On Bullshit, Truth, Lies; and You

By Joshua Brancheau

It is not a common endeavor to discuss the multiplicity of things that are known as bullshit. Nevertheless, bullshit is everywhere, and everyone seems like they would rather not acknowledge it. In regards to verbal communication alone, bullshit arises frequently and is almost always unheeded. When Harry Frankfurt analyzed bullshit, he concluded that bullshit was the enemy of truth, and therefore worse than lies. His conclusion is based on the assumption that the truth is not an important factor in bullshit, while lies admit to the importance of truth in the process of purposefully manipulating it. Frankfurts analysis leads towards the assumption that bullshitting or, communicating with bullshit, is worse than lying. I believe that the quality of communication rests in its ability to exchange information, whether communicating with truths, lies or bullshit. I would like to argue that a positive exchange of ideas can occur through all three types of communication. The quality of any piece of communication should be based solely on its ability to convey clear and constructive ideas in benefit of a receiver, whether bullshit or not. While the clarity of dialogue is a sufficient factor in successfully passing on information, the quality of what is being communicated necessarily relies on the intended and effectual constructiveness of that information to serve the ends of its recipient. In order to further

understand my claim, let us consider the two sources which have lead me to this conclusion, the essays, On Bullshit,1 by Harry Frankfurt, and, Logic and Conversation,2 by H.P. Grice. With an understanding of what is outlined in these two essays we can continue to build our understanding of what bullshit is and how it fits into the ways in which we communicate.

Frankfurt, Harry G., The importance of what we care about: Philosophical Essays. New York, NY. Cambridge University Press. 1988. All references to this book are to the specific essay On Bullshit, and are henceforth cited with endnotes as BS- page#, paragraph# Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. 1989. All references to this book are to the specific essay Logic and Conversation, and are henceforth cited with endnotes as LC- page#, paragraph#

In, On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt invites the reader to begin in an investigation of, What bullshit is, and how it differs from what it is not.3 As an illustration of what he considered to be the essence of bullshit Frankfurt uses a verbal exchange. He introduces an anecdote told by Fania Pascal, an associate of Ludwig Wittgenstein, in which Wittgenstein reacts obtusely to a figure of speech. Frankfurt paints a picture of Wittgenstein in which he is a man who is an enemy to nonsense wherever it can be found. In the anecdote Pascal says, obviously in pain, I feel just like a dog that has been run over,4 which gains her the disgusted response of Wittgenstein, You dont know what a dog that has been run over feels like. 4 Frankfurt uses this dialogue to investigate what it is that bothers Wittgenstein so much. Was he joking, or was he seriously disturbed by the expression? Frankfurt claims that Wittgenstein was disgusted because he considered the womans claim to be bullshit, unconnected to a concern with the truth.5 Frankfurt proclaims It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth this indifference to how things really are that I regard as the essence of bullshit.6 In order to illustrate further, bullshits lack of concern for the truth, Frankfurt turns toward the Oxford English Dictionary. As observable data to back up his hypothesis, we are given a stack of actual definitions, with snippets of literature cited as examples of the definitions, and a discussion of how a bull session, just plain bull, and bullshit,7 all participate in this activity of lacking: lacking conviction, lacking necessity, lacking purpose, lacking substance, and lacking facts. Through analysis of these definitions, Frankfurt demonstrates how bullshit is disconnected from the truth, how a bullshitter makes up fictions, whether they are based on facts or not, and how bullshit is missing anything substantial worth paying attention to. Bullshit cannot be
BS pg117, p2 BS pg123, p1 5 BS pg124, p3 6 BS pg125, p2 7 BS pgs125-128
3 4

associated with the truth. Frankfurt comes to a point where he must demonstrate how something that is so disconnected from what is true, is also disconnected from what is false and the discussion shifts towards lies. Frankfurt makes the distinction that lies are fake, and bullshit is phony.8 The intention behind bullshit is distraction and the containment of focus, not the advancement of complex ideas. Frankfurt makes a reference to a fictional account where someones father told them that it was always better to try and bullshit your way through, rather than lie.9 This leads Frankfurt to discuss the comparative virtues and vices of bullshit and lies. Lying is more direct and has a more distinctive and punishable effect, whereas bullshit is vague and rarely builds anything worth remembering. The bullshitter has no concern for the truth while the liar delicately manipulates the truth in a way that not only recognizes truthfulness, but also is effective at representing truthfulness. Throughout society, bullshit is more tolerated than lies. Frankfurt counters this occurrence with an appeal for the truth. Even though lies are false, their intention to create true ideas is what makes them better than bullshit. He indicates that a lack of recognition for reality and what can be known as the facts, is far more problematic then manipulations which recognize that reality and attempt to displace it.10 Harry Frankfurt claims that bullshit is worse than lies because of its indifference towards the truth. For the most part, I agree with Frankfurt on this thesis. The uncontained proliferation of bullshit is detrimental to our state of ontological well being. However, in his central

demonstration of bullshit, the Wittgenstein anecdote, his example exhibited and defined an instance of metaphor as bullshit. The use of this example implies that this type of

communication is worse than lying, because it has no concern for the way things really are, and I
BS pg128, p3 BS pg129, p1 10 BS pg132, p1
8 9

disagree. While Frankfurts claim about the reasons behind Wittgensteins remark, (that he was disgusted by her use of bullshit) follows from the end results of his analysis of bullshit, I disagree with his connotation. The use of idiomatic phrases, slang, metaphor, and obscurity, can all be interpreted through the context of a cooperative conversation, creating a positive exchange of information. With the assistance of H.P. Grice I believe it can be demonstrated that cooperative conversation efforts, even with the use of metaphors or other idiomatic expressions, which convey meaning other than what can be literally translated from their words by themselves and would be defined as bullshit by Frankfurt, are productive and can be beneficial to the goals of a group in dialogue. Productive conversation can occur with the use of bullshit. In Logic and Conversation, Grice introduces two crucial ideas that are beneficial to my cause. The first is the outline of what he calls the Cooperative Principle and the second is a product of the first, conversational implicature. The Cooperative Principle is the idea that there is a mutual understanding between a group of interlocutors. The understanding is that they all maintain a shared responsibility to keep to the conversation, whether ordained a direction, or free to roam around. Cooperative conversations are meant to be beneficial to all of the members that participate in them. Grice describes the Cooperative Principle (CP) as something sustained by four categories of maxims. Unbeknownst to most participants in verbal exchanges, they are most likely following the maxims of the CP, because they are taking part in cooperative conversation; by exploiting the maxims of the CP they create conversational implicature. A statement which has the intention of meaning something other than what is literally said, and has the foundation of a cooperative conversation to lead the recipients, to the speakers desired interpretation, creates an instance of conversational implicature.

The maxims of the Cooperative Principle are broken up into four categories: quality, quantity, relation, and manner.11 They seem fairly obvious when you think about common courtesy, but the busy nature of our culture today does not allow for a leisurely philosophical inquiry into courtesy to happen very often. In summation the maxims of the four categories say (respectively): contribute only what you know to be true, elaborate with examples until you have made your point clear, dont say something irrelevant, and organization and clarity are two things that should be considered in order to efficiently and accurately convey any complex idea. The maxims act as structural restraints to allow for cooperative conversation to occur, they prevent unnecessary, and untrue information from being introduced into the conversation. These maxims sound like a great normative code which would be useful in all exchanges of information, but do we ever follow all of the rules? With recognition of the maxims, a member of a conversation can recognize when another member violates or exploits the Cooperative Principle and thus gain more than just a literal, and possibly misleading understanding of what was said. A violation can occur when there is a clash between two maxims. A friend asks another friend where he is visiting yet another friend in France. The South of France, is the reply, thus implying, with intention to or not, he doesnt know where his other friend lives, through the use of vagueness.12 The intentional exploitation of a maxim is what creates conversational implicature. Conversational implicature is a deliberate breaking of the CP, with which the speaker intends for the audience to notice and infer more than what is being spoken. This allows for gestures, inflections, and even bullshit to influence the final meaning of exchanges in a cooperative dialogue.

11 12

LC pg26, p3 LC pg32, p3

Think about the statement, I feel just like a dog that has been run over! Can anyone really know what a dog that has been run over feels like? Can we really express how we feel in physical pain? Is it that difficult to allow for an expression to take the place of a truth? Do we have to say I hurt hear, or maybe, I hurt everywhere? I feel bright as sunshine, or I feel sick as a dog, both can imply interpretable meanings. Beyond that, it would not be difficult to interpret their meanings. Someone says, I feel as bright as sunshine, and you know they are awake, alert, happy, warm, emitting energy like the sun; or, I feel like I have been hit by a car, and you know they are in pain, shock, probably with some disorientation. In both cases Wittgenstein might reply, You dont know what a giant molten nuclear reactor emitting energy in all directions feels like; or, You have never been hit by a car! And, Frankfurt might argue, Thats all bullshit, lets stick to reality. But the statements convey meaning. In recognition of the Cooperative Principle, and with a little bit of common sense, that meaning is attainable. That intended meaning is the projected effect of conversational implicature. In Logic and Conversation, Grice discusses the logical form conversations in natural language can and should follow. He believes that members in a conversation have a mutual interest in reaching a stated or unstated goal, which directs them to operate in such a way as to reach that goal. By understanding the conditions under which verbal communication is effective, we gain a better understanding into how that system of communication can be expanded. Contrary to Frankfurt, the ideas Grice puts forward embrace the expansion and possibly the evolution of our language structure. Finding a consistent way to interpret meaning out of some of the everyday bullshit we throw around lies in our own understanding of the level of cooperation involved in whatever certain dialogue we are mixed up in. The use of figures of speech, metaphor, or any other idiomatic type expression can become problematic in an attempt

to rid the world of what Frankfurt considers to be bullshit.

Grice illustrates a system of

normative principles which allow for certain context-based expressions to be productive, which are otherwise bullshit type statements to Frankfurt. The Cooperative Principle is an inherent code of conduct which should be formally recognized in-light of its ability to describe what a cooperative conversation effort looks like, enable those participants to recognize conversational implicature, and ultimately give bullshit some cause. Outside of the realm of cooperative conversation bullshit is everywhere, except where we find lies. Outside of the realm of cooperative conversation, everyone acts deconstructively. When someone uses an odd expression, or a little bit of positive bullshit, within the context of a cooperative conversation, it should not be considered an act against all sacred knowledge, there is no reason that slang and other idiomatic expressions can not be added to our dialect. Bullshit is not always worse than lies. It is not a factual account that can be read literally, but it can be used in a context that should lead to the proper conclusion, and therefore has an inclination towards an intended truth. The more particular direction of truth and lies allows for a greater amount of constructivity to occur, being either positive or negative, but bullshit can still be positive. As an example, I bullshit all of the time. If I want my audience to know that I am bullshitting than I make it obvious, direct them somewhere, produce an effect. If I want to imply I know what I am talking about and misrepresent myself in that way, then I distract them with smart sounding things, and possibly confuse them to the effect that they do not want to hear anymore. Bullshit can be used to create new ideas, as well as be used to prevent the creation of new ideas. I would like to make the distinction that there are positive or constructive instances of truth, lies and bullshit, as well as negative or destructive ones. This distinction should be made in consideration of the intention each type of statement is made with, as well as the fulfillment of

that intention. If the statement was made in an effort to further the understanding of its recipient and it does, than it is positive. If the intention is to hurt, confuse, distract, or mislead, than the statement should be considered negative. A lie can be positive if it leads to an end which is positive. You tell your friend that she should not go-out directly after work on her birthday because you have a surprise party waiting at her house. As well as, a truth can be negative when intended to be destructive. You are told that there is not enough oxygen on the top of Mount Everest with the intention to douse your dreams of one day climbing it. This dichotomy in our natural language allows for Frankfurts analysis to hold and my interpretation of Grices observations to deepen our understanding of bullshit. Worthless bullshit is worse than truths, lies, and positive bullshit. But bullshit which leads to an exchange of understanding is superior to negative truths, lies and bullshit. If the evaluation of quality communication were based on adherence to truth alone, bullshit would be the worst type of communication, but by evaluating communication based on the intended and effective usefulness towards a decided goal then natural language can become more flexible. Between communicating with truths, lies and

bullshit, the quality of communication rests in its ability to exchange information and continue the building of more complex ideas.