official minimum or maximum distances out into the oceans associated with the Offshore Defense concept. According to the PLAs Academy of Military Science, Prior to the 1980s, the PLAN considered offshore to mean 200 nm from Chinas coast. Under Deng Xiaopings guidance in the 1980s, Chinas offshore included the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the Spratly Islands, the sea area inside and outside of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, and the sea area in the northern Pacific Ocean. In 1997, Jiang Zemin provided guidance to the PLAN that it should focus on raising its offshore comprehensive combat capabilities within the first island chain, should increase nuclear and conventional deterrence and counterattack capabilities, and should gradually develop combat capabilities for distant ocean defense. So, how far offshore will Offshore Defense take the PLA Navy? According to PLAN officers, and implied in some PLAN publications, the answer appears to beas far as the PLA Navys capabilities will allow it to operate task forces out at sea with the requisite amount of support and security. For many PLAN officers, this is still a function of the operational reach of the PLAs landbased aircraft and the PLANs antisubmarine warfare capabilities.PRC military theorists conceive of two island "chains" as forming a geographic basis for Chinas maritime defensive perimeter. The precise boundaries of these chains have never been officially defined by the Chinese government, and so are subject to some specualtion. By one account, China's "green water" extends eastward in the Pacific Ocean out to the first island chain, which is formed by the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan's archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo. Further eastward is "blue water" extending to the second island chain running from the north at the Bonin Islands and moving southward through the Marianas, Guam, and the Caroline Islands. Adm. Liu Huaqing was chief of the PLAN (198288) and later vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (198997). Liu and others defined [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Peoples Liberation Army, 2004)] the First Island Chain, or current limit of most PLAN operations, as comprising Japan and its northern and southern archipelagos (the latter disputed by China), South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Second Island Chain, which Liu envisioned as being fully within the scope of future PLAN activities, ranges from the Japanese archipelago south to the Bonin and Marshall islands, including Guam.Initially, China would seek to be able to control over the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The three seas are all located within the "first island chain" of the Pacific Ocean, including the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands. Some Chinese analysts writing publicly include Diego Garcia, the key US military base in the Indian Ocean, as an element in the geostrategic belt enveloping Chinas coasts. Writing in Guofang Bao [Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, 100,000 US Troops in the Asia-Pacific Look for New Homes, Guofang Bao, June 10, 2003, 1, FBIS-CPP20030611000068], Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang depicted the first island chain as sweeping all the way through the Indonesian archipelago to Diego Garcia in a single, unbroken arc. That is, in this conception the "first island chain" are the sea lines of communication between China and the oil fields of South West Asia.The waterways within the "second island chain" including the Japan Sea, the Philippines Sea and Indonesia Sea, covering Kuriles, Kokkaido, and Marianas and Palau Islands in the south. To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. US DOD analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggested as of 2007 that in the near term, China was seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that reaches out to the second island chain (i.e., the islands extending south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean). One area of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of medium-range ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support infrastructure. Other analysts believe that if China truly intends to expand its regional control to the "second island chain," they will have to build or acquire

aircraft carriers to achieve this capability. In the conception of Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, the second island chain runs through Guam another forward redoubt for US forces and ends at Australia. Other analysts see Guam as in a "third island chain." Some unofficial Chinese publications refer to a Third Island Chain centered on Americas Hawaiian bases, viewed as a strategic rear area for the US military.

PLA Doctrinal Development Because the PLA is a conservative organization, it takes time to enact major institutional, systemic, or operational changes. This also includes the internal resistance such changes often encounter. When the PLA does move toward making major doctrinal, administrative, or operational reforms, the evidence methodical process. Based on an understanding of the organization, roles, and missions of the PLA in general, it is apparent that most major reforms go through a thorough and sequential 10-step process as follows: Recognize there is a problem Conduct research and theoretical work to look for solutions Experiment with new concepts Make adjustments to theories and experiments based on results Establish limited prototypes or conduct larger exercises to validate adjustments Promulgate regulations or directives to codify changes Study the new procedures PLA- or servicewide Execute the new procedures Inspect from the center for compliance Declare success or identify contradictions Merely getting to the point of a codification of what the new changes should be on any major issue requires a good deal of ad-hoc committee work and consensus building within the PLA community responsible for the particular change, reform, or adjustment to practice. Not surprisingly, major reforms in the PLA also require a political imprimatur. Most directives, policies, and regulations are issued under the authority of the CMC. However, when potentially significant (and potentially dislocating) change is required or a completely new direction is taken, the reforms are further justified by the invocation of the ideological correctness of the policy. Ideological correctness is a function of invoking a body of military theories, thinking, or thought that is tied to the original military thinking of one of Chinas past (or present) leaders. This invocation of such high-level ideological justification is continually referred to even after the fact of the change in order to reinforce the seriousness of the need within the PLA to carry through with the intent of the change or reform. As such, each doctrinal reform can take a different amount of time, depending on the scope of the changes. In some cases, however, the changes take place in conjunction with one of Chinas Five-Year Plans. They are identified forimplementation either at the end of one plan for the next plan, or at the beginning of the plan. PLAN Doctrine The Navy Military Studies Research Institute is the single most important center in the PLAN for the developmeny of national-level naval strategy, the development of navy operational- level (campaign-level) warfighting concepts, naval tactics, and research and studies that look to the future of naval warfare and the development of foreign naval issues. Established in August 1985, the PLAN refers to it in English as the Navy Research Institute (NRI). Tactics, Combat Methods, and Training Concept Development The PLAN follows a basic seven-step process in developing new tactics, combat methods, and training concepts, which can take several years to complete. Although the PLAN has a Naval Tactics Department in NRI, it often tasks specific operational units as test points to develop certain tactics and combat methods and to test new concepts. For example, the PLAN identi- fied several different units as test points for the new OMTE up to two years before it was finally published. The eight steps are as follows: Study the theory. This can be done by bringing in specialists from PLAN and civilian institutions. In addition, the project participants at the unit usually visit PLAN academies and research institutes, as well as the civilian production facilities for the equipment being studied. Begin developing the concepts on paper and receive theoretical evaluation approval from higher headquarters for them. Begin using the specific equipment or weapon system to develop and revise the concepts. Test the concepts at a PLAN test facility. Receive a technical evaluation and approval from higher headquarters. PLAN Headquarters authorizes them for use throughout the force. Demonstrate the tactics, combat methods, or training concepts to VIPs and the rest of the force. Units begin to implement the changes.

People's Liberation Navy - Defense White Papers

Chinas 2004 Defense White Paper The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding Chinas maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests. Preparation for the maritime battlefield has been intensified and improved while the integrated combat capabilities are being enhanced to conduct offshore campaigns. The capability of nuclear counter-attacks has also been enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy has compressed the chain of command and reorganized the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to building maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. The PLA Navy has also sped up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat ships as well as various kinds of specialpurpose aircraft and relevant equipment. At the same time, the weaponry is increasingly informationalized and long-range precision strike capability raised. Chinas 2006 Defense White Paper The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks. The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations.

People's Liberation Navy -Foreign Policy

Since the mid-1990's, most Asian nations have taken advantage of naval diplomacy to further their foreign policy goals, and the regions naval activities have increasingly expanded from bilateral to multilateral in focus. The 17-member Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has held 10 biennial meetings and multiple preparatory workshops since it was established in 1988. WPNS has 21 member countries, including China, plus four observer countries. Beijing has taken full advantage of this trend in naval diplomacy by using the PLAN as a valuable, but small component of its robust worldwide, multilevel foreign relations program. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated a broad program of foreign military exchanges in the late 1970s, PLAN commanders have traveled abroad about 21 times to 34 different countries, and have hosted more than 70 counterparts from about 30 countries. The PLANs political commissars have traveled abroad only a few times. In addition, the PLAN has conducted 25 ship visits abroad to 60 countries and territories. The PLAN conducted its first around-the-world voyage in 2002. Within the context of its overall naval foreign relations program, the PLAN has taken a high-profile, dual-purpose posture in the South China Sea. On one hand, the PLAN has increased its physical presence in the South China Sea and East China Sea, while on the other hand it has increased the number of port calls as a form of confidence-building measures. Chinas Military Diplomacy Since China began to open to the outside world in the early 1980s, the PLAs foreign relations have evolved as a means to advance Chinas national defense policy in several ways. According to the PRCs 2004 defense white paper, Adhering to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, China persists in developing friendly relations and strengthening cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and devotes itself to promoting international security dialogues and cooperation of all forms. Based on information from the PRCs five defense white papers and other PLA writings, the five general goals of the PLAs foreign exchange program are listed below. For all practical purposes, the PLA has been fairly successful in meeting each of these goals. Shape the international security environment to support key national security objectives Improve political and military relations with foreign countries Provide military assistance to developing countries Enhance Chinas military and defense industry modernization by acquiring technology and advancing key research and development programs through foreign assistance Help Chinas military leaders, younger officers, and civilian cadre acquire modern military knowledge, especially from the developed world, in doctrine, operations, training, military medicine, administration, and a host of non-combat-related areas. PLAN Foreign Relations As part of the PLAs overall foreign affairs program, the PLANs interaction with foreign countries has four major components, including high-level exchanges, ship visits, functional exchanges, and arms sales and purchases. High-Level Naval Exchanges High-level naval exchanges by the PLAN and foreign naval officers can be divided into the following categories, some of which may overlap: International politics Arms purchases and technology transfer Show the flag and promote goodwill Regional security discussions As the figures below show, travel by the PLAN commander has been somewhat uneven. From 1991-2002, the PLAN commander averaged one trip abroad per year, involving one to four countries. Since early 2002, the three PLAN commanders have continued to host several foreign naval counterparts each year, but no PLAN commander has traveled abroad. The last PLAN political commissar visit abroad was in early 2003, when Vice Admiral Yang Huaiqing visited Algeria and Mexico before he and Shi Yunsheng were replaced as a result of the Ming submarine accident. These visits are not concentrated in any one geographical region, but are split almost evenly between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, followed by South America and North America. A PLAN commander has only made one visit to Africa and zero visits to the Middle East. The commander has visited only one Southeast Asian country.

Blending Diplomacy with Seamanship As shown in the next set of figures, (below) China sent only 2 task groups abroad to 4 countries and hosted 23 port calls from 14 countries during the 1980s. During the 1990s, the PLAN dispatched 10 task groups for port calls to 20 countries and hosted 30 port calls from 17 countries. Since January 2000, the PLAN has sent 13 task forces on 37 country visits and hosted about 25 foreign naval ship visits. The PLAN has conducted all of its ship visits using 7 different destroyers, 7 frigates, 2 training ships, and 6 replenishment ships. As the program has progressed, the PLAN has used its port calls as an opportunity to show off its newest ships as well as to train its crews in open-ocean operations.

A typical PLAN port call abroad lasts 2-4 days in each country. The task force commander is usually one of the three fleet commanders. The shortest voyage was to North Korea and the longest voyage covered more than 30,000 nautical miles and four months to circumnavigate the globe in 2002. Some of the visits have been arranged so that the PLAN could participate in various anniversaries, such as Indonesias 50th anniversary, the 35th anniversary of the Sino-DPRK friendship treaty, the 30th anniversary of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations, the 50th anniversary of Sino-Pakistan relations, the 100th anniversary of the Philippine Navy, and Russias 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy. Foreign ships have visited Shanghai, Qingdao, Zhanjiang, and Guangzhou. Of these, Shanghai has received the most visitors. For example, as of August 2006, Shanghai had hosted more than 60,000 people in 912 delegations and 87 port calls by foreign vessels from 120 countries. In 2003, the PLAN conducted its first joint maritime search-and-rescue exercises during separate visits by vessels from Pakistan and India. Since then, it has conducted similar exercises with French, British, and Australian vessels. The PLAN also conducted searchandrescue exercises during its ship visits to the United States, Canada, and the Philippines in late 2006. For comparison purposes, the US Navy Seventh Fleets official website states, Seventh Fleet units conduct more than 100 exercises per year with nations throughout Asia. These exercises are an essential part of our overall engagement program, and are imperative to building friendships and maintaining interoperability. The PLAN identifies the following three broad objectives for its ship visits: Improving political and military relations between China and the PLAN host country at the state-to-state level Learning lessons from foreign militaries that may prove useful in the PLANs modernization efforts Improving relations between China and the PLAN host country at the person-toperson level State-to-State Diplomacy The primary objective of PLAN ship visits is to improve political and military relations between China and the PLAN host nation. While the total number of dispatched task forces and country visits is still relatively low, there has been a significant increase in the quantity of PLAN ship visits abroad since 1997. The first year China dispatched two task forces in a single year was 1997. It was also the first time a PLAN vessel visited South America. Indeed, this was the first time a PLAN vessel visited anywhere outside the Asia-Pacific region. The growing quantity and scope of PLAN voyages beginning in 1997 illustrates the increased foreign- policy role China assigns to its naval fleet. During those 1997 voyages, the PLAN assigned precedence to showing the Chinese flag abroad at the expense of Chinese military readiness. The overriding goal was to illustrate to the people of those countries, including overseas Chinese who visited the ships in huge numbers during port calls, that China and the PLAN were both open to the outside world and no longer just a backward coastal navy. Significantly, China simultaneously deployed its only two relatively capable, reasonably modern warships, the two new Luhu-class guided-missile destroyers, away from Chinese waters. The readiness of these ships to participate in some potential crisis, such as in the Taiwan Strait, was effectively subordinated to the value of sending these ships to North and South America and to three ASEAN countries. Second, the government and the PLAN expended the effort and resources to plan and conduct these extensive cruises, accepting the risk that its untested ships might break down or

that other embarrassing circumstances might be encountered. Finally, of the 60 country visits made by PLAN ships since 1985, 77% of those visits have taken place since 1997. Prior to 1997, PLAN vessels had conducted 14 country visits in the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States (Hawaii). Since January 1997, PLAN vessels have conducted 46 country and territory visits, including 24 in the Asia-Pacific region, 6 in North America, 5 in South America, 8 in Europe and 3 in Africa. Modernization Lessons The next objective of PLAN ship visits is to provide the PLAN with an opportunity for observing foreign navies and gathering examples that may prove useful in its own modernization efforts. During such visits, they attempt to understand the profound differences between the PLANs posture, doctrine, and attitudes as contrasted with other navies, especially the USN, which it sees as a world standard. The PLAN takes every advantage to learn as much as possible from foreign ship visits to China. In an unprecedented move, Beijing accepted an invitation from Washington to send PLAN officers to observe RimPac 98, the major multinational Pacific Ocean naval exercise. Similar previous invitations had been rejected, due to Chinas general aversion to activities that might contribute towards the appearance or reality of an Asia-Pacific regional security architecture. Two Chinese representatives, the commanding officer of a PLAN destroyer and an associate professor at the Naval Command Academy, were sent to observe. Person-to-Person Diplomacy The final goal of PLAN ship visits is to improve relations between China and the private citizens of PLAN host nations. During the port calls abroad, the PLAN has engaged in several activities. Like the other PLA and PLAAF officers who have traveled abroad, the task force leaders have met with senior government and military officials of the host country and paid visits to naval schools and facilities. The PLAN delegation also opens their ships for visits by naval officials and the public. During the 1997 visit to the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile, more than 64,000 people visited the ships. The Navy has also drawn the attention of local Chinese, such as during their visit to Seattle in 2000 where hundreds of overseas Chinese adults and students, as well as 100 children from a local Chinese-language school, participated in the open house. PLAN sailors have engaged in soccer and basketball competition with the host countrys sailors. Meanwhile, the host country usually provides some type of honor ceremony and provides local entertainment for the crew, such as when Malaysian native tribes performed traditional singing and dance. During the training ship Zhenghes visit to Hawaii in 1989, the local Chinese-American community in Honolulu held several special events for and in honor of the crew. Functional and Educational Exchanges Functional and educational exchanges are conducted primarily to benefit naval modernization efforts, but they also meet some criteria for supporting Chinas foreign policy. The PLANs relations with other navies provide ideas for the badly needed PLAN reforms in areas such as personnel management, training, logistics, and equipment maintenance. The PLAN has also adopted other concepts from foreign navies. Specifically, the PLAN is emulating programs for training students attending civilian universities to become Navy officers. China will increasingly look to its version of a Naval Reserve Officer Training program to supplement its naval academies in supplying officers, especially officers with technical degrees who can function better in a navy adopting advanced technologies. The PLAN has used various educational exchanges to support the broader goals of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA. This is reflected in its small-scale undertakings involving other countries with which the Chinese government has pursued closer ties. The PLAN provided training for students from Cambodia and several African countries in PLAN facilities in Qingdao and Shanghai, but this apparently ended in the early 1980s. The PLAN provided training for the Thai Navy in the early 1990s in connection with Thailands purchase from China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) of four Jianghu frigates two of which visited Shanghai in September 2002. Similar training has been provided to the Egyptian Navy. The training for Thailand and Egypt was conducted by the PLAN but funded by CSSC. Between 1985 and 1993, the PLAN had only about 100 naval personnel take part in academic exchanges and/or study abroad. By the late-1990s, the PLAN had stopped, at least temporarily, sending officers abroad for training in military schools. This is in contrast to the other services that stepped up their student activities abroad. One possible reason is that former PLAN Commander Zhang Lianzhongs negative attitude toward foreign travel affected this aspect of the PLANs foreign relations, but it may also be that the PLAN spends the majority of its foreign relations budget on ship visits. Looking to the Future The PLAN has become fairly predictable in its foreign relations cycle since the mid-1990s and will most likely continue at the same pace for the rest of this decade. Although Chinas commander and ship visits abroad have received attention over the past few years, they are remarkable primarily because they have occurred within the context of Chinese naval modernization. While both total numbers of commander and ship visits are small, they are noteworthy given the fact that the PLAN is an organization in flux; it is currently seeking a new doctrine and the capabilities to implement this as-yet undefined doctrine. On the other hand, these exchanges are also noteworthy given the fact that they have increased at such a small pace and scale relative to high-level Chinese military visits from the PLA ground forces and Air Force. Between now and 2010, the PLAN can be expected to average one annual voyage consisting of two to three port calls abroad and to host five to ten foreign ships per year. There are no discernible PLAN preferences for which months to conduct port calls, but none have taken place during January or February. Foreign ship port calls will take place equally throughout the year and will be an even mix between Shanghai and Qingdao, with an occasional visit to Guangzhou. The PLAN commander has not traveled abroad since 2002. Initially, the reason was due to the fallout from the Ming submarine accident in early 2003 and commander Shi Yunshengs subsequent replacement that summer. It is not clear why Zhang Dingfa did not travel during 2004 and 2005, but may have to do with health reasons that led to his removal from office in August 2006. Now that Wu Shengli has become the commander, he and his successor will most likely continue to take one trip overseas to one to four countries and to host an average of three to six counterparts per year. PLAN political commissars have led only four delegations abroad since 1990, so they are not expected to travel much over the next decade. Overall, the total number of PLAN flag officers who travel abroad is comparatively less than the Army or Air Force. This most likely reflects the Armys dominance of the program and that the PLAN spends most of its foreign relations budget hosting foreign ships and conducting its own ship visits abroad. There are certain predictors for PLAN commander and ship visits abroad. One predictor for ship visits abroad is upcoming anniversaries, including five-year increments of diplomatic ties with the PRC or major host-country naval anniversaries. In addition, the PLAN dispatched its two Luhu destroyers (Harbin and Qingdao), its first Luhai destroyer (Shenzhen), and all of its Jiangwei frigates on port calls 18-48 months after they were commissioned. The question is whether the PLAN will follow the same pattern and use its new Sovremenny destroyers for port visits at some point in the near future. Concerning visits by the PLAN commander, at least one trip to Pakistan and Thailand will most likely occur. Regionally, an equal number of trips to Asia and Europe will take place, with at least one to two visits including countries in South America. About one-half of the commanders visits will be reciprocal exchanges either the year before or the year after hosting his counterpart. He will most likely travel during April, July, or November, and will probably not travel between December and March. Most of the PLANs senior officer and ship

visits with particular countries have taken place along with increased exchanges among senior political and military officials. These of- ficials include the president, premier, foreign minister, Central Military Commission vicechairmen, defense minister, and chief of the general staff. There is no discernible pattern as to whether the PLAN visits take place before or after any other official. This trend will most likely continue throughout the decade. There are political and economic limitations, however, to the number of exchanges China and the region can handle in the future. Most countries in Asia, including China, limit themselves to the total number of military exchanges they can hold annually, and specific limits are placed on the number and types of relations they hold with individual countries. Besides political issues, there are limited funds for these exchanges. It is expensive, and getting more expensive every year, to send delegations abroad and to host foreign delegations in-country. In addition, the rising cost of fuel will limit what some navies can accomplish in the future. Finally, the PLAN has military attachs assigned in only a couple of countries, including the United States and Britain

People's Liberation Navy - Organizational Structure

The PLAN considers its founding day as 23 April 1949, when the East China Military Region Navy was created. In January 1950, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committees Military Commission, commonly known as the Central Military Commission (CMC), appointed an Army general, Xiao Jinguang, as the first PLAN commander. On 14 April 1950, PLAN Headquarters was officially established in Beijing. As of 2007, the PLAN was composed of five branches submarine, surface forces, naval aviation, coastal defense, and marine corps. It also has 10 subordinate academies and schools, as well as various research institutes, specialized support forces, and a political, logistics, and maintenance structure. These forces are organized into three fleetsNorth Sea Fleet (NSF), East Sea Fleet (ESF), and South Sea Fleet (SSF). The PLANs primary missions are to guard against enemy invasion from the sea, defend the states sovereignty over its territorial waters, and safeguard the states maritime rights and interests. Unit Designators Every PLAN platoon and above unit has a True Unit Designator or TUD, such as the 62nd Submarine Zhidui or the Qingdao Support Base. However, the PLAN rarely provides these designators to the public in speeches or newspaper articles, on letterhead, or on Internet sites. Instead, the PLAN identifies them as a certain unit, such as a certain North Sea Fleet submarine zhidui. In some cases, the PLAN identifies regiment level and above units with what it calls a unit designator code. Outside China, this is known as a Military Unit Cover Designator, or MUCD. People's Liberation Navy - Organizational Terminology The DIA in 2007 related that the PLAN had three echelons below the Fleet level. DIA would translate Zhidui as a Flotilla, Dadui as either a Squadron (of vessels) or a Group (aviation, training, and ground-based), and Zhongdui as a battalion-leader organization for surface ships or a Squadron (for aviation). Zhidui might be directly rendered as "leading team". Zhidui Flotilla: A PLAN zhidui [Flotilla] is a division leader-grade vessel headquarters organization, which various dictionaries translate as a flotilla or division. The PLAN has seven types of zhidui: Submarine Destroyer Frigate Speedboat Combat support vessel Submarine chaser and frigate Landing ship Some zhidui are combined-vessel zhidui that are composed of several types of vessels. For example, the PLAN has destroyer and frigate zhidui, nuclear and conventional submarine zhidui, and speedboat zhidui that consist of missile boats, minesweeper boats, submarine chasers, and torpedo boats. Vessel zhidui normally have a set number of support vessels. Dadui Squadron: A PLAN dadui [Squadron] can be either a regiment-leader or battalion-leader grade organization, depending on which branch and type of unit is being discussed. When applied to naval vessels, a dadui is a regiment leader-grade vessel headquarters organization and is most often translated as a squadron. Training dadui are also regiment leader-grade organizations. For PLAN aviation, coastal defense, Marine Corps, and maintenance troops, a dadui is a battalion leader-grade headquarters organization, which is sometimes translated as a group. In other contexts, Dadui might be rendered as "company", or "big team, or "Brigade". But in a military context, a Brigade would be designated as l, and even though a Dadui might be about the size of a regiment, a Regiment may be better rendered as tuan. For a quarter century, until the economic reforms of 1978-1979, the communes and their subunits, the production brigades (shengchan dadui) and the lower-level production teams (shengchan dui) were the fundamental political, social, and economic units of rural China. The production brigades and lower-level production teams [shengchan dadui and shengchan dui] were built on existing structures of the local community, but redefined as a product of the state. In the pre-reform era the collectivized unit of agricultural production was called dadui or shenchan dadui, literally meaning big production team. The dadui had tremendous local decision making power. Subsequent to the reforms, the body of the production brigade (shengchan dadui) was turned to administrative villages (xingzheng cun), while farmers of production teams were organised into villager groups. In the post-reform era, most of the dadui simply became Village Level Administration, as collectivesed farming was phased out and replaces with household responsibility system (occasional collectivised dadui still remain). With village elections came the Village Committee (VC) and the Villagers Group (VG) [in over 60% of all the villages nationwide by 1997] which performed functions similar to those once performed by shengchan dadui (village brigade) and shengchan xiaodui (production team) under the commune system. Though the term is rarely officially used, nowadays many anachronistically call themselves dadui. In post-reform China many have taken on the role of organising enterprises where resources are pooled and collective investments made. They are known as TVEs or Township Village Enterprises and their success have contributed a great deal to Chinas economic rise. Zhongdui Detachment: This level of organization for vessels is generally not discussed in English-language articles about the PLAN, nor is there any standard [or even readily available nautical] rendering of this term. For PLAN vessels and training organizations, this is a battalion leader-grade organization. For PLAN aviation, coastal defense, Marine Corps, and maintenance troops, this is a company leader-grade organization.

A Zhongdui is literally a "medium team" or "Medium Detachment", but the term is also rendered as company [People's Armed Police, but not Army, which uses the term lian] or a Squadron (for aviation). PAP regiments range from 800 to more than 2000 troops, and are broken down into battalion (dadui) and company (zhongdui) sub-units. A security guards company (lian or zhongdui) might be made up of 100 or so soldiers, while a security guards platoon (pai) might be roughly 35 strong. PLAAF's main arm, the aviation troop aircraft, are organized into air divisions (shi), air regiments (tuan), groups (dadui), and squadrons (zhongdui). The term zhongdui is also used to designate Chinese naval commando reconnaissance units. In Chinese prisons inmates are organized into brigades (dadui), squadrons (zhongdui), and teams (xiaodui). The PLAN has the following five specific terms for its vessels, ships, and boats, each with a specific meaning and organizational grade level. Within the PLAN, each type of vessel is assigned one of the PLAs 15 grades. The vessel terms and their grades are shown below: Jianting and jianchuan are generic terms that refer to boats, ships, and vessels. Chuan is best translated as a ship. Within the PLAN, a chuan is a non-combat support vessel that can be of any size or type. Therefore, there is no set grade level for a chuan. In fact, the commander for some chuan are noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Jian is best translated as a ship. Within the PLAN, a jian is a combat vessel that is more than 400 tons. A jian is a regiment leader-grade organization. Ting is best translated as a boat. Within the PLAN, a ting is a vessel that is less than 400 tons. Certain types of ting are now more than 400 tons, especially after they have been upgraded with heavier weapon systems, but the designation has remained based on historical precedence. The highest grade for a ting is battalion leader-grade, but some ting can be lower than battalion leader-grade. For example, a 125-ton escort boat is a company leader-grade organization; a guided missile boat is a company deputy leader-grade or platoon leader-grade organization; and a landing craft, which has an NCO as the commander, does not have a grade. In the PLAN, a submarine is classified as a boat. However, nuclear submarines are considered a division deputygrade organization, and conventional-powered submarines are considered regiment deputy-leader grade organizations. Below shows the grade structure for the three types of vessel headquarters and vessel types that are subordinate to the headquarters. For example, destroyers, which are a regiment leader-grade organization, are subordinate to a zhidui headquarters, and frigates, which are a regiment deputy leader-grade organization, are subordinate to a dadui headquarters.

Commander, PLAN North Sea Fleet Naval AF, NSF U/I NAF DIV U/I NAF DIV U/I NAF DIV U/I Destroyer Flotilla U/I Destroyer Flotilla U/I Destroyer Flotilla (Poss) 1 Submarine Flotilla 2 Submarine Flotilla 12 Submarine Flotilla 62 Submarine Flotilla U/I Amphibious Flotilla (Poss) U/I Patrol Boat Flotilla U/I Amphibious Flotilla U/I Amphibious Flotilla (Poss) U/I Patrol Boat Flotilla U/I Patrol Boat Flotilla U/I Amphibious Flotilla (Poss) U/I Amphibious Flotilla (Poss) U/I Patrol Boat Flotilla 11 Patrol Boat Flotilla 1 Marine BDE 2 Marine BDE 3 Destroyer Flotilla 6 Destroyer Flotilla 8 Destroyer Flotilla 22 Submarine Flotilla 42 Submarine Flotilla U/I Destroyer Flotilla U/I Destroyer Flotilla (Poss) U/I Destroyer Flotilla (Poss) 32 Submarine Flotilla East Sea Fleet Naval AF, ESF 4 NAF DIV 6 NAF DIV South Sea Fleet Naval AF, SSF 8 NAF DIV 9 NAF DIV

People's Liberation Navy - Leadership

Leadership is implemented at all levels in the PLAN as a shared responsibility through the CCP Party committee system. In general, every headquarters organization in the PLAN down to the company level has a commander and a co-equal political officer. The commander and political officer, along with the deputy commanders, deputy political officers, and the directors of the four departments (Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment), compose the Party committees standing committee, where all major decisions are discussed and decided upon for implementation. The political officer usually serves as the Party secretary and the commander as the deputy secretary. In September 2004, the commander of the PLAN, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, became the first PLAN commander ever to serve concurrently as a member of the CCP Central Committees Military Commission (CMC). His promotion and appointment to the CMC provided a unique challenge for the PLAN within the PLA hierarchy. All organizations within the PLA are assigned one of 15 grades. In addition, the commander and political officer are assigned the same grade. However, when Zhang Dingfa was promoted one grade as a CMC member, neither the grade for the PLAN as an organization nor the grade of the PLAN political commissar was raised to the same level. Therefore, although Zhang and his successors will hold the same grade as the Chief of the General Staff and the directors of the General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Equipment Department (GED), the PLAN as an organization is not equal to the four General Departments and is still at the same grade as the seven Military Regions. Commanders and Political Commissars From 1949 to 2006, the PLAN has had a total of 7 commanders and 11 political commissars, as shown in the charts below.

For more information on the 7 PLAN Commanders click here Deputy Commanders Since 1949, the PLAN has had about 40 deputy commanders, with an average of three serving at the same time. Each deputy has his own broad portfolio of responsibilities that cut across the four major departments. Whereas many of the early deputies were transferred from Army positions, almost all the deputies from the 1970s on rose up through the PLAN. Of the deputy commanders, 12 previously served as fleet commanders (2 NSF, 3 ESF, and 7 SSF) and 7 served as PLAN Headquarters chiefs of staff (i.e., director of the Headquarters Department). The remaining 19 deputies came from a wide variety of positions in the four major departments within PLAN Headquarters. Of the deputies, three were later promoted as the plan commander. Deputy Political Commissars Since 1949, the PLAN has also had about 25 deputy political commissars, with an average of two serving at the same time. Of the deputies, 10 previously served as fleet political commissars (3 NSF, 2 ESF, and 5 SSF) and 5 served as the director of the Political Department in PLAN Headquarters. The remaining deputies came from a wide variety of political positions within the PLAN, Army, and four General Departments. Six of the deputy political commissars have been promoted as the PLAN political commissar. Chiefs of Staff Since 1949, the PLAN has had at least 14 chiefs of staff, who serve as the director of the Headquarters Department within PLAN Headquarters. Of these, 7 have received lateral promotions in grade as a deputy commander. Political Department Directors Since 1949, the PLAN has had at least 15 directors of the Political Department within PLAN Headquarters. Of these, 5 have received lateral promotions in grade as a deputy political commissar. Fleet Commanders and Political Commissars Each of the PLANs three fleets has a commander and political commissar, who hold the same grade as the deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, chief of staff and Political Department director at PLAN Headquarters. Since the late 1980s, the NSF, ESF, and SSF fleet commanders have also been concurrently appointed as a deputy commander of the Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military Regions, respectively. Since the three fleets were established, the NSF has had 11 commanders and 11 political commissars, the ESF has had 11 commanders and 13 political commissars, and the SSF has had 14 commanders and 12 political commissars. Of these, only the former commander of the NSF, Zhang Dingfa, and the commander of the SSF, Wu Shengli, have become the PLAN commander. In addition, only one fleet political commissar, Zhou Kunren, who served as the SSF political commissar, has become the PLAN political commissar.

People's Liberation Navy - Organizational Structure

Overall Structure The PLANs overall structure can be viewed from four perspectives: Tiered structure Administrative structure Leadership and command structure Logistics and technical support structure Tiered Structure The PLANs tiered structure consists of the following five levels: PLAN Headquarters is an MR leader-grade organization. Until 2004, both the PLAN commander and political commissar were grade-3 officers. This issue became somewhat blurred in mid-2004, when the PLAN commander was elevated as a member of the Military Commission, which is a grade-2 billet. Even though the commander was elevated to a grade-2 officer, the PLAN as an organization remained a grade-3 organization. Furthermore, the commander and political commissar are still considered co-equals within the PLAN, even though the political commissar is still a grade-3 officer. The PLAN has three Fleet Headquarters (North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea), each of which is an MR deputy leader-grade organization. Therefore, since the late 1980s, each fleet commander has been concurrently assigned as an MR deputy commander. Each

fleet has several subordinate bases, which are jun deputy leader-grade organizations, and can be categorized into three types: support bases, test bases, and training bases. Fleet aviation is at the same level. Of the total number of bases, the following eight are considered major support bases: North Sea Fleet (NSF) Qingdao Lushun East Sea Fleet (ESF) Zhoushan Fujian Shanghai South Sea Fleet (SSF) Guangzhou Yulin Zhanjiang The PLAN also has other specialized bases as follows: Huludao is a missile test, research and development, and training base Jianggezhuang is for the PLANs nuclear powered submarines only A third type of base, which may or may not be co-located with a support base, is a training base or training center Some support bases have subordinate division leader-grade garrisons, which are responsible primarily for coastal patrol, coastal defense, and protecting fishing boats. The PLAN has six subordinate garrisons: NSF: Dalian and Weihai ESF: Xiamen SSF: Shantou, Beihai, and Xisha (Paracel Islands) Vessel zhidui, which are usually subordinate to a support base, and dadui, which can be subordinate to a support base or a zhidui. Administrative Structure The PLANs administrative structure at each level throughout the chain-of-command consists of four first-level departments: Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment. Each first-level department has several second- level departments that have administrative and/or functional responsibilities for subordinate organizations within the headquarters and throughout the PLAN. It is not always clear what the differences between the two responsibilities are, but some administrative responsibilities include housing, food, and transportation support, while functional responsibilities include plans and budgeting. Plan Headquarters When the PLAN Headquarters was established in Beijing in 1949, it had three firstlevel departments Headquarters, Political, and Logistics. In April 1952, Naval Aviation was added as a fourth first-level department. During the 1950s, the PLAN also formed various other first-level departments, but they were eventually reorganized, abolished, or merged with other departments. During the 1960s to 1990s, the PLAN established different departments to manage vessel equipment and technical issues. Following the establishment of the PLAs General Equipment Department (GED) in 1998, the PLAN merged these departments into the Equipment Department. Since then, the PLANs administrative organization has included four first-level departments Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment. The directors are the same grade as the PLAN deputy commanders and the three fleet commanders. PLAN Headquarters Department The PLAN Headquarters Department is the military command organization for the Navys leaders. The director is the Chief of Staff. The Headquarters Department consists of several functional departments and military studies research organizations. The primary functional departments, listed in alphabetical order, are as follows: Communications Intelligence Military Affairs Operations Training PLAN Political Department The Political Department is the leading organization responsible for political work. It consists of several functional departments, plus the military court and procuratorate (i.e., the Inspector General). The primary functional departments are as follows: Cadre (Officer) Discipline Inspection Organization Propaganda Security PLAN Logistics Department In 1985, the PLAN changed the existing four-tiered logistics supply structure - PLAN Headquarters, Fleet Headquarters, support base, and units-to a three-tiered structure- PLAN Headquarters, support base, and units. As such, the three fleet headquarters no longer have a logistics administrative structure. The Logistics Department is the leading organization responsible for managing logistics support. Because it is the largest component of the PLAN, the Logistics Department is organized more like a command than a department. As such, it has a director and a political commissar. The primary second-level functional departments are as follows: Audit Engineering Design Finance Health Military Transportation Port, Airfield, and Barraks Management Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel The PLAN has some second-level departments within the logistics organizational structure that are unique to the Navy. The first organization is the Engineering Command Department, and the second is the Vessel On-Shore Service Department. The Engineering Command Department is responsible for construction of all naval facilities, including airfields, ports, air defense, and buildings. The Vessel On-Shore Service Departments are responsible for logistics and technical support for naval vessel units while they are in port. The logistics support system is primarily responsible for supporting personnel living conditions, port and shore base facilities construction, plus supply and technical support for all types of munitions (including vessel gun shells, missiles, torpedoes, and mines) and land-based common-use weapons and equipment. Although the PLAN supplies units with special-use materials, the military regions supply them with common-use materials.

PLAN Equipment Department The Equipment Department is primarily responsible for technical support for all PLAN equipment and weapon systems from concept development to retirement. As such, the Equipment Department is responsible for the PLANs special-use equipment throughout the following seven steps: Plans and theoretical evaluation Technical design Construction design Inspection during construction Test and evaluation Delivery of the vessel to the unit Lifetime repair support The Equipment Department has subordinate factories, repair facilities, depots, warehouses, and purchasing stations. Because it is one of the largest components of the PLAN, the Equipment Department is organized more like a command than a department. As such, it has a director and a political commissar. The primary second-level functional departments are as follows: Armament Comprehensive Plans Defense Industry Regional Representative Bureaus Electronics Equipment Inspection and Management Vessel Technology Leadership and Command Structure The PLAN has a four-tiered on-shore vertical and lateral leadership and command structure. Within the PLANs vertical structure: PLAN Headquarters is the highest tier, is the services supreme command staff, and is the CMCs and Four General Departments functional department that implements leadership over PLAN units. The three fleet headquarters make up the second tier. They are the campaign component and constitute the leadership and command staff for a certain strategic direction. Furthermore, the three fleet headquarters receive leadership not only from PLAN Headquarters but also from their respective military region headquarters. Support bases make up the third tier and are primarily responsible for the comprehensive support of all naval forces within their area of responsibility. Garrisons and zhidui make up the fourth tier. When the fleets conduct mobile task-force operations, the PLAN employs only a three-tiered at-sea command structure: PLAN Headquarters Fleet Headquarters Zhidui Within the PLANs lateral leadership and command structure, all four tiers have fairly equivalent staffs and functional departments, even though the names may be slightly different: PLAN Headquarters, support bases, and garrisons have four first-level departments Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment The Fleet Headquarters have only two first-level departmentsHeadquarters and Political. They do not have a Logistics or Equipment Department Support bases and garrisons have four first-level departmentsHeadquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment Zhidui have three first-level departments Headquarters, Political, and an On-Shore Service Department, which is equivalent to a Logistics Department Logistics and Technical Support Structure Finally, the PLAN also has a three-tiered onshore logistics and technical support structure that skips the fleet headquarters: PLAN Headquarters Support bases Garrisons and zhidui

People's Liberation Navy - The PLA's Grade and Rank Structure

The PLA is organized into an administrative structure and an operational structure. Both of these are based on the PLAs officer personnel structure, which is composed of 15 grades and 10 ranks. Therefore, a basic knowledge of the PLAs officer grade and rank structure is essential to understanding the organizational structure. Since the Red Army was founded in 1927, the PLA has always had a grade system for its of- ficers, who are usually referred to as cadre. The first rank system was not introduced until 1955. Changes in the grade and rank system are shown below: 1927: A simple grade structure was introduced 1952: A revised structure of 21 grades was implemented 1955: A system with 20 grades and 15 ranks was introduced 1965: At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the rank system was abolished and officers used the governments National Administrative Cadre system of 27 grades 1972: Four grades were abolished, leaving 23 grades 1979: 23 grades were reduced to 15 1988: New rank system with 10 ranks was implemented As of 2007, all PLA officers and organizations are assigned one of these 15 grades. The image below shows the current system with 10 ranks and 15 grades as it applies to the PLAN.

Understanding the Two Systems The US military system, grades and ranks are synonymous. US military officers are assigned one of 10 ranks and each rank has an equal grade of O-1 to O-10 (i.e., a US Navy commander is an O-5). In 2007, The PLA also has 10 officer ranks, but it has 15 officer grades, which are identified by the type of organization and whether it is a leader or deputy leader

position (i.e., division leader or division deputy leader). Each named grade has an associated number. However, when referring to officers or organizations, the PLA uses the name, not the number. For example, a division leader is not called a Grade-7 officer. Each grade has both a primary rank and a secondary rank. For example, a fleet commander can have the primary rank of vice admiral or the secondary rank of rear admiral. Furthermore, as shown in the figure below, each rank can have from one to four grades associated with it. For example, a PLA Navy commander can be assigned the grade of regiment leader, regiment deputy leader, or battalion leader.

Promotions Within the PLA, the grade, not the rank, has always reflected authority and responsibility across service, branch, and organizational lines. Thus, although rank is a key indicator of position within the hierarchy of foreign militaries, grade is the key indicator within the PLA. One must make a clear distinction about what constitutes a promotion in the PLA. Within the PLA, promotions in grade are what count. Moving forward from one grade to the next is a promotion. For example, from a regiment leader to a division deputy leader is a grade promotion. Moving from one position to another in the same grade is a lateral transfer. For example, moving from the chief of staff to be a deputy commander in PLAN Headquarters is not a grade promotion, because both of these positions are MR deputy leaders. Furthermore, one should not equate a promotion in rank to a promotion in grade. For example, the commander and political officer at every level in the PLAs chain of command hold the same grade, but they often do not have the same rank. The reason for this is that officers must serve in a particular grade for a set period of time before they are promoted in rank. PLA regulations specify the time-in-rank and time-in-grade requirements for officers before they are promoted to the next rank and grade. For all ranks except second lieutenant to first lieutenant, the time-in-rank requirement is four years. However, the time-in-grade requirement is three years. Furthermore, in the PLA, time in service begins the first day as a cadet in an academy, not the day of commissioning upon graduation. As shown in the figure below, the promotion cycle for grades and ranks is not a 1:1 ratio.

Military Pay Criteria and Retirement Military pay is calculated on the basis of time in rank, time in grade, and time in service. Unlike the US military, the PLA includes the three or four years served as an academy cadet in their total time in service. Finally, regulations regarding retirement ages are based on grade, not rank.

People's Liberation Navy - Political Systems

According to PLA writings, the PLAs political work system is the means through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guarantees absolute control over the military. Every organization in the PLA, including headquarters, operational units, academies, research institutes, and factories, has one or more components of the political work system, which consists of the following six main components: Party committee system Political administrative system Discipline inspection system Party congresses Political officer system Judicial system The PLANs political work system is identical to the larger PLAs political work system. Party Committee System The PLA has five types of Party committees that can be established in organizations at all levels of the PLA. The type of Party committee established depends on three factors: The level at which the organization resides The organizations responsibilities, such as the Operations Department having greater responsibilities than the Management Bureau, even though they are at the same level The number of Party members Each Party committee is responsible to a higher level committee and ultimately through the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the CCPs Central Committee. The five types of Party committees, which are discussed in more detail later, are shown below: Party Committee Grassroots Party Committee

Party general branch Party branch Party small group Every organization in the PLA is composed of two basic components: A headquarters element Administrative departments Every headquarters element has one of the three types of Party committees shown below: A Party committee established in every regiment-level and above organization headquarters A grassroots Party committee established in each battalion-level organization headquarters A Party branch established in each company level organization headquarters Every administrative department has one of the four types of Party committees shown below: Party committee Party general branch Party branch Party small group The figure below provides an example of the different types of Party committees within PLAN Headquarters structure, including the Operations Division of the Operations Department in the Headquarters Department.

Party Committees A Party committee is established in each headquarters element for all PLA regimentlevel and above organizations. The PLAN has a Party committee for each regiment and above organization. At the regiment level, this includes vessel dadui, aviation regiments, coastal defense regiments, and all regimentequivalent organizations. Each of these Party committees has a standing committee consisting of the commander, political commissar, deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, and directors of the four first-level administrative departmentsHeadquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment. In most cases, the political commissar is the Party secretary and the commander is the deputy secretary. In some situations, however, the commander is the secretary and the political officer is the deputy secretary. In addition to the headquarters elements Party committee, each of the four first-level administrative departments has its own Party committee. In addition, some second-level departments for regiment and above organizations have their own Party committee if there are enough Party members for one. Grassroots Party Committees A grassroots Party committee is assigned to the headquarters element for all battalion-level organizations.Although these committees are formally identified as grassroots Party committees, the PLA often omits the term grassroots and identifies them just as Party committees. Grassroots Party committees are not assigned to administrative departments. Party General Branches Party general branches are established only within administrative departments that are not large enough to have a Party committee but are too large for a Party branch. Party general branches are not established in headquarters elements. Party Branches Party branches are assigned to all company-level organization headquarters and to all second and third-level administrative departments. For example, the second-level Operations Division subordinate to PLAN North Sea Fleets Headquarters Department has a Party branch. Furthermore, each administrative branch on PLAN vessels, such as a destroyers radar and sonar branch, has its own Party branch. Party Small Groups All PLA Party members must belong to some type of Party organization. Party small groups are established at the platoon level, where only a few officers are present, and at the squad level, which is composed solely of enlisted personnel. In addition, when the PLA establishes ad hoc working groups, the members, regardless of their grade or rank, are organized into a Party small group or a Party branch. Which type of Party committee is established, such as a Party small group or Party branch, depends on the number of Party members involved. Party Congresses By regulation, every regiment-level and above organization in the PLA holds a Party Congress once every five years, but a Party Congress can be held on an ad hoc basis if necessary. For example, from 1956 to 2004, the PLAN held 10 Party Congresses. Although they were held sporadically through the 1960s, they have been held every five years since. The PLAN holds plenary sessions for each congress about twice a year. Party Congresses are composed of elected representatives from the Party committee at each level. They are the top-level organizations responsible for supervising lower-level Party committees. In addition, every administrative department that has a Party committee with more than 200 Party members holds its own Party Congress every five years. The Party Congress reviews the departments activities for the previous five years and selects new members for the next Party committee. Battalion and company-level organizations and administrative departments that have fewer than 200 Party members convene a Congress of Military Party Members. All of these Party Congresses are responsible for approving the Party Committees report, the report for that levels discipline inspection commission, discussing key issues and making decisions based on those issues, and selecting and approving the members for the next Party committee and that organizations discipline inspection commission. Political Officer System Party committees are the decision-making and guidance bodies for all key issues, including training, at each level in the chain of command. The political officer system consists of political officers at every level in the chain of command from the company level up to the four General Departments. Platoons and squads donot have political officers. The three types of political officers are: Political commissars are assigned to all regiment-level and above organizations Political directors are assigned to all battalion-level organizations Political instructors are assigned to all company-level organizations Some of the key responsibilities for political officers include:

Serving as either the secretary or deputy secretary of the Party committee Implementing decisions made within the Party committee system Instilling Party discipline among Party members Providing political education to the troops within their organization Working with other components of the political work system Political officers at the company and battalion levels are responsible for gathering information on all personnel for promotions. They are also responsible for administering the Party member selection process. However, promotions and Party membership decisions are decided by the appropriate Party committee. The PLA has a dual leadership system, where the commander and political officer are coequal in grade; however, almost all key decisions are made by the organizations Party committee, where the political commissar is normally the secretary and the commander is the deputy secretary. For example, Party committees oversee virtually all of a units work: from operations and training issues, such as logistics support and personnel completion of training tasks; to officer evaluation, selection, and staffing; to expenditure of unit funds for goods and materials; to the implementation of higher-level Party committee decisions. Political Administrative System All regiment-level and above headquarters in the PLA have a political administrative structure, which is responsible for implementing the organizations political work. Organizations at the battalion level and below do not have any administrative departments. The political administrative structure consists of departments, divisions, offices, or branches, which are responsible for managing the establishment of Party organizations, officer personnel records, propaganda, security, culture, mass work, and Party discipline.3 At the regiment level, some of the administrative branches are combined. For example, the figure below shows how the propaganda and security administrative structure is organized from PLAN Headquarters down to the regiment-level vessel dadui.

People's Liberation Navy - Personel

Understanding the size of the PLA in the past, present, or future is not an easy task. The main reasons for this are because the PLAs organizational structure has changed significantly over the past five decades and statistics were not always available or accurate. Furthermore, the statistics provided have not always differentiated among the different components of the armed forces. Although China has provided public information about the total size of the PLA over the past decade, it has not broken down the number of personnel by service or branch, nor has it provided specific figures for the number of officers, technical officers, civilian cadre, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts. Figures for the PLA Navy available in Western publications are not necessarily accurate, but they do provide a rough estimate.

PLA Reductions Since 1950, the PLA has implemented 10 force reductions. When the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA had 5.5
million troops. At that time, the enlisted force consisted primarily of illiterate peasant volunteers and the officer-to-enlisted-member ratio was about 1:1. As of 2007, the PLA has a 1:1:1 ratio for officers to noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to conscripts, which equates to approximately 760,000 personnel in each category. This 33% ratio for PLA officers contrasts to about a 15% ratio for officers in the US Military. The first downsizing occurred in late 1950, but when the Korean War broke out, the force quickly grew to 6.3 million. The increase affected almost all infantry forces. The next six force reductions occurred in 1952, 1953, 1957, 1966, 1980, and 1982. The eighth downsizing occurred from 1985 to 1987, with a reduction from 4.238 million to 3.235 million. The ninth downsizing occurred between 1997 and 2000 with a 500,000-man reduction to 2.5 million. The 10th downsizing occurred between September 2003 and December 2004, with a 200,000-man reduction to the PLA force of 2.3 million in 2007. The 10 force reductions in the PLA have focused on the following areas:

Strengthening the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Reducing the officer-to-enlisted-member ratio Increasing the NCO-to-conscript ratio Replacing officer billets with NCO billets Reducing the number of headquarters Reducing the number of administrative organizations within each headquarters Streamlining the operational, logistics, and administrative chains of command Abolishing or merging operational units Transferring certain units to non-PLA organizations, such as the railway troops in 1978 Strengthening the warfighting capability for grassroots units in an informationalized environment Reforming the professional military education system

PLAN Personnel Although the PLAN does not provide specific data about the size and breakdown of its personnel force, available
information suggests that as of 2007, the PLAN has approximately 290,000 personnel, which equates to 12.6% of the PLAs 2.3 million. Given a 1:1:1 ratio for officers, NCOs, and conscripts for the PLA as a whole, and assuming that the ratio holds for the PLAN, means the PLAN has approximately 97,000 personnel in each category. However, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel in the PLA Navy and US Navy can vary depending on the type of unit. For example, a PLAN Luhai-class destroyer has 40 officers (16.0%) out of a crew of 250 personnel, while a USN Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has 23 officers (7.1%) out of a crew of 323 personnel.

PLAN Officer Corps

The PLAs and PLANs officer corps are organized into officers and technical officers. All PLA officers serve in one of five career tracks, each of which is broken into several specialties. With the exception of the political career track, officers are assigned to their career track and specialty when they enter an officer academy as a cadet. The PLAs education system has undergone continuous reforms along an uneven path since the PRC was founded in 1949. The primary goal of these reforms has been to produce an educated officer corps capable of commanding, using, supplying, and maintaining the PLAs weapon systems and equipment during wartime. The path began with an illiterate or semiliterate force and is now producing operational and technical officers with graduate degrees. Although the PLA and PLAN do not provide specific data about the size and breakdown of its personnel force, available information as of 2007, suggests the PLAN has approximately 290,000 personnel. A 1:1:1 ratio for PLA officers, NCOs, and conscripts means the PLAN has approximately 97,000 officers. Officer Career Tracks PLA officers are assigned to one of five career tracks: Military officer, also identified as the command track Political officer Logistics officer Equipment officer Technical officer Officers in the military track normally attend one of the PLAs command academies or specialized academies, such as the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. Upon graduation, these officers are assigned as unit commanders throughoutthe chain of command or as staff officers in the Headquarters Department at regiment and above organizations. Officers in the political officer career track areusually chosen from officers who have alreadyserved as a platoon or company officer in the military career track, but they can also come from the other three career tracks. Once they are selected for the political career track, they receive training as a political officer. Officers in the logistics, equipment, and technical officer career track attend specialty academies, such as the PLAN Logistics Academy or the Aviation Engineering Academy. Each career track has sub-specialties, which equate to the appropriate department within the Four General Departments and the PLAN Logistics Department. For example, logistics officers specialize in finance, quartermaster, transportation, materials, fuel, and so on, which equate to the administrative departments under the General Logistics Department. Technical Officers The technical officer system was introduced in 1980. Since 1988, technical officers have been divided into three categories (senior, intermediate, and junior), 14 grades (platoon leader to CMC member), and 10 ranks (second lieutenant/ensign to lieutenant general/vice admiral). Technical officers wear the same rank insignia as regular officers, but they wear a special technical officer insignia on their collar. Officer Promotion and Assignment Procedures As of 2007, officer promotions and assignments are managed through the political work system in a three-step process. The first step consists of the organizations political office gathering information on the officer, including interviews with the officers subordinates, co-workers, and bosses. Each officer receives three evaluations, including an annual evaluation, one every two to three years, and a promotion evaluation. The evaluations focus on four items: political character, general military and billet knowledge, achievements, and physical fitness. During the second step, the political office makes a recommendation to the organizations Party committee. Depending on the level within the chain of command, the Party committee can either authorize the promotion or assignment or send the recommendation to the Party organization in the next higher command for approval. Finally, the Party committee announces the promotion or assignment. Based on the officers grade, promotions and assignments are approved at different levels as follows: The chairman of the CMC approves all promotions and assignments for officers at the division-leader grade up to the chief of the general staff and director of the General Political Department. The general departments or military region leaders approve all promotions for officers at the division deputy-leader (brigade-leader) and regiment-leader grade. The group army or jun-level leaders approve all promotions for officers at the regiment deputy-leader and battalionleader grade. The division or brigade leaders approve promotions for officers at the battalion deputy-leader and below grades. Promotion Cycle PLA regulations specify the time-in-rank and time-in-grade requirements for officers before they are promoted to the next rank and grade. For all ranks except second lieutenant to first lieutenant, the time-in-rank requirement is four years. However, the time-in-grade requirement is three years. Furthermore, in the PLA, time in service begins the first day as a cadet in an academy, not the day of commissioning upon graduation. As shown below, the promotion cycle for grades and ranks is not a 1:1 ratio.

Mandatory Retirement Ages As shown below, the mandatory retirement age for PLA officers is based on their grade, not their rank or time in service. In 1994, retirement ages were added for military region deputy leader- and military region leader-grade officers.

CMC vice chairmen and CMC members do not have mandatory retirement ages. The mandatory retirement age for technical officers is slightly higher for each grade than for regular officers.

PLA Navy Officer Recruitment As of 2007, the PLAN has a program for commissioning enlisted sailors, plus two separate programs for recruiting and commissioning civilian college students. The first program for civilian college students involves three months of military-political training following graduation from a civilian college. The second program is the National Defense Scholarship Program. Enlisted Sailor Selection for Officer Training The number of enlisted sailors selected to attend an officer academy and graduate as an officer has continued to decrease significantly over the past few years. The primary reason is that the PLAN has increased the number of civilian college graduates recruited as officers. The second reason is that the PLAN would prefer to retain its best enlisted personnel as NCOs. Civilian College Student Programs From 1994 to 2004, the PLAN accepted more than 7,000 civilian college graduates as officers, and, from 2000 to 2006, more than 1,800 students participated in the National Defense Scholarship Program. As part of Chinas 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), the PLAN increased its recruitment of civilian college students as officers to supplement the number of officers trained in PLAN academies. The goal for the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) is to have officers trained through civilian colleges comprise 40% of new officers each year. The two plans emphasize such specialties as electronic information, communications, radar, machinery, foreign languages, and construction. The PLAN has been testing different models for integrating the civilian college graduates into the force. For example, the new civilian college graduate officers must first receive training for academy before being assigned to an operational unit. The PLAN designated the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy as a training work. It began training civilian college students who already had a bachelors degree as surface vessel technical and command officers and as grassroots political work and command officers. In 2002, thePLAN began testing the 2+2 program, whereby outstanding undergraduate students in civilian colleges finish a two-year basic course at selected universities and then enter one of the naval academies for the last two years. The PLANs National Defense Student Program was officially started in 2000. These students, who are identified as reserve officers, receive a stipend and summer training while they are attending college. Upon graduation, they join the PLAN as active-duty officers. The PLAN has signed agreements with 12 universities to support the National Defense Scholarship Program and has set up selection and training offices at each school. The schools include Nanchang University, Huazhong Science and Technology University, Harbin Engineering University, Northwestern Polytechnic University, China Ocean University, Huadong Ship Engineering University, Ningbo University, Nanhua University, the Nanchang Aviation Industry College, and Xian University. According to the agreements, students who will soon graduate from the program can apply for graduate school in PLA academies, and the PLAN can select officers to take postgraduate courses in the civilian institutions. Upon graduation from a civilian college, the new officers receive from one to three months of military-political training. After completing this training, they are assigned as student officers to their operational unit, where they receive on-the-job training for one to three years. A continuing complaint within the PLAN for some of the civilian college graduates is that, although their education level is high, their basic understanding of military technology is low, their ability to adapt to working in a military environment is lacking, and their ability to manage troops is weak. At the same time, however, several civilian college graduates have now become key personnel on vessels and in operational unit headquarters. Academies As part of the PLAs reforms discussed above, the PLAN implemented several changes to its education system by creating comprehensive academies and expanding the curriculum beyond a single branch. As shown below, the PLAN currently has 10 officer academies. In April 1999, the PLAN integrated the Naval Engineering Academy in Wuhan and the Naval Electronic Engineering Academy in Nanjing to form the Naval Engineering University, which is one of the PLAs five comprehensive institutions. After it was formed, the university became the first PLAN institution to confer masters and doctoral degrees. Today, it offers courses in technology, command, engineering, and management in several academic disciplines on multiple levels.

In 2004, the PLAN renamed the Naval Guangzhou Vessel Academy as the Naval Service Arms Command Academy. It is the only tactical command specialty school for all five PLAN branches and has primary responsibility for training surface force, Marine Corps, and coastal defense force intermediate-level command personnel, and submarine force and naval aviation tactical command personnel. Since the academy was established in 1977, it has graduated more than 6,000 officers. At least 97% of the current surface vessel COs, 80% of the surface vessel dadui, Marine Corps, and coastal defense battalion and regiment commanders, and 70% of the

destroyer and frigate zhidui commanders received their basic training at the academy. The academy has also hosted military delegations from more than 50 countries. Teaching Reforms In addition to restructuring its academies, the PLAN has attempted to address two major complaints about its education system. First, the students spend too much time studying theory. Second, the students do not spend enough time on practical application. Part of this problem is that much of the teaching material at the academies has not been updated for years and the equipment the students train on is not the same as in the PLANs operational units. To solve these problems, the academies have attempted to acquire advanced equipment for training purposes and to update their written training materials. The academies are also acquiring and making more use of simulators. Second, students in their final year spend a few weeks before graduation with an operational unit to gain some practical experience. Graduate Programs As of 2007, seven of the PLANs officer academies offer masters degrees and five offer doctorate degrees. This is a one-third increase since 2000. As a result, an increasingly higher number of PLAN officers are invovled in some type of post-graduate work or receiving masters or doctoral degrees in PLAN academies. Since the early 2000s, this program has transitioned from technical personnel, researchers, and academy instructors receiving post-graduate education to providing the same opportunities to vessel commanding officers and junior officers, as well as other key operations and headquarters personnel. PLAN officers are also receiving graduate degrees from civilian universities. For example, about 1,000 PLA officers stationed in the Shanghai area have received masters and doctorate degrees from various Shanghai institutions, such as Fudan University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, and Tongji University. In addition, PLAN officers are increasingly going abroad to attend foreign war college programs. Continuing Education The PLAN has spent considerable sums of money to provide the means and resources for its officers to continue their education after being assigned to their operational units. For example: Some units have signed agreements for local civilian universities to conduct night classes on certain technical specialties. Certain civilian universities, such as the Jiangsu Science and Technology University, have provided training classes for PLAN officers for several decades. The PLAN has also spent millions of Renminbi on reading rooms, online systems, computers, and stocking libraries with thousands of books. Some units have designated certain nights as study periods, which can be used to conduct individual or group study. Several PLAN units have also created officer training centers, which include the use of simulators and training on naval stratagem. In addition, the PLAN has a Navy Cadre Training Center associated with the Central Party School in the Western Hills near Beijing, which serves as a base for studying advanced naval and intermediate- level cadre theory.

PLAN Enlisted Forces

The PLAs enlisted force for all services and branches consists of two components: Conscripts Noncommissioned officers or NCOs In the PLA, officers and cadre are synonymous, and all enlisted personnel, regardless of service or branch, are identified as soldiers. Enlisted personnel, not officers, in the PLAN are also called sailors. Unlike the US Navy, PLAN enlisted personnel use Army terminology for all ranks and grades. The enlisted force has changed profoundly this decade, particularly as a result of the revised Military Service Law of the Peoples Republic of China that became effective in January 1999. Prior to 1999, PLA Navy and Air Force conscripts served for four years, and Army and Second Artillery conscripts served for three years. Upon completion of their conscription period, they could remain on active duty as a volunteer for a total service time of 16 years. The revised Service Law reformed the entire enlisted force structure in the following two ways: It reduced the mandatory service period for conscripts in all PLA services and branches to two years. It established a formal NCO corps that is divided into six service periods, so that enlisted personnel can now potentially serve for a total of 30 years. All conscripts report for induction screening on 1 November and begin their basic training during early December. Near the conclusion of their conscription period, they have the following three career options: Selection for officer training at a PLA academy Selection as an NCO Demobilization Concerning the enlisted force, conscripts and junior NCOs who meet the age requirements can take the examinations to attend an officer academy. All NCOs who are not selected for officer training or promoted to the next grade are demobilized at the end of November. Because the new NCO program did not begin until 1999, at which time the service period for volunteers ended at the 16-year point, the PLA has a small number of grade-5 NCOs and only a few grade-6 NCOs today. The majority of NCOs are in grades 1 to 3, with a large turnover of grade-1 NCOs who are not promoted to service period. As of 2007, the PLA has 2.3 million personnel divided roughly into thirds (765,000) for officers, NCOs, and conscripts. Although the PLA actually conscripts only about 4% of the males eligible each year, it is still having some problems meeting its quotas. The PLAN has approximately 290,000 personnel. As the ratio of officers, NCOs, and conscripts in the PLAN likely mirrors the 1:1:1 ratio for the PLA as a whole, the PLAN has about 194,000 enlisted personnel, of whom one-half (97,000) are conscripts and one-half are NCOs. Therefore, based on the two-year conscription cycle, the PLAN receives approximately 48,500 new conscripts each November and demobilizes a similar number of conscripts and an unknown number of NCOs at the same time. This process is a primary factor that drives the PLANs one-year training cycle. Force Management The PLA has several organizations within the General Staff Department (GSD) and General Political Department (GPD) that are responsible for different administrative aspects of the enlisted force. The organization with the greatest amount of jurisdiction is the GSDs Military Affairs Department, which is responsible for managing the size and composition of the enlisted force, as well as maintaining their personnel records. The GSDs Mobilization Department is responsible for the recruiting and induction process for conscripts, and the GSDs Military Training and Service Arms Department is responsible for training. The GPDs Organization Department is responsible for selecting enlisted-force personnel as Party members and managing all of their political-related issues. Although primarily concerned with officer personnel management, the GPD Cadre Department also defines the guidelines governing the selection of enlisted-force personnel as officers. Conscription Process The annual conscription process in the PLA begins each August when the military holds a two-day conference to make arrangements for the upcoming winter conscription cycle. In the PLAN, operational units determine how many new conscripts and NCOs are needed for the coming year. PLAN units then submit these figures to each fleet, military region, and PLAN Headquarters, where they are compiled and sent to the GSD. Also in August, local Peoples Armed Forces Departments or PAFDs, which are military organizations that operate on behalf of the local government, are required to contact all draft-age males who reach the age of 18 before 31 December of the current calendar year. These individuals must register for military service by the end of September. Each locality in China is assigned an annual recruitment quota, which is based on distribution of population. At present, the proportion of conscripts from urban areas accounts for just over 33% with the remaining 67% conscripted from rural areas. Although most individuals who register for conscription are 18, theoretically any male between the ages of 18 and 22 may sign

up. Females may also register provided they are between the ages of 18 and 19 and have graduated from high school the previous spring. Although neither the Military Service Law nor the Regulations on PLA Conscription Work stipulate offi- cial education requirements for conscripted males, many of the recent annual conscription orders state that incoming conscripts should be graduates of intermediate school, which in China runs through the 9th grade. Media reporting suggests that most intermediate school graduates wait until they are 18 to either join or be conscripted. Individuals specifically exempted from registration include those who have secured admission to college, are medically or physically exempt, have been imprisoned, or are under investigation at the time of conscription. Chinese media also indicates that bribery is used both by people who want to join but are not qualified and by those who do not want to be conscripted. Once registration is complete, the PAFD begins the process of pre-selecting potential conscripts. This process continues until the end of October when the State Council and the CMC issue the order for the upcoming conscription period. This annual conscription order specifies the requirements for conscripted citizens and contains instructions for local PAFDs on how to carry out conscription work. On the basis of this conscription order, PAFDs throughout the country then notify personnel of their selection as potential conscripts and instruct them to report to a local induction center run by the PAFD for a series of examinations. The induction process occurs throughout November, with potential conscripts being examined for a single day, after which they return home and wait for their conscription orders or rejection letter. The three types of exams include: Physical exam Political exam (administered by the local public security bureau) Psychological exam Unlike the US military, the PLA does not give any pre-induction written examinations such as the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (AFVAB) to determine each conscripts specific proficiencies for military specialties. As a result, it is also unclear how the PLA determines which conscripts go into the PLAN and what their specialty will be. Before 1999, conscripts had no control over which service or branch they would be assigned to. As of 2007, they can voice a preference to enter a particular service or branch, although their choice is far from guaranteed, possibly due to the educational or technical requirements of certain services or branches. As PAFDs are composed primarily of personnel from the ground forces, recruitment teams from the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery are often dispatched to selected regions to handpick their own conscripts. Leaving Home and Reporting for Active Duty In most instances, conscripts in all of the PLAs services and branches serve in a province other than their home of record. During the second week of December, PLAN conscripts travel from across the country to one of several training and operational facilities concentrated along the coast. Transportation arrangements are usually made in advance, and it is common for large numbers of conscripts to travel together. Although the majority of travel is done by train, the PLAN has begun to charter civilian aircraft to transport the new conscripts. Conscription Difficulties and the Urban- Rural Divide As noted earlier, PLA conscription quotas are based on the distribution of the population. Inherent in these quotas are differing educational levels, technical abilities, and attitudes towards military service. For example, those who grow up in the countryside are less likely to be able to operate and maintain advanced weapons and equipment. Conversely, although many potential urban recruits are often better educated, they may also be blessed with greater economic opportunities and thus have less desire to serve in the PLA than their rural counterparts. Therefore, although the PLA believes conscripts selected from urban areas are more likely to possess the educational and technical skills it desires, it is having difficulties in its urban conscription work, as well as in its abilities to recruit high school graduates in general. A number of different reasons explain why individuals may decide against joining the military. One is that many increasingly feel that, in an era of rapid economic growth and greater opportunities, joining the PLA is simply not attractive. By comparison, although many young people were once attracted to the PLA due to the prospects for upward mobility, many now believe there is no future in joining the PLA, especially when testing into a military academy or becoming an NCO is increasingly difficult. Moreover, educational reforms have made attending college in the PRC much easier than it used to be, which has reduced the pool of eligible conscripts. For example, the number of students attending college today is about 20% versus 1.4% in 1978. In addition, a college education is widely viewed as a way to improve ones future prospects, including the opportunity to make money after graduation. Furthermore, although the PLA provides stipends for its conscripts and their families, these minimal allowances have not kept pace with the rising cost of living and are far less attractive to individuals from more affluent areas of the country. Thus, many people, particularly in urban areas, think it simply does not pay to join the military. There appears to be little incentive to register and essentially waste two years, especially as post-demobilization employment prospects do not markedly improve. Therefore, despite the recent emphasis on technology and education, the core of the enlisted force continues to be made up of young men from poor rural areas. Although four of the last five annual conscription orders (2001-2005) note that it is preferable that conscripts recruited from rural areas be high school graduates, in truth, most rural conscripts are intermediate school graduates with low degrees of technical proficiency. China has a system of compulsory education through intermediate school, but many families are unable to cope with the high cost of school fees once their child enters high school. For these families, particularly those from the countryside, the prospect of joining the PLA is viewed as one of the only means available to potentially escape a life of poverty. Not surprisingly, some resort to bribery in an attempt to pay their way into the military. As a result of all these factors, the proportion of new conscripts who are high school graduates remains in the minority. Recruiting Civilian College Students and Graduates One way the PLA has attempted to compensate for its inability to conscript some of Chinas more educated youth is by recruiting them once they are in college or after they have graduated. In 2001, the PLA began to recruit civilian college students in their first to third year of school as members of the enlisted force. Most of these students who join as conscripts resume their studies once they complete their two-year conscription obligation, but the PLAs unwritten goal appears to be to retain them on active duty and have them become NCOs. The PLA has instituted several preferential policies, including monetary incentives and reduced tuition, to recruit college students as conscripts. In addition, depending on their college specialty, some students who join as conscripts are given the rank of private 1st class immediately upon joining instead of waiting until after they complete basic training. The PLA has also begun recruiting civilian college graduates and promoting them directly as NCOs. The specific grade they are given depends on their experience. Such incentives are probably necessary as media reporting suggests that many students voluntarily join the PLA for personal reasons instead of idealistic motivations. Although many students join the military to learn new skills or gain experience, others view enlisting as a way to improve their chances to join the Communist Party, which is widely seen as a tool of social mobility in China, or as a way to reduce the financial burden on ones family. Conscript Duties and Responsibilities Reduced Leadership Responsibilities The shortening of the mandatory conscription period, coupled with the expansion of the NCO corps, has led to a gradual reduction in conscript leadership and some technical responsibilities throughout the PLA. With conscripts now serving only two years on active duty and with the PLAN no longer providing technical training to its conscripts, the Navy has begun to turn over many of the leadership responsibilities previously held

by conscripts in their third or fourth year to junior NCOs (NCO grades 1 and 2). As a result, the scope of conscript responsibilities has diminished, with typical duties consisting of tasks that do not require significant leadership skills or technical competency. These include such tasks as performing physical security and guard work, engaging in logistical support, and operating motor vehicles and unsophisticated communications equipment. Efficiency Reports All members of the enlisted force receive an efficiency report written by their immediate supervisor. In the PLAN, enlisted sailors receive an annual efficiency report. Company Party branches review each efficiency report and receive input from the person's supervisor, coworkers, and subordinates. Their efficiency reports are included in their personnel records, which are managed through the GSD Military Affairs Department system. In 2003, as part of its transparency in grassroots affairs campaign, the PLAN began to allow sailors to review and comment on their efficiency reports. Conscript Party Membership Conscripts in the PLAN are eligible to become members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Applicants must be at least 18 years of age and a member of the Communist Youth League or CYL. Conscripts have a number of motivations for wanting to become Party members. Many view membership in the CCP as a tool of upward mobility and an asset that can help them attain their goal of becoming an officer or NCO. For the majority of PLA conscripts demobilized after the conclusion of their two-year conscription period, Party membership can also be a valuable asset in finding employment or obtaining a better job upon returning home. The process to become a Party member is arduous and can take just about the entire two year conscription period. Therefore, the Party has basically given up recruiting conscripts. Predictably, the lengthy recruitment process, competitive selective procedures, and low overall quota (about 3%) of conscripts eligible to become Party members have caused many conscripts to be less than enthusiastic about joining. As a result, it is common today for many PLAN units to be without a single conscript Party member. Although conscripts may not be Party members, most of them are involved in Party sponsored activities through the CYL system. For example, besides daily and weekly activities administered through the CYL organization in each unit, PLAN Headquarters holds CYL Congresses attended by members from throughout the PLAN NCO Selection, Retention, and Evaluation Process At the conclusion of their second year of service, conscripts have the option of applying to extend their stay in the PLA by becoming NCOs or officers. Conscripts not selected as an NCO or for officer training conclude their conscription period at the end of October and are demobilized. The possible career paths available to conscripts are illustrated in the figure below.

The majority of conscripts who remain on active duty do so by becoming NCOs. Conscripts who choose to become NCOs can either be selected on the basis of merit or pass an exam for entrance into an NCO program of study at a PLA academy or school. In both situations, however, the process is highly competitive and the results are by no means guaranteed. Also, media reports indicate that corruption is widespread in the selection process. One of the key changes instituted by the revised Military Service Law was the formal creation of a professional NCO corps with a 30-year career path, as shown below.At the end of each period, NCOs may extend their stay in the PLA by being promoted to a higher rank; otherwise, they are demobilized. An NCO's rank is based on his service period, as are his salary, promotion, and date of demobilization.

NCO Professional Military Education NCOs in the PLAN have a number of options for receiving professional military education (PME). The chart below shows these options, which range from receiving no training at all, to technical training at a training organization, continuing education usually in the form of correspondence or distance-learning courses done from within the unit, to training at a special NCO school or NCO program at an officer academy.

Although the number of noncommissioned officers who attend an NCO school or officer academy NCO program is presently small, the number attending academies and schools has doubled since the 1999 reforms to the NCO system. For example, between 2000 and 2003, more than 20,000 PLA NCOs received training at either an NCO school or officer academy NCO program. This is a direct result of the PLAs increased emphasis on the importance of NCO training and education. According to guidance issued in 2005 by the GSD Military Affairs Department, all NCOs who hope to be selected to a higher grade must undergo education at a PLA academy or school or receive training at a training organization. The guidance is as follows: Junior NCOs (grades 1-2), intermediate

NCOs (grades 3-4), and all technical and command NCOs must have at least a high schoollevel education. Senior NCOs (grades 5-6) must have at least a senior technical-level education, as well as at least 10 years of experience in their specialty. Learning Multiple Specialties The PLAN is now focusing on its personnel learning more than one skill to fill in for others who take vacation or are killed or injured during combat. Specifically, the PLAN has begun developing NCOs who master one technical specialty but are competent in several others. For example, conscripts must master one technical specialty, while grade-4 NCOs must master two specialties and be competent in two others. Training by Skill Levels Under the PLANs old Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), all enlisted personnel on board a ship received the same type of training, regardless of their skill level. Under the new OMTE, the PLAN is providing different types of training for each grade and skill level. Refresher Training As part of its Talent Cultivation Project, the PLAN has also begun to mandate short-term refresher training for NCOs prior to promotion to the next service period. NCOs receive instruction on new events and concepts, as well as the latest developments in armament and technology. College-Level Education NCOs in the PLAN have the option of getting a college-level education at the PLAN NCO School located in Bengbu, Anhui Province, or one of the following six PLAN officer academies that offer NCO programs: Dalian Vessel Academy Naval Engineering University Service Arms Command Academy Submarine Academy Logistics Academy Aviation Engineering Academy Noncommissioned officers who attend an NCO program at an officer academy are assigned to their own student units and are not mixed with officer cadets. The duration of study is between two to three years, after which they receive either a secondary or senior technical degree. Until the early 2000s, the highest degree NCOs could receive was a two-year secondary technical degree, which in China is viewed as a high school equivalency degree. The three year senior technical degree, which is equivalent to a US associates or vocational degree, is a relatively new phenomenon for PLA NCOs. The PLANs first class of NCO senior technical graduates completed their program at the PLAN NCO School in July 2003. PLAN NCO School The PLAN NCO School is a technical school that trains NCOs for two or three years to work in maritime and ground-based services. Originally founded in 1977, the school has 24 academic specialties divided into nine categories, including chemical defense, communications, navigation, logistics, machinery, mechanical and electrical, and weapons. The school also publishes the journal NCO Training. The school began its first short-term training classes in March 2005, which consisted of 17 technical specialties. The new courses last from one to three months. These training opportunities are the outgrowth of a PLA plan to increase the professional skills of its NCOs. According to PRC media reports, some units appear to be having trouble finding suitable candidates to hold down certain billets due to a lack of specialties in the current NCO education system.The PLA as a whole, as well as the PLAN, has been trying to address complaints from operational units that the NCO schools focus on too much theory and not enough practical application. Duties and Responsibilities As the overall proportion of NCOs in the enlisted force has surged to about 50%, and over 60% in some technical units, the responsibilities of noncommissioned officers have also increased, primarily at the expense of conscripts and junior officers. At present, NCOs hold down many key technical billets in all types of units. Other recent examples of the expansion of the scope of NCO duties and responsibilities include: Inheriting billets once held exclusively by officers, such as mess officers Handling much of the training for both conscripts and junior NCOs Serving as the commanding officer for some smaller vessels in the PLAN Serving as acting platoon leaders. As the NCO force grows and the officer corps gets smaller, the PLAN has begun training noncommissioned officers at its NCO School and NCO programs in officer academies to take over several different types of officer billets. These billets include electronic countermeasures, land-based radar, sonar technology, and signals communication. NCO Party Membership Although only a small percentage of conscripts are actively recruited for Party membership, the proportion of NCOs who are Party members has increased greatly in recent years. With the large increase in NCO Party members, PRC media reports suggest that the role of Party organizations in grassroots units (i.e., battalion level and below) has been strengthened and that a number of NCO Party members are also members of company-level Party branches. According to the PLA Daily, following the 16th Party Congress in October 2002, the PLA tasked each company-level Party branch to incorporate one to two NCO Party members. Usually these are more experienced NCOs who are squad leaders and serve as the head of a Party small group , which is the smallest organization that makes up a Party branch. For example, one PLAN vessel unit, where NCOs consisted of 70% of all Party members, incorporated many of these NCO Party members into the Party branch to adapt to this new reality. The PLANs goals are to have NCO actively participate in work decisions and to gain managerial experience. That said, NCO involvement in the Party decision-making process is limited to the company level, as only the Party branch secretaries and deputies, which are positions staffed by officers, can participate in Party committees above the company level. Officer Selection Although the direct commissioning of members of the enlisted force to the officer corps was prevalent during the Red Army days and still existed after the PLA was formed in the mid-1940s, the practice was abolished shortly after the Cultural Revolution. Since 1980, the PLA has gradually changed its system of directly commissioning enlisted members as officers, so that, during peacetime, all conscripts selected to become officers are now required to undergo three to four years of training in a PLA academy. This is true for NCOs as well, although a handful of more experienced, older NCOs may be selected to undergo only a few months of short-term training before being commissioned. Upon graduating from a military academy, the new officers incur a 7- to 8- year commitment to the PLA. In 2003, the four General Departments issued new age requirements for enlisted personnel applying for officer training. Members of the enlisted force who were conscripted after graduating from high school cannot be more than 23 years old when they applied. The age requirement was further reduced since 2003 to 22 years old. This implies that the only members of the enlisted force permitted to apply to an officer academy are conscripts and grade-1 NCOs who have not exceeded the age limit. All conscripts and NCOs who apply to officer undergraduate and senior technical academic specialties offered at military academies

take the All-Army Uniform Academic Examination for admission to military schools. The exam is held throughout the PLA once a year, usually in early June. The examination results and academy enrollment decisions are usually posted in mid-July, and classes begin in the fall. In addition to taking the Uniform Academic Examination, many enlisted applicants for military academies and schools must take an exam covering specific military training subjects, depending on the academic specialty they elect to study. This test is usually given several months ahead of the Uniform Academic Examination. The duration of the exam is about two hours, and the scores on these specialty exams are combined with the applicants score on the Uniform Academic Examination for an overall score. According to the All-Army Recruitment Office, nearly 30,000 enlisted personnel nationwide took the exam in 2005, with more than 5,000 individuals gaining admission to military academies as officers, an overall national ratio of 1 to 6. Of note, the total number of enlisted personnel in the PLAN recruited into officer academies during the 2003 recruitment cycle plunged by 58% from the previous year. Statistics from the PLAN Political Departments Cadre Department show that about 650 enlisted sailors were admitted to naval academies in 2003 compared to more than 1,500 in 2002. An examination of admissions statistics from 2005 reveals a further reduction, with the number of enlisted sailors admitted dropping to about 450. Although the high number of applicants who take the examination each year suggests there remains great interest in extending ones active- duty service as an officer, it has become increasingly difficult for enlisted personnel to gain admission to military academies in recent years for the following three reasons: First, the PLA has been reducing its overall size, with a major focus on shrinking the officer corps. Second, the PLA began recruiting civilian college graduates as officers in the early 1990s and instituted a National Defense Scholarship Program in civilian universities in the early 2000s. This program has further reduced the number of officer slots available to enlisted personnel. Third, the PLA has been trying to expand the size of its NCO corps with personnel who previously would have been qualified to become officers. Retirement and Demobilization With the reduction of the mandatory conscription period to two years, half of the entire conscription force now turns over each November. Moreover, NCOs are also demobilized at this time, provided they have completed a service period and are not selected for promotion to the next higher grade. When a conscript or NCO is demobilized from the PLA, he receives a retirement subsidy, as well as a medical subsidy if he suffers from a chronic illness. Once the soldier is formally demobilized and returns to civilian life, all expenses related to his demobilization and job placement are paid by the local government where he resides. The demobilization process for NCOs is sometimes disruptive for unit training. In some cases, NCOs receive about a month of training prior to demobilization to prepare them for a civilian job. Typical types of training include computers, driving, cooking, photography, and vehicle repair. The changeover of personnel can sometimes cause difficulties for units to manage, particularly when it leaves a gap in expertise. For example, the replacements for NCOs who serve as squad leaders are sometimes not identified until the NCOs are demobilized. The units must then spend time training the new NCO as a squad leader. In addition, because the PLAN takes the demobilization date seriously, vessels on patrol have returned to port just to disembark NCOs who are being demobilized the following day. The vessels are then left shorthanded until replacements can be trained. After demobilization, conscripts and NCOs can be placed in enlisted reserve service if they are evaluated as suitable. These forces are occasionally brought in to active-duty units for training. In 2002, the PLAN decided to conduct its first reservist mobilization training to keep reserve personnel updated with the more technically sophisticated equipment currently in service. For example, one destroyer unit called up 80 reservists who had previously served in the unit as grade-2 or higher NCOs. The reservists trained together for several days and then conducted at-sea training for about a week

People's Liberation Army Navy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Active since September, 1950 250,000 58 77 principal 84 amphibious ~387 coastal ~31 mine ~370-480 ~150 auxiliary/support vessels personnel submarines combatants ships vessels vessels craft

Size

surface warfare warfare warfare landing

Engagements Current commander

Chinese Civil War Sino-Vietnamese War Anti-Piracy in Somalia Admiral Wu Shengli

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN or PLA Navy) (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnggu Rnmn Jifngjn Hijn) is the naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the military of the People's Republic of China. Until the early 1990s, the navy performed a subordinate role to the PLA Land Forces. Since then, it has undergone rapid modernisation. It is currently the second largest naval service in the world after the United States Navy. With a personnel strength of over 250,000, the PLAN also includes the 35,000 strong Coastal Defense Force and the 56,000 man Naval infantry/Marines, plus a 56,000 PLAN Aviation naval air arm operating several hundred land-based aircraft and shipbased helicopters. As part of its overall program of naval modernization, the PLAN has a plan of developing a blue-water navy.[1] Mission Peacetime: Sea patrols of territorial waters Establish presence in disputed territorial waters and protect current interests Anti-piracy, anti-smuggling, search and rescue Maintain security of territorial waters Active logistical support role of combatants and island garrisons Maintain security of Sea Lines of Communications Wartime: Littoral defense of local seas Blockade or protection of vital ship routes and choke points (eg. Taiwan strait) Tactical transport, support, and amphibious operations of ground forces Air defense Anti-submarine operations Engagement of enemy shipping Active logistical support role of combatants and island garrisons History See also: Naval history of China The PLAN traces its lineage to units of the Republic of China Navy who defected to the People's Liberation Army towards the end of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, Mao Zedong asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy." During the Landing Operation on Hainan Island, the communists used wooden junks fitted with mountain guns as both transport and warships against the Republic of China Navy. The Naval Academy was set up at Dalian on November 22, 1949, mostly with Soviet instructors. The navy was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval forces under General Staff Department command in Jiangyan, now in Taizhou, Jiangsu province. It then consisted of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Kuomintang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By 1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in Chinapossibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personneland the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. With Soviet assistance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground forces. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally

the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet was under discussion. 1950s and 1960s Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the Navy remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the service largely avoided the turmoil affecting the country. Although it paid lip service to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the Navy continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets. 1970s and 1980s In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense budget was allocated to naval forces, the Navy grew dramatically. The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats, the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the production of larger surface ships, including support ships for oceangoing operations, increased. The Navy also began development of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In the 1980s, under the leadership of Chief Naval Commander Liu Huaqing, the navy developed into a regional naval power, though naval construction continued at a level somewhat below the 1970s rate. Liu Huaqing was an Army Officer who spent most of his career in administrative positions involving science and technology. It was not until 1988 that the People's Liberation Army Navy was lead by a Naval Officer. Liu was also very close to Deng Xiaoping as his modernization efforts were very much in keeping with Deng's national policies. While under his leadership Naval construction yards produced fewer ships than the 1970s, greater emphasis was placed on technology and improved quality. Modernization efforts also encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and force structure in favor of more green-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the expansion of China's capabilities were the 1980 recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the navy conducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic missile. The navy also had some success in developing a variety of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, improving basic capabilities.[2] In 1986 the Navy's order of battle included two Xia-class SSBNs armed with twelve CSS-N-3 missiles and three Han-class SSNs armed with six SY-2 cruise missiles. In the late 1980s, major deficiencies reportedly remained in antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, naval electronics (including electronic countermeasures equipment), and naval aviation capabilities. The PLA Navy was ranked in 1987 as the third largest navy in the world, although naval personnel had comprised only 12 percent of PLA strength. In 1987 the Navy consisted (as it does now) of the naval headquarters in Beijing; three fleet commands the North Sea Fleet, based at Qingdao, Shandong; the East Sea Fleet, based at Ningbo; and the South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang, Guangdong and about 2,000 ships. The 350,000-person Navy included Naval Air Force units of 34,000 men, the Coastal Defense Forces of 38,000, and the Marine Corps of 56,500. Navy Headquarters, which controlled the three fleet commands, was subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department. In 1987, China's 1,500 km coastline was protected by more than 100 diesel-powered Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines, which could remain at sea only a limited time. Inside this protective ring and within range of shore-based aircraft were destroyers and frigates mounting Styx antiship missiles, depth-charge projectors, and guns up to 130 mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate protection would have been swarmed by almost 900 fast-attack craft. Stormy weather limited the range of these small boats, however, and curtailed air support. Behind the inner ring were Coastal Defense Force personnel operating naval shore batteries of Styx missiles and guns, backed by ground force units deployed in depth. Into the 21st century As the 21st century approached, the PLAN began to transition to an off-shore defensive strategy that entailed more out-of-area operations away from its traditonal territorial waters.[3] Between 1989 and 1993, the training ship Zhenghe paid ports visits to Hawaii, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. PLAN vessels visited Vladivostok in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. PLAN task groups also paid visits to Indonesia in 1995; North Korea in 1997; New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines in 1998; Malaysia, Tanzania, South Africa, the United States, and Canada in 2000; and India, Pakistan, France, Italy, Germany, Britain, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand in 2001.[4] In March 1997, the Luhu-class guided missile destroyer Harbin, the Luda-class guided missile destroyer Zhuhai, and the replenishment oiler Nancang began the PLA Navy's first circumnavigation of the Pacific Ocean, a 98-day voyage with port visits to Mexico, Peru, Chile, and the United States, including Pearl Harbor and San Diego. The flotilla was under the command of Vice Admiral Wang Yongguo, the commander-in-chief of the PLAN South Seas Fleet (SSF).[5][4][6][7][8][9] The Luhu-class guided missile destroyer Qingdao and the replenishment oiler Taicang completed the PLA Navy's first circumnavigation of the world (pictured), a 123-day voyage covering 32,000 nautical miles (59,000 km; 37,000 mi) between 15 May and 23 September 2002. Port visits included Changi, Singapore; Alexandria, Egypt; Aksis, Turkey; Sevastopol, Ukraine; Piraeus, Greece; Lisbon, Portugal; Fortaleza, Brazil; Guayaquil, Ecuador; Callao, Peru; and Papeete in French Polynesia. The PLA naval vessels participated in naval exercises with the French frigates Nivse and Prairial, as well as exercises with the Peruvian Navy. The flotilla was under the command of Vice Admiral Ding Yiping, the commander-in-chief of the North Sea Fleet (NSF), and Captain Li Yujie was the commanding officer of the Qingdao.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16] Overall, between 1985 and 2006, PLAN naval vessels visited 18 AsianPacific nations, 4 South American nations, 8 European nations, 3 African nations, and 3 North American nations.[17] In 2003, the PLAN conducted its first joint naval exercises during separate visits to Pakistan and India. Bi-lateral naval exercises were also carried out with exercises with the French, British, Australian, Canadian, Philippine, and United States navies.[18] On December 26, 2008, the PLAN dispatched a task group consisting of the guided missile destroyer Haikou (flagship), the guided missile destroyer Wuhan, and the supply ship Weishanhu to the Gulf of Aden to participating in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. A team of 16 Chinese Special Forces members from its Marine Corps armed with attack helicopters were on board.[19][20][21] Since then, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply ship in the Gulf of Aden by assigning ships from the South Sea Fleet and/or East Sea Fleet to the Gulf of Aden on a three monthly basis. PLAN operations has been marred by the 2001 Hainan Island incident, a major submarine accident in 2003, and several naval incidents involving the U.S. MSC-operated ocean surveillance ships Victorious and Impeccable during 2009. Current status Strategy, plans, priorities The People's Liberation Army Navy has become more prominent in recent years owing to a change in Chinese strategic priorities. The new strategic threats include possible conflict with the United States and/or a resurgent Japan in areas such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. As part of its overall program of naval modernization, the PLAN has a long-term plan of developing a blue water navy.[1] Current modernizations, however, represent a naval force that is best suited to cooperation rather than competition with other world powers. [22] Robert D. Kaplan has said that it was the collapse of the

Soviet Union that allowed China to transfer resources from its army to its navy and other force projection assets.[23] China is constructing a major underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, Hainan. In December 2007 the first Type 094 submarine was moved to Sanya.[24] The Daily Telegraph on 1 May 2008 reported that tunnels were being built into hillsides which could be capable of hiding up to 20 nuclear submarines from spy satellites. According to the Western news media the base is reportedly to help China project seapower well into the Pacific Ocean area, including challenging United States naval power.[25][26] During a 2008 interview with the BBC, Major General Qian Lihua, a senior Chinese defense official, stated that the PLAN aspired to possess a small number of aircraft carriers to allow it to expand China's air defense perimeter.[27] According to Qian the important issue was not whether China had an aircraft carrier, but what it did with it.[27] However, as of yet only certain military personalities have stated China indeed plans to build or acquire aircraft carriers and there has, as of yet, been no official evidence of an active and advancing aircraft carrier program. At the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the PLAN, 52 vessels were shown in manoeuvres off Qingdao in April 2009 including previously unseen nuclear submarines. The demonstration was seen as a sign of the growing status of China, while the president, Hu Jintao, indicated that China is neither seeking regional hegemony nor entering an arms race.[28] On January 13 2009, Adm. Robert F. Willard, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, called the PLAN's modernization "aggressive," and that it raised concerns in the region.[29] On July 15 2009, Senator Jim Webb of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that only the "United States has both the stature and the national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China brings" to situations such as the claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands.[30] The PLAN "continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of Chinas military, C4ISR systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM, and a dependence on foreign suppliers for certain key ship components."[31] 2008 Anti-piracy operations On 18 December 2008, Chinese authorities deployed People's Liberation Army Navy vessels to escort Chinese shipping in the Gulf of Aden.[32] This deployment came after a series of attacks and attempted hijackings on Chinese vessels by Somali pirates. Reports suggest two destroyers (Luyang II-Class 171 Haikou and Luyang-Class 169 Wuhan) and a supply ship are the ones being used. This move was welcomed by the international community as the warships complement a multinational fleet already operating along the coast of Africa. It will be the first time Chinese warships have deployed outside the Asia-Pacific region for a military operation since Zheng He in the 15th century. Since this operation PLAN has sought the leadership of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction body (SHADE), which would require an increase in the number of vessels contributing to the antipiracy fleet.[22] Organization Main article: People's Liberation Army Navy Organization The PLAN is organized into several departments for efficient command, control and coordination. Ranks Main article: Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy Equipment The PLAN initially utilized Soviet-based hardware as the backbone of their forces, with increasing domestic production over time. In the last several years, the PRC has made progress in modernizing its fleet with the purchase of Sovremenny class destroyers and Kilo class submarines, as well as producing sophisticated domestic designs such as the Lanzhou class destroyers and the Yuan class submarines. China's submarine fleet has also made advances. The Song and Yuan-class subs are quieter than their predecessors and the Kilo-class subs are equipped with two next-generation weapons: the Klub anti-ship cruise missile and the VA111 Shkval torpedo. Some Chinese submarines, including the Kilo and Yuan, are also thought to have air-independent propulsion, which would allow them to remain submerged for longer periods of time than they could previously maintain. Chinese naval technology has improved, in part due to Russian assistance. Its latest destroyers use more local hardware of an improved quality, such as better fire-control systems, stealth technology in their hull designs to reduce their radar profile, and C4ISR systems. However, despite these rapid advances, roughly half of China's major combat vessels and the bulk of the smaller vessels are still from older, obsolescent classes and not replaced by newer ones. Inventory Nr. Nr. Nr. in Type Planned/ Active Reserve Building Submarines Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines Nuclear Attack Submarines Conventional Ballistic Missile Submarines Conventional Attack Submarines Total Submarines Principal Surface Combatants Aircraft Carriers Destroyers Frigates Total Principal Surface Combatants Coastal Warfare Vessels Missile Boats Torpedo Boats Gun Boats Submarine Chasers Total Coastal Warfare Vessels 2 4-6 0 1 7-9 3 1 4 5 5 1 47 58 0 26 51 77 132 20 160 75 ~387 110-120 150 100 20 ~380-390

Amphibious Warfare Vessels Landing Platforms Landing Ships Landing Craft Total Amphibious Warfare Vessels

1 83 370-480 ~454-564

Mine Warfare Vessels 42 Mine Warfare Ships 27 26 4 Mine Warfare Drones 68 Total Mine Warfare Vessels 31 Total Auxiliary/Support Vessels ~153 12+ Total All Vessels ~1160-1270 450+ 12+ 420+ Total Combat Vessels ~633 Note: "Total Combat Vessels" counts only submarines, principal surface combatants, coastal warfare vessels, mine warfare ships, landing platforms and ships. These are vessels that would normally be commissioned and excludes landing craft, mine warfare drones and auxiliary/support vessels. All numbers are approximate. Ships Main article: Ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy Submarines Main article: Submarines of the People's Liberation Army Navy Naval Weaponry Main article: Naval Weaponry of the People's Liberation Army Navy Naval Aircraft Main article: People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force Future fleet See also: Future Chinese aircraft carrier The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to the first and second island chains, as far as the South Pacific near Australia, and spanning to the Aleutian islands, and operations extending to the Straits of Malacca near the Indian Ocean.[33]Modernizing the fleet into a blue water navy will also provide better power projection in not only the region but globally in the 21st century. Chinese naval analysts also feel the need to develop a navy capable of countering force projection by the United States Navy or capable of handling a potential conflict with Taiwan. The future PLAN fleet will be composed of a balance of assets aimed at maximising the PLAN's fighting effectiveness. On the high end, there would be modern destroyers equipped with long range air defense missiles (Type 052B, Type 052C, Type 051C); destroyers armed with supersonic anti-ship missiles (Sovremenny class); advanced nuclear powered attack and ballistic missile submarines (Type 093, Type 094); advanced conventional attack submarines (Kilo and Yuan); aircraft carriers and large amphibious warfare vessels capable mobilizing troops at long distances. On the medium and low end, there would be more economical multi-role capable frigates and destroyers (upgraded Luda, Luhu, Jiangwei II, Jiangkai); fast littoral missile attack craft (Houjian, Houxin, Houbei); various landing ships and light craft; and conventionally powered coastal patrol submarines (Song). The future fleet will have the obsolete combat ships (based on 1960s designs) phased out in the coming decades as more modern designs enter full production. It may take a decade for the bulk of these older ships to be retired. Until then, they will serve principally on the low end, as multi-role patrol/escort platforms. Their use could be further enhanced in the future by being used as fast transports or fire support platforms. This system of phasing out would see a reversal in the decline in quality of PLAN vessels by 2015, and cuts in inventory after the end of the Cold War could be made up for by 2020.[34] During 2001-2006 there has been a rapid building and acquisition program.[33] There were more than a dozen new classes of ships built in these last five years,[33] totalling some 60 brand new ships (including landing ships and auxiliaries).[33] Simultaneously, dozens of other ships have been either phased out of service or refitted with new equipment. There had been speculation about the PLAN building or acquiring an aircraft carrier,[35] but on March 23 2009 China's defense minister, Liang Guanglie, confirmed the country's plans to build its own aircraft carrier.[36] Submarines play a significant role in the development of the PLAN's future fleet. This is made evident by the construction of a new type of nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the Type 094 and the Type 093 nuclear attack submarine. This will provide the PLAN with a more modern response for the need of a seaborne nuclear deterrent. The new submarines will also be capable of performing conventional strike and other special warfare requirements. Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service reported that the long term goals of PLAN planning include: assert or defend Chinas claims in maritime territorial disputes and Chinas interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect Chinas sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert Chinas status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence.[37] During the military parade on the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, the YJ-62 naval cruise missile made its first public appearance; the YJ-62 represents the next generation in naval weapons technology in the PLA. See also Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag Republic of China Navy References 1. ^ a b Chinese navy urged to go from coastal waters to oceans 2. ^ Cole, Bernard D. The Great Wall at Sea Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001 3. ^ China's Navy 2007. Washington, DC: United States Navy. 2008. pp. 2330. ISBN 0785227598. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 4. ^ a b China's Navy 2007. Washington, DC: United States Navy. 2008. p. 114. ISBN 0785227598. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 5. ^ Dengfeng, Wu (2009). "Deep Blue Defense A Modern Force at Sea". Focus. China Pictorial. http://www.chinapictorial.com.cn/en/focus/txt/2009-04/07/content_190344.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-25.

^ Dumbaugh, Kerry; Richard Cronin, Shirley Kan, Larry Niksch, David M. Ackerman (February 2, 2009, reviewd November 12, 2001). Chinas Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. CRS32. ISBN CRS Report RL31183. http://web.mit.edu/kolya/.f/root/net.mit.edu/sipb.mit.edu/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL31183.pdf. Retrieved 2010-03-02. 7. ^ Kim, Duk-ki (2000). Naval strategy in Northeast Asia: geo-strategic goals, policies, and prospects. New York, New York: Routledge. p. 152. ISBN 071464966X. http://books.google.com/?id=9ReJ6RvoeREC&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=Zhuhai+Nancang+1997&q=Zhuhai%20Nanc ang%201997. Retrieved 2010-03-02. 8. ^ JO1 Robert Benson, USN (Fall 1997). "Chinese Navy's Historic Pearl Harbor Visit". Forum. Asian Pacific Defense (APAN). http://forum.apan-info.net/fall_97/China_r.html. Retrieved 2010-03-02. 9. ^ "30 Years of Sino- US Relations". News feature. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2001. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/premade/28067/sino-us6.htm. Retrieved 2010-03-03. 10. ^ Graham, Euan (2005). Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?. New York: Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies. p. 208. ISBN 0415356407. 11. ^ China's Navy 2007. Washington, DC: United States Navy. 2008. pp. 114115. ISBN 0785227598. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 12. ^ ""China celebrates navy's circumnavigation"". News Online. ABC News. September 23, 2002. http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200209/s683908.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 13. ^ ""Chinese naval ships made first round-the-world sailing"". Special Reports. Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. 2009-09-18. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2009-09/18/content_4089049.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 14. ^ "2002: Chinese naval ships made first round -the-world sailing". Yearly Focus. PLA Daily. October 8, 2008. http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-11/27/content_1608384.htm. Retrieved 2010-03-02. 15. ^ "Chinese Naval Fleet Concludes Visit to Turkey". World News. People's Daily Online. June 24, 2002. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/23/eng20020623_98395.shtml. Retrieved 2009-03-02. 16. ^ "Chinese Naval Ship Formation's First Global Navigation". Home China. People's Daily. September 28, 2002. http://english.people.com.cn/200209/28/eng20020928_104085.shtml. Retrieved 2010-03-04. 17. ^ China's Navy 2007. Washington, DC: United States Navy. 2008. p. 115. ISBN 0785227598. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 18. ^ China's Navy 2007. Washington, DC: United States Navy. 2008. p. 116. ISBN 0785227598. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 19. ^ "China to add special forces, helicopters to fight pirates". Shanghai Daily. 2008-12-23. http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2008/200812/20081223/article_385590.htm. Retrieved 2009-03-27. "China ready to use force on Somali pirates". Defencetalk.com. 2008-12-23. 20. ^ http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/navy/China_ready_to_use_force_on_Somali_pirates120016822.php. Retrieved 2009-03-27. 21. ^ Erikson, Andrew R.; Lt. Justine D. Mikolay, USN (March 2009). "Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates". U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding 135 (3): 3441. ISSN 0041798X. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1809. Retrieved 2009-04-20. "Access requires registration.". 22. ^ a b Why China's Naval Rise Could Help the World 23. ^ China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship, page 50 24. ^ http://www.janes.com/news/security/jir/jir080421_1_n.shtml 25. ^ Harding, Thomas, "Chinese Build Secret Nuclear Submarine Base", London Daily Telegraph, May 2, 2008. 26. ^ Harding, Thomas, "Chinese Nuclear Submarines Prompt 'New Cold War' Warning", London Daily Telegraph, May 3, 2008. 27. ^ a b "China has aircraft carrier hopes". BBC News. 2008-11-17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7732679.stm. Retrieved 2010-05-22. 28. ^ Kathrin Hille (April 24, 2009). "China's show of sea power challenges US". Financial Times. 29. ^ China's 'aggressive' buildup called worry 30. ^ US Reaffirms Its Rights to Operate in South China Sea 31. ^ Ronald ORourke (December 23, 2009). "CRS RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress". Congressional Research Service. http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153. Retrieved 2010-05-07. 32. ^ http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Somalia-Pirates-China-Deploys-Navy-To-Gulf-Of-Aden-FollowingHijackAttempt/Article/200812315185722?lpos=World_News_News_Your_Way_Region_8&lid=NewsYourWay_ARTICLE_15 185722_Somalia_Pirates%3A_China_Deploys_Navy_To_Gulf_Of_Aden_Following_Hijack_Attempt 33. ^ a b c d Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, Retrieved on 2008-05-22 34. ^ The Next Arms Race 35. ^ http://sinodefence.com/navy/aircarrier/default.asp 36. ^ http://en.rian.ru/world/20090323/120692506.html 37. ^ China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues for Congress This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the Library of Congress Country Studies. A Country Study: China External links Chinese naval aircraft in service PLAN - Chinese Defence Today Global Security - China PLA idag-PLAN (Swedish)

6.

Geographic Boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains. PLAN Type 052C air defence destroyer Varyag

Sailors shown in 2009 during 60th anniversary celebrations of the PLAN Chinas Critical Sea Lines of Communication. In 2004, over 80 percent of Chinese crude oil imports transited the Straits of Malacca, with less than 2 percent transiting the Straits of Lombok. PLAN sailors in Qingdao, North Sea Fleet HQ on parade with Type-56 carbines.

Guangzhou-class destroyer Guangzhou (168) Song-class SSK PLA Navy ships Qingdao and Taican during 2002 world circumnavigation

A starboard view of the PLA Navy Han class nuclear-powered attack submarine No. 405 underway. April 1, 1993. A Chinese sailor, armed with a Type 56 assault rifle in 1986.Major Naval Units in PLA Military Regions in 2006 (Source: US DOD) - click to enlarge.

Fleets in Dong Hai - Fleet in action in Nan Hai

People's Liberation Army Navy Organization

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the Naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLAN force consists of approx. 250,000 men and over a hundred major combat vessels, organized into 3 fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Below is the organizational structure of the PLAN. PLAN Headquarters PLAN HQ is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department and the Chairman of the CMC. Information current as of March 2007 Commander-in-Chief of the Navy: Admiral Wu Shengli Commander Command Period Wu Shengli Aug 2006 - Present Zhang Dingfa Jun 2003 - Aug 2006 Shi Yunsheng Nov 1996 - Jun 2003 Zhang Liangzhong Jan 1988 - Jun 2003 Liu Huaqing Aug 1982 - Jan 1988 Ye Fei Jan 1980 - Aug 1982 Xiao Jinguan Jan 1950 - Jan 1980 Political Commissar of the Navy: Admiral Liu Xiaojiang Political Commissar Command Period Liu Xiaojiang Jul 2008 - Present Hu Yanlin Jun 2003 - Jul 2008 Yang Huaiqing Jul 1995 - Jun 2003 Zhou Kunren Dec 1993 - Jul 1995 Wei Jingshan April 1990 - Dec 1993 Lee Yaowen Oct 1980 - April 1990 Ye Fei Feb 1979 - Jan 1980 Du Yide Oct 1977 - Dec 1978 Su Zhenhua Sep 1971 - Sep 1977 Li Zuoping Jun 1967 - Sep 1971 Wang Hongkun Mar 1966 - Jun 1967 Su Zhenhua Feb 1957 - Feb 1966 Deputy Political Commissars: Kang Chengyuan Fan Yinhua Wu Huayang Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy: Ding Yiping Jin Mao Shen Binyi Wang Yucheng Zhang Yongyi Zhang Zhannan Zhao Xingfa Gu Wengen Chief of Naval Staff: Ding Yiping Director of Political Department: Xu Jianzhong Fleet Commanders North Sea Fleet: Rear Admiral Tian Zhong; Political Commisar Li Guang East Sea Fleet: Vice Admiral Xu Hongmen; Political Commisar Xu Jianzhong South Sea Fleet: Vice Admiral Gu Wengen; Political Commisar Huang Jiaxiang Fleets The People's Liberation Army Navy is divided into three fleets. the North Sea Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao, Shandong Province, patrols the Bohai Bay and the Yellow Sea. Its flagship is DDG Harbin. the East Sea Fleet, headquartered in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, patrols the East China Sea, which is called the Eastern Sea in Chinese. Its flagship is J302 Chongmingdao. the South Sea Fleet, headquartered in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, patrols the South China Sea, or the South Sea in Chinese. Its flagship is AOR/AK Nanchang. Bases North Sea Fleet Major bases: Qingdao (HQ), Huludao, Jianggezhuang, Guzhen Bay, Lushun, Xiaopingdao. Minor bases: Weihai Wei, Qingshan, Luda, Lianyungang, Ling Shan, Ta Ku Shan, Changshandao, Liuzhuang, Dayuanjiadun, Dalian

East Sea Fleet Major bases: Ningbo (HQ), Zhoushan, Shanghai, Daxie, Fujian. Minor bases: Zhenjiangguan, Wusong, Xinxiang, Wenzhou, Sanduao, Xiamen, Xingxiang, Quandou, Wen Zhou SE, Wuhan, Dinghai, Jiaotou South Sea Fleet Major bases: Zhanjiang (HQ), Yulin, Huangfu, Hong Kong, Guangzhou (Canton). Minor bases: Haikou, Shantou, Humen, Kuanchuang, Tsun, Kuan Chung, Mawai, Beihai, Ping Tan, San Chou Shih, Tang-Chiah Huan, Longmen, Bailong, Dongcun, Baimajing, Xiachuandao, Yuchi Naval Aviation Main article: People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force The PLANAF has 25,000 personnel and roughly 800 aircraft under the navy's command. It operates similar aircraft to the air force, including fighters, bombers, strike aircraft, tankers, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, maritime patrol, seaplane, transport, training and helicopter types. The PLANAF has traditionally received older aircraft than the PLAAF and has taken less ambitious steps towards mass modernization. Advancements in new technologies, weaponry and aircraft acquisition were made after 2000. The modern day PLANAF is capable of performing a number of roles, from airborne interdiction to coastal ship defense. PLANAF Air Bases includes: North Sea Fleet: Dalian, Qingdao, Jinxi, Jiyuan, Laiyang, Jiaoxian, Xingtai, Laishan, Anyang, Changzhi, Liangxiang and Shan Hai Guan East Sea Fleet: Danyang, Daishan, Shanghai (Dachang), Ningbo, Luqiao, Feidong and Shitangqiao South Sea Fleet: Foluo, Haikou, Lingshui, Sanya, Guiping, Jialaishi and Lingling Coastal Defense With around 25,000 personnel, the navy's coastal defense force forms the vanguard of China's defense from amphibious and air attack. The coastal defense troops operate a variety of artillery and missile systems that are capable of engaging air and sea targets. The coastal defense troops have played a key role in PLAN history. In 1958, this force fired artillery against KMT forces on the islands near the mainland. Throughout the 1960s-80s, the coastal defense troops were focused on defending China's coast from a possible Soviet sea-borne invasion. The principle weapon that has served with the coastal defense troops is the HY-2 coast-launched anti-ship missile (based fundamentally on the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx). These missiles could be launched from either fixed emplacements, or mobile truck mounts. Since the 1990s, the coastal defense forces have received more types of short to long range anti-ship missiles. Today the primary weapons of the coastal defense troops are the HY-2, YJ-82, and C-602 anti-ship missiles. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat of an amphibious invasion of China has diminished. Though no longer a vital component of the PLAN, the coastal defense forces nonetheless would be important in any conflict to protect key PLAN coastal assets from enemy sabotage, as well as air defence. Marine Corps Main article: People's Liberation Army Marine Corps The PLAN has command over two 6000-man marine brigades both based in the South China Sea. It is believed in time of war, up to 28,000 Marines can be mobilized. These two brigades possess combined arms units, including armor, artillery, missile, air defense, and logistical support. PLAN marines are part of the rapid mobilization forces of the Chinese military. The marines perform two principle missions in the PLAN: 1) Serve as the spearhead of any amphibious operation; and 2) Garrison or assault island chains, in particular potentially disputed territories in regional waters. Special forces elements of the marines include reconnaissance units known as 'frogmen'. These are troops that could be launched from submarines or small craft to survey landing sites and sabotage enemy defenses prior to a full marine assault. Paramilitary Maritime Organizations See also: China Coast Guard The PLAN is complemented by paramilitary maritime services, such as CMS, Hai Guang, People's Armed Police and the militia. The CMS is known to perform mostly coastal and ocean search and rescue or patrols. The CMS has received quite a few large patrol ships that would significantly enhance their operations. Hai Guang, militia, police and other services operate hundreds of small patrol craft. For maritime patrol services, these craft are usually quite well armed with machine guns and 37mm AA guns. It is believed that in the near future, an integration of all these separate services would form a Chinese coast guard. In addition, these services operate their own small aviation units to assist their maritime patrol capabilities. Hai Guang and CMS are known to operate a handful of Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and a maritime patrol aircraft based on the Harbin Y-12 STOL transport. Roles of these services are diverse but include: Patrol of territorial waters and disputed territories Anti-smuggling, anti-piracy Maritime policing and ship inspections Harbour and coastal security Research and survey Search and Rescue Fisheries protection Unlike US or Japan, the Chinese Coast Guard is not under an independent command. Instead, they're part of the armed police, under the local (provincial) border defense force command. Every coastal province has 1 to 3 Coast Guard squadrons: 3 Squadrons: Fujian, Guangdong 2 Squadrons: Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Hainan, Guangxi 1 Squadron: Heibei, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shanghai Typical Coast Guard ships include the 130 ton Type 218 patrol boat, armed with twin 14.5mm machine guns, assorted speedboats, and few larger patrol ships. Up until very recently, the largest ship in Chinese Coast Guard service was the 1,500 ton Haixun-class Cutter (#1001). In March 2007, it was reported that the PLAN has transferred 2 Jianghu FFG's (#509 & #510) to the Coast Guard and re-numbered 1002 & 1003. These 2 ships now represent the largest vessels in the Coast Guard inventory. The Chinese Coast Guard conducts periodic joint-training sessions with other navies, including the US Coast Guard service.[1] The Chinese Coast Guard also participates in the annual North Pacific Coast Guard Forum in Alaska, along with US, Canadian, Japanese, S. Korean, and Russian Coast Guards. As part of an exchange program, members of the Chinese Coast Guard service have been assigned to serve on US Coast Guard cutters.[2] References 1. ^ Logon Form 2. ^ RealClearPolitics - Articles - U.S. Coast Guard Has Chinese aboard External links Sinodefence.com Global Security PLAN Overview GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies China Data Supplement Office of Naval Intelligence China's Navy 2007 CRS Report for Congress: China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S Navy Capabilities Background and Issues for Congress

East Sea Fleet

The East Sea Fleet was the first naval force formed by the People's Republic of China, on 23 April 1949, and was initially based at Shanghai. It has since been assigned to be part of the People's Liberation Army Navy and its headquarters have been moved to Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, but the fleet continues to patrol the East China Sea. Its flagship is Chongmingdao. The fleet was used in a support role during the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) invasion of the previously Kuomintang-held island of Yijiangshan on 14 January 1955. It has engaged in numerous other battles against the Taiwanese military. It has also operated in support of the South Sea Fleet against the People's Army of Vietnam, particularly in the 1980s. The fleet would have a key role in any invasion of Taiwan, and one of its principal missions is to effectively support a PLA amphibious operation against that island. The fleet has been augmented by two Sovremenny class missile destroyers, with a further 2 to be delivered by the end of 2006. Four Kilo class attack submarines have also joined the fleet. Major Naval Bases in the Fleet Ningbo Fleet Headquarters Shanghai Naval Base Xiangshan Naval Base Zhoushan Naval Base Fujian Naval Base Ships in the fleet (47) Diesel-electric submarines (7) Destroyers (8) 4 Sovremenny-Class: 4 Kilo-class: o Hangzhou (136) o 364 o Fuzhou (137) o 365 o Taizhou (138) o 366 o Ningbo (139) o 367 4 Luda-Class: 3 Song class o Nanjing (131) o 320 o Hefei (132) o 321 o Chongqing (133) o 322 o Zunyi (134) Landing ships (7) Frigates (25) 7 Yukan-Class LST: o Zijinshan (927) 2 Jiangkai-Class II: o Xuzhou (530) o 928 o Zhoushan (529) o 929 o 930 2 Jiangkai-Class: o 931 o Ma'anshan (525) o 932 o Wenzhou (526) o 933 6 Jiangwei II-Class: Jiangxing (521) Lianyungang (522) Putian (523) Sanming (524) Luoyang (527) Mianyang (528) 4 Jiangwei I-Class: o Anqing (539) o Huainan (540) o Huaibei (541) o Tongling (542) 2 Jianghu II-Class: o Ningbo (533) o Jinhua (534) 9 Jianghu-Class: o Shaoxing (510) o Nantong (511) o Wuxi (512) o Huaiyin (513) o Zhenjiang (514) o Xiamen (515) o Jiujiang (516) o Nanping (517) o Ji'an (518)

o o o o o o

South Sea Fleet

The People's Republic of China's South Sea Fleet (SSF) was first established in late 1949. The flagship of the SSF is the AOR/AK Nanchang (953). Initially, the fleet's strength consisted mostly of former Kuomintang ships and personnel, which either defected or were captured by the People's Liberation Army. One of three fleets of the People's Liberation Army Navy, the SSF's duties were to protect the city of Guangzhou and the Pearl River regions, and support the PLA in capturing islands that were still in the hands of the Kuomintang forces. The fleet's development has been slow, because most of China's shipbuilding industry is located on the northern or eastern coasts. In the 1970s the fleet underwent a major buildup, due to conflict in the Paracel Islands and other reefs in the South China Sea. In 1974, the SSF took the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, which resulted in the sinking of one South Vietnamese frigate while damaging another. The latest incident was in 1988, when a Chinese naval task force engaged Vietnamese naval forces, sinking one Vietnamese warship and damaging another. Most of the fleet's surface ships are located at Zhanjiang naval base, while all of the fleet's submarines are at Yulin navy base on Hainan Island. The SSF has many other bases included Guangzhou, Haikou, Shantou, Mawei, and Beihai, while naval air force bases are at Lingshui, Haikou, Sanya, Zhanjiang, and Guiping. The fleet's area of operations is divided into six zones. A task group under the fleet's deputy commander, Rear Admiral Su Zhiquan, consisting of the Luyang I class destroyer Guangzhou and the tanker Weishanhu visited several European ports, including Portsmouth, Cadiz, and Toulon, in September-October 2007. During the visit the two ships conducted communications and maritime rescue drills with HMS Ark Royal.[1] Major Naval Bases in the Fleet The fleet headquarters was, at Naval air force bases: first, at Guangzhou, but was later relocated to Zhanjiang. Lingshui Yulin, Hainan Island Haikou Guangzhou Sanya Haikou Zhanjiang Shantou Guiping Mawei Beihai Stonecutters Island, Hong Kong - People's Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison Destroyers: 4 Jianghu II-Class: o Shaoguan (553) 2 Luyang II-Class DDG: o Lanzhou (170) o Anshun (554) o Haikou (171) o Zhaotong (555) o Jishou (557) 2 Luyang-Class: o Guangzhou (168) Diesel-Electric submarines: o Wuhan (169) 8 Ming-Class 1 Luhai-Class: Landing ships: o Shenzhen (167) 1 Yuzhao-Class LPD: 6 Luda-Class: o Kunlun Shan (998) o Changsha (161) o Nanning (162) 11 Yuting-Class LST: o Nanchang (163) o 991 o Guilin (164) o 934 o Zhanjiang (165) o 935 o Zhuhai (166) o 936 o 937 Frigates: o 938 4 Jiangkai-Class II: o 939 o Huangshan (570) o 940 o Chaohu (568) o 908 o Yuncheng (571) o 909 o Yulin (569) o 910 4 Jiangwei II-Class: 6 Qiongsha-Class troop transport ships: o Yichang (564) o NY830 o Yulin (565) o NY831 o Yuxi (566) o NY832 o Xiangfan (567) o NY833 6 Jianghu V-Class: o NY834 o Beihai (558) o NY835 o Kangding (559) 1 hospital ship o Dongguan (560) o Shantou (561) 4 Yudao-Class LSMs o Jiangmen (562) o Foshan (563) External links and references ^ Jon Rosamund, 'China completes joint exercise with UK aircraft carrier,' Jane's Navy International, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/south-sea.htm October 2007, p.6 http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/orbat/southseafleet.asp

North Sea Fleet

The North Sea Fleet (NSF) is one of three fleets of the People's Liberation Army Navy. It includes nuclear powered submarines: five Han class attack submarines and China's single Xia class ballistic missile submarine, all based at Qingdao. The NSF has historically received primacy during the allocation of the destroyers and frigates, as its role was to be coastal defence of north east China (including Beijing) against any amphibious attacks by Russia. However, unlike the East and South Sea Fleets, it has not been involved in combat. Major Naval Bases in the Fleet The fleet headquarters is located at Qingdao, with other major naval bases at: Lushun Huludao Ships in the fleet The flagship of the fleet is the Harbin, a Luhu class destroyer. Destroyers 2 Luzhou-Class: o Shenyang (115) o Shijiazhuang (116) 2 Luhu-Class: o Harbin (112) o Qingdao (113) 4 Luda-Class (being decommissioned): o Yinchuan (107) o Xining (108) o Kaifeng (109) o Dalian (110) Frigates 3 Jianghu II-Class: o Dandong (543) o Siping (544) o Linfen (545) 1 Jianghu-Class: o Changzhi (519) Nuclear submarines 4 Han-class SSNs: o ChangZheng 2 (402) o ChangZheng 3 (403) o ChangZheng 4 (404) o ChangZheng 5 (405) 1 Xia-class SSBN: o ChangZheng 6 (406) Diesel-electric submarines At least 15, and possibly up to 20 Ming and Romeo submarines These three ships belong to China East Sea Fleet 3 Jianghu II-Class: Dandong (543) Siping (544) Linfen (545)

Aircraft carrier "Varyag" Type 051 Luda III class destroyer Zhuhai (166) Type 052 Luhu class destroyer Qingdao (113)

Type 051B Luhai class destroyer Shenzhen (167) Sovremenny class (956EM) destroyer Taizhou (138) Type 052B destroyer Guangzhou

Type 052C destroyer Lanzhou (170) - Jiangwei II class frigate

Type 054A frigate - Qiandaohu class fleet replenishment ship Weishanhu (887)

PLAN training ship Zhenghe - Fuqing class tanker Hongzehu (AOR881) on a visit to Auckland

A Chinese Kilo - Song class submarine

A Chinese Kilo class submarine on its delivery voyage in 1995. Type 094

A Han class submarine in 1993 HY-1 Missile - HQ-61B SAM

Ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the Naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the navy of the People's Republic of China. The PLAN force consists of approx. 250,000 men while the ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy number over a hundred major combat vessels, organized into 3 fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Below are some of the ships currently in operation with PLAN. In addition to ships, the PLAN also has its own air arm, the PLANAF. Aircraft carriers Main article: Future Chinese aircraft carrier Destroyers Currently, the destroyers are the largest principal surface combatants in the People's Liberation Army Navy and will continue to be so for sometime in the near future since larger warships such as aircraft carrier and cruisers are not planned to enter service anytime soon. Another link between the proposed Chinese aircraft carrier and Chinese destroyers is that all captains and their deputies of the Chinese destroyers were former naval pilot: China was to deploy its aircraft carrier and as part of the preparation, pilots were selected to complete their training for carrier deployment. However, the Chinese aircraft carrier program was delayed and the pilots were reassigned and retrained for destroyer commands, and most of these destroyer commanders are still qualified naval pilots. Classes of ships Project 956 Sovremenny class 2 ships o Hangzhou (ex-Vazhnyy - - Eminent) (136) - - sold to China before completion) o Fuzhou (ex-Vdumchivyy - - Thoughtful) (137) - - sold to China before completion) Project 956EM Sovremenny class 2 ships o Taizhou (138) - - improved 956EM built for China. (2005) o Ningbo (139) - - improved 956EM built for China (2006) o China reportedly also holds the option to purchase an additional two Project 956EM in the future. Type 051 Luda class 13 ships still extent o Yinchuan (107) o Xining (108) o Dalian (110) - Command variant o Nanjing (131) o Hefei (132) - Command variant o Chongqing (133) o Zunyi (134) o Nanning (162) o Nanchang (163) o Guilin (164) o (Xi'an (106) was retired Oct. 2007 and Changsha (161)was retired Aug. 2008) Type 052 Luhu class 2 ships o Harbin (112) o Qingdao (113) Type 051B Luhai class 1 ship Type 052B Luyang class 2 ships Type 052C Luyang II class 2 ships Type 051C Luzhou class 2 ships Type 051D destroyer - 1 ship under construction [1] Type 052D destroyer - 1 launched [2] The PLAN indigenous destroyer classes (051, 052, 051B, 052B, 052C and 051C) listed above is in the historic sequence, that is, 051 is oldest and 051C is newest. At first glance, the alternating of 051 and 052 is confusing. In the PLAN nomenclature, however, 051 and 052 are not names of generations, but indicate the types of the ship's main engine. Destroyers with type prefix 051 use steam turbines and the ones with 052 use gas turbines. China cannot produce gas turbine indigenously for the destroyers yet and the gas turbine has to be imported. Type 052 ships use LM2500. Since 1989, however, LM2500 cannot be imported anymore due to the arms embargo. The newer 052 ships (052B/C) use the Zorya-Mashproekt DA80/DN80 gas turbine from the Ukraine. Mechanical difficulties with the Ukrainian gas turbines resulted in the steam turbine versions (Type 051B and 051C) being developed in parallel. Development The People's Liberation Army Navy had traditionally focused on the principles of coastal defense. With this came a series of warship designs based on the Soviet Navy's own destroyers and frigates. The first PLAN destroyers were the Anshan class, directly purchased from the Soviet Union. These were armed with torpedoes and various surface- and air-warfare guns. The Anshan's effectiveness in naval warfare was significantly enhanced with the torpedo tubes being replaced by anti-ship missile launchers. Although retired from the active service, the Anshan class destroyers remain on PLAN's list and act as training ships and perform public relations duties. 1970s The Luda class followed from the 1970s onwards, with many similarities to the Soviet Kotlin class. The Ludas are armed with six anti-ship missiles and various guns and ASW weapons. Both the Luda and Anshan were key vessels to PLAN's coastal defense doctrines, as small coastal defense destroyers. These ships were all armed with mostly manually operated air defense artillery with no surface-to-air missiles and no ASW torpedoes. One Luda class ship, 160, was lost in an accident. By the mid 1990s, all Anshan class destroyers were retired. 1980s onwards PLAN focus shifted in the 1980s. With the import of Western systems, and a focus on blue-water multi-role operations, the Luhu class emerged. The first vessel, Harbin (112) (seen and commissioned by the early 1990s), was a significant shift from traditional Chinese warship design. There was much more focus on air defense and ASW warfare, including the

installation an 8-celled Crotale launcher, a short range missile system later indigenously produced as HQ-7. A second vessel, the Qingdao was launched later in the mid 1990s. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Luhai class was introduced as an enlarged version of the Luhu. These ships were the first truly modern combat vessels with blue water and multi-role operations in mind. These destroyers were still obsolete by Western standards, and delays in their construction resulted in just three being built. Since the late 1980s, the older Luda, and later the Luhu and Luhai classes have been through various upgrade and refit programmes. Both 112 and 113 of the Luhu class, and 167 of the Luhai class have undergone major refits. All three now carry sixteen YJ83 Anti-ship missiles, improved HQ-7 SAM (Based on the Crotale), and enhanced electronic, sensor and weaponry capabilities. Upgraded to the Luda class have been more sporadic. One vessel was refitted with a double hangar and helicopter deck. At least four others have been upgraded with HQ-7 short range SAM, new automatic air defense artillery (as opposed to the old manual mounts), torpedoes and sixteen YJ83 antiship missiles. Though the other remaining ships continue to retain original weaponry, they have all undergone major refits to extend their surface lives. All Ludas are being fitted with satellite communications and navigation systems to allow them to operate beyond coastal waters. In 1996, China signed a deal with Russia for the purchase of two Sovremenny class destroyers. The first ship arrived in January 2000 and the second in January 2001. These ships significantly improve the PLAN's fighting capabilities. Each ship displaces 7,940 tons full loaded. Weaponry included ASW torpedoes and mortar launchers, AK-630 automatic CIWS cannons, two twin mountings of 130 mm rapid fire cannons, the short-medium ranged SA-N-12 Grizzly Surface to Air Missile and the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship missile. Two improved Sovremenny vessels were acquired in 2002, and include a longer range SS-N-22 missile, improved air defense missiles, and the Kashtan CIWS cannon and missile combination. 21st Century Since 2003, three new classes of indigenous destroyers have emerged: The Type 052B (Luyang I) class features a stealthy design, modern layout, and adopted many Russian and indigenous weapons/sensors. Its armament included two indigenously designed Type 730 CIWS (first of its kind in China), sixteen YJ83 anti-ship missiles, two SA-N-12 Grizzly air defense missile launchers (48 missiles, 50 km range), torpedoes, anti-submarine rockets, a 100 mm artillery mount, and a hangar to hold one Kamov KA-28 ASW helicopter. This was followed by the Type 052C (Luyang II) class, which included 4 statically mounted phased array radars of indigenous design, providing the ship with continuous 360 degree coverage for search, tracking and direction for multiple SAM missiles. The Type 052C destroyer was the first PLAN warship to utilize VLS missiles, with HQ-9 long range air defense missile (48 missiles, 200 km range, similar to the Russian S-300 missile). It is also armed with a new anti-ship cruise missile known as the YJ-62. The third class was the Type 051C destroyer. This class uses the same hull and layout as the Luhai class destroyer. Initial construction was delayed by the slow acquisition of the Russian S-300FM long range SAM. The ship uses VLS launchers with 48 rounds of the S-300FM. The S-300FM is capable of engaging low to high altitude targets as far as 150 km. It is not known if the PLAN will continue construction of all three classes or select one class for mass production in the near future. Outlook The PLAN destroyer fleet has progressed significantly since its humble beginnings in 1949. Impressive advances have been made just in the past 2 decades and modern Chinese destroyers are now generations ahead of their earlier counterparts. These destroyers are in no way built in such great numbers as the US Arleigh Burke class. However, China's rapidly expanding military and shipbuilding capacity should be able to keep pace with PLAN requirements. Frigates Frigates are the most numerous principal surface combatants in the People's Liberation Army Navy . In spite of the more recent trend to construction of larger warships, like destroyers, this status will unlikely to change in the near future. Classes of ships Type 053H Jianghu I class - 11 ships Type 053H1 Jianghu II class - 9 ships Type 053H2 Jianghu III class - 3 ships Type 053HT-H Jianghu IV class - 1 ship Type 053H1G Jianghu V class - 6 ships Type 053H2G Jiangwei I class - 4 ships Type 053H3 Jiangwei II class - 10 ships Type 054 Jiangkai I class - 2 ships Type 054A Jiangkai II - 6 ships (1 sea trial, 1 under construction) Type 054B - 1 launched Development Frigates were the first large surface combatants made available to the PLAN. The Soviet Union sold several frigates to the PLAN in the 1950s, including the Riga class frigates. These frigates became the foundation of Chinese built designs, such as the Jinan class. These ships were mostly armed with naval guns, though later designs managed to replace torpedo tubes with a twin launcher for SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles. 1970s Initial attempts to fit anti-aircraft missiles to frigates resulted in the single ship Jiangdong class, which was completed in 1970. Carrying two twin launchers for the HQ-61B short ranged SAM, this vessel served as the sole PLAN SAM capable frigate until the 1990s. Its effectiveness in engaging missiles and aircraft was thought to be limited. The same hull later used for the Jianghu class. During the 1970s the PLAN introduced the Jianghu class. Essentially, a scaled down version of the Luda class of destroyers, this large class of missile frigates would have many follow-on variants. The first hull, 515 Xiamen was completed in 1975, and mass production followed until 1996. All Jianghu class ships are armed with four SY-2 anti-ship missiles (indigenous and improved versions of initial Soviet SS-N-2 Styx). Gun armaments vary across the class, including a single 100 mm mount or a more modern Type 79 100 mm twin mounts. The latest eight hulls (built during the early 1990s) feature automatic twin 37 mm Type 76A AA guns. One Jianghu, hull 516, was refitted recently to carry a battery of 122 mm rockets, fixed on stabilized launchers. A total of 27 Jianghu Is were built, and they remain in use today with various upgrades and refits to extend their service life. The vessels are deficient in modern anti-aircraft, anti-ship and anti-submarine fighting capabilities. The first Chinese frigate to carry a helicopter was a modified Jianghu II, the 'Siping' 544, dubbed as the Jianghu IV class. Only one ship was modified, despite great optimism that most of the class would follow suit. The Siping is believed to perform more as a test ship, with a single helicopter hangar and a new single 100 mm gun mount similar to the French Creusot-Loire rapid fire main gun. Its fighting capabilities have been retained with twin SY-2 missiles and AA guns. The fitting of the helicopter hangar meant the sacrifice of the aft SY-2 missile launchers. A further step for the Jianghu class was made by the appearance of the Jianghu III/V class, first commissioned in 1986. These ships are the first to have air conditioning onboard Chinese warships. They feature heavy Western influence, and instead of using the SY-2 missiles, they

are armed with the YJ8 series. The 'V' carries the YJ82 with extended range. Only three ships were built (two III's and one V), but older ships are planned to be converted to the standard of latter units. 1990s The Jiangwei I class was launched in 1991 and represented a shift away from the old Jianghu concept. Major features included a sextuple HQ-61B SAM launcher, modernized electronics and radar, six YJ8 missiles, automatic Type 76F anti-aircraft guns and a hangar and helicopter deck for one French AS 565 or Z-9C helicopter. Four of the Jiangwei I were built between 1990-1994. Though a great versatile design, it suffered the same weaknesses in air defense, as its SAM had to be manually reloaded as well as unsatisfactory performance. The four ships have been refitted since for life extension, and continue to serve the PLAN. The HQ-61 SAM system was later replaced by HQ-7 SAM systems during refits. The first Jiangwei II was launched in 1997. This has a similar design layout to the Jiangwei I but has incorporated major improvements. These included eight (not six) YJ82/3 missiles, octuple HQ-7 SAM (replacing the HQ-61B), improved fully automated main gun, and a redesigned aft structure. Ten Jiangwei IIs have been built, the last ship commissioned in 2005. All Jiangweis have since been refitted with a stealthier gun casing for their 100 mm main guns. 21st Century In 2005, The Type 054 frigate entered PLAN service (hulls 525 and 526). The Type 054 is considerably stealthier than all previous PLAN frigate designs. The Type 054 Ma'anshan class is armed with an HQ-7 octuple launcher, eight YJ83 anti-ship missiles, a 100 mm main gun, four AK630 CIWS turrets, ASW torpedoes and rocket launchers, carries one Ka-28 Helix or Z-9C, and displaces 3,400 tons. This represents a new generation of frigate design in the PLAN, and a shifting focus on larger multi-role platforms. The air defense missile armament is no better than the Jiangwei II class although this may be upgraded later. The Type 054 has now been superseded by the Type 054A frigate, which is in series production. The 054A features a number of important improvements over the original 054. The main air defense armament has been upgraded to a 32-cell VLS HQ-16 medium-range SAM system, giving area air defence capability for the first time to PLAN frigates. In addition, the four AK630 CIWS have been replaced by two autonomous Type 730 CIWS. The Type 054A is altogether a well balanced and stealthy frigate design, with considerable firepower and multi-role versatility. Two new major upgrades of the Type 054A have been released, the Type 054B and Type 054C. Littoral and coastal warfare vessels Although the People's Liberation Army Navy classify its surface combatants with displacement less than 1,000 tons as boats, the maximum displacement of its boats in the inventory is only around 500 tons. Submarine chasers Haiqing class submarine chasers - 20 Haijiu class submarine chasers - 2 Haizhui (Type 062-I) class submarine chasers - 13 Hainan (Type 037) class submarine chasers - ~40+ and dozens in reserve Kronshtadt class submarine chasers - less than 20 (in reserve) Missile boats Type 022 Houbei class missile boats - At least 40 completed, more under construction. Houjian (Type 037-II) class missile boats - 5 boats Houxin (Type 037-IG) class missile boats - 24 boats Houdong class missile boats - 1 Type 021 Huangfeng (Soviet Osa-I) class missile boats - 40 + (being rearmed) with 60 - 70 in reserve Hola class missile boat - 1 China Cat (C 14) class missile boat - 1 Heku/Hegu/Houku/Hougu (Type 024) class missile boats - 20 + (being rearmed) with up to 50 in reserve Torpedo boats Huchuan (Type 025) class Torpedo Hydrofoils - ~20, nearly 100 being in reserve P 4 class torpedo boats - 50 (in reserve, being transferred to patrol duties) P 6 class torpedo boats [2] Gunboats Shanghai III (Type 062-I) class gunboats - 2 Shanghai I & Shanghai II (Type 062) classes gunboats - 150+ active and at least 100 in reserve Huludao (Type 206) class gunboat - 8+ Shantou class gunboats - less than 25 (in reserve, subordinated to naval militia) Beihai class gunboats - less than 30 (in reserve, subordinated to naval militia) Huangpu class gunboats - less than 15 (in reserve, subordinated to naval militia) Yulin class gunboats - less than 40 (being transferred to logistic duties) Patrol boats Harbour security boat (PBI) - 4 newly built 80 ton class harbour security / patrol boats, and more are planned in order to take over the port security / patrol duties currently performed by the obsolete Shantou, Beihai, Huangpu, and Yulin classes gunboats, which are increasingly being converted to inshore surveying boats and range support boats. Development The PLAN's main focus until the 1980s was a sharp emphasis on coastal defense. This could be seen influenced from early engagements against the Republic of China naval forces, where Communist forces found the value of small maneuverable craft against larger, better armed but slower Nationalist ships. Early littoral craft in the PLAN's inventory included riverine craft and gun boats converted from various ships. This was later added to in the 1950s by Soviet designed gun and torpedo attack craft. Such gun craft included the Kronstadt class heavily armed gun boats which served the PLAN until the 1980s. Soviet missile attack craft were later added to the fleet, including the Komar and Osa type fast attack missile craft. Although most littoral designs bore Soviet influence, there were quite a few indigenous designs or copies of Soviet-type craft. Hundreds of vessels were deployed by the fleet, serving as the backbone of the PLAN until a higher emphasis was placed upon bluewater naval operations. Despite availability of frigates and destroyers, the brunt of PLAN involvement in small scale conflicts have been borne by the littoral forces. For instance,

the various naval engagements between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces were carried out by PLAN littoral craft. Blue-water capabilities are now the most sought by the PLAN with increasing acquisition of destroyers, advanced submarines, frigates and auxiliary support assets. The torpedo attack boat has mostly disappeared from the PLAN fleet, and the force of missile, ASW and gun boats have reduced dramatically. Littoral warfare has not been completely pushed aside however. New classes of missile attack boats continue to be built to replace older types. Anti-submarine warfare is still seen as a high level mission of PLAN littoral craft. With more emphasis placed upon multi-role capabilities of sea borne rescue, patrol, transport and counter-piracy, littoral gunboat also remain important. Missile Boats Missile boats compose of a new tri-maran class, Houjian, Houxin, Huangfeng, Hoku class. The Hoku class is similar to the Soviet Komar class, but with a steel (rather than wooden) hull. Its armament composes of a twin 25 mm anti-aircraft gun and a double launcher for two SY-1 anti-ship missiles. Most of these boats have been retired from active service, with a handful remaining in the fleet. The Soviet Osa I class was copied by the Chinese into the Huangfeng class. Armaments and equipment vary across each class; early variants are armed with the manual 25 mm AA mounts, while some are fitted with a fire control radar for two 30 mm twin cannon turrets, based on the Soviet AK230. Missile armament comprises four SY-1/2 missiles. A large number (over 100) were built for the PLAN and for export. Several dozen remain either in active service or in reserve. The next generation of missile craft are the Houxin and Houjian class. The 478-ton Houxin design is based on the Hainan-class hull, but with a redesigned superstructure, new systems, two automatic twin-37 mm guns and four YJ8 series anti-ship missiles. Around 28 are in service, built since the 1990s. A much more sophisticated and stealthy design is the 520-ton Houjian class. Main armament of the Houjian design is the twin 37 mm mount, two 30 mm twin turrets, and six YJ8 series anti-ship missiles. The Houjian is far more capable, larger and more flexible than the Houxin, being based primarily in Hong Kong. The total number produced is not certain, but five (or some sources state nine) craft are in service. The latest third generation missile attack craft is the 220X design. Seen since 2005, its most distinctive feature is its trimaran hull that can achieve maximum wave piercing performance at high speeds. The stealthy design has two missile-houses, that can possibly be fitted with various ordinances. Eight missiles of the YJ83 anti-ship missiles are believed to be carried, as well as a single AK630 CIWS for self-defense. Four hulls emerged by 2005, with another eight to twelve others being constructed in 20052006. This indicates a new class being mass produced for the PLAN to replace the aging Hoku and Huangfeng classes. With these second and third generation missile attack craft, the PLAN possesses a large number of potent missile platforms that could be launched either in defensive or offensive sorties. Gunboats and Submarine Chasers PLAN gunboats have been a traditional part of PLAN coastal defense strategies, and this category is further divided into two subcategories: gunboats and submarine chasers. One of the main missions of littoral gunboats are to search and destroy submarines, although the lack of ASW torpedoes and modern sonars hinder this role. Other roles include engaging enemy shipping, bombarding enemy shore targets, minelaying, transport, escort and patrol. Currently, there are three prominent classes in the frontline service. The Shanghai I/II class built since the 1960s in large numbers have been the main type of coastal attack vessel of the PLAN. It is considerably well armed for a vessel its size, equipped with two 37 mm manual AA guns and two 25 mm AAA. The Hainan class has proven itself to be a reliable design in many roles. Its main armament is two twin 57 mm guns, and two 25 mm AAA. The Hainan is also armed with anti-submarine multi-barrelled rockets and depth charges. There is provision for the fitment of four YJ8 series anti-ship missiles as well. The third class is a second generation improvement of the Hainan design, the Haiqing class. This has improved superstructure and automatic 37 mm AA guns. Unlike other Western Navies, the PLAN has no dedicated patrol craft. Most patrol craft are operated by maritime paramilitary forces. There are at least four newly built dedicated harbour patrol craft operated by the PLAN (classified as PBI by the west), but mostly, numerous gunboats are deployed for harbour security and harbor patrol missions. Patrol roles of course can be carried out by the current gun attack and missile boats, as the PLAN focuses less upon coastal defense and more on multi-purpose littoral ships. Mine warfare vessels The Chinese coastal and littoral waters are ideal for minefields and when the naval doctrine emphasized on coastal defense, this proved to be an advantage for the Chinese defenders. However, when the naval doctrine is shifted from coastal defense to venturing into blue water operations, the People's Liberation Army Navy suddenly found itself in serious deficit of mine countermeasure vessels and this situation is unlikely to change in the near future despite the Chinese effort to catch up. Classes of ships Wochi class minehunter (MHS) - 1 (hull # 804) Wozang class minehunter (MHS) - 2 under construction (hull # 328) Wolei class minelayer - 1 (Hull # 814) Wosao class minesweeper - 5+ Wochi class minesweeper - 2+ Lianyun class minesweeper - up to 60, many in reserve Type 010 class oceangoing minesweeper - 14 (+ 26 in reserve) T-43 class oceangoing minesweeper - less than 5, all in reserve Wosao class minesweeper, coastal - 9 (+ new additions) Fushun class coastal minesweeper - ~20, modified Shanghai-II class gunboat for minesweeping, all in reserve and being scrapped. Futi class (Type 312) minesweeper / minesweeping drone - 4, with an additional 42 in reserve Auxiliary minesweepers converted from fishing boats - over 80, all in reserve. Development Despite the extensive use of mines as a strategically important defensive and offensive weapon, the PLAN operates only a small number of mine warfare ships. These boats comprise of Minelaying and Minesweeping types. The PLAN operates a single Wolei class minelayer. This ship was commissioned in 1988 and displaces 2400 tons full load. It can carry and lay up to 300 mines. There is little need of a dedicated minelaying type however, as most PLA surface and submarine combatants can lay minefields. Minesweepers have served the PLAN since its founding. The most common type was the Type 010 minesweeper based on the Soviet T-43 Ocean minesweepers, imported and subsequently produced with modifications in reasonable numbers. 40 or so remain in active or reserve service. The T-43 is an aging but reliable design. One ship took part in one of the Sino-Vietnamese sea battles over the Spratley Islands. The T-43 is due to be replaced by a new class of ocean minesweeper. Currently two new classes of minesweeper have emerged since 2004. Coastal minesweeping is primarily conducted by the Wosao class. The number of these craft

are unknown, but around a dozen is a safe estimation. This class first entered service in the late 1980s, and is still in low rate production. Coastal sweeping can also be conducted by around 20 modified Shanghai class named as Fushun class, and 46 Futi class minesweeping drones similar to the German design. Amphibious warfare Chinese amphibious warfare vessels are intended to occupy a key role in any future military confrontation with Taiwan. China currently maintains an inventory of smaller vessels with limited sea lift capacity. The recent construction of large dock landing ships indicates the shift toward blue water operations. The Yuzhou class LPD represents a major step forward in the Chinese plan for a blue water navy. Classes of ships Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Type 081 (3 planned)[3] Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) 1 Type 071 Yuzhao class (6-8 planned)[4] Landing Ship Tank (LST) 7 Type 072 Yukan class 9 Type 072II Yuting I class 9 Type 072III Yuting II class (+ more building) Landing Ship Medium (LSM) ~31 Type 079 Yuliang class 23 Yuling class 13 Type 074 Yuhai (Wuhu-A) class 3 Type 073 I/II/III class 11 Type 073 IV Yunshu class Landing Craft (Mechanized/Personnel/Utility/Vehicle) 1 Type 073 Yudeng class 2 Yudao class ? Type 724 LCAC 100 Type 271 Yupen class 200~300 Type 067 Yunnan class 30+ Type 068 Yuch'in class 30+ Type 069 Yuch'in class 10+ NEW Yubei class twin hull high capacity LCU Troop Transports 4 Qiongsha class Hospital Ships 2 Qiongsha class Additional Sea Lift Large numbers of reserved and retired landing ships and craft. In wartime, can utilize civilian transport ships of various types. Several small air cushion LCVPs that serve from LSTs. Air Force and Army services operate their own amphibious assets. Naval and Army helicopters operating from ships or land bases. Future Assets Type 71 Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) has launched in December with NATO name "Yuzhao" New class of air cushion vehicle transport (operating from LSD) Acquisition of large indigenous or Russian built air cushion transports. Development Despite shifting naval warfare doctrines from coastal defense to blue-water operations, the component of the PLAN that has always been consistent in its role and constantly expanding, are the amphibious warfare assets. PLAN amphibious vessels have played a key role in its history, including in past naval conflicts. Initial attempts to retake coastal islands held by the Republic of China (especially Hainan Island) have involved the PLAN's amphibious transport arm. It is interesting to note however, that most of the amphibious assets available in those early conflicts were mostly derived from fishing junks and small civilian craft. Some of these operations were largely a success, others were complete failures. In these early engagements against the Taiwanese Navy and Air Force, these primitive amphibious vessels suffered high combat or attrition losses. Learning from these lessons and with the eventual aim of retaking Taiwan itself, the PLAN embarked on a long programme to build up large forces of landing vessels. Landing ships would also partake in the Sino-Vietnamese sea battles near the Spratley Islands. Current sea lift capabilities of the PLAN are hard to estimate without declassified documents. In times of conflict, a large force of paramilitary, civilian, army and air force craft could also be utilized. The PLAN has exercised frequently with large civilian ships. These civilian types include Rollon/Roll-off ships, freighters, ferries, vehicle transports and various logistical assets. Therefore if the PLAN could effectively utilize all these transports, the actual sea lift capacity of the Chinese sea forces is significantly higher. Helicopters and air dropped troops/vehicles in any amphibious operation will also greatly increase the number of troops in a sea lift. Although this combined military lift is very impressive and the second largest sea lift capability in the world, it is distributed across three different fleets. Although Taiwan is the main target of amphibious operations, an increase in South China Sea interests (as well as island claims in the Yellow Sea) have ensured that PLAN amphibious assets are well spread between the three fleets. The largest type of amphibious ship in the PLAN is the Type 071 17,600+ ton landing platform dock which operates helicopters and large LCVPs. The Type 071 enables PLA/Marine forces to operate far from home waters and enhances the PLAN's ability to rapidly mobilize troops in any

amphibious assault. Large air cushion LCVPs would be able to carry tanks at high speeds at over-the-horizon range. Since the PLA's victory in the civil war, a handful of ex-US LSTs were captured (or salvaged) from the Nationalists and impressed into service. These craft were built for US forces between 1942-1945. The first indigenously designed LST was completed in 1980 as the Yukan Type 072 class. Sea lift of the Yukan is 200 troops, 10 tanks and two LCVPs (up to 500 tons), as well as a heavy armament of 57 mm/37 mm/25 mm cannons. Production ended in 1995 after seven ships were built. A much improved class was the Yuting 072II, with nine ships built by 2001. Improvements included longer hull to accommodate an aft helicopter deck, larger internal flood bay for four LCVP and improved self defense artillery. The notable advantage of the Yuting II is its ability to operate helicopters. Despite being without hangar facilities, the heli-deck could operate two medium sized helicopters. With this combination of helicopter and LCVP operations, the Yuting could insert small groups of infantry from over the horizon. In addition, marine and army amphibious tanks/APCs have exercised swimming operations off LSTs while being a distance away from shore. This reduces the vulnerability of the LSTs from operating on beachheads. From 2002 onwards, another improved class, the 072III was seen in large numbers. This class features a redesigned superstructure. At least nine have been confirmed with more being built in shipyards. LSMs constitute the core of PLAN amphibious operations. With more than 50 LSMs confirmed in service, the PLAN possesses medium ranged amphibious assets capable of operating in littoral operations as well as a limited capability in outer sea landings. Like their larger LST counterparts, the LSMs of the PLAN can carry tanks and infantry. The largest class is the Yuliang 079, with some 31 ships in service. This class started series production in the 1980s from multiple shipyards, and can lift three-five tanks. This class was followed by the smaller Wuhu (or Yuhai) class, with around 13 in service since 1995. This class can carry 2 tanks and 250 troops. Simultaneously, another class of large LSM was planned as the Yudeng 073 class (commissioned in 1994). Following this unsuccessful design were two other prototypes, as the 073II and 073III. The class finally entered mass production 2003 as the improved IV variant. Sea lift of the Yudeng class is six tanks (or 12 vehicles) and 200 troops. 11 hulls have been confirmed so far with many more expected. The mainstay of littoral amphibious operations can be carried out by the hundreds of LCM/LCU/LCT/LCVP types of craft. These craft can mostly transport infantry, while some can also carry between one to three tanks/vehicles. The most common type is the Type 067 (built since 1968) which could lift 46 tons. The larger Type 271 has served more exclusively as a logistics transport more than an amphibious transport. Type 271s have also seen service with army and air force sea units as the main logistics workhorse. In times of war however, this class could lift quite a heavy load for its size (3 tanks or 6 amphibious light tanks/APCs). Over 100 have been produced for various military/logistics/non-military transport roles. The latest landing craft is the Yubei class LCU, which features a unique tank deck that runs across the whole length of the ship, while the superstructure is located on the side. This gives the Yubei a significant lift capacity (150 troops and up to four tanks). More than ten have been confirmed built, with production continuing at several yards, indicating this is going to be a large class. The Yubei may end up replacing some of the older or smaller LCMs/LCUs and even LSMs in littoral transport roles. Air cushion craft The Type 724 design is the mainstay of the PLAN air cushion fleet. This is a small craft capable of speeds of up to 40 knots. Crewed by two or three, the design only permits ten infantry to be carried. The Type 724 operates primarily from the Yuting and Yukan class LSTs (each ship carrying two-four of these LCVPs). Although unable to carry larger numbers of infantry or any vehicles, the Type 724 nonetheless provides the PLAN with valuable experience in cushion deployments from amphibious ships far from shore. Its high speed and small size makes it a hard target to attack, and is ideal to insert small bands of marines or special forces. A second type was the Type 722II, a large indigenous design built in 1989 and the first to operate indigenously designed gas turbine engines. This craft could carry 100 infantry or 15 tons of cargo. It was retired from service in 2001. There are plans to develop an LCAC class that would be large enough to carry tanks and vehicles from large landing ships. The navy has also expressed great interest in the acquisition of Russian air cushion assault transports, particularly the Zubr class that could lift tanks and infantry. Auxiliaries Naval auxiliaries are the major constraints for the Chinese ambition of having a blue water navy. In order to have full blue water operation capability at any given time on its own (without the support of foreign ports), the tonnage ratio of auxiliaries to combatants alone should be 40%, i.e. for every five tons of displacement of combatants, there should be two tons of displacement of the auxiliaries. Not only do the Chinese lack the necessary tonnage ratio needed, most of its naval auxiliary force currently consists of aging ships that are near the end of their life. Classes of ships Fleet Replenishment 3 Fuchi (Qiandaohu) class 2 Fuqing (Taikang) class 1 Fusu (Nancang) class 1 Qinghaihu class Coastal/Fuel/Garrison Replenishment/Tankers 8 Fulin class (coastal/garrison replenishment) 2 Shengli Class (coastal/garrison replenishment) 7 Fuzhou class 5 Guangzhou class ? Fujian class (new class) ? Fubei class (new class) ? Fuchang class (new class) Fleet support 2 Dayun class (supply ship) 2 Yantai class Freight support 13 Danlin class 3 Dandao class

5 Hongqi class 9 Leizhou class Hospital ship 1 Daishandao class (#866, ) Icebreakers 1 Yanbing class 3 Yanha class Submarine support 3 Type 925 Dajiang class 5 Dalang-II class 5 Dalang-III class 2 Dazhou class ? Type 648 1 Dadong class 1 Yudong class 1 Dazhi class 2 Dazhou class 4 Daliang class Submersibles 4 Type 7103 DSRVs 2 Osprey class submersibles 1 (+ 1) Sea Pole class bathyscaphe 1 (+ ?) Dragon class bathyscaphe 1 (+ ?) Harmony class bathyscaphe ? Mobile diving bell ? QSZ-II submersible Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) o Remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUVs) 2 8A4 ROUVs ? RECON-IV ROUVs ? 7B8 ROUVs ? Goldfish class ROUVs 1 HR-01 ROUV 1 HR-02 ROUV ? JH-01 ROUVs ? SJT-5 ROUVs ? SJT-10 ROUVs ? SJT-40 ROUVs 1 Sea Dragon-I ROUV 1+ Sea Dragon-II ROUV o Autonomous underwater vehicle (AUVs) 1 Arctic class ARV 1 Explorer AUV 1 WZODA AUV 1 CR-01 AUV 1 CR-01A AUV 1+ CR-02 AUV 2+ Intelligent Water class AUV Electronic tracking ships 1 Shiyan Training/Test ships 1 Shichang class 1 Zhenghe class 2 Dahua class (used for testing weapons, sensors, electronics) Space Event Ships 6 Yuanwang-6 Class 6 Yuanwang-5 Class 6 Yuanwang-3 Class 6 Yuanwang-2 Class 6 Yuanwang-1 Class 1 Dadie class 2 Type 625C

3 Type 645 3 Type 643 3 Type 813 1 Dongdiao 232 1 Shiyan Survey Craft 1 Ganzhu class 5 Yenlai class 6 Yannan class Tugs 4 Tuzhong class 1 Daozha class 17 Gromovoy class 9 Hujiu class 19 Roslavl class Development The demands of modern day warfare has meant that logistic support ships in the navy are becoming vital. The PLAN operates a very large number and variety of auxiliary vessels that are capable of supporting fleet and military operations both in a coastal and ocean theatres of war. PLAN auxiliary vessels are present in all three fleets, stationed in many naval bases and have increasingly exercised frequently alongside combatants. PLAN auxiliaries include tugs, fleet replenishment ships, freighters, tankers, submarine tenders, research, survey ships, space event/monitoring platforms, ice breakers, repair and communications, electronic warfare and monitoring, transport and training ships. Fleet replenishment has been an expanding element in PLAN auxiliaries. The PLAN view the need of replenishment ships as vital for blue water fleet operations. Since the 1970s, underway replenishment has been widely practised by destroyer and frigate combatants. In many overseas visits, a tanker has traditionally accompanied the visiting ship. The first replenishment ships built for the dedicated task of fleet refuelling was the Taikang class, of which two remain in service (one was sold to Pakistan and another converted to civilian duties). The next fleet replenishment vessel was purchased from Russia in the 1990s, being the single Nancang. This ship is significantly superior to the Taikang in terms of refueling systems and the storage capacity. Two new hulls of the indigenous Qiandaohu class were commissioned into service by 2005. With five ships (and possibly a sixth vessel), the PLAN's ability to operate further away from home has been significantly enhanced. There are several classes of submarine support ship, including the Dajiang and Hudong class. With such a large submarine fleet, it remains quite important for the PLAN to field a large number of coastal and ocean submarine support assets. The Hudong in particular is a rescue ship built during the 1960s, accommodating a rescue bell device. The larger Dajiangs can perform a wider range of support tasks, as well as carrying the Chinese designed DSRV for deep sea rescue operations. The PLAN is known to operate two dedicated training platforms. The first is the single Zhenghe, a converted liner fitted with armaments to train PLAN cadets. The other training ship is the Sichang. It was designed with a double helicopter deck to operate as an aviation training ship. It has proven its usefulness as a multi-role platform though, capable of freighting operations due to the large amount of space on the helicopter deck. Sichang is very versatile, similar to the British Argus concept. It can perform aviation training, aviation operations, act as a freighter, hospital ship and military transport, and can carry small ships on its deck, in addition to regular cadet training operations. Developments in 2006 and Beyond Though the PLAN had gone through extensive modernisation and acquisition between 2003 to 2005, it appears that this growth has not slowed down at all (and in fact may have even accelerated) through 2006. It is expected that more ships will be acquired at even faster rates in 2007 and beyond. In 2006, the following ships have been launched or are in their advanced stages of building: 1x Type 071 LPD (already launched in water, being fitted with equipment), 3-4x Type 054A Frigates, 20+ Type 220X "Stealthy" Fast Attack Missile Craft, 1x Weapons testing vessel. In addition, several Song 039 class submarines were also launched or inducted into service in 2006. Inventory Year first of Nr. class Nr. Nr. in Remarks Planned/ Class Reserve entered Active Building service

Submarines Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines Type 094 Jin 2009 Type 092 Xia 1981 Nuclear Attack Submarines Type 093 Shang Type 091 Han 2002 1974

3 1 2+ 4 1

Has 7200+ km range JL-2 SLBM Has 2500 km range JL-1A SLBM Has sub-launched YJ-8 AShM Has sub-launched YJ-8 AShM Used as SLBM test platform Air-independent propulsion. Has sub-launched AShM Has sub-launched YJ-8 AShM Has sub-launched 3M-54 Klub supersonic AShM Has sub-launched 3M-54 Klub supersonic AShM

4-6

Conventional Ballistic Missile Submarines Modified Project 629 Golf 1958 Conventional Attack Submarines Type 041 Yuan 2005 Type 039/039A/039G Song 1999 Project 636 Kilo II 1998 Project 877EKM Kilo I 1982 1

4+ 13 10 2

Type 035 Ming Type 033 Romeo Total Submarines

1974 1962 7-9

15 8 63 2

Future Chinese carrier Project 1143.5 Kuznetsov Type 051C (Luzhou) Project 956EM Sovremenny II Type 052C Luyang II (Lanzhou) Type 052B Luyang I (Guangzhou) Type 051B Luhai Type 052 Luhu Project 956 Sovremenny I Type 051DT Luda IV Type 051 Luda I Total Destroyers Type 054A Jiangkai II Type 054 Jiangkai I (Ma'anshan) Type 053H3 Jiangwei II Type 053H1G Jianghu V Type 053H2G Jiangwei I Type 053H2 Jianghu III Type 053HT-H Jianghu IV Type 053H1 Jianghu II Type 053H Jianghu I Total Frigates Total Principal Surface Combatants

2015 1991 2006 2005 2004 2004 1998 1994 1980 1999 (upgrade) 1971

Principal Surface Combatants Aircraft Carriers 2 1 Ex-Varyag. In refit Destroyers 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 9 26 Frigates 8+ 2 10 6 4 3 1 9 11 54 80 Has long-range S-300FM VLS SAM Has medium-range SA-N-12 SAM and Moskit supersonic AShM Has long-range HQ-9 VLS SAM. Most advanced destroyers in Chinese service. Has medium-range SA-N-12 SAM Has short-range HQ-7 SAM Has short-range HQ-7 SAM and Variable Depth Sonar Has medium-range SA-N-12 SAM and Moskit supersonic AShM Has short-range HQ-7 SAM

2005 2002 1996 1993 1988 1986 1985 1978 1974

Has medium-range HQ-16 VLS SAM Has short-range HQ-7 SAM Has short-range HQ-7 SAM Has short-range HQ-61 SAM

Type 022 Houbei China Cat (C 14) Type 021 Houdong Type 037-II Houjian Type 037-IG Houxin Type 021 Hola Type 024 Heku/Hegu/Houku/Hougu Type 021 Huangfeng (Osa-I) Total Missile Boats Type 025 Huchuan P4 Type 062-I Shanghai III Type 062 Shanghai II/I

2004 2002 1994 1991 1991 1970 1966 1965

Coastal Warfare Vessels Missile Boats Stealth wave-piercing catamaran design 80+ Experimental vessel 1 1 5 24 1 20+ 50

1966

60-70 40+ 172+ 110-120 Torpedo Boats 100 20 50 0 Gun Boats 2 100 150+

1982 1982

Type 206 Huludao Type 037-IS Haiqing Type 037-I Haijiu Type 062-I Haizhui Type 037 Hainan Kronshtadt Total Coastal Warfare Vessels 1992 1987 1982 1964 1950s

8 Submarine chasers 20 2 13 40 20 0 427+ 380-390 Amphibious Warfare Vessels Landing Platforms 1 1 Landing Ships 9 11 13 9 3 7 31 83 Landing Craft 10 20-30 4 0 10 100 200-300 30+ 4 370-480 5 454-564 Mine Warfare Vessels Mine Warfare Ships 1 2 1 9 26 14 Mine Warfare Drones

Type 071 Yuzhao LPD Type 072-III Yuting II LST Type 073 IV Yunshu LSM Type 074 Yuhai (Wuhu-A) LSM Type072-II Yuting I LST Type 073 III Yudeng LSM Type 072 Yukan LST Type 079 Yuliang LSM Total Landing Ships Yubei LCU Type 724 LCAC Zubr LCAC Type 722-II Jingsha II LCAC Type 271 Yupen LCU Type 067 Yunnan LCU Type 068/069 Yuch'in LCM Total Landing Craft Total Amphibious Warfare Vessels

2008 2004 2003 1995 1993 1991 1978 1972

2004 1994 1988 1988 1970 1968 1962

Type 081 Wochi minehunter Type 082-II Wozang minehunter Type 918 Wolei minelayer Type 082 Wosao minesweeper Type 010 minesweeper Type 312 Futi minesweeper / minesweeping drone Total Mine Warfare Vessels Total All Vessels

2006 2005 1988 1980s 1955

1971

4 31 ~12081318 ~681

42 68 450+

17+

17+ 420+ Total Combat Vessels Notes: 1. Vessels in each category are ordered by the year first of class entered service. The "year first of class entered service" refers to the year that the first vessel of the class entered service anywhere in the world (for vessels that were not designed or built in China). 2. "Total Combat Vessels" counts only submarines, principal surface combatants, coastal warfare vessels, mine warfare ships, landing platforms and ships. These are vessels that would normally be commissioned and excludes landing craft, mine warfare drones and auxiliary/support vessels. All numbers are approximate. References 1. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/type051c_luzhou.asp 2. ^ [1] External links Chinese Defense Today

Future Chinese aircraft carrier

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Builders: In service: Planned: Type: Displacement: Propulsion: Aircraft carried: Changxingdao Shipyard, Shanghai 2015 (projected)[1] 2[1] aircraft carrier est. 50,00060,000 tons[1] Conventional Su-33[2] (J-15/Chinese Naval Flanker?)[3][4]

Since the 1970s, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has expressed interest in operating an aircraft carrier as part of its blue water aspirations, and press reports have frequently quoted senior Chinese military officials as expressing an intention to build aircraft carriers.[5] Since 1985, China has acquired four retired aircraft carriers for study: the Australian HMAS Melbourne and the ex-Soviet carriers Minsk, Kiev and Varyag. Reports state that two 50,000-60,000 ton aircraft carriers are due to be finished by 2015.[1] Sukhoi Su-33s (navalized Flankers) are the aircraft most likely to be flown from these carriers.[2] Acquisition of retired aircraft carriers Chinese shipyards have gained some exposure to carrier design with the acquisition of retired hulls such as the Australian HMAS Melbourne acquired in 1985. Through various ventures, China has also purchased the exSoviet carriers Minsk[6] and Kiev. These carriers have become floating amusement parks for tourists. There had been plans to purchase foreign second-hand carriers in the past. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had reportedly sought to purchase a Kiev-class aviation cruiser, but these deals did not come through. Another possible deal between China and France for the sale of the Clemenceau fell through in 1997.[7] Varyag Main article: Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag The 67,500 ton ex-Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag (Admiral Kuznetsov class), which was only 70% completed and floating in Ukraine, was purchased through a private Macau tourist venture in 1998. Since her troublesome tow to Dalian shipyard, the carrier has undergone a long refit. Varyag was stripped of any military equipment as well as her propulsion before she was put up for sale. News reports state that she is being refitted to be returned to operational status.[1][8] Using knowledge gained from inspecting carriers, an indigenous design may emerge with both Russian and Western influences. China has shipyards that are capable of building a ship of such tonnage and size. Acquisition of designs In addition to the acquisition of retired aircraft carriers of foreign navies, the PLAN has been actively purchasing foreign aircraft carriers designs as well. One such example was its effort to purchase the blueprints for proposed conventional take off/landing ships from Empresa Nacional Bazan of Spain; the 23,000 ton SAC-200 and the 25,000 ton SAC-220 designs. Negotiations started between 1995 - 1996 but it did not result in any purchase. However, the Spanish firm was paid several million US dollars in consulting fees, indicating that at least some critical design concepts / principles were obtained, or perhaps a partial design was purchased.[7] After the Spanish firm had submitted its findings, Russian aircraft designer Nevskoye Design Bureau completed an aircraft design for China in the late 1990s to meet the Chinese requirement but neither Russia nor China disclosed the price. Neither did the two countries reveal any information on whether China was satisfied with the design or not, but in any case, no aircraft carriers based on the design were built. Limited Chinese industrial capabilities in the late-1990s made it impractical for China to start any construction of aircraft carriers. A complete set of blueprints of a foreign aircraft carrier design was obtained by China when it purchased the decommissioned Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev. Russia insisted on China buying the blueprints as well for higher price, but neither country has revealed the exact dollar value. However, based on the official information released by the Chinese government on aircraft carriers, all of which dictates conventional design, the V/STOL design does not appear to fit the Chinese requirement. The complete set of blueprints of a foreign aircraft carrier design obtained by China when it purchased the incomplete Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag is the most recent purchase. Ukraine urged China to increase the original $18 million bid to include additional purchase of the complete set of blueprints of the design, and after negotiations, China agreed to pay another $2 million to purchase the complete set of blueprints. According to the memoir of Chinese embassy staff members who participated in the process, the blueprints reached China before the ship. This conventional design is judged to be much more fitting to the Chinese requirement in comparison to other smaller or V/STOL designs, and all of the blueprints of foreign aircraft carrier designs would greatly help China in developing a design of its own. Early plans The first official plan of PLAN aircraft carrier dated back on March 31, 1987 when the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense approved the plan on the aircraft carrier and the next generation nuclear submarine for PLAN submitted by the then commander-in-chief of PLAN, Liu Huaqing. The original plan was to be progressed in stages, with basic research to be completed by the end of the 7th 5-year plan, and development of the platform and aircraft to be completed by the end of the 8th 5-year plan. By the year 2000, construction was to begin when ordered. To prepare the commanders needed for the future aircraft carriers, the Central Military Commission approved the program of training jet fighter pilots to be future captains in May, 1987, and the Guangzhou Warship Academy () was selected as the site.[7] However, Liu Huaqings plan proved to be too ambitious as the domestic Chinese industry at the time simply could not meet the goal demanded by the plan. As a result, the plan was drastically scaled back to basic research level and the date for an aircraft carrier entering PLAN service was postponed and eventually put on hold. In the meantime, pilot candidates for warship captain training was also altered, with candidates switched to ship-borne helicopter pilots, because it was considered that naval helicopter pilots with much more ship-borne aviation experience would be better prepared than the land-based jet fighter pilots who lack ship-borne aviation experience. Current status In mid-2007, Chinese domestic sources revealed that China had purchased a total of four sets of aircraft carrier landing systems from Russia[9] and this was confirmed by Russian manufacturers. However, experts disagreed on the usage of these

systems: while some have claimed that it is a clear evidence of the construction of an aircraft carrier, others claim these systems are used to train pilots for a future ship. In August, 2008, Mr. Huang Qiang (), the speaker of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense announced to the public at news conference that China had mastered all of the technologies for an aircraft carrier, and would build aircraft carriers in the future when time was deemed right. The strongest proof of a Chinese aircraft carrier also appeared in 2008, from an official Chinese governmental source when the training program of jet fighter pilots for warship captains were resumed: PLA Daily ( [1]) published the news of Dalian Warship Academy () accepting a total of 50 jet fighter pilots for warship captain training in 2008, and in comparison to the first class that was held more than one and half a decades ago at Guangzhou Warship Academy (), the training has been lengthened to four years. Resumption of this plan is viewed by foreign observers and military analysts as another step in preparation for an aircraft carrier entering service. In late 2008, and through early 2009, there have been foreign reports that China will start building two 50,000-60,000 ton aircraft carriers due to be finished by 2015.[1][5] Whether the two ships will be similar to the Varyag (ski jump) or American carriers (catapult) or even if these reports are accurate, is not yet known. There are also some reports of a possibility of China building two nuclear powered aircraft carriers,[10] though how reliable these are can be questioned. According to the Nippon News Network (NNN), research and development on the planned carriers is being carried out at a military research facility in Wuhan. NNN states that the actual carriers will be constructed at a shipyard in Shanghai.[11] Kanwa Intelligence Review reports that the second carrier to be constructed will likely be assigned to Qingdao[12]. It was also reported in 2009 that the Brazilian Navy will train PLA naval officers in carrier operations in exchange for assistance on nuclear submarine technology and additional funding.[13] See also List of aircraft carriers in service Jiangnan Shipyard References 1. ^ a b c d e f "www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200812310046.html". http://www.asahi.com/english/Heraldasahi/TKY200812310046.html. 2. ^ a b "www.defenseindustrydaily.com/china-to-buy-su33-carrierbased-fighters-from-russia-02806/". http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/china-to-buy-su33-carrierbased-fighters-from-russia-02806/. 3. ^ "cnair.top81.cn/J-10_J-11_FC-1.htm". http://cnair.top81.cn/J-10_J-11_FC-1.htm. 4. ^ "www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.193/pub_detail.asp". http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.193/pub_detail.asp. 5. ^ a b "www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/23/content_7607571.htm". http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200903/23/content_7607571.htm. 6. ^ "Former Soviet aircraft carrier sold in China for $16mln". http://en.rian.ru/world/20060531/48857033.html. 7. ^ a b c "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors." Storey, I.; Ji, Y. Naval War College Review. Winter 2004, Vol. 57, No. 1. 8. ^ Jon Rosamond, 'China completes joint exercise with UK aircraft carrier,' Jane's Navy International, November 2007, p.6 9. ^ "a.abcnews.com/International/wireStory?id=7020155". http://a.abcnews.com/International/wireStory?id=7020155. 10. ^ Ryall, Julian (2009-02-20). "www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/4730952/Hillary-Clintons-visit-to-Chinasparks-alarm-in-Japan.html". The Daily Telegraph (London). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/4730952/Hillary-Clintons-visit-to-China-sparks-alarm-inJapan.html. Retrieved 2010-05-03. 11. ^ Nippon News Network, January 12, 2010. 12. ^ Kanwa Intelligence Review, "Long-Range SAMS Deployed In Qingdao", April 10, 2010. 13. ^ Hsiao, Russell (12 June 2009). [tt_news=35116&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=f072084889 "PLAN Officers to Train on Brazilian Aircraft Carrier"]. China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 12. The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35116&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=f072084889. Retrieved 26 April 2010.

Aircraft Carrier Project

The US Defense Department reported in early 2009 that "Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domestically-produced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in Chinas shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those projections. The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020." China's navy will develop a new generation of warships and aircraft to give it much longer-range capabilities, its commander-in-chief said in comments published Thursday April 16 2009. Admiral Wu Shengli told the state-run China Daily newspaper the Chinese navy wanted to develop hardware such as large combat warships, stealth submarines with abilities to travel further and supersonic cruise aircraft. More accurate long-range missiles, deep-sea torpedoes and a general upgrade of information technology were also in the pipeline, according to Wu. The navy will establish a maritime defense system that corresponds with the need to protect China's maritime security and economic development," Wu said. The English-language China Daily, which the government uses to deliver messages to a foreign audience, printed his comments on its front page and said it had obtained a rare interview with such a high-ranking military figure. It quoted other Chinese military figures as saying that Wu's reference to building large warships referred to highly-publicized plans to build an aircraft carrier, but also other unspecified vessels. Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie was quoted in state media in March 2009 saying China no longer wanted to be the only major global power without an aircraft carrier. China will not remain the world's only major nation without an aircraft carrier indefinitely, state press 23 March 2009 cited the nation's defense minister as telling his Japanese counterpart. Liang Guanglie made the remarks to visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, the Oriental Morning Post said, in discussions that took place after a recent spike in tension in the South China Sea. "Among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the paper quoted Liang as saying, citing Japanese official sources. "China's navy is currently

rather weak, we need to develop an aircraft carrier." Liang's comment is the highest-level recent confirmation that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation's shores. On 23 December 2008 Xinhua, China's official news agency, reported that China's Ministry of National Defense had stated that aircraft carriers are "a reflection of a nation's comprehensive power" and were needed to meet the demands of a country's navy. The Chinese government would seriously consider "relevant issues" with "factors in every aspects" on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said spokesman Huang Xueping when responding to a question at a press conference on whether it was a good opportunity at present to build China's aircraft carrier. "China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of China's armed forces is to safeguard the country's marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas," he said. In November 2008 the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, said that having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power, and the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier. The question of China's plans to build aircraft carriers are important for several reasons. Many other countries have aircraft carriers, and little thought is given to Brazil's aircraft carrier, or Argentina's aircraft carrier, when it had one. Unlike other major maritime powers, Japan does not have aircraft carriers, and the Japanese government has regarded this class of ships as being an "offensive" weapon precluded by Japan's peace constitution. Should China acquire aircraft carriers, Japan might reconsider this position, and this might mark the start of a larger reconsideration of Japan's military posture. The United States has twice as many aircraft carriers as the rest of humanity combined, each of which is larger than other country's carriers. China's acquisition of aircraft carriers might be seen as a step towards challenging American preeminence on the high seas. At a minimum, it would mark the acquisition of a power projection capability that would move further afield than the Taiwan scenario, and into the South China Sea and beyond. China, following the Cold War, continued to have very little in the way of credible power-projection capabilities, though China could project military forces superior to those that Southeast Asian countries could deploy to the South China Sea. The PLA Navy had studied the acquisition of an aircraft carrier beginning in the mid-1980s, followed by persistant reports that China has planned to launch a 40,000 ton class aircraft carrier by 2010, though these reports remained unsubstantiated and appeared to based on woefully inadequate analysis and information. While some in the Navy had lobbied for a carrier for many years, their proposals were continually overruled by the Central Military Commission. This decision could have been motivated by a desire not to be seen to be adding a major new capability to China's maritime forces, with consequent adverse regional reaction. From a purely military perspective, a Chinese aircraft carrier would be expensive to operate, and carrier would be vulnerable to attack by aircraft, fast surface vessels and submarines. An aircraft carrier could enhance China's ability to lay claim to the islands and coral atolls of the South China Sea, an area potentially rich in oil and other resources. An aircraft carrier would make a potent political and diplomatic statement, potentially creating a major change in the strategic balance in East Asia. In 1992, the Chinese authorities reportedly authorized a program for studying the development of an aircraft carrier. Chinese leaders at various levels did extensive feasibility studies on this project since then. In 1993, senior leaders of the Chinese Navy announced that China would start developing an aircraft carrier. In January 1993, Chinese political leaders decided to step up their carrier program and allocated several billion dollars for the project. At that time, it was believed that China had planned to finish the first aircraft carrier by 2000, but the plan was delayed repeatedly due to lack of carrier technology. Eventually it was decided to advance the carrier program in two stages. During the first stage, China proceeded to buy several scrapped carriers from overseas in order to study the parts. China had previously pursued similar policies both in defense and other industries. Between 1985 and 2002, Chinese firms purchased a number of vessels, for ostensibly for a variety of purposes. These included for amusement parks, hotels, scrap metal, as well as likely analysis of design and other developmental purposes. China has a long history of aquiring technology for reverse engineering purposes. Of the vessels, the Varyag, an ex-Soviet carrier, contruction of which was never completed, and sold by Ukraine to what appeared to be a Chinese front company in 1998, has been the source of the greatest speculation. After arriving in Dalian, the hull was placed in drydock for a few months and painted in PLAN colors. Subsequently the hull was moored at a cargo warf. Minor work was reported to have been conducted on the hull, delivered without engines or any other equipment, between 2005 and 2008. However, as of August 2008, there was no visible work being done to make the hull seaworthy. Several years of highly visible construction activity, to include the installation of a propulsion plant, would be required to make this hull seaworthy. Phase 2 centered on the domestic construction of a carrier by China. China appeared to have chosen to build a Chinese aircraft carrier, rather than purchasing one off-the-shelf. Although China's long-term goal was to acquire one or more aircraft carriers and it had an active program to develop a design, it remained unclear whether Beijing had reached a firm decision on the kind of carrier it would have, given budget constraints and naval funding priorities. Since the first reports of Chinese carrier aspirations in the 1980s and 1990s, various sources have claimed that China was building everything from purely training vessels to super-carriers similar to US Navy types. In June 2005 Zhang Guangqin, the top official overseeing the country's burgeoning shipbuilding industry, denied that China was assembling an aircraft carrier in Shanghai. "I can say it clearly that there's no such thing at all," said Zhang, the vice-minister at the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense, at a news briefing in Beijing. "As to building aircraft carrier or not, related governmental departments will take all factors in consideration." In October 2006 Lieutenant-General Wang Zhiyuan, Vice Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee in the PLAs General Armament Department stated: "The Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own aircraft carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in the oceans." Russian press has reported Chinese interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters, a variant of the Su-27 already transferred to China. In October 2006 a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no subsequent discussion of such a deal. In March 2007 a Chinese Admiral of the PLAN was quoted as saying that the Chinese shipbuilding industry was actively conducting R&D in aircraft carrier construction and could be ready to build such a vessel by 2010. The 2008 "Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China" stated "evidence in recent years increasingly suggests Chinas leaders may be moving forward with an aircraft carrier program. For example, beginning in early 2006 and with the release of Chinas Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported on statements from high-level government and military officials on Chinas intent to build aircraft carriers including a March 2007 statement from the then-minister of Chinas Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)." As of 2008, Russia was believed to have been providing assistance for several years in the construction of three Chinese-designed aircraft carriers. Some analysts have thus predicted that China could have an operational carrier by 2015, while others have considered 2020 to be a more realistic timeframe. No confirmed work on any shipbuilding project of any size had been observed or reported as of the end of 2008. In 2007 Liu, Wei-Wei; Qu, Xiang-Ju of the School of Aeronautics Science and Technology, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China, published a paper "Modeling of carrier-based aircraft ski jump

take-off based on tensor" in the Chinese Journal of Aeronautics [v 18 n 4 p 326-335]. However, there are unconfirmed reports that the Chinese had built a ski jump nearly identical to that of the Varyag at Yanliang [Janliang] Airfield, which is China's main aviation test facility. Reportedly it appeared that preparions were in progress to test aircraft on it. As of early 2008 a variant of the Su-27 was being flight tested at this facility.

Aircraft Carrier - Phase 1 - Study Foreign Technology

1985 - HMAS Melbourne In 1985 China purchased the 17,000-ton former Royal Australian Navy aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne as scrap, and she was finally broken up in Dalian, China. According to some reports, as late as 1994 the ship was still in existence at Guangzhou, China, being studied by Chinese naval architects. The hulk had been stripped of all useful equipment prior to sale, but Australian Navy sources reportedly said that the Chinese were particularly interested in the ship's steam catapult, even requesting the operating manuals. It was said that a navy unit had built a simulated flying deck at its airport in northern China. The design of the Melbourne was taken for reference. Reportedly, the airborne troops of the navy used the deck to carry out numerous flying tests. The improved deck adopted the optical landing system designed and developed by China. 1995 - Empresa Nacional Bazan CTOL In 1995 a Spanish firm, Empresa Nacional Bazan, was reported to have offered to build China two conventional takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) vessels, with the first to be delivered within five years and the second roughly three years later. While China was reported to have expressed an interest, a deal was not reached. 1995 Clemenceau In late 1995, France was reported to have offerred the retired aircraft carrier Clemenceau for free, provided that China bought radar and communications systems from French companies. Nothing came of the offer. 1998 Minsk In 1993 China began negotiations with Russia for the purchase of two Kiev-class 40,000-ton carriers (the Kiev and Minsk) and the still-incomplete Varyag, though initially with no results. In 1998 the Minsk, a 40,000-ton Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carrier, was purchased from a South Korean shipbreaking company by the Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry Company, a Chinese firm. The South Korean firm stripped the vessel of its armaments, engines, and communications suite and required that the vessel would not be used for military purposes. The Chinese company had the ship towed to Guangdong Province, where it planned to convert the ship into a floating museum. In September 2000 the ship was moved to Shenzhen to become part of a theme park called Minsk World. 1998 Varyag In 1992 China was reported to have opened discussions with Ukraine to purchase of the Varyag, a 67,500-ton Kuznetsov-class attack aircraft carrier about two-thirds complete and docked at the Black Sea shipyard of Nikolayev. In mid-1992 China's Science Academy sent 15 naval specialists to Ukraine for two months to conduct a feasibility study on the matter. After hearing their report, the Central Military Commission decided to go ahead with the plan and buy a carrier, aircraft and electronic equipment by 1994. These negotiations were ultimately fruitless, after Japan and the United States put pressure on Ukraine to pull out of the deal. In early 1998 a Macau-based company, Chin Lot Tourist and Amusement Agency bought the Varyag for $20 million dollars, with the announced intent of turning it into a floating amusement park and gambling casino in Macau. The contract with Ukraine stipulated that the buyer could not use the carrier for military purposes, and that any equipment that could be used to build other warships would be removed from the craft. In 1999 a respected Hong Kong periodical reported that British and French companies had made Beijing an offer to equip the Varyag with many of the systems needed to make it operational. In March 2002, following a significant delay by Turkish authorities who denied the carrier passage through the Bosporus Strait, the Varyag arrived in Dalian. Chong Lot was a subsidary a Hong Kong firm called Chinluck (Holding). Chong Lot was also connected to another Hong Kong company, Goldspot Investments Ltd. All three firms had connections with former People's Liberation Army officials. Directors of Chinluck were reported to have ties to the Chinese Navy, though Chinluck denied any People's Liberation Army involvement in the sale of the Varyag. Three of the five directors of Chinluck Holding, the parent company of Chong Lot, were Chinese nationals from Shandong, which happens to be the home of the Chinese Navy's North sea fleet. Chinluck (Holding) Co. Ltd. did not have any public presence, and Chong Lot carried a non-existent address in Macau. In 2003 Sky Cruise International Company Limited sought the winding up of Chinluck (Holdings) Company Limited. The petition was filed on 16 August 2003, and was heard before the High Court of Hong Kong on 12 November 2003, at 9:30 in the morning. Sky Cruise held its registered office at 13th Floor, Bel Trade Commercial Building, 1-3 Burrows Street, Wanchai, Hong Kong. On 4 April 2003, Zhong Nan Group (Hong Kong) Investments Ltd filed suit against Chinluck (Holdings) Co Ltd to recover USD 1,928,200. However, the the Chinluck Group remained active. On 10 March 2005, Xinhuanet quoted Cheng Zhen Shu, who was chairman of the Chinluck Group Ltd in Hong Kong, as saying "The adoption of the anti-secession law and mighty military strengthen will deter 'Taiwan independence' elements from pursuingillegal activities." The carrier was surrounded with heavy security in Dalian, which bars civilian access. Police flank the shipyard entrance. This fueled speculation that the Varyag was being used by the Chinese military. It was not evident that China could actually turn Varyag into an active military warship, since she was badly deteriorated. Around 70 percent complete, Varyag displaces about 33,600 tons [versus the 67,000-ton design displacement]. Varyag had the nuclear reactors that were installed by the Ukrainian state-run Generating Systems of Crimea removed prior to sale. Electronics were either never fitted or removed before she was sold. In May 2005 the Varyag reportedly entered the dry dock near its mooring in Dailan harbor. One picture from the side has been seen in multiple forms and an aerial shot was undoubtably fabricated. The ship was said to have emerged from the dry dock in its current paint scheme, a standard gray used by the PLAN. That the ship was only said to have entered the dry dock in May and was out by August 2005, a time span of around 3 months and a third of the time full operational US carriers usually spend in dry dock for repairs and refit called the speculation into question. That the ship continued to ride high at its morrings in Dailan harbor as of 2007, suggesting that reports of refitting and installation of equipment were at least grossly exaggerated. Subsequent unconfirmed reports followed suggesting that the Varyag could be being readied for operational use, for use as a training carrier, or perhaps most probable of the possibilities, to be brought to some limited capability in time for the Olympic Games in 2008 as a propoganda tool. As of June 2008 the newest pictures of the Varyag showed her with additional new paint, but a lack of any visible activity.

2000 - KievIn May 2000, seperate from the sale of the Varyag, the Tianma Shipbreaking Company in Tianjin purchased the Kiev from Russia. While the initial contract required that the ship be scrapped, the contract was renogatiated so that the Kiev would become a tourist attraction at the Beiyang Recreation Harbor.

Aircraft Carrier Project Phase 2 - New Construction

China appeared to have chosen to build a Chinese aircraft carrier, rather than purchasing one off-the-shelf. Although China's longterm goal was to acquire one or more aircraft carriers and it had an active program to develop a design, it remained unclear whether Beijing had reached a firm decision on the kind of carrier it would have, given budget constraints and naval funding priorities. The PLA Navy would need to overcome several large obstacles before it could field an operational aircraft carrier and associated supporting ships. First, the PLA Navy did not initially have any carrier-capable aircraft. Second, although substantially improved in these areas, it still needed more and better anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities to protect a carrier and its supporting vessels. Finally, to have adequate power projection capabilities from the use of a carrier, it was preferable to have more than one carrier so that a carrier was assuming the mission at sea at all times. Thus, many experts concluded that an operational aircraft carrier would not appear to be in China's near future, even though China was funding research and development and training officers in aircraft carrier operations. According to one Russian report, China planned to build an aircraft carrier with a displacement of between 40,000 to 60,000 tons. The feasibility study and draft design of China's aircraft carrier started in 1992. According to Russian sources, China began work on its own carrier in 1999 at Shanghai Shipyard. This carrier, code named "9985 plan" or "Project 9935," would have a 48,000 ton displacement, capable of carrying 30-40 fighter jets, most of which would be multi-functional SU-30MKK jets bought from Russia. The first carrier of purely Chinese design, the ship could have a built-in vertical anti-air and anti-ship missile launching system. China had reportedly started work on naval bases and harbors in Shanghai, Zanjiang and Dalian to improve docking facilities for this carrier. The plan for China's first light and conventional powered aircraft carrier was estimated to cost around 4.8 billion yuan, with authorities reportedly having already allocated one billion yuan for the first phase of the project. The aircraft carrier was expected to be launched in 2003 and to officially go into service in around 2005. From then on, it was estimated that China would be able to build a new aircraft carrier at an interval of every three years. If started in 1999, this carrier was expected to be completed by 2006. As of mid-2004 there were no credible reports of the start of construction of such a ship. In early September 2003 the Harbin Technical University held its 50th anniversary celebration. Founded soon after the Chinese Communist revolution, Harbin had been deeply involved in PLA military technical research. As part of this celebration Harbin students produced a 1:100 scale model of a prospective aircraft carrier. Derived from the Kuznetsov design, novel features included the placement of anti-ship missiles, and the use of a new anti-aircraft missile similar to that on the new No. 170 air defense destroyer. Such a ship could eventually carry an air wing comprised either of navalized Shenyang J-11 or Chengdu J-10 fighters, plus Kamov helicopters for ASW or AEW missions. In January 2004 it was reported that China would build several helicopter carriers, having decided to delay plans to build aircraft carriers. China was said to ask a European country to build the helicopter carriers and a contract was said to be expected to be signed in the near future. An un-named European country was said to have provided China with the design and specifications of the carrier it would build for the Chinese Navy. The helicopter carriers would act as a stopgap for aircraft carriers that the Chinese Navy wanted to build, despite lacking the capability to do so. In June 2005 it was reported that China had completed the final design for an aircraft carrier, and would secretly start construction in early August 2005 at Jiang-nan Shipyard, Zhang-xing Island near Shanghai. The 29 June 2005 issue of Hong Kong Economic Daily (Jing-ji-ri-bao,) reported that the project would cost 3 billion yuan (390 million dollars), about 3% of China's military budget. The ship was described as having a top speed of 30 knots, and a maximal displacement of 78,000 ton. It was said to be equipped with Russian engines and radars. It would carry 54 fighter planes and 13 anti-submarine helicopters, including the latest Russian fighters (Su-33). It was expected to enter service by the year 2008. Zhang Guang-qin, Vice Minister of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, denied the rumor that a carrier was under construction. While these reports persist, they appear to be based on rumor and speculation, which despite repeated efforts, have gone unverified. For instance, the multiple aircraft carriers that China was reported to be building, were all said to be under construction at the same time at a shipyard in Shanghai, which was also enclosed, to prevent observation. Though efforts to identify a building or structure of this size have not yielded any results. China has apparently decided to postpone commissioning of its first aircraft carrier until no earlier than 2010. The formation of an experimental fleet centered on such a carrier would take another three to four years. Based on the experience of other countries, it seemed that that China would start building 10,000 ton cruisers to be convoy ships. It was also possible that China would purchase such cruisers directly from overseas, most likely the Ukraine, a missile cruiser from Ukraine, which was almost completed, and then build China's own similar cruisers modeled on the Ukraine. Helicopters from a carrier could provide support to potential amphibious operations. Fixed-wing aircraft operating from a carrier could provide greater air defense over a potential beachhead. If China were to build or purchase an aircraft carrier, such an asset would enable it to provide increased air defense and support for amphibious operations. The proposed Chinese aircraft carrier could be a vessel of 40,00050,000 tons of displacement, one similar to the French De Gaulle-Class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Given the complexities of developing a new naval reactor considerably larger than the type used on PRC nuclear submarines and that a very long range was not required, conventional steam boilers would be adequate for a Chinese aircraft carrier. Russian designed steam turbines could give the carrier a top speed of 30 knots. The vessels might carry 24 combat aircraft, such as the Sukhoi-30MKK launched by a ski-jump. Below deck might be two missile launchers housing 24 missiles, either the Russian SSN-22 Sunburn or the more advanced Yakhont. China was also reported to be working on a land-attack cruise missile to be mounted on the vessel. China would probably build a carrier at the Shanghai Jiangnan Shipyard. Minsk and Kiev Russian Kiev-class Carriers Varyag Russian Kuznetsov-class Carriers

Nimitz Replica - Orient Green Boat Theme Park

Kiev - Theme Park - Varyag

Destroyer Shipbuilding
China's emergence on the global stage as an economic power and as a net importer of oil has had a significant impact on China's maritime strategy. In order to protect oil and other trade routes, the PLAN is beginning to develop the foundations of a naval capability that can defend sea lines of communication (SLOCS). While China's submaline force is well suited to interdiction, protection of SLOCs with a submarine force is more challenging. The State Council and CMC modernized its fleet of first generation destroyers by retrofitting them with new technology to improve their combat systems. Emphasis was placed on the electronics and the development of a combat-intelligence-command system. Improvements to the ships were made in the Dalian shipyard in 1987, which resulted in improved weapon systems, living conditions, and most significantly in electronic counter measures. The newly improved destroyers were made available to the PLAN in 1989. While improving the existing destroyer fleet, the Seventh Academy began work on new class of guided missile destroyer. Initially it involved a joint partnership with another country. Such a relationship could not be established, and instead research was concentrated in China's own research bodies. The new generation of destroyers emphasized an advanced combat-intelligence system that was superior to the ones already installed in the first-generation destroyers. It also had better real-time information capabilities and improved long-range surveillance. The anti-submarine, airdefense, and electronic counter measure capabilities were also enhanced. To effectively protect shipping, a visible and demonstrable naval capability, generally based on surface combatants with the endurance and range to operate farther from shore for an extended period of time, is preferable. To suit this need. China is building improved classes of destroyers, including the long-range SA-N-20 SAM -equipped LUZHOU DDG and the HHQ-9 SAM equipped LUYANG II DDG. The long-range SAM systems these platforms possess will provide Chinese surface combatants with an area air defense capability as they operate farther from shore and outsIde of the protection of land-based air defense assets, Under the protection afforded by these advanced area air defense destroyers, which are also equipped with long-range ASCMs. the Chinese Navy can operate combatants such as the four SOVREMENNYY II DDGs. These long-range engagement and air defense capabilities now being fielded by the PLAN give China a significantly improved capacity for operations beyond the littoral in support of SLOC protection. Since 1971 there have been six different shipyards involved with building destroyers (DDG) for the PLAN. As of 2006 only two remain. The four shipyards that have produced destroyers in the past but have now been absorbed with other shipyards are as follows: Luda Naval Facility is located in the Liaoning Province, in Liaoning. This shipyard was responsible for constructing six Type 051 Luda-class Guided Missile Destroyers between 1971 and 1975. This ship yard has been incorporated into the Dalian New Shipyard. Zhonghua Shipyard was established in 1926 in Shanghai. This particular shipyard was responsible for constructing four Type 051 Luda-class Guided Missile Destroyers over a four year period between 1980 and 1983. This ship yard, as of mid-2000, has been negotiating a merger with the Hudong shipyard. Guangzhou Naval Base is located at the mouth of the Pearl River, 70 nm (nautical miles) north of Hong Kong. This shipyard was responsible for constructing seven Type 051 Luda-class Guided Missile Destroyers. The first was produced on or about late 1972 or early 1973. This ship, a Luda-I #160 was lost near Zanjiang due to an explosion in August 1978. Further, this shipyard produced two more destroyers in 1983 and then one per year for the next three years. The last destroyer produced in this yard was a Luda-III series in 1991. This shipyards development is limited by the extensive shallow areas and heavy siltation. China has been renovating this shipyard since the early to mid-1990s, by adding more berths for vessels and by deepening the approach channel by 12.5 meters, which should be completed by 2005. Qiuxin Shipyard was founded in 1902 and is located on the west bank of Huangpu River, near Shanghai. This shipyard only produced one destroyer, a Type 052 Luhu-class Multi-role Destroyer in 1994. In August of 2000 this shipyard merged with Jiangnan shipyard. The following are the two remaining shipyards known to be involved with the construction of destroyers. Jiangnan Shipyard The Jiangnan shipyard was established in 1865 and is located near Shanghai. This shipyard has in the past built some frigates, but more recently, with the exception of two SS Song-class submarines built in 2005, has been focused on the production of destroyers. The first DDG built here was a Type 052 Luhu-class Multi-role Destroyer in 1996. It is possible that a second ship of this class was launched about 1995 and then halted, and then possibly restarted in 1999. Between 2003 and 2005 Jiangnan shipyard has completed four Type 052 Luhai-class Multi-role Destroyers. One of the series Type 052B Luyang I was completed in 2003 with an additional ship of the same series completed in 2004. Also in 2004, the first of two in the series Type 052C Luyang II was completed. The second in this series was completed in early 2005. There is speculation as to another ship in this series being launched in 2005, if so; this boat could be completed sometime in 2006. This shipyard has maintained a build rate of one boat per year; with an exception in 2004 when it built two boats, one each of two different series. It is projected that the Jiangnan shipyard can produce approximately one DDG every year. This shipyard has also proven, in relation to destroyer building, that if necessary, it can produce two boats per year as meets P.L.A.N.s requirements. Dalian Shipyard Dalian City was founded in 1899. Since then it has grown into a major seaport and center for industry. Dalian sits on the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula facing the Bohai and Yellow Seas. The Dalian shipyard has produced Type 052 Luhaiclass Multi-role Destroyers. One of the series Type 052A was completed in 1999. Two additional ships were launched, one in 2004 and another in 2005. It is expected that these ships can be completed by 2006 and 2007 respectively assuming construction is not impeded. The types are also unknown but it is possible that a new DDG Luzhou Type 051C could be the result. Though the 1990s this shipyard has undergone massive renovations which would explain the low production rates. It is estimated this shipyard, when fully operational, will produce approximately one DDG per year as meets PLANs requirements. Destroyer Construction History Date 1971 1972 Luda 1 1 1 Zhonghua Guangzhou Qiuxin Jiangnan Dalian

1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1991 1994 1996 1999 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Note:

2 2 1 1 1 1? 2 1 1 1? 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 ... ... ... ... 1 ... ... ... ...

Question marks denote ships accounted for on webpage that do not have years attached, so years produced are estimated

Type 052C DDG Luyang II

Type 052A DDG Luhai

C168 DDG Type 052B YANTAI C170 DDG Type 052C LUJANG LUHU CLASS 112 Harbin 113 Qingdao Shenyang class 115 Shenyang 116 Shijiazhuang LUHAI CLASS 167 Shenzhen LU YANG CLASS 168 Guangzhou ex Yantai 169 Wuhan Lanzhou class 170 Lanzhou 171 Haikou Type 051C Luzhou 115 Shenyang 116 Shijiazhuang Type 052C Luyang-II 170 Lanzhou 171 Haikou Type 052B Luyang-I 168 Guangzhou ex Yantai 169 Wuhan Type 051B Luhai 167 Shenzhen Type 052 Luhu Type 051 Luda

Frigate Shipbuilding
The early years of building frigates (FF and/or FFG) began in the early 1960s with the FF Type 065 Jiangnan-class. Western sources diverge on what particular shipyards were involved, but the ones mentioned are the Guangzhou, Shantou, and Jiangnan shipyards. In the mid-to-late 1970s a second class was built at the Hudong shipyard, the FFG Type 053K Jiangdong-class. Serious production of FFGs began in 1976. From 1976 to 1987, the main shipyards involved in construction were Hudong and Jiangnan. Jiangnan shipyard produced thirteen frigates over an eleven year period between 1976 and 1987; one frigate, the Kaifeng was either renamed or scrapped. Jiangnan shipyard produced two more frigates sometime after 1987, with production rates averaging about one per year, it is speculated these two boats were built in 1988 and 1989. After 1987 Hudong continued to produce FFGs alone while the Jiangnan shipyard produced its first destroyer in 1996. In 2005 the Huangpu shipyard began producing FFGs. As of 2006 there were two shipyards producing frigates, the Hudong and the Huangpu. Hudong Shipyard The Hudong Shipyard was founded in 1928 and is located on the eastern bank of the Huangpu River in Shanghai. The first known frigates to be completed from this shipyard were the FFG Type 053HT Jianghu-III and, the FFG Type 053HT-H Jianghu-IV; both were completed in 1986. Prior to this date, there were a total of six frigates produced; however, exact completion dates are unknown. In order to speculate on the build rates of the past, we will look to the build rates of the mid-1980s through 2005. From 1986 through 2005, a total of 23 frigates were produced; on average that is approximately one frigate per year. Working backwards then projecting one boat per year for the years prior to 1986, we speculate the completion of the first frigate at the Hudong shipyard was 1980. The frigates completed in 1984 and 1985 were sold to Egypt. This shipyard has maintained a build rate of one boat per year on average, despite a three per year for three years run in the early 1990s. It is projected that the Hudong shipyard can produce approximately one FFG every year. This shipyard has also proven, in relation to frigate building, that if necessary, it can produce three boats per year as meets P.L.A.N.s requirements. As of 2006 there had been a total of nine frigates exported to three different countries, all of the Jianghu-class Type 053 and variants thereof. The following is a list of countries who have received frigates from China: Two were delivered to Egypt in 1984 and 1985. One has been delivered to Bangladesh in 1989. Six were received by the government of Thailand; two in 1991; two in 1992; one in 1995, and another in 1996 According to Janes information Group, three frigates of the Jiangwei II class are to be built with construction beginning in 2007 and delivery planned for 2009. A fourth of this class was to be built in Pakistan with Chinese assistance to develop Pakistani indigenous shipbuilding. Huangpu Shipyard The Huangpu shipyard is located in Guangzhou in southern China. Construction on frigates began in 2001 on the Jiangwei-II class Type 057 with the first one being completed in 2003. Another was completed in 2004 with an additional three more to be built; however, construction of this class was expanded to a second yard and Huangpu shipyard built two of the three completing them in 2006. The shipyard also completed one of the new Jiangkai-class Type 054 in 2005. In the shipyards short time producing frigates, between 2001 and 2006, five frigates have been completed maintaining a build rate of approximately one FFG per year.

Submarines of the People's Liberation Army Navy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Submarines have long been one of the three focuses of the People's Liberation Army Navy (the other two are aircraft and attack boats), and when the decision was made in the late 2006 to concentrate on building other principal surface combatants to strengthen the air defense and to further delay the construction of aircraft carriers due to insufficient air cover, submarines will continue to play the lead dominant role in the assault force for the PLAN. Classes of boats SSN o Type 091 Han class - 5 boats o Type 093 Shang class - 2 boats (more under construction)[citation needed] SSBN o Type 092 Xia class - 1 boat o Type 094 Jin class - 5 boats (more under construction)[citation needed] Diesel-Electric o Type 033 Romeo class submarine - mostly retired, 8 remain in service o Type 035 Ming class submarine - version of Romeo, 15 boats o Kilo class - 12 boats o Type 039 Song class submarine - 13 boats [1] o Type 041 Yuan class submarine - 5 boats (more under construction) SSGN o Type 092 Xia class - under construction/conversion [2][3][4] SSG o Project 629 submarine - at least 1 in service Future submarines SSN o Type 095[2][3] o Type 097 Qin class[4][5] SSBN o Type 096[6][7][8] Nuclear attack submarine force Nuclear submarines have been envisaged in the Chinese Navy since the 1950s. Despite ambition and a long history of development, the acquisition of nuclear submarines has been a difficult process. The Cultural Revolution greatly disrupted nuclear submarine development. The Sino-Soviet split prevented any Soviet assistance in nuclear propulsion, and these propulsion problems have been troublesome to this day. The first Chinese nuclear powered submarine was laid down in 1967 but not completed until 1974. The Han class has experienced more than 20 years of development, the last of the class not being commissioned until 1990. Only five hulls have entered service and have been reported to have experienced nuclear reactor difficulties (though this has been greatly overcome in some aspects by French and subsequent Russian assistance). The Han class since their commission have gone through major upgrades and numerous refits. It is believed that long refits have often meant that these submarines spend more time in port than out at sea, greatly affecting their operational capacity. Combat capabilities of the Han seem to be undermined by the poor and noisy nuclear reactors. Their initial design and weapons fit seem inadequate if confronting other submarines and ships in Western navies. Hull 401 (and possibly 402 as well in the near future) has been retired from active service by 2005. All remaining hulls however have been greatly refitted with new sonars and anechoic tiles (which reduce noise levels). The Han has mostly operated in local waters, but since the 1990s, Hans have been used more aggressively. A Han shadowed a US carrier battle group in the mid-1990s, and more recently, a Han operated around Japanese waters, prompting a Japanese task force to chase the submarine out of its territory. Han-class submarines are far from being as capable or effective as their American Los Angeles class counterparts, but with recent improvements they can pose a great threat by operating deep in the Western Pacific and attacking targets that are less well-protected by ASW coverage. A new class of SSN has been in development since the 1980s, when the PLAN first sought a replacement for the Han class. Little information has emerged about the Type 093 SSN project, but it is believed to have great Russian influence. The 093 design maybe similar and comparable to the Russian Victor III class, signifying a significant step forward for Chinese nuclear attack submarines. The 093 has been the focus of much attention from US and Asian military analysts. Its improved capabilities will undoubtedly increase PLAN power in the region and its ability to carry war to the West Pacific. Such submarines can escort future SSBNs as well as attacking US Navy carrier battle groups in the deep ocean. There have been reports that the first hull was launched around 2001, with a second hull also launched a few years afterwards. Photos of the 093 'Shang' class were released on the internet in mid-2007, with some photos considered to be from official sources as well, perhaps leading to speculation that the 093 may be declassified. There have been numerous reports that China has the option of buying or leasing Russian nuclear attack submarines, particularly the Akula class. It is unlikely, however, that Russia in the foreseeable future would be willing to sell such high-level platforms to China, nor is China likely to be interested in wasting money on run-down Russian attack submarines considering the near-completion of the 093 class and development of the 095 class. China is constructing a major underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, Hainan. [9] In December 2007 the first Type 094 submarine was moved to Sanya.[5] The Daily Telegraph on 1 May 2008 reported that tunnels were being built into hillsides which could be capable of hiding up to 20 nuclear submarines from spy satellites.[10][11]

Ballistic missile submarine force China engaged in the development of submarine launched ballistic missiles since the 1950s, with the acquisition of a single Soviet Golf class conventional powered ballistic missile submarine. The original Golf class design has three launch tubes. Using this single hull, the PLAN acquired experience and tests from this platform. The Golf played a major role in China's JL-1 SLBM development project. The first successful launch of the JL-1 SLBM took place in 1982 from a submerged pontoon, and the first successful launch from a submerged submarine was in 1984 from the Golf test submarine. It is believed the single hull is still serving as a test platform for different missile technologies, as well as a test launcher of the JL-2 missile. China's first SSBN, the Xia 092 class hull 406, was laid down in 1978, launched in 1981 and commissioned by 1983. The JL-1 missile was not ready until the first successful test launch of the missile from the Xia in 1988. Previous launch attempts from 1985 had failed. Its primary weapon is the JL-1 SLBM, with 12 launch tubes, as well as six 533 mm tubes for self defense. Because of only one hull, the PLAN does not possess the capability of the other superpowers to maintain a constant SSBN patrol. The missile's short range also permits the 092 to launch its missiles against regional targets only. Striking targets far away require the submarine to travel dangerously closer to enemy waters. The Xia has since undergone a major modernisation refit, with a new black-coated paint and possibly other improvements with unofficial reports indicating the Xia is now carrying an improved missile, the JL-1A that is alleged to have longer range. The PLAN currently has plans to acquire a new class of SSBN, with a projected number of between three to six vessels. The 094 is believed to have been heavily influenced by Russian assistance. It features 12 launch tubes for the longer ranged JL-2 missile (contrary to the previously speculated 16), which has an 8000 km range that can carry 3 to 4 MIRVs. The 094 would be permitted to patrol nearer Chinese waters, with the ability to launch its missiles against continental US targets. Recent photos released in the internet by unofficial sources (including alleged satellite images by Google Earth) show at least one operational 094 followed by one or two other hulls being fitted in Huludao submarine facilities. The 094 bears a strong resemblance to the Xia, though being much larger in all aspects and thought to be far more capable. Conventional submarine force Submarine warfare is regarded as a vital part of PLAN's coastal defense doctrine. Large numbers of conventional powered submarines have therefore been in service, and this force makes up the bulk of the PLAN's submarines, making it the third largest submarine force in the world today. The PLAN currently operates five different classes of conventional submarines. In times of war, these submarines can be used for disrupting lines of shipping, laying mines, attacking ships, defending against enemy submarines and later generations of Chinese SSK can employ use of anti-ship missiles. Being quiet underwater combatants, they represent a considerable threat to regional navies. History The first class of submarine to be operated by the PLAN was the Soviet Whiskey class. These were little different from the German U-Boat designs used in the later years of World War II. The Whiskey was imported from the Soviet Union and subsequently built in considerable numbers (40+). Most of these hulls have been removed from service by the mid 1990s. The second type to be operated also owed its origins to the Soviet Union. The Romeo class was principally based upon late war German U-boats. The Romeo was also copied in China as the Type 033 submarine. Production of this submarine took place since the 1960s until the 1980s (even till the early 1990s). It has been estimated that more than 100 have been produced for the PLAN and for export. The 033 formed the backbone of the PLAN submarine forces, mostly patrolling near the coast. Their main armaments were primitively guided or unguided torpedoes and mines. The 033 generally had very limited ability to engage more advanced submarines in modern warfare as well as being quite vulnerable to modern ASW sensors and weapons. By the late 1990s, a large number of 033s had been retired from active duty and pulled into reserves. A handful of upgraded hulls remain in service. These upgraded hulls have new sonar fits and other improvements that keep them effective as patrol submarines. The Ming class 035, first commissioned in 1974, is based on the 033. It could be considered as China's first indigenously-designed submarine, despite its similarities to the Romeo class. The Ming did not particularly perform well in initial hulls. One of the first boats was scrapped after a fire. Initial hulls have since also been scrapped, but major improvements and eventual reliability have permitted production to proceed at a rate of one to two boats a year between 1988 and 1995. Following a hiatus, production resumed in the late 1990s and continued until 2001. At least 17 hulls are still in service, with later hulls using modern sonar systems which include the French DUUX-5. The later hulls of the Ming class may have been employed for testing Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), which would significantly reduce the noise level of the submarine. Mings have reportedly been exercising more frequently and making recent incursions into Japanese waters. On one occasion a Ming surfaced briefly within Japanese waters before submerging again. In 2003, Ming 361 was lost with all hands. It was speculated that 361 was testing an AIP system, and that a failure caused the near-instantaneous death of the all crewmembers (as they were found dead in their quarters with the submarine intact). The PLAN in the 1990s sought to acquire a modern conventional submarine with emphasis on sensors, weaponry, and modern capabilities to engage enemy submarines in modern warfare. In 1994 it ordered two Kilo 877EKM type submarines from Russia, which were delivered by 1995. In 1996, two improved Kilo 636 submarines were ordered, delivered between 1997-1998. In 2002, a $2 billion deal was signed for eight more Kilo 636, these submarines particularly fitted with the capability of launching the Russian Novator 3M-54E Klub S cruise missile capable of engaging land and sea targets at 220 km. The Kilo class represents a huge leap forward in the PLAN submarine fleet. Originally a Soviet design in the 1980s, the Kilo was meant to be one of the world's quietest class of submarines. With 12 Kilos operational by 2006, it is unclear whether PLAN will buy more of these potent vessels. Despite the purchase of the Kilos, the PLAN has continued to develop indigenous designs. The Song class design was first launched in 1994 with sea trials in 1995. It featured Western influences with a German propulsion system, seven blade skewed propeller and noise-reduction rubber tiles; however, the first hull retained the traditional stepped sail. The first hull was not fully operational until 1999. As a result of the sea trials a significantly modified design emerged as the Song 039A, with a number of improvements, including a conventional sail. Song 039A appears quite similar to the Agosta class in appearance. By 2006 about 12 hulls have been confirmed to be built so far, indicating the class has performed satisfactorily. The Song presents a major milestone to indigenous submarine designs, being comparable in capabilities to contemporary Western submarines. Song submarines are armed with torpedoes and a sub-launched variant of the YJ-8 anti-ship missile. An AIP system may be installed in the future. Internet photos emerged in 2005 of a new class of submarine dubbed the Yuan class. The hull seems to resemble Russian influences (as it is similar to the Kilo) while also adapting features found on the 039A. The Yuan is expected to adapt an AIP system to achieve maximum quiet operational capabilities. The Yuan could be armed with advanced Russian and Chinese torpedoes and cruise missiles. The Yuan came as a surprise to US military intelligence, as the submarine's existence was entirely unknown until internet images emerged. This class of SSK is expected to have capabilities which surpass the Kilo and Song class SSK designs currently being operated by the PLAN. Series production began late in 2007, with at least two boats identified so far.

Outlook The future fleet of conventional Chinese submarines is a deadly quiet force that could perform defensive and offensive operations. The future fleet will compose of the Kilo, Song and Yuan types, as the Romeos and Mings are phased out of service. China is reported to have the option of purchasing the more advanced Russian Amur class SSK. With the success of indigenous programmes, however, future purchases of foreign submarines look relatively unlikely. See also PLAN Vessel Inventory Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle Dajiang Notes 1. ^ [1] 2. ^ http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/12/06/2003339341 3. ^ http://www.deagel.com/Nuclear-Attack-Submarines/Type-095_a001843001.aspx http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&sl=zh4. ^ CN&tl=en&u=http://www.lzmmil.cn/html/jqbg/2009/1026/3017.html&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.com&twu=1&usg= ALkJrhidKPSFXwmOBBX53JolhKGvyomOVw http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&sl=zh5. ^ CN&tl=en&u=http://www.lzmmil.cn/html/wqqy/20090806/2103.html&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.com&twu=1&usg= ALkJrhi23xVVJTqASmLkibMazLIqB5HobA 6. ^ http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/3/3/05A7F8B5-44E0-45F9-960D-42C6A6B54878.html 7. ^ http://csww.org/2009/02/16/chinese-new-type-096-ssbn-spotted/ 8. ^ http://img182.imageshack.us/img182/219/382714e92a3dca66ec2edbh5.jpg 9. ^ http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/images/Hainan-full.jpg 10. ^ Harding, Thomas, "Chinese Build Secret Nuclear Submarine Base", London Daily Telegraph, May 2, 2008. 11. ^ Harding, Thomas, "Chinese Nuclear Submarines Prompt 'New Cold War' Warning", London Daily Telegraph, May 3, 2008. External links Chinese Defense Today * Erickson, Andrew Erickson; Lyle Goldstein (Winter 2007). "China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings". Naval War College Review 60 (1): 5479. http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/documents/EricksonGoldstein_China's%20Future%20Nuclear%20Submarine%20Force_NWCR_2007-01.pdf. Retrieved 2009-08-25.

Submarine Shipbuilding
The total number of diesel submarines in the Chinese inventory has actually declined since the 1980s, when the "People's War at Sea" concept called for high numbers of low echnology combatants. The number of submarines has declined by about one-half. The large submarine force of that period, dominated by the 1950s-era ROMEO SS class, was drawn down during the 1990s and has been replaced by a smaller but more technologically advanced force of KILO SS, SONG SS, and YUAN SS. Each of these submarine classes, which are quiet platforms with anti-ship cruise missiles is an integral part of China's regional anti-access strategy. China has purchased Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and reportedly wants to purchase associated technology to replace its aging, obsolete diesel-electric submarine force. The quieting incorporated into these submarines is required for successful operations in the open ocean operating areas which could facilitate the PLAN's wartime mission of keeping enemy combatants outside of strike range of the theater of operation. Long-range weapons are the means by which each individual submarine can influence a larger body of ocean, which is required with the expansion of the geographic scope of the maritime battlefield. Including the late 2006 surfacing of SONGclass SS near USS KITTY HAWK. Chinese submarines seem to be operating beyond their familiar operating areas. China claims that its submarines have conducted long-range patrols almost since the inception of the Chinese submarine force. According to Chinese press reports, PLAN submarines have occasionally ventured into the Pacific Ocean and, with some degree of regulaIity, continue to conduct these "cruises of long duration." Although China has apparently been satisfied with only a handful of these deployments every year, the growing technological capabilities of the PLAN submarine force and China's evolving maritime strategy, which calls for an operational capability beyond the littoral in support of an anti-access mission, create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence in the Western Pacific Ocean east of the Ryukyu Island chain. The US Department of Defenses Annual Report to Congress on The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China for 2006 reported that the PLA Navy had 55 submarines, of which 50 were diesel and and 5 nuclear. By the end of 2006 the Chinese Navy operated about 55 attack submarines the majority of which are diesel-electric powered. In May 2007, the Annual Report noted that the PLAN had 58 submarines, of which 53 were diesel and and 5 nuclear. These US Defense Department order of battle estimates appear to include only active operational units that are currently in commission, and do not units in reserve, or recently launched pre-comissioning units. Chinas next generation nuclear attack submarine, the Type 093 Shang-class, was expected to enter service in 2005. The new Type 094 Jin-class SSBN was launched in July 2004, but is not expected to be operational until around 2008-2010 [and thus does not appear to be included in the DOD total count]. Trends in nuclear submarines would suggest that priority is being given to modernizing a constant size force structure, rather than building up a larger force structure. China's maxitime strategy is evolving along two paths. First. China is focused on a regional anti-access capability, which is ptincipally applicable in preventing third-party intervention in a Taiwan scenarto. Second, China is simultaneously expanding its maritime strategy to include a mission to protect China's growing dependence on maritime commerce for economic development. From China's perspective, the lessons of warfare from the mid to late 1990s -namely, that modem navies such as the USN can conduct warfare at long ranges - expanded the geographic scope of the maritime battlefield. In order to counter long-range cruise missile strikes or carrier-based aviation strtkes, the Chinese Navy sought ways to extend its reach beyond the littoral regions in a manner that offered the potential to counter a modem navy's advanced assets. Limitations in air defense capabilities for surface combatants as well as the inherent challenges of antisubmarine warlare compelled the Chinese leadership to focus much of its military modernization effort on the submarine force.

During the 1990s most PLAN submarines were believed to have obsolete sonar systems based on older analog designs. A limited number of Chinese submarines have more modern digital sonar systems based probably on 1980s Western technology. The Chinese have an extensive research and development infrastructure in shallow-water acoustics and have experience using modern commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computer processing technology. It is likely that current Chinese sonar designs are similar to commercially available Western submarine sonar systems and feature modern COTS processors and displays. PLAN submarines are assessed to incorporate a wide range of quieting technologies, most of which are imported. China nonetheless desires to develop the capability to produce indigenously quiet submarines. The main submarine quieting technologies are machinery mounts, hull coatings, and propellers. Future PLA Navy submarine designs are expected to incorporate lower propeller rotational rates and more advanced propeller designs, machinery mounts, and hull coatings. Chinas apparent goal is to design and construct quiet submarines independently of other countries. This effort is evident in Chinas large investment in research, development and manufacturing. As of 2005, there were three shipyards involved in building submarines for the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Bohai, Wuchang, and Jiangnan. The Bohai yard is involved with the construction of all nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs and SSBNs) while Wuchang and Jiangnan produce conventional-powered (diesel) submarines (SS). By 2006 China was building modern diesel SS Type 039 Song at an average rate of 2 per/year, according to Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, Jr. USN (Retired), former Deputy Commander and Chief of Fleet Forces Command. Konetzni predicted that China might have 75 modern submarines by 2020 [Statement of Before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee 28 March 2006].By 2007 there was some uncertainty as to whether the SONG would continue in serial production, or whether it would be replaced by the SS Type 041 Yuan, of which only one or two examples had been produced to date. Since the 1990s China has produced an average of two new conventional attack submarines annually, and has a demonstrated industrial capacity to produce at twice that rate, if required. Future force levels are also influenced by decisions on the pace of retirement of the SS Type 039 Song. Bohai Shipyard The Bohai shipyard was established in 1954 and is located in Huludao, on the northern coast of the Bohai Gulf. The first submarine to be commissioned from this yard in 1987 was the PLANs first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Type 092 Xia-class. This boat is a modified version of the PLANs first-generational design of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), the Type 091 Han-class. In 1997-98 the Bohai shipyard began construction of a new class of SSN, the Type 093 Shang-class. It has been reported that by late July or early August of 2004 the Bohai shipyard began construction on a replacement for the SSBN Xia-class; the improved SSBN being built is labeled the Jin-class. According to estimates by the US Department of Defense, the SSN Shang-class became operational in 2005-06, and the SSBN Jin-class will become operational 2010 [possibly as soon as 2080] respectively.This shipyard is in the process of building two new nuclear submarines for PLAN and based on very limited recent production experience, it is projected that the Bohai shipyard is producing approximately one SSN every three years and one SSBN every two years [this seems a bit rapid]. Once various problems get worked out and sea trials prove the operational capability of these submarines, the production levels could be further increased, producing more boats in less time, according to PLAN requirements. Wuchang Shipyard The Wuchang shipyard was founded in 1934 and is located in Wuhan. It is the largest, modern shipyard in inland China, which would explain why it is the most productive of all the conventional-powered submarine shipyards. The first submarines constructed here were the Type 035 SS Ming-class and the Type 091 SSN Han-class; in 1974 one of each class was completed. A total of twenty Ming-class submarines were built between 1974 and 2001, but by the end of the 1980s the first three Ming-classes had been scraped. A total of five Han-class submarines were built between 1974 and 1991; these five ended the production of the Han-class SSNs. Further, these were the only nuclear-powered submarines produced at the Wuchang shipyard, any future construction of SSN or SSBN style submarines would be constructed at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao, China. In 1974 the Wuchang shipyard produced two submarines, the SS Ming-class and the SSN Han-class. From 1975 through 1995 this shipyard produced only one submarine per year with the exception of the years 1988 and 1991 when two were produced in those years. The two aforementioned years is when one Han-class was added to the ongoing Ming-class build-up. The year 1994 was when the yard began to lay the ground work for producing two submarines per year. During the years 1994 and 1995 the shipyard produced only one operational Ming-class submarine per year; however, a new class of SS was launched during 1994 and began sea trials in 1995, the new class of submarine is the Type 039 SS Song-class. While this new class was going through sea trials, two more Ming-classes were produced in 1996. In 1997 the shipyard did not put forth any operational boats; however, according to some reports an improved variant of the Song-class, Type 039G was launched that year. From 1994 through 1998 the Wuchang shipyard has been constructing two submarines per year, all while incorporating new classes and improved variants. The year 1999 saw record breaking submarine production when two Ming-class and one Song-class submarines were completed. In 2000 the shipyard produced one Ming-class while working on two more Song-classes, which consequently were delivered in 2001 for a record tying three boats that year, this time it was the last of the Ming-class to be produced along with two more Song-class submarines. The three years following 2001 saw the shipyard produce one Song-class per year, but if history teaches us anything about this shipyard, it is that when there is a lull in production there is a possibility of a new submarine class being produced. This assumption proves correct when in 2005 another record tying production year when three ships are completed. The submarines completed are one Song-class and two new, Type 039A / Type 041 SS Yuan-class. This shipyard has consistently averaged approximately two submarines per year form 1994 through 2005. Given Chinas ongoing modernization of its naval forces in general and the belief that submarines are the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) first line of defense against carrier strike groups, it is projected that the Wuchang shipyard can produce approximately two SS submarines every year as meets PLANs requirements. Jiangnan Shipyard The Jiangnan shipyard was established in 1865 and is located near Shanghai. This shipyard, although regarded as the cradle of Chinas national industry, has a very limited submarine production history. In 1974 it completed production on one of the first three Ming class submarines produced, which was later to be scrapped during the 1980s. Two Song-class submarines were launched in 2004 at this shipyard and were to be completed by 2005. Although not very active in submarine production, this shipyard is very active in the production of destroyers and frigates which we will discuss in another section. This shipyard has also proven, in relation to submarine building, that if necessary, it can produce two boats per year. Submarine Construction History Date Huludao / Bohai Wuhan Shipyard Jiangnan Shipyard

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1 1

1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 2

Type 095 submarine

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Name: Operators: Preceded by: Succeeded by: In service: Planned: Type: Type 095 People's Liberation Army Navy Type 093 Type 097 Qin class launch in 2010, active service in 2020 (est.)[1] 5[1] Attack submarine

Installed power: Nuclear reactor

Range: Armament:

Unlimited Torpedo tubes HY-4 cruise missiles[1]

The Type 095 (Chinese designation: 09-IV) is a proposed class of third generation nuclear-powered attack submarines for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of the People's Republic of China. Little is known about this class except that the initiation of its development may be in response to the rumoured poor performance of the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine.[2][3] However, it's more likely that the 095 class were initiated because of new technological breakthroughs possibly in the reported propulsion and nuclear reactor fields, as the Chinese military traditionally prefers to do improvements on existing weapons and platform types rather than initiate an entirely new program, however poor the performance of initial product may be. This can be observed from a number of other Chinese programs like the Luda class DDG, the J8 fighter even the upgraded 091 class SSN to 091G. It is anticipated that Type 095 submarines will have a substantially reduced acoustical signature, incorporating the latest Russian submarine technology (Russian involvement in Chinese nuclear submarine program has been greatly exaggerated, as recent reports and photos of the current 093 class SSN previously thought to have been extensively influenced by Russian help with the Victor III class SSN design have shown to be incorrect, as the two share no design relation), within a larger version of the Xia/Jin hull type.[1][4][5] Additionally, it is also speculated that Type 095 submarines may be armed with long-range anti-ship HY-4 cruise missiles and act as a potential undersea escort for any future PLAN aircraft carrier task forces.[1] Notes 1. ^ a b c d e Chen, Ta-chen (December 6, 2006). "Chinese fast developing advanced submarines". Taipei Times: 8. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/12/06/2003339341. Retrieved 2009-08-22. 2. ^ "Type 095". Deagel.com. http://www.deagel.com/Nuclear-Attack-Submarines/Type-095_a001843001.aspx. Retrieved 2009-08-22. 3. ^ Richard Fisher, Jr. (June 11, 2009). "The Implications of Chinas Naval Modernization for the United States". StrategyPage.com. http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.199/pub_detail.asp. Retrieved 2009-09-02. 4. ^ Warship 2007, p.167 5. ^ ""China's Quest for a Superpower Military"". Backgrounder #2036. The Heritage Foundation. May 17, 2007. http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg2036.cfm#_ftnref60. Retrieved 2009-08-22. References Erickson, Andrew Erickson; Lyle Goldstein (Winter 2007). "China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings". Naval War College Review 60 (1): 5479. http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/documents/EricksonGoldstein_China's%20Future%20Nuclear%20Submarine%20Force_NWCR_2007-01.pdf. Retrieved 2009-08-25. Jordan, John; Antony Preston, John Jordan, Stephen Dent (2007). Warship 2007. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-8448-60418. External links Type 095 - Deagel.com "Chinese fast developing advanced submarines" by Ta-chen Cheng - Taipei Times - December 6, 2006 "China's Quest for a Superpower Military" by John J. Tkacik, Jr. - The Heritage Foundation - May 17, 2007 Chinese Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke - February 4, 2008 (CRS Report RL33153) "The Implications of Chinas Naval Modernization for the United States" - Testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission by Richard Fisher, Jr. - June 11, 2009

Naval weaponry of the People's Liberation Army Navy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. The PLAN force consists of approx. 250,000 men and over a hundred major combat vessels, organized into 3 fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Most of the naval weapon systems used by the PLAN were developed prior to 1990. The naval weaponry of the PLAN is based on three tiers : artillery, torpedoes, and missiles, each geared to a specific threat range and type. History Throughout its early history from 1949 to the early 1980s, the PLAN had principally relied upon artillery and torpedoes as its main weapons. This resulted in the development of many types and calibers of anti-aircraft and anti-ship guns. Torpedoes were secondary weapons, playing an important role in PLAN's coastal defense doctrines. Many destroyers, frigates and torpedo craft all carry an array of anti-ship torpedoes to this day. The adoption of the missile, like in most navies, has completely revolutionized Chinese naval capabilities and tactics. In addition, there has been growing attention given to ASW, electronic, and airborne weaponry. It must be noted that the Cultural Revolution was a major disruption to many weapons development programs of the PLAN. Advanced weaponry concepts were always in the minds of PLAN thinkers since the 1950s, even if they were unable to be implemented at the time. Therefore, a lot of modern weapon systems such as SAMs, modernized torpedoes and missile/sensor systems were not introduced into service until the early 80s. Furthermore, economic and technical sophistication to produce the fire control, targeting systems, and tracking capabilities were not in place until the mid 80's. Artillery Systems In the PLAN, artillery takes the form of anti-ship guns and anti-aircraft guns. Anti-ship guns are typically found on destroyers and cruisers, with smaller versions on frigates. Smaller ships utilize torpedoes for anti-ship weaponry. The increasing use of missiles means less attention is paid to pure anti-ship weapons. The PLAN never possessed battleships or battlecruisers, and the use of a ship's main guns is mostly in standoff capacity, as they have never engaged in close-shore support from cruisers or destroyers. Anti-aircraft guns vary in size and power from swivel-mount 25 mm machine guns to advanced Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) and radar-assisted 57 mm rapid-fire anti-aircraft weapons. Almost all classes of PLAN vessels maintain at least some anti-aircraft capability. Most destroyers and cruisers augment this with surface-to-air missiles. Older and Legacy Artillery Systems currently in use Soviet ZIF-32 twin 57 mm open gun mount (Type 66) Soviet 2M-8 (Type 61) manual twin 25 mm open gun mount Type 76 automatic twin 37 mm open gun mount Type 69 single or twin 14.5 mm heavy machine gun Soviet Bu-11 (Type 63) manual twin 37 mm open gun (open mount) mount Single or twin 12.7 mm heavy machine gun (open mount) Type 61 twin 25 mm open gun mount The most commonly carried artillery system in most indigenous ships is the 37 mm anti-aircraft artillery (Type-61/76)[1]. This is a manually operated gun, with a gun crew on an open mount. The Type 61 is carried by most Chinese surface combatants, ranging from the small Shanghai and Hainan coastal combat vessels to the largest combatants of the Luda and Jianghu class. These guns are highly limited -- they can only be operated in clear weather conditions, and are only effective in daylight conditions since they lack radar coordination or any form of automatic or autonomous targeting. They are, however, economical and highly reliable. Their firepower has been effectively utilized not only against aircraft, but against surface and land targets. The old manually operated Type-61 37 mm weapon is gradually being phased out in favor of automatic weaponry, but it nonetheless remains on board many littoral and major combatant vessels. In addition to the manual 37 mm, there is the Type-66 57 mm (120 rounds per minute at 12,000 meters) and Type-61 25 mm cannon systems (800 rounds per minute at 2,500 meters). These are also manually mounted. The 57 mm is prominent on board the Hainan class and several LSTs. This system like the 37 mm is almost totally ineffective [2] against modern jet aircraft and incoming missiles. However it has been combat proven to be effective against enemy shipping, particularly in the Sino-Vietnamese naval battle near the Spratley Islands on several occasions. The 25 mm is a one-man operated weapon that complements the larger caliber artillery systems. It remains as a popular gun mount on smaller vessels, particularly landing ships and mine warfare designs. Machine guns such as the 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm are also classified as automatic weapons; being widely operated as short range self defense weapons on most amphibious craft. It is interesting to note that the majority of Chinese naval auxiliary ships possess manually operated anti-aircraft artillery, in contrast to the majority of Western navies that have little or no armaments on board their auxiliaries. Current Ship Artillery Systems Anti-Aircraft AK-630 Type 730 CIWS H/PJ76A automatic twin 37 mm enclosed gun mount Type 76A automatic twin 37 mm enclosed gun mount Type 76F automatic twin 37 mm enclosed gun mount Type 76 automatic twin 37 mm open gun mount Type 69 automatic twin 25 mm enclosed gun mount Type 66 automatic twin 57 mm open gun mount Type 65 semi-automatic water-cooled twin 37 mm open gun mount Type 63 automatic twin 37 mm open gun mount Type 61 semi-automatic air-cooled twin 37 mm open gun mount Type 61 automatic twin 25 mm enclosed gun mount Type 76 automatic twin 57 mm open gun mount [3]

Type 66 automatic twin 57 mm open gun mount [4] Type 59 automatic twin 57 mm open gun mount [5] AK-230 (Type 69) Anti-aircraft artillery remains important to PLAN combatants, but its concept has been radically changed recently. All new combatants and those that have been upgraded now possess a fully automatic variant of the 37 mm cannon. This system is known as the Type 76A dual anti-aircraft artillery system (180 rounds per minute engaging at 4,500 meters)[6]. The Type 76A is a direct descendant of the Type 76 twin 37 mm gun, which in turn, is a the successor of Type 61 manual twin 37 mm gun. Although the Type 76 twin 37 mm gun is fully automatic, it has an open turret and thus is subject to harsh environment, which causes reliability problems. Another shortcoming of the Type 76 twin 37 mm gun is that like its manually operated predecessor, it lacks fire control systems. Type 76A twin 37 mm gun was thus developed to solve these problems by introducing an enclosed turret and fire control systems. A fire control radar guides these weapons, and can engage targets in most conditions. There is also an optronic device that enables manual and optical aiming. The Type 76F is a Type 76A system with simplified fire control system, which only has electrooptic system but lacks the radar. In addition, there is a console for one human operator inside the gun mount for local manual control, though the gun can be fully automated. Unlike the old manual mounts that require a full crew of men to steer, aim, load, and fire the weapon, the Type 76F only requires the single operator to aim the system. In addition to the 37 mm guns, a number of Russian AK230 were also purchased and reverse engineered (as Type 69) for small boats. Anti-ship

Type 76 twin 130 mm enclosed gun mount French Cresusot-Loire Compact 100 mm gun mount Soviet 130/58 M1957 twin 130 mm enclosed gun Type 210 100/55 automatic single 100 mm enclosed gun mount mount Soviet 130/50 M1936 130 mm semi-enclosed gun Type HPJ87 100/55 automatic single 100 mm enclosed gun mount mount Type 79 automatic twin 100 mm enclosed gun Soviet 100/56 Bu-34 single 100 mm semi-enclosed gun mount mount Type 79A automatic twin 100 mm enclosed gun Soviet AK176 automatic single 76 mm enclosed gun mount mount Type PJ33A automatic twin 100 mm enclosed gun Soviet AK-130 twin 130 mm enclosed gun mount mount Most PLAN surface combatants in the class of destroyer and frigate operate a main gun (mostly a forward turret, and many ships have an aft turret as well). Anti-surface artillery has been primarily based on Soviet designs of 76 mm to 130 mm designs. The Type76 130 mm twin mount is the main artillery mount on the Luda class destroyers. A more indigenized ship artillery gun system was the Type 79 dual 100 mm gun (as well as single versions). The gun can be operated with one operator or completely automatically guided by radar or optronic aiming. These guns can achieve accurate fire at roughly 25 rounds a minute. A new indigenous 100 mm mount is available on the latest combatants; this is a single rapid fire weapon similar to the French Creusot-Loire weapon. Newer indigenous 130 mm gun systems are also under development. Close-In Weapons Systems

New CIWS AK-630 AK-630 mod Type 730 Kashtan CIWS Many navies in the world operate a variety of Close In Weapons Systems (CIWS). These systems are designed to engage high speed, low altitude targets at close range. One particular target for the CIWS is incoming anti-ship missiles. A CIWS with its rapid fire and radar control could hopefully defeat incoming missiles. China until very recently has mostly lacked a CIWS system. The Russian built Sovremenny class destroyers that were purchased in a 1996 deal gave China its first CIWS capability. These used a CIWS called the AK630, with mounts that [7] were exclusive to the Russian ships only. China however has more recently been either able to reverse engineer the AK630 or buy the cannon turrets. These have been fitted on board the Type 054 Ma'anshan class frigates and the new Type 220X missile attack craft.[8] A Chinese system, the Type 730, is China's first entirely indigenous CIWS. Though externally similar to the Dutch Goalkeeper, it is thought to operate indigenous radar and optical systems. It has seven barrels, and fires 30 mm caliber shells in rapid succession (4,500-5,800 rounds per minute)[8]. This system has been fitted on board the 052B, 052C and 051C destroyers so far, and is expected to replace some Type 76 mounts on older combatants, as well as being standard for all new surface combatants. The purchase of two additional Sovremenny class destroyers will give PLAN the Kashtan CIWS system (gun and SAM combination). Torpedoes, Mines and ASW Weaponry The torpedo is no longer an important anti-ship weapon in the PLAN. However it was very dominant among the coastal attack craft. With the success of torpedo boats in World War I and World War II, the PLAN sought the use of torpedoes in its defense as well. The agility of small coastal craft coupled with fast torpedoes was a grave threat for larger combat vessels. The 1950s, 60s and 70s saw a large number of torpedo craft built (as many as 200 operated at one stage). In later years, however, with the increasing inability to even detect Russian or American submarines, the PLAN shifted emphasis from torpedoes to ASW applications and submarines. While most surface combat vessels have some torpedo capability, it is secondary and some ships do not feature torpedo tubes at all. History and Older Torpedoes In Use The torpedo programs of the People's Republic of China was set up under the guidance of former-Soviet Union in the 1950s. During the 1950s, China built two torpedo factories under Soviet direction, and begun its license assembly of unguided straight running torpedoes. In April, 1958, Naval Arms Ministry of PLAN established torpedoe research institute indigenously. Four months later, the deputy chief-of-staff of PLA Zhang Aiping and the deputy commander-in-chief of PLAN Luo Shunchu () led a military delegation to visit former-Soviet Union signed a deal with Soviets to produce three types of Soviet torpedoes in China. In comparison with other military programs each with dozens or even hundreds of Soviet advisors, however, former-Soviet Union did not put too much emphasis on the torpedo capability: the total number of Soviet advisors initially sent to China for its all of its torpedo programs was only five. Soviet Union quickly delivered the samples and technical information of the three types of torpedoes to China with the five advisors to China as promised. Two Soviet advisors were assigned to assist China to produce the RAT-52 rocket powered torpedo, while others were assigned to teach China about compressed oxygen

and SAET-60 passive homing acoustic homing torpedoes. In July, 1960, the first two samples of Chinese-built rocket propelled torpedoes were completed. The propulsion system and electronics of the electrically powered passive acoustic homing torpedo had also been completed, while the basic technologies of compressed oxygen torpedoes was also mastered by China. Everything appeared to be great but the subsequent Sino-Soviet split ended the promising future: from July 28 September 1, 1960, formerSoviet Union had quickly withdrew all of its advisors from China. Compounding the problem, other domestic political turmoils such as Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution had further seriously hindered the indigenous Chinese torpedo developments. As a result, the most numerous torpedoes in Chinese inventory were unguided straight running torpedoes. In 1978 the PLAN gained significant torpedo capability when a single US Mk 46 Mod.1 block 2 torpedo, thought to be recovered by fishermen, was reverse engineered and became the Yu-7 ASW torpedo. It is thought that during the 1980s, the Yu-7 design also benefited from subsequent batches of Mk 46 Mod. 2 torpedoes purchased for PLAN from USA for a total US$ 8 million in 1985. The Yu-7 is thought to be not as capable as the latest Western or Russian designs, but has become the corner stone of PLAN anti-submarine warfare. Yu-7 is mostly seen carried by the Z-9C and Z-8 helicopters, and shipboard variants can be launched from destroyers and frigates. From October thru November, 1983, Chinese Northwestern Polytechnical University completed upgrade of the acoustic test facilities under the direction of California Institute of Technology, and this facility played an important role in Chinese torpedo development ever since. In 1993, China ordered three types of Soviet torpedoes along with its purchase of Kilo class submarines: TEST-71, which was replaced by its successor TEST-96 in the 2nd order, and Type 53-65. It is also reported that China had ordered the latest Russian APR-3E light ASW torpedo for its Ka-28 and Be-200 ASW aircraft. Current Torpedoes Chinese submarines have operated a variety of indigenously designed torpedoes. These range from the basic unguided Yu-1 to the much more long ranged and highly advanced Yu-6. Little has been documented on PLAN torpedo designs. It was thought that PLAN torpedoes were old and lacked the advanced capabilities to home in against agile or quiet targets. However with the delivery of Russian Kilos, China also obtained some highly advanced Russian torpedo designs. One such weapon is the Wake homing torpedo that homes on a surface ship's wake rather than just sonar readings. It is believed such technology has been applied to new Chinese torpedoes such as the Yu-5. In addition, Jane's Information Group reported in the late 1990s that China had already purchased numerous 200 knot Russian Shkval torpedoes from Kazakhstan, and was negotiating in purchasing the Soviet torpedo factory in Kazakhstan. Anti-Submarine Warfare

CY-1 CY-2 CY-3 CJ-1 S3V ASW warfare apart from torpedoes remains a limited area in the PLAN. PLAN vessels have traditionally utilized depth charges and A/S Mortars. PLAN ships also are commonly armed with multi-barreled ASW rocket launchers. These are based on Russian designs, and are capable of firing rocket bombs at short ranges. It is believed[11] to be effective against shallow targets as well as a possible shield of stopping incoming torpedoes. Most PLAN combatants have traditionally two to four multi-barreled launchers in front of the main gun. There has been evidence that PLAN had embarked on developing a modern ASW rocket system similar to the ASROC. This was a medium ranged rocket that carried a torpedo as its warhead. The system is known to be CY-1[12] (and perhaps a new model the CY-3). CY-1 never entered production however, and its status as an active project is in doubt. PLAN forces have had their ASW capabilities somewhat improved with the introduction of Variable Depth Sonar (VDS), which is mounted on some frigates and destroyers. In addition, PLAN helicopters operate dipping sonar and sonobuoys to enhance their detection capabilities. When targets are found, they can drop depth charges, depth bombs or torpedoes. Mine Warfare Mine warfare has also been another traditional component of PLAN weaponry. Mines remain to be seen as a very useful power amplifying tool by the PLAN. Strategic minefields could be laid around the Taiwan Strait to deny access or delay deployment of US Navy forces, particularly aircraft carrier battle groups and submarines. Chinese mines have continually been addressed by many analysts and scholars as a very dangerous weapon that could be employed against the US Navy. Most PLAN destroyers, frigates, littoral craft and submarines can lay mines. Chinese mines vary in type, from basic contact/magnetic mines to more modern and complex systems.[11] China first decided to establish dedicated factories for naval mines in 1954, and in 1958, several programs of naval mines were launched simultaneously by Fengxi Machinery Factory. The first of these, Moored-1 (Mao-1), a large sized moored mine entered mass production in 1962 after being tested multiple times and evaluated by the navy. Most early Chinese mines are either Soviet origin, or direct copies of Soviet mines, with the exception of remotely controlled mine. The first three types of naval mines entered the Chinese service are all moored mines equipped with contact fuses, and all of them are developed by the Fengxi Machinery Factory. Moored-1 is a large sized mine and Moored-2 (Mao-2) is a medium sized mine, a copy of Soviet KSM mine, and both types require target to strike the mine for detonation. Moored-3 (Mao-3) is a mine with contact wires so that targets would not have to strike the mine itself for detonation, and the mine can be detonated some distance away, still causing enough damage if the target is within range and comes in contact with the contact wire. Moored-1 and Moored-2 entered mass production in 1964 and 1965 respectively. In the 1970s, China had successfully developed non-contact fuses such as the acoustic fuse, and earlier contact fuse equipped mines were upgraded with non-contact fuses. Also in 1970, Fengxi Machinery Factory and Engineering Technology Equipment Research Institute begun to jointly develop a riverine moored mine that can be remotely controlled fuse. The project was completed in 1974, and the ultrasonic remote control can be either used to arm or disarm the mines, or alternatively, directly detonate the mine. Since the 1990s, all of mines in the Chinese inventory are upgraded with computerized controls and a new series of Chinese mines were actively marketed for the export, and these include derivatives from existing mines, as well as brand new design such as the one similar to American CAPTOR mine. Chinese naval mines with known designations:
Drifting-2 drifting mine Moored-1 moored mine (large) Moored-2 moored mine (medium) Moored-3 moored mine (contact wires) Moored-4 moored mine

Sinking-1 bottom mine Sinking-2 bottom mine Sinking-3 bottom mine Sinking-4 bottom mine Sinking-5 bottom mine

Specialized-1 rocket propelled mine Specialized-2 remotely controlled mine Training-1 Training mine Type 500 Training mine EM12 bottom mine (mainly for export)

Missiles The PLAN has three main categories of missiles: anti-ship, anti-air and land-attack. History and Use

Imported Missiles The missile had been an ever evolving component of PLAN weaponry since the late 1960s. The Soviet Union's assistance to Chinese military developments included the SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile technology. Since the 60s, China has manufactured its own models of anti-ship missile based on the SS-N-2 Styx, in the form of HY-1, SY-1, SY-2, and other airborne and ground-launched systems. The oldest designs have since been phased out, but late variants remain in service. The fundamental shortcoming of missiles based on the SS-N-2 Styx are being short ranged (only 40-100 km), slow, in agile and rather large and easily detectable targets for modern SAM and CIWS. Later Chinese variants have vastly superior electronics, radar guidance and performance to the older Soviet models.[11] As China has normalized its relationship with the former Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, the importation of Russian missiles resumed, and a new generation of Russian anti-ship missiles have been imported, including the supersonic SS-N-22 and Kh-31, Klub-S, (the Russian equivalent of the anti-shipping version of American BGM-109 Tomahawk), and AS-20 Uran (the Russian equivalent of the air-launched American AGM-84 anti-shipping Harpoon missile). Indigenous Missiles China's first completely indigenous anti-ship missile program was the YJ8 series. This missile externally appears similar to the French Exocet and American Harpoon, but is essentially a Chinese designed weapon system. The basic YJ8 appeared in the early 1980s, with a short range of 22 miles (40 or so kilometers). It was successful in its test launches however, hitting and sinking targets of up to 10,000 tons with a high hit probability. Unlike older designs, the YJ8 could attack targets at low altitudes to reduce its vulnerability to CIWS, and has greater Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to prevent enemy jamming. The YJ8 entered widespread service, becoming the standard anti-ship missile on most second and third generation Chinese built warships, ranging from destroyers and frigates, to missile craft and submarines. The missile can also be launched from shore platforms and aircraft.[13] Several models of the YJ8 have since emerged. The YJ82 was significantly a better missile with a significantly improved range of 120 km and far more advanced ECM. The latest variant is the YJ-83, with a range exceeding 250 km, and capable of making its final approach at Mach 1.5 to penetrate ship defenses. In addition, a variant revealed at 2006 Zhuhai Airshow designated as C802KD/YJ-82KD has ground attack capabilities similar to the AGM-84 SLAM. All YJ8 models can be launched from a common boxed launcher. Most littoral combatants carry four to six missiles, while larger surface ships can carry eight. PLAN destroyers have mounted sixteen missiles. Though the YJ8 series does not have the advance 'pop up' approach or checkpoint flight characteristics of the Harpoon, it is respected as one of the most potent anti-ship missiles ever developed. The YJ83's performance in some areas is superior to even the latest variants of Harpoon and Exocet, though its ECM and agility is slightly inferior. Current Missiles The PLAN inventory includeds a mixture of foreign and domestic missiles, and Russia was the largest foreign provider. Anti-ship Missiles DF-21 anti-ship ballistic YJ-4 C-101 missile YJ-12 C-303 [2] CJ-20[14] HY series C-302 [3] CJ-10 SY series C-301 [4] DH-10 Kh-31 / YJ-91 (equipped by naval air force) CJ-1 C-805 FL series (Can and has been used by Iran & Iraq for FL-10 C-803 land attack) FL-9 SS-N-22 Sunburn C-701 (Can also be used as air-to-surface missile) FL-8 SS-N-27 Klub S C-703 FL-7 YJ-81 (C-801) C-704 TL-1 series [5][6] YJ-82 (C-802) C-705 TL-2 series [7] C-801 C-601 TL-6 series YJ-8 YJ-63 TL-10 series YJ-62 (C-602) HN-1 (HongNiao-1) or (RedBird-1) Kh-35 XW-41 HN-3 (HongNiao-3) or (RedBird-3) KD-88 C-611/YJ-61 (C-611) HN-2 (HongNiao-2) or (RedBird-2) KD-63 YJ-22 CF-1 (Chang Feng 1) YJ-2 CF-2 (Chang Feng 2) YJ-1 HJ-10 Supersonic anti-ship missiles have been a key development in China. The Russian ramjet SS-N-22 Sunburn is operated by China on board its Sovremenny class destroyers. These missiles are highly potent as they are capable of penetrating ship defenses (even in AEGIS simulations). Its high velocity hypersonic approach and its large warhead make the SS-N-22 a valuable weapon for the PLAN. China has long sought to produce its own supersonic and eventually hypersonic anti-ship system since the 1980s. High speed missiles are seen as the most effective means of attacking modern warships. Only Russia, China and India(Brahmos)(co-developed with Russia) have so far successfully developed and deployed such weapons. Earlier Chinese missiles of such capability from before 1990s include the C-301 (also known as HY-3). With its four ramjet engines, it has a range of 130 km and a speed greater than Mach 2.5. Though a success, the missile is far from being as potent as the SS-N-22, mainly because it can only fly at a higher cruise altitude of 50 meters, rather than cruising at wave tops (such as the 20 meter cruise altitude of SS-N-22), so it is easier to intercept in comparison to SS-N-22. the PLAN's air force has also purchased both the KH31 ramjet supersonic missile and the AS-20 turbojet subsonic anti-ship missile from Russia to arm its fighters. Apart from ramjet technology, China has successfully developed some supersonic anti-ship missiles that can fly above Mach 1.0 (as most anti-ship missiles currently fly at Mach 0.9). The C-101, also known as FL-2 features a smaller and thinner body of the original SS-N-2 Styx, but it can fly at speeds around Mach 1.7. It can attack targets at 40 km. However, like the much larger C-301, its cruise altitude is also at 50 meters and thus prone to interception in comparison to faster SS-N-22 with lower cruise altitude. As a result, both C-101 and C-301 only saw very limited service. The YJ83 also possesses some supersonic attack capabilities. More modern missiles today with the YJ-12 and YJ-91(KH-31) are the most advanced supersonic missiles China has in service, entered service at ~1999 with a range of 400km at a speed of mach2.5, can be launched from both ship and air and possess land attack capability.

Anti-air missiles HQ-2 (port defense) TY-90 (Used in FLS-1) HQ-9 long range SAM (vertical launched) Various MANPAD: o HN-5 SA-N-6 long range SAM (vertical launched) o QW-1 SA-N-7 o QW-2 SA-N-12 medium range SAM o QW-3/FLS-1 TOR-M1 short-medium range SAM (projected) (vertical launched) o QW-4 HQ-17 o QW-11 HQ-16 o QW-18 o FN-6 HQ-7 short range SAM HQ-61 short range SAM LY-60N (port defense & export frigates) KS-2 KS-1 (port defense) FL-3000N CIWS China's navy had long lacked an air defense missile system, hence why it has been a major area of weakness. China's SAM development had been seriously jeopardized by the Cultural Revolution, and the break away from the Soviet Union meant that no Soviet assistance in air defense missiles was given. The first naval SAM system was not developed until the late 1960s. This was in the form of the HQ-61 SAM, originally a short range land based system. The first PLAN ship to be armed with SAM was the Type 053K frigate Jiangdong, launched in 1970. However it took many years for the design to mature and the obsolete system was never ideal for naval operations. The Jiandong had two twin launchers of the HQ61 SAM. The missile was capable of engaging enemy air targets out to 10 km. The HQ-61 was only applied to a limited degree. The Jiangwei I class of four units, were armed with a sextuple launcher. The weakness however was lack of automatic reload systems, so the crew had to manually reload. When China opened up in the late 1970s, it had greater access to Westernized technologies. One vital asset imported was the French Crotale short ranged SAM. Two systems were initially imported and mounted aboard two Luda class destroyers. The design was subsequently indigenized into the HQ-7. The improved-Luda, Luhu, Luhai, Jiangwei II, and 054 class warships. The launcher is an eight celled system, with a reload hatch that has additional missiles below deck. Its engagement range is 10-12 km and is claimed to be capable of engaging low flying missiles and aircraft. Although the HQ-7 was a significant step towards PLAN air defense capabilities, the PLAN still fell short of possessing a medium to long range missile system that could provide true fleet defense coverage. The purchase of Russian Sovremenny class destroyers meant China obtained the medium range SA-N-7 SAM and its subsequent improved models. This missile was far more advanced than any Chinese indigenous design. The missile was soon adapted for service on board the PLAN's 052B class destroyer. China sought to import the Russian SA-N-6 long range SAM system. This was based on the land based S-300 missile, by which time China already was operating. The SA-N-6 is a vertical launched system (VLS) with a range of 100 km and performance similar to the US Patriot. Two such systems were negotiated for and not ready for installation until late 2005 (on board the new 051C destroyers). Meanwhile China had developed the HQ-9 system, believed to have partially borrowed some of the features on both Russian S-300 and US Patriot technology(fire control). This was China's first indigenous long range high performance air defense missile. This was installed on the 052C class warships. With VLS missiles finally in service with the PLAN, there has been high optimism to see a short range VLS weapon that could replace the HQ-7. Contenders for the future short range SAM of the PLAN include a vertical launched variant of the HQ-7, Russian TOR-M1, Russian SA-N-12, VLS variant of the Chinese LY60N or HQ-61, or a completely new design.[11] Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Land Attack Rockets

JL-1 JL-2 Jianghu-I Hull 516 JL-1 and JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles. The JL-1 was first test fired in 1982 and first successfully launched from the Xia class SSBN in 1987. The JL-1 is currently carried on board China's sole SSBN, the Xia 092. It has 12 launch tubes. Each JL-1 has a range 2,150 km and a single 250-500kT nuclear warhead. An improved model is in service with a 2,800 km range and possibly higher accuracy. The JL-2 will be the next generation of Chinese SLBM, similar to early variants of the Trident. With a range of 8000 km and multiple warheads (MIRV), this missile is essentially based on the land based DF-31 ICBM design. This means that the future 094 class SSBN can patrol near Chinese waters and launch missiles that could hit the American mainland. The JL-2 project remains under secret and the status of the 094 is largely unknown. One vessel was reported launched very recently, while the JL-2 missile's development is believed to be in its mature stages.[15] A single Jianghu I (hull 516) was modified very recently. It has its anti-ship missiles replaced with several multiple-rocket launchers. The rockets are of 122 mm caliber, and are based on the Type 89 system, which is itself quite similar to the Soviet BM-21 rocket system. The 122 mm rockets are launched from a stabilized launcher, meaning that even if the ship is affected by wave motion, the launcher itself will be stabilized. The rockets have a range of up to 40 km, and can achieve reasonable accuracy in fire. This installation may be seen as an experiment by the PLAN to make use of older warship designs, by turning them into shore bombardment platforms. Though only one ship is being tested for now, this is a very possible concept for future PLAN conversions of their large number of old Luda's and Jianghu's. Fire support from ships is seen as very important by the PLAN when conducting amphibious operations. Cruise missiles The YJ-62 naval cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the YJ-62 represents the next generation in naval weapons technology in the PLA. Future Weapons Systems The current quality and capability of PLAN weaponry has improved significantly, closing the gaps between PLAN obsolescence and Western standards. Future PLAN weapon systems could include land attack cruise missiles, stealthy hypersonic missiles, armed ship launched UAVs, anti radiation missiles, and land based anti-ship ballistic missiles, EMP bombs, long range artillery systems, super-speed torpedoes and improved mines. References 1. ^ Chinese Defence Today - Type 61 Dual-37mm Shipboard Antiaircraft Artillery Gun

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

^ Chinese Defence Today - Type 69 Dual-30mm Automatic Antiaircraft Artillery Gun ^ http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRussian_57mm-81_zif-71.htm ^ http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRussian_57mm-81_zif-71.htm ^ http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRussian_57mm-81_zif-71.htm ^ Chinese Defence Today - Type 76A Dual-37mm Shipboard Antiaircraft Artillery Gun ^ Chinese Defence Today - AK-630 Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) ^ a b Chinese Defence Today - Type 730 Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) ^ http://books.google.ca/books?id=lDzknmTgDUC&pg=PA670&lpg=PA670&dq=c43+torpedo&source=bl&ots=2rgMAVrbLh&sig=JGabNTKJE9F2agYQvQ7Dr6hu_w&hl=en&ei=xxlIS6qXBI_mswOLltHOAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0C AkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=c43%20torpedo&f=false ^ http://books.google.ca/books?id=O99t5l91_fEC&pg=PA153&lpg=PA153&dq=c43+torpedo&source=bl&ots=fgnajDlrNn &sig=lDd4rAdoq9CzYw1jd8mYpnmaAtw&hl=en&ei=xxlIS6qXBI_mswOLltHOAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result& resnum=2&ved=0CAwQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=c43%20torpedo&f=false ^ a b c d China's Navy Today ^ Chinese Defence Today - CY-1 Anti-Submarine Rocket ^ YJ-8 (C-801) Anti-Ship Missile - SinoDefence.com ^ http://www.global-military.com/sword-20-cruise-missiles-loaded-on-to-h-6m-bombers.html ^ JL-1 (CSS-N-3) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile | Strategic | SinoDefence.com

Silkworm missile
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The HY-2 Haiying (Chinese: ; pinyin: hiyng; literally "Sea Eagle"), known in Western media as the Silkworm missile, is an anti-ship series. The missile is also designated as C-201. Specifications It is based on Shang You (SY), meaning Upstream anti-ship missile, which in turn, was based on the Russian P-15 Termit missile. The missile looks almost identical to the Shang You (SY) anti-ship missile, and has similar performance. It has a maximum range of 95 km, with a 513 kilogram payload. Design During its deployment, China discovered that the Shang You (SY, in Chinese) anti-ship missile could only be used by small missile boats with very few electronic components. When the missile was deployed on larger ships containing many complex electronic components, the missile proved subject to severe compatibility problems. This incompatibility could have resulted in the accidental ignition and/or possible explosion of the missile when all of the electronics on the ships were turned on to their maximum capacity. Orders were given to solve the problem, and Hai Ying (HY) or Sea Eagle anti-ship missile was the answer. However, due to the political turmoil in China, such as the Cultural Revolution, the program did not succeed until the 1980s, too late for the planned platform, the Luda class destroyer, which was called upon for ballistic missile test missions in the Pacific Ocean. As a result, none of the Luda class destroyers deployed in that mission carried anti-ship missiles. Once the Hai Ying (HY) anti-ship missile entered mass production, however, the Shang You (SY) anti-ship missile was not phased out immediately. Instead, it was continuously manufactured in parallel, as a cheaper alternative for export, as well as to arm the numerous classes of much smaller missile boats of the massive force, which totaled several hundreds, but eventually, Shang You (SY) anti-ship missile was replaced by its improvement, the Hai Ying (HY) anti-ship missile in Chinese service. History The Silkworm was developed at the Institute of Mechanics under Tsien Hsue-shen, a Chinese scientist who did his graduate studies at MIT and Caltech, before being deported by the United States in 1955 after being suspected of Communist ties. A book about this scientist's life was written by Iris Chang, entitled Thread of the Silkworm. The Silkworm gained fame in the 1980s when it was used by both sides in the IranIraq War; both countries were supplied by China. During 1987, Iran launched a number of Silkworm missiles from the Faw Peninsula vicinity striking the Liberian-flagged tanker Sungari and US flagged tanker Sea Isle City in October 1987[1] and 5 other missiles struck areas in Kuwait earlier in the year. In October 1987, Kuwait's Sea Island off shore oil terminal was hit by an Iranian Silkworm which was observed to have originated from the Faw peninsula. The attack prompted Kuwait to deploy a Hawk missile battery on Failaka Island to protect the terminal.[2] In December 1987, another Iranian Silkworm was fired at the terminal, but it struck a decoy barge instead.[3] Prior to these attacks the missile's range was thought to be less than 80 kilometres (49.7 mi), but these attacks proved that the range exceeded 100 kilometres (62.1 mi) with Kuwaiti military observers seeing that the missiles originated from the area and tracking them on radar along with US satellite imagery of the launch sites.[4] In March 1988, China agreed to stop supplying Iran with HY-2 missiles, though it is reported that supply continued into 1989.[citation needed] Iran has since developed the capability to manufacture these missiles itself. On February 25, 1991 a shore-based launcher fired two Silkworm missiles at the USS Missouri (BB-63) which was in company with the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) and HMS Gloucester. A Sea Dart missile from the Gloucester shot down one Silkworm and the other missed, crashing into the ocean.[5] More recently, the missile was used by Iraq against Kuwait during the 2003 Iraq War.[6] During the 2003 Gulf War, Iraq used the Silkworm as a surface to surface missile by firing at least two of them at the coalition positions in Kuwait. During the 2006 Lebanon War, it was initially reported that Hezbollah guerillas fired a Silkworm missile at an Israeli warship off the shores of Lebanon. Israeli sources later said that the missile used instead was a more sophisticated Chinese C-701. Notably, Syria and Egypt employed Soviet Styx missilesthe Russian-made precursors to the Silkwormagainst Israeli warships in both the 1967 War of Attrition following the Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While the missiles were ineffective during the Battle of Latakia in 1973, four Styx missiles sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 1967, marking the first time that ship-to-ship missiles were successfully used in combat. While it is not a particularly sophisticated missile when compared to others such as the Exocet, the Silkworm's unusually large warhead ensures that a single hit will inflict very serious damage. Derivatives Many derivatives of HY-2 are developed, including the following:

HY-2: Basic variant radar-guidance land-to-ship missile *developed from the HY-1 missile HY-2A: IR-guidance variant HY-2AII: Improved variant of the HY-2A HY-2B: Improved radar-guidance variant with a mono-pulse radar seeker replacing the original conical scanning radar HY-2BII: Improved variant of the HY-2B with a newly designed radar seeker C-201: air-launched version C-201W Extended-range variant powered by a turbojet engine replacing the original liquid-fuel rocket motor. Export only Naming confusion The name Silkworm may be slightly inaccurate. Coined by Western analysts, this term has been apparently used to refer to both HY-1 and HY-2 missiles. C-201 is the numerical designation used by Chinese for these missiles. The HY-1 missile, NATO codename CSS-C-2 has been nicknamed both Silkworm, and Sea Eagle (from the Chinese Haiying). The HY-2 missile, NATO codename CSS-C-3 has been nicknamed Seersucker, Sadsack and Silkworm. This is the missile China has exported to many Middle Eastern countries, and is the missile referred to in this article, and in the mainstream media. Both the Shang You (SY) and the Fei Long (FL) families of anti-ship missiles are often also referred as Silkworms. These weapons are, however, very similar to each other. The reason for such confusion is because all of them are developed from the same root: In addition to the original Shang You (SY) family for small missile boats that remained in large scale production for sometime, and the Hai Ying family first developed for larger warships later on, there is another anti-ship missile that is specifically designed to be launched from shore. This family is the Fei Long (FL) or Flying Dragon anti-ship missile. The Fei Long (FL, ) family is the cheapest of the three because its requirement is the lowest: as the missile is stored in a controlled environment in a warehouse on land, the salinity, temperature and relative humidity requirements for the missile itself are greatly reduced. Because it is designed and deployed on land, the associate C4I systems can be located separately: the distributed system prevents electromagnetic interference, and if the C4I system is attacked, the distributed nature of the Fei Long (FL) family would greatly reduce casualties and damage. All of the system of Fei Long (FL) family can be used by the Hai Ying (HY) or Shang You (SY) families, but FL systems cannot be used on ships. The Fei Long (FL) family has had a much longer production run than the Shang You (SY) family. Chinese industrial designation Export type designation NATO reporting name NATO/U.S DOD code Remarks CSS-N-1 tbd Shang You (SY-1) FL-1 SCRUBBRUSH CSS-N-5 tbd Shang You (SY-2) FL-2 SABBOT CSS-N-2 ship-launched Hai Ying (HY-1) tbd SAFFLOWER Hai Ying (HY-1) tbd CSSC-2/CSS-N-2 land-launched SILKWORM CSSC-3 land-launched Hai Ying (HY-2) C-201 SEERSUCKER CSSC-6 land-launched Hai Ying (HY-3) C-301 SAWHOUSE Hai Ying (HY-4) C-401 CSSC-7 land/air-launched SADSACK Ying Ji (YJ-4I) not applicable none none land/air-launched Ying Ji (YJ-4II) not applicable none none land/air-launched SY-1 This is the original Chinese version of Soviet P-15 Termit missile, and the first was SY-1, produced at Factory 320 (the Nanchang Aircraft Factory []);; Chinese sources identify the designers as Li Tongli and Lu Lin. The main difference between P-15 Termit and SY-1 missiles is that the unreliable aneroid altimeter of P-15 Termit was replaced by a much more reliable radar altimeter in SY-1. The successor of SY-1, designed by Peng Lisheng () and designated as SY-1A, had a mono-pulse terminal guidance radar seeker replacing the original conical scanning radar seeker. The missile received a NATO reporting name CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush. The missile has been upgraded to be air-launched, and the air-launched version is known as C-601, which is the first air-launched anti-ship missile in China. The missile received a NATO reporting name CAS-1 Kraken. Specifications: Length: 6.55 metre Diameter: 0.76 metre Wingspan: 2.4 metre Weight: 2,095 kg Warhead: 513 kg shaped charge high explosive Propulsion: One liquid rocket engine and one solid rocket booster Speed: Mach 0.8 Range: 150 km [1] Cruising altitude: < 20 meters Guidance: Inertial + active conical scanning terminal guidance radar (SY-1); or inertial + monopulse active radar (SY-1A) Single-shot kill probability: 70% SY-2 The liquid fuel engine was rather hazardous and unreliable, so a solid fuel rocket engine was developed. This engine also made it possible to reduce the size and weight of the missile while providing greater range. The warhead weight is also reduced, but its effectiveness was actually increased when a time-delayed semi-armour-piercing high-explosive design was adopted. The extended version developed is designated SY-2A. Specification: Length: 6 metre Diameter: 0.54 metre Wingspan: 1.7 metre Weight: 1,720 kg Warhead: 365 kg shape charged high-explosive

Propulsion: A solid rocket engine and a solid booster Speed: Mach 0.9 Range: 130 km[7] Cruising altitude: 20 metre Guidance: Inertial + active radar Single-shot kill probability: 70% FL missiles FL-2 of the Fei Long (FL) or Flying Dragon anti-ship missiles series, produced at the Nanchang Aircraft Factory (), shares the similarity with SY-2, except it is the cheaper version used for land use only, as mentioned earlier. A supersonic version, FL-7, has also been developed, which differs from the Silkworm missiles significantly. HY-1 The HY-1 received two separate NATO reporting name, the CSS-N-2 Safflower for the ship to ship version and the CSSC-2 Silkworm for the land based coastal defense variant. HY-1: Basic developmental version developed from the SY missiles, used only in very small numbers as land-to-ship missile for evaluation purposes. Did not enter series production and was replaced by HY-1J. HY-1J: Ship-to-ship variant for Type 051 DDG HY-1JA: Improved ship-to-ship variant with a new radar seeker for better anti-jamming capability and accuracy HY-1A: Land-to-ship variant based on the HY-1JA HY-1B: Low level target drone for the test of HQ-2A SAM HJ-1YB Target drone for the test of HQ-61 SAM Specifications: Length: 6.60 metre Diameter: 0.76 metre Wingspan: 2.4 metre Weight: 2,300 kg Warhead: 513 kg shaped charge high explosive Propulsion: One liquid rocket engine and one solid rocket booster Speed: Mach 0.8 Range: 85 km [2] Cruising altitude: 100~300m (early models); <20m (later models) Guidance: Inertial + active conical scanning terminal guidance radar (early models); or inertial + monopulse active radar (later models) Single-shot kill probability: 70% HY-2 The HY-2 is identical to the HY-1 but with a further stretched body. The missile features a round nose accommodating the radar seeker, a pair of mid-mounted delta wings on the middle section of missile body, and three tail control surfaces. The missile is powered by a liquid-fuel rocket motor, with a solid rocket booster attached under the missile fuselage. The HY-2 is launched from land-based launcher and flies at an altitude of 1,000m during the initial stage of the flight. After the missile switched to the cruising mode, the flight altitude was reduced to 100~300m. During the final stage of the flight, the missile switched on its radar seeker and dives to an altitude of 8m until it hits the target. The single-shot hit probability is estimated to be 90%. Due to its oversized body, the HY-2 did not develop a ship-to-ship variant. The missile is obsolete and will be replaced by the YJ-8 series in the future.[8] Dimensions: Length: 7.48 m; Diameter: 0.76 m; Wingspan: 2.4 m Launch weight: 2,998 kg Warhead: 513 kg shaped charge high-explosive Propulsion: One liquid rocket engine and one solid rocket booster Speed: Mach 0.8 Range: 200 km [3] Flight altitude: < 20m Guidance: Inertial + active conical scanning terminal guidance radar (HY-2); or inertial + IR guidance (HY-2A); or inertial + monopulse active radar (HY-2B) Single-shot hit probability: 90% SFQ-1 SFQ-1 was an unarmed test vehicle deriative of the Silkworm missile family. The test vehicle was used in the Chinese development of small turbojets that were designed to improve the range of the Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as powering the experimental versions of land attack YJ-4 cruise missiles. The entire project was reportedly named as Kunpeng () Project, which first started in the early 1970s. SFQ-1 was specifically developed to test mini turbojet engines WP-11 and FW-41, the Chinese reverse engineered western turojet engines for UAVs and missiles. YJ-4 YJ-4 is a family of experimental land-attack cruise missiles developed by China in the 1970s and early 1980s. Due to the limitation of Chinese industrial and technological bottleneck at the time, the YJ-4 only entered the Chinese services in extremely limited numbers, mainly serving as a foundation for more successful Chinese cruise missiles developed later, such as Changfeng missile. Two versions of YJ-4 family were developed: YJ-4I, which is also frequently but erroneously referred as YJ-41, and YJ4II, which is also frequently but erroneously referred as YJ-42. The two missiles only differed in their respective powerplant, YJ-4I was equipped with WP-11, the Chinese version of Turbomeca Marbor, while the longer ranged YJ-4II was equipped with an engine that was twice powerful, FW-41, the Chinese version of Teledyne CAE J69, reversed engineered from downed American Ryan Firebee. HY-3 The HaiYing-3 (HY-3, also known as C-301 in its export name; NATO codename: CSS-C-6 Sawhorse) is the active radarhoming, ramjet-powered supersonic land-to-ship missile developed by China Haiying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy

(CHETA, also known as 3rd Space Academy). The missile was developed in the 1980s based on the design of the HY-2 (C-201) and the ramjet technology of the cancelled YJ-1 (C-101). The development was completed in the early 1990s but the missile did not enter service. The HY-3 is a large-size missile with a slim forward body and sharp nose, and a fatter rear half with four solid rocket boosters and two ramjet engines located aft of the missile body. There are a pair of front-canards on the front fuselage, four control surfaces on the rear fuselage, and four smaller stabilising fins attached on the solid rocket boosters. The booster motors accelerate the missile to past Mach 1.8 and the kerosene-fuelled ramjet engines accelerate the missile to a cruise speed of Mach 2.0. Its range is variously reported as up to 130 km, and it can fly as low as 50 m in its terminal attack phase. The missile is programmed to dive from cruising altitude to under 30m before the active-radar terminal phase begins, then dive onto the target just prior to impact. The 3.5t missile is launched from a land-based launcher. Each firing unit consists of four launchers, a target acquisition radar, a fire-control unit, a power unit, and 8~12 missile reloading vehicle (each with one missile).[9] Length: 9.85m Diameter: 0.76 m Wingspan: 2.24 m Weight: 3,400 kg Warhead: 300~500 kg time-delayed semi-armour-piercing high-explosive Propulsion: Two side-mounted ramjet engines; four solid propellant boost motors Speed: Mach 2.5 Range: 180 km [4] Flight altitude: 50 m Guidance: Inertial and terminal active radar HY-4 The HY-4 development of the C-201 is a mid-range ground-, air-, and ship-launched cruise missile. Development of the C-201 HY-4 is believed to have started in the mid-1970s, replacing the C-201 HY-2 liquid propellant sustainer motor with a small turbojet engine, and adding a monopulse active radar seeker. Apart from the substitution of the turbojet engine, the overall configuration of the HY-4 variant of the C-201 missile is similar to the HY-2 variants of the C-201, with two delta wings and tri-form rudder and tail. The missile has a radio altimeter which allows the cruise height to be varied between 70 and 200 m altitude, followed by a steep dive onto the target. The air-launched version is designated as C-401. Developer: China Sea Eagle Electro-Mechanical Technology Co. Length: 7.36 m Diameter: 0.76 m Wingspan: 2.4 m Weight: 1,740 kg Speed: Mach 0.8 0.85 Range: 300500 km [10][11] Cruising altitude: 8 m[12] Propulsion: one turbojet engine and one solid rocket booster XW-41 A developed version based on HY-4, known as the XW-41, has been developed. This latest version of the C-201 missile family is said to have a 300 km range with additional GPS/GLONASS guidance. However, due to the availability of more advanced anti-ship missile with similar range, such as the C-602, the future of XW-41, like others in the Silkworm missile family, is uncertain despite its successful trials. Although still a member of Silkworm missile, the developer considers the missile was different enough to be a listed as a separate category of its own due to the amount of new technologies adopted. After the Gulf War, United Arab Emirates ordered 30 of these shore-based version for coastal defense, and accordingly to Jane's Defence Weekly, these missiles are referred by the general name Silkworm missiles, but domestic Chinese sources have claimed that these were XW-41s, though there are reports claiming these missiles are other models of Silkworm series. YJ-63 (C-603) XW-41 and its predecessor HY-4 lost their intended market when the wars in middle east ended, so XW-41 was converted to the first indigenously developed air-to-surface precision strike missile. The developmental work begun in the mid-1990s when Sea Eagle Mechanical-Electrical Research Academy () received support of Chinese military and the project was completed in 2002. The resulting new missile was named as YJ-63, also known as C-603. In comparison to XW-41, the original radar guidance was changed to TV guidance. The original inverted Y-configuration of tail control surfaces was changed to X-configuration. Like its predecessor, XW-41, turbojet engine was adopted instead of liquid fuel rocket engine used on HY-2. KD-63 Newest version of YJ-63 series that entered service in 2004 - 2005. This land attack version is almost identical to C-603 in appearance, except it has a solid nose instead of a window for TV guidance optronics. The solid nose indicates that the guidance of this air-to-surface missile adopts other means of guidance such as radar, but the exact type remain unknown. C-611 Upgraded version of C-601 and other earlier models of the air-to-surface missiles of Silkworm family. Not all upgrades are necessarily the same due to difference between various versions, but electronics for all versions are upgraded to the latest standard. The seeker of the missile is modernized to include semi-active and passive homing capability, and the missile can be used against coastal ground targets. Cruise altitude is decreased while the range is increased. Range: 200 km Minimum cruise altitude: 20 meter Guidance: active / passive / semi-active homing Seeker: monopulse radar Operators Bangladesh[13] Egypt People's Republic of China

Iran Iraq Myanmar North Korea Sudan United Arab Emirates

References 1. ^ U.S. Flag Tanker Stuck by Missile in Kuwaiti Waters; First Direct Raid. The New York Times. October 17, 1987. 2. ^ The Gulf Punch, Counterpunch. Time (magazine). 3. ^ Iranian Silkworm strikes decoy barge; Daniel J. Silva. St. Petersburg Times. St. Petersburg, Fla.: December 8, 1987. pg. 14.A. 4. ^ Counter-Memorial and Counter-claim submitted by the United States of America. June 23, 1997. 5. ^ Rostker, Bernard (December 2000). "TAB H Friendly-fire Incidents". Depleted Uranium in the Gulf (II). United States Department of Defense. http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du_ii/du_ii_tabh.htm. Retrieved 2007-02-25. 6. ^ friendly printed version:Iraqs missile and rocket activity during spring 2003, according to the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command 7. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/navalmissile/sy2.asp 8. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/navalmissile/hy2.asp 9. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/navalmissile/hy3.asp 10. ^ "Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States". Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_gormley.htm. Retrieved 2009-04-19. 11. ^ "HY-4". MissileThreat.com. http://www.missilethreat.com/cruise/id.60/cruise_detail.asp. Retrieved 2009-04-19. 12. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/navalmissile/hy4.asp 13. ^ http://www.bdmilitary.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276&Itemid=122 External links Wikimedia Commons has media related to: HY-2 Haiying

Federation of American Scientists page on HY-1 HY-2

HY-1 launch vehicle in the Beijing Military Museum. Silkworm missile stored at Umm Qasr in Iraq.

Chinese Warships SYSTEM Source

Modernization Hull Numbering System Inventory 200 200 200 0 5 7 50 1 5 4 1 17 1 1 20 1 19 1 2 16 40 6 4 30 94 1 30 38 1 4 20 16 16 55 1 1 5 10 2 10 17 1 1 7 1 24 0 2 2 2 2 2 14 46 2 10 4 30 82 1 4 30 20 1 4 22 9 9 62 1 1 2 5 12 2 14 17 1 1 6 1 27 2 4 2 2 1 2 14 47 6 10 4 27 111 1 40 20 20 1 4 25 9 9

Class

198 5 117 1 3 2 1 1 90 20 15 11 4 31 20 2 5 4 212 1 90 120 1 230 120

199 0 63 1 4 3 1 1 53 18 16 2 37 26 2 5 4 213 1 90 120 1 1 190 100

199 5 48 1 5 1 10 1 1 29 18 1 17 32 2 4 26 1 2 222 1 90 120 1 1 9 120 100

201 0 63 2 1 3 4 12 2 20 17 1 1 1 26 3 4 3 2 1 2 11 47 12 10 4 21 84 50 4 30 -

201 5 71 4 4 2 12 10 2 20 15 1 1 1 1 1 25 6 4 4 2 1 2 6 47 22 10 4 11 94 60 4 30 -

202 0 78 5 6 1 12 20 2 20 12 1 1 1 1 1 26 9 4 6 2 1 2 2 47 28 10 4 5 94 60 4 30 -

Submarines SSBN Jin SSBN Xia SSN Shang SSN Han SS Kilo SS NEWCON SS Yuan SS Song SS Ming SSB Golf SS Wuhan SS Romeo SS Whiskey Aircraft Carrier CV NEWCON ATS Shichang Destroyers DDG Luzhou DDG Hangzhou DDG Luyang II DDG Luyang I DDG Luhai DDG Luhu DDG Luda DD Anshan Frigates FFG Jiangkai FFG Jiangwei II FFG Jiangwei I FFG Jianghu FFG Jiangdong FF Jiangnan FF Chengdu Guided Missile Boats PCFG C-14 Cat PCFG Hola / Hela PCFG Houbei PCFG Houku / Hegu PCFG Huangfeng / Hounan / Houdong PCFG NEWCON PGG Homa PGG Houjian / Huang PGG Houxin PGG Molniya Torpedo Boats PHT Huchuan

Type 094 Type 092 Type 093 Type 091 Sov Kilo Song / Yuan Type 041 Type 039 Type 035 Type 031 Type 033G Type 033 Type 03

(Multirole Aviation) Type 051C Sovremenny Type 052C Type 052B Type 052A Type 052 Type 051 Type 07 Type 054 Type 057 Type 055 Type 053 Type 053K Type 053 [mod-Sov Riga] Type 01 [ex-Sov Riga]

Type 021-mod Type 022 Type 024 [Komar] Type 021 [Osa]

Type 024-mod Type 037-II Type 037-IG Molniya Type 025

PHT P-6 PHT P-4 Patrol Boats PC Haiqing Type 037-IS PC Haijiu Type 037-I PC Hainan Type 037 PC Shanghai III / Haizhui Type 062/1 PC Shanghai II Type 062 PG Kronshtadt Kronshtadt PC Shanghai I PC Huludao Type 206 PC Shantou / Swatow Mine Warfare MST Wolei / Bulieijian (minelayer) MSO Type 010 Type 010 MSO Type 010 [RESERVE] Type 010 [Sov T-43] MSC Wosao Type 082 MSC Fushun / Shanghai-II (minesweeper-coastal) MSC Lianyun (minesweeper-coastal) MSB Futi Type 312 (drone) Amphibious Warfare Ships LPD Yuzhao Type 071 LST Yuting Type 072 III LST Yuting Type 072 II LST Yukan Type 072 LST Shan US LST-1 LSM Yudeng Type 073 III LSM Yudao Type 073 II LSM Hua US LSM-1 APA Qiongsha (attack transport) AH Qiongsha (hospital ship) AH Shichang (Multirole Aviation) AH Type 920 Type 920 (hospital ship) AH (hospital ship) Project 320 Russian Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) Amphibious Warfare Craft LCU Yuhai/Wuhu Type 074 LCU Yulian/Yuliang/Yuling Type 079 LCM Yuchin/Yuqin/Yuchai Type 068/069 LCM Yuchin [RESERVE] Type 068/069 LCM Yunnan Type 067 LCM Yunnan [RESERVE] Type 067 LCM Type 271 LCM US LCM-6 LCT US LCT-6 LCAC Dagu Type 722-II LCAC Jingsah II Type 724 Surveillance AGI Dongdiao (electronic reconnaissance) AGI Dadie / Beidiao (electronic reconnaissance) AGI Yanbing [Mod Yanha] (electronic reconnaissance) AGI Yanha / Haibing (electronic reconnaissance) AGI NEWCON (electronic reconnaissance) AGI Xing Fengshan / (intelligence collection)

60 50 420 45 325 20 5 25 136 35 20 80 + 37 3 15 4 15 ++ 429 23 45 300 + ?? 50 10 1 34 1 15

60 30 440 4 90 10 300 10 5 25 126 1 35 1 10 80 + 36 3 13 4 10 6 ++ 401 30 40 + 320 + ?? 10 1 42 1 1 3 15

10 10 440 5 4 95 10 300 5 25 116 1 35 1 80 + 36 1 5 13 1 4 6 ++ 406 30 40 + 320 + ?? 10 1 5 42 1 1 3 15

221 15 2 95 11 100 92 1 27 13 1 50 + 26 8 7 3 1 1 6 + ++ 369 12 31 20 + 45 230 ?? 1 30 47 1 1 1 3 15

233 28 2 88 17 100 92 1 12 28 1 50 + 33 4 11 7 3 1 1 4 2 + 2 ++ 349 14 31 8 30 36 200 ?? 30 45 1 1 1 3 1

235 30 2 88 17 100 92 1 10 30 1 50 + 37 8 11 7 3 1 1 4 2 + 2 ?1 ++ 339 15 31 8 30 25 200 ?? 30 45 1 1 1 3 1

231 36 78 17 100 92 1 40 1 50 + 39 1 12 11 7 1 1 4 2 + 2 ?1 ++ 305 20 25 30 200 ?? 30 45 1 1 3 1 1

221 46 68 17 90 92 1 40 1 50 + 48 2 20 11 7 1 1 4 2 + 2 ?1 ++ 305 25 20 30 200 ?? 30 45 1 1 4 1

204 56 58 10 80 90 40 50 + 50 3 25 11 5 4 2 + 2 ?1 ++ 305 30 15 30 200 ?? 30 43 1 4 -

Xiangyang Hong AGI NEWCON AGM Yuan Wang AGOR Xiang Yang Hong AGOR Haiyang AGOR Yanqian (modKansha) AGOR NEWCON AGS Yannan AGS NEWCON Support ... ADG Yen Pai ADG Yenka ADG Yen Fang AK AK Yantai AK Dayun AK Damen AK Hongqi AK Danlin AK Yukan AK Galati AK Zhandou 59 AK FS-331 AK NEWCON AK/AOT Dandao AK/AOT Danlin AK/AOT NEWCON AOH ... AOE Qiandaohu / Fuchi AOR Nanyun / Nancang AOR Fuqing ... AOTL Leizhou AOTL Shengli AOTL Guangzhou AOTL Jinyou AOTL Fulin / Mettawee AOTL Fuzhou AOTL 2-TM AOTL NEWCON ... ARC Wulai ARC Youzhong Class ARC Youdian ... ARL Galati ARL Achelous ARS Daozha ARS Dadong ARS Dadao ARS Ten Ting

(intelligence collection) (space event ship) (Oceanographic Research) (Oceanographic Research) (Oceanographic Research) (Oceanographic Research) (Surveying) (buoy tender) (Surveying) (buoy tender) ... (degaussing) (degaussing) (degaussing) Cargo (cargo) Type 904 (cargo) (cargo) (cargo) (cargo) (cargo) (cargo) (Romanian) (cargo) (cargo) (US Army) (cargo) (cargo / transport oiler) (cargo / transport oiler) (cargo / transport oiler) (small harbor oiler) ... (Underway Replenishment) (Underway Replenishment) (Underway Replenishment) ... (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) [US] (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) (coastal transport oiler) ... (cable repair) (small cable ship) (cable ship) ... (repair) (Romanian) (repair) (U.S.) (large salvage tug) (salvage) (salvage) (salvage)

7 2 2 7 174 ... 2 2 ... 1 5 4 1 2 1 1 3 13 2 ... 4 ... 5 2 5 3 7 14 1 ... 3 3 ... 1 1 4

4 7 2 2 7 166 ... 2 2 ... 1 5 4 1 2 1 3 13 ... 3 ... 5 2 5 3 7 14 ... 3 3 ... 1 4

4 7 2 2 7 173 ... 2 2 2 ... 2 1 5 4 1 2 1 3 13 ... 2 ... 5 2 5 3 7 14 ... 1 3 4 ... 1 1 1 1 4

4 11 2 2 7 164 ... 3 2 2 ... 2 2 1 5 4 1 3 13 ... 1 2 ... 2 5 3 7 10 ... 1 3 6 ... 1 1 1 1 4

14 4 11 2 7 155 ... 3 ... 2 2 6 5 3 13 ... 1 1 2 ... 2 5 3 15 ... 1 3 4 ... 1 1 1 -

14 4 11 2 7 154 ... 3 ... 2 2 6 5 3 13 ... 1 1 2 ... 2 5 3 15 ... 1 3 4 ... 1 1 1 -

14 4 4 2 7 7 142 ... 3 ... 2 2 6 5 3 13 ... 3 1 ... 15 ... 1 2 3 ... 1 1 1 -

14 4 4 9 7 140 ... 3 ... 2 2 1 10 16 ... 3 1 ... 15 ... 1 1 3 ... 1 1 1 -

14 4 4 9 7 135 ... 3 ... 22 1 10 16 ... 3 1 ... 15 ... 1 3 ... 1 1 1 -

ARS Kansha ARS Jin Jian Xun ARS NEWCON ... AS Dazhi ASL Dazhou ASR Dajiang ASR Dalang ASR Hudang / Hudung / Hudong ASR NEWCON ... AT Yan Jiu AT Yung Gang AT Gromovoy AT Roslavl AT Dinghai AT Yanting AT FT-14 AT Sotoyomo AT "254-Design" AT NEWCON ATA Hujiu ATA Tuzhong ATA NEWCON ... AWL Fuzhou AWL Leizhou AWL NEWCON AWT Fulin AWT Fuzhou AWT NEWCON ... AX Daxin / Dakin ... IX Yanxi / YenHsi IX Test 970 Auxiliary, Merchant Marine ... AGE Dahua AGE Xiangyanghong 5 AGE Ji Di Hao ... AGOR NEWCON AGOR Dong Fang Hong AGOR Hai AGOR Kexue Hao / Hai Ying AGOR Huanghai 11 AGOR Shijian AGOR Shuguang 04 AGOR Shukuang AGOR Yanlun AGOR Kan ...

(salvage) (salvage) (salvage) ... (submarine support) (Submarine Tender, Small) (submarine rescue) (submarine rescue) (submarine rescue) (submarine rescue) ... (ocean going tug) (ocean going tug) (ocean going tug) (Soviet) (ocean going tug) (Soviet) (ocean going tug) (ocean going tug) (ocean going tug) (ex-trawler) (ocean going tug) [US] (ocean going tug) (U.S. Army) (ocean going tug) (auxilary ocean tug) (auxilary ocean tug) (auxilary ocean tug) ... (coastal water transport) (coastal water transport) (coastal water transport) (replenishment ship) (replenishment ship) (replenishment ship) ... (training ship) ... (weapons trial support) (weapons trial support) Survey / Research / Exp ... (research) (experimental) (research) ... (survey / research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic survey) (oceanographic research) (oceanographic research) ...

1 1 ... 1 2 5 1 1 ... 1 1 16 4 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... ... 1 32 ... 1 1 ... 1 1 1 2 5 3 1 1 ...

1 1 ... 1 2 5 1 1 ... 1 1 16 4 3 3 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 31 ... 1 1 ... 1 1 2 1 2 5 2 2 ...

1 1 ... 1 2 3 3 1 ... 1 1 16 4 2 3 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 33 ... 1 1 ... 1 1 2 1 2 5 2 2 ...

1 ... 2 3 5 1 ... 1 1 17 4 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 1 32 ... 1 1 ... 4 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 ...

4 ... 2 3 5 1 ... 1 1 17 4 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 1 32 ... 1 1 ... 4 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 ...

4 ... 2 2 5 1 ... 1 1 17 4 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 1 32 ... 1 1 ... 4 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 ...

4 ... 4 6 ... 1 1 21 8 4 ... 9 4 8 7 ... 1 ... 1 1 32 ... 1 1 ... 13 2 2 2 ...

4 ... 3 6 ... 1 1 21 4 8 ... 4 2 7 4 4 7 ... 1 ... 1` 1 30 ... ... 14 2 2 2 ...

4 ... 3 6 ... 21 12 ... 13 15 ... ... 1 30 ... ... 21 1 1 ...

AGS NEWCON AGS Ganzhu / Kanzhu AGS Kaiboban AGS King Hai AGS Nan Hai Class AGS Shuguang 01 AGS Yanlai AGS Yenlai AGS Yenlun AGS Flower AGSC Kan Yang / Hace

(survey) (survey) (survey) (survey) (geophysical research) (hydrographic survey) Mod-T43 MSO (survey) (survey) (survey) (hydrographic survey) (British) (coastal survey)

1 2 3 5 1 1 2

1 2 3 5 2

1 3 4 5 2

1 3 5 2

1 3 5 2

1 3 5 2

6 3 2

6 3 1

6 1 -

People's Liberation Navy - Hull Numbering System

Submarine Hull Numbers The PLAN assigns 3-digit hull numbers to its submarines as follows: Nuclear submarines have 4xx hull numbers Conventional submarines have 2xx or3xx hull numbers Vessel Hull Numbers The PLAN assigns 3-digit hull numbers to its destroyers and frigates as follows: Destroyers have 1xx hull numbers Frigates have 5xx hull numbers In addition, vessels above battalion leadergrade have 3-digit hull numbers. These include submarine chasers, minesweeper ships, serviceships, landing ships, and some escort boats. Small combatants have a 4-digit pennant number,the first digit of which signifies area subordination. Furthermore, company leader-gradeboats have 4-digit hull numbers. These include minesweeper boats, service ships, landing craft, missile speedboats, missile boats, and some escort boats. The system for hull numbers on auxiliaries consists of a 3-digit number preceded by two or more Chinese characters describing the ships fleet and function. For example, nanshui is an SSF water tanker: The first character shows the fleet as follows: Bei for North Sea Fleet Dong for East Sea Fleet Nan for South Sea Fleet The second character shows the functionas follows: Jiao for transport Jiu for salvage Jun for dredge Kang for hospital Shui for water tanker Tuo for tug Xiu for repair You for oiler

Weapons and Equipment Development Procedures

PLAN Headquarters is responsible for overseeing all naval weapon system and equipment development. The PLANs development cycle for all of its weapon systems and equipment, regardless of how large or small, consists of the following five phases: Theoretical evaluation Program definition Engineering development Design finalization Production finalization The main responsibilities during the theoretical evaluation phase are to begin examining the proposed technology to meet operational requirements, which includes the entire technology program, development cost, conditions to support the technology, and development time frame forecast. The final step is to report the requirements for the new project to higher authorities for approval. Once the theoretical evaluation phase is completed, the program definition phase begins. In this phase, the comprehensive development project is implemented by assigning specific responsibilities to all organizations involved in the project. The three main tasks in the program definition phase are as follows: Conduct a theoretical evaluation of the development program Conduct testing that focuses on key technologies and new parts Conduct subsystem trial manufacturing and experimentation A Design Finalization Committee is responsible for approving each milestone throughout this phase of the project and then reporting the findings to PLAN Headquarters. During the engineering development phase, which can take several years, the factory and associated research institutes are responsible for designing the weapon and producing and testing a prototype.The design finalization phase involves a comprehensive review and inspection of the new weapon system or equipment throughout the process, including

systematic testing of each component of the prototype or prototypes. The PLAN Military Production Finalization Committee is responsible for reviewing and approving each step of the process. During the production finalization phase, the new system is produced for delivery to the operational force. The PLAN also begins training personnel to use, support, and maintain the new system or equipment. Once the new system or equipment enters the operational force, it can still take a lengthy period of time, possibly years, before the system and its personnel are considered combat capable.

Warship Modernization
As of 2007 the PLA Navy numbered 290,000 personnel. According to the US Department of Defenses Annual Report to Congress on The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China for 2006, the PLA Navy had 70 principal combatants (25 destroyers and 45 frigates), 55 submarines (50 diesel and 5 nuclear), some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships (an increase of over 14% since 2005), and about 45 coastal missile patrol craft. In May 2007, the Annual Report noted that the PLAN had 72 principal combatants, 58 submarines, some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and about 41 coastal missile patrol craft. In addition, there is a large fleet of about 600 landing craft, both military and civilian, that could be used for ship-to-shore operations, as well as a handful of air cushion vehicles. Using these assets, China can sealift about one division of 10,000 men. The PLAN also has hundreds of smaller landing craft, barges, and troop transports, all of which could be used together with fishing boats, trawlers, and civilian merchant ships to augment the naval amphibious fleet. The size of the major surface combatant fleet has been relatively stable, with older ships slowly being replaced by newer Chinese-built destroyers and frigates.In the mid-1980s, the development of secondgeneration warships was included in the Seventh and Eighth Five-Year Plans as a key area of endeavor in the development of new weapons and equipment. After the reduction of the military forces by one million men in 1985, the Chinese military placed more attention on qualitative army building and on assisting new and high-technology arms and services. Beijing's naval modernization program is designed to prepare the PLA to conduct regional active defensive warfare in support of Chinese economic interests and sovereignty claims--a doctrinal shift away from a focus on the large-scale, land-based guerrilla warfare of Mao's classic "People's War." This approach potentially will give Beijing the "credible intimidation" needed to accomplish political and military goals without having to rely on overwhelming force-on-force superiority. China's modernization programs thus seek to realize short-term improvements in anti- surface warfare (ASuW) and precision strike warfare. Concurrently, the PLAN is acquiring weapons that would be useful in countering potential adversaries operating on naval platforms or from bases in the East and South China Seas, particularly stand-off weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). The State Council and CMC modernized its fleet of first generation destroyers by retrofitting them with new technology to improve their combat systems. Emphasis was placed on the electronics and the development of a combat-intelligence-command system. Improvements to the ships were made in the Dalian shipyard in 1987, which resulted in improved weapon systems, living conditions, and most significantly in electronic counter measures. The newly improved destroyers were made available to the PLAN in 1989. While improving the existing destroyer fleet, the Seventh Academy began work on new class of guided missile destroyer. Initially it involved a joint partnership with another country. Such a relationship could not be established, and instead research was concentrated in China's own research bodies. The new generation of destroyers emphasized an advanced combat-intelligence system that was superior to the ones already installed in the first-generation destroyers. It also had better real-time information capabilities and improved long-range surveillance. The anti-submarine, air-defense, and electronic counter measure capabilities were also enhanced. In 1988, the PLAN began to re-develop its initial plans for a frigate specialized in both anti-air and anti-ship capabilities. By the early 1990s, PLAN had a line-of-sight air defense capability out to 13 kilometers and up to 8 kilometers in altitude. Its missiles are judged effective against aircraft as well as sea skimming surface-to-surface or air-to-surface anti-ship missiles. More sophisticated radars reach to the horizon and allow the identification of targets for anti-ship SSMs. Electronic countermeasures have also improved, and the electronic warfare capabilities of the new vessels are a dramatic improvement over the old vessels. Nevertheless, the PLAN continues to lag behind other regional navies, including that of Taiwan, in most technological areas, especially air defense, surveillance, and C4I. The PLAN continues to have longstanding concerns about its capability to engage enemy aircraft, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions. This problem is becoming more significant as the Navy strives to operate away from the protection of land-based air defenses. PLAN surface combatants have a limited, and primarily self-defense, anti-air warfare (AAW) capability. Only about twelve of its destroyers and frigates are outfitted with SAM systems; the others are armed only with AAA and possibly man-portable air defense systems. In addition, PLAN warships lack the modern air surveillance systems and data links required for area air defense missions. The combination of short-range weapons and lack of modern surveillance systems limits the PLAN to self-defense and point-defense anti-air warfare only. Consequently, except in unusual circumstances, no PLAN ship is capable of conducting air defense of another ship. Additionally, the PLAN could not reliably defend against either current or projected anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). China has recognized the importance of countering low-observable aircraft and cruise missiles. Engineering efforts to develop air defense systems capable of detecting and eventually engaging these systems are underway. Over the course of the 1990s the Navy streamlined and modernized its forces by eliminating large numbers of older ships and replacing them with fewer, more modern units. The number of submarines has declined by about one-half. The PLA Navy's force modernization has emphasized the addition of new, indigenously built destroyers, frigates, supply ships, landing ships, and other smaller vessels. The new Luhu-class destroyers and the new Jiangwei-class frigates represent a substantial improvement over the Navy's current fleet of destroyers and frigates. The PLAN is now better able to defend itself, even in the absence of air cover, in contested waters such as the South China Sea.The size of the major surface combatant fleet has been relatively stable, with older ships slowly being replaced by newer Chinese-built destroyers and frigates. To increase the survivability of its surface combatants, the Navy seeks to acquire modern antisubmarine and antiaircraft systems. It has had little success in developing these systems and now seeks technical assistance from Russia and, reportedly, Israel. In the interim, China has purchased a few modern systems from Western sources, such as the French-built Crotale air defense system and the Whitehead A244S antisubmarine torpedo.China's modernization efforts likely are focused on developing torpedoes with state-of-the-art homing and propulsion systems capable of operating in acoustically challenging shallow-water environments. China also may seek advanced torpedo countermeasures like mobile decoys and hard-kill anti-torpedo torpedoes to increase the survivability of its surface ships and submarines.During 2003 construction began on about 70 military ships, mainly smaller units such as landing craft. By early 2004 China was considering acquisition of another pair of Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers, in addition to the two already purchased. The purchase of additional Kilo-class submarines is under negotiations, on top of the four bought in the late 1990s. China launched 13 attack submarines between 2002 and 2004. During the period 2001 through 2005, China moved ahead with one of the most ambitious

military buildups in the world - including building 23 new amphibious assault ships that could ferry tanks, armored vehicles and troops across the 100 miles to Taiwan. Nearly all of the PLAN's inventory of US-built, World War II-vintage landing ships have been replaced by similar numbers of domestically-produced vessels. These new, larger, and more specialized vessels, combined with the new Dayun-class supply ships, will form the basis of a more modern and expanded fleet. Shortcomings in long-range lift, logistics, and air support, however, hinders China's ability to project amphibious forces. The PLAN's amphibious fleet provides sealift sufficient to transport approximately one infantry division, although it has yet to conduct training exercises on this scale. The PLAN also has hundreds of smaller landing craft, barges, and troop transports, all of which could be used together with fishing boats, trawlers, and civilian merchant ships to augment the naval amphibious fleet. While in principle large numbers of troops could be transported by such expedient means, in practice such a "human wave" assault would be a high-risk undertaking, particularly in the absence of rehearsed air and sea cover. China likely has enough mine warfare assets to lay a good defensive and a modest offensive minefield using a wide variety of launch platforms. China is believed to have a variety of mine types available including bottom and moored influence, mobile mines, remotely controlled mines, and propelled-warhead mines. China recently has begun advertising some advanced mines, indicating it may have even more sophisticated mines in its inventory. Projected Warship Modernization Submarines Huludao Nuclear Date 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 SSN 1 2 1 SSBN 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Wuhan Diesel Jiangnan Diesel Destroyers Dalian Jiangnan Frigates Hudong Huangpu

People's Liberation Army Marine Corps

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLAMC) (Simplified Chinese: ; Traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnggu Rnmn Jifngjn Hijnlzhndu) is marine corps of the People's Republic of China's People's Liberation Army Navy. It currently consists of two 6000-man brigades. History Though the Marine Corps was originally established in the 1950s during the Chinese Civil War by Communist troops to conduct amphibious operations against islands held by the Nationalists, the organization was disbanded in October 1957 when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) abandoned any plans to attack Taiwan. Following the disbanding of the Marine Corps, the PLAN did maintain a naval infantry force, which consisted of several infantry and amphibious tank regiments. In 1979 the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China re-established the Marine Corps and organized it under the PLAN. On 5 May 1980, the 1st Marine Brigade was activated on Hainan.[citation needed] Organization The Marine Corps is subordinate to PLAN Headquarters, the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. The two 6000-man brigades are both based in the South China Sea. It is believed in time of war, up to 28,000 Marines can be mobilized. These two brigades possess combined arms units, including armor, artillery, missile, air defense, and logistics. Marine Corps: 1st Marine Brigade and 2d (aka 164th) (Marine) Brigades both based in Zhanjiang (SSF); 12,000 personnel. Each Brigade comprises all or most of the the following: 1 x Armoured Regiment (2 x Bns w/Type 63 amphibious light tanks), 3 x Mechanized Infantry Bns w/Type 86 IFV and Type 63/89 APC (both amphibious), Marine (Assault) Infantry Battalion. (750 Marines), Special Operations Force Battalion; Missile Battalion (HJ-8 & HJ-73 ATGM's and NH-5 SAM's), A mixed Engineer and Chemical Battalion; Communications and electronic warfare Battalion. PLAN marines can perform a variety of missions. They are considered elite troops, and are part of the rapid mobilization forces of the Chinese military. All marines are believed to receive the best training, which includes parachuting and amphibious warfare exercises. The marines perform two principal missions: serving as the fighting spearhead of any amphibious operation, to establish a beachhead of launch direct assaults against enemy targets inland via amphibious landing, and acting as a garrison or assault group in island chains, in particular potentially disputed territories in regional waters.[citation needed] Equipment Personnel Equipment Type 95 Assault Rifle Type 95 Family Squad Automatic Weapon HJ-8 Anti-tank missile HJ-73 Anti-tank missile Armour ZBD2000 Amphibious Tank Type 62 Light Tank Type 63 Light Amphibious Tank Type 63A Light Amphibious Tank Type 63 APC Type 77 Amphibious APC Type 85/89 APC Type 86 Infantry Fighting Vehicle WZ551 Wheeled APC Artillery Type 89 Self Propelled 122mm gun system The modern day Chinese marine possesses the Type 95 bullpup assault rifle as standard infantry armament. The marine wears a blue/littoral camouflage uniform as standard dress. The effectiveness of this camouflage is unknown, and is thought to be ineffective once the marines penetrate deeper into urban and forested terrain. The marines also make use of GPS and night vision systems to enhance their fighting capabilities. The PLA Marines are equipped with amphibious light tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The Type 63A is the newest light tank in Chinese service. It is based on the hull of the older Type 63 (which in turn is based on the Soviet PT76 amphibious light tank). The Type 63A features a number of improvements, in particular the new welded turret which features much greater armour protection and the 105mm main gun (capable of firing standard NATO projectiles as well as the gun launched anti-tank missile). The marines are believed to have continued operating the Type 63 and the non-amphibious Type 62 light tanks as secondary units. The Type 77 amphibious APC was the standard armoured transport for the marines for many decades. However, new designs have been adapted from the army to complement these aging transports. These include specially modified versions of the Type 89 and Type 63 APCs, with enhanced swimming capabilities. The Type 86 (or WZ501) IFV is also in service with the marines. Based on the Soviet BMP-1, it is armed with a single 73mm main gun and mounts an HJ73 ATGM (with max range of 3000 meters). For air defense, the marines employ a mix of automatic and manually operated anti-aircraft artillery systems, as well as short range surface-to-air missiles. The marines have been seen operating the new Type 95 self-propelled air defense platform on an amphibious hull similar to the Type 77 APC. This platform is armed with four 25mm cannon with a short ranged SAM combination

to achieve effective killing capabilities against low flying targets at short ranges. The Type 89 self-propelled 122mm gun is the first SP artillery system in service with the marines since 1999. This adds additional accurate firepower to the PLAMC. Equipment In terms of equipment, the marines are receiving more modern armoured fighting vehicles. The latest example has been apparently a new light tank. This tank features the same turret as the Type 63A, but is on a lighter chassis that may perform better on water than the original Type 63A hull. Only photos have appeared of this vehicle so far with no firm details. A second new vehicle is a new armoured recovery vehicle, which features a brand new hull. The exact status of both vehicles is still generally unknown. Deployment Capabilities The marines in the next few years are expected to have greater deployment capability with the introduction of several new ships in the navy. The primary new ship in question is the Type 071 Landing Ship Dock, which could operate both high speed hovercraft to transport troops and vehicles, as well as helicopters. It has also been reported lately that China may sign an agreement in the near future to finalize the purchase of the Russian 'Zubr'-type air cushion assault transport, which could transport sizeable numbers of troops and equipment at speeds exceeding 50 knots. With the PLAN's accelerating efforts to expand its capabilities beyond territorial waters, it would be likely for the PLAMC to play a greater role in terms of being an offshore expeditionary force similar to the U.S and Royal Marines. External links sinodefense.com globalsecurity.org china-defense.com comw.org fas.org

PLA (N) Marines of the 1st Marine Brigade and members of the USMC fire the Type 95 Assault Rifle during an exchange exercise. PLAN Marines based in Zhanjiang stand at attention.

People's Liberation Army Navy - Marine Corps

Though the Marine Corps was originally established in the 1950s to conduct amphibious operations against Nationalist held islands, the organization was disbanded in October 1957 when the PLA essentially abandoned plans to liberate Taiwan by force. Following the disbanding of the Marine Corps, the PLAN did maintain a naval infantry, which consisted of several infantry and amphibious tank regiments. In 1979 the CMC re-established the Marine Corps and organized it under the PLAN. On May 5, 1980 the 1st Marine Brigade was activated on Hainan Island. The Marine Corps has infantry, artillery, armor and engineering units, as well as reconnaissance, chemical defense and communications units. It is intended to be a rapid assault force for amphibious operations, forward base seizure, and coastal defense. The Marine Corps is headquartered in Beijing and reports directly to the commander of the PLAN for administrative issues, though it has an operational chain of command to the South Sea Fleet commander. It is possible that during wartime, the Marine Corps would report to the General Staff Department. [Cole 2002] The commander of the Marine Corps is likely to be a senior captain and does not have an official position on the SSF staff. It is principally comprised of some 10-12,000 troops organized into two brigades, both located in the South Sea Fleet. The Marines are equipped with Type-63A tanks, Type-63 armored personnel carriers and various artillery pieces. The Marine Corps does not have an organic aviation capability. Prior to 1999, Marine Corps officers were trained in Army academies. In 1999, the PLANs Guangzhou Naval Vessel Academy established a Naval Marine Corps Tactics Command Department, which is responsible for training all new and company-grade Marine Corps officers. A s of 2007, as shown below, the PLAN has two Marine Corps brigades, which are designated the 1st and 164th. Both brigades are subordinate to the South Sea Fleet Headquarters and are located in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province. Each brigade has three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and one amphibious armor regiment. The Marine Corps also consists of engineering, reconnaissance, chemical defense, and communications units, which are battalion- or company-level organizations. Marine Corps personnel receive three types of training at one of three types of locations. Training is conducted during three phases. Types of Training The Marine Corps conducts three types of training: Technical, Tactics, Psychological, physical, and fieldcombat survival training Technical Training Technical training consists of basic knowledge for amphibious combat, swimming in full battle gear, reconnaissance, capturing enemy personnel, hand-to-hand combat, airborne landing and parachuting, using water and land loading and unloading equipment, driving combat vehicles, firing from shore-to-sea and sea-to-shore, and overcoming water and beach obstacles, as well as using survival equipment. Tactics Training Tactics training consists of knowledge of services and branches, principles of tactics theory, individual and unit tactics, and combinedarms tactics. It also includes the following: Theory and principles of amphibious operations

 Boarding landing vessels, crossing bodies of water, and loading and unloading equipment Selecting loading sites and landing sites Assaulting beaches, establishing beachheads, and breaking out from beachheads Organizing and commanding pre-invasion night operations Dealing with different terrain features Planning, organizing, and commanding amphibious operations Coordinating with other services and branches Psychological, Physical, and Field-Combat Survival Training This training consists of adapting to different types of conditions, including crossing long distances of water under difficult conditions and surviving under field combat conditions after landing on shore or on an island or reef. Training Methods Officers receive their basic training at a PLAN academy, but enlisted force members receive their training at an operational unit. Unit training is normally conducted at one of three locations: Training base Training center Special training site Unit training normally occurs in the following three phases: Shore-based training At-sea training Amphibious landing exercises Current Training Reforms Based on the revised OMTE issued in 2002, the PLAN has implemented some training reforms for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is paying more attention to simulator training for a wide variety of specialties, such as driving and using various types of equipment. The Marine Corps also conducts combinedarms training with the South Sea Fleets landing vessel zhidui. As of 2007, The training is taking place under more difficult sea and weather conditions than in the past.

Marine Corps Equipment SYSTEM Tanks PT-76 T-59 Type-63A Type-60 Armored Personnel Carrier Type-63 Type-77 Type-531 LVT Artillery 122mm Type-83 122mm Type-54 107mm Type-63 MRL Anti-Tank Missiles HJ-73 HJ-8 Surface-to-Air Missiles HN-5 -+ + + + -+ + + -+ + + + + + -+ + + -+ + --+ --+ --+ -+ --150 -60 ---+ -+ + + + --150 -60 ---+ -+ --150 -60 ---+ -+ 1985 1990 1995 Inventory 2000 2003 2005 2010

+ +

+ +

+ +

People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnggu Rnmn Jifng Jn Hijn Hngkngbng) is the naval aviation branch of the People's Liberation Army Navy of the People's Republic of China. Primary Mission Provide fleet air defense for PLAN surface combatants Patrol and hunt/destroy for submarines Air patrols and defense of territorial waters Air defense of the mainland's coastline Anti-ship attack Secondary Mission Transport and training Search and rescue Assault transport and tactical support for amphibious operations Interdiction attack on enemy ground targets Current status The PLANAF has 25,000 personnel and roughly 800 aircraft under the navy's command. This is a considerably large naval aviation force considering the lack of aircraft carriers. It operates similar aircraft to the air force, including fighters, bombers, strike aircraft, tankers, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, maritime patrol, seaplane, transport, training and helicopter types. The PLANAF has traditionally received older aircraft than the PLAAF and has taken less ambitious steps towards mass modernization. Advancements in new technologies, weaponry and aircraft acquisition were made after 2000. The modern day PLANAF is capable of performing a number of roles, and is quite numerically and technologically adept in anti-ship and air defense operations. History Historically, the PLANAF's main role has been to provide the navy's warships with air defense coverage. Part of the coastal defense doctrine was to have naval aircraft protecting the ships, hence why many PLA ships of the 1960s-70s lacked long range antiaircraft missiles or artillery. During the Sino-Vietnamese War, the PLANAF carried out many successful bombing and airstrike missions against Vietnamese territories, such as in the Spratly Islands. The 1960s saw a series of air combat sorties flown against Taiwanese intruders. PLANAF pilots have been credited with many major victories over the Taiwanese in these small incidents[citation needed] . Historical aircraft operated by the PLANAF include the J-5, the J-6, and H-5. These aircraft have been retired by the late 1990s. Fighters For fighter missions the PLANAF operates the J-7E and J-8II. The J-7E is a much improved design based on the original Soviet MiG-21. With new double delta wings and the PL-8 AAM, the J-7E is quite an effective dogfighter. The J-8II is an indigenous fighter with a nose mounted radar and capable of high speed high altitude interceptions. A small number of these fighters are in service, and are capable of being inflight refuelled by the navy's own H-6DU tankers, modified from former navy H-6D missile bombers. The navy's air defense squadrons can always be complemented by the PLAAF, that operates more advanced combat aircraft including the J-11B and J-10 fighters. Strike and anti-ship attacks are carried out by the Q-5, JH-7, Su-30MK2 and H-6. The Q-5 was a design based on the J-6, but with provision for a nose radar. It has become the premiere light nuclear attack aircraft of the Chinese air force since the 1970s. Around 40 Q-5s are in service with the PLANAF. These are believed to be of the modified model that has a modified nose. These nuclear naval strike variants carried a search radar. Main armament were air dropped torpedoes and rockets, though it was believed these special Q-5s were capable of carrying one YJ8 air launched anti-ship missile. The JH-7 was an indigenous, supersonic, heavy nuclear attack aircraft with a crew of two. Its general performance and weapons delivery capability is thought to be comparable to early models of Panavia Tornado. The JH-7 was subsequently improved to the JH-7A, capable of carrying a variety of advanced Chinese and Russian precision munitions as well as anti-ship missiles. The JH-7 can be armed with the YJ82 improved air launched missile, or the Russian KH-31 ram jet anti-ship missile. The most recent acquisition of the PLANAF were a batch of 24 Su-30MK2. These aircraft are highly advanced and improved variants of the Su-30MKK. The primary difference between the naval variant and the air force one, is that the MK2 has a longer range search radar that could detect and attack surface ship targets with advanced long range missiles. The H-6 is a design based on the 1950s Soviet Tu-16 Badger. Though based on an old design, it has been built in new air frames and vastly improved models (similar to the upgrades given to the US B52s). Chinese H-6 variants in the navy include the H-6D, that specializes in carrying two anti-ship missiles. The PLANAF is believed to operate a much improved model, capable of launching the more advanced YJ-62 and YJ-8 series anti-ship missiles. Maritime patrol For maritime patrol, the PLANAF has the Y-8MPA, Y-8J and Harbin SH-5 sea plane. The Y-8MPA is based on the Y-8 heavy transport aircraft. Although it carries no weapons, the Y-8MPA has a vast array of electronics and sensors that could detect surface ships, aircraft or submarines. The Y-8J is the Y-8 fitted with one of six (or eight) British Skymaster long range detection radars. These Y-8Js serve as AWACS to direct aircraft into interception, as well as providing target coverage for the PLAN combatants. The Harbin SH-5 sea plane is capable of patrol, rescue and anti-submarine warfare. For the latter role, the aircraft can carry a large payload of torpedoes and depth bombs. Helicopters Helicopters are an important asset aboard Chinese surface combatants. With over 30 surface warships and numerous auxiliaries capable of facilitating a helicopter, it is surprising that the PLANAF operates small numbers of ship-borne helicopters. Over the years, the PLANAF has operated the Changhe Z-8 , Harbin Z-9 and Russian Ka-28 Helix. The Changhe Z-8 is the largest helicopter built in China yet, which is largely similar to the French Super Frelon design. The Z-8 is most efficient in auxiliary roles in the PLAN, such as towing mine clearing systems, vertical inflight refueling of smaller ships, and supporting the Chinese submarine fleet. The Z-8 is also quite capable of carrying out attacks on submarines using dipping sonar and torpedo, and attacks against surface ships using the YJ-82 missile. The Z-9C and the French AS 565 have become standard helicopters for PLAN surface combatants. The French delivered eight AS 565N Dauphins to the PLANAF in the late 1980s to equip China's latest escorts. The Z-9C is an indigenous version of the AS 565. Numbers have not been confirmed, but around 25 are credited to be in service (though some

estimate only 10). The Z-9C is a multi role medium sized helicopter capable of ASW, SAR and surface targeting roles. With the purchase of the Russian Sovremenny class destroyers, the Ka-28 Helix was also imported. This is the export version of the Ka-27, the standard ship borne helicopter for the Russian Navy. The Ka-28 is vastly superior to the Z-9C and Z-8 in performance, and is expected to be the new standard helicopter for future Chinese destroyers and frigates. Eight Ka-28s were delivered so far (with four ASW and four SAR variants) to form a training regiment. More have since been delivered. Future The future of the PLANAF is unclear. However, it is certain that as the navy receives more attention, the PLANAF will receive newer aircraft and much more funding, as its significant role in projecting power over the sea is becoming evermore realized. A new transport helicopter, the Z-15, may enter naval service by 2015 as a dedicated medium sized multi-role shipborne helicopter. This would replace the Z-9C and complement the Ka-28 Helix. In early 2006, an article reported a deal between China and Russia, which sees the PLANAF's acquisition of 40 Ka-29 assault transports, 20+ Ka-31 AEW helicopters (mounted with search radar) and up to 20 Be-200 jet amphibians. If this purchase goes ahead, this would represent a major step forward for the PLANAF in terms of capabilities. The KA-29 may form the first dedicated transport for the marine corps, the Ka-31's powerful radar can serve in over-thehorizon target acquisitions and early warning for Chinese surface ships, and the Be-200 jet amphibian would replace the SH-5 in maritime patrol duties and ASW. In addition PLANAF would undergo significant change once China's first aircraft carrier is fully operational. Near the end of October 2006, Russias Kommersant newspaper revealed that Russian state-run weapon exporter Rosoboronexport is completing negotiations with China to deliver up to 48 Sukhoi Su-33 (NATO codename: Flanker-D) carriercapable fighter aircraft in a purchase deal reportedly worth $2.5 billion. The Su-33 is a variant of Sukhois Su-27 Flanker with forward canards, foldings wings, an arrester hook, a reinforced structure, and other modifications that help it deal with carrier operations and landings. At present, reports regarding the sale and Chinas aircraft carrier intentions both remain somewhat murky. What is not in doubt, however, is that China has expressed interest and is presently in negotiations to acquire these aircraft, plus setting up a program to train naval air cadets, seems to be adding more credibility to the rumors. On June 4, 2009, UPI reported that Eastern European sources had reported that preparations had been completed to construct an Aircraft Carrier at Changxing Island Shipyard.[1] Current inventory[2] Fighter aircraft Shenyang J-8II Finback Chengdu J-7D/E Fishbed Sukhoi Su-30 MK2 Flanker (24) RECCE Harbin HZ-5 Beagle (phased out) Bomber and maritime strike aircraft Xian JH-7A Flounder (~52) Xian H-6D Badger (~26) Nanchang Q-5 Fantan (40) Maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft Shaanxi Y-8MPA (4) Shaanxi Y-8J - AEW (~2) Harbin SH-5 - ASW (4) Shaanxi Y-8 ELINT - ASW and AEW (~2) Beriev Be-6 Madge - ASW (phased out) Transports and trainers Xian Y-7 (variant of Antonov An-24 Coke) (~10) Nanchang CJ-6 (based on Yakovlev Yak-18A Max) Shenyang JianJiao JJ-6 Farmer Guizhou JianJiao JJ-7 Fishbed Mil Mi-8 Hip Antonov An-26 Curl Shaanxi Y-8 (based on Antonov An-12 Cub) Shijiazhuang Y-5 Yakovlev Yak-42 Clobber Aerial refueling Xian HY-6DU Badger Reserve aircraft Harbin H-5 Beagle - light bomber Shenyang J-6 Farmer - fighter Currently, helicopters are the only ship-based aircraft in the PLANAF. They include: Chenghe Z-8 - ASW (based on Arospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon) Harbin Z-9C - ASW/SAR (variant of Eurocopter SA 365 Dauphin) Kamov Ka-28 Helix - ASW Kamov Ka-27 Helix - ASW References ^ China ready to build its first aircraft carrier ^ Chinese military aviation OrBat External links sinodefense.com china-military.org

People's Liberation Army Navy - Air Force Branch

The PLA Navys aviation forces are known as Naval Aviation. Naval Aviation is ranked third in protocol order among the PLAN's five branches. Besides aircraft and airfields, Naval Aviation has subordinate antiaircraft artillery (AAA), radar, communications, chemical defense, aircraft maintenance, and logistics units, as well as various academies. The mission of the PLAN Air Force or PLANAF, is to provide air defense of ports and naval installations as well as air protection for fleet units. Other tasks that fall within its purview include ASuW, maritime reconnaissance, aerial minelaying, ASW operations, ground attack, and limited logistics support. The Naval Air Force would augment the PLAAF during hostilities (and vice versa). Naval Aviation is ranked third in protocol order among the PLANs five branches. Besides aircraft and airfields, Naval Aviation has subordinate antiaircraft artillery (AAA), radar, communications, chemical defense, aircraft maintenance, and logistics units, as well as various academies. The PLANAF operates a mixture of B-6 BADGER and B-5 BEAGLE bombers; Q-5 FANTAN, F-6 FARMER, and F-7 FISHBEDs. The PLANAF also fields SUPER FREOLON and DAUPHIN helicopters and small transports. An unidentified NAF Division is reported to have conducted a number of night training early 2003, conducting three night training exercises over water. This coupled with efforts to train ground crews in night operations allowed the division to more than double its night training time compared to previous years. This training was done to meet requirements of the new MTEP. The report goes on to state that the division created manuals for flight and ground crews on night operations, possibly indicating that the formulation of tactics and doctrine is evolving at the unit rather than national level. [Liberation Army Daily 8 Feb 2003 (PLA Activities Report February 2003)]

People's Liberation Army Navy - Air Force History

The Early Years Following its founding in April 1949, the PLAN issued its first three-year plan. The portions that pertained to creating an aviation branch included: Establishing three air divisions (one aerial mine-laying bomber division, one fighter division, and one division consisting of two ground-attack regiments and one fighter regiment) Establishing three aviation schools, which would train a total of 10,000 pilots and ground support personnel Building two to three Naval Aviation air-fields in each strategic combat area Purchasing 360 aircraft and necessary support equipment from the Soviet Union Although the advent of the Korean War did not allow the PLAN to fulfill its goals on schedule, the three-year plan laid the foundation for creating an aviation arm. Based on this plan, Naval Aviation had its origins when the CMC established the PLAN 1st Aviation School on 1 October 1950 at Qingdao on the Shandong peninsula. On 27 June 1952, the Naval Aviation 1st Division became operational at Shanghai Hongqiao air- field, followed by several Naval Aviation units, schools, and fleet aviation troops. This air division was manned with the first graduates of the aviation school at Qingdao. Naval Aviation celebrates 6 September 1952 as its founding, based on the following events: The Naval Aviation Department was established in Beijing as one of six separate administrative departments within PLAN Headquarters A Naval Aviation Headquarters was established at Liangxiang Airfield near Beijing Naval Aviation was designated one of the PLANs five operational branches, along with the submarine, surface, coastal defense, and Marine Corps branches Operational and Administrative Structure By the end of 1954, Naval Aviation had 5 air divisions and 1 independent regiment. By 1960, the force comprised 500 aircraft, which were organized into 9 divisions and 3 independent regiments. As of 2007, Naval Aviation has 7 air divisions assigned to 25 airbases located throughout the three fleets. After the Naval Aviation branch was established, the structure changed several times. Through April 1960, the Naval Aviation Department was responsible for implementing leadership over the aviation troops and schools. From May 1960 to January 1964, Naval Aviation units were placed under the three fleets, but simultaneously received leadership and command from the Naval Aviation Department. After January 1964, Naval Aviation units came under the leadership of the fleets, while the Naval Aviation Department was responsible for only Naval Aviation schools and for naval aviation unit functional, not operational, responsibilities. The Cultural Revolution Period By 1965, the PLAN had created 14 schools, including three aviation schools - 1st AviationSchool in Qingdao, Shandong (1950), 2nd Aviation School in Qingdao (1952), 4th Aviation School in Langzhong, Sichuan (1961). During he Cultural Revolution, however, severalschools were closed. Besides schools closing, the Cultural Revolution had disastrous consequences across the board for Naval Aviation. For example, Naval Aviation headquarters was abolished in November 1969 and was not reestablished until May 1978. Around 1986, the Naval Aviation Department was re-subordinated under the Headquarters Department at PLAN Headquarters. As part of its downsizing program in late 2003, the PLAN again abolished Naval Aviation Headquarters at Liangxiang Airfield near Beijing, which was a first-level MR deputy leader-grade organization equivalent to a fleet headquarters, but kept the Naval Aviation Department as a second-level department under the Headquarters Department at PLAN Headquarters. As a result of the PLAN's policies, Naval Aviation fighter and bomber pilots averaged less than 30 hours annually from 1965-1971. During 1968 alone, combat pilots averaged only 12.5 hours per year. In addition, from 1969-1977, Naval Aviation had more than 70 aircraft accidents that resulted in total loss of the aircraft and 62 pilot deaths. By the end of 1977, however, this trend began to turn around when Naval Aviation pilots flew more hours annually than they had since 1959. For example, in 1978, Naval Aviation pilots averaged just under 90 hours, which was the highest number of hours ever flown. Combat History On 18 March 1954, Naval Aviation engaged in its first air combat, and the last air combat took place on 10 February 1970 over Hainan. The PLAN states that its Naval Aviation pilots have shot down or damaged 40 aircraft and Naval Aviation AAA have shot down 380 aircraft, some of which were unmanned drones.

People's Liberation Army Navy - Naval Aviation Organizational Structure

Naval Aviation is composed of bomber, fighter- bomber, attack, fighter, antisubmarine and reconnaissance units, as well as warning, electronic countermeasure, transport, rescue, and air refueling units. Together, these aircraft have reconnaissance, security, antiship, antisubmarine, and air defense capabilities. The organizational order moves from the Naval Aviation Department through fleet aviation to air divisions and regiments. Today, as shown below, Naval Aviation has 7 air divisions, which are organized into air regiments and regiment-grade field stations, battalion-grade flight and maintenance groups, and company-grade flight and maintenance squadrons. Naval Aviation also has several independent regiments, such as its shipborne helicopter regiments. Each

fleet also has a radar brigade subordinate to Naval Aviation. In addition, the North Sea Fleet has a Naval Aviation AAA regiment. Naval Aviations air divisions and regiments are assigned to the following 25 airbases located throughout the three fleets: North Sea Fleet Anyang, Changzhi, Dalian, Jiaoxian, Jinxi, Jiyuan, Laishan, Laiyang, Liangxiang, Qingdao, Shanhaiguan, and Xingtai. East Sea Fleet Daishan, Danyang, Ningbo, Luqiao, Shanghai, and Shitangqiao. South Sea Fleet Foluo, Guiping, Haikou, Jialaishi, Lingling, Lingshui, and Sanya.

Pilot Recruitment and Training Historically, Naval Aviation pilot cadets were selected only from high school graduates, but that situation began to change in 2001, when Naval Aviation began selecting personnel who already had a bachelors degree from a PLAN academy. The high school graduate cadets receive their bachelors degree in one of two ways. They either attend their first two years at the PLANs Aviation Engineering College in Yantai, Shandong Province, or at the PLAAF Aeronautics University in Changchun, Jilin Province. After they complete their basic studies, they then spend two years in flight training at Naval Aviations only flying academy at Huludao, Liaoning Province, or one of the PLAAFs flight academies. After completing their bachelors degree, the new officer pilots attend about one year of transition training at the Naval Aviation base in Shanhaiguan, Hebei Province, in the North Sea Fleet. In 2001, Naval Aviation began training its first pilots who have bachelors degrees from one of several PLAN academies. After completing two years of basic flight training at a PLAAF flight academy in 2003, they received a second bachelors degree and were assigned to the Naval Aviation transition training base. After completing their transition training, they entered the operational force in mid-2004 After completing their transition training, all new Naval Aviation pilots are assigned to an operational unit where they receive their initial flight training in the units aircraft. Following two to three years of technical training and basic tactics training, the pilots can be awarded wings as a third-grade pilot. As their training continues, they have the opportunity to become a second-grade pilot by flying in day and night using instrument flight rules (IFR), maintaining flight safety, and reaching a certain proficiency level. Next, if they have conducted combat and training missions under day and night IFR conditions, flown a certain number of hours, reached the level of instructor pilot and flight controller, and maintained flight safety, they can become a first-grade pilot. Finally, they can become a special-grade pilot if they have made special achievements in combat, training, and test flights, and maintained flight safety. Unit Training As noted above, Naval Aviation has three phases of pilot training: academy, transition, and unit training. Phase 1 consists of aviation basic theory and technical flight training in a basic, intermediate, and advanced trainer at a flight academy. Phase 2 consists of transitioning into a combat aircraft and conducting basic combat technical training at a transition training unit. Phase 3 consists of tactics training in the primary combat aircraft at an operational unit. Naval Aviation also conducts training for its AAA, radar, communications, chemical defense, weather, aircraft maintenance, and logistics troops. Flying Hours and Content China does not provide public information about how many flying hours its Naval Aviation pilots receive each year. Each regiment has two quotas it must meet during the year. The first quota is a total number of hours. The second quota is the percentage of flight time dedicated to tactics training. Naval Aviation performs about 8.5% of each quota per month and usually completes its quota in mid-December. Based on information available in PLAN writings, it appears that Naval Aviation combat aircraft pilots average around 125 hours per year. Most units normally fly only three days per week. Each training sortie for fighter and attack aircraft averages around 45 minutes. Bomber sorties are longer. The PLAN divides the training day into three 8hour flying periods, and most training events occur within one of those periods. To meet the goals of the new OMTE, however, Naval Aviation has experimented with certain adjustments with the length of the flying periods, time per sortie, and content per sortie. Specifically, some units have been flying what the PLAN calls large flying periods that cross from one flying period into another. Some units have also increased the time per sortie and incorporated more training subjects per sortie. As a result, the total number of hours per pilot has not necessarily increased, but the number of sorties and flying periods has decreased to accomplish the same amount of training. More Rigorous Training Scenarios As Naval Aviation adapts to more offensive and defensive missions at further distances and the possibility of having its home air- fields destroyed or damaged by enemy missiles, it has changed the way its units and individuals train. In 1996, the North Sea Fleet formed a Blue Force aviation ground-attack unit that simulates enemy tactics. In addition, individual pilot training on simulators in all three fleets was not emphasized as much until the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) was implemented in 2002. The OMTE requires Naval Aviation pilots to conduct more rigorous training than before. For example, pilots fly more long-distance, over-water, cross-border missions during the day and night. Many of the flights are at minimum altitude (i.e., below 100 meters) or low altitude (above 100 meters) and in poor weather conditions. Vessels with helicopters have focused on helicopter operations during day and night that are gradually moving further from the vessel. The OMTE also requires Naval Aviation pilots to take more responsibility for building their own flight plans, rather than merely implementing flight plans developed by higher headquarters or someone else in the regiment. To train in a real-war situation, Naval Aviation has increased its training at unfamiliar airfields, in unfamiliar airspace, and under unknown conditions. Some training events include mobility transits to another airfield when an enemy attack is imminent. Naval Aviation divides the day into three flying periods and has increased its use of longer flying periods that transition from day into night, night into after midnight, and late night into day.

Naval Aviation is also now conducting some "rolling-type" training events that include activity through all three flying periods without rest. In addition, rather than conducting a single flight subject per sortie, Naval Aviation is now conducting two or more flight subjects per sortie. Attacks on surface vessels are now conducted from multiple altitudes and multiple directions by increasingly large groups of aircraft. To deal with the higher training tempo, Naval Aviation has begun placing greater emphasis on psychological and fatigue training for its pilots. Logistics and Maintenance To meet the needs of a more mobile force and to deal with possible damage to airfields and aircraft during a conflict, Naval Aviation field stations are moving from providing logistics and maintenance support for a single type of aircraft at home to supporting operations for multiple types of aircraft at home and during mobile operations. Naval Aviation is also practicing rapid repair of facilities, runways, and aircraft following an enemy attack. Naval Aviation airfields are also able to support visiting PLAAF and Army Aviation aircraft and helicopters for short periods of time as they transit within and between military regions. SYSTEM 1985 1990 1995 155 0 25 130 100 --100 600 -+ + + + + 19 15 5 ---Inventory 2000 2004 105 0 25 80 50 -20 30 358 42 66 250 --7 8 -4 4 1 -68 6 6 4 50 2 Rotary Anti-Submarine Warfare As-565 Ka-28 SA-321 Z-9 Z-8 Z-5 Transport Mi-8 ----68 --15 10 3 40 43 -4 15 12 12 -10 43 8 8 15 -12 -8 43 8 8 15 -12 -8 43 8 8 15 -12 -8 3 66 6 4 4 50 2 3 66 6 4 4 50 2 3 66 6 4 4 50 2 68 0 18 50 50 6 20 30 274 48 26 200 --7 8 -4 4 2005 68 0 18 50 50 24 20 30 274 48 26 200 --7 8 -4 4 2010 45 ? 10 10 25 80 24 50 30 225 55 20 150 --7 8 -4 4

Bomber H-10 H-6 H-5 Attack J-11 JH-7 Q-5 Fighters J-8 J-7 J-6 J-5 J-4 RECCE HZ-5

BACFIRE BADGER BEAGLE FLANKER FBC-1 FANTAN

Tu-22M Tu-16 Il-28 Su-30MK2

Fixed-Wing 180 160 0 0 50 30 130 130 ---600 -+ + + + 50 --50 600 -+ + + +

FISHBED FARMER FRESCO

MiG-21 MiG-19 MiG-17

H-5

Anti-Submarine Warfare Be-6 PS-5 Y-8 CUB An-12 AEW Y-8 CUB An-12

----

----

Aerial Refueling HY-6 Transport An-26 Y-8 CUB Y-7 Y-5 YAK-42

An-12 An-24

Naval Air Force, NSF

The North Sea Fleet is believed to be comprised of roughly two fighter divisions, a bomber division, a training regiment, a water plane regiment, a shipboard helicopter unit, and a radar brigade. An unidentified naval air force division attached to North Sea Fleet's Naval Air Force conducted three, over the sea, night exercises in January 2003. Reports indicate that the training plan for 2003 conists of more than twice the amount of night time training flights conducted in previous years. The division has also intensified training of ground crews to prepare them for night operations. [Liberation Army Daily, 08 Feb 2003 (PLA Activities Report February 2003)] On January 23, 2003 an unidentified NAF division organized a combat readiness exercise. The exercise simulated an attack on the airfield by enemy aircraft. Multiple sorties were reported to have surged. [People's Navy, 18 Feb 2003 (PLA Activities Report February 2003)] In early February 2003 a new type of combat aircraft from an unidentified NAF Regiment, from NSF, completed a long-distance trans-regional training flight across five air regions. The exercise showed that the emergency mobile operations capability of the regiment and its adaptability to training in different places have been enhanced. [People's Navy, 18 Feb 2003 (PLA Activities Report February 2003)]

North Sea Fleet

Harbin-Shuangcheng 1st Independent Regiment Y8X Y8J Y8JB 9xx1 Jiaozhou 5th Fighter/Ground Attack Division 5/ 15th Air Regiment J8FH 83x5x In 2007 the J8A was replaced by J8F. Earlier this Regiment was based on Qingdao-Liuting Jincheng (Changzhi) 4th Independent Regiment Mi-8 Ka-28 9xx4 Laiyang 1st Independent Regiment Y8J Y8(DZ) 9xx1 Liangxiangzhen 2nd Independent Regiment An-26 Y7 Y8 9xx2 Liangxiangzhen PLANAF HQ Air Regiment Yak-42D B-401x Qingdao-Cangkou 6th Independent Regiment SA321Ja Z8JH Z9C Y5 9xx6 SAR equipped SA365N replaced Z9Cs. Earlier this Regiment was reported on the northerly located Qingdao-Liuting.At Cangkou also a Technical School is located. Qingdao Naval Base 3rd Independent Regiment SH5 9xx3 Qinhuangdao/Shanhaiguan 7th Air Division 20th Air Regiment JH7A 82x7x In 2009 Q5 aircraft were replaced by JH7A Yantai Laishan 5th Fighter/Ground Attack Division 5/ 14th Air Regiment JH7A 82x5x JH7As replaced Q5s around 2006 Naval Aviation Air Academy The Flight Training Institute is also known as Air Academy Air Regiment CJ6A 81x0x Huludao Air Regiment Y5 93x0 Huludao Air Regiment Y7 82x0x Xingcheng Air Regiment H5 83x0x Xingcheng Air Regiment Mi-8 93x0 Xingcheng Air Regiment JL8 84x0x Jincheng (Changzhi) Bomber Trainer Regiment Y7 HYJ7 90x0 Air Regiment Z9C 98x0 Unknown

East Sea Fleet

Danyang 1st Bomber Division 1 1st Air Regiment H6G 81x1x Feidong 4th Fighter Division 4 10th Air Regiment Su-30MK2 81x4x Luqiao 4th Fighter Division 4 12th Air Regiment J7EH 83x4x Ningbo Zhangquio 4th Fighter Division 4 12th Air Regiment J7EH 83x4x It has to be confirmed that the 12th Regiment (former J6) still uses Ningbo airbase. Shanghai-Dachang 6th Ground Attack Division 6 16th Air Regiment JH7 81x6x Yiwu 6th Ground Attack Division 6 17th Air Regiment JH7 82x6x The 17th Air Regiment was based at Shanghai-Dachang using J6. J6s were replaced by JH7 end 2003 and the Regiment relocated to the former Air Force Air Base near Yiwu. Mid 2006 62x6x aircraft were still noted at Dachang however! 7th Independent Regiment Y7 Sa321Ja Z8 Z8E 9xx7 The fleet this regiment reports to has to be confirmed

South Sea Fleet

Guiping/Mengshu 3rd Bomber Division 3 8th Air Regiment H6D HU6D 82x3x Jialaishi 8th Fighter Division 8 24th Air Regiment J7II 83x8x Earlier this regiment was reported at Haikou. The 22nd Regiment used to fly here with J6 that are now stored on the base.. Ledong/Foluo Northeast 9th Fighter Division 9 27th Air Regiment JH7A 83x9x In August 2004 the first JH7A's for the 27th Regiment were noted. J7IIs used by this regiment most probably went to the 24th Regiment Lingshui 9th Fighter Division 9 25th Air Regiment J8H 81x9x JJ6 83x9x (JJ6) In 2007 the J8H replaced the J8Ds within the 25th Regiment.

People's Liberation Army Navy - Coastal Defense

The PLA Navys coastal defense forces are composed primarily of shore-to-ship missile units and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units. The PLAN usually lists the coastal defense forces as fourth in protocol order among its five branches. However, the PLAN provides very little public coverage of the coastal defense forces compared to the other branches. History The coastal defense forces were officially established in 1950 with the opening of the Coastal Artillery School in August and the creation of the first coastal artillery battalion in October. In 1952, PLAN Headquarters created a Coastal Defense Department within the Headquarters Department. Today, PLAN Headquarters, each fleet headquarters, and each support base with subordinate coastal defense units has a coastal defense troop administrative organization in the Headquarters Department. During 1951, the PLAN created several coastal artillery regiments, which were subordinate to either a base or a naval garrison. In 1955, a mobile coastal artillery regiment was established along with several independent coastal artillery battalions. In 1963, the PLAN began equipping its coastal defense forces with fixed and mobile shore-toship missiles. By the end of the 1960s, these missiles were organized into either regiments or battalions and were subordinate to either a fleet headquarters or a base. The PLAN states that, since being created in the 1950s, the coastal defense forces have, either independently or in coordination with the ground forces or other PLAN branches, participated in more than 400 combat operations. During these operations, the coastal defense forces sank or damaged more than 70 vessels and shot down or damaged more than 40 aircraft. As of 2007, the coastal defense forces shore-to-ship missiles are organized into either regiments or battalions, and AAA are organized into regiments. In some cases, shore-to-ship missiles and AAA are combined into a single regiment. Each regiment and battalion is subordinate to afleet headquarters or a support base. However, not every fleet has the same type of units. The figure below shows the current organizational structure for the three fleets.

China Coast Guard

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Branch Type Flag The China Coast Guard (Simplified Chinese: ) serves as a coordinating body for maritime search and rescue in the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China. The China Coast Guard is the maritime branch of the Public Security Border Troops, a paramilitary police force under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Function The CCG is known to perform mostly coastal and ocean search and rescue or patrols. Equipment The CCG has received quite a few large patrol ships that would significantly enhance their operations. Hai Guang, militia, police and other services operate hundreds of small patrol craft. For maritime patrol services, these craft are usually quite well armed with machine guns and 37mm AA guns. In addition, these services operate their own small aviation units to assist their maritime patrol capabilities. CCG operates a handful of Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and a maritime patrol aircraft based on the Harbin Y12 STOL transport. Roles Roles of the CCG are diverse but include: Patrol of territorial waters and disputed territories Anti-smuggling, anti-piracy Maritime policing and ship inspections Harbour and coastal security Research and survey Search and Rescue Fisheries protection Command Unlike US or Japan, the Chinese Coast Guard is not under an independent command. Instead, they are part of the armed police, under the local (provincial) border defense force command. The largest operational unit of the CCG is a CCG flotilla, which is a regimental-level unit in Chinas military administrative hierarchy. Every coastal province has 1 to 3 Coast Guard flotillas. Currently there are twenty CCG flotillas across the country.: Fujian o 1st Flotilla - Fuzhou o 2nd Flotilla - Quanzhou o 3rd Flotilla - Xiamen Guangdong o 1st Flotilla - Guangzhou o 2nd Flotilla - Shantou o 3rd Flotilla - Zhanjiang Guangxi o 1st Flotilla - Beihai o 2nd Flotilla - Fangchenggang Hainan o 1st Flotilla - Haikou o 2nd Flotilla - Sanya Hebei with 1 Flotilla - Qinhuangdao Jiangsu with 1 Flotilla - Taicang People's Armed Police Coast Guard

Liaoning

1st Flotilla - Dalian 2nd Flotilla - Dandong Shandong o 1st Flotilla - Weihai o 2nd Flotilla - Qingdao Shanghai with 1 Flotilla - Shanghai Tianjin with 1 Flotilla - Tianjin Zhejiang o 1st Flotilla - Taizhou o 2nd Flotilla - Ningbo Ships Typical Coast Guard ships include the 130 ton Type 218 patrol boat, armed with twin 14.5mm machine guns, assorted speedboats, and few larger patrol ships. Up until very recently, the largest ship in Chinese Coast Guard service was the 1,500 ton Haixun-class Cutter (#1001). In March 2007, it was reported that the PLAN has transferred 2 Jianghu FFG's (#509 & #510) to the Coast Guard and re-numbered 1002 & 1003. These 2 ships now represent the largest vessels in the Coast Guard inventory. Training The Chinese Coast Guard conducts periodic joint-training sessions with other navies, including the US Coast Guard service.[1] The Chinese Coast Guard also participates in the annual North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum in Alaska, along with US, Canadian, Japanese, S. Korean, and Russian Coast Guards. As part of an exchange program, members of the Chinese Coast Guard service have been assigned to serve on U.S. Coast Guard cutters.[2] Notes 1. ^ Logon Form 2. ^ RealClearPolitics - Articles - U.S. Coast Guard Has Chinese aboard See also People's Liberation Army Navy People's Armed Police China Maritime Safety Administration another Coast Guard force. External links (English) CCG - Chinese Defence Today (Chinese) China Maritime Safety Administration official website (Chinese) State Oceanic Administration (Chinese)/(English) Aid to navigation (Chinese)/(English) China Hidrography (Chinese)/(English) China Rescue & Salvage

o o

China Maritime Safety Administration

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Formed Headquarters Minister responsible Parent agency

1949 Beijing Li Jiaxiang, Vice Minister of Transport Ministry of Transport www.msa.gov.cn/ (Chinese)

The China Maritime Safety Administration (Chinese: ) is a government agency which cordinates maritime search and rescue in the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China. The CMSA is part of the Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China Administrative Structure The agency is organized into the following structure: Major Functions Safety Management of Shipping Company Survey of Ships Flag State Control Port State Control Prevention of Pollution from Ships Safe Carriage of Dangerous Goods Training, Examination and Certification of Seafarers Seafarers' Passports Aids to Navigation Hydrographic Survey Marine Traffic Control China Ship Reporting System (CHISREP)

Navigational Warnings and Notices Vessel Traffic Service Maritime Search and Rescue Marine Accident Investigation Education and Training International Cooperation Law Enforcement Operational organization The MSA operates primarily along the PRC coastline and Yangtze River, Pearl River and Heilongjiang Rivers. The MSA maintains 20 Regional MSAs, one per coastal province, under which 97 local branches have been established. Regional MSAs Changjiang MSA Fujian MSA Guangdong MSA Guangxi MSA Hainan MSA Hebei MSA Heilongjiang MSA Jiangsu MSA Liaoning MSA Shandong MSA Shanghai MSA Shenzhen MSA Tianjin MSA Zhejiang MSA Strength The MSA's 25,000 officials, other working staff, operate a patrol force of 1,300 vessels and watercraft of various types. These include 207 patrol vessels of 20 meters and greater length, 2 are 100 meters and above, 2 are 60 meters and above, 18 are 40 meters and above, 59 are 30 meters and above and 126 are 20 meters and above. Fleet Haixun 31 Patrol Ship Haixun 21 Patrol Ship Haijing 31025 RHIB Harbin Z-9 helicopter Eurocopter EC 135 Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation CA109 See also China Coast Guard International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea External links China Maritime Safety Administration official website (English) China Maritime Safety Administration official website (Chinese) State Oceanic Administration (Zhong ghuo hai jian) (Chinese) Aid to navigation (Chinese)/(English) China Hydrography(Chinese)/(English)

An MSA cutter on the Grand Canal of China off Yangzhou

People's Liberation Army Navy Uniforms Military dress uniform

1. Style: Open-necked coat with picked lapel and square laps. Two lower insert pockets with flap. Toothed-edges (distinguishing type of service) at collar edge, sleeve cuffs and out-seams on trousers. Western-style trousers in dark greenish brown (Army), gray (Navy) or deep sky-blue (Air Force.) 2. Material: Thin whipcord 3. Decorations: Big cap insignia, hard epaulets, collar insignias, tie, tie bar, service mark tag, identity tag, aiguillette. 4. Cap: Peak hat. 5. Shoes: Leather.

Military dress uniform for the Navy's male officers

Military dress uniform for the Navy's female officers

Spring/autumn military service uniform Suit-style spring/autumn military service uniform for the Army's male officers 1. Style Suit-style military service uniform for officers. Jacket-style military service uniform for noncommissioned officers and soldiers. Suit-style: Straight collar coat with small notch lapel and shoulder straps. Four buttons on flap. Loose lap and sleeve cuffs. Two upper patch pockets with a button on each flap. Two lower slit pockets. No upper pockets for females. Jacket-style: Broad lap and 3-button-through flap, tight sleeve cuffs, double piping pockets with zippers for female uniforms. Trousers: Western-style with vertical pockets. 2. Colours: Bright greenish-brown for the Army. Dark blue for the Navy. Bright sky-blue for the Air Force. 3. Material: 45/55 wool-terylene blended serge 4. Decorations: Big cap insignia, mid-sized cap insignia, hard epaulets, collar insignias, tie, tie bar, service mark tag, armband. Identity tag, aiguillette and peak cap for officers on protocol occasions. 5. Caps: Peak hat, beret. 6. Shoes: Leather.

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's female officers

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Jacket-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Jacket-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's female officers

Jacket-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Suit-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Jacket-style spring autumn military service uniform for the Navy's male officers

Sailor dress

Sailor dress

Summer military service uniform 1. Style Shirts: Convertible collars, two upper out pockets, circular lap, flap with front welt with six buttons through. Yoke on the back. Trousers: Western-style with slash pockets. Additional pistol pocket for males. Skirts: Front open with out pocket. Five buttons. Cloth belt. Slash pockets on both sides. 2. Colours: Bright greenish brown for the Army. Grey for the Navy. Bright sky-blue for the Air Force. The colours of trousers and skirts are the same as those of Spring/Autumn military service uniform. 3. Material: 65/35 terylene-cotton, yarn-dyed fabric for long-sleeve shirts. Jungang woollen-cloth for short-sleeve shirts, trousers and skirts. 4. Decorations: Mid-sized cap insignia, soft epaulets, service mark tag, armband, tie and tie bar. 5. Caps: Peak hat, beret. 6. Shoes: Leather/rubber.

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Summer military service uniform for the Navy

Ceremonial uniform and cap of the Chinese Navy