From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_double_effect (5/3/12) (This wikipedia article is accurate this time.

) Principle of double effect: The doctrine consists of four conditions that must be satisfied before an act that has both good and bad effects is morally permissible: 1. 2. 3. 4. The action itself (OBJECT) must be either morally good or neutral. *The bad effect must not be the means (OBJECT) by which one achieves the good effect.* The intention (INTENTION) must be the achieving of only the good effect. The good effect must be at least equivalent in importance to the bad effect. (CIRCUMSTANCESwhich include consequences)

The second of these four conditions is an application of the more general principle that good ends do not justify evil means (cf. Romans 3:8): We may not do evil that good may come of it.

Examples: Medicine A vaccine manufacturer typically knows that while a vaccine will save many lives, a few people may get sick or die from side effects of vaccination. The manufacture of a drug is in itself morally neutral. Lives are saved as a result of the vaccine, not as a result of the deaths due to side effects. The bad effect, the deaths due to side effects, does not further any goals of the manufacturer, and hence is not intended as a means to any end. Finally, the number of lives saved is much greater than the number lost, and so the proportionality condition is satisfied. This is more a case of side effects/benefit analysis than of a real Principle of Double Effect application and is common in medicine. [CLASSIC CASE OF DOUBLE EFFECT:] The principle of double effect is frequently cited in cases of pregnancy and abortion. A doctor who believes abortion is always morally wrong may nevertheless remove the uterus or fallopian tubes of a pregnant woman, knowing the procedure will cause the death of the embryo or fetus, in cases in which the woman is certain to die without the procedure (examples cited include aggressive uterine cancer and ectopic pregnancy). In these cases, the intended effect is to save the woman's life, not to terminate the pregnancy, and the effect of not performing the procedure would result in the greater evil of the death of both the mother and the fetus. War The principle appears useful in war situations. In a war, it may be morally acceptable to bomb the enemy headquarters to end the war quickly, even if civilians on the streets around the headquarters might die. For, in such a case, the bad effect of civilian deaths is not disproportionate to the good effect of ending the war quickly, and the deaths of the civilians are side effect and not intended by the bombers, either as ends or as means. On the other hand, to bomb an enemy orphanage in order to terrorize the enemy into surrender would be unacceptable, because the deaths of the orphans would be intended as a means, in this case as a means to ending the war early, contrary to the means-end condition.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ (April 16, 2013) Many morally reflective people have been persuaded that something along the lines of double effect must be correct. No doubt this is because at least some of the examples cited as illustrations of DE have considerable intuitive appeal: 1. The terror bomber aims to bring about civilian deaths in order to weaken the resolve of the enemy: when his bombs kill civilians this is a consequence that he intends. The tactical bomber aims at military targets while foreseeing that bombing such targets will cause civilian deaths. When his bombs kill civilians this is a foreseen but unintended consequence of his actions. Even if it is equally certain that the two bombers will cause the same number of civilian deaths, terror bombing is impermissible while tactical bombing is permissible. 2. A doctor who intends to hasten the death of a terminally ill patient by injecting a large dose of morphine would act impermissibly [wrongly] because he intends to bring about the patient's death. However, a doctor who intended to relieve the patient's pain with that same dose and merely foresaw the hastening of the patient's death would act permissibly. [However, recent studies have shown that in fact morphine in doses used for pain relief does not hasten death. ] 3. A doctor who believed that abortion was wrong, even in order to save the mother's life, might nevertheless consistently believe that it would be permissible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with cancer. In carrying out the hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman's life while merely foreseeing the death of the child. Performing an abortion, by contrast, would involve intending to kill the child as a means to saving the mother. 4. To kill a person whom you know to be plotting to kill you would be impermissible because it would be a case of intentional killing; however, to strike in self-defense against an aggressor is permissible, even if one foresees that the blow by which one defends oneself will be fatal. 5. It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.

6. Sacrificing one's own life in order to save the lives of others can be distinguished from suicide by characterizing the agent's intention: a soldier who throws himself on a live grenade intends to shield others from its blast and merely foresees his own death; by contrast, a person who commits suicide intends to bring his or her own life to an end.