Back to the Beginning Postmodern Platos by Catherine H. Zuckert Review by: Stanley Rosen The Review of Politics, Vol.

59, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 162-164 Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408129 . Accessed: 02/07/2013 20:16
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with Nietzsche's double lights this difficultyquite effectively.In accordance rhetoric,will to power has two meanings:creativefreedomand fundamental chaos. Rosen's claim is that the chaos, which is also materialnecessity, destroys the freedom. Thus Rosen illuminates the task that is still left to Lampertand others to confrontthis apparentdifficulty more directly and discursively. In the end, setting themside by side, Rosen'sand Lampert's books may leave one wondering who Nietzsche is. This would have to be determined decisively beforeone could draw any conclusionsaboutNietzsche'srelation to Strauss.But thereare other,more pressing reasons to want to know who Nietzsche is. Nietzsche is the most popular philosopher in America today and his influencecontinuesto grow. Muchof Nietzsche'simpacton American society comes through his influence on popular culture, which makes him hard to see but gives him great sway. Herr Nietzsche has been and continues to be injectedinto our veins inconspicuously,initially unfelt and unnoticed,but his influencewends its way throughthe channelsof our life and will eventually reach our hearts and brains.This ever growing, often influencemakes the questionof who Nietzsche is much more subterranean, than a mere academiccuriosity.Is this foreignsubstancethatis invading the body of America malignant or benign? Rosen's and especially Lampert's books already begin to answer the question of who Nietzsche is, and the differencesbetween the two point the way for necessaryfuturework. -Michael W. Grenke

BACK TO THE BEGINNING Platos.(Chicago and London: The CatherineH. Zuckert: Postmodern 351. of 1996. $56. $19.95,paper.) Press, University Chicago Pp. This is an interestingand valuablebook. CatherineZuckertattemptsto of Nietzsche and Heidegger prepare explain how the Plato interpretations the thought of three important"postmodern" figures:H. G. Gadamer,Leo Strauss, and Jacques Derrida. The term "postmodern"refers here to the thesis that modernity is coterminouswith the crisis of the western philoof the natureand sophical tradition,a crisis thatdemands a reconsideration even possibility of philosophy as it was defined for our traditionby Plato. Despite differencesamong the personnel of her drama, Zuckertshows us that their understandingof philosophy entails, when it does not explicitly make fundamental,a politicalteachingor program.The individualchapters are of varying interest,but never sink below the level of competence.Given the extentof her thesis and the complexityof the many textsshe surveys, it is inevitablethat Zuckertfrequentlylapses into surveys of what will be familiar to specialists. I believe that the thought of the two ostensibly central figures, Nietzsche and Heidegger,is too complex to be successfully treated in a chapter each. One might wish to justify Zuckert'sprocedure on the

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grounds that Nietzsche and Heidegger are no more the main figures of this book than is Plato, to whom no chapteris devoted. A simple counting of chapters,togetherwith attentionto variousremarks by the authorin her text and footnotes, suggests very strongly that the real hero of this book is Leo Strauss, and that the "second lead" is JacquesDerrida,who on Zuckert's analysis comes surprisinglyclose to Strausson many points, despite radical differencesin theirdevelopment.Of the nine chaptersin Zuckert'sbook, the middle threeare devoted to Strauss,who also appearsvery favorablyin the ninth and last chapter,and to whom, indeed, the last word is given in such a way as to underlinehis prominence.Derridais assigned two chapters,but he is subjected to judicious criticism,whereas I was unable to find any criticalor negative remarksaddressed to Strauss. The central theme of the book is the understanding by Zuckert's protagonistsof Plato'sphilosophy in one of two ways: namely, either as an ontology (Heidegger, Derrida) or as a recommendationof a way of life (Gadamer,Strauss).Nietzsche deconstructsthe Platonicontology but also sees clearly the political nature of Platonism.Zuckertemphasizes that the notion of legislation is for Nietzsche central to the Platonicconception of philosophy, and thatNietzsche criticizedPlatofor disguising thatnature.A second way of stating the centraltheme is to say that for all of the thinkers studied, philosophy, in the sense of the knowledge of the truth about the whole, i.e. the eternal order, as exemplified by the so-called doctrine of Platonic Ideas, is impossible. Nietzsche and Heidegger, each in his own way, wished to replacephilosophy with a new beginning;Zuckertperhaps does not emphasize sufficiently the emptiness of these invocations to a postphilosophicalactivityor way of life. I will come backto this point below. Gadamer sees Platonic sound,therebydeviating philosophyas fundamentally from his teacherHeidegger;but this is because philosophy is for him not a not an ontologybut a way of life,namely,the perpetual doctrineand certainly attemptto establisha humancommunitythroughdialecticor the discussion of unanswerablequestions,a discussion that is historicallyconditionedand hence always subjectto furtherinterpretation. Straussalso rejects,or casts considerabledoubt on, the traditionalview that Platonismis centrallythe theoryof Ideas.As Zuckertpresentshim, Straussholds thatphilosophy is a way of life, also devoted to the askingof questions,but contraryto Gadamer, not historical or endlessly open to reinterpretation because, for reasons which are explainedneitherby Zuckertnor by Strauss,we are in a position to pose the fundamental thefundamental questions,andeven further possible answers to these questions, but never to decide which of these answers is correct.As Zuckertnotes, Strausshas been accused of nihilism;one might restatethisby saying thathe seems to be as muchof a historicistas Gadamer, despite his repudiationof historicism,since we can hardlybe said to know the fundamentalquestions, let alone the fundamentalalternativeanswers, unless we know the foundations.Butthe closestStrausscomes to saying that we know, or can know, the foundations,is with referenceto the naturalends of human moral and political life. This seems to make philosophy political rather than theoretical. I might mention in parentheses that Strauss's presentationof Socratesas the exemplarof the politicalversion of wisdom

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or the philosophical way of life is certainly "exoteric"(to use his own technicalterm),since Straussknew and often noted that for Plato,virtue is nothing otherthanwisdom. In otherwords, even thoughAristotleseparates theoryfrompractice(as well as production),whereas Platodoes not, the net result is that for Aristotle, there is such a thing as a good or natural or healthypoliticallife, and hence theremust be practicalwisdom, whereas for Plato this makesno sense: the only good life is philosophy,and certainlynot the political life. I lack the space to expand on this remark and replace it with the following point. Zuckertregularlydefends Straussfrom the chargeof nihilism, that is, from historicismand relativism,by saying that he both defines philosophy as a way of life and praises the Socraticway of life. But on the terms of Strauss'sexoteric teaching,which Zuckertseems to believe is his genuine or "esoteric"teaching,political knowledge, that is, knowledge of the ends of man, is independentof the knowledge of thewhole (p. 259) and so cannot be said to constitute genuine knowledge, despite the exoteric assurancethat it does. Derridais thus correct,on this basis, in saying that if we rejectthe notion of a naturalorder, it makes no sense to talk of human nature.In otherwords, the praiseof the Socraticway of life makessense as a contra-nihilisticcelebrationof philosophy if and only if Socrates'way of life is guided by or culminates in knowledge of what we may call here "the Ideas."Nothing containedin Strauss'sexotericteaching,and so of course in Zuckert'spresentationof it or her criticismof Derrida,preserves Strauss from Derrideandeconstruction.Strauss is on this analysis on a par with Nietzsche, Heidegger,and anyoneelse who claims thatphilosophy is a way of life but not a teaching.Thereare many ways of life, some (but not all) of which contradicteach other on decisive points yet agree in calling themselves philosophical.If theoreticalknowledge is impossibleand philosophy must be replacedeitherby poetry or by politics (which I take to be the rival alternativesoffered by Zuckert'sprotagonists),then of course beings are effectively replacedby theirpoetic or politicaltraces.The second lead turns out, perhaps behind the back of the author,to be the hero, or the one who wins the heroine:not truth, but endless chatter.Can we be blamed if we thinkhere, not of the cunning of reasonbut of its imbecility? I admireZuckert'sbook and thereforeI have takenher seriously. None of my reservationsabout the success of her defense of Strauss affect that high opinion or my strong recommendation.Her accounts of Strauss and Derridaare especiallystimulating;indeed, I know of no superioranalysisof Strauss'sexotericdoctrineof comparableconcision. I wish only to indicate that my even higher opinion of Straussis based upon the fact that whereas his exoteric teaching is like silver, and hence quite valuable, it is not as valuable as gold. But was there a golden apple concealedwithin the silver filigree?Interestedreadersmust take a look for themselves.Palineksarches, as Socratessays. We are still waiting for a persuasive defense of the philosophical way of life. Perhaps this is because there is no such defense, or because such a defense is superfluousfor the philosopherand implausible for the non-philosopher. Whatever the correct answer, Zuckert'sbook is helpful in our own attemptsto pose the fundamentalquestions. -Stanley Rosen

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