ASSIGNED CASES CHAPTER 5

RE: DUE PROCESS G.R. No. L-46496 - February 27, 1940 ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents. [Note: The SCRA version of this case provides an incomplete details as to how this case came about, this digest attempt to summarize the facts based on what was reflected in the original text] Facts: In reference to a previous ruling of the Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor-General -on behalf of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) - while movant National Labor Union (NLU) prays that the issue be remanded to CIR for a new trial. As a matter of course, Ang Tibay opposed both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by NLU. It appears that Mr. Toribio Teodoro owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather manufacturing company which supplies, among others, the Philippine Army. Movant NLU alleged that Toribio made a false claim when it said that there was a shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay, making it necessary for the company to lay-off 89 laborers. Movant further averred that the union called the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY (NWB) is a company controlled union dominated by Toribio himself making the latter guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly favoring NWB. Issue: Whether or not NLU was denied procedural due process by the CIR and that their Motion for New Trial, being meritorious, should be granted. Held: 1. To resolve the issue before us, it would help to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. 2. Administrative character - The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without

regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. (Section 20, CA 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 3. Cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings: A. Right to a hearing, including the right to present ones own case and submit evidence in support thereof; B. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented C. Decision must have something to support itself D. Evidence must be substantial a. It must be relevant as a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion b. The rules of evidence shall not be controlling so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order c. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does NOT constitute substantial evidence E. Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected a. On boards of inquiry i. They may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case ii. Their report and decision are only advisory iii. CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute to a board of inquiry, fiscal, justice of the peace, any public official but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself or any of its powers F. CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at the decision G. CIR should render its decision in such a manner that the parties can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The Court observed that the record of the case is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate a conclusion of law [see Primary cardinal requirements aforementioned]. Therefore, in the interest of justice, a new trial should commence giving the movant the opportunity to present new evidence. The legislation which created CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. RE: Notice and Hearing [G.R. No. 144464. November 27, 2001]

GILDA G. CRUZ and ZENAIDA C. PAITIM, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent. FACTS: The Civil Service Commission discovered that petitioner Zenaida Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for co-petitioner Gilda Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. After a fact finding investigation by the CSC, it was determined that a prima facie case exists against them for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BESTINTEREST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, CSC through Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service. Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 where the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge all at the same time. HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial and factual findings. As such, it is being considered experts in their field and are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. 1. RE: Administrative Appeal and Review G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998 HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents. 2. RE: Doctrine of Res. Judicata

FACTS: Petitioner Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. of Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), owns a 144-hectare land located Sumilao, Bukidnon. The land leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) for a period of 10 years and expired in April, 1994. During the existence of the lease, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land at P2.38 million. NQSRMDC sought and was later on granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction ordering the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." Despite of the writ issued by DARAB, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected and filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order and to nullify the action undertaken by the DAR Regional Director on the valuation of their property. DARAB granted the Omnibus Motion prayed for. The Provincial Governor Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6 designating certain areas along BukidnonSayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated. Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao enacted thereafter Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land from agricultural to industrial/institutional to promote economic activity. An application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association). This was favorably recommended by a lot government officials and the people of the affected barangay. Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agroindustrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. The DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property." Governor Fortich appealed to the Office of the President while NQSRMDC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction where the appellate court ordered to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision. It stated that: deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, and by the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities. When owner NQSRMDC desired to donate four (4) hectares of the subject land to DepED for the establishment of the NQSR High School, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries.

NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. RTC then issued a TRO restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land. This was challenged by some farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case. The farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound. The Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona which modified the decision of the Office of the President, through the former Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, to wit: NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway.

The so called "Win-Win" Resolution is the subject petition. Issues: Whether the final and executor OP Decision dated March 29, 1996 through Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres can still be substantially modified by another OP decision ["Win-Win" Resolution] by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona. Held: When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, because no one has seasonably filed any motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. The assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void otherwise stated, it will be in gross disregard of the rules and basic precept that accord finality to administrative determination.

ASSIGNED CASES - CHAPTER 6

RE: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies G.R. No. 88550 April 18, 1990 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, THE HON. GERONIMO VELASCO in his capacity as Minister of Energy and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. Facts: Herein petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Petitioner also applied with then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the

exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." Petitioner IEI was later on informed that in order to rationalize the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance, the operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which at that time developing the coal deposit in the Bagacay Area. Therefore, that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. As a consequence, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Subsequently, however, the latter filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEIs application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over cases of non-observance to the Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies or the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. RE: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies [G.R. No. 170255. January 31, 2006] MANUEL R. VICENTE, JR. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LYDIA F. SONZA Facts: Petitioner and private respondet are both candidates for Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Catmon, Malabon City in the July 15, 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Petitioner Vicente emerged as the seventh winning candidate while respondent Sonza landed in the eighth place or a difference of only one (1) vote. Unsatisfied with the results, respondent filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Malabon impugning the election results. Sonza raised misappreciation of ballots in order to increase the votes of Vicente and non-counting of the votes cast for her. The MeTC counted votes which were contested by petitioner as marked ballots and therefore not appreciated by the board of election tellers in favor of any candidate. This resulted to the tilting of the votes in favor of Sonza who obtained 771 votes while that of Vicente remained at 770 or a margin of only one (1) vote.The MeTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner's proclamation and declaring respondent as the duly elected seventh winning candidate.

Dissatisfied, petitioner Vicente appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) where he claimed that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in counting two (2) contested votes which the board of election tellers found to be marked and therefore not appreciable for any candidate. The COMELEC rendered a resolution dismissing the appeal and affirmed the findings of the MeTC. Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated decision to the COMELEC en banc, petitioner Vicente went directly to the Supreme Court via the present recourse. Issue: Whether or not the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner Vicente amounts to non exhaustion of administrative remedies? Held: Yes. The general rule is that any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, these decisions or rulings refer to the decision or final order of the COMELEC en banc and not of any division thereof. A motion for reconsideration of a decision of the COMELEC Division has to be filed first, which is resolved by the COMELEC en banc, whose decision on the motion for reconsideration may then be the subject of a petition for certiorari with this Court. Thus, it has been held that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC in division, the jurisdiction to hear and decide all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, and in the COMELEC en banc to resolve motions for reconsideration from decisions or rulings of the former. In other words, the "decision, order, or ruling of" the COMELEC which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari refers to that of the COMELEC en banc otherwise, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Rule 18, Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that a timely motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC Division decision has to be filed with the COMELEC en banc before a special civil action for certiorari may be filed with this Court. Consequently, the filing of the instant petition was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies available before the COMELEC. RE: Doctrine of Prior Resort G.R. No. L-33146 May 31, 1977 THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners, vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II (Pasig, Rizal), and JUANITO S. FLORES, doing business under the name and style of JS. F. ENTERPRISES and ASIATIC INCORPORATED, represented by EUGENIO VILLANUEVA, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner filed a certiorari against public respondent for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Juanito S. Flores, the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, and restraining Customs Commissioner from proceeding with the auction sale. Petitioner contends that the goods are classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by certain Central Bank circulars as prohibited importation thus made subject to forfeiture proceeding. Further, assumption of jurisdiction by Judge Pedro Navarro over an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding is a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities. Issue: Whether the trial court have jurisdiction to the extent that it may validly hear and issue injunction against forfeiture proceedings of the Collector of Customs over banned imported commodities.

Held: The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. In Pacis v. Averia, this Court observed: "This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs." Reference was then made in the opinion to previous cases. Then it continued: "Papa v. Mago likewise deserves to be cited. The opinion of Justice Zaldivar for the Court emphatically asserted the doctrine anew in the following language: 'It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods. RE: Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action [G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999] SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP), petitioner, vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents. FACTS: Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) sought to annul and set aside the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) dismissing the election protests or motions to annul the certification elections. This commenced when Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social Security System (ACCESS) filed with BLR a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of SSS. BLR ordered the certification election among the rank and file employees of the SSS in its main office. On October 11, 1991, ACCESS garnered 1,378 votes while SSSEA obtained 1,116 votes. SSSEA filed with the BLR an election protest and/or motion to annul the certification election but was later on denied. Bathan-Velasco, in his capacity as the officer in charge of BLR denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the Regional Offices. She also declared ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS. ISSUE: Whether or not SSSEA exhausted all administrative remedies prior to a court proceeding.

HELD: SSSEA failed to take an appeal from the order of Bathan-Velasco to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition. Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for certiorari involve a review of the factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations as such are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.