Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA G.R. No. 122191, Oct.

8, 1998 Jurisdiction is based on allegations on the pleading State of the Most Significant Relationship Theory Conflicts of Laws Problem Points of Contact FACTS: Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIAs airlines based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi nationals. The two were eventually arrested and deported back to Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various dates after the incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out that a case was in fact filed against her before the Saudi court, which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country manager. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Whether or not the case involves a conficts problem

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided under Section 1 of RA 7691. Venue was also held to be proper. Furthermore, jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and defendant were properly acquired. Choice-of-law Problem Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law. Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contract, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the following: The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts andtorts; The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g. the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance ofthe claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and The flag of the ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of the complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiffbelow (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the allegedtort. Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules

HELD: Is there a conflicts case? The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise. Applicability of Art. 19 and 21, NCC and Jurisdiction of Quezon City RTC The Supreme Court held that private respondent aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.

ontort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Over-all injury occurred in the Philippines As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established. NOTE: These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the following: (1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts; (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS JADER FACTS: Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination. In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiffs name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latters negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam. ISSUE: Whether or not Jader may validly claim for damages. RULING: In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, REGALADO, J.: FACTS: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. ISSUE: Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages. RULING: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constituteacts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State

must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment. RUBIO VS CA A TRO was issued against the defendant to prevent and restrain them from furtherunlawfully and willfully interference with the transaction between the plaintiff corporation with Alfonso T. Yuchengco on the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. It appears that the Perez Rubio spouses owned shares of stock in Hacienda Benito,Inc. The Perez Rubios, sold said shares to Robert O. Phillips and Sons, Inc. forP5,500,000.00 payable in installments. Robert O. Phillips, in his behalf and in that of his wife and Robert O. Phillips andSons, Inc., entered into negotiations for the sale of their shares of stock in HaciendaBenito, Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco. Upon being informed of this, the Perez Rubios,through their attorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez, reminded the Phillips spouses andthe Phillips corporation in writing of their obligations under the contract of salereminded them in particular that the shares subject matter thereof were still subjectto the payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price. The Phillips (individuals and corporation), through their attorney, Juan T. David,sent a letter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in substance, that the only obstacle tothe consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. was their letter of November 24, 1964 and warned thatunless the same was withdrawn by March 29, they would seek redresselsewhere.. Perez Rubio did not withdraw the letter. Because of the issuance of a preliminary injunction ex parte which restrainedpetitioner Perez Rubio from interfering with the Yuchengco transaction and thedenial of a motion to dissolve the injunction petitioner Perez Rubio was constrainedto file a petition for certiorari with this Court alleging that the lower courtcommitted a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction ISSUE: W/N the Perez Rubio unlawfully interfered in the transaction betweenPhilips and Yuchengco HELD: NO, he is not liable. A thorough examination of the record reveals that the factual findings of theappellate court are incomplete and do not reflect the actual events that transpiredconcerning the sale of shares of stock of Hacienda Benito to Alfonso Yuchengco. The important point left out by the appellate court refers to the controversial letterof the petitioner to Phillips and Sons and to the Phillips spouses wherein thepetition stated that he has a vendor's lien over the shares of stock of HaciendaBenito and that he still has the option to rescind the contract as regards his sale of stock of the Hacienda. A copy of the letter was sent to Alfonso Yuchengeo, theprospective buyer of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, but even after receiptof the letter, the negotiations on the sale of the shares of stock of HaciendaBenito to Alfonso Yuchengco continued. All the details of the negotiations in the sale of the shares of stock of HaciendaBenito, Inc. from Phillips and Sons to Mr. Yuchengco, there is no factual or legalbasis for the appellate court's conclusion that the petitioner unlawfully andinofficiously interfered with the negotiations. There is no reason why the petitioner should be accused of unlawful interference inmaintaining his stand regarding the sale of shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc.that he still had the option to rescind the contract between him and Phillipsand Sons and stating the existence of his vendor's hen over said shares of stock . The petitioner never pretended that he still had full control of the shares of stock which he sold to Phillips and Sons. He in fact admitted that the shares of stock werealready transferred to the corporation and that he did not have a recorded lientherein. He merely made of record his right to rescind under the original contract of sale. The details pertaining to the earlier transaction governing the sale of theshares of stock between the petitioner and Phillips and Sons were in fact, allknown to Yuchengco. And, more important, it is obvious from the recordsthat the petitioner's interest was only in the payment of the P4,250,000.00balance due him from Phillips and Sons . He had the right to refuse to withdraw the November 24, 1964 letter. We seenothing illegal or inofficious about the letter or the refusal to withdraw it.