MarkB.N.Hansen Professor,Literature,InformationScience+InformationStudies,VisualStudies Initiative DukeUniversity UbiquitousSensationorTheAutonomyofthePeripheral:TowardsanAtmospheric, Impersonal,andMicrotemporalMedia Machinesthatfitthe humanenvironment, insteadofforcinghumans toentertheirs,willmake usingacomputeras refreshingastakingawalk inthewoods.1 I.

1 I. TechnicsandSensation Thedesiretoexpandhumansensorycapacitieshaslonginformedthe developmentoftechnology.Fromthetelescopetothephotographiccamerato contemporarymachinevisionandinfraredsystems,technologiesforexpanding visionhavemadeformerlyimperceptibledomainsofsensationaccessibletohuman experience.Referringtophotography(andonlysubsequentlytocinema),Walter Benjaminhasquiteaptlycharacterizedthisprocessastheopeningupofanoptical unconscious.2 TheinvocationofBenjaminservesasareminderofthefundamental

historicaldimensioninformingthecorrelationofsensationwithtechnics:witheach technicalliberationofsomeformerlyinvisibleareaofthesensoryworld,the operationandmeaningofsensationchangesinsomecrucialway.WhatBenjamin teachesusishowsensationgetsrepeatedlytransformedinwaysthatnecessarily tightenthecircuitbindinghumanperceptionwithitstechnicalsupplementation.

 Itisnoteworthythat,forallofhisinterestintactileexperience,Benjamins

thematizationofthehistoricalcorrelationofsensationandtechnicsprivilegesthe domainofthevisual.AsIhavearguedinNewPhilosophyforNewMedia,thisisa privilegethathaslargelydeterminedthetheorizationofthetechnical supplementationofsensationfromphotography(anditsprecursors)tothedigital computer.AsexemplifiedbyJonathanCrarysarchaeologyoftechnical spectatorship,RosalindKrausssattentiontoopticaldevicesassourcesofart production,PaulViriliosexplorationsofmachinevisionsystemsandrealtime optics,andLevManovichsembeddingofnewmediaprocedureswithincinematic culture,developmentsofBenjaminsinsighthavecontinuedtoinvestthevisualas theprivilegedsensorydomainfortechnicssimpactonsensation. Whileitcertainlyinstancesavaluationthathasbeencentralnotsimplyin

WesternarthistorybutinWesternthinkingassuch(asHansJonashascompellingly demonstrated3),thisprivilegeofthevisualhas,tomymind,gonehandinhandwith anothervaluationcentraltoWesternhistory,namelythecorrelationbetweenmedia andhumanperceptualratios.FromthecavepaintingsoftheUpperPaleolithic period4tocontemporarysocialmedianetworksforsharingphotographs (flickr.com)andvideos(youtube.com),theperennialroleplayedbymediahasbeen togivedurable,externalsupporttoprivate,fleetinghumanexperiences.5Withno morethanabitofcompetitionandincursionfromthedomainoftheaural,the historyofthemediasupplementationofhumanexperiencehasplayeditselfouton theterrainofthevisual.

 Ifmodernmediahistorywouldappeartowitnesstheassimilationofall sensorystreamsintoasinglemediamodelamodelinwhichallpotentialityfor playingonesensorymodeagainstanotherisfromtheoutsetsubordinatedtothe captureandstorageofexperienceinhumanlyaccessibleformrecent developmentspromiseareturnofsensoryheterogeneity.Informingsuchareturn

isthedisplacementofaspatialconceptualizationoftheimageinfavorofatemporal one.Itisjustsuchadisplacementthatisatstakeinthecomputationalrevolution wearecurrentlylivingthrough. Toelucidatethesignificanceofthisdisplacement,letmesimplyandbriefly invoketwocorrelatedsitesofcontemporaryculturalpractice.Inhiseffortto articulateanaestheticsrootedintheoperationofneuralplasticity,artistWarren Neidichdevelopsanaccountofimage/artproductionintermsofergonomics.(By ergonomics,Neidichmeansthetuningofsensorymaterialtotherequirementsof thenervoussystem.)ThedevelopmentofdigitaltechnologypromptsNeidichto contrasttwokindsofergonomics:visualandcognitive.Whileadmittingthatwe currentlyliveinaperiodoftransitioninwhichbothmodelsofergonomicsarein operation,Neidichlinkscognitiveergonomicswithaliberationoftemporalityand specifically,ofmicrotemporalprocessesofneuralimagingfromsubordinationto thespatial/visualimage: Visualandcognitiveergonomicsaredistinguishedinanumberofways. Visualergonomicsdevelopedfirstandistetheredtoearlyformsof representationsuchaspainting,sculpture,anddrawing.Itisprimarily concernedwiththerepresentationofstaticspace.Itdelineatesaprocess

4 throughwhichnaturalspaceiscodedtoberepresentedasspaceonacanvas, anditdescribesahistoricalprocessbywhichthatspacebecomespalpable andhaptic.Visualergonomicsislinkedtotraditionalformsandmaterials ofrepresentationlikepainting;butbecausecertainideasofspaceandits representationdiscoveredin,say,landscapepainting,werecarriedoverto photographyandlatercinema,italsohassomerelevancetothem.Cognitive ergonomicsisalaterphenomenonandisinvolvedindelineatingdynamic processes.Whereasvisualergonomicswasinvolvedindefiningspace, cognitiveergonomicsisinvolvedindescribingtemporality.[Incontrastto visualergonomics,cognitiveergonomics]ismuchmorepertinenttorecent digitalandinternetart.Inthisregarditisinvolvedindeterminingthe processthroughwhichinformationonacomputerscreenisobtained,andfor thatitreliesonknowledgeofhowcognitivesystemsoperate.Cognitive ergonomics,asitsnameimplies,takesintoaccountthewholebrainand conceptualsystem,asisnecessarywhenorganizingtechnologiesthat interfacewiththeentirebodyandbeing.6

Inhisdevelopmentofthespecificallytemporaldimensionofcognitiveergonomics, Neidichdrawsonneuroscientificresearchintotheproblemoftemporalbinding. Whatthisresearchhasshownisthatvisualandmotorcognitionarisesthroughthe synchronizationofmicrotemporallyasynchronousquasiautonomousprocesses.In thefieldofthevisualcortexforexample,astheworkofSemirZekiandhis colleagueshasdemonstrated,distinctprocessesforrecognitionofcolor,motion, orientation,andlocationareboundbythesheerfactoftheirhappeningwithinthe

 samemicrotemporalwindow.7Becausethereisnoneedforanysupplementary agentofbindingonhisaccount,Zekiconsiderstheseprocessestobedistinct microconsciousnessesthatformthebasisforourhigherorderexperiencesof seamless,integratedvisualsensation.

Asamediatorintheprocessoftemporalbinding,cognitiveergonomicsthus operatesatthemicrotemporallevel,whichistosaythatitconcernsitselfwithhow thesequasiautonomousmicroconsciousnessescombinetogenerate macrosensations.AsNeidichdevelopsit,theaimofanaestheticsattunedtothis microtemporaldomainofsensationistotargetandengineerthedevelopmentofthe brainssecondaryrepertoireatthismicrotemporallevel.Couldweconjecturethen thatbindingandtheprocessofreentrywhichallowsittohappenismorethanjusta neurobiologicalprocessbindingdifferentareasofthebrain,butisalsoaprocess thatoperatesintheworldofnetworkedrelations?8Neidichcontendsthatthe creationofcertaintypesofimagesand(Iwouldadd)mediaenvironmentscan promotecertainpatternsfortheassemblyofmacrosensationsoutofthe microtemporaloperationsofcognitiveandvisualprocessing:aestheticsis constantlyreassemblingthepartialitiesthatmakeuptheperceptionofphysical objectsandtheirrelations..Thesepartialitiesarelinkedtogetherbyprocesses analogoustothosewesawatworkinthebrain.Processesanalogoustoreentrytie thesefragmentstogetherintowholes.[Only]thoserelationswithan ergonomicallyconsistenttemporalitywillbeinscribedintothesecondary repertoire.9Inthefinalinstance,Neidichsworkforegroundsthenecessityfor contemporarymediatheorytoengagethetemporaldimensionofsensationbeyond

therestrictiveframeimposedbythemodelofsensoryassimilationweveinherited frommodernmediahistory. Asecondandaltogethercomplementarypleaforatemporaltheoryofmedia comesbywayofphilosopherMaurizioLazzaratosneoBergsonist(andpost Deleuzian)accountofvideoasamachinetocrystallizetime.Conceptualizing videoasthefirsttechnologythatcorrespondstoageneralizeddecodingofthe flowsofimages,adecodingwhosegenesisistracedinBergsonsMatterand Memory,Lazzaratocontrastsvideoandcinemaastwodistinctmachinicmediations ofperception.10Attheheartofthiscontrastisthedifferencebetweenrecordingand modulation:whereascinema,theparadigmofrecordingmedia,operatesby capturinglightasimpressiononasurface(andthusbyimposingitsspatial organization,theformoftheframe,oninfinitessimalmodulationsoflight),video directlymodulatestheflowsofelectromagneticwaves.Videoimagesare contractionsanddilations,vibrationsandtremorsoflight,ratherthantracings, reproductionsofreality.Thevideocamerastakeisacrystallizationoftime matter.11Withtheintroductionofvideo,exemplarofelectronicanddigital technologies,wehaveatourdisposalfortheveryfirsttimeinhistoryamachine thatoperateslikewedo:thetechnologiesoftime[bywhichismeant,aboveall, video]imitatethevarioussyntheses(conservation,passageandsplittingarising [ddoublementsurgissement])oftime,andthroughthesefunctionsofcontraction relaxationtheyworkontheconditionsofproductionofaffectiveforce.Asin Bergson,themattercontractedbythesetechnologiesconsistsofthevarious temporalstratificationsofmemory.[T]hetermimitationindicates[s]that

 electronicanddigitaltechnologiesoperatelikethematerialandspiritualsyntheses

inBergson:theycrystallizetime.Videoanddigitaltechnologiescanthusbegrasped astechnologiesthatimitateperception,memoryandintellectualwork.12 Whatremainscrucialforthisdeterminationofvideoasmarkingacertain breakinthehistoryofmachinicperceptionisthewayitimitatesthespecifically temporaloperationofintellectualwork.Incontrasttocinemawhich,inlinewith BergsonscritiqueinCreativeEvolution,canonlygrasptimeastheproductofa mechanicalactivityproceedingaccordingtoanexternalandpredeterminedformof image,videodirectlyengagesthefluxofthereal,oftimematter,priortoits contractionintotheimage,orbetter,intheveryprocessofsuchcontraction.Ifvideo (andelectronicanddigitaltechnologiesmoregenerally)helpsusappreciatethe temporalbasisofBergsonstheoryoftheproductionofimages,asLazzaratoargues, thatispreciselybecauseitexpandsouraccesstothepoweroftime.Asamedia technologythatimitatesandintensifiestheoperationofthebrainstemporal syntheses,videoliterallyexplodestheopticalimage.Whatappearsbeneaththe shardsofthisexplodedimageisthedynamicandconstructive,microtemporal processofimagingormodulationthatdirectlyengagesandsynthesizes(contracts dilates)timematteritself,independentlyoftheformoftheimageandpriortothe operationofmacroconsciousperception. Together,thesetwoexamplesattesttoacertainimbricationof microtemporalneuralprocesseswithmicrotemporalmodulationofdigital technologies.ForbothNeidichandLazzarato,withdifferingemphasestobesure, thereisanecessitytocorrelatethetechnicalmediationofsensationwiththe

 cognitiveoperationofthesensingbrain,andtodosoatalevelthatbreakswith whatIhaveabovecharacterizedastheassimilatoryformofmediaweinheritfrom

modernmediahistory.Bywayofprovisionalconclusionandinpreparationforthe discussionofthesensoryimpactofubiquitouscomputingtocome,letmesuggest thatthismicrotemporalcorrelationoftechnicalmediationandcognitiveoperation markstheendofthehistoricaldialecticofsensationandtechnicsasthiswas conceptualizedbyWalterBenjamin(andhissuccessors)throughthefigureofthe opticalunconscious.Inthecontextofthetwinandtomymind,conceptuallyand practicallycorrelatedrevolutionsofneuroscienceandcomputation,thedialectic oftheprogressive,technicallyenabledexpansionofthevisibleworldhasreached itsendpoint.Initsplaceisanewcorrelationofmediaandsensationthatoccurs beneaththetemporalframedefinitiveofbothimageandconsciousperception. II.UbiquitousComputingandtheAutonomyofthePeripheral Intheeyesofitsprogenitors,ubiquitouscomputingdesignatesthenext phaseintheevolutionofcomputationfollowingthepersonalcomputer.The importantwavesoftechnologicalchange,writeMarkWeiserandJohnSeelyBrown inTheComingAgeofCalmTechnology, arethosethatfundamentallyaltertheplaceoftechnologyinourlives.What mattersisnottechnologyitself,butitsrelationshiptous.Inthepastfifty yearsofcomputationtherehavebeentwogreattrendsinthisrelationship: themainframerelationship,andthePCrelationship.Todaytheinternetis carryingusthroughaneraofwidespreaddistributedcomputingtowardsthe

 relationshipofubiquitouscomputing,characterizedbydeeplyembedding computationintheworld.Ubiquitouscomputingwillrequireanew approachtofittingtechnologytoourlives,anapproachwecallcalm technology.13 Centraltothisaccountofathird,postPCphaseofcomputationisamassive

transformationinhowhumansrelatetocomputers:ratherthantheonepersonone computerrelationdefinitiveofthePCera,thethirdwaveofubiquitouscomputing hasmanycomputersservingeachpersoneverywhereintheworld.14Inlinewith Weiserspropheticvisionofcomputationcomingtorealizeitsinmostpotential,this transformationispresentedasacorrectivetothesocialaberrationofpersonal computing,whereagaintheissueatstakeishowcomputersrelatetotheirhuman users:MycolleaguesandIatPARC,WeiserwritesinTheComputerforthe21st Century,thinkthattheideaofapersonalcomputeritselfismisplaced,andthatthe visionoflaptopmachines,dynabooksandknowledgenavigatorsisonlya transitionalsteptowardachievingtherealpotentialofinformationtechnology.15 CloselyrelatedtothispositionisWeisersdistancingofubiquitous computingfrompresentdaytrends,includingmobilecomputing,screencentered multimedia,andespeciallyvirtualreality.16Becausetheyeachpreserve,andindeed enhance,theatomisticcorrelationofsingleuserandsinglecomputer,thesetrends rundirectlycountertotheaiminformingubiquitouscomputing,theaimof enhancingtheusersintercoursewiththeworldthatalreadyexists.Inplaceof virtualreality,Weiserproposesthenotionofembodiedvirtuality,which referencestheprocessofdrawingcomputersoutoftheirelectronicshells:rather

10

thansimulatingtheworldinsidethecomputer,embodiedvirtualitymeansbringing thevirtualityofcomputerreadabledataallthedifferentwaysinwhichitcanbe altered,processedandanalyzedintothephysicalworld.17Suchamoveis crucialtotheseamlessandtransparentconnectionsthatWeiserandhiscolleagues envisionascomputersarepush[ed]intothebackgroundandindividualsaremade moreawareofthepeopleontheotherendsoftheircomputerlinks.18 Perhapsthemostsignificantcharacteristicdifferentiatingubiquitious computingfromthePCandfromPCbasedinternetanddistributedcomputingisits invisibility.ThisisapointtowhichWeiserandhiscolleaguesreturnrepeatedly. Personalcomputers,theyinsist,cannottrulymakecomputinganintegral,invisible partofthewaypeoplelivetheirlives.Thatiswhyitisimperativetoconceivea newwayofthinkingaboutcomputersintheworldthattakesintoaccountthe naturalhumanenvironmentandallowsthecomputersthemselvestovanishintothe background.19Invisibilityliesatthecenterofcalmcomputing:Justasagood, wellbalancedhammerdisappearsinthehandsofacarpenterandallowshimor hertoconcentrateonthebigpicture,wehopethatcomputerscanparticipateina similarmagicdisappearingact.20Weiserandhiscolleaguesspeakofembedded computerssounobtrusivewewillnotevennoticeourincreasedabilityfor informedaction21;theyenvisionaworldwheremachinestakecareofour unconsciousdetails22andtheyinsistonthemultiscalardimensionsofuniquitous computingnetworks,whichimportantlyincludesconnectionatthemicroscopic scale.23Forthem,thecatchwordsofthethirdcomputationalrevolutionarenot intelligentoragent,butratherinvisible,calmandconnection.24

11 Inhisvisionofinvisibleubiquity,Weiseremphasizesthepsychologicaland

socialoverthetechnical:Suchadisappearance[ofcomputersintothebackground] isafundamentalconsequencenotoftechnology,butofhumanpsychology. Wheneverpeoplelearnsomethingsufficientlywell,theyceasetobeawareofit. Whenyoulookatastreetsign,forexample,youabsorbitsinformationwithout consciouslyperformingtheactofreading.[W]henthingsdisappearweare freedtousethemwithoutthinkingandsotofocusbeyondthemonnewgoals.25In linewiththisrealityofhumanlife,thegoaloftheubiquitouscomputingdesigner canonlybetorendercomputersinvisiblesothatattentioncanbefocusedonaction ratherthanconnection. Itisimportantnottoforgetthatthisgoalcanberealizedonlybecauseofthe actualinvisibilityofcontemporarycomputers: Mostofthecomputersthatparticipateinembodiedvirtualitywillbeinvisible infactaswellasinmetaphor.Alreadycomputersinlightswitches, thermostats,stereos,andovenshelptoactivatetheworld.Thesemachines andmorewillbeinterconnectedinaubiquitousnetwork.Hundredsof computersinaroomcouldseemintimidatingatfirst,justashundredsof voltscoursingthroughwiresinthewallsdidatonetime.Butlikethewires inthewalls,thesehundredsofcomputerswillcometobeinvisibleto commonawareness.Peoplewillsimplyusethemunconsciouslyto accomplisheverydaytasks.26 Farfrombeingatrivialnecessaryconditionfortheimplementationof computationalubiquity,thisinvisibilityinfactofcontemporarycomputersis,Iwant

 toemphasize,absolutelycentraltoourreckoningofthesensoryandexperiential impactofubiquitouscomputing. Onecrucialreasonforthiscentralityconcernswhatwemightcallthe

12

sensoryaddressofubiquitouscomputing:unlikethepersonalcomputerwhich framesinformationforfocusedsensoryassimilation,ubiquitouscomputational environmentssolicitafarbroaderrangeofsensorycontactfromtheirusers.Weiser andBrownengagethisexpandedsensoryaddressthroughtheconceptofthe periphery,whichintheirvisioniskeytothesuccessfuldevelopmentofcalm technology.Theperipherydesignateswhatweareattunedtowithoutattendingto explicitly,anditsinclusioninthecircuitlinkinghumanuserandcomputuational systemvastlyexpandstherangeofourattunementtotheenvironment:byplacing thingsintheperiphery,WeiserandBrownclaim,weareabletoattunetomany morethingsthanwecouldifeverythinghadtobeatthecenter.Thingsinthe peripheryareattunedtobythelargeportionofourbrainsdevotedtoperipheral (sensory)processing.27 Yet,evenastheaddresstotheperipheralexpandsthesensorysolicitationof

ubiquitouscomputationalsystems,WeiserandBrownarequicktoinsistonits dialecticalcouplingtothecenter.Calmtechnologyisdefinedintermsofthe movementbackandforthbetweenperipheryandcenter,whichmeansintheend thattheenfranchisementoftheperipheryofattentionservestheexpansionof cognitiveagencyanditspowertoact:byrecenteringsomethingformerlyinthe peripherywetakecontrolofit.Peripherallywemaybecomeawarethatsomething isnotquiteright,aswhenawkwardsentencesleaveareadertiredanddiscomforted

 without[her]knowingwhy.Bymovingsentenceconstructionfromperipheryto

13

centerweareempoweredtoact,eitherbyfindingbetterliteratureoracceptingthe sourceoftheuneaseandcontinuing.Withoutcenteringtheperipherymightbea sourceoffranticfollowingoffashion;withcenteringtheperipheryisafundamental enablerofcalmthroughincreasedawarenessandpower.28Itisasif,inrelationto thetaskofdesigningcomputationalsystems,theperipherycannotcarryavaluein itself,butisonlyimportantandcanonlyservetoexpandhumansensecapacities becauseofitspayoffforcenteredawarenessandselfpresentaction. Inconcludingmydiscussionofubiquitiouscomputing,letmesuggestthat

thisfunctional(ifnotindeeddownrightinstrumental)approachtosensory expansionmisseswhatistrulyrevolutionaryaboutubiquitouscomputing, understoodasaphasenotsimplyinthedevelopmentofcomputation,butmore broadly,intheevolvingimbricationoftechnicsandsensation.Forwhatthe constitutiveanddefininginvisibilityofubiquitiouscomputingactuallyforegrounds isthecentralityofmicrotemporalandbydefinitionimperceptibleinformational flowsattheveryheartofcontemporarysensoryexperience.Unliketheperipheral attunementtheorizedbyWeiserandBrown,thismicrotemporalandimperceptible dimensionofubiquitouscomputationalenvironmentscanneverbebroughtintothe sphereofdirect,consciousattentionandawareness:rather,itimpactssensory experienceunconsciously,imperceptibly,inshort,atalevelbeneaththethresholdof attentionandawareness.Itimpactssensoryexperience,thatis,byimpactingthe sensingbrainmicrotemporally,attheleveloftheautonomoussubprocessesor

 microconsciousnessesthat,aswesawinsectionIabove,comprisethe infrastructureofseamlessandintegratedmacroconsciousexperience. NatalieJeremijenkosartworkDanglingString,profferedasanexampleof

14

calmtechnologybyWeiserandBrown(andcreatedduringJeremijenkostenureat XeroxPARC),gesturestowardthisfundamentalshiftintherealityofsensory experience.Anditdoesso,moreover,preciselybyforegroundingtheautonomyof theperipheral.DanglingStringisjustwhatitstitlesuggestsitis:an8footpieceof plasticstringhangingdownfromasmallelectricmotormountedintheceilingand connectedviaanethernetcabletotheinternet.Themotorisprogrammedsothat eachbitofinformationflowingthroughthenetworkcausesittoperformatiny twitch;accordingly,whenthenetworkisquiet,thestringtwitcheseveryfew seconds,andwhenitisbusy,thestringwhirlsmadlyandemitsthemuffled,hollow noiseofitsownvibrations.InitsinstallationatXeroxPARC,theworkwasplaced (asintended)inanunusedcornerofahallway,adjacenttoofficesfromwhichit couldbeseenandheardwithoutbeingobtrusive.29 Givenitspredominantlyperipheralfunctioning,DanglingStringwouldseem

topresentanimperfectexemplarfortheoscillationcharacteristicofcalm technology.ReversingthetrajectoryfromperipherytocenterthatmarksWeiser andBrownsdescription,DanglingStringinitiallyattractsfocalattentionand subsequentlyfadesintotheperiphery:Atfirst,noteWeiserandBrown,Dangling Stringcreatesanewcenterofattentionjustbybeingunique.Butthiscentersoon becomesperipheralasthegentlewavingofthestringmoveseasilytothe background.Thatthestringcanbebothseenandheardhelpsbyincreasingthe

 cluesforperipheralattunement.30WeiserandBrownappeartorecognizethe

15

worksbiastowardtheperipheral,whichtheycorrelatewithitspresencewithinthe actualworld:Thedanglingstringincreasesourperipheralreachtotheformerly inaccessiblenetworktraffic.Whilescreendisplaysoftrafficarecommon,their symbolsrequireinterpretationandattention,anddonotperipheralizewell.The string,inpartbecauseitisactuallyinthephysicalworld,hasabetterimpedance matchwithourbrainsperipheralnervecenters.31Yetbyemphasizinghowthe workcanbefunandusefulandbycomparingitfavorablywithscreenbased,but otherwisekindreddatavisualizationsofnetworktraffic,WeiserandBrownimpose ontheworkthevalueofcognitivepayoffthatinformstheirfunctionalistapproach. WhatrendersDanglingStringexemplaryofthemoreprofoundsensory

revolutionIwishtocorrelatewithubiquitouscomputingisitsinvestmentinthe autonomyoftheperipheral.Toappreciatethispoint,letusdwellforamomenton somethingWeiserandBrowneffectivelyignore:namely,theindirectionofthe worksaddress.Whatiscommunicatedbythevibrationsofthedanglingstringis neithersolelynorprimarilythesensoryexperienceitdirectlyaffords,butratherthe underlyingpatternsofinternetnetworktrafficthatittranslatesintosensoryform. Tobeevenmoreprecise,whatDanglingStringaffordsisasensoryinterfaceontoa world,whichistosay,ontoarealmofmicrotemporaloperations,fromwhich perceptionandsensoryawarenessareordinarilyexcluded.Inthissense,whatthe comparisonwithotherscreenbasedvisualizationshighlightsisthestriking singularityofDanglingString:instarkcontrasttoavisualizationlikeJohnKlimas Ecosystem,whichusesflockingbirdstotrackstockmarketfluctuationsandwhich

16

canbesaidtosucceedtotheextentthatitoffersafocalizedperceptualandindeed, virtualanalogtotheimperceptible,32whatsupportstheaestheticexperienceof microtemporaldatafluxinDanglingStringispreciselytheunwaveringcommitment totheperipheralthatitrequiresofitsexperiencers.Putanotherway,thework doesnttellusmuchaboutdatatrafficwhenitisengagedthroughfocalawareness; allitcanreallytellusisthatthereisalittleorthatthereisalotoftraffic.By contrast,asusersgrowaccustomedtotheperipheralpresenceofDanglingString, theydevelopwhatwecanonlycharacterizeasanaffectiveconnectiontoit.Asthey becomefreetonotattendfocallytothework,andbegintosenseitatthemarginsof awareness,theirmodeofsensingshiftsfromthemacroperceptuallevelwhatisit tellingmeaboutthetrafficvolume?tothemicroperceptuallevel;atthislevel, microtemporalrecognitionsofmotion,orientation,sound,andsoon,sustainan ongoingmicroaffectiveconnectionthatneverreachesthelevelofaconscious,focal perception. III. Depresencing

Itisonlybyfocusingonthetemporalspecificityofubiquitouscomputingthatwe canappreciateitsrevolutionaryimpactonoursensoryinterchangewiththeworld. Todoso,wemustputpressureontheclaimsadvancedinthenameofubicomp, whichhavemoreorlessexclusivelytendedtoemphasizethecomputers disappearanceintotheenvironmentandtheresulting,allegedlytransparentfocus onunencumberedhumaninteraction.[FNsomeoneonthis]Farmoresignificant thanthesimplefactofthecomputersdisappearance,however,isthefundamental

 shiftinmodeofaddressthataccompaniestheproliferationofubiquitious computingintoourcontemporarylifeworld:putbluntly,withinubiquitous

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computationalenvironments,computersaddressusatthelevelofmicrosensation, whichistosayatamicrotemporallevelthatisbydefinitioninvisibletoperceptual consciousness.Forthisreason,wemustconcludethatubicompmarksaqualitative shiftintheeconomyofsensation,andnotjustanewconfigurationofcomputer mediatedhumaninteraction.Tobeevenmoreprecise,ubicompcalls microsensationintoserviceasthepredominatemodeofhumanenvelopmentinthe worldatthesametimeasitexemplifiestheirreducibletechnicalbasisforsuch envelopment:preciselybecausetheyofferinformationperipherallywhichisalsoto say,inatimeframebeneaththethresholdofconsciousperceptionubicomp environmentscatalyzesensationaccordingtoaprotocolthatisnotwhollybiotic,but iscruciallyandirreduciblytechnical.Wecouldsaythenthatubicompenvironments catalyzeaformofsensationthatobeystwomastersatonce:theneurallogicof sensoryfusionandthetechnicallogicofcomputationalprocessing.Accordingly, whileproponentsofubiquituouscomputingmaytakepainstodesignenvironments wherecomputersaremadetodisappear,thisdisappearancetakesplaceontop,asit were,ofamorefundamentalinfrastructuraldisappearance:theplungeintothe autonomyoftheperipheralwheresensingbrainsinterfacedirectlywith microtemporalinformation,outsideoftheperceptualrelationdominatedbyvision andthemacroscaletimeconsciousnesswhichitexemplifies. Ifubiquitouscomputingcomprisesasensoryrevolutionthatmarkstheendpoint ofacertaintrajectoryinthedialecticoftechnicsandsensation(asIsuggested

 above),ourefforttograspitssignificancerequiresustocorrelateitwithanew

18

paradigmofmedia.Forjustasubiquitiouscomputingintroducesflexibilityinthe couplingofhumanandcomputer,sotoodoesitabandonanobjectcenteredmodel ofmediainfavorofanenvironmentalone.Nolongeradelimitedtemporalobject thatweengagewithfocallythroughaninterfacelikeascreen,mediabecomesan environmentthatweexperiencesimplybybeingandactinginspaceandtime, whichistosay,withoutinmostcasesexplicitlybeingawareofit,withouttakingit astheintentionalobjectortargetofourtimeconsciousness. Intheremainderofthispaperandbywayofexplicatingthisthesis,Iwantto unpackexactlywhatisatstakeinubiquitouscomputingunderstoodascatalystfora revolutioninthefunctionofmediaandinthecouplingofsensationandtechnics.33 Thiswillrequireafundamentalinterventionintothephenomenologyoftime consciousnessthat,ultimately,Iwanttoputforthasamediatheoreticaldeepening, ratherthancriticalrepudiation,ofphenomenology.Aswehavenowseen,ubicomp mediaenvironmentssolicitamodeofsensationthatismolecularanddiffuse,which istosay,asensibilitycomprisedofpreciselythosemicrosensoryprocessesthatare atstakeintheautonomyoftheperipheral.Onthisground,ubiquitioussensibility contrastsstarklywithphenomenologicalsensibility:whereastimeconsciousness synthesizestimeinordertocreatetemporalunitiesthatprovidecontentsfor consciousexperience,microsensoryprocessessynthesizetimetocreatetemporal unitiesforneuralprocessing.Becausetheyoperateatafinegrainedtemporalscale thatcutsagainstthegrainofphenomenologicalexperience,theymustbeconsidered tobenonconscious.Thepromiseofubicompenvironmentsisdirectlytiedtothis

19

lastfact:forifthesensoryormicrosensorydimensionofcontemporarytechnics evadesthegraspofconsciousness(andthusofphenomenologyinitstraditional forms),wecanonlyexperienceitindirectly,bymeansoftheenactivepossibilities thatsmartenvironmentsafford. Thesensoryrevolutionusheredinbyubiquitiouscomputingconvergeswitha transformationinthefocusofphenomenologyfromperceptiontosensationthat, inasense,hasalwaysalreadybeenunderwaywithinphenomenology,fromHusserl onward.WhilethedominantthreadofHusserlianphenomenologyiscertainlythe analysisofperceptionandperceptualconsciousness,Husserlsultimatelegacytous mayturnouttobehisdetailedattentiontothefinestructureofsensationandits imbricationwiththeproblematicoftemporality.34Recentcommentarieson Husserl,andespeciallytheworkofFrenchphilosopherRenaudBarbaras,havenot onlysuggestedasmuch,buthavecorrelatedthisdisplacementattheheartof HusserlsworkwiththetrajectoryofMerleauPontysphilosophy(fromthe phenomenologyofperceptiontotheontologyofthesensiblethatisTheVisibleand theInvisible)aswellaswiththesignificanceoftheredemptiveprojectofJan Patocka(tocarrythroughonHusserlsinitialformulationofaphenomenologyof (world)manifestation).35WecouldaddtothesereferencesthenamesofEmmanuel LevinasandMichelHenri,bothofwhomhaveintheirownwayspinpointed sensationasananchoringpointforacriticaltransformationofHusserlian phenomenology,36alongwiththenamesofcertainpoststructuralists,mostnotably GillesDeleuze,whohaverejectedphenomenologyinthenameofwhatits philosophicalcommitments(tocommonsenseandrecognition)bracketout,namely

 transcendentalsensibility.37Whatallofthesevariedandperhapsinpart

20

incompatibleinterventionsshareisasensethattheegocentricorCartesianbasisof phenomenologymustbeabandonedinfavorofsomeaffirmationofthe imbeddednessofthemindbodywithintheworld.Withspecificrespecttomy argumenthere,thisamountstoanaffirmationthatsensibilityprecedesperception andthatitinvolvesadirectednesstothesensoryworldassuch,ratherthantoward specificobjectsuniquelyavailableto(orconstitutedby)consciousness. Myfocusonthesensoryimpactofubicompaimspreciselytocorrelatethis internaltransformationofphenomenologywiththematerial/technical transformationofourcontemporarylifeworld.Tostateitasathesis:ubicomp environmentscarryoutinpracticeandindeedexpandtheupsurgeofthe sensiblethatnowcomprisesthenecessaryfocusofcontemporary phenomenological(orpostphenomenological)analysis.Inlinewithsuchathesis, thedemarginalizationoftheperipheralandthecorrelativedemarginalizationof microtemporalneuralprocessingmightwellbeunderstoodasadiscretestagein thehistoricaldisplacementofperceptionbysensation.Indeed,wemighteventhink ofitasakindoflitmustestdemonstratingthenecessityforsuchadisplacement:to theextentthatthemicrotemporalresistsconsciouspresentation,itcanonlybe accessedthroughthemediumofsubperceptualsensation. Ubiquitouscomputingmakesthemicrotemporalsensuous.Indoingso,itputs intocontactthetechnical(micro)temporalityofcomputationandtheneural (micro)temporalityofthemindbody.Asaresultofthisconnection,twofurther displacementsensue:ononehand,ofthevisualbythesensoryassuch,and,onthe

 other,ofsubjectcentered(perceptual)agencybytheagencyoftheenvironment.

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Bothofthesedisplacementsconcerntheimbricationoftechnicsandsensation,and thereforespeakdirectlytomygeneralargumentinthispaper.Indeed,both correlatemoreorlessimmediatelywiththefindingsofrecentneuroscientific researchonsensation,andspecificallyonthevisualcortex,thatIdescribedabovein SectionI.Withitsfocusonthemicrosensoryprocessesthatunderlietheperception ofimages(or,wemightnowwanttosay,appearances),thisresearchsuggestsa reconfigurationoftheimageanditsroleinexperience:ratherthantreatingthe imageasanobjectintheworld,wemusthenceforthconsideritastheentireprocess throughwhichthinkinghappensandhenceasasensoryoperationthatisinsome senseamodalorevensimplybeneaththedifferentiationofthesenses.Tothismust beaddedthenotionthatsensation,farfromconstitutingitsownmatter(whetherin theformofanobjectorotherwise),takesplacewithinandaspartoftheworld: ratherthanattributingtheroleoftimeconstitutiontotimeconsciousness,asdoes theclassicalHusserlianaccount,wemustratherascribethepoweroftemporalizing whatHusserlsstudentEugenFinkcallsdepresencing[Entgegenwrtigung]to theworlditself,andseektoelucidatehowthephenomenonoftimeconsciousness emergesonthebasisofamoreprimitive,microsensoryreceptionofworldly temporalizing.Farfrombeingitsownagentandproducingcontentsthatarecutoff fromtheworld,consciousnessrespondstotheworldsmicrosensorysolicitation, anditisfromsuchrespondingthattheselfaffectionconstitutiveoftime consciousnessisborn.

 Consideredtogether,contemporaryneuroscientificresearchintothe temporalityofimagingand(post)phenomenologicaldevelopmentsofHusserls workinformanaccountoftheirreducibletechnicityofsensationthatdiffersin

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crucialwaysfromthedeconstructiveparadigmforthetechnicalcontaminationof thinking.Thisparadigm,initiallyformulatedinDerridasearlyworkonHusserl, Heidegger,andFreud,andlaterdevelopedintoafullfledgedphilosophyoftechnics byBernardStiegler,takesrootfromthemotifofretentionalfinitude.38Because livingmemoryisfiniteandimperfect,itmustrelyonexternal,nonliving,technical memorysupplementswhich,fromwritinguptothelatestformsofarchive(e.g., internetdatabases),cannotsimplybedismissedasmerelysecondary,butmust ratherbeseentoinherewithinorcontaminatetheinmostintimacyoflivingthought. Whileafullaccountisbeyondthescopeofmydiscussionhere,Iwanttomaketwo observationsthatwillforegroundtheshortcomingsofthisparadigminthefaceof contemporarytechnicaldevelopments(ubicompbutalsotheinternet).First,the deconstructiveparadigmidentifiesmediawithmemory,andbydoingso,both imposesahigherorderframeofreference(consciousness,thought,etc.)andlends weightoverwhelminglytothepastanditscontinuitywiththepresentatthe expenseofallconcernwiththefuture.Second,thisparadigmidentifiesmediawith theformoftheobject,andbydoingso,effectivelyinstitutesacontentmodelof thinkingwhich,moreover,itpassesoffasoriginary.39 Whiletheseidentificationsmayremainlargelybenignoreveninvisiblesolong asthepurposeoftechnicsistostorepreviousexperience(oneneedonlythinkof thetechnologyofwriting),theybecomeperniciousinthefaceoftodaysmassive

 technicaldistributionofcognitionbeyondthebrain.Giventheselatter developmentsdevelopmentsatwhosecenterliesubiquitouscomputingthe

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deconstructiveparadigmcannotbutappearantiquated,aquaintremnantofaworld thathasnowpassedusby.Forthefactofthematterisclear:inourworldtoday, technicsdoesnotremainindexedtohumanconsciousnessanditsconstitutive timeframe(s),butoperatesatscaleswelloutsideofwhatwecanperceive.This, again,ispreciselywhywemustturnfromperceptiontosensationinoureffortto thinkthecontemporarycorrelationoftechnicsandlife. IV.BeyondtheObject Becausetheyaddressusatthepreperceptuallevelofsensation,developments likeubiquitiouscomputingnotonlyexposethenecessityforapostdeconstructive phenomenologybut,intheprocess,linkthelimitationsofthedeconstructive paradigmtoitsenablingcriticalassimilationofacertainphenomenologicalheritage. Situatedinthishistoricalcontext,thedeconstructivemodelfailstotheprecise extentthatitpreservestheobjectcentered,perceptionfocused,egological approachfacilitatedbythetraditional(Husserlian)phenomenologicalreduction.40 Despiteitsimportantandpersuasivedemonstrationthatthephenomenological cogito(ortimeconsciousness)cannotfunctionwithouttheassistanceof technologiesthatbroachitsintimacy,thedeconstructiveparadigmdoesnothingto questionthemoregeneralegologicalframeworkimposedbyclassical phenomenology.

 ThislimitationfindsperfectexemplificationinthecentralfigureofStieglers philosophy:thetechnicaltemporalobject.UpdatingHusserlsanalysis,Stiegler

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arguespowerfullythattheadventoftechnicalrecordinginthe19thcenturysecures thepossibilityforexcavatingthestructureoftimeconsciousness:specifically,the factthatconsciousnesscanexperience(hearorsee)thesameexacttemporalobject morethanoncegivesitthepossibilitytoaccountfortheroleof(secondary) memoryonthecreationofnewpresentexperiences(whichStieglersomewhat misleadinglycallsprimaryretention).Whatmakesthesecond(ornth)experience ofthesametemporalobjectdifferentfromthoseprecedingisthememoryof previousexperiencesthatconsciousnessbringstobearonit. InStieglersupdating,thetechnicaltemporalobjectphonographicand cinematographicrecordingtakestheplaceoftheHusserlianmelodyasobjectal supportforthefluxoftimeinconsciousness.41Intheprocess,whatwassimplyan heuristicforexposingthefinestructureoftimeconsciousnessgetstransformed intoaculturalindustrialtechnology:incontrasttoHusserl,whourgedvoluntary recoursetothemelodyasamethodforaccessingtheineffablefluxoftime consciousness,Stieglerinsiststhatcontemporaryconsciousness,inorderto experienceitselfasbeingaffectedbytime,hasnooptionbuttorelyonindustrial temporalobjects.Fromavehicleforexposingtheintimacyoftimeconsciousness, the(technical)temporalobjecthasnowbecomethecentralexternalsupportforthe veryproductionoftimeconsciousness.Thecostofthisdependenceon industrialized(recordedortertiary)memoriesistimeconsciousnesss susceptibilitytocooptationbythecultureindustries.Thatiswhy,atwhatare

 perhapshisbleakestmoments,Stieglerisabletopaintapictureofpurelypassive consciousnessesinthecollectivethrallofthestandardizedfluxesoftelevision programsandotheraudiovisualtemporalobjects.

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Leavingasidequestionsofitsplausibilityandnotwithstandingitsastutegraspof acertaineffectoftelevisualculture,Stieglersmodelremainsemphaticallypartial. Bluntlyput,itaddressestheimpactoftechnicsexclusivelythroughthefigureof perceptualconsciousness:technicsonlymattersinsofarasitsupportsand constrainstheproductionofnewcontentsofconsciousness.42Withregardtothe distinctionbetweenperceptionandsensationthathasguidedmyargumenthere, thesignificanceofthislimitationshouldbeclear:byinstitutingtheobjectasa privilegedperceptualfigure,Stieglersmodeleffectivelyleavesasidetheentiretyof technicsssubperceptual,sensoryimpactonembodiedhumanlife;since microtemporalsensationcannottaketheformofanobjectconstitutedby perceptualconsciousness,itsimplyfallsbythewayside.Attheveryleast,this conclusionrevealsjusthowlittleStieglersmodeltogetherwiththedeconstructive paradigmitexemplifiessuitsthecontemporaryphaseofourtechnogenesis. Itispreciselythisbiastowardobjectperceptionandthemoregeneralegological frameworkitrequiresthatisputintoquestionandfinallyovercomebythe methodologicaltransformationthat,Isuggest,iscurrentlyreconfiguringthefieldof phenomenologyandthattakesrootinthedisplacementofperceptualconsciousness infavorofsubrepresentational,impersonal,microtemporalsensation.Insofarasit lendspracticalmotivationtothisdisplacement,theubicomprevolutiongoeshand inhandwiththefundamentalreenvisioningofthephenomenologicalprojectafter

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itsowndeconstruction.Notsurprisingly,thisreenvisioningproximatelyconcerns themostfundamentalmotifofthephenomenologicalproject:temporality.Andit takesrootinHusserlsownfailuretoreconcileandindeed,inthepatent impossibilityofreconcilingtwoaspectsofhisresearch:ononehand,hisradical insightintothenecessityforanontemporal,nonegologicalabsolutefoundationof temporalization;and,ontheother,hisenduringmethodologicalprivilegingof consciousnessthat,soitwouldseem,marksthephenomenologicalprojectatits deepestlevel. Inthelatemanuscriptsontime(theCManuscriptsfrom1929193443),the symptomofthisfailuregoesbythenameofthelivingpresent(lebendige Gegenwart).WhatremainsconstantacrossHusserlsvariouscharacterizationsof thelivingpresentisthenecessitytofusetwodimensionsoftheabsoluteflowof temporalization,namelythestandingandthestreaming.Husserladdressesthis necessitydifferentlyindifferentmanuscriptgroupings:insomeplaceshe introducesanonegologicaldimensionofhylethatstandsagainsttheegologicalas coconstitutiveoftemporalization;atotherplaces,heseekstoresolvetheparadox ofthestanding,streamingnatureoftemporalfluxwithoutabandoningthe frameworkoftheegological.Intheformercase,thestandingdimensionis identifiedwiththenonegologicalhyleticimpression,andthestreamingwiththe egologicalresponsetothisimpression;inthelattercase,itistheegothatboth standsandstreams:itrepeatsmachinicallyasapurelyformalnuncstans(standing Iornow)anditstreamsawayastheintentionalmodificationofthepure impression.Inbothversionsofthelivingpresent,however,Husserlfailstogivea

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coherentaccountoftheabsolutefoundationoftemporalization:bothaccounts,that is,gesturetowardaworldlyormaterialfoundationoftemporalizationonlyto reimposetheframeworkoftheegoandwithitacertainpriorityofthepresent. ThiscritiqueofHusserlsmaturethinkingontemporalityhasbeenadvanced mostforcefullyandalsomostconstructivelybyHusserlsfinalassistantandthe putativeheirtohisproject,EugenFink.InhisowndevelopmentofHusserlswork ontemporalizationandtimeconsciousness,FinkopposestoHusserlsfigureofthe livingpresent(lebendigeGegenwart)theoperationofdepresencing (Entgegenwrtigung).ConvincedthatHusserlsfatalerrorwastohavebegunwith timeconsciousnessratherthanthemorefundamentalworldlytemporalization withinwhosehorizontimeconsciousnessismadepossibleandarises,Finkargues thatthetrueproblemofthephenomenologicalanalysisoftimeisexplaininghow timeisconstitutedindependentlyofanypresencingintime.Horizonforming depresentings[or:depresencings]arenotanykindofintentionalexperience,not anykindofactthatinsomewayfirstcarriesoffsomeobjectivesomething,sothat nowpresentificationwouldbethecountermoveagainstthiscarryingoff.Rather depresencingsareawayinwhichoriginaltemporalityitselfcomesaboutas temporalprocesstemporalizes[eineZeitigungsweisederursprnglichen Zeitlichkeitselbst].44Depresencingmustthusbedifferentiatedcategoricallyfrom thelivingpresent:itisnottheflowoftimeitself(thatis,thestandingstreaming livingpresent)butratherthatwhichmakessuchflowpossible:Theflowoftimeis justpresencing[Gegenwrtigen],ittakesplaceintime.Depresencingtemporalizes time[zeitigtdieZeitbringsitaboutastemporal],depresencingsarenotintime.45

28 Bydrawingacategoricaldistinctionbetweenpresencinganddepresencingand,

ineffect,differentiatingtwoseparatetimeseriesorlevelsoftemporalization,Fink succeedspreciselywhereHusserlultimatelyfails.ForwhereasHusserlmerely assertedtheneedtoviewthefundamentaltimeconstitutingstructuresas untemporalwithoutbeingabletogiveacoherentaccountofthesestructures,Fink managestogroundthepresencingofconsciousnesswithinamorefundamental givingoftimewithindepresencing.WhatallowsFinktodothisishis(Heidegger inspired)methodologicalconvictionthatphenomenologyinitsmatureformmust beginwiththepregivennessoftheworld.Theanalysisoftime,accordingly,must beginfromworldtimethetimethatencompassesbothtranscendenceand immanenceandmust,moreover,rejectthetraditionalapproach(constitutionvia thematicobjects)infavorofafocusonitsownhorizonality.WhenFinkassertsthat timeconstitutionishorizonconstitution,notobjectconstitution,hemeansto suggestpreciselythatHusserlsmostfundamentalproblematicistheconstitutionof theworldasadynamic,pregivenprocess.46 WithoutdoingjusticetothecomplexityofFinksintervention,letmesingleout twoaspectsofhisaccountofworldtimeasdepresencingthatdirectlyconcernmy argumenthere.First,Finkassertstheneedtofoundtimespregivennessnotonthe flowofcontentsthroughconsciousnessbutratheronthehorizonality(ormore precisely:theswinging[Zeitschwingung])ofdepresencingitself.RonaldBruzina perfectlycapturesthesignificanceofthisassertioninhisdefinitivecommentaryon Finksphenomenologyoftime:Depresencingsareantecedenttoprotentionsand retentions.Pastandfuturearenotstretchestobecashedin[i.e.,cashedinin

 termsofdeterminatecontentorobjects].IfforHusserlprotentionandretention havetodowiththetransformationofcontentsasseenintheirpassagefromthe present,forFinkdepresencingsashorizonalaretheconditionofpossibilityfor presentingitself,forpresencing,forbringingsomethingtopresence [Gegenwrtigung].47Statedevenmoreemphatically:timedoesnotpassbecause thepresentbecomespastandanticipatesthefutureorbecausetheimpressionis inseparablefromretentionsandprotentions;quitetothecontrary,thevery

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possibilityforthepresenttobepresentitself,foramomenttobecomepresentorto presence,stemsfromamorefundamental,originarypassingoftime:depresencing. Notwithstandingtheirlexicalaffinity,presencinganddepresencingcharacterize whatareatbottomcategoricallydifferentlevelsoneonthissideofbeingandtime; anotherontheirhitherside.Again,Bruzinaclarifiesthisdifferentiationintermsof thecontenthorizondistinction:theprotentionalandretentionalhorizonsdonot gaintheiroperativevaluefrompresencing,asifthelatterisachievedfirstand depresencingisthenamodificationofit.Onemaycharacterizeinthatwaythe contentthatisheldretentionallyorprotentionally,butthehorizonsof depresencingthemselvesarequiteanotherthing.Farfrombeingthenegative derivativefromthecenteringholdinpresenceofanobjectthatperceptioneffects, theyareintrinsictothetotalpossibilityoftheholdinthenowpreciselyasdynamic andflowing,ratherthanasfrozenandstatic.48Itisasifthethicknessoftime reverberatedintwodirections,orbetterontwodistinctplanes:whenrelatedtothe experienceofanego,retentionalprotentionalthicknessqualifiesthecontentsof consciousness;bycontrast,whenrelatedtoworldtime,itqualifiesthehorizonality

 orswingingofdepresencingindependentlyofanysubjectiveactivity.Instark contrasttoHusserlwho,aswenoted,neverabandonedhiseffortstoreconcile

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absolutetimeconstitutionwithegologicalexperience,Finksfundamentalpointis thatthesetworeverberationsarenotequal:depresencingconditionspresencing; worldtimeconditionsegologicaltimeconsciousness. ThisconclusionimmediatelybroachesthesecondaspectofFinksworkthatis relevantformypurposeshere:theIantecedencyofdepresencing.Time constitutionproper,writesFinkinaltogetherunequivocalterms,isIless.theI isonlypossibleinahorizonoftime,isabeingthatisconstitutedasidenticalin timehorizons.49 V.ImpersonalSensation Letuspauseheretotakestockofjusthowfarwevecome.IftheI(including timeconsciousness)andtheobject(includingthetemporalobject)comeafteror onthissideoftheconstitutionoftime,thenanapproachlikeStieglerscandono morethancapturetheimpactoftechnicsontheconstitutionofsubjectsandobjects withintime;itsimplycannotaddresstheimpactoftechnicsontime.Bycontrast, thewagerofmyargumentisthattechnicsdoesimpacttimeatthelevelofits absoluteconstitution,whichistosay,priortoanyexperienceintime,andthatthis impactparadoxicallyholdsfargreatersignificanceforourexperiencethanthefact thatmediaproximatelymediateourintratemporallives.Wemightevensaythat technicsimpactonexperienceispredominatelyindirect:technicsimpacts

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embodiedexperienceimpactstheveryemergenceofsuchexperienceprecisely becauseandinsofarasitimpactsorsupportsworldlydepresencing. Tounpackthislogicofindirection,weneedfirsttotakecognizanceofthe irreduciblesensorydimensionofdepresencing,itscategoricalantecedencetothe egonotwithstanding.Thecrucialpointtograsphereisthatembodiedhuman beings,quiteindependentlyoftheirsubjectivesingularity,comprisepartofthe world,andhenceofworldly(or,wemightsay,objective)depresencing.(I borrowthisparticularvalenceofthetermobjectivefromCzechphenomenologist JanPatockaforwhomthesubjectisbothasubjectiveinterioritysubtractedfromthe worldsmanifestationand,moreprimordially,anobjectiveaspectofthat manifestation;itiscrucialthatweappreciatethesingularityofthisusage:the objectivityatissueherepreceedstheconstitutionofinterworldlyobjects.)How,we needtoask,areweabletosensedepresencingobjectively,tosenseasanobjective aspectofthatdepresencing,priortoandindependentlyofanysubjectively constitutedphenomenologicalexperience? AlthoughitremainsconstrainedbyitsfidelitytotheHusserlianconceptof intentionality,JeanPaulSartresdistinctionofconsciousnessandegopointsusin therightdirection.FortheearlySartreofTheTranscendenceoftheEgo, consciousnessjustisequivalenttothequalitativeexperienceitishavingatany givenmomentintime.Theresimplyisnoneedforafurtherunifyingagentandthus noreasontopostulateanegoatall:thereisnoIontheunreflectedlevel.WhenI runafteratram,whenIlookatthetime,whenIbecomeabsorbedinthe contemplationofaportrait,thereisnoI.Thereisaconsciousnessofthetram

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needingtobecaught,etc.andanonpositionalconsciousnessofconsciousness.In fact,Iamthenplungedintotheworldofobjects,itistheywhichconstitutetheunity ofmyconsciousnesses.50Advancingthestrongandunmistakably counterintuitiveclaimthatHusserlsphenomenologyitselfhasnoneedfora transcendentalandsubjectiveprincipleofunification,Sartresanalysiswouldseem toconfirmthepriorityofabsoluteconsciousnessoveranyegologicalsubjective experience:TheWorlddidnotcreatetheme,themedidnotcreatetheWorld,they aretwoobjectsfortheabsolute,impersonalconsciousness,anditisthroughthat consciousnessthattheyarelinkedbacktogether.Thisabsoluteconsciousness, whenitispurifiedoftheI,isnolongerinanywayasubject,norisitacollectionof representations;itisquitesimplyapreconditionandanabsolutesourceof existence.51 WhatmakesSartrespositionsosuggestiveishisinsistenceontheimpersonality ofabsoluteconsciousness:impersonalitysimplyispresubjectivesensation.Atthe sametime,hisparticularconceptualizationofimpersonalityeffectivelyprevents himfromengagingwiththefundamentalproblematicoftimeconstitution.For Sartre,thatis,theimpersonalityofconsciousnessentailsitsabsolutespontaneity: transcendentalconsciousnessisanimpersonalspontaneity.Itdeterminesitselfto existateveryinstant,withoutusbeingabletoconceiveofanythingbeforeit.Thus everyinstantofourconsciouslivesrevealstousacreationexnihilo.Notanew arrangementbutanewexistence.52Whilecertainlycorrectwhereconstituted consciousnessisconcerned,Sartrespositionwouldleavethemysteryoftimes

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flowingpreciselywhatFinknamesinthemostradicalwaywithhisconceptofde presencingnotonlyunsolved,butfundamentallyunaddressed. Inseekingtocapitalizeonthismotifofimpersonality,andspecificallytobringit tobearonouraccountoftime,itwouldperhapsbehooveustotakeseriouslythe possibilityofacontinuitythathasaphysicalorworldlybasis,ratherthana subjective,mentalone.JustsuchaphysicalcontinuityisatissueinFinksde presencing:wellinadvanceoftheunifiedexperienceoftheselfconscioussubject thathasliterallydictatedthetrajectoryofpostCartesianmodernphilosophy,there isanoriginarysensorycontinuitythatispresubjective,worldlyandobjective(in Patockassense).Preciselybecauseandtotheextentthatworldlydepresencingis necessarilyphysicalormaterial,itentailsanobjectivesensorydimension,andit doesso,significantly,whetherornotthisdimensionevergetsactuallyexperienced byembodied,sensinghumanmindbodies(orothersensingcreatures). Understoodinthisway,impersonalityqualifiesakindofsensibilitythatismore physicalthanpsychological,andtheissuewemustnowaddressishowembodied humanmindbodiescanenjoysuchimpersonalsensation.Canandhowcanwe experiencetheworldandtimefromthestandpointofourownirreducible worldliness,asphysicomaterialelementsoftheworlditself?Howclosecanhuman mindbodiesthosemostcomplexphysicopsychologicalmixturesactuallycome todirectparticipationinworldlydepresencing?Andhow,finally,cantechnicsbe deployedtoenhancethispossibilityfordirectphysicomaterialsensation? Tobeginansweringthesequestions,letmeturntoarecentmediaart environmentthat,inmyopinion,successfullybroachesthedomainofthe

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microsensory,andthat,forthisreason,capturesthepromiseofubicompasanew stageinthehistoryoftechnicsandsensation.OliafurEliassonsYourcolourmemory (2004)isanimmersivepanoramiccolorinstallationdesignedtocatalyzethe experienceofafterimagesandtherebytogenerateanexperientialreflectionon colorsensation.(Figure1)

Theworkcyclesthroughchangesofcolorat30secondintervalsandgeneratesthe productionofafterimagesasafunctionoftimespentintheinstallation. ConsiderEliassonsowncharacterizationoftheinstallation: Yourcolourmemoryinvestigatesaspectsofcolorperception,oneofwhichis afterimagesandtheirtemporalrelationshipwiththeirsources.Ifweentera

35 roomsaturatedinredlight,oureyes,asareaction,producesomuchgreen withadelayofapproximately1015secondsthattheredappearsmuch lessintense;itisalmosterased.Ifthecoloroftheroomweretochangefrom redtocolorless,acleargreenafterimagewouldappearonourretinas.In Yourcolourmemory,thecolorfadesfromonetothenextinasequenceof30 seconds.Inthatminutethesinglecolorslowlyappears,ripens,and subsequentlyfadesintoanothercolor.Iftheroomisbluewhenyouenter, afterabout10secondsyouwillbegintoproduceanorangeafterimage;ifthe installationfadesfrombluetoyellow,thesubsequentmovementof afterimagesinyoureyewillbefromorangetopurple.Theretinalfadeout occurswithadelayofabout1015secondsinrelationshiptotheactual changeofcolorintheroom.Thereare,inotherwords,twocolorcurvesat work:onepertainingtotheworkitself,onebeingcreatedbelatedlyinyour eyes.Onecouldarguethatanothercurvefinallyappears,namelythecurveof colorsperceivedbythebrain,whichisanaverageofthetwopreceding curves.IfIweretoenterthecolorsaturatedroomsometimeafteryou,my experienceofthecolorwoulddiffersubstantiallyfromyours,asyouwould alreadybeenrolledinasequenceofwallcolorsandafterimagesthat determineyourpresentexperience.I,ontheotherhand,maynotyethave producedafterimagesthatcolormyperceptiontothesamedegreesoto speak.Ourperceptionoftheroom,therefore,dependsontheamountoftime wespendimmersedinthechangingcolorsandonwhatusetheroomisto us.53

 Twoaspectsoftheworkcryoutforimmediateattention.First,thetemporal structureoftheexperiencessolicitedbytheworkperfectlymimicsthetemporal structureoftimeconsciousnessaccordingtoHusserlsspecifications:justas retentionalsedimentationimpactstheproductionofnewpresentssotoodoes

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retinalsedimentationmodulatethecontinuouspresencingofcolor.Andyet,whatis atstakeinthetwocasescouldnotbemoredifferent:ononehand,temporalization followingthedictatesofconsciousness;ontheother,temporalizationemerging directlyfromthebrainsinauguralresponsetothematerialityoftheworld(light). Second,theworkproductivelyexploitsandcomplicatesthedividebetweenthe physicalandthepsychological.Whilethescienceofcolorperception,informedby technicalincursionsbeginninginthe19thcentury,postulatesacategorical distinctionbetweenthephysicalwavelengthoflightandthequalitativeperception ofcolor,Eliassonseekstooccupythespacebetweenthesetwodistinctphenomena, togivehisviewersaccesstoaninchoatesensorydomainwherethetransferfrom thephysicaltothequalitativeissomehowstillinprocess. WhatallowsEliassontodothisis,Isuggest,preciselythemicrosensory dimensionassociatedwiththeneuralprocessingofvision.Inrelationtothe resultingmacrosensations(distinctcolorperceptions),themicrosensationsatissue herecompriseadomainofvirtualactivity,withnoconsciousexperiential correlate,wherethedividebetweenthephysical(wavelengthoflight)andthe mental(qualitiativeperception)hasnotyetbeeneffectuated.Atthismicrotemporal levelofexperience,sensationispredominatelyafunctionofworldlydepresencing, whichistosaythatitoccursintheembodiedbrainbutinitspecificallyasapartof

 theworldor,perhapsbetterstill,priortoanydivisionbetweenmindandmatter.

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Whateversensationisinvolvedhereoccursnotinrelationtoapresentthatpasses, andthustoasubjectseparatedoutfromtheworld,butratherasafunctionofthe ongoingdepresencingoftheworlditself,ofthecontinuousreplacementofone colorwithanother,coupledwiththeentiretyofworldlyprocesses(quantityof externallight,densityoftrafficinroom,etc.)thatfurthercolorit.Thespecific qualitativeexperiencescatalyzedbyYourcolourmemorydelaysinreaction, afterimages,etc.aretestimonialstothisprimordialdomainofsense:literally presentificationsofabsentmicrosensations,theseexperienceshaveastatus somewherebetweenthemicroconsciousnessofneuralprocessingandconstituted timeconsciousness,betweenpurelyimpersonal,quasidirectregisteringoflightby thebrainandpersonalqualitativeexperiencesofcolorperception.(Figure2)

 Withoutperhapsaffordinganydirectsensoryexperienceofthebrutephysical materialityoflight,Yourcolourmemorycatalyzesafundamentallydifferent

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experiencethanwhatisatissueinHusserlsanalysisoftimeconsciousness,evenin theformittakesfollowingSartresreworking.Themicrosensorydomainofneural processingliesontheverycuspofthebrutelyphysical:itcomprisesthemindbodys veryfirstlayerofresponsetotheprimalmateriality(primalimpressionality)ofde presencing.Forthisreason,itenjoysamoreradicalimpersonalitythanwhatSartre attributestothemyriadconsciousnessesofintentionalexperience:this impersonalitystemslessfromthesimplelackofanyegoicdimensionthanfromthe sheermaterialityofthebrainsresonancewiththeworld.Microconsciousneural processingisimpersonalpreciselybecauseitisphysicalandmaterial:itisthebrain intheprocessofmodulatingthepurehyle,beforeanydivisionbetweentheegoic andthenonegoic(hyletic).Itisthebrainparticipatingintheprocessofde presencing. Forsimilarreasons,Yourcolourmemorycomprisesatechnificationof experiencethatisatoddswiththetechnicalsupplementationoftimeconsciousness atissueinStieglersupdatingofHusserl.Farfromimpactingtheconstitutionof temporalobjectsthatmirrorconsciousnesssselfexperienceofitsownexistencein time,Eliassonsuseofdigitaltechnicsmediatesthefluxofmicrosensationasit emergesfromandoperatesinthespaceopenedbythecomplexinterplaybetween thephysicalimpressionalityoflightandthequalitativeexperienceofcolor.Whatis atstakeinYourcolourmemoryis,accordingly,anexperiencedirectedagainstthe entertainmentindustryscommodificationoftheexperienceeconomyandthe

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Disneyficationoftheexperiencingofart.54Eliasson,notesJonathanCrary,hasno interestinsomedemonstrationpiecethatinformsusaboutthefascinating peculiaritiesofcolorvision.Ifafterimagespreoccupyhim,itis,inpart,asastrategy ofchallenginganddisplacingperceptualhabitsimposedbydominantfeaturesof contemporarytechnologicalculture.Quitesimply,tovividlyexperienceonesown afterimagesis,atleasttemporarily,toceasetobeamereconsumerofradiant imagesorenergyfromscreens,monitors,pages,andothersourcesthatclutterour lives.Itistorecognizeonesselfasageneratorofluminousphenomena.55More thanameredemonstration,Yourcolourmemoryexposesasensorydimension normallyconcealedincontemporaryimageconsumption. Itis,however,notjustthatourafterimagescomprisecounterimagestothe radiantimagesofcontemporarycapitalistculture;theyattest,rather,toan entirelyothersensorylifethanthatwhichinformstheculturalindustrialcaptureof thetimeofconsciousness.WhatwelearnfromEliassonsinstallationandlearn through,indeed,asexperienceispreciselythatbeneaththelevelatwhichour personalconsciousnessistargeted(whetherforhypersynchronizationorfor expansion),thereoperatesanimpersonalnexusofmicrosensoryprocesseswhich sustainoursensoryenvelopmentwithinthephysicomaterialworld.Withthe complextemporalitiestheyinvolve,ourafterimagesareciphersofthis envelopment:theycomprisedirectemergencesfromthemicrosensoryresponseof ourembodiedbrainstocontactwithphysicalwavelengthsoflight. Notwithstandingitsdistinctlyandintentionallylowtechquality,Yourcolour memoryexemplifiesthepotentialfortechnicstomodulateourimpersonal

 microsensoryexperience.Withoutitselfbeingone,Eliassonsinstallationthus pointstowardstheaffordancesofubiquitouscomputationalenvironments.In

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particular,itconsecratesamodeofsensationthatmaterializeswhatwemightcall ouroriginaryenvironmentalcondition:ourdirectcontactwiththeworldthat preceedsanydivisionofmindandmatterandthatcontinuessurreptitiously, imperceptiblytoinformoursensoryexperience,asitwere,beforeitbecomes ours.Itthuscontributestoanewunderstandingofthefunctionofmedia,onethat breakswiththelongstandingdetermination(adeterminationculminatinginthe deconstructiveparadigmdiscussedabove)oftechnicalmediaasmemory supplement.ForinEliassonsenvironment,asinubicompenvironmentsmore generally,mediadoesnotfunctiontostorepersonalexperiencesomuchasit operatestosecureaccesstoandfacilitatesensoryexperienceofadomainof temporalcommonalitythedepresencingoftheworldthathappens independentlyofthevicissitudesofconsciousness.Byparticipatinginthisprocess, weliterallyjointhecommonmovementoftheworldandhenceexperience,ina directsensorymode,thefundamentalopennessofthefuture. IfYourcolourmemorygivesanewspecificitytotheautonomyoftheperipheral aspecificitythat,Isuggest,characterizesubicompenvironmentsmoregenerally thatisbecauseitemphaticallydemonstratesagainthroughandasexperience thatsensinghappensfirstandforemostinthemediumofthephysicalandwithout consciousawareness.Asourmostbasicresponsetothedepresencingoftheworld, sensingisbydefinitionproximatelyecstatic,outofsync,andoutofscalewith

 consciousexperience.Andthat,precisely,iswhyubiquitoussensationis proximatelyandautonomouslyperipheral.

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1MarkWeiser,TheComputerforthe21stCentury,ScientificAmerican,September 1991,accessedathttp://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser?SciAmDraft3.html, 6/4/09. 2WalterBenjamin,AShortHistoryofPhotography,inTheWorkofArtintheAgeof TechnicalReproducibility,andotherEssaysonMedia,ed.M.Jenningsetal. (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2006). 3SeeHansJonas,TheNobilityofSight,inThePhenomenonofLife(Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1966). 4FNoncavepaintings 5noteonmytwomodelsofmedia 6WarrenNeidich,VisualandCognitiveErgonomics:FormulatingaModelthrough whichNeurobiologyandAestheticsareLinked,inBlowUp:Photography,Cinema, andtheBrain(NewYork:DistributedArtPublishers,2003),234. 7Seeforexample,Zeki 8Neidich,29. 9Neidich,2930. 10MaurizioLazzarato,MachinestoCrystallizeTime:Bergson,tr.A.Toscano, Theory,Culture&Society,26.6(2007):93122,here934. 11Lazzarato,111. 12Lazzarato,110. 13MarkWeiserandJohnSeelyBrown,TheComingAgeofCalmTechnology,Xerox PARC,October5,1996,1,accessedat http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/acmfuture2endnote.htm,6/4/09. 14MarkWeiser,OpenHouse,ITPReview2.0,March1996, http://www.itp.tsoa.nyu.edu/~review;pdfaccessedanddownloadedfrom http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/WeiserPapers.html,6/4/09. 15Weiser,TheComputerforthe21stCentury,1. 16Perhapsmostdiametricallyopposedtoourvisionisthenotionofvirtualreality, whichattemptstomakeaworldinsidethecomputer.Usersdonspecialgogglesthat projectanartificialsceneontheireyes;theywearglovesorevenbodysuitsthat sensetheirmotionsandgesturessothattheycanmoveaboutandmanipulate virtualobjects.Althoughitmayhaveitspurposeinallowingpeopletoexplore realmsotherwiseinaccessibletheinsidesofcells,thesurfacesofdistantplanets, theinformationwebofcomplexdatabasesvirtualrelaityisonlyamap,nota territory.Itexcludesdesks,offices,otherpeoplenotwearinggogglesandbody suits,weather,grass,trees,walks,chanceencountersandingeneraltheinfinite richnessoftheuniverse.Virtualrealityfocusesanenormousapparatuson simulatingtheworldratherthanoninvisibleenhancingtheworldthatalready exists(TheComputerforthe21stCentury,2). 17Weiser,TheComputerforthe21stCentury,2. 18Weiser,TheComputerforthe21stCentury,9. 19Weiser,TheComputerforthe21stCentury,1.

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20M.Weiser,R.GoldandJ.S.Brown,TheOriginsofUbiquitousComputingResearch atPARCintheLate1980s,IBMSystemsJournal,38.4(1999):693696,here695. 21Weiser,OpenHouse. 22Weiser,OpenHouse. 23Weiser,TheComputerinthe21stCentury,2. 24Weiser,OpenHouse. 25Weiser,TheComputerinthe21stCentury,1. 26Weiser,TheComputerinthe21stCentury,23. 27WeiserandBrown,TheComingAgeofCalmTechnology,4. 28WeiserandBrown,TheComingAgeofCalmTechnology,45. 29MydescriptionoftheworkisbasedonthatgivenbyWeiserandBrown,The ComingAgeofCalmTechnology,8. 30WeiserandBrown,TheComingAgeofCalmTechnology,8. 31WeiserandBrown,TheComingAgeofCalmTechnology,8. 32ForadescriptionofEcosystem,see http://www.cityarts.com/lmno/ecosystm.html. 33Writingin1999,WeiserandBrownassessthetransformationeffectuatedby ubiquitouscomputing:Intheend,ubicompcreatedanewfieldofcomputer science,onethatspeculatedonaphysicalworldrichlyandinvisiblyinterwoven withsensors,actuators,displays,andcomputationalelements,embedded seamlesslyintheeverydayobjectsofourlivesandconnectedthroughacontinuous network.Whatistrulystartlingishowquicklywearefindingthisnewformof computationmanifestingitselfaroundus(Weiseretal.,TheOriginsofUbiquitous ComputingResearchatPARCintheLate1980s,694). 34ThisclaimtakesrootinthewealthofHusserlsmanuscriptswhichformulatea muchmorecomplexpictureofphenomenologythanthepublishedtexts.These manuscriptshaveformedthebasisfortherecentrevisionaryreadingsofHusserl thathavebeenmyinspirationhere. 35SeeRenaudBarbaras,DesireandDistance:IntroductiontoaPhenomenologyof Perception,tr.P.Milan(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2006). 36SeeEmmanuelLevinas,IntentionalityandSensation,inDiscoveringExistence withHusserl,tr.R.CohenandM.Smith(Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversity Press,1998)andOtherwisethanBeing,tr.A.Lingis(Pittsburgh:Duquesne UniversityPress,1998[1981]);MichelHenri,HyleticPhenomenologyandMaterial Phenomenology,inMaterialPhenomenology,tr.S.Davidson(NewYork:Fordham UniversityPress,2008). 37SeeGillesDeleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,tr.P.Patton(NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,1995). 38SeeJacquesDerrida,OfGrammatology,tr.G.Spivak(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,1967),SpeechandPhenomena,andOtherEssaysonHusserls TheoryofSigns,tr.D.Allison(Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973); BernardStiegler,TechnicsandTime,vol.2:Disorientation,tr.S.Barker(Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress,2008),partIV. 39Idevelopthiscriticismatlengthinmyforthcomingbookontimeandtime consciousness.

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40Inreality,thisfigureofthetraditionalHusserlianphenomenologicalreductionis nothingmorethanasimplificationandartificialstabilizationofone,perhaps dominantstrandofHusserlsthinking.Togetafullsenseofwhatisatstakehere, onewouldhavetofollowthemyriadpermutationsoftheepocheacrossHusserls careerandintheworkofhismoreimportantstudentsanddisciples.Sufficeittosay herethattherearemany(oratleastseveral)Husserls,whichistosaythatagainst thistraditionalpicturethereisaHusserlwhocorrelatesthereductionwiththe encounterwiththehylepriortotheadventofperceptualconsciousness. 41In1905lecturesontimeconsciousness,OnthePhenomenologyofInternalTime Consciousness,Husserloffersthemelodyastheexampleparexcellenceofa temporalobject.Atemporalobjectisdefinedasanobjectthatdoesnotsimplyexist intime,butthathastimeasitscontent.Afinitetemporalstructurewithabeginning andanend,themelodyformsaperfectsurrogatetoobjectifytheineffablefluxof timeconsciousness.Itisbyanalyzingtheretentionsofjustpastsounds,alongwith expectationsforsoundsjusttocome,thatweacquireinsightintothecomplex structureoftimeconsciousness. 42ItthusinstanceswhatIhaveelsewherecalledtechnesis:theputtingintowriting oftechnology.SeeHansen2000. 43EdmundHusserl,SpteTexteberZeitkonstitution(19291934):DieC Manuskripte,ed.D.Lohmar(Dordrecht:Springer,2006). 44EugenFink,VergegenwtigungundBild,inStudienzurPhnomenologie,1930 1939(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1966),24. 45Fink,citedinRonaldBruzina,EdmundHusserlandEugenFink:Beginningsand EndsinPhenomenology,19281938(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2004),235. 46Fink,citedinBruzina,207. 47Bruzina,236.MyunderstandingofthesignificanceofFinksdeparturesfrom HusserlowesmuchtoBruzinasmeticulousreconstructionofFinksworkfromhis scantpublishedtextsandunpublishednotes. 48Bruzina,239. 49Fink,citedinBruzina,239. 50JeanPaulSartre,TheTranscendenceoftheEgo,tr.A.Brown(LondonandNew York:Routledge,2004),13. 51Sartre,51. 52Sartre,46. 53OliafurEliasson,SomeIdeasAboutColor,inOliafurEliasson:Yourcolour memory,ed.R.Torchia(Glenside,PA:ArcadiaUniversityArtGalleryandOliafur Eliasson,2006),778. 54Eliasson,83. 55JonathanCrary,IlluminationsoftheUnforeseen,inOliafurEliasson:Yourcolour memory,22.