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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

n Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

t is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including he Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of

gnorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, or which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from hem, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He ailed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to et him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and even he lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a udgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In he aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.

. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a oan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage ove a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure o he mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against he Bank, its officers and counsel, as aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES 1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R. CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow edemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the

obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of he Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 the judgment was eversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, his Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin or prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no urther motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . . ." 2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750; CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action i.e., Borromeo's right to edeem the lots foreclosed by TRB having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356. 3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485; CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

n the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed mmovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by hat Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB awyers, Mario Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by he RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata(being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with inality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division 4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal. 4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368; CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law office. This action was

docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC Branch 14 5) on the ground of litis pendentia.

The RTC ruled that

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 he Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint. 5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and inally win Civil Case No. R-22506." 6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and its officers and awyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been suing TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which

defendants must be held liable under said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of 100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989, 9 dismissed the case. 7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

t appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata the subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 and litis pendentia the subject matter being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by he Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12 8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344; CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for econsideration. When his motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had been unreasonable delay in he criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994. a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated. _________,

hereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he eceived a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was reated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt with "all the valor of ignorance" to fasten not only civil, but also criminal iability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here. 1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused he respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.

n a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice hereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its alsification. a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo involving the same foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were: a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990. 2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behal of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over property registered in its name one of two mmovables formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the mprovements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order. 3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows: It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents. In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary.

I. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced

proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal Bank. 1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R. No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the ransaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retrobeing in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of he Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of he Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively). a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentmen even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybaez, presiding). These processes were brought to he attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to he Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybaez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise o entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibaez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void." xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . . . . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . . b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) 6740; G.R. No. 84054

t is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and he Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for econsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

n a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help n the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the esolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra(or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in he ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's action to the parties concerned. c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were he officers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical easons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment the notice sent to him of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration had been signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an explanation for said patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing esolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson-

Lao," supra directing that all complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990). 2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R. CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a complaint for Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's udgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's arguments aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals. Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing he resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL or absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the ecord because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989. 3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R. SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

n arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, he Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents therein named, and required Borromeo o secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied. a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court to which the case was raffled caused issuance of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 in G.R. No. 84999 this Court, equired Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles who, as already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and

United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989. 4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

t is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was endered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal esearch fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are inal." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows: Dear Mr. Borromeo: This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit. In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. Very truly yours, JULIETA Y. CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted o hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable. 1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

n relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No.

21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining that the matters herein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ." 2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that espondents really were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial esolutions." 33

II. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES 1. RTC Case No. 21615; CAG.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Caares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but he latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked he start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo. 2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even he Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Caares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and njunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence iled by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes o action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert." 2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458; CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Caares but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the latest judgment against him This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Caares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassmen or which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability in the performance of their official unctions, and lack of jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

n the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the Court: Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res judicata under the circumstances. xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.

Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.

V. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R, CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated he case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered udgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for econsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that espondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no jurisdiction to review interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained

before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries UCPB and Samson K. Lao in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients n (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that espondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (VicePresident), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybaez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with deferential awe and respec sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority and name of the courts. And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the country's judicial system and administration of justice. . . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of he Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of he decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the espondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse dispositions some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of hese defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."

n those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the aws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."

n another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your irm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and hat "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

n another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular"

proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads: SC, NARVASA TYRANTS!!! CODDLERS OF CROOKS! VIOLATOR OF LAWS by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land grabbing What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit" despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273). TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!! IMPEACH NARVASA ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution

VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS HENCE IN DEFAULT CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION

 BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES

DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO Mabolo, Cebu City

Te. 7-5649.

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter BP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them that last quoted, above " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system" and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved: 1) to REQUIRE: (a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and (b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City. SO ORDERED. 1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained o Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices hereof, treated of in several other communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter o him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

n response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;" 2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body;" 3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the circular merely states the truth and asks for justice

based on the facts and the law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies; 5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded. SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.: 1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint; 2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely: a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify heir grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability or Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. 44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and cour employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory hat the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved. 1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body, is still anothe llustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that he "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the ntervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform their unctions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46

His claim that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the ibelous' circular" is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by he Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing he Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing finality of udgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants like Borromeo to resort to administrative prosecution or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law rom court judgments or orders. 1. Reason for courts; Judicial Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the parties a trial or hearing in the first instance as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in he very nature of things, exclusive to the courts. 2. Paramount Need to end Litigation at Some Point

t is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes fo awsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels s others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." 3. Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the and may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, here the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.

n an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately endered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263

[1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316317) xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democractic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287). 4. Final and Executory Judgments of Lower Courts Not Reviewable Even by Supreme Court

n respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar ules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts. 51 Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was endered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorarior prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may hen, no longer be reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal; Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution or the institution of a civil or criminal action as a substitute for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of he Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court. 1. Common Basis of Complaints Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust udgments or interlocutory orders 53 i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or urisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the iscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability. 2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or eview of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to udicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal mplications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an ndispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: he determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal itigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review by appeal or special civil action is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised n accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a

charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335). xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption o regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitutionin the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory. Such judgments, being no onger reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority. 3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case is an essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision whether final and executory or not and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjus udgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. 4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in heir conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or mmorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a

utile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust udgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication hat the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust udgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order 5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the rial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which the same being unappealable it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been endered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final, authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from nfluence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation he fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable or acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to espond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent egislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and urisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee, or any private ndividual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and iberties of another person which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgmen or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject o the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the Court's orbearance had no effect on him.

nstead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's rresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the egislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more

serious sanctions.

T IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Footnotes 1 Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106; Peo v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 407. 2 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 7, Infra. 3 Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu. 4 Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and Vailoces, JJ. 5 Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding. 6 Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5. 7 Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial, JJ. 8 Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding. 9 Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17. 10 Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto. 11 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra. 12 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 2, supra. 13 SEE Sub-Head I, supra. 14 Decision dated May 21, 1993: Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Puno and Ramirez, JJ. 15 As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of the Court En Banc is, of course, not a "mere clerk," but the highest administrative officer in the Division or Court, next only to the Justices. 16 Sub-Head II, A, 1, infra. 17 Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1,c, infra. 18 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively. 19 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra.

20 See sub-head I, A, 3, supra Because TRB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, Borromeo filed criminal complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers, which were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. 21 Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta Roquillano-Belarmino. 22 See sub-head I, A, 1, supra. 23 See sub-head I, supra. 24 By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal Jufelinito R. Pareja. 25 Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval by Director IV V. V. Varela, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, Deputy Ombudsman, Visayas. 26 In the third paragraph of this opinion. 27 Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Sub-head A, 1, 5, supra. 28 Rollo G.R. 82273. 29 This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank of Communications. 30 Sub-head II, A ,3, supra. 31 Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, DOMB. 32 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 1, supra. 33 SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra. 34 Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court of Appeals. 35 Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115. 36 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra.

37 During the entire period that the administrative case was pending (1990 to 1994), Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets, flyers to IBP, harshly critical of the courts and the lawyers who had in one way or-another taken measures adverse to him. One of the last was an "OPEN LETTER to IBP Prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April 19, 1994. 38 There are at least ten (10) other such."circulars, flyers, or letters in the record, all amounting more or less the same errors and defamatory imputations. 39 Sub-Head II; A, 1, infra. 40 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1 c, infra, respectively.

41 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra. 42 Sub-Head II, A, 1, a, infra. 43 Sub-Head I, A, 7, supra. 44 Rule 71, Sec, (c) and (d), Rules of Court. 45 SEE Sub-head II, A, 1, a, supra. 46 Peo v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193 SCRA 649, 660 (1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140.

47 Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474, September 10, 1993; GSIS v. Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, March 9, 1993; Gesulgon v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993; Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japson, 211 SCRA 879, G.R. No. 68073, July 29 1992; Cachola v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 97822, May 7, 1992; Enriquez v. CA, 202 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991; Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990 Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L-51626, April 30, 1980; Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, G.R. No. L-30523, April 22, 1977. 48 20 SCRA 441, 444.

49 Against judgments of the Supreme Court since obviously no appeal to a higher court or authority is possible, the only remedies are those set forth in the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52 and 53, with regard to civil cases and proceedings, and Rule 125 in relation to Rule 124, in respect of criminal cases. SEE Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 215, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 212 G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991; Church Assistance Program v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 G.R. No. 76552, March 21, 1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80, G R. No. 77526, June 29, 1988 Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 75860, September 17, 1987; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577, G.R. Nos. L-58011-2, November 18. 1983; Tugade v. CA 83 SCRA 226; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L-31589, July 31, 1970; Albert v. CFI, 23 SCRA 948, G.R. No L-23636, May 29 1968; Shoji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333(1922); SEE also Concurring Opinion of Gutierrez J. in Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990. 50 148 SCRA 382, 417-418. 51 Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordnary, equitable remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or in extreme situations, an action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud. 52 Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L-59370, February 11, 1986, citing Malia v. IAC, 138 SCRA 116, G.R. No. L-66395, August 7, 1985; Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No. L-70230, June 24, 1985; Bethel Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136 SCRA 203, G.R. No. L-35563, April 30, 1985; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984 and the cases cited therein pertaining to "immutability of judgments;" Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 1983; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, G.R. No. L-24921, March 31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Sawit v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310.

53 Articles 204-206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalize offenses which have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element. 54 148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420-42155 Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA 10 (Sept. 9, 1977). 56 Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Alug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 (Oct. 18, 1990). 57 Quizon v Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975). 58 Alzua, et. al v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326. 59 The old Code of Civil Procedure.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995 In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Facts: The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, who has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account. In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc. ISSUE: Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the Court? RULING: No. There can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. He stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. On the contention that he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. MTJ-98-1147. July 2, 1998]

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C. MONZON, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 14 October 1996,[1] complainant charged respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City, with ignorance of law, in that he deliberately refused to suspend a barangay chairman who was charged before his court with the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. The factual antecedents recited in the letter-complaint are not controverted. On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against one Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things, said respondent Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed[2] on 30 September 1993 on the ground that Maghirangs sister -in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 [3] from Director Jacob Montesa of the Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code prior to the Local Government Code of 1991. In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,[4] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sisterin-law as barangay secretary. On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon reconsider[5] the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa. Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and recommending the filing of an information for unlawful

appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,[7] the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the corresponding information against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. The information for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was forthwith filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in San Pablo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the presiding judge, respondent herein, issued a warrant for the arrest of Maghirang, with a recommendation of a P200.00 bond for his provisional liberty. With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, on 4 May 1995, the City Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension[8] of accused Maghirang pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, which reads, in part:

SEC. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a single or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in Court, shall be suspended from office.
In his Order of 30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground that:

[T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirangs] terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offenses committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from office relating to a given term may not be the basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992).
The prosecution moved for reconsideration[10] of the order, alleging that the court had confused removal as a penalty in administrative cases and the temporary removal from

office (or suspension) as a means of preventing the public official, while the criminal case against him is pending, from exerting undue influence, intimidate (sic) witnesses which may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a penalty or sanction whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy. Accordingly, while a re-elected public official cannot be administratively punished by removing him from office for offenses committed during his previous term, said public official can be temporarily removed to prevent him from wielding undue influence which will definitely be a hindrance for justice to take its natural course. The prosecution then enumerated the cases decided by this Court reiterating the rule that what a re-election of a public official obliterates are only administrative, not criminal, liabilities, incurred during previous terms.[11] In his order of 3 August 1995,[12] respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecution is premised upon the act charged allegedly committed during the accused [sic] previous term as Barangay Chairman of Brgy. III-E. San Pablo City, who was subsequently re-elected as Barangay Chairman again during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994. Certainly, had not the accused been re-elected the prosecution will not file the instant motion to suspend him as there is no legal basis or the issue has become academic. The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58, wherein the Supreme Court subscribed to the rule denying the right to remove from office because of misconduct during a prior term. It is opined by the Court that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is [sic] administrative case filed against a local official who is at the same time criminally charged in Court. At present, the records of the Court shows [sic] that there is no pending administrative case existing or filed against the accused. It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court in Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., that Since petitioner, having been duly re-elected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for any acts committed during his former tenure, the determination whether the respondent validly acted in imposing upon him one months suspension for act [sic] done during his previous term as mayor is now merely of theoretical interest.
Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21 September 1995,[13] respondent voluntarily inhibited himself. The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City.

On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27 January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he issued the two challenged orders only after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, citing authorities in support thereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguing that to warrant a finding of ignorance of law and abuse of authority, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision.[14] He emphasized, likewise, that the error had to be so grave and on so fundamental a point as to warrant condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent;[15] otherwise, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and that would be intolerable. [16] Respondent further alleged that he earned complainants ire after denying the latters Motion for the Suspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which was filed only after Maghirang was re-elected in 1994; and that complainant made inconsistent claims, concretely, while in his letter of 4 September 1995 requesting respondent to inhibit from the case, complainant declared that he believed in respondents integrity, competence and dignity, after he denied the request, complainant branded respondent as a judge of poor caliber and understanding of the law, very incompetent and has no place in Court of Justice. Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at this time, for he had only three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the compulsory age of retirement of seventy (70); and that for the last 25 years as municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as presiding judge of the MTCC, San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity. In compliance with the Courts resolution of 9 March 1998, the parties, by way of separate letters, informed the Court that they agreed to have this case decided on the basis of the pleadings already filed, with respondent explicitly specifying that only the complaint and the comment thereon be considered. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that this Court hold respondent liable for ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In support thereof, the OCA makes the following findings and conclusions:

The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be preventively suspended only if there is an administrative case filed against him is without basis. Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) states that: Suspension and loss of benefits Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under

this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103). In the same case, the Court held that as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90) days. Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful Appointment, punishable under Article 244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it was mandatory on Judge Monzons part, considering the Motion filed, to order the suspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of ninety (90) days. This, he failed and refused to do. Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension because offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for removal during the present term is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases x x x (Underscoring supplied) Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to office it must be assumed that

they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case. (Underscoring ours) Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during Maghirangs first term as barangay chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 during his second term, his re-election is not a bar to his suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case. Respondents denial of complainants Motion for Reconsideration left the complainant with no other judicial remedy. Since a case for Unlawful Appointment is covered by Summary Procedure, complainant is prohibited from filing a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition involving an interlocutory order issued by the court. Neither can he file an appeal from the courts adverse final judgment, incorporating in his appeal the grounds assailing the interlocutory orders, as this will put the accused in double jeopardy. All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying complainants Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability. This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, ruled: In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic principles. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,[17] this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that -- when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any -- refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.
In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioners insistence that he was benefited by the ruling in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija[18] that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his present term of office, as follows:

There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the investigation which has been commenced here, and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation the object of which is to cause the indictment and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases cited, the subject of the investigation was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved and its object was merely to cause his suspension or removal from public office. While the criminal cases involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case, an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as [they] affect the populace of the municipality where he serves.
[19]

Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,[20] this Court likewise categorically declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office were not extinguished by his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Hechanova referred only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official, thus:

1. The first problem we are to grapple with is the legal effect of the reelection of respondent municipal officials. Said respondents would want to

impress upon us the fact that in the last general elections of November 14,1967 the Makati electorate reelected all of them, except that Vice-Mayor Teotimo Gealogo, a councilor prior thereto, was elevated to vicemayor. These respondents contend that their reelection erected a bar to their removal from office for misconduct committed prior to November 14, 1967. It is to be recalled that the acts averred in the criminal information in Criminal Case 18821 and for which they were convicted allegedly occurred on or about July 26, 1967, or prior to the 1967 elections. They ground their position on Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466, and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58. A circumspect view leaves us unconvinced of the soundness of respondents' position. The two cases relied upon have laid down the precept that a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure. But the present case rests on an entirely different factual and legal setting. We are not here confronted with administrative charges to which the two cited cases refer. Here involved is a criminal prosecution under a special statute, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019).
Then again, on 30 May 1974, in Oliveros v. Villaluz,[21] this Court held:
I

The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office. Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying the criminal case against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of petitioner's reelection," but contends that "said respondent's power to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon petitioner's reelection" arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that of sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office. Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced. The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively

to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez the Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that the cases of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but that as tocriminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by reelection of the public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualificationfrom public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act . . . that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and thereby launder his evil acts." Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the AntiGraft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election." It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode

the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men."
Finally, on 21 August 1992, in Aguinaldo v. Santos,[22] this Court stated:

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed from administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence, since both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court. While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges -- and, of course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where ones c ompetence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.[23] He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24] Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple issue. On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v. Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial Governor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he simply wished to enjoy the privilege of overruling this Courts doctrinal pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera:[25]

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. A becoming modesty of inferior

courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[26]

The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men of the robe may at times be commendable, but certainly not when this Court, not once but at least four times, had indicated what the rule should be. We had spoken clearly and unequivocally. There was no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was clear and unmistakable. We did take pains to explain why it must be thus. We were within our power in doing so. It would not be too much to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would at the very least, take notice and yield deference. Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear for misinterpretation what is expected of them. Thus: A becoming modesty of inferior court[s] demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. In the constitutional sense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a category. The grave abuse of discretion is thus manifest.
[27]

In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras,[28] this Court affirmed that by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, this Court has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution and laws form part of this countrys legal system.[29] All other courts should then be guided by the decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v. Cloribel[30] warned:

Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.

That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least, appropriate, considering respondent is due for compulsory retirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his first offense. WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[1] [2]

Rollo, 2-5. Rollo, 8. [3] Id., 11-12. [4] Id., 13-14. [5] Id., 17-18. [6] Id., 19. [7] Rollo, 20. [8] Id., 26-27. [9] Id., 30. [10] Rollo, 33-35. [11] Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 11959, 31 October 1959; Lizares v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-22059, 17 May 1966; Oliveros v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, 30 May 1974; Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992); Ingco v. Sanchez, 21 SCRA 1292). [12] Id., 36-37. [13] Rollo, 39.
[14]

Citing Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 474-475 [1986]; Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597 [1994]; Roa v. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57 [1994].
[15] [16]

Citing Negado v. Autojay, 222 SCRA 295, 297 [1993]. Citing Bengzon v. Adaoag, A.M. MTJ-95-1045, Nov. 28, 1995. [17] 21 SCRA 1292, 1295 [1967]. [18] 106 Phil. 466. [19] At 1294-1295. [20] 28 SCRA 517, 526-527 [1969]. [21] 57 SCRA 163, 169-171. [22] 212 SCRA 768, 773.
[23]

Estoya v. Abraham Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21, citing Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993].
[24] [25]

Id., at 22, citing Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993]. 65 Phil. 56, 82 [1937]. [26] 34 SCRA 73, 78-79 [1970]. [27] Citing People v. Vera, supra note 25. [28] 237 SCRA 724, 735 [1994].

[29] [30]

Article 8, Civil Code. 18 SCRA 713 [1966].

Conducto vs Monzon Case Digest

Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon 291 SCRA 619 Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He refused to suspend the mayor due to criminal charges against the latter for the crime of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official cannot be suspended for something that has happened in a previous term. Settled jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases. Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with the basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did the act deliberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot overturn a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.

Macariola vs. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 114 SCRA 77 FACTS: Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with acts unbecoming of a judge. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce. ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondents order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of

Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated. Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"? Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J: In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge." The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus: Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant. In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages. On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes

as the only children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C]. The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following project of partition: COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition: l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola; 2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola; 3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales; 4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales; 5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares; 6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved. Tacloban City, October 16, 1963. (SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City (SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the

same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition. SO ORDERED. Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963. (SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge EXH. B. The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U). One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V). Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12). On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F). On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.). Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated. The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel. On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION (1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of

Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition; (2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion; (3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion, (a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages; (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages; (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees. B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin; (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit. C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes. D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO (1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo; (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit. SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.] It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971. I

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides: Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another: xxx xxx xxx (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied]. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]). In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition. While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation. The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus: And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A. Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum). xxx xxx xxx On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391394, rec.). On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows: 1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was

authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents: 1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D); 2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e). In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition. Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her onefourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition. Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the

assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.). Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.). II With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that: Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties: 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxx xxx xxx 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory. It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the

nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that: By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899). While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said: On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. " There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]). It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business. It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned. Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature. Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation. In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law. On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..." It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution. Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges. And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees. However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency. Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]). Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that: A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ... WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,

1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation III With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows: The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K. The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorneyat-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorneyat Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan. Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.). In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business

activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion. WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave. Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents. DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5] In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts; Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and Maler Foundation accounts.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6] dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners request for legal [7] assistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II

RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
[8]

Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioners motion for sum mary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary judgment:

CONCLUSION There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
[10]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto. In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioners motion for summary judgment:

CONCLUSION In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.

The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis. WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.
[12]

Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that -I

PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379: A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF: 1. 2. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER; ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT; ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

B.

3.

4. C.

PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

D.

PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.

II

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT: A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND

B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III

THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.

IV

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
[13]

Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for

reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before it. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people. In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002. Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.

PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

B.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
[14]

Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:
(A)

BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.

(1)

The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents Answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment.
(B)

(2)

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED APRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS. (1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents. Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly acquired during their incumbency. (a) (b) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple acquired or own the Swiss funds. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how much of the Swiss funds was acquired during the incumbency of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.

(2)

(3)

In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries.

(4)

Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c) (d), and (e) of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
[15] [16] [17]

(C)

IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS. (1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private respondents. Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such judicial admissions were made by private respondents.
(D)

(2)

SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.
[18]

For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have the Swiss Court

decisions officially translated in our known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper before this Court. PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65[19] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out. At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.[21] One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:

surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and

firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.[23] We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. (1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
[25]

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.[26] The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic. The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:

xxx 4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986. 5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x xxx xxx xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx. ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME xxx 12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9. 13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules: Schedule A: Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof); Schedule B: Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof);

Schedule C: Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2 hereof); Schedule D: Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3 hereof). 14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as follows: Official Salaries Legal Practice Farm Income Others Total P 2,627,581.00 16.01% 11,109,836.00 67.71% 149,700.00 2,521,325.00 15.37% P16,408,442.00 100.00%

.91%

15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund. 16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents receivables from prior years during the period 1967 up to 1984. 17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his

networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy. 18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as Miscellaneous Items and Various Corporations. There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings. 19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965. 20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount ofP861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income. 21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the years 1966 until 1972. 22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.

G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS 23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise. H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971. 25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972. 26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account Reference OSER. The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on June 25, 1981.

27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed. 28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION. 29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation s funds to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the Marcos Familie 30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00 I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARIVALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests.

32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using an Americansounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for Declaration/Specimen Signatures submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION. 33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees. 34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneficiaries. 35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved. 36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the

circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the Marcos Families. 37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION. 38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation. 39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account Reference OMAL. The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981. 40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation. 41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundations German

marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina. J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries. 43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account Reference Dido, Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981. 44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under the

circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundation. 45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00. 46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned by Marcos Familie. K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden. 48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First VicePresident and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00. L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found among Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Companys assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean

Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word JOHN LEWIS. This word will have the same value as the couples own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis. 50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories. 51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A. 52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundations Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently transformed into a foundation. 53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof. x x x x x x.
[27]

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following:

xxx xxx 4.

xxx

Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.

5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R.

Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest. xxx xxx xxx

10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition. 11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged. 12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet. 13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto. 17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR. 19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. 23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of privity or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense:

(a) (b)

Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993; Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents; Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted; Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children; Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;

(c)

(d) (e)

(f)

(g) (h)

Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.

An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.

Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.

In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of such assertions. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
[28]

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove, by the presentation of

evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family. Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition. It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[31] To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:

23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
[32]

Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
[33]

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in

effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. [34] Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[35] In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:

(1)

the Swiss bank deposits existed and (2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:

Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.
[36]

By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the Republics petition for forfeiture:

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude the

same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republics petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that the funds involved were lawfully acquired was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits. The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a[39] of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission. Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital documents[41] attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.[42] It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As

correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:

The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.
[43]

How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain. Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof. The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not. When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial.[44] An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. [45] The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at

all.[47] Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them. As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:

Its specific denial of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.
[48]

Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds. PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993 The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others: xxx (d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof; xxx (f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
[49]

It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the

holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50] The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:

xxx WITNESSES 4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial. xxx DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED MARCH 21, 2000 The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:

x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[51]

The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republics motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief. Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52] Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and Memoranda of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54] All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact. Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republics allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds. This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:

PJ Garchitorena: Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. Thats your statement of facts? Atty. MARCELO: Yes, Your Honor. PJ Garchitorena: Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case. Atty. TECSON: We joined the Manifestation of Counsel. PJ Garchitorena:

You do not own anything? Atty. TECSON: Yes, Your Honor. PJ Garchitorena: Counsel for Irene Araneta? Atty. SISON: I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor. xxx Atty. SISON: Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.
[55]

We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity. Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS. Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise Agreement dated December 28, 1993 These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully acquired. In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:

COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests: That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the aboveentitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;

That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits. But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds. Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The facts pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial. We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper. In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56] In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57] A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy.[58] Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner. [59] In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the illgotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations

against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact. Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were false. Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago. Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy responses like lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity or they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago or, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired. But, whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end. In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment." [60] We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35 Summary Judgment Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any

time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours)
[61]

Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been served? This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in order. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for summary judgment at any time. However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.[62] Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive period is provided. Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary judgment.[64] And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment. This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New York Supreme Court ruled:

"PER CURIAM. Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for

summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have appealed. The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66] In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment. This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial. Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial." [68] In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate. The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the

rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of them. Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents answ er was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses. This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."[69] Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[70] In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".[71] A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment. Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture. In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.[72] This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they

claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction. But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights.[73] Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74] As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[75] Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses. (2) The Propriety of Forfeiture The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage. The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:

xxx xxx Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. xxx xxx Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:

(1) (2)

ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.

That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.[78] Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79]The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.[80] The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President 1966-1976 at P60,000/year 1977-1984 at P100,000/year 1985 at P110,000/year P660,000 800,000 110,000 P1,570,00 Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos coupl es combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the

applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
[81]

It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83] The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation. Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise

or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit. Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses. We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law. Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them. We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.

In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer stated:

22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being thatrespondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof. Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 8[86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:

In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them. Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void. [89] They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they stood

on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130 [90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGGs commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the governments undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void. The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:

x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents.
[91]

A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.[92] The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO: Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo? F. MARCOS, JR.: Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman. ATTY. FERNANDO: Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?

PJ GARCHITORENA: In connection with what? ATTY. FERNANDO: In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against your family? F. MARCOS, JR.: The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93] xxx ATTY. FERNANDO: What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility? F. MARCOS, JR.: My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as what I have always why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end to this problem.[94] xxx ATTY. FERNANDO: Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank? PJ GARCHITORENA: So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash? F. MARCOS, JR.: Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.[95] xxx PJ GARCHITORENA: x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in connection herewith? F. MARCOS, JR.: I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadnt really discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

beginning to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end.[96]

Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.s testimony that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.[98] In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following:

That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the aboveentitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case; That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; xxx xxx xxx

Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving William Saunders and Jane Ryan which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations:

xxx

xxx

xxx

2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied) xxx xxx xxx

3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas admission of the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset. On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:

7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said deposits. Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;

WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds and that it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions. The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
[105]

In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them. The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
[106]

SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
[107]

The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whene ver a privity of estate exists between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in rights.[108] Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.[109] Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all. [110] Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case. Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are: (1) (2) (3) the offender is a public officer or employee; he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.

It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officers salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case. Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise

stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:

Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed illgotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.[111] Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law. [112] The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [113] taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114] An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:

[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect

upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? [116] There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation. In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117] Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to the foundations interests nor incon sistent with equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question. The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the assets.[118] But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary. In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the action was unnecessary:

And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the

corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Governments cause of action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their members (or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions.
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them. Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]

Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.
[121]

Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3[122] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. [123] Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124] on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief.[125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable. [126] Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent party. [127] If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered. In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered illgotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379:

SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims. While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of

the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts. The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave. Carpio, J., no part.

[1]

An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor. E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country, creating the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates, both here and abroad. E.O. No. 2 issued twelve (12) days later, warning all persons and entities who had knowledge of possession of ill-gotten assets and properties under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government. E.O. No. 14 Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A. Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases, whether civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The law also declared that the civil actions for the recovery of unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil action under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Declared null and void by this Court on December 9, 1998 in the case of Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and Magtanggol Gunigundo", docketed as G.R. No. 130716. In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG filed a request for mutual assistance with the Swiss Federal Police Department, under the procedures of the International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to freeze the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in Switzerland.

[7]

IMAC is a domestic statute of Switzerland which generally affords relief to the kind of request from foreign governments or entities as authorized under E.O. No. 2. The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the request of petitioner Republic, and ordered the Swiss deposits to be blocked until the competent Philippine court could decide on the m atter.
[8]

Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195. Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castaeda, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218. Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena with the separate concurring opinions of Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castaeda, Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote their respective dissenting opinions. Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146. Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62. Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605. Sec. 3 the petition shall contain the following information

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

xxx (c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.
[16]

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General. (e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property xxx. Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654. Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court. Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996]. Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972]. 240 SCRA 376 [1995]. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997]. 69 SCRA 524 [1976]. Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court. Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970]. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37. Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910]. 197 SCRA 391 [1991]. Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973]. Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236. Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064. 61A Am. Jur., 172-173. Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1995 ed.]. Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court. Supra. Supra. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof. 22 SCRA 48 [1968] XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) Contract for opening of deposit dated March 21, 1968; (b) Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3, 1970; (d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated February 13, 1970; (e) Letter of instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions dated March 10, 1991.

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

[41]

TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a) Management agreement dated August 28, 1990; (b) Letter of instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich; (c) Approval of Statutes and By-laws of Trinidad Foundation dated August 26, 1990; (d) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, 1970; (e) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers Geel dated August 28, 1970; (f) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Rayby Foundation dated March 10, 1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Trinidad Foundation dated March 10, 1981. MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and Regulations of Maler dated October 15, 1968; (b) Letter of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey d Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Bank dated October 19, 1968.
[42]

Where an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts xxx. Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194. Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281. Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L- 31869, Aug. 8, 1973. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals , 195 SCRA 567 [1991]. 28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969]. Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but the change(s) had no adverse effects on the rights of private respondents. Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49410, 169 SCRA 409 [1989].

[43]

[44]

[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

[49]

[50]

[51]

Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court. adopted by the Marcos children. dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos; dated October 5, 2000 as jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as filed by the Marcos children. TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999. Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses Antera and Virgilio Soriano , April 20, 2001. Plantadosi vs. Loews, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943. Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000]. Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348 [1989]. Rollo, pp. 2659-70. Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court. Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is served in an action to recover a debt or a liquidated demand arising,

[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

[60]

[61]

[62]

1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or 2. on a judgment for a stated sum; the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of the facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed, and his belief that there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend. (emphasis ours)
[63]

73 Am Jur 2d 733, 12; 49 C.J.S. 412, 224. Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184. 19 NYS2d 250 [1940]. 73 Am Jur 2d 733, 12; 49 C.J.S. 412, 224. Supra. Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion , et. al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976]. Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the old Rules of Court. Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983]. Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956]. Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958]. Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764, October 4, 2002; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil. 472 [1966]. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].

[64]

[65]

[66]

[67]

[68]

[69]

[70]

[71]

[72]

[73]

[74]

[75]

[76]

"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor", approved on June 18, 1955. Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081. Ibid. Id., p. 1062. Exhibit S. Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997 ed., p. 650. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1980 ed., p. 64. Section 9, Article VII. Section 4(1), Article VII. Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court. Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098. Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100. Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998]. Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court. Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205. 31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721. Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178. Ibid, p. 1181. Ibid, p. 1188. Ibid, p. 1201. 29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137. 31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795. Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261. Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507. Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256. Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289. Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974]. Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court. Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court. Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court. 29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.

[77]

[78]

[79]

[80]

[81]

[82]

[83]

[84]

[85]

[86]

[87]

[88]

[89]

[90]

[91]

[92]

[93]

[94]

[95]

[96]

[97]

[98]

[99]

[100]

[101]

[102]

[103]

[104]

[105]

[106]

[107]

[108]

[109]

31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817. Ibid, p. 814. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857. Rollo, pp. 2255-2265. Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court. 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARTIES 97 (2000). Supra note 3 13 (2000). Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199 SE2d 223. Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:

[110]

[111]

[112]

[113]

[114]

[115]

[116]

[117]

Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent Imelda R. Marc os, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests: That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject-matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various Foundations alleged in the case; That in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the Estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
[118]

Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000 memorandum of respondent Mrs. Marcos:

On the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally the owner of the assets to be seized and restituted, has not been involved in the collecting procedure pending in the Philippines. Even though such opponent is nothing but a legal construction to hide the true ownership to the assets of the Marcos family, they nevertheless are entitled to a hearing as far as the proceedings are concerned with accounts which are nominally theirs. The guarantees of the Republic of the Philippines therefore must include the process rights not only of the defendants but also of the formal owners of the assets to be delivered.
[119]

240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995]. Supra. Id at 470-471. Substantially the same as Section 11, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court. Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court. Supra note 3 265 (2000) Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571, 18 FR Serv 2d 221, later app (CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 1090, on reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that a failure to request the joinder of a defendant was excused where the moving partys former counsel, who had resisted the joinder, abruptly withdrew his appearance and substitute counsel moved promptly to join the corporation. Supra note 3.

[120]

[121]

[122]

[123]

[124]

[125]

[126]

[127]

Republic vs Sandiganbayan Case Digest

Republic of the Philippines (Presidential Commission Sandiganbayan [GR 107789, 30 April 2003]; Africa vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 147214] on Good Government) vs.

Facts: On 7 August 1991, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) stockholders meeting during which a PCGG controlled board of directors was elected. A special stockholders meeting was later convened by the registered ETPI stockholders wherein another set of board of directors was elected, as a result of which two sets of such board and officers were elected. Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI, alleging that the PCGG had since 29 January 1988 been "illegally 'exercising' the rights of stockholders of ETPI," especially in the election of the members of the board of directors, filed a motion before the Sandiganbayan, prayed that said court order the "calling and holding of the Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt's control and supervision and prescribed guidelines." The PCGG did not object to Africa's motion provided that "(1) An Order be issued upholding the right of PCGG to vote all the Class "A" shares of ETPI; (2) In the alternative, in the remote event that PCGG's right to vote the sequestered shares be not upheld, an Order be issued (a) disregarding the Stock and Transfer Book and Booklet of Stock Certificates of ETPI in determining who can vote the shares in an Annual Stockholders Meeting of ETPI, (b) allowing PCGG to vote 23.9% of the total subscription in ETPI, and (c) directing the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of ETPI providing for the minimum safeguards for the conservation of assets prior to the calling of a stockholders meeting. By the assailed Resolution of 13 November 1992, the Sandiganbayan resolved Africa's motion, ordering the conduct of an annual stockholders meeting of ETPI, for 1992. Assailing the foregoing resolution, the PCGG filed before the Supreme Court a petition (GR 107789) for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition. By Resolution of 26 November 1992, the Supreme Court enjoined the Sandiganbayan from (a) implementing its Resolution of 13 November 1992, and (b) holding the stockholders' meeting of ETPI scheduled on 27 November 1992. On 7 December 1992, Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (AEROCOM), Benito Nieto, Carlos Nieto, Manuel Nieto III, Ramon Nieto, Rosario Arellano, Victoria Legarda, Angela Lobregat, Ma. Rita de los Reyes, Carmen Tuazon and Rafael Valdez, all stockholders of record of ETPI, filed a motion to intervene in GR 107789. Their motion was granted by the Supreme Court by Resolution of 14 January 1993. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the PCGG, in early 1995, filed a "VERY URGENT PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO HOLD SPECIAL STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING FOR [THE] SOLE PURPOSE OF INCREASING [ETPI's] AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK," it claiming that the increase in authorized capital stock was necessary in light of the requirements laid down by Executive Order 109 and Republic Act 7975. By Resolution of 7 May 1996, the Supreme Court resolved to refer the PCGG's very urgent petition to hold the special stockholders' meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution. In compliance therewith, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution of 13 December 1996, granting the PCGG "authority to cause the holding of a special stockholders' meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class 'A' shares of stock." The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors thus authorized the ETPI Chair and Corporate Secretary to call the special stockholders meeting. Notices were sent to those entitled to vote for a meeting on 17 March 1997. The meeting was held as scheduled and the increase in ETPI's authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was "unanimously approved." On 1 April 1997, Africa filed before the Supreme Court a motion to cite the PCGG "and its accomplices" in contempt and "to nullify the 'stockholders meeting' called/conducted by PCGG and its accomplices," he contending that only this Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. Africa went on to contend that, assuming that the Sandiganbayan had such power, its Resolution of 13 December 1996

authorizing the PCGG to hold the stockholders meeting had not yet become final because the motions for reconsideration of said resolution were still pending. Further, Africa alleged that he was not given notice of the meeting, and the PCGG had no right to vote the sequestered Class "A" shares. A motion for leave to intervene relative to Africa's "Motion to Cite the PCGG and its Accomplices in Contempt" was filed by ETPI. The Supreme Court granted the motion for leave but ETPI never filed any pleading relative to Africa's motion to cite the PCGG in contempt. By Resolution of 16 February 2001, the Sandiganbayan finally resolved to deny the motions for reconsideration of its Resolution of 13 December 1996, prompting Africa to file on 6 April 2001 before the Supreme Court a petition for Review on Certiorari (GR 147214), challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions of 13 December 1996 (authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting to increase ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class "A" shares of stock) and 16 February 2001 (denying reconsideration of the December 13, 1996 Resolution). The petitions were consolidated. Issue: 1. Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered ETPI Class "A" shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors. 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan can order the Division Clerk of Court to call the stockholders meeting and in appointing then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Sabino de Leon, Jr. to control and supervise the same. Held: 1. When sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exception in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares. 2. The Clerk of Court, who is already saddled with judicial responsibilities, need not be burdened with the additional duties of a corporate secretary. Moreover, the Clerk of Court may not have the requisite knowledge and expertise to discharge the functions of a corporate secretary. The case of Board of Directors and Election Committee of SMB Workers Savings and Loan Asso., Inc. v. Tan, etc., et al. (105 Phil. 426 (1959). Vide also 5 Fletcher Cyc Corp (Perm Ed) 2074; 18A Am Jur 2d ) provides a solution to the Sandiganbayan's dilemma of calling a meeting when ETPI had two sets of officers. There, the Supreme Court upheld the creation of a committee empowered to call, conduct and supervise the election of the board of directors. Such a committee composed of impartial persons knowledgeable in corporate proceedings would provide the needed expertise and objectivity in the calling and the holding of the meeting without compromising the Sandiganbayan or its officers. The appointment of the committee members and the delineation of the scope of the duties of the committee may be made pursuant to an agreement by the parties or in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 (Management Committee) of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies insofar as they are applicable.

EN BANC

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY CASTRO, ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,

G.R No. 187167

Present:

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,

- versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.

ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents. July 16, 2011 Promulgated:

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
1

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
2 3 4

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
5 6 7 8

baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
9 10 11 12 13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
14

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.

Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds, occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.
15 16 17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.
18

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
19 20

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
21 22

Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
23

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
25 26

RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
27 28

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners

argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increasedthe Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:
29

Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters 166,858

Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive Economic Zone 382,669

TOTAL

440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be

determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
32 33

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago . (Emphasis supplied)
34

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds

the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.
35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
36 37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
38

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
39

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
40 41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
42 43 44

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
45 46 47

Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and
48 49 50

balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
51 52

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
53

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
54 55

devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

(Pls. see concurring opinion) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDODE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Associate Justice

I certify that Mr. Justice Abad left his concurring vote. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

(on leave) JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

1Entitled An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. 2 Entitled An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines. 3 The third Whereas Clause of RA 3046 expresses the import of treating the Philippines as an archipelagic State: WHEREAS, all the waters around, between, and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland waters of the Philippines. 4 One of the four conventions framed during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, this treaty, excluding the Philippines, entered into force on 10 September 1964. 5 UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. 6 The Philippines signed the treaty on 10 December 1982. 7 Article 47, paragraphs 1-3, provide: 1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx 8UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The deadline for the filing of application is mandated in Article 4, Annex II: Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the names of any Commission members who have provided it with sc ientific and technical advice. (Underscoring supplied) In a subsequent meeting, the States parties agreed that for States which became bound by the treaty before 13 May 1999 (such as the Philippines) the ten-year period will be counted from that date. Thus, RA 9522, which took effect on 27 March 2009, barely met the deadline. 9 Rollo, p. 34. 10Which provides: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,

consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 11Entered into between the Unites States and Spain on 10 December 1898 following the conclusion of the SpanishAmerican War. Under the terms of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands lying within its technical description. 12 The Treaty of Washington, between Spain and the United States (7 November 1900), transferring to the US the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu and the US-Great Britain Convention (2 January 1930) demarcating boundary lines between the Philippines and North Borneo. 13 Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16. 14 Allegedly in violation of Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. 15 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995). 16 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 165 Phil. 303 (1976). 17Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J., concurring). The two other factors are: the character of funds or assets involved in the co ntroversy and a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition. Id. 18. Rollo, pp. 144-147. 19See e.g. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623 (dismissing a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, not for the impropriety of remedy but for lack of merit); Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137 (issuing the writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591); Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003) (issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition declaring unconstitutional portions of Republic Act No. 9189). 20See e.g. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77 (granting a writ of certiorari against the Philippine Senate and nullifying the Senate contempt order issued against petitioner). 21 Rollo, p. 31. 22Respondents state in their Comment that petitioners theory has not been accepted or recognized by either the United States or Spain, the parties to the Treaty of Paris. Respondents add that no State is known to have supported this proposition. Rollo, p. 179. 23UNCLOS III belongs to that larger corpus of international law of the sea, which petitioner Magallona himself defined as a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. x x x x (Merlin M. Magallona, Primer on the Law of the Sea 1 [1997]) (Italicization supplied). 24 Following Article 47 (1) of UNCLOS III which provides:

An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied) 25 Under the United Nations Charter, use of force is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory. 26 The last paragraph of the preamble of UNCLOS III states that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general internatio nal law. 27 Rollo, p. 51. 28 Id. at 51-52, 64-66. 29 Based on figures respondents submitted in their Comment (id. at 182). 30 Under Article 74. 31 See note 7. 32 Presidential Decree No. 1596 classifies the KIG as a municipality of Palawan. 33 KIG lies around 80 nautical miles west of Palawan while Scarborough Shoal is around 123 nautical west of Zambales. 34 Journal, Senate 14th Congress 44th Session 1416 (27 January 2009). 35 Rollo, p. 159. 36 Section 2, RA 9522. 37 Article 121 provides: Regime of islands. 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 38 Rollo, pp. 56-57, 60-64. 39Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the term archipelagic waters separately from territorial sea. Under UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State may have internal waters such as those enclosed by closing lines across bays and mouths of rivers. See Article 50, UNCLOS III. Moreover, Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides: Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. (Emphasis supplied)

40 Mandated under Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS III: Article 52. Right of innocent passage. 1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3. 2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published. (Emphasis supplied) Article 53. Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. 2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes. 3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same entry and exit points shall not be necessary. 5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane. 6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes. 7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it. 8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally accepted international regulations. 9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may designate, prescribe or substitute them.

10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to which due publicity shall be given. 11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article. 12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied) 41Namely, House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738, identically titled AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES IN THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, PRESCRIBING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES AND PROVIDING FOR THE ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES THEREIN. 42 The relevant provision of UNCLOS III provides: Article 17. Right of innocent passage. Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea . (Emphasis supplied)

Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage Article 21. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage. 1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State; (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards. 3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. 43The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea applies only to ships and not to aircrafts (Article 17, UNCLOS III). The right of innocent passage of aircrafts through the sovereign territory of a State arises only under an international agreement. In contrast, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters applies to both ships and aircrafts (Article 53 (12), UNCLOS III).

44Following Section 2, Article II of the Constitution: Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied) 45Archipelagic sea lanes passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits to which the territorial sea of continental coastal State is subject. R.R. Churabill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 127 (1999). 46 Falling under Article 121 of UNCLOS III (see note 37). 47 Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the following rights under UNCLOS III:

Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone.

1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. xxxx

Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as follows:

Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. 1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 48 See note 13. 49 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 698 (1995); Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 580-581 (1997). 50 G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792. 51 The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. 52The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferentia l use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fis hing resources. 53This can extend up to 350 nautical miles if the coastal State proves its right to claim an extended continental shelf (see UNCLOS III, Article 76, paragraphs 4(a), 5 and 6, in relation to Article 77).

54 Rollo, pp. 67-69. 55Article 47 (1) provides: An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied)