The Five Power Defence Arrangements and ASEAN Security Community: Overlapping Interests or Stumbling Block?

Matthew Hanzel*) ABSTRACT Approaching a more comprehensive ASEAN Security Community, the member states are facing security options among themselves, which somehow show disbelieve to the ASEAN as an institution. One of such options taken is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which involves two ASEAN members and three other countries. Established during a very contentious time in the region in 1971, the threat seems to be altogether reduced, while the presence itself raises questions, whether it is at the best interests for the region, or that there is any concerns that the ASEAN will never be able to come in time if there is any security problem in the region. This paper will examine the presence of FPDA as a tool of interest for its members and how it stands today with the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community. Keywords: ASEAN, FPDA, Singapore, Malaysia, regional security

I. Introduction Approaching the completion of ASEAN Political-Security Community, more questions appear than answers on whether ASEAN can be a strong institution in terms of maintaining security in the region. As the goal is closing by, it seems that ASEAN is still far from such ideal. There are many reasons that can be attributed to explain the problem, yet this paper will discuss one of the reasons, which is the remaining distrust, through a security agreement known as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Even though ASEAN looks like a regional organization trying to maintain stability in the region, the fact is far from perfect. There are in fact on-going
*)

Matthew Hanzel is a fourth-year undergraduate student of Department of International Relations, Universitas Pelita Harapan.

conflicts and disputes among ASEAN member states, to mention some, the armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple, and border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus, ASEANs security ideals should be put under scrutiny. No wonder, with the on-going problems, there are distrusts that lead sub-regional security arrangements to exist, such as the FPDA. This paper therefore will use the FPDA as an example to discuss the distrust and its impact to ASEANs ideals as a security community. This paper will ultimately try to answer whether the existing presence of FPDA will constitute an overlap of or a stumbling block to greater security cooperation among ASEAN member states, which in turn may be problematic to ASEANs dream of creating a Political-Security Community in the nearest future. II. About the FPDA The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was formed in 1971 to replace the former Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) formed in 1957. FPDA consists of five countries: two of them are ASEAN member states Malaysia and Singapore, two are neighboring regions Australia and New Zealand, and the last is the United Kingdom. The context of the establishment of AMDA is on the threat of Confrontation between the Malaya Federation (who was planning an expansion) and Indonesia (who was disagree with such expansion). Therefore, it was considered a necessity for the young Federation to protect itself from possible attacks, and the British troops were present in the territory at that period of time.1 FPDA was established to succeed AMDA due to the concern that the withdrawal of British forces from the region will leave a gap to the Malaysian and Singaporean defense, especially the air defense.2 When AMDA is succeeded by

How Son Khoo, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke...," Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, October 2000: 107-114. 2 Damon Bristow, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization," Contemporary Southeast Asia (Institute of Southease Asian Studies) 27, no. 1 (April 2005): 4.

FPDA, the arrangement changes from commitment to help the other parties during times of attack to mere consultation. The consultation provided by the three outer-regional partners was destined to provide psychological deterrence, while also performing a confidence-building measure between Malaysia and the newly independent Singapore.3 Meanwhile, the British power wanted to provide both Singapore and Malaysia aid, for a few years as they developed their own defence capabilities.4 The existence of FPDA, while without potential existing military power within the region, is not without rejection. Indonesia is one of the staunch opponents of the presence of FPDA in the region, cited to be inappropriate and demanded for its replacement with inter-regional partners in the 1990s, only to soften the approach in the 1990s.5 Indonesias response to FPDA is described as lukewarm following the repeated behind-the-scenes objections.6 FPDA also faced skepticism, especially on the reason on why the British found it necessary to form the FPDA, so much that FPDA was suggested to be a, temporary arrangement to allow the British to get out of their commitments east of Suez.7 In recent years, typically after the Cold War, FPDA is still considered as relevant by the five members, in which member states regularly conduct highlevel meetings between the ministers of defense. One form of realization of the cooperation within the arrangements is the joint military training known as the Bersama Lima (five together) between the member states.8 The FPDA consists of three main pillars, which are the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), which remains the only standing component of the

Ralf Emmers, "The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture," RSIS Working Paper, April 2010: 7-9. 4 Allan Crowe, The Five Power Defence Arrangements (Canberra: Government of the Commonwealth of Australia on behalf of the FPDA Consultative Council, 2001): 3. 5 Ibid.: 8-9. 6 Bristow, loc. cit.: 9. 7 Kin Wah Chin, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After," Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 193-203, as mentioned also by Bristow, loc. cit.: 5. 8 Olivia Siong, Five Power Defence Arrangement key to regional peace, security, November 1, 2011, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1162917/1/.html (accessed December 28, 2012).

arrangements; the military-political consultation, which becomes the main pillar of the arrangements; and lastly the joint exercise between the member states.9 III. FPDA as a Tool of Interest The role of FPDA can be seen through the perspective of realism in terms of power and security. Being one of the great theories of International Relations, realism focuses on national interest, power politics, military, and security.10 Realists believe that states will focus more on their national interests, and the conduct of international relations is based for the benefit and fulfillment of their national interests. Meanwhile, states behavior is determined by distribution of power, and states must remain aware of the possible acquirement of additional power by other states (especially the neighboring states) that may endanger their own security.11 One of the evidences on how FPDA constitutes a realization of national interest on the realists perspective is the way Singapore views the establishment, role, and presence of FPDA in relations to the Singaporean defense. Through the Singaporean perspective, FPDA is portrayed as a kind of savior or helper, especially during the establishment of Singapore Armed Forces after its independence in 1965. The context is that during that period of time, Singapore perceived numerous threats to its existence: Indonesias Confrontation through the 1960s, the fear of Malaysias political disagreement that may impact Singapores existence, and the impending British withdrawal from the region by the 1970s.12 How can FPDA be helpful for Singapore in building the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) can be seen through the following statistics, regarding the number of standing army. Bearing in mind that Singapore gains its independence in 1965
Bristow, loc. cit.: 1-20. Marc A. Genest, "Realist Theory," in Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations, 42-44 (Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004). 11 Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Rafferty, Introduction to Global Politics (New York City, New York: Routledge, 2008): 19-20. 12 Lawrence Leong, "Rethinking the British Legacy British Withdrawal and Origins of the Singapore Armed Forces, 1966-1971," Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces (Singapore Armed Forces) 37, no. 2 (2011): 22-31.
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and that FPDA is formed in 1971, the following data, with careful observation of the timeframe, may show that the SAF and the Singaporean national defense did grow during the time of FPDAs existence. Year 1967 1970 1980 1989 14,000 42,000 Data not available Active Duty Personnel13 50014 6,000 50,000 140,000 Reserves

Table 1: Number of personnel on active duty and reserves from the decades of 1960s-1980s. Mind that FPDA is formed in 1971.

What is also interesting is how Singapore developed its arsenal with amazing pace during its first decade of existence. In the 1970s alone Singapore tripled its active duty personnel while multiplying its reserve eight times. At the same time, Singapore started conscription (obligatory military service for Singaporeans that are qualified), establishing flying school (for the Air Force) with the help of the British military (!), establishing new maritime command, renewing weaponry system, even producing own ammunition, small arms, and purchasing tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft.15 As a result, Singapore today has greater ratio of active military personnel per total population compared to Indonesia, once perceived as a threat to its existence.

Rodney P. Kats, Growth of the Armed Forces, Library of Congress Federal Research Division, December 1989, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sg0141) (accessed December 30, 2012). 14 An initial number of personnel first trained at Israel to form the Singapore Armed Forces. See ibid. 15 Ibid.

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Singapore Number of active military personnel Ratio of active military personnel per total population Ratio of active military personnel per territory defended (in personnel per sq km) 103.30 72,000 (2011)16 1.34%18

Indonesia 438,410 (2011)17 0.17%19

0.23

Table 2: A comparison between today's Singaporean and Indonesian military personnel

Aside from other variables that may contribute to Singapores military growth, the great leap that happened after FPDA entered into force cannot be easily dismissed. Singapore fulfills what matters most to its national interest, which is to create a strong defense mechanism to ensure its national sovereignty and existence. In a theoretical, and interest-fulfillment perspective, how can Singapore use FPDA as a tool of interest? The utilization of FPDA as a tool of interest to provide a psychological deterrence is true as an option of foreign policy making, since a considerably weaker state (here, Singapore, newly independent, without a developed military power) found it necessary to cooperate with stronger states (such as the United Kingdom) to balance neighboring states that were stronger, especially Indonesia.20

Global Fire Power, Singapore Military Strength, July 7, 2011, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Singapore (accessed December 30, 2012). 17 Global Fire Power, Indonesia Military Strength, June 30, 2011, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Indonesia (accessed December 30, 2012). 18 Central Intelligence Agency, Singapore, December 5, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html (accessed December 30, 2012). 19 Central Intelligence Agency, Indonesia, December 13, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (accessed December 30, 2012). 20 U.S. Army War College, Guide to National Security Issues, 3rd Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., Vol. II (U.S. Army War College, 2008): 125-126.

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Therefore, it is justified to think FPDA from a national interest perspective, that FPDA is a useful instrument for member states (as shown by the example of Singapore), that it is paramount for the Southeast Asian member states to maintain their existence by cooperating with stronger states to deter other (neighboring) states from overpowering.21 Thus, it limits the full purpose of FPDA, in terms of interest, to the state-level perspective of fulfillment of national interest of the member states. IV. The Regional Situation Today: ASEAN In a greater map, it is interesting to understand that both ASEAN and FPDA were destined to create a regional balance of power a tenet of realists that states should prevent other states from being too powerful22 especially considering Indonesia as the de facto leader of the region. The issues of sovereignty and national survival become the paramount interests behind the establishment of ASEAN.23 During the same period of time, the Cold War was around the height, Communism started to penetrate the Indochina, typically Vietnam, while the United States and the British allies (such as Singapore and Malaysia) tried to maintain security interests with the outerregional powers.24 Indonesia, on the same time, was one major problem, typically during the Confrontation, and the close ties with Communist powers such as China and North Vietnam. Only after President Sukarno was deposed, the founding members can trust that Indonesia could be a peaceful regional leader that would not be as threatening for the neighboring countries.25

States may cooperate as such to balance other states that are considerably stronger, while there is a belief that usage (or development) of military power will be counterproductive. See U.S. Army War College, ibid.: 126. 22 Mansbach and Rafferty, op. cit.: 20. 23 Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism," in International Relations of Asia, 195-214 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008):198. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.

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FPDA has a similar origin: maintaining sovereignty. Indonesias significant military power in the 1960s (significant due to the formation of Malaysia and Singapore) could eliminate the two newly independent states. It was really close: Indonesia did commit attacks (or, as one observer says, terrorist attacks) to Malaysian soil.26 The establishment of FPDA was also signified by the existing distrust, typically from the Singaporean government, to Indonesia, inasmuch that Singapore was afraid that Indonesia would potentially become a regional hegemon.27 ASEAN, as the larger regional framework where FPDA is located, is well known for the distrust between the member states. The following statement may summarize the above point: The founding members of ASEAN were suspicious of models based on supranational institutions, such as those established in Europe, and instead favoured principles of informality (as distinct from formal institution-building), flexibility and consensus decision-making. These attributes have been described by both ASEAN leaders and commentators alike as the ASEAN Way.28 This principle, embraced by the ASEAN members, should be put under scrutiny when the organization puts the gear into a closer regional integration through the ASEAN Charter, signed and entered into force in 2007. The goal of creating three distinct communities that will involve ASEANs civil societies, namely: the Political-Security Community, the Economic Community, and the Socio-Cultural Community; is destined to somehow mimic the success of the European Union (EU),29 typically as they successfully evolve from an economic cooperation into a greater political cooperation.

Khoo, loc. cit.: 107-114. Emmers, loc. cit.: 9. 28 Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy (New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 192. 29 John McLean, Will ASEANs New Charter Bring Greater Cooperation?, April 2009, http://development.asia/issue03/cover-03.asp (accessed December 28, 2012).
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Nonetheless, the problem of ASEAN favoring informality compared to a EU-style formality can be seen apparent in the ASEAN Charter. The informality is evident through a number of issues, including the lack of governing organization (with the ASEAN Summit taking deliberative role),30 relying on consultation and consensus instead of institutional decision-making process,31 the principle of non-interference, and especially no sanctions on violations of the charter. Further questions must be asked while observing the formation of ASEAN Political-Security Community. A careful observation on the formation of the Community will point out that the Community focuses more on finding shared values and norms instead of creating an institution with legal power to unite ASEAN in a common goal.32 The shared values and norms, as ASEAN believes, will deter conflict, instead of using an institution with proper power to do so (by granting regional security).33 Even with such most non-obstructive, basic requirement, member states still question the move with notable suspicion, especially when the organization is seeking for a new or greater relevance (such may be seen through the development of the three ASEAN Communities).34 In an even bigger picture, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is often cited also to be a potentially cooperative security arrangements to fulfill the common interests of the region, especially for ASEAN member states.35 The caveat is, however, as explained above, is that national interest takes precedent over regional cooperation, as evident in ASEAN, that national security, sovereignty, and existence, are more paramount compared to a multilateral cooperation, which renders regional security system incapacitated.36 ASEAN, in most cases, still considering balance of power (especially for Indonesia) to be the
ASEAN Charter, Article 7 (2). ASEAN Charter, Article 20. 32 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2009): 2-3. 33 Simon, op. cit.: 210. 34 Bristow, loc. cit.: 2. 35 Ibid. 36 Wibawanto Nugroho, "Pertahanan Negara Dikaitkan dengan Kemampuan Negara," Verity (Jurusan Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Pelita Harapan) I, no. 1 (Januari 2009): 75.
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main issue,37 instead of achieving mutual understanding between the member states, which justifies also the worries, dissent, or even pessimism, that ASEAN is not working for the good of the region. Nevertheless, it will be a mistake also to forget ASEAN member states efforts in ASEAN level (regardless of its (in)significance) to protect the regional peace and security. Three months after FPDA entered into force, the five founding members of ASEAN signed the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOFPAN), which promotes peace, neutrality, freedom from outside influence, and to cooperate in the field of security. ASEAN then followed the ZOFPAN with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ, 1995), along with the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (2001). Yet, real measures are still difficult to be seen, which often stop at treaty signings, another signal on ASEANs frequent failure to take real action to protect the interest of the region. V. Analysis: Overlapping Interest, Stumbling Block, or Both? Many contemporary observers command FPDA as being helpful to support ASEANs regional security interests. For instance, Emmers believes that FPDA complements the regional security stability, and is able to follow the development of contemporary security of Southeast Asia.38 Such relevance is even shared by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, citing the importance of FPDA as, basis for defence co-operation between the UK and Malaysia and for further wider security interests in the region.39 Bristow even went as far as claiming that FPDA will counter the concern of Indonesias revival, and therefore FPDA is considered to be possessing its deterrent value.40

Simon, op. cit.: 210. Emmers, loc. cit.: 2-3. 39 Tom Rutherford, "Military Balance in Southeast Asia (Research Paper 11/79)," Social and General Statistics Section, House of Commons-Library (2011): 19. 40 Bristow, loc. cit.: 11.
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In this perspective, the Author cannot completely deny the role of FPDA in maintaining peace and security, at least at the mini-lateral level.41 In fact, FPDA develops to tackle larger issues outside the traditional security problems, especially on counter-terrorism. While this fact is undeniable, the Author prefers to emphasize another side of the coin, which is on how FPDA proves that there is a stumbling block for ASEAN to develop a more comprehensive ASEAN Political-Security Community in the nearest future. The Author argues, therefore, that a greater belief that FPDA works for the better for ASEAN should be taken with a grain of salt. When discussing the impact of FPDA, there seems to be two differing sides, depending on the perspective, on how observers judge the success of FPDA and its place within the ASEAN framework. On one side, FPDA is seen as profitable to the member states, namely Malaysia and Singapore, as commonly seen from the perspective of the member states themselves. On the other side, FPDA is considered as complementary, if not overlapping, to ASEANs security interests, only to follow and develop with the necessity and development of recent times. A stronger case is more apparent to observe for the former, while further scrutiny is necessary for the later. Side One: FPDA for Malaysia and Singapore For the former, a strong case can be seen from the example of Singapore, as can be found at section (III) of this paper. The way Singapore accelerates itself on building its military might especially to balance its neighboring states during its first decade of existence will not be achievable without any support, in this case from FPDA, which enters into force at the same period of time. The consultative nature does not alleviate British influence in Singapores military development, for instance in building Singapores armed forces.42 As shown also from statements shown previously, the member states of FPDA does not seem to deny that fact. Observers and parties alike cite how FPDA
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A term used by Emmers to describe FPDA, e.g. loc. cit.: 2-3. Kats, op. cit.

helps the new born states to develop their military power in order to guarantee their national defense.43 This, again, emphasizes the Authors believe that FPDA largely serves best the member states interests instead of projecting the influence to the region. Side Two: FPDA in ASEAN Context For the later side, there should be questions when FPDA is being related to ASEANs security interests. Just as what has been shown previously, apparently FPDAs impacts can be explicitly seen through the national interest of the member states, while there is no definite argument on how FPDA can help ASEAN maintaining its security and stability. This fact can be seen while comparing the two ASEAN member states that are members of FPDA to ASEAN in general. The State of the World Atlas shows that Southeast Asia is volatile, with level of peace ranging from high to very low, with some countries still brimming with conflicts.44 While the same reference does depict Malaysia and Singapore to be peaceful (which may due to the presence of FPDA for both countries), the same is not shared by the entire region. Another observation can be done to the issue of terrorism and counterterrorism. The FPDA is often cited to be growing in relevance due to more attention to terrorism (including conducting more training to tackle terrorism),45 which may clear Malaysia and Singapore from significant terrorist activities, yet does not give the same impact to the region (in which Indonesia is among the center of the problem in the region).46 In that respect, ASEANs failure to internalize and consolidate is wellknown, which can be seen for example at the 2012 ASEAN Summit, where ASEAN cannot even reach one consolidated voice regarding admission of Timor

For instance, see Leong, loc. cit.: 27-28. Dan Smith, The Penguin State of the World Atlas, 8th Edition (London: Penguin Books, 2008): 75. 45 Rutherford, op. cit.: 21. 46 For instance, as depicted by Smith, op. cit.: 63.
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Leste and the South China Sea dispute.47 Of course, FPDA, to that extent, may also be translated as a part of that division between the 10 member states. Bear in mind also that ASEAN member states, more often than not, pursue a minilateral or self-fulfillment, aside from FPDA being one of the paramount examples. Other instances, such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (otherwise known as SIJORI) highlights the fact that it is my country first or our group first instead of ASEAN. FPDAs Presence Today Then why FPDA still exists today? The answer lies again on the national interests of both Singapore and Malaysia, and to a certain extent of the outerregional partners of United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Regardless of the growing attention of FPDA towards non-traditional security issues that plague ASEAN member states today, the effort has not been serious enough to merit command as being for ASEAN. The FPDA, therefore, may still exist due to distrust from the ASEAN member states (in this case Malaysia and Singapore), that ASEAN will do good to fulfill their interests. As a matter of fact, until today ASEAN seems to be too transcendent, way above the member states when dealing with problem. ASEANs failure to decisively act in problems such as the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, southern Thailand conflict, the long dispute and armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, the Rohingya and democratization of Myanmar, and many others, give member states justification to act on their own behalf. The way FPDA still exist today may prove to be a stumbling block for ASEANs idea of creating a consolidated Political-Security Community. While ASEANs goal is to create a proper and strong regional integration, the region itself is relatively divided by the sometimes-overlapping mini-lateral subregional cooperation, which purposes are to be served by ASEAN in a regional framework. Logically, a strong regional institution will find sub-regional
Rizal Sukma, Insight : Good and bad news from the 20th ASEAN Summit, April 7, 2012, http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/07/insight-good-and-bad-news-20th-aseansummit.html (accessed December 30, 2012).
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cooperation in a similar field redundant, otherwise the presence of such subregional cooperation may suggest that the regional organization is actually weaker or comparatively insignificant to the member states (especially of those who participate in the sub-regional cooperation). Clearly, as mentioned previously, FPDA is not the only sub-regional cooperation that exists with ASEAN, so the emergence of such sub-regional cooperation can mean one thing: a question to the strength of ASEAN as a regional institution. The Author can then argue that no compelling case are built by many observers to justify that FPDA is in fact influential to ASEAN. In fact, Bristows observation on FPDAs strengths and credits provide no direct, significant, or strong impacts to ASEAN as a regional institution. Bristow observes such strengths are considerably in favor to Malaysia and Singapores interests. Besides the suspicion of Indonesias recent growth, FPDA is believed to be an unobstrusive and non-threatening alliance, deterring both practically and psychologically an unidentified enemy (which is Indonesia), becoming a confidence building measure between Malaysia and Singapore, even helping British defense companies to promote the military wares to potential buyers in the region.48 Such benefits from the FPDA, can be logically and explicitly seen as non-beneficial to ASEANs regional security in general, and in fact matters most only to Malaysia and Singapores national interests. Indeed, the presence of FPDA is faced also with suspicion, even when it has developed itself to adapt with the current security necessities of Southeast Asian region, from neighboring states, especially Indonesia. While the presentday FPDA is without the principle of collective security,49 nonetheless FPDA is perceived as threat by many members of Indonesias civil society, so much that there is a belief that FPDA may push the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to act on behalf of the United Kingdom.50 Even though ASEAN has
Bristow, loc. cit.: 9-13. Collective security, defined simply by Bristow as, an attack on one member as an attack on all See Bristow, loc. cit., 16. 50 If Indonesia enters into war with Malaysia, then Malaysia, a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) will be aided by the other member states, which are Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Formed in 1971, member states of
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pressed for stronger peace and security cooperation in the region, there are distrusts even from member states of ASEAN outside of FPDA. What Should ASEAN Do? What can ASEAN do, them, to eliminate the distrust to ASEAN as a regional institution? ASEAN needs to gain trust from the member states that it can decisively guarantee the regional security, so as to push member states to pave way for bigger portion of multilateral interests to be prioritized than solely the national interests. As previously mentioned, as long as ASEAN member states still consider their national interests to be significantly more important from the multilateral interests, then ASEAN will go nowhere, let alone creating a strong ASEAN Political-Security Community. A complete trust from all member states may not be the easiest task to accomplish with respect to ASEANs regional integration, however the necessity cannot be more emphasized. As FPDA was born, in part, due to distrust against the neighboring states in the region, even if FPDAs relevance has developed, shifted, or even altered, FPDAs continuous existence from ASEANs tumultuous past can only mean the same suspicion may still exist, and that its member states national interest still take paramount precedence. VI. Conclusion Judging from a larger perspective, it is easy to assume that FPDA is nothing but a relic from the past. For certain, it is formed when countries in the region were in conflict, when there were urgency to protect the states own existence, meanwhile

FPDA will cooperate if there is any aggression or threats to Malaysia and Singapore. Besides that, speculation appears that if the United Kingdom, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joins the war, then other member states of NATO will follow suit, thus attacking Indonesia en masse. Quoted and translated from Renne R. A., Armandhanu, Denny Kawilarang, Inggris Dukung Diplomasi Damai RI-Malaysia, September 3, 2010, http://dunia.news.viva.co.id/news/read/175759-inggris-dukung-diplomasi-damai-ri-malaysia (accessed December 30, 2012). See also Elin Yunita Kristanti, Serang Malaysia, RI Bisa Dikeroyok 4 Negara, September 1, 2010, http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/174792serang-malaysia--ri-bisa-dikeroyok-4-negara (accessed December 31, 2012).

ASEAN was established around the similar time frame, and while it has bigger goals, its aim were shallower. When ASEAN enters the 21st century, with member states are walking into a new level of relationship with the ASEAN Charter with all the setbacks FPDA seems to lose its relevance. ASEAN member states clearly no longer need to fear about their existence. As stated previously, this paper does not completely dismiss the idea that FPDA has created some constructive results that especially limited mainly to its member states. Both Malaysia and Singapore, two founding members of ASEAN, are significantly benefited from the presence of FPDA and their participation within. Nevertheless, this paper also shows some evidences that it is a tall order to deny that FPDA serves most if not all to the national interests of its member states, and contributes very little if any to the development of regional security in Southeast Asia. Readers will have already seen how Singapore, one of the member states, benefited so much that it shadows its once potential threat (and, evidently, an existing threat) in terms of active military personnel per population ratio. It is just one of the evidences on how FPDA serves national interests best and more than the regional security interests. It can be concluded also that FPDA create more problems (even if it is considerably behind-the-scenes rather than explicit) than solution for the creation of ASEAN Political-Security Community in the nearest future. Not only the fact that it creates a soft fragmentation within ASEAN member states by creating a sub-regional cooperation, FPDA is still perceived as threat by neighboring member states, thus its presence may hinder a stronger ASEAN as an institution. Meanwhile, it is an obligation from ASEANs side to strengthen itself, especially to be more decisive, regarding dispute settlement and when answering problems within the region. The current state of ASEAN is being handcuffed by the ASEAN Charter, which guarantees more of national sovereignty and noninterference compared to a stronger regional cooperation. An improvement of ASEANs decisiveness, even how gradual or even by the slightest of margin in the nearest future, will give ASEAN member states confidence that ASEAN will be able to guarantee the regional peace and security (which, of course, requires

the willingness of all member states, a lengthy discussion that will not be elaborated here). To conclude, regardless of FPDAs evolving interest and continuing (perceived) relevance to the regional security, there are even stronger evidences that FPDA will be counter-beneficial to ASEAN Political-Security Community, the way that it provides no strong benefits to ASEANs regional security. Therefore, it is up to the question whether FPDA will evolve to more Southeast Asian cooperation or it dissolves into the ASEAN format of regional security cooperation in the future. Bibliography Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2008. . ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2009. Bristow, Damon. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization." Contemporary Southeast Asia (Institute of Southease Asian Studies) 27, no. 1 (April 2005): 1-20. Central Intelligence Agency. Indonesia. December 13, 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (accessed December 30, 2012). . Singapore. December 5, 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/sn.html (accessed December 30, 2012). Chin, Kin Wah. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After." Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 193-203. Crowe, Allan. The Five Power Defence Arrangements. Canberra: Government of the Commonwealth of Australia on behalf of the FPDA Consultative Council, 2001. Duxbury, Alison. The Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy. New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Emmers, Ralf. "The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture." RSIS Working Paper, April 2010.

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