39. Aquino v. Delizo (109 Phil 21) FACTS: Fernando Aquino, petitioner, was married to Conchita Delizo, defendant.

Petitioner filed a complaint on the ground of fraud alleging that defendant conceived a child which was not his own. This means that defendant concealed the fact that she was pregnant with another man and then got married to him. Only the plaintiff testified and presented documentary evidence such birth certificate and affidavit of the petitioners brother who admitted that he is the fa ther of defendants child. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not concealing the pregnancy constitutes fraud of annulment of marriage HELD: Yes. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In this case, it was alleged that defendant (wife) was only four months pregnant and was naturally plump or fat, therefore, plaintiff (husband) would not be expected to know by merely looking at her that she was pregnant at the time of their marriage. and may be a ground

40. ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

Facts: plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953 defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando court granted Auroras counterclaim Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppels

He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged: he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations defendant Fernando carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several children during the whole range of nine years

Issue: whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage Held: No. Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. The court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage

41. Tolentino vs Villanueva

Facts: On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.

In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof.

Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M. but petitioner failed to comply. Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation can be promulgated based on petitioners evidence and without the appearance of his wife. Held: Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:

"ART. 88.No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed."

"ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."

The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

Jocson vs. Robles

Facts: Gloria Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo Robles on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage. Allegedly, herein defendant contracted a previous marriage with a certain Josefina Fausto which also filed a criminal complaint against herein defendant on the same ground of bigamy. Herein plaintiff asked for moral and exemplary damages and alleged that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical abuse. On the otherhand, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage and argued that he was compelled by force, threat and intimidation by the parents of the plaintiff. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of facts are involved in the case. To support this argument, defendant presented affidavits executed by herein plaintiffs father and brother. On the date set by the court, both parties did not appear in court. The defendants motion was denied by the lower court on the ground that before judgment can be had on the nullity of the marriage, proof that a previous marriage was validly subsisting. In addition, the court found an indication that there was collusion between the parties so as to get a declaration of nullity of marriage. Hence this appeal by the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the affidavits are sufficient to render judgment and declaration of nullity of marriage?

Held: The higher court ruled that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, JR

FACTS: In 1972, petitioner, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, a US citizen got married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines; and, they begot two children. In 1982, the couples got divorced in Nevada, United States and petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner claiming that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada is valid in the Philippine jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the divorce is valid. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada has released private respondent from the marriage based on the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. To maintain that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and

fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. Petitioner should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

People v. Sensano and Ramos

Facts:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Venturawere married on April 29, 1919. Afterthe birth of their only child, thehusband left his wife and was gone forthree years without writing to her orsending her support. While thehusband was away, the wife began tolive with Marcelo Ramos. Whenhusband returned, he filed a charge of adultery which resulted in a convictionand a sentencing. When the sentencewas completed, wife begged thehusband to take her back but herefused. Abandoned a second time, thewife fled back to Ramos. Husband,knowing that his wife reverted to herlover, did not do anything to assertshis rights and left for the states. Hereturned to the Philippines seven yearslater and presented a second charge of adultery. Issue: WON the second charge of adulterycan be a ground for legal separation. Held/Ratio: No. The husband was only assuming amere pose of an offended spouse.He consented to the adulterousrelations of his wife and Ramos and isthus, therefore barred from institutingany criminal proceeding. Even if hewas still in a foreign country, he wouldhave still been able to take actionagainst the accused but since he didnttake this option, it showed aconsiderable lack of genuine interestas the offended party.

Bugayong vs. Ginez (art.55-56)

Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamins sisters.

Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonilas godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Matubis v. Praxedes
Facts: Matubis and Praxedes got married on 1943. The couple agreed to live separately on 1944. On April, 1948, the spouses entered into an agreement stating that both relinquish their rights over each other as husband and wife, that both are free to marry again, and that wife is no longer entitled to support. In Jan. 1955, the husband cohabited with another woman and had a child with her. On April 1956, wife alleged abandonment and concubinage subsequently filing a petition for legal separation. RTC held that the acts constituted concubinage but dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Plaintiff appealed. Issue: WON there was consent of the wife to her husbands concubinage. Held/Ratio:

Yes. As seen in the agreement, there was an express condonation and consent granted to the husband. Having consented, the wife cannot claim legal separation and is undeserving of the courts sympathy. The petition was also filed after the prescriptive period. She came to know the situation in Jan. 1955 but only instituted the complaint on April. 1956 more than a year later.

Contreras v. Macaraig
May 29, 1970, Dizon, J. Facts: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She failed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. However she finally found out about her husbands mistress and the birth of the latters child. In December 1963, wife finally met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her husbands illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription. Issue: WON the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963. Held/Ratio: December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her husbands infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation. #49 RAMOS-SAMOSA vs. VAMENTO FACTS: Petitioner Lucy Samosa- Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage on the part of respondent Clement Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injuction for the return of her paraphernal exclusive porperty. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for P.I. were heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even dim. Respondent Judge Vamonte, thereafter, granted respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition. Hence, the petition; ISSUE: Whether or not, Article 103 of the New Civil Code prohibiting the hearing for an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from filing of the petition, would likewise

preclude the court from acting on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such suit. RULING: No. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision; that the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

50. ARANETA VS CONCEPCION

CASE DIGEST:

FACTS: Petitioner filed a case of adultery against his wife. Defendant on the other side filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their 3 children, a monthly support and the return of her passport which was allegedly taken by the Petitioner. Affidavits and documents were submitted both in support and against the omnibus petition. Petitioner denied misconduct imputed to him. RTC granted the omnibus petition, MR denied, thus, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. Issue: Whether or not the parties needed to present evidence first before the omnibus petition be granted Ruling:

Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent lite in accordance with this opinion. The courts order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is REVERSED. The prohibition on Article 103 of the CC was used by the Judge for refusing request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues. It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word means. To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intend. Consequently, each part of section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody

Reyes v. Judge Ines-Luciano

88 SCRA 803 (G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979) (obligation to support spouse)

FACTS: January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes and Celia Ilustre-Reyes got married. They had children. March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down the 13-flight stairs, hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half unconscious. May 11, 1976: She left their office May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag. Manuel demanded that she get out but she ignored him. Hence, he doused her with grape juice, kicked her, attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver. June 3, 1976: Celia filed the following petitions against Manuel: (1) Action for support pendente lite; (2) Legal separation for the attempt to kill her. Contentions of Manuel: Celia committed adultery with her physician. She is thus not entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was excessive.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite.

HELD: Yes. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action. BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely alleged. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite and for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. YET Celia asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not necessarily from Manuels private funds. As to the determination of amount, Celia was unemployed and without funds. All their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President, Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel. i. Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61 ii. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84 iii. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc.

iv. That these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite.

Lapuz v. Eufemio
Jan. 31, 1972, Reyes, JBL: Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on the ground of being abandoned and the latter cohabiting with another woman. Eufemio counterclaimed that his marriage was void ab initio because said marriage was allegedly bigamous. Before trial could be completed, Carmen died in a car accident. Husband moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the grounds of prescription and a lack of a cause of action due to the death of his wife. Issue: WON the death of the plaintiff before final degree in an action for legal separation abates the action. Held/Ratio: Yes. [Additional Info: Carmen (through her substitute) assumed that her husbands counterclaim converted the legal separation cause of action to one which voided the marriage. This was deemed untenable since both can stand independent and separate adjudication. ] "Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. - 1 Corpus Juris, 208

A review of the resulting changes in property relations (which was among the reasons why Carmen filed the original petition) between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation. HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

#54 ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ 42 Phil 54

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921 (Matrimonial Home)

Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification. (2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife. (3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife. Held: (1) No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven;

(2) The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this

consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him.

(3) Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other.

HELD: NO.

It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium.

At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

PILAR ATILANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA CHING BENG, defendantappellant.

Facts: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. Chua returned toManila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she did not.

In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents. Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in Manilawith him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his parents. Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilars allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she had experienced some previous in-law troubles. Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga. His petition was denied, thus this case.

Issue:Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua Held: The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any support. (G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958