62nd Army (Soviet Union)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2013) The 62nd Order of Lenin Army (Russian: 62- ) was a field army established by the Soviet Union's Red Army during the Second World War. Formed as the 7th Reserve Army as part of the Stavka Reserve in May 1942, the formation was designated as the 62nd Army the following month. After an epic combat performance in the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army was granted Guards status and renamed the 8th Guards Army in April 1943.

Contents

1 History 2 Second World War Commanders 3 Notes 4 References

History
The 7th Reserve Army was formed 28 May 1942 as part of the Stavka Reserve (RVGK). Within one month, this force had been redesignated the 62nd Army. From mid August 1942 until late January 1943, the 62nd Army, under the command of General Vasily Chuikov, fought in the Battle of Stalingrad. 62nd Army conducted an epic defense of the city that repeated and desperate attacks by the German 6th Army was unable to overcome. The Army, along with the 64th Army, was operating under the Soviet Stalingrad Front. After Operation Uranus, the German assault at Stalingrad, had come to utter disaster, the 62nd Army was uniquely awarded the Order of Lenin, and granted Guards status as the 8th Guards Army. On 13 September 1942 the Army composition was: 33rd, 35th Guards, 87th, 98th, 112th, 131st, 196th, 229th, 244th, 315th, 399th Rifle Divisions 10th, 38th, 42nd, 115th, 124th, 129th, 149th Rifle Brigades post 9-27-1942 193rd Rifle Division 23rd Tank Corps 20th Tank Destroyer Brigade 115th Fortified Region twelve artillery and mortar regiments

(Note: 33rd Guards, 87th and 229th rifle divisions were in the process of being brought up to strength; 131st and 399th rifle divisions were held in the second echelon of the Army.) On 1 November 1942 during the height of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army commanded the 13th, 37th, and 39th Guards Rifle Divisions, the 45th, 95th, 112th, 138th, 193rd, 284th and 308th Rifle Divisions, the 42nd, 92nd, 115th, 124th, 149th, and 160th Rifle Brigades, the 84th Tank and 2nd Motor Rifle Brigades, the 115th Fortified Region, and 20 regiments of howitzer, gun, antitank, mortar, rocket, and anti-aircraft artillery among other support units.[1] Many of these formations were burnt-out shells by the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, with many formations reduced to hundreds of men.[2]

Second World War Commanders

Jul 1942 to Aug 1942: Major General V. Ia. Kolpakchi Aug 1942 to Sep 1942: Lieutenant General A. I. Lopatin Sep 1942 to Apr 1943: Lieutenant General V. I. Chuikov

Notes
1. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1 November 1942 (Russian) 2. ^ John Erickson (historian), The Road to Stalingrad, Cassel Military Paperbacks, 2003 edition, p.385, 403

References

Born, Keith E. (ed.) Slaughterhouse. Bedford: Aberjona Press, 2005. ISBN 09717650-9-X. Glantz, David M. Companion to Colossus Reborn. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. ISBN 0-7006-1359-5. Poirier, Robert G., and Conner, Albert Z. The Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War. Novato: Presidio Press, 1985. ISBN 0-89141-237-9.

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Armies of the Soviet Army

Armies

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6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th 50th 51st 52nd 53rd 54th

55th 56th 57th 58th 59th 60th 61st 62nd 63rd 64th 65th 66th 67th 68th 69th 70th Separate Coastal Army 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 14th 18th 20th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th

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Cavalry

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Reserve Army

Vladimir Kolpakchi
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2007)
Vladimir Kolpakchi 7 September 1899 Kiev, Russian empire 17 May 1961 (aged 61) Moscow, USSR Soviet Union

Born Died Allegiance Awards

Vladimir Yakovlevich Kolpakchi (Russian: , Ukrainian: ) (* September 7, 1899, Kiev May 17,

1961, Moscow) was a Soviet General of the Army during the World War II, Hero of the Soviet Union.

References
First commander of 62nd Army when it was activated from the 7th Reserve Army. Was re-assigned before 62nd Army began the defense of Stalingrad.

Anton Lopatin
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Anton Lopatin 18 January 1897 Born Russian empire 9 April 1965 (aged 68) Died USSR Soviet Union Allegiance

Awards

Order of Lenin (3) Order of the Red Banner (2) Order of Kutuzov, 1st class (2) Order of the Red Star

Anton Ivanovich Lopatin (Russian: ) (January 18, 1897 April 9, 1965) was a Soviet officer during the Second World War, and Hero of the Soviet Union. Lopatin begun his service in the Red Army in 1918, and participated in the Russian Civil War. After completing his command courses in 1927. From 1937 Lopatin was appointed commander of a cavalry division. He began the Great Patriotic War in the rank of General-Major, and was promoted to the rank of General-Lieutenant 1942. During the war he commanded the 31st Rifle Corps of the Southwestern Front (from October 1940), 9th Army (from July 1941), 62nd Army (from August 1942)with the mission, to defend Stalingrad, 34th Army (from October 1942), 11th Army (during March - July 1943), and 20th Army (September - October 1943). During January - July 1944 Lopatin served as the Deputy Commander of the 43rd Army, and from July 1944 as Commanding Officer of the 13th Guards Corps with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.

He also completed the Higher academic course at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1947. After the war Lopatin commanded a Rifle Corps, and occupied high ranking positions in Staffs of several Military Districts before retiring in 1954.

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Anton Lopatin was awarded three Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Kutuzov (1st class), Order of the Red Star, and numerous medals.

Vasily Chuikov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Chuikov) Jump to: navigation, search Vasily Chuikov

Lieutenant General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov (prior to 1943)

Nickname Born Died

"The Man of Iron Will" "The Stone" February 12, 1900 Serebryanye Prudy, Tula Governorate, Russian Empire March 18, 1982 (aged 82) Moscow, Soviet Union

Allegiance Years of service Rank Commands held

Soviet Union 19171972 Marshal of the Soviet Union 4th Army 62nd Army 8th Guards Army Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Kiev Military District World War II Battle of Stalingrad Battle of Berlin (9)

Battles/wars

Awards

Order of the October Revolution Order of the Red Banner (4) Order of Suvorov, 1st class (3) Order of the Red Star Distinguished Service Cross (USA)

Other work

1961 until his death, he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov (Russian: ) (February 12, 1900 March 18, 1982) was a Soviet lieutenant general in the Red Army during World War II, commander of the 62nd Army during the Battle of Stalingrad, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945), and after the war a Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Contents

1 Early life 2 The Russian Revolution and Civil War 3 Inter-war period 4 Second World War 5 Stalingrad 6 Later life 7 Memoirs in translation 8 In popular culture 9 Honours and awards 10 See also 11 References 12 External links

Early life

Born into a peasant family in the village of Serebryanye Prudy in the Tula region south of Moscow, he was the eighth of twelve children and the fifth of eight sons.[1] Chuikov and all his brothers became soldiers and fought in the Russian Civil War.[2] At the age of twelve, he left school and his family home to earn his living in a factory in St. Petersburg, turning out spurs for cavalry officers.[3]

The Russian Revolution and Civil War

During the turmoil of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chuikov became unemployed. Later the same year, an older brother arranged for Chuikov to be recruited into the Red Guards. The year after, in 1918, he joined the Red Army.[4] In October 1918, Chuikov saw active service when he was sent to the Southern Front as a deputy company commander to fight against the White Army. In the spring of 1919, he became commander of the 40th Regiment (later renamed the 43rd), part of the 5th Army under Tukhachevsky facing the White Army at Kolchak in Siberia.[5] Chuikov's record of service during the Civil War was distinguished. In the fighting from 1919 to 1920 he received two awards of the Order of the Red Banner for bravery and heroism. He was wounded four timesone, in Poland in 1920, left a fragment in his left arm that could not be operated on. It led to partial paralysis and caused him to lose temporary use of his arm. Chuikov carried this war wound for the rest of his life, and it eventually led to septicaemia breaking out in 1981, causing a nine-month illness and finally his death.[6]

Inter-war period
He left his regiment in 1921 to continue his studies at the Frunze Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1925.[7]

Second World War

Chuikov commanded the 4th Army in the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. He commanded the 9th Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1940. His army was defeated by the Finns at Suomussalmi and Raate Road. He was then sent to China as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. In May 1942, the USSR recalled him. According to Chuikov's memoirs, his recall was due to Nationalist China claiming that the USSR was providing military aid as part of an attempt to draw the USSR into the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Stalingrad
On returning to Moscow, Chuikov was placed in command of the 64th Army (later 7th Guards), on the west bank of the Don River. The 64th Army took part in the fighting withdrawal to Stalingrad, and shortly before the Battle of Stalingrad itself began, Chuikov was made commanding general of the more important 62nd Army, which was to hold Stalingrad itself, with the 64th on its southern flank.

It was at Stalingrad that Chuikov developed the important tactic of hugging the enemy, by which under-armed Soviet soldiers kept the German army so close to them as to minimize the superior firepower enjoyed by the Wehrmacht. Chuikov had witnessed firsthand the blitzkrieg tactics the Nazis had used to sweep across the Russian steppe, so he used the Germans' carpet-bombing of the city to draw panzer units into the rubble and chaos, where their progress was impeded. Here they could be destroyed with Molotov cocktails and Russian artillery operating at close range. This tactic also rendered the German Luftwaffe ineffective, since Stuka dive-bombers could not attack Red Army positions without endangering their own forces.[8][9] After the victory at Stalingrad, the 62nd Army was redesignated the Soviet 8th Guards Army. Chuikov then commanded the 8th Guards as part of 1st Belorussian Front and led its advance through Poland, finally heading the Soviet offensive which conquered Berlin in April/May 1945. Chuikov's advance through Poland was characterized by massive advances across difficult terrain (on several occasions, the 8th Guards Army advanced over 40 miles in a single day). On May 1, 1945, Chuikov, who commanded his army operating in central Berlin, was the first Allied officer to learn about Adolf Hitler's suicide, being informed by General Hans Krebs who had come to Chuikov's headquarters under a white flag. He accepted the surrender of Berlin's forces from General Helmuth Weidling. Chuikov appeared in the documentary film Berlin (1945), directed by Yuli Raizman.

Later life
After the war, Chuikov stayed in Germany, later serving as Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany from 1949 until 1953, when he was made the Commanding General of the Kiev Military District. While serving at that post, on March 11, 1955 he was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1960 to 1964, he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army's Ground Forces. He also served as the Chief of the Civil Defense from 1961 until his retirement in 1972. From 1961 until his death, he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He was a major consultant for the design of the Stalingrad battle memorial on Mamayev Kurgan, and was buried there after his death at the age of 82.

Memoirs in translation

The Beginning of the Road: The Story of the Battle for Stalingrad, London, 1963.[10] Chuikov, Vasili; David P. Barrett (translator) (2003). Mission to China: Memoirs of a Soviet Military Adviser to Chiang Kaishek. Eastbridge. ISBN 9781-891936-10-4. Chuikov, Vasili (1978). The end of the Third Reich. Moscow: Progress. ISBN 978-0-8285-0453-9.

In popular culture

Chuikov was briefly featured in the 2004 German-Austrian movie Downfall (Der Untergang), dealing with the fall of Berlin in 1945. He was portrayed by a Russian actor Aleksandr Slastin. In Dana Kramer-Rolls' novel Home Is the Hunter, Star Trek character Pavel Chekov refer to Chuikov as his ancestor (although "Vasily" is spelled as "Vassili"). Chuikov is a character in Robert Conroy's Red Inferno: 1945. The novel follows his career alongside Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov in a fictional situation where the Soviet Union attacks America and the remaining Allied nations. Towards the end, an American Boeing B-29 Superfortress drops a nuclear bomb near the city of Paderborn, Germany, where he is stationed, killing him, Zhukov, and a large portion of the Soviet military's elite forces.

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Soviet Union

Hero of the Soviet Union, twice (19 March 1944, 6 April 1945) Order of Lenin, nine times (26 October 1943, 19 March 1944, 21 February 1945, 11 February 1950, 11 February 1960, 12 February 1970, 11 February 1975, 21 February 1978, 11 February 1980) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of the Red Banner, four times (1920, 1925, 1944, 1948) Order of Suvorov, 1st class, three times (28 January 1943, 23 August 1944, 29 May 1945) Order of the Red Star (1940) Honorary arms with golden national emblem of the Soviet Union (22 February 1968) Jubilee Medal "In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary since the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "Thirty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Medal "For the Capture of Berlin" Medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw" Medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "60 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"

Foreign

Order of Merit for the Fatherland in gold, twice (East Germany) Grand Cross of the Star of People's Friendship (East Germany) Cross of Grunwald, 2nd class (Poland)

Gold Cross of the Virtuti Militari (Poland) Commander's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (Poland) Order of Sukhbaatar (Mongolia) Two orders of China Distinguished Service Cross (United States)

Awards of other countries

Red Army order of battle at the Battle of Stalingrad

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

The Order of Battle of the Red Army at the Battle of Stalingrad. Order of Battle is as at 19 November 1942.
Main article: Battle of Stalingrad

Contents

1 Red Army Order of Battle [1]:435 o 1.1 STAVKA Representatives [1]:435-437 o 1.2 Stalingrad Front [1]:437 o 1.3 Don Front [1]:437-438 o 1.4 Southwestern Front 2 Footnotes 3 Citations 4 Bibliography

Red Army Order of Battle

STAVKA Representatives[1]:435

Army General G.K. Zhukov Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky

Stalingrad Front[1]:435-437

Colonel-General A.I. Yeremenko Political Officer N.S. Khrushchev

8th Air Army (General T.T. Khryukin) 28th Army (LtG. D.I. Ryabyshev)

Rifle Divisions: 34th Guards, 248th Special Brigades: 52nd, 152nd, 159th Tank Brigades: 6th Guards Front Reserve: 330th Rifle Division, 85th Tank Bde 51st Army (General N.I. Trufanov) o Rifle Divisions: 15th Guards, 91st, 126th, 302nd o Special Brigades: 38th o Tank Brigades: 254th o Armoured formations added for Operation Uranus: 4th Mechanised Corps, 4th Cavalry Corps 57th Army (General F.I. Tolbukhin) o Rifle Divisions: 169th, 422nd o Special Brigades: 143rd o Tank Brigades: 90th, 235th o Armoured formations added for Operation Uranus: 13th Mechanised Corps 62nd Army (General V.I. Chuikov) o Rifle Divisions: 13th Guards, 37th Guards, 39th Guards, 45th, 95th, 112th, 138th, 193rd, 196th, 244th, 284th, 308th, 10th NKVD o Naval Infantry Brigades: 92nd o Special Brigades: 42nd, 115th, 124th, 149th, 160th o Tank Brigades: 84th, 137th, 189th 64th Army (General M.S. Shumilov) o Rifle Divisions: 36th Guards, 29th, 38th, 157th, 204th o Naval Infantry Brigades: 154th o Special Brigades: 66th, 93rd, 96th, 97th o Tank Brigades: 13th, 56th

o o o o

Don Front[1]:437

Colonel-General K.K. Rokossovsky

24th Army (General I.V. Galanin) o Rifle Divisions: 49th, 84th, 120th, 173rd, 233rd, 260th, 273rd o Tank Brigades: 10th 65th Army (General Lieutenant-General P.I. Batov) o Rifle Divisions: 4th Guards, 27th Guards, 40th Guards, 23rd, 24th, 252nd, 258th, 304th, 321st o Tank Brigades: 121st 66th Army (Major-General A.S. Zhadov) o Rifle Divisions: 64th, 99th, 116th, 226th, 299th, 343rd o Tank Brigades: 58th 16th Air Army (Major-General S.I. Rudenko)

Southwestern Front[1]:437-438

General N.F. Vatutin

1st Guards Army (General D.D. Lelyushenko) o Rifle Divisions: 1st, 153rd, 197th, 203rd, 266th, 278th o Front Reserve: 1st Guards Mechanised Corps 5th Tank Army (General P.L. Romanenko)

Rifle Divisions: 14th Guards, 47th Guards, 50th Guards, 119th, 159th, 346th Armoured formations added for Operation Uranus: 1st Tank Corps, 26th Tank Corps, 8th Cavalry Corps 21st Army (Major-General I.M. Chistyakov) o Rifle Divisions: 63rd, 76th, 96th, 277th, 293rd, 333rd o Tank Regiments: 4th Guards, 1st, 2nd o Armoured formations added for Operation Uranus: 4th Tank Corps, 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps 2nd Air Army (Colonel K. Smirnov)[2] 17th Air Army (Major-General S.A. Krasovsky)

o o

Hazi Aslanov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Hazi" redirects here. It is not to be confused with Azi, Hasi (disambiguation), Hazy, or Hazzi. "Hzi Aslanov" redirects here. For the village in Azerbaijan, see Hzi Aslanov, Azerbaijan. Hazi Aslanov

Native name Born

H January 22, 1910 Lankaran, Baku Governorate, Russian Empire

Died Buried at Allegiance Service/branch Years of service Rank

January 24, 1945 (aged 35) L epj D tr ct, Latvia, Soviet Union Martyrs' Lane USSR Red Army 1929 1945 Major General

Commands held

10th Motor Transport Bataillon 55th Separate Tank Regiment 35th Guards Tank Brigade Winter War Battle of Moscow Battle of Stalingrad Hero of the Soviet Union (twice) Order of Lenin (twice) Order of the Red Star Order of Alexander Nevsky Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class Order of the Great Patriotic War, 1st Class (posthumously)

Battles/wars

Awards

Hazi Aslanov (Hazi Ahad oglu Aslanov, Azerbaijani: Hzi Aslanov, Russian: ; commonly described as Azi Aslanov and A. A. Aslanov,;[1] January 22, 1910, Lankaran January 24, 1945, Latvia) was an Azerbaijani Major-General of the Soviet armoured troops during World War II. Aslanov was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title twice.[2]

Contents

1 Early years 2 Battles o 2.1 Winter War o 2.2 Battle of Moscow o 2.3 Battle of Stalingrad 3 Death 4 Awards and honors 5 References

Early years

Hazi Aslanov was born on January 22, 1910 in Lankaran in a working-class family. When he lost his father at the age of 13, he left local school number 1 and worked in the Lankaran Brick Plant.[3][4] In 1929, Aslanov graduated from the Transcaucasian Preparatory Military School in Baku and continued his education at Leningrad Cavalry School, where he passed courses at the Military Academy of Armored Forces.[5] After graduation, in June 1931 he was appointed commander of a 15th Cavalry Regiment platoon of 3rd Cavalry Division Bessarabia named after Grigory Kotovsky.[6] In June, 1933, he was appointed commander of the separate tank company. In 1937, he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[7] Aslanov also served as deputy commander for the technical part of company, commander of 2nd Rifle Division and 60th Rifle Divisions, followed by motor transport battalion of the Kiev Military District, where he gained captain rank in February 1939.[8]

Battles
Winter War

He served during the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland and fought in the Karelian Isthmus, then took part in the breaking of the Mannerheim Line during the SovietFinnish War.[8] He was promoted to the major in November, 1940.
Battle of Moscow

In August 1941, he replaced the injured commander of a tank battalion, composed of 12-15 machines type T-26, BT-5, BT-7 and T-34. In the fierce battles near Shostka, Bakhmach and Piryatin, his tank commanders fought to the last tank, while Aslanov personally led his battalion in the attack. In one of these battles, Aslanov received two bullet wounds in his right leg and a severe shrapnel wound to the head, but despite these he remained in the service. When the battalion lost all of its tanks, he was recalled to the reserve in September 1941. He was also appointed 10th Deputy for the technical units, where he fought in Piryatin, Okhtyrka, Bohodukhiv and Kharkiv.[8] The next year, he was appointed to the command of the 55th Tank Regiment.
Battle of Stalingrad

Later in 1942, he led the 35th Guards Tank Brigade from Stalingrad through Borisovo, Vileyka, and Minsk to Vilnius and Riga, and participated in the battles of Rostov and Taganrog. His brigade liberated the town of Pleshinitsy. Aslanov was famous for his "thrust from flank" technique, which involved launching an attack by heading straight toward the enemy, while other Soviet troops were sent to attack from the sides.[9]

Death

The funeral of Hazi Aslanov in Baku

On January 24, 1945 near Priekule in the Liepja District in Latvia during a reconnaissance, Aslanov was seriously wounded and died five and a half hours later on the battlefield. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, for his leadership of the Tank Brigade.[10]

Awards and honors

Aslanov's bust on his grave in the Martyrs' Lane of Baku

Aslanov received his first star in 1943 for his performance at Stalingrad. The second was supposed to be given for the cross of Berezina river, under the recommendation of General of the Army Ivan Chernyakhovsky, but because of discriminatory treatment, he received it posthumously, 46 years later, in 1991, after a special appeal by Azerbaijani intelligentsia to Mikhail Gorbachev.[9][11]

Granite memorial plate in memory of Hazi Aslanov on Mamayev Kurgan

A subway station, school, oil tanker and a streets in Baku, Imishli and Volgograd, monument in Vialejka were named after him.[12][13] The village in Agstafa region carries his name and his house museum functions in Lankaran.[14][15] A special granite memorial plate was constructed in memory of him on Mamayev Kurgan.[16]

References
1. ^ Aleksander A. Maslov, David M. Glantz, Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle, 1941-1945, Routledge, 1998, ISBN 978-0-7146-4790-6, p. 251. 2. ^ We re he r f ct ry c mp g t rted B ku 3. ^ (Russian) 4. ^ , , (Russian) 5. ^ (Russian) 6. ^ : (Russian) 7. ^ Michael Parrish, Sacrifice of the Generals: Soviet Senior Officer Losses, 1939-1953, Scarecrow Press, 2004, ISBN 978-0-8108-5009-5, p. 28. 8. ^ a b c : (Russian) ab 9. ^ War and its Legacy: General Aslanov 10. ^ Azerbaycaninsesi.com:Hzi Aslanov (Azerbaijani) 11. ^ : (Russian) 12. ^ Sea Transport: Palmali Group of Companies 13. ^ (Russian) 14. ^ Travel to Azerbaijan 15. ^ Cultural centres in Lankaran 16. ^ (Russian)

: . .1. . 1987. . 1975.

Hazi Aslanov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

"Hazi" redirects here. It is not to be confused with Azi, Hasi (disambiguation), Hazy, or Hazzi. "Hzi Aslanov" redirects here. For the village in Azerbaijan, see Hzi Aslanov, Azerbaijan. Hazi Aslanov

Native name Born

H January 22, 1910 Lankaran, Baku Governorate, Russian Empire January 24, 1945 (aged 35) L epj D tr ct, Latvia, Soviet Union Martyrs' Lane USSR Red Army 1929 1945 Major General

Died Buried at Allegiance Service/branch Years of service Rank

Commands held

10th Motor Transport Bataillon 55th Separate Tank Regiment 35th Guards Tank Brigade

Battles/wars

Winter War Battle of Moscow Battle of Stalingrad Hero of the Soviet Union (twice) Order of Lenin (twice) Order of the Red Star Order of Alexander Nevsky Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class Order of the Great Patriotic War, 1st Class (posthumously)

Awards

Hazi Aslanov (Hazi Ahad oglu Aslanov, Azerbaijani: Hzi Aslanov, Russian: ; commonly described as Azi Aslanov and A. A. Aslanov,;[1] January 22, 1910, Lankaran January 24, 1945, Latvia) was an Azerbaijani Major-General of the Soviet armoured troops during World War II. Aslanov was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title twice.[2]

Contents

1 Early years 2 Battles o 2.1 Winter War o 2.2 Battle of Moscow o 2.3 Battle of Stalingrad 3 Death 4 Awards and honors 5 References

Early years
Hazi Aslanov was born on January 22, 1910 in Lankaran in a working-class family. When he lost his father at the age of 13, he left local school number 1 and worked in the Lankaran Brick Plant.[3][4] In 1929, Aslanov graduated from the Transcaucasian Preparatory Military School in Baku and continued his education at Leningrad Cavalry School, where he passed courses at the Military Academy of Armored Forces.[5] After graduation, in June 1931 he was appointed commander of a 15th Cavalry Regiment platoon of 3rd Cavalry Division Bessarabia named after Grigory Kotovsky.[6] In June, 1933, he was appointed commander of the separate tank company. In 1937, he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[7] Aslanov also served as deputy commander for the technical part of company, commander of 2nd Rifle Division and 60th Rifle Divisions, followed by motor transport battalion of the Kiev Military District, where he gained captain rank in February 1939.[8]

Battles
Winter War

He served during the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland and fought in the Karelian Isthmus, then took part in the breaking of the Mannerheim Line during the SovietFinnish War.[8] He was promoted to the major in November, 1940.
Battle of Moscow

In August 1941, he replaced the injured commander of a tank battalion, composed of 12-15 machines type T-26, BT-5, BT-7 and T-34. In the fierce battles near Shostka, Bakhmach and Piryatin, his tank commanders fought to the last tank, while Aslanov personally led his battalion in the attack. In one of these battles, Aslanov received two bullet wounds in his right leg and a severe shrapnel wound to the head, but despite these he remained in the service. When the battalion lost all of its tanks, he was recalled to the reserve in September 1941. He was also appointed 10th Deputy for the technical units, where he fought in Piryatin, Okhtyrka, Bohodukhiv and Kharkiv.[8] The next year, he was appointed to the command of the 55th Tank Regiment.
Battle of Stalingrad

Later in 1942, he led the 35th Guards Tank Brigade from Stalingrad through Borisovo, Vileyka, and Minsk to Vilnius and Riga, and participated in the battles of Rostov and Taganrog. His brigade liberated the town of Pleshinitsy. Aslanov was famous for his "thrust from flank" technique, which involved launching an attack by heading straight toward the enemy, while other Soviet troops were sent to attack from the sides.[9]

Death

The funeral of Hazi Aslanov in Baku

On January 24, 1945 near Priekule in the Liepja District in Latvia during a reconnaissance, Aslanov was seriously wounded and died five and a half hours later on the battlefield. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, for his leadership of the Tank Brigade.[10]

Awards and honors

Aslanov's bust on his grave in the Martyrs' Lane of Baku

Aslanov received his first star in 1943 for his performance at Stalingrad. The second was supposed to be given for the cross of Berezina river, under the recommendation of General of the Army Ivan Chernyakhovsky, but because of discriminatory treatment, he received it posthumously, 46 years later, in 1991, after a special appeal by Azerbaijani intelligentsia to Mikhail Gorbachev.[9][11]

Granite memorial plate in memory of Hazi Aslanov on Mamayev Kurgan

A subway station, school, oil tanker and a streets in Baku, Imishli and Volgograd, monument in Vialejka were named after him.[12][13] The village in Agstafa region carries his name and his house museum functions in Lankaran.[14][15] A special granite memorial plate was constructed in memory of him on Mamayev Kurgan.[16]

References

1. ^ Aleksander A. Maslov, David M. Glantz, Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle, 1941-1945, Routledge, 1998, ISBN 978-0-7146-4790-6, p. 251. 2. ^ We re he r f ct ry c mp g t rted B ku 3. ^ (Russian) 4. ^ , , (Russian) 5. ^ (Russian) 6. ^ : (Russian) 7. ^ Michael Parrish, Sacrifice of the Generals: Soviet Senior Officer Losses, 1939-1953, Scarecrow Press, 2004, ISBN 978-0-8108-5009-5, p. 28. 8. ^ a b c : (Russian) 9. ^ a b War and its Legacy: General Aslanov 10. ^ Azerbaycaninsesi.com:Hzi Aslanov (Azerbaijani) 11. ^ : (Russian) 12. ^ Sea Transport: Palmali Group of Companies 13. ^ (Russian) 14. ^ Travel to Azerbaijan 15. ^ Cultural centres in Lankaran 16. ^ (Russian)

: . .1. . 1987. . 1975.

Vasily Badanov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (November 2009) Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov

Native name Born Died Allegiance

December 14, 1895 Verkhnyaya Yakushka, Simbirsk Governorate, Russian Empire April 1, 1971 (aged 73) Moscow, USSR Russian Empire (1915-1917) Soviet Union (1919-1953)

Service/branch Years of service Rank Commands held Battles/wars

Russian Imperial Army Red Army 1915 1917 1919 1953 Lieutenant-general 24th Tank Corps 4th Tank Army World War I Russian Civil War World War II

Awards

Order of the Red Banner (3) Order of Suvorov, 2nd class Order of Kutuzov, 2nd class Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd class Order of the Red Star various other medals

Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov (Russian: ; 14 December 1895, Verkhnyaya Yakushka 1 April 1971, Moscow) was a Soviet military officer and general, best known for his leadership in the Tatsinskaya Raid (1942) and subsequent command of the 4th Tank Army (19431944).

Biography
Conscripted into the Russian Army during World War I, Badanov graduated from an officers' school in 1916, one year prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. Serving as a commissar and a staff officer in the Red Army during in the Russian Civil War, Badanov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919. Noted for his superb command of the 24th Tank Corps in 1942 during the German Stalingrad campaign, Badanov was promoted to lieutenant-general (a rank above majorgeneral in the Soviet system) soon after the Tatsinskaya Raid and became the first recipient of the Order of Suvorov, second class, in 1943. Badanov commanded the 4th Tank Army in 1943-1944, which he led during the Battle of Kursk. Badanov was seriously wounded during the LvovSandomierz Offensive, and was assigned to the task of preparing the Soviet tank and mechanized forces for the front line for the remaining portion of the war. He served as the commanding officer of the Central Group of Forces' tank units in 1946-1950. Badanov retired from the active-duty armed forces in 1953.

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia.

Order of Lenin Order of the Red Banner, three times Order of Suvorov, 2nd class Order of Kutuzov, 2nd class Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd class Order of the Red Star Jubilee Medal "In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary since the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"

Nikolay Dyatlenko
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

The interrogation of Paulus at Don Front HQ. Left to right: General Rokossovsky, Marshal Voronov, Dyatlenko and Field Marshal Paulus

Captain Nikolay Dmitrevich Dyatlenko (Russian: ; 26 November 1914 1996) was a Ukrainian officer, interrogator and translator who was part of a team that attempted to deliver a message of truce (sometimes referred to as an "ultimatum") to the German Sixth Army at the Battle of Stalingrad in January 1943. He also acted as the translator at the interrogation of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus a few weeks later.

Contents

1 Life 2 Stalingrad truce o 2.1 First attempt o 2.2 Second attempt 3 Interrogations of captured German officers 4 Bibliography 5 Footnotes 6 Sources

Life
Dyatlenko was born in 1914 in the village of Kulichka in the Lebedyn district, in present-day Sumy Oblast, Ukraine.[1] He studied philology at the University of Kiev before World War II, and after the war he became an author.[2]

Stalingrad truce
First attempt

A fluent German speaker, Captain Dyatlenko was transferred to the 7th Department of the Stalingrad Front in the autumn of 1942 to help with the interrogations of German prisoners of war.[3] Beevor claims that he was a member of the NKVD,[4] but there is no mention of this in Dyatlenko's account of the ultimatum delivery, and the index in Erickson's Road to Berlin lists him as a Red Army officer.[5] Together with Major Aleksandr Mikhailovich Smyslov from Red Army Intelligence, Dyatlenko was chosen by NKVD and Red Army officers to deliver notice of truce to the beleaguered German forces in the Kessel at the Battle of Stalingrad. Smyslov was to be the truce envoy and carried the truce papers in an oilskin packet,[6] whilst Dyatlenko was his interpreter.[7] Dyatlenko had no idea of the sort of behaviour that was expected of a truce envoy, later admitting that all he knew of the necessary protocols came from Solovyov's play Field Marshal Kutuzov.[8] On 7 January 1943 the two envoys were dressed in the finest uniforms available (the Russian quartermaster assured them that they would be "dressed like bridegrooms")[8] and were driven with Colonel Vinogradov in a Willys jeep to the edge of 24th Army's sector at Kotluban. All shooting ceased during the night and on 8 January 1943, Dyatlenko and Smyslov, accompanied by a Red Army trumpeter armed with a three-note trumpet and a white flag, approached the German lines. On their first approach they were driven back by German fire.[8] On a second approach they had no better luck; the fire was not aimed directly at them, but, as on the previous day, was meant to drive them back.[9]
Second attempt

According to one account, the Stavka was keen to call off any further attempts to initiate a truce[10] but on the evening of 89 January Russian planes overflew the Kessel, dropping leaflets signed by Voronov and Rokossovsky addressed to "Deutsche

Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften" and printed with an ultimatum to Paulus; they also dropped bombs.[11] German soldiers later admitted that they had picked up these leaflets and read them, so the ultimatum was known about in the defending German army.[11] Dyatlenko and Smyslov were driven to the HQ of the 96th Rifle Division near Marinovka, then a staff car drove them to the front line, from where they proceeded on foot. On their second attempt, the envoys forgot their white flag, so a new one had to be made from a sheet belonging to the divisional commander; this was nailed to a branch from an acacia.[11] They were again accompanied by a trumpeter, this time a warrant officer named Siderov, whose call "Attention! Attention", although sounding to Dyatlenko more like 'The Last Post'",[11] had the effect of attracting the attention of a German warrant officer. He asked their business.
"We are truce envoys from the commander of the Red Army," Dyatlenko shouted back in German. "We are on our way to your commander-in-chief with a message. We ask you to receive us according to international law." [6]

Blindfolded with the shirt from Siderov's snowsuit (as well as forgetting their white flag, the envoys had forgotten to bring the blindfolds they had carried on their attempt the day before) the three Soviets were led behind German lines, at one point slipping on the ice and creating "an unplanned diversion".[12] The German soldiers who came to their aid themselves slipped and fell over, reminding Dyatlenko of the Ukrainian children's game "A little heap is too little: someone is needed on top".[12] Once they had reached the German trenches and had their blindfolds removed, Dyatlenklo realised to his embarrassment that he was carrying his pistol, against international convention.[12] A senior German officer came in, then left to confer with his superiors; he soon returned and told the Soviet envoys to return, without their oilskin packet having had even a cursory inspection.
"I am ordered," the colonel announced to the Russians, "not to take you anywhere, not to accompany you, nor to receive anything from you, only to cover your eyes again, to lead you back, to return your pistols and to guarantee your safety." [13]

Erickson wrote of the incident: "Paulus refused to meet the emissaries, who were informed that the Sixth Army's commander already knew the contents of the message from Soviet radio transmission."[10]

Paulus (left), and his aides Col. Wilhelm Adam (middle) and Lt.-Gen. Arthur Schmidt (right), after their surrender in Stalingrad

Interrogations of captured German officers

After the capitulation of Axis forces at Stalingrad in JanuaryFebruary 1943, Dyatlenko interrogated many senior captured German military officers, including a battalion commander of the German 295th Infantry Division,[14] General Edler von Daniels[15] and Colonel Wilhelm Adam. Adam told him that it was in fact General Schmidt, rather than Paulus, who had ordered the truce envoys away without reading their message (Dyatlenko did not reveal to Adam that he himself had been one of the envoys).[16] He acted as translator at the interview by General Rokossovsky and Marshal Voronov of Field Marshal Paulus, the commander of the encircled Sixth Army, at Don Front HQ in Zavarykin. As Voronov said to Dyatlenko just before the interrogation, referring to the failed envoy mission:
So, Captain [...] You no doubt remember the time the old man didn't want to receive you. Well, now he's visiting us himself. And you're going to receive him. [4]

Following the Paulus interrogation, Dyatlenko was assigned to interrogate a number of other captured German generals, such as the commander of XIV Panzerkorps, General Helmuth Schlmer, and General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach.[17]

Bibliography

Zh V. . (2002). : , , , Book 2. (contains Dyatlenko's account of the delivery of the ultimatum). Olma Media Group. ISBN 5-224-03184-2.

Footnotes

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

^ Voron'ko (1985), p. 150 ^ , vokrugsveta.ru, accessed 13 March 2010 ^ Beevor (1999), p. 180 ^ a b Beevor (1999), p 388 ^ Erickson (1983), p. 847 ^ a b Beevor (1999), p. 326 ^ (Soviet Military Review), 1986, books.google.com, accessed 11 March 2010 ^ a b c Beevor (1999), p. 323 ^ Beevor (1999), pp. 3234 ^ a b Erickson (1983), p. 35 ^ a b c d Beevor (1999), p. 324 ^ a b c Beevor (1999), p. 327 ^ Beevor (1999), p. 329 ^ Beevor (1999), p. 360 ^ Beevor (1999), pp. 378 ^ Beevor (1999), pp. 3789 ^ Beevor (1999), p. 396

Sources

Beevor, Antony (1999). Stalingrad. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-024985-0. Erickson, John (1983). The Road to Berlin. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 0297-77238-4. Voron'ko, Platon (1985). 22 --9 . .

Sasha Filippov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (February 2011) Sasha Filippov (Russian: ; June 26, 1925 December 23, 1942) was a spy for the Red Army during the Battle of Stalingrad.

Contents

1 Early life 2 Espionage activities 3 Death 4 Posthumous honors 5 Portrayals in fiction 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links

Early life
Sasha Filippov was born in 1925 in Stalingrad (modern-day Volgograd), Russian SFSR, Soviet Union. At the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, Filippov lived in the Stalingrad suburb of Dar Gora with his father, mother, and a younger brother who was born in 1932. Physically, Sasha was frail and short statured.

Espionage activities
When the initial Wehrmacht assault on Stalingrad resulted in battalions of the German 6th Army quickly overrunning suburbs of the city, many Russian families were caught unaware and found themselves unable to flee in time. One such family was the Filippovs. While his family stayed indoors, Filippov went out and began speaking with the German soldiers. He found out where the headquarters for the German staff was located and proceeded to offer his services as a cobbler to the officers of the invading forces. He was informed that his services would be useful and soon he was a regular sight behind the German lines, repairing and polishing shoes and boots for the officers and soldiers. Unbeknownst to the Germans, however, he had also gone to Red Army headquarters to offer his services as a spy. Designated by the Red Army as the information source code named 'schoolboy', Filippov would remove documents from the desks of German officers, report German conversations and enemy troop movements, and describe what German military activity he could see to Russian officers, all while mending footwear for the German Army. From this information, more precise attacks could be made on troop concentrations and the Wehrmacht headquarters located in the Dar Gora area was even shelled one night by Russian artillery, thanks to Filippov providing the exact firing coordinates. Filippov's parents never knew the details of his work as a double agent at the time. They knew only that their son was working for the Red Army in some fashion, though not exactly how.

Death
On the evening of December 23, 1942, Filippov's parents were told by their neighbors that their son had been arrested by the Germans; Mr. and Mrs. Filippov had apparently been anticipating this event for several weeks. The Germans had discovered his spying activities and had sentenced him to death for espionage. His mother rushed out of their house to see her son being led barefoot by a German platoon through the falling snow, accompanied by two other young persons, one of them a girl. Sasha's mother passed him some food, apparently with the thought that her son was being led off into captivity. This was not to be the case. The procession was marched to a grove of peashrub trees on Bryanskaya street, where Sasha and the two others were hanged in view of neighbors and his parents. Mr. Filippov was unable to witness the actual execution of his son and left before this order was given, while

Sasha's mom remained alone with the body of her son after the soldiers had marched off. Early in 1980s the researchers have revealed the name of the woman hanged together with Sasha: it was 22-year-old Maria "Masha" Uskova, a single mother from the nearby urban-type settlement Katrichevo. The other hanged man's name still remains unknown.

Posthumous honors

Order of the Red Banner Sasha was awarded the Order of the Red Banner posthumously in 1944. In Volgograd, the former Bryanskaya Street where he lived now bears his name, as does the public school (No. 14) on that street. There is also a park named after him, where his grave and a memorial are situated.

Portrayals in fiction
Filippov is portrayed by Gabriel Thomson in the film Enemy at the Gates, in which his role and death are dramatized, with some historical inaccuracies

References

Craig, William. Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. Penguin Books; 1973; pp97, 170-171, 285-286.

Further reading

Chuikov, V.I. Heroism Without Precedent. Moscow: 1965. Chuyanov, A.S. Stalingrad is Reviving. Moscow: 1944. Druzhinin, D.V. Two Hundred Fiery Days. Moscow: 1968. Filiminov, B.V. The Immortals. Volgograd: 1965. Grossman, V.I. Stalingrad Hits Back. Moscow: 1942. Menshikov, M.P. The Stalingrad Battle. Stalingrad: 1953.

Semin, I.A. Stalingrad Tales. Moscow: 1961. Wieder, Joachim. Stalingrad: How It Really Was. Munich: 1962. Zamyatin, N.M., et al. The Fight for Stalingrad. Moscow: 1943.

Peter Gitelman
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Peter Gitelman (born May 29, 1917, in Glusk, Belarus; died March 10, 2007, in Montreal) was a Red Army Master Sergeant who took part in the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II.[1] He was one of five children in a roving photographer's family. He went to Ukraine to learn a trade and before the war worked in Kiev as an electrical engineer. When he tried to enlist in the Russian air force, he was rejected because he had impaired vision in his left eye. After the Germans attacked Russia in 1941, Gitelman enlisted in the Red Army When Stalingrad was attacked, Gitelman was sent to work as a technician in Soviet military field hospital #833. It was in Stalingrad that he met his wife, Elena Gritsenko, a nurse working in the same field hospital. They married in 1945 and they took part in the Prague Offensive, the last major battle of the war. He was decorated for bravery following the Russian offensive against the Germans that claimed more than one million lives during the winter campaign of 1942-1943. He was awarded the Soviet World War II Order, First Grade, and given medals for taking part in the liberation of Prague, the defence of Stalingrad and the Soviet Victory medal for distinguished military service. He was an X-ray technician. After the war, he returned to Kiev and did hospital work until he was well into his 70s. In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he emigrated to Canada as a refugee. He became a Canadian citizen, but the Canadian government did not recognize his military service record, and did not consider him a war veteran. "Canada, he thought, had forgotten that Russians and Canadian soldiers were allies during the war, fighting the same enemy." "Red Army veterans living in Canada created their own association, but it is little more than a kitchen club. Although he was invited several times to the Russian Embassy to take part in anniversary celebrations, he was ignored by the Canadian department of Veterans affairs." He died of complications following hip surgery, at the age of 90, on March 10, 2007 at St. Mary's Hospital, in Montreal.

References
1. ^ "Red Army sergeant never talked about horrors of war". The Gazette. March 30, 2008. Retrieved 2009-12-24.

Vasily Grossman
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Vasily Grossman

Vasily Grossman with the Red Army in Schwerin, Germany, 1945. December 12, 1905 Born Berdichev, Russian Empire September 14, 1964 (aged 58) Died Moscow, Soviet Union writer, journalist Occupation Soviet Union Nationality 19341964 Period Soviet history Subjects World War II Life and Fate Notable work(s) Vasily Semyonovich Grossman (Russian: , Ukrainian: ; December 12, 1905 - September 14, 1964) was a Soviet writer and journalist. Grossman trained as an engineer and worked in the Donets Basin, but changed career in the 1930s and published short stories and several novels. At the outbreak of the Second World War, he became a war correspondent for the Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, writing firsthand accounts of the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin. Grossman's eyewitness accounts of conditions in a Nazi extermination camp, following the liberation of Treblinka, were among the earliest. Grossman also translated Armenian literature into Russian, despite the fact that (as he writes in 'Dobro Vam!', - the account of a sojourn in Armenia in the early 1960s, during which he worked at the translation of a book by a local writer called Martirosjan) he

lacked the ability to read Armenian, and worked on an interlinear translation made for him by a third person. After World War II, Grossman's faith in the Soviet state was shaken by Joseph Stalin's turn towards antisemitism in the final years before his death in 1953. While Grossman was never arrested by the Soviet authorities, his two major literary works (Life and Fate and Everything Flows) were censored during the ensuing Nikita Khrushchev period as unacceptably anti-Soviet, and Grossman himself became in effect a nonperson. The KGB raided Grossman's flat after he had completed Life and Fate, seizing manuscripts, notes and even the ribbon from the typewriter on which the text had been written. Grossman was told by the Communist Party's chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov that the book could not be published for two or three hundred years. At the time of Grossman's death from stomach cancer in 1964, these books were unreleased. Copies were eventually smuggled out of the Soviet Union by a network of dissidents, including Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Voinovich, and first published in the West, before appearing in the Soviet Union in 1988.

Contents

1 Early life and career 2 War reporter 3 Conflict with the Soviet regime 4 Legacy 5 Notes 6 See also 7 Publications 8 References 9 External links

Early life and career

Born Iosif Solomonovich Grossman in Berdychiv, Russian Empire (today in Ukraine) into an emancipated Jewish family, he did not receive a traditional Jewish education. A Russian nanny turned his name Yossya into Russian Vasya (a diminutive of Vasily), which was accepted by the whole family. His father had social-democratic convictions and joined the Mensheviks. Young Vasily Grossman idealistically supported the Russian Revolution of 1917. Grossman began writing short stories while studying at Moscow State University and later continued his literary activity working as an engineer in the Donbass. One of his first short stories, In the town of Berdichev ( ), drew favourable attention and encouragement from Maxim Gorky and Mikhail Bulgakov. The film Commissar (director Aleksandr Askoldov), made in 1967, suppressed by the KGB and released only in October 1990, is based on this four-page story. In the mid-1930s Grossman left his job as an engineer and committed himself fully to writing. By 1936 he had published two collections of stories and the novel Glyukauf, and in 1937 was accepted into the privileged Union of Writers. His novel Stepan

Kol'chugin (published 1937-40) was nominated for a Stalin prize but deleted from the list by Stalin himself for alleged Menshevik sympathies.[1] During the Great Purge some of his friends and close relatives were arrested, including his common-law wife. For months he petitioned the authorities to release her, which happened in 1938.

War reporter
When Nazi-Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Grossman's mother was trapped in Berdychiv by the invading German Army, and eventually murdered together with 20,000 to 30,000 other Jews who had not evacuated. Grossman was exempt from military service, but volunteered for the front, where he spent more than 1,000 days. He became a war correspondent for the popular Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). As the war raged on, he covered its major events, including the Battle of Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Berlin. In addition to war journalism, his novels (such as The People are Immortal ( )) were being published in newspapers and he came to be regarded as a legendary war hero. The novel Stalingrad (1950), later renamed For a Just Cause ( ), is based on his own experiences during the siege. Grossman described Nazi ethnic cleansing in German occupied Ukraine and Poland, and the liberation by the Red Army of the Nazi-German Treblinka and Majdanek extermination camps. He collected some of the first eyewitness accounts as early as 1943 of what later became known as the Holocaust. His article The Hell of Treblinka[2] (1944) was disseminated at the Nuremberg Trials as evidence for the prosecution.

Conflict with the Soviet regime

Grossman participated in the assembly of the Black Book, a project of the Jewish AntiFascist Committee to document the crimes of the Holocaust. The post-war suppression of the Black Book by the Soviet state shook him to the core, and he began to question his own loyal support of the Soviet regime. First the censors ordered changes in the text to conceal the specifically anti-Jewish character of the atrocities and to downplay the role of Ukrainians who worked with the Nazis as police. Then, in 1948, the Soviet edition of the book was scrapped completely. The poet Semyon Lipkin, Grossman's friend, believed it was Joseph Stalin's post-war antisemitic campaign that cracked Grossman's belief in the Soviet system: In 1946... I met some close friends, an Ingush and a Balkar, whose families had been deported to Kazakhstan during the war. I told Grossman and he said: "Maybe it was necessary for military reasons." I said: "...Would you say that if they did it to the Jews?" He said that could never happen. Some years later, a virulent article against cosmopolitanism appeared in Pravda. Grossman sent me a note saying I had been right after all. For years Grossman didn't feel very Jewish. The campaign against cosmopolitanism reawoke his Jewishness. Grossman also criticized collectivization and political repression of peasants that led to the Holodomor tragedy. He wrote that "The decree about grain procurement required

that the peasants of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban be put to death by starvation, put to death along with their little children."[3] Because of state persecution, only a few of Grossman's post-war works were published during his lifetime. After he submitted for publication his magnum opus, the novel Life and Fate ( , 1959), the KGB raided his flat. The manuscripts, carbon copies, notebooks, as well as the typists' copies and even the typewriter ribbons were seized. The Politburo ideology chief Mikhail Suslov told Grossman that his book could not be published for two or three hundred years:[4] I have not read your novel but I have carefully read the reviews of your manuscript, responses to it, which contain many excerpts from your novel. Look how many quotes from them I have written down.... Why should we add your book to the atomic bombs that our enemies are preparing to launch against us?... Why should we publish your book and begin a public discussion as to whether anyone needs the Soviet Union or not?[5] Grossman wrote to Nikita Khrushchev: "What is the point of me being physically free when the book I dedicated my life to is arrested... I am not renouncing it... I am requesting freedom for my book." However, Life and Fate and his last major novel, Everything Flows ( , 1961) were considered a threat to the Soviet power; these novels were suppressed and the dissident writer effectively transformed into a nonperson. Grossman died of stomach cancer in 1964, not knowing whether his major novels would ever be read by the public.

Legacy

Memorial plaque in Donetsk where Grossman lived and worked in the 1930s. Life and Fate was published in 1980 in Switzerland, thanks to fellow dissidents: physicist Andrei Sakharov secretly photographed draft pages preserved by Semyon Lipkin, and the writer Vladimir Voinovich managed to smuggle the photographic films abroad. Two dissident researchers, professors and writers, Efim Etkind and Shimon Markish retyped the text from the microfilm, with some mistakes and misreadings due to the bad quality. The book was finally published in the Soviet Union in 1988 after the policy of glasnost was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The text was published again in 1989, because further original manuscripts emerged after the first publication. Everything Flows was also published in the Soviet Union in 1989.

Life and Fate is considered to be in part an autobiographical work. Robert Chandler, the novel's English translator, has written in his introduction to the Harvill edition that its leading character, Viktor Shtrum, "is a portrait of the author himself," reflecting in particular his anguish at the murder of his mother at the Berdichev Ghetto. Chapter 18, a letter from Shtrum's mother, Anna, has been dramatized for the stage and film The Last Letter (2002), directed by Frederick Wiseman, and starring Catherine Samie. Chandler additionally suggests that aspects of the character and experience of Shtrum are based on the physicist Lev Landau. The late novel Everything Flows, in turn, is especially noted for its quiet, unforced, and yet horrifying condemnation of the Soviet totalitarian state: a work in which Grossman, liberated from worries about censors, spoke honestly about Soviet history. Some critics have compared Grossman's novels to the work of Leo Tolstoy.[6][7]

Notes
1. ^ Chandler, Robert. Introduction to Life and Fate, pages viii-ix. New York, NYRB Classics. 1985. 2. ^ (Russian) (Tryeblinski ad) 3. ^ Robert Conquest (1986) The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505180-7. 4. ^ Chandler, Robert. Life and Fate: Introduction. New York, New York Review of Books Classics, 1985. 5. ^ Under Siege, by Keith Gessen. Published in the New Yorker on March 6, 2006; accessed July 11, 2007. 6. ^ Tolstoy Studies Journal: Ellis, Frank. "Concepts of War in L.N. Tolstoy and V.S. Grossman." Volume II, 1989, pp. 101-108. 7. ^ Biography of Grossman (PDF) by Gregory Freidin, Stanford University

See also

History of the Soviet Union History of the Jews in Russia and Soviet Union Ilya Ehrenburg Varlam Shalamov Solomon Mikhoels Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Doctors' plot Stalin and antisemitism Gulag Samizdat Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Vasily Grossman

Publications

Life and Fate (ISBN 0-00-261454-5 - first English translation edition, other editions ISBN 0-09-950616-5; ISBN 1-59017-201-9; ISBN 1-86046-019-4) Forever Flowing (European Classics - ISBN 0-8101-1503-4) The Black Book: The Ruthless Murder of Jews by German-Fascist Invaders Throughout the Temporarily-Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union and in the Death Camps of Poland during the War 19411945. by Vasily Grossman and Ilya Ehrenburg (ISBN 0-89604-031-3) Everything Flows, Trans Robert & Elizabeth Chandler (2010), Harvill Secker and New York Review Books (ISBN 978-1-59017-328-2). The Road, Stories, Journalism, and Essays, translated from the Russian by Robert and Elizabeth Chandler with Olga Mukovnikova, commentary and notes by Robert Chandler with Yury Bit-Yunan, afterword by Fyodor Guber, New York, New York Review Books, 2010, ISBN 1-59017-361-9 For a Just Cause (1956) originally titled Stalingrad. No English translation. "In The War" and Other Stories. Trans Andrew Glikin-Gusinsky. Sovlit.com (Russian) Grossman's publications at lib.ru

References

The Bones of Berdichev: The Life and Fate of Vasily Grossman by John Gordon Garrard, Carol Garrard (ISBN 0-684-82295-4) Vasiliy Grossman: The Genesis and Evolution of a Russian Heretic by Frank Ellis (ISBN 0-85496-830-X) A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army, 1941-1945 by Antony Beevor and Luba Vinogradova (Pantheon, 2006 - ISBN 0-375-42407-5 ) - Based on Grossman's notebooks, war diaries, personal correspondence and articles.

External links

Study Center Vasily Grossman: http://www.grossmanweb.eu/en/home.asp "Out of the Ruins of Stalingrad" March 2006 (Russian) 100th anniversary of Vasily Grossman's birthday Interview with Yekaterina Korotkova (Grossman) "Under Siege", from The New Yorker, March 6, 2006. (Russian) "The one who said the forbidden words. To centennial anniversary of Vasily Grossman", an article in Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), Kiev, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian. Chandler, Robert. "Vasily Grossman" (HTML) (PDF), Prospect, Issue 126, September 2006 Eli Shaltiel: Eyewitness to hell (Ha'aretz, 30 October 2006) Introduction from Life and Fate (Russian) , (St. Vasily Who Did Not Believe in God) by Antonina Krishchenko. 20 September 2002

Nikita Khrushchev
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"Khrushchev" redirects here. For other people with this surname, see Khrushchev (surname).

Nikita Khrushchev

First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union In office September 14, 1953 October 14, 1964 Kliment Voroshilov Leonid Brezhnev President Anastas Mikoyan

Premier

Georgy Malenkov Nikolai Bulganin Himself

Joseph Stalin Preceded by Succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union In office March 27, 1958 October 14, 1964 Frol Kozlov Alexei Kosygin Dmitriy Ustinov First Deputies Lazar Kaganovich Anastas Mikoyan Nikolai Bulganin Preceded by Succeeded by Alexei Kosygin Chairman of the Bureau of the Central

Committee of the Russian SFSR In office February 27, 1956 November 16, 1964 Andrei Kirilenko Deputy Position created Preceded by Succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev Full member of the Presidium In office March 22, 1939 November 16, 1964 Member of the Secretariat In office December 16, 1949 October 14, 1964 Member of the Orgburo In office December 16, 1949 October 14, 1952 Candidate member of the Politburo In office January 18, 1938 March 22, 1939 Personal details April 15, 1894 Kalinovka, Dmitriyevsky Uyezd, Born Kursk Governorate, Russian Empire September 11, 1971 (aged 77) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Died Union Soviet Nationality Communist Party of the Soviet Political party Union Yefrosinia Khrushcheva (19161919, died) Marusia Khrushcheva (1922, separated) Spouse(s) Nina Kukharchuk (Khrushcheva) (19231971, survived as widow)

Signature Military service Soviet Union Allegiance Service/branch Red Army Years of 19411945 service

Rank Commands Battles/wars

Lieutenant General Soviet Armed Forces World War II

Awards

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev[a] (April 15 [O.S. April 3] 1894 September 11, 1971) led the Soviet Union during part of the Cold War. He served as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964, and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or Premier, from 1958 to 1964. Khrushchev was responsible for the partial de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union, for backing the progress of the early Soviet space program, and for several relatively liberal reforms in areas of domestic policy. Khrushchev's party colleagues removed him from power in 1964, replacing him with Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Premier. Khrushchev was born in the Russian village of Kalinovka in 1894, close to the presentday border between Russia and Ukraine. He was employed as a metalworker in his youth, and during the Russian Civil War was a political commissar. With the help of Lazar Kaganovich, he worked his way up the Soviet hierarchy. He supported Joseph Stalin's purges, and approved thousands of arrests. In 1939, Stalin sent him to govern Ukraine, and he continued the purges there. During what was known in the Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic War (Eastern Front of World War II), Khrushchev was again a commissar, serving as an intermediary between Stalin and his generals. Khrushchev was present at the bloody defense of Stalingrad, a fact he took great pride in throughout his life. After the war, he returned to Ukraine before being recalled to Moscow as one of Stalin's close advisers. In the power struggle triggered by Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev, after several years, emerged victorious. On February 25, 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, he delivered the "Secret Speech," denouncing Stalin's purges and ushering in a less repressive era in the Soviet Union. His domestic policies, aimed at bettering the lives of ordinary citizens, were often ineffective, especially in the area of agriculture. Hoping eventually to rely on missiles for national defense, Khrushchev ordered major cuts in conventional forces. Despite the cuts, Khrushchev's rule saw the tensest years of the Cold War, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Some of Khrushchev's policies were seen as erratic, particularly by his emerging rivals, who quietly rose in strength and deposed him in October 1964. He did not suffer the deadly fate of some previous losers of Soviet power struggles, but was pensioned off with an apartment in Moscow and a dacha in the countryside. His lengthy memoirs were smuggled to the West and published in part in 1970. Khrushchev died in 1971 of heart disease.

Contents

1 Early years 2 Party official o 2.1 Donbas years o 2.2 Kaganovich protg o 2.3 Involvement in purges 3 World War II o 3.1 Occupation of Polish territory o 3.2 War against Germany 4 Rise to power o 4.1 Return to Ukraine o 4.2 Stalin's final years o 4.3 Struggle for control 5 Leader (19551964) o 5.1 Domestic policies 5.1.1 Consolidation of power; Secret Speech 5.1.2 Liberalization and the arts 5.1.3 Political reform 5.1.4 Agricultural policy 5.1.5 Education o 5.2 Foreign and defense policies 5.2.1 United States and allies 5.2.1.1 Early relations and U.S. visit (19571960) 5.2.1.2 U-2 and Berlin crisis (19601961) 5.2.1.3 Establishing relations with Cuba 5.2.1.4 Cuban crisis and test ban treaty (19621964) 5.2.2 Eastern Europe 5.2.3 China 6 Removal 7 Life in retirement 8 Legacy 9 See also 10 Notes 11 References 12 External links

Early years
Khrushchev was born April 15, 1894,[b][1] in Kalinovka,[2] a village in what is now Russia's Kursk Oblast, near the present Ukrainian border.[3] His parents, Sergei Khrushchev and Ksenia Khrushcheva, were poor peasants of Russian origin[3] and had a daughter two years Nikita's junior, Irina.[1] Sergei Khrushchev was employed in a number of positions in the Donbas area of far eastern Ukraine, working as a railwayman, as a miner, and laboring in a brick factory. Wages were much higher in the Donbas than in the Kursk region, and Sergei Khrushchev generally left his family in Kalinovka, returning there when he had enough money.[4] Kalinovka was a peasant village; Khrushchev's teacher, Lydia Shevchenko later stated that she had never seen a village as poor as Kalinovka had been.[5] Nikita worked as a

herdsboy from an early age. He was schooled for a total of four years, part in the village parochial school and part under Shevchenko's tutelage in Kalinovka's state school. According to Khrushchev in his memoirs, Shevchenko was a freethinker who upset the villagers by not attending church, and when her brother visited, he gave the boy books which had been banned by the Imperial Government.[6] She urged Nikita to seek further education, but family finances did not permit this.[6] In 1908, Sergei Khrushchev moved to the Donbas city of Yuzovka; fourteen-year-old Nikita followed later that year, while Ksenia Khrushcheva and her daughter came after.[7] Yuzovka, which was renamed Stalino in 1924 and Donetsk in 1961, was at the heart of one of the most industrialized areas of the Russian Empire.[7] After the boy worked briefly in other fields, Khrushchev's parents found him a place as a metal fitter's apprentice. Upon completing that apprenticeship, the teenage Khrushchev was hired by a factory.[8] He lost that job when he collected money for the families of the victims of the Lena Goldfields Massacre, and was hired to mend underground equipment by a mine in nearby Rutchenkovo,[9] where he helped distribute copies and organize public readings of Pravda.[10] He later stated that he considered emigrating to the United States for better wages, but did not do so.[11] When World War I broke out in 1914, Khrushchev, as a skilled metal worker, was exempt from conscription. Employed by a workshop which serviced ten mines, Khrushchev was involved in several strikes demanding higher pay, better working conditions, and an end to the war.[12] In 1914, he married Yefrosinia Pisareva, daughter of the elevator operator at the Rutchenkovo mine. In 1915, they had a daughter, Yulia, and in 1917, a son, Leonid.[13] After the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917, the new Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd had little influence over Ukraine. Khrushchev was elected to the worker's council (or soviet) in Rutchenkovo, and in May he became its chairman.[14] He did not join the Bolsheviks until 1918, a year in which the Russian Civil War, between the Bolsheviks and a coalition of opponents known as the White Army, began in earnest. His biographer, William Taubman, suggests that Khrushchev's delay in affiliating himself with the Bolsheviks was because he felt closer to the Mensheviks who prioritized economic progress, whereas the Bolsheviks sought political power.[15] In his memoirs, Khrushchev indicated that he waited because there were many groups, and it was difficult to keep them all straight.[15] In March 1918, as the Bolshevik government concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers, the Germans occupied the Donbas and Khrushchev fled to Kalinovka. In late 1918 or early 1919 he was mobilized into the Red Army as a political commissar.[16] The post of political commissar had recently been introduced as the Bolsheviks came to rely less on worker activists and more on military recruits; its functions included indoctrination of recruits in the tenets of Bolshevism, and promoting troop morale and battle readiness.[17] Beginning as commissar to a construction platoon, Khrushchev rose to become commissar to a construction battalion and was sent from the front for a two-month political course. The young commissar came under fire many times,[18] though many of the war stories he would tell in later life dealt more with his (and his troops') cultural awkwardness, rather than with combat.[17] In 1921, the civil war ended, and Khrushchev was demobilized and assigned as commissar to a labor brigade in the Donbas, where he and his men lived in poor conditions.[17]

The wars had caused widespread devastation and famine, and one of the victims of the hunger and disease was Khrushchev's wife, Yefrosinia, who died of typhus in Kalinovka while Khrushchev was in the army. The commissar returned for the funeral and, loyal to his Bolshevik principles, refused to allow his wife's coffin to enter the local church. With the only way into the churchyard through the church, he had the coffin lifted and passed over the fence into the burial ground, shocking the village.[17]

Party official
Donbas years
Through the intervention of a friend, Khrushchev was assigned in 1921 as assistant director for political affairs for the Rutchenkovo mine in the Donbas region, where he had previously worked.[19] There were as yet few Bolsheviks in the area. At that time, the movement was split by Lenin's New Economic Policy, which allowed for some measure of private enterprise and was seen as an ideological retreat by some Bolsheviks.[19] While Khrushchev's responsibility lay in political affairs, he involved himself in the practicalities of resuming full production at the mine after the chaos of the war years. He helped restart the machines (key parts and papers had been removed by the pre-Soviet mineowners) and he wore his old mine outfit for inspection tours.[20] Khrushchev was highly successful at the Rutchenkovo mine, and in mid-1922 he was offered the directorship of the nearby Pastukhov mine. However, he refused the offer, seeking to be assigned to the newly established technical college (tekhnikum) in Yuzovka, though his superiors were reluctant to let him go. As he had only four years of formal schooling, he applied to the training program (rabfak) attached to the tekhnikum that was designed to bring undereducated students to high-school level, a prerequisite for entry into the tekhnikum.[21] While enrolled in the rabfak, Khrushchev continued his work at the Rutchenkovo mine.[22] One of his teachers later described him as a poor student.[21] He was more successful in advancing in the Communist Party; soon after his admission to the rabfak in August 1922, he was appointed party secretary of the entire tekhnikum, and became a member of the bureau the governing council of the party committee for the town of Yuzovka (renamed Stalino in 1924). He briefly joined supporters of Leon Trotsky against those of Joseph Stalin over the question of party democracy.[23] All of these activities left him with little time for his schoolwork, and while he later claimed to have finished his rabfak studies, it is unclear whether this was true.[23] In 1922, Khrushchev met and married his second wife, Marusia, whose maiden name is unknown. The two soon separated, though Khrushchev helped Marusia in later years, especially when Marusia's daughter by a previous relationship suffered a fatal illness. Soon after the abortive marriage, Khrushchev met Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk, a welleducated Party organizer and daughter of well-to-do Ukrainian peasants.[24] The two lived together as husband and wife for the rest of Khrushchev's life, though they did not register their marriage until 1965. They had three children together: daughter Rada was born in 1929, son Sergei in 1935 and daughter Elena in 1937. In mid-1925, Khrushchev was appointed Party secretary of the Petrovo-Marinsky raikom, or district, near Stalino. The raikom was about 400 square miles (1,000 km2) in area, and Khrushchev was constantly on the move throughout his domain, taking an

interest in even minor matters.[25] In late 1925, Khrushchev was elected a non-voting delegate to the 14th Congress of the USSR Communist Party in Moscow.[26]

Kaganovich protg
Khrushchev met Lazar Kaganovich as early as 1917. In 1925, Kaganovich became Party head in Ukraine[27] and Khrushchev, falling under his patronage,[28] was rapidly promoted. He was appointed second in command of the Stalino party apparatus in late 1926. Within nine months his superior, Konstantin Moiseyenko, was ousted, which, according to Taubman, was due to Khrushchev's instigation.[27] Kaganovich transferred Khrushchev to Kharkov, then the capital of Ukraine, as head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Party's Central Committee.[29] In 1928, Khrushchev was transferred to Kiev, where he served as second-in-command of the Party organization there.[30] In 1929, Khrushchev again sought to further his education, following Kaganovich (now in the Kremlin as a close associate of Stalin) to Moscow and enrolling in the Stalin Industrial Academy. Khrushchev never completed his studies there, but his career in the Party flourished.[31] When the school's Party cell elected a number of rightists to an upcoming district Party conference, the cell was attacked in Pravda.[32] Khrushchev emerged victorious in the ensuing power struggle, becoming Party secretary of the school, arranging for the delegates to be withdrawn, and afterward purging the cell of the rightists.[32] Khrushchev rose rapidly through the Party ranks, first becoming Party leader for the Bauman district, site of the Academy, before taking the same position in the Krasnopresnensky district, the capital's largest and most important. By 1932, Khrushchev had become second in command, behind Kaganovich, of the Moscow city Party organization, and in 1934, he became Party leader for the city[31] and a member of the Party's Central Committee.[33] Khrushchev attributed his rapid rise to his acquaintance with fellow Academy student Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Stalin's wife. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that Alliluyeva spoke well of him to her husband. His biographer, William Tompson, downplays the possibility, stating that Khrushchev was too low in the Party hierarchy to enjoy Stalin's patronage, and that if influence was brought to bear on Khrushchev's career at this stage, it was by Kaganovich.[34] While head of the Moscow city organization, Khrushchev superintended construction of the Moscow Metro, a highly expensive undertaking, with Kaganovich in overall charge. Faced with an already-announced opening date of November 7, 1934, Khrushchev took considerable risks in the construction and spent much of his time down in the tunnels. When the inevitable accidents did occur, they were depicted as heroic sacrifices in a great cause. The Metro did not open until May 1, 1935, but Khrushchev received the Order of Lenin for his role in its construction.[35] Later that year, he was selected as Party leader for Moscow oblast, a province with a population of 11 million.[31]

Involvement in purges
Stalin's office records show meetings at which Khrushchev was present as early as 1932. The two increasingly built a good relationship. Khrushchev greatly admired the dictator and treasured informal meetings with him and invitations to Stalin's dacha, while Stalin felt warm affection for his young subordinate.[36]

Beginning in 1934, Stalin began a campaign of political repression known as the Great Purge, during which millions of people were executed or sent to the Gulag. Central to this campaign were Moscow Trials, a series of show trials of the purged top leaders of the party and the military. In 1936, as the trials proceeded, Khrushchev expressed his vehement support: Everyone who rejoices in the successes achieved in our country, the victories of our party led by the great Stalin, will find only one word suitable for the mercenary, fascist dogs of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang. That word is execution.[37] Khrushchev assisted in the purge of many friends and colleagues in Moscow oblast.[38] Of 38 top Party officials in Moscow city and province, 35 were killed[38] the three survivors were transferred to other parts of the USSR.[39] Of the 146 Party secretaries of cities and districts outside Moscow city in the province, only 10 survived the purges.[38] In his memoirs, Khrushchev noted that almost everyone who worked with him was arrested.[40] By Party protocol, Khrushchev was required to approve these arrests, and did little or nothing to save his friends and colleagues.[41] Party leaders were given numerical quotas of "enemies" to be turned in and arrested.[41] In June 1937, the Politburo set a quota of 35,000 enemies to be arrested in Moscow province; 5,000 of these were to be executed. In reply, Khrushchev asked that 2,000 wealthy peasants, or kulaks living in Moscow be killed in part fulfillment of the quota. In any event, only two weeks after receiving the Politburo order, Khrushchev was able to report to Stalin that 41,305 "criminal and kulak elements" had been arrested. Of the arrestees, according to Khrushchev, 8,500 deserved execution.[41] Khrushchev had no reason to think himself immune from the purges, and in 1937, confessed his own 1923 dalliance with Trotskyism to Kaganovich, who, according to Khrushchev, "blanched" (for his protg's sins could affect his own standing) and advised him to tell Stalin. The dictator took the confession in his stride, and, after initially advising Khrushchev to keep it quiet, suggested that Khrushchev tell his tale to the Moscow party conference. Khrushchev did so, to applause, and was immediately reelected to his post.[42] Khrushchev related in his memoirs that he was also denounced by an arrested colleague. Stalin told Khrushchev of the accusation personally, looking him in the eye and awaiting his response. Khrushchev speculated in his memoirs that had Stalin doubted his reaction, he would have been categorized as an enemy of the people then and there.[43] Nonetheless, Khrushchev became a candidate member of the Politburo in January 1938 and a full member in March 1939.[44] In late 1937, Stalin appointed Khrushchev as head of the Communist Party in Ukraine, and Khrushchev duly left Moscow for Kiev, again the Ukrainian capital, in January 1938.[45] Ukraine had been the site of extensive purges, with the murdered including professors in Stalino whom Khrushchev greatly respected. The high ranks of the Party were not immune; the Central Committee of Ukraine was so devastated that it could not convene a quorum. After Khrushchev's arrival, the pace of arrests accelerated.[46] All but one member of the Ukrainian Politburo Organizational Bureau, and Secretariat were arrested. Almost all government officials and Red Army commanders were replaced.[47] During the first few months after Khrushchev's arrival, almost everyone arrested received the death penalty.[48]

Biographer William Taubman suggests that, since Khrushchev was again unsuccessfully denounced while in Kiev, he must have known that some of the denunciations were not true and that innocent people were suffering.[47] In 1939, Khrushchev addressed the Fourteenth Ukrainian Party Congress, saying "Comrades, we must unmask and relentlessly destroy all enemies of the people. But we must not allow a single honest Bolshevik to be harmed. We must conduct a struggle against slanderers."[47]

World War II
Occupation of Polish territory
When Soviet troops, pursuant to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, invaded the eastern portion of Poland on September 17, 1939, Khrushchev accompanied the troops at Stalin's direction. A large number of ethnic Ukrainians lived in the invaded area, much of which today forms the western portion of Ukraine. Many inhabitants therefore initially welcomed the invasion, though they hoped that they would eventually become independent. Khrushchev's role was to ensure that the occupied areas voted for union with the USSR. Through a combination of propaganda, deception as to what was being voted for, and outright fraud, the Soviets ensured that their new territories would elect assemblies which would unanimously petition for union with the USSR. When the new assemblies did so, their petitions were granted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Western Ukraine became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) on November 1, 1939.[49] Clumsy actions by the Soviets, such as staffing Western Ukrainian organizations with Eastern Ukrainians, and giving confiscated land to collective farms (kolkhozes) rather than to peasants, soon alienated Western Ukrainians damaging Khrushchev's efforts to achieve unity.[50]

War against Germany

When the Germans invaded the USSR, in June 1941, Khrushchev was still at his post in Kiev.[51] Stalin appointed him a political commissar, and Khrushchev served on a number of fronts as an intermediary between the local military commanders and the political rulers in Moscow. Stalin used Khrushchev to keep commanders on a tight leash, while the commanders sought to have him influence Stalin.[52] As the Germans advanced, Khrushchev worked with the military in an attempt to defend and save the city. Handicapped by orders from Stalin that under no circumstances should the city be abandoned, the Red Army was soon encircled by the Germans. While the Germans stated they took 655,000 prisoners, according to the Soviets, 150,541 men out of 677,085 escaped the trap.[53] Primary sources differ on Khrushchev's involvement at this point. According to Marshal Georgi Zhukov, writing some years after Khrushchev fired and disgraced him in 1957, Khrushchev persuaded Stalin not to evacuate troops from Kiev.[54] However, Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that he and Marshal Semyon Budyonny proposed redeploying Soviet forces to avoid the encirclement until Marshal Semyon Timoshenko arrived from Moscow with orders for the troops to hold their positions.[55] Early Khrushchev biographer Mark Frankland suggested that Khrushchev's faith in his leader was first shaken by the Red Army's setbacks.[28] Khrushchev stated in his memoirs,

But let me return to the enemy breakthrough in the Kiev area, the encirclement of our group, and the destruction of the 37th Army. Later, the Fifth Army also perished ... All of this was senseless, and from the military point of view, a display of ignorance, incompetence, and illiteracy. ... There you have the result of not taking a step backward. We were unable to save these troops because we didn't withdraw them, and as a result we simply lost them. ... And yet it was possible to allow this not to happen.[56] In 1942, Khrushchev was on the Southwest Front, and he and Timoshenko proposed a massive counteroffensive in the Kharkov area. Stalin approved only part of the plan, but 640,000 Red Army soldiers would still become involved in the offensive. The Germans, however, had deduced that the Soviets were likely to attack at Kharkov, and set a trap. Beginning on May 12, 1942, the Soviet offensive initially appeared successful, but within five days the Germans had driven deep into the Soviet flanks, and the Red Army troops were in danger of being cut off. Stalin refused to halt the offensive, and the Red Army divisions were soon encircled by the Germans. The USSR lost about 267,000 soldiers, including more than 200,000 men captured, and Stalin demoted Timoshenko and recalled Khrushchev to Moscow. While Stalin hinted at arresting and executing Khrushchev, he allowed the commissar to return to the front by sending him to Stalingrad.[57]

The aftermath of a bombing raid in Stalingrad Khrushchev reached the Stalingrad Front in August 1942, soon after the start of the battle for the city.[58] His role in the Stalingrad defense was not major General Vasily Chuikov, who led the city's defense, mentions Khrushchev only briefly in a memoir published while Khrushchev was premier but to the end of his life, he was proud of his role.[59] Though he visited Stalin in Moscow on occasion, he remained in Stalingrad for much of the battle, and was nearly killed at least once. He proposed a counterattack, only to find that Zhukov and other generals had already planned Operation Uranus, a plan to break out from Soviet positions and encircle and destroy the Germans; it was being kept secret. Before Uranus was launched, Khrushchev spent much time checking on troop readiness and morale, interrogating Nazi prisoners, and recruiting some for propaganda reasons.[58] Soon after Stalingrad, Khrushchev met with personal tragedy, as his son Leonid, a fighter pilot, was apparently shot down and killed in action on March 11, 1943. The circumstances of Leonid's death remain obscure and controversial,[60] as none of his fellow fliers stated that they witnessed him being shot down, nor was his plane found or body recovered. As a result, Leonid's fate has been the subject of considerable speculation. One theory has Leonid surviving the crash and collaborating with the Germans, and when he was recaptured by the Soviets, Stalin ordering him shot despite Nikita Khrushchev pleading for his life.[60] This supposed killing is used to explain why

Khrushchev later denounced Stalin in the Secret Speech.[60][61] While there is no supporting evidence for this account in Soviet files, some historians allege that Leonid Khrushchev's file was tampered with after the war.[62] In later years, Leonid Khrushchev's wingmate stated that he saw his plane disintegrate, but did not report it. Khrushchev biographer Taubman speculates that this omission was most likely to avoid the possibility of being seen as complicit in the death of the son of a Politburo member.[63] In mid-1943, Leonid's wife, Liuba Khrushcheva, was arrested on accusations of spying and sentenced to five years in a labor camp, and her son (by another relationship), Tolya, was placed in a series of orphanages. Leonid's daughter, Yulia, was raised by Nikita Khrushchev and his wife.[64] After Uranus forced the Germans into retreat, Khrushchev served in other fronts of the war. He was attached to Soviet troops at the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943, which turned back the last major German offensive on Soviet soil.[65] Khrushchev related that he interrogated an SS defector, learning that the Germans intended an attack a claim dismissed by his biographer, Taubman, as "almost certainly exaggerated".[66] He accompanied Soviet troops as they took Kiev in November 1943, entering the shattered city as Soviet forces drove out German troops.[66] As Soviet forces met with greater success, driving the Nazis westwards towards Germany, Nikita Khrushchev became increasingly involved in reconstruction work in Ukraine. He was appointed Premier of the Ukrainian SSR in addition to his earlier party post, one of the rare instances in which the Ukrainian party and civil leader posts were held by one person.[67] According to Khrushchev biographer William Tompson, it is difficult to assess Khrushchev's war record, since he most often acted as part of a military council, and it is not possible to know the extent to which he influenced decisions, rather than signing off on the orders of military officers. However, Tompson points to the fact that the few mentions of Khrushchev in military memoirs published during the Brezhnev era were generally favorable, at a time when it was "barely possible to mention Khrushchev in print in any context".[68] Tompson suggests that these favorable mentions indicate that military officers held Khrushchev in high regard.[68]

Rise to power
Return to Ukraine
Almost all of Ukraine had been occupied by the Germans, and Khrushchev returned to his domain in late 1943 to find devastation. Ukraine's industry had been destroyed, and agriculture faced critical shortages. Even though millions of Ukrainians had been taken to Germany as workers or prisoners of war, there was insufficient housing for those who remained.[69] One of every six Ukrainians was killed in World War II.[70] Khrushchev sought to reconstruct Ukraine, but also desired to complete the interrupted work of imposing the Soviet system on it, though he hoped that the purges of the 1930s would not recur.[71] As Ukraine was recovered, conscription was imposed, and 750,000 men aged between nineteen and fifty were given minimal military training and sent to join the Red Army.[72] Other Ukrainians joined partisan forces, seeking an independent Ukraine.[72] Khrushchev rushed from district to district through Ukraine, urging the depleted labor force to greater efforts. He made a short visit to his birthplace of Kalinovka, finding a starving population, with only a third of the men who had joined

the Red Army having returned. Khrushchev did what he could to assist his hometown.[73] Despite Khrushchev's efforts, in 1945, Ukrainian industry was at only a quarter of pre-war levels, and the harvest actually dropped from that of 1944, when the entire territory of Ukraine had not yet been retaken.[69] In an effort to increase agricultural production, the kolkhozes (collective farms) were empowered to expel residents who were not pulling their weight. Kolkhoz leaders used this as an excuse to expel their personal enemies, invalids, and the elderly, and nearly 12,000 people were sent to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev viewed this policy as very effective, and recommended its adoption elsewhere to Stalin.[69] He also worked to impose collectivization on Western Ukraine. While Khrushchev hoped to accomplish this by 1947, lack of resources and armed resistance by partisans slowed the process.[74] The partisans, many of whom fought as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), were gradually defeated, as Soviet police and military reported killing 110,825 "bandits" and capturing a quarter million more between 1944 and 1946.[75] About 600,000 Western Ukrainians were arrested between 1944 and 1952, with one-third executed and the remainder imprisoned or exiled to the east.[75] The war years of 1944 and 1945 had seen poor harvests, and 1946 saw intense drought strike Ukraine and Western Russia. Despite this, collective and state farms were required to turn over 52% of the harvest to the government.[76] The Soviet government sought to collect as much grain as possible in order to supply communist allies in Eastern Europe.[77] Khrushchev set the quotas at a high level, leading Stalin to expect an unrealistically large quantity of grain from Ukraine.[78] Food was rationed but nonagricultural rural workers throughout the USSR were given no ration cards. The inevitable starvation was largely confined to remote rural regions, and was little noticed outside the USSR.[76] Khrushchev, realizing the desperate situation in late 1946, repeatedly appealed to Stalin for aid, to be met with anger and resistance on the part of the leader. When letters to Stalin had no effect, Khrushchev flew to Moscow and made his case in person. Stalin finally gave Ukraine limited food aid, and money to set up free soup kitchens.[79] However, Khrushchev's political standing had been damaged, and in February 1947, Stalin suggested that Lazar Kaganovich be sent to Ukraine to "help" Khrushchev.[80] The following month, the Ukrainian Central Committee removed Khrushchev as party leader in favor of Kaganovich, while retaining him as premier.[81] Soon after Kaganovich arrived in Kiev, Khrushchev fell ill, and was barely seen until September 1947. In his memoirs, Khrushchev indicates he had pneumonia; some biographers have theorized that Khrushchev's illness was entirely political, out of fear that his loss of position was the first step towards downfall and demise.[82] However, Khrushchev's children remembered their father as having been seriously ill. Once Khrushchev was able to get out of bed, he and his family took their first vacation since before the war, to a beachfront resort in Latvia.[81] Khrushchev, though, soon broke the beach routine with duck-hunting trips, and a visit to newly Soviet Kaliningrad, where he toured factories and quarries.[83] By the end of 1947, Kaganovich had been recalled to Moscow and the recovered Khrushchev had been restored to the First Secretaryship. He then resigned the Ukrainian premiership in favor of Demyan Korotchenko, Khrushchev's protg.[82] Khrushchev's final years in Ukraine were generally peaceful, with industry recovering,[84] Soviet forces overcoming the partisans, and 1947 and 1948 seeing better-

than-expected harvests.[85] Collectivization advanced in Western Ukraine, and Khrushchev implemented more policies that encouraged collectivization and discouraged private farms. These sometimes backfired, however: a tax on private livestock holdings led to peasants slaughtering their stock.[86] With the idea of eliminating differences in attitude between town and countryside and transforming the peasantry into a "rural proletariat", Khrushchev conceived the idea of the "agrotown".[87] Rather than agricultural workers living in villages close to farms, they would live further away in larger towns which would offer municipal services such as utilities and libraries, which were not present in villages. He completed only one such town before his December 1949 return to Moscow; he dedicated it to Stalin as a 70th birthday present.[87] In his memoirs, Khrushchev spoke highly of Ukraine, where he governed for over a decade: I'll say that the Ukrainian people treated me well. I recall warmly the years I spent there. This was a period full of responsibilities, but pleasant because it brought satisfaction ... But far be it from me to inflate my significance. The entire Ukrainian people was exerting great efforts ... I attribute Ukraine's successes to the Ukrainian people as a whole. I won't elaborate further on this theme, but in principle it's very easy to demonstrate. I'm Russian myself, and I don't want to offend the Russians.[88]

Stalin's final years

Khrushchev attributed his recall to Moscow to mental disorder on the part of Stalin, who feared conspiracies in Moscow matching those which the ruler believed to have occurred in the fabricated Leningrad case, in which many of that city's Party officials had been falsely accused of treason.[89] Khrushchev again served as head of the Party in Moscow city and province. Khrushchev biographer Taubman suggests that Stalin most likely recalled Khrushchev to Moscow to balance the influence of Georgy Malenkov and security chief Lavrentiy Beria, who were widely seen as Stalin's heirs.[90] At this time, the aging leader rarely called Politburo meetings. Instead, much of the high-level work of government took place at dinners hosted by Stalin. These sessions, which Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Kliment Voroshilov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Nikolai Bulganin, who comprised Stalin's inner circle, attended, began with showings of cowboy movies favored by Stalin.[91] Stolen from the West, they lacked subtitles.[91] The dictator had the meal served at around 1 a.m., and insisted that his subordinates stay with him and drink until dawn. On one occasion, Stalin had Khrushchev, then aged almost sixty, dance a traditional Ukrainian dance. Khrushchev did so, later stating, "When Stalin says dance, a wise man dances."[91] Khrushchev attempted to nap at lunch so that he would not fall asleep in Stalin's presence; he noted in his memoirs, "Things went badly for those who dozed off at Stalin's table."[92] In 1950, Khrushchev began a large-scale housing program for Moscow. A large part of the housing was in the form of five- or six-story apartment buildings, which became ubiquitous throughout the Soviet Union; many remain in use today.[93] Khrushchev had prefabricated reinforced concrete used, greatly speeding up construction.[94] These structures were completed at triple the construction rate of Moscow housing from 1946 1950, lacked elevators or balconies, and were nicknamed Khrushcheby by the public, a

pun on the Russian word for slums, trushcheby. Almost 60,000,000 residents of the former Soviet republics still live in these buildings.[93] In his new positions, Khrushchev continued his kolkhoz consolidation scheme, decreasing the number of collective farms in Moscow province by about 70%. This resulted in farms that were too large for one chairman to manage effectively.[95] Khrushchev also sought to implement his agro-town proposal, but when his lengthy speech on the subject was published in Pravda in March 1951, Stalin disapproved of it. The periodical quickly published a note stating that Khrushchev's speech was merely a proposal, not policy. In April, the Politburo disavowed the agro-town proposal. Khrushchev feared that Stalin would remove him from office, but the leader mocked Khrushchev, then allowed the episode to pass.[96] On March 1, 1953, Stalin suffered a massive stroke, apparently on rising after sleep. Stalin had left orders not to be disturbed, and it was twelve hours until his condition was discovered. Even as terrified doctors attempted treatment, Khrushchev and his colleagues engaged in intense discussion as to the new government. On March 5, Stalin died. As Khrushchev and other high officials stood weeping by Stalin's bedside, Beria raced from the room, shouting for his car.[97] Khrushchev reflected on Stalin in his memoirs: Stalin called everyone who didn't agree with him an "enemy of the people." He said that they wanted to restore the old order, and for this purpose, "the enemies of the people" had linked up with the forces of reaction internationally. As a result, several hundred thousand honest people perished. Everyone lived in fear in those days. Everyone expected that at any moment there would be a knock on the door in the middle of the night and that knock on the door would prove fatal ... [P]eople not to Stalin's liking were annihilated, honest party members, irreproachable people, loyal and hard workers for our cause who had gone through the school of revolutionary struggle under Lenin's leadership. This was utter and complete arbitrariness. And now is all this to be forgiven and forgotten? Never! [98]

Struggle for control

On March 6, 1953, Stalin's death was announced, as was the new leadership. Malenkov was the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with Beria (who consolidated his hold over the security agencies), Kaganovich, Bulganin, and former Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov as first vice-chairmen. Those members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who had been recently promoted by Stalin were demoted. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as Party head for Moscow to concentrate on unspecified duties in the Party's Central Committee.[99] The New York Times listed Malenkov and Beria first and second among the ten-man Presidium and Khrushchev last.[100] On March 14, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat of the Central Committee.[101] In September, Khrushchev was elected by the Central Committee as First Secretary of the Party.[102] Even before Stalin had been laid to rest, Beria launched a lengthy series of reforms which rivalled those of Khrushchev during his period of power and even those of Mikhail Gorbachev a third of a century later.[101] Beria's proposals were designed to

denigrate Stalin and pass the blame for Beria's own crimes to the late leader.[101] One proposal, which was adopted, was an amnesty which eventually led to the freeing of over a million prisoners.[103] Another, which was not, was to release East Germany into a united, neutral Germany in exchange for compensation from the West[104] a proposal considered by Khrushchev to be anti-communist.[105] Khrushchev allied with Malenkov to block many of Beria's proposals, while the two slowly picked up support from other Presidium members. Their campaign against Beria was aided by fears that Beria was planning a military coup,[106] and, according to Khrushchev in his memoirs, by the conviction that "Beria is getting his knives ready for us."[107] On June 26, 1953 Beria was arrested at a Presidium meeting, following extensive military preparations by Khrushchev and his allies. Beria was tried in secret, and executed in December 1953 with five of his close associates. The execution of Beria proved to be the last time the loser of a top-level Soviet power struggle paid with his life.[108] The power struggle in the Presidium was not resolved by the elimination of Beria. Malenkov's power was in the central state apparatus, which he sought to extend through reorganizing the government, giving it additional power at the expense of the Party. He also sought public support by lowering retail prices and lowering the level of bond sales to citizens, which had long been effectively obligatory. Khrushchev, on the other hand, with his power base in the Party, sought to both strengthen the Party and his position within it. While, under the Soviet system, the Party was to be preeminent, it had been greatly drained of power by Stalin, who had given much of that power to himself and to the Politburo (later, to the Presidium). Khrushchev saw that with the Presidium in conflict, the Party and its Central Committee might again become powerful.[109] Khrushchev carefully cultivated high Party officials, and was able to appoint supporters as local Party bosses, who then took seats on the Central Committee.[110] Khrushchev presented himself as a down-to-earth activist prepared to take up any challenge, contrasting with Malenkov who, though sophisticated, came across as colorless.[110] Khrushchev arranged for the Kremlin grounds to be opened to the public, an act with "great public resonance".[111] While both Malenkov and Khrushchev sought reforms to agriculture, Khrushchev's proposals were broader, and included the Virgin Lands Campaign, under which hundreds of thousands of young volunteers would settle and farm areas of Western Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. While the scheme eventually became a tremendous disaster for Soviet agriculture,[112] it was initially successful.[113] In addition, Khrushchev possessed incriminating information on Malenkov, taken from Beria's secret files.[114] As Soviet prosecutors investigated the atrocities of Stalin's last years, including the Leningrad case, they came across evidence of Malenkov's involvement.[115] Beginning in February 1954, Khrushchev replaced Malenkov in the seat of honor at Presidium meetings; in June, Malenkov ceased to head the list of Presidium members, which was thereafter organized in alphabetical order. Khrushchev's influence continued to increase, winning the allegiance of local party heads, and with his nominee heading the KGB.[116] At a Central Committee meeting in January 1955, Malenkov was accused of involvement in atrocities, and the committee passed a resolution accusing him of involvement in the Leningrad case, and of facilitating Beria's climb to power. At a meeting of the mostly ceremonial Supreme Soviet the following month, Malenkov was

demoted in favor of Bulganin, to the surprise of Western observers.[117] Malenkov remained in the Presidium as Minister of Electric Power Stations.[118] According to Khrushchev biographer William Tompson, "Khrushchev's position as first among the members of the collective leadership was now beyond any reasonable doubt."[119]

Leader (19551964)
Domestic policies
Consolidation of power; Secret Speech Main article: Secret Speech After the demotion of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov initially worked together well, and the longtime foreign minister even proposed that Khrushchev, not Bulganin, replace Malenkov as premier.[120] However, Khrushchev and Molotov increasingly differed on policy. Molotov opposed the Virgin Lands policy, instead proposing heavy investment to increase yields in developed agricultural areas, which Khrushchev felt was not feasible due to a lack of resources and a lack of a sophisticated farm labor force.[121] The two differed on foreign policy as well; soon after Khrushchev took power, he sought a peace treaty with Austria, which would allow Soviet troops then in occupation of part of the country to leave. Molotov was resistant, but Khrushchev arranged for an Austrian delegation to come to Moscow and negotiate the treaty.[122] Although Khrushchev and other Presidium members attacked Molotov at a Central Committee meeting in mid-1955, accusing him of conducting a foreign policy which turned the world against the USSR, Molotov remained in his position.[123] By the end of 1955, thousands of political prisoners had returned home, and told their experiences of the gulag labor camps.[124] Continuing investigation into the abuses brought home the full breadth of Stalin's crimes to his successors. Khrushchev believed that once the stain of Stalinism was removed, the Party would inspire loyalty among the people.[125] Beginning in October 1955, Khrushchev fought to tell the delegates to the upcoming 20th Party Congress about Stalin's crimes. Some of his colleagues, including Molotov and Malenkov, opposed the disclosure, and managed to persuade him to make his remarks in a closed session.[126] The 20th Party Congress opened on February 14, 1956. In his opening words in his initial address, Khrushchev denigrated Stalin by asking delegates to rise in honor of the communist leaders who had died since the last congress, whom he named, equating Stalin with the drunken Klement Gottwald and the little-known Kyuichi Tokuda.[127] In the early morning hours of February 25, Khrushchev delivered what became known as the "Secret Speech" to a closed session of the Congress limited to Soviet delegates. In four hours, he demolished Stalin's reputation. Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the "congress listened to me in silence. As the saying goes, you could have heard a pin drop. It was all so sudden and unexpected."[128] Khrushchev told the delegates, It is here that Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power ... he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party or the Soviet Government.[129]

The Secret Speech, while it did not fundamentally change Soviet society, had wideranging effects. The speech was a factor in unrest in Poland and revolution in Hungary later in 1956, and Stalin defenders led four days of rioting in his native Georgia in June, calling for Khrushchev to resign and Molotov to take over.[130] In meetings where the Secret Speech was read, communists would make even more severe condemnations of Stalin (and of Khrushchev), and even call for multi-party elections. However, Stalin was not publicly denounced, and his portrait remained widespread through the USSR, from airports to Khrushchev's Kremlin office. Mikhail Gorbachev, then a Komsomol official, recalled that though young and well-educated Soviets in his district were excited by the speech, many others decried it, either defending Stalin or seeing little point in digging up the past.[130] Forty years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev applauded Khrushchev for his courage in taking a huge political risk and showing himself to be "a moral man after all".[131] The term "Secret Speech" proved to be an utter misnomer. While the attendees at the Speech were all Soviet, Eastern European delegates were allowed to hear it the following night, read slowly to allow them to take notes. By March 5, copies were being mailed throughout the Soviet Union, marked "not for the press" rather than "top secret". An official translation appeared within a month in Poland; the Poles printed 12,000 extra copies, one of which soon reached the West.[126] Khrushchev's son, Sergei, later wrote, "[C]learly, Father tried to ensure it would reach as many ears as possible. It was soon read at Komsomol meetings; that meant another eighteen million listeners. If you include their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, you could say that the entire country became familiar with the speech ... Spring had barely begun when the speech began circulating around the world."[132] The anti-Khrushchev minority in the Presidium was augmented by those opposed to Khrushchev's proposals to decentralize authority over industry, which struck at the heart of Malenkov's power base. During the first half of 1957, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich worked to quietly build support to dismiss Khrushchev. At a June 18 Presidium meeting at which two Khrushchev supporters were absent, the plotters moved that Bulganin, who had joined the scheme, take the chair, and proposed other moves which would effectively demote Khrushchev and put themselves in control. Khrushchev objected on the grounds that not all Presidium members had been notified, an objection which would have been quickly dismissed had Khrushchev not held firm control over the military, through Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov, and the security departments. Lengthy Presidium meetings took place, continuing over several days. As word leaked of the power struggle, members of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, streamed to Moscow, many flown there aboard military planes, and demanded to be admitted to the meeting. While they were not admitted, there were soon enough Central Committee members in Moscow to call an emergency Party Congress, which effectively forced the leadership to allow a session of the Central Committee. At that meeting, the three main conspirators were dubbed the Anti-Party Group, accused of factionalism and complicity in Stalin's crimes. The three were expelled from the Central Committee and Presidium, as was former Foreign Minister and Khrushchev client Dmitri Shepilov who joined them in the plot. Molotov was sent as Ambassador to Mongolia; the others were sent to head industrial facilities and institutes far from Moscow.[133]

Marshal Zhukov was rewarded for his support with full membership in the Presidium, but Khrushchev feared his popularity and power. In October, the defense minister was sent on a tour of the Balkans, as Khrushchev arranged a Presidium meeting to dismiss him. Zhukov learned what was happening, and hurried back to Moscow, only to be formally notified of his dismissal. At a Central Committee meeting several weeks later, not a word was said in Zhukov's defense.[134] Khrushchev completed the consolidation of power by arranging for Bulganin's dismissal as premier in favor of himself (Bulganin was appointed to head the Gosbank) and by establishing a USSR Defense Council, led by himself, effectively making him commander in chief.[135] Though Khrushchev was now preeminent, he did not enjoy Stalin's absolute power.[135] Liberalization and the arts After assuming power, Khrushchev allowed a modest amount of freedom in the arts. Vladimir Dudintsev's Not by Bread Alone,[136] about an idealistic engineer opposed by rigid bureaucrats, was allowed to be published in 1956, though Khrushchev called the novel "false at its base".[137] In 1958, however, Khrushchev ordered a fierce attack on Boris Pasternak after his novel, Doctor Zhivago was published abroad (he was denied permission to publish it in the Soviet Union). Pravda described the novel as "low-grade reactionary hackwork", and the author was expelled from the Writer's Union.[138] To make things worse (from Khrushchev's perspective), Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, which, under heavy pressure, he declined. Once he did so, Khrushchev ordered a halt to the attacks on Pasternak. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that he agonized over the novel, very nearly allowed it to be published, and later regretted not doing so.[138] After his fall from power, Khrushchev obtained a copy of the novel and read it (he had earlier read only excerpts) and stated, "We shouldn't have banned it. I should have read it myself. There's nothing anti-Soviet in it."[139] Khrushchev believed that the USSR could match the West's living standards, and was not afraid to allow Soviet citizens to see Western achievements.[140] Stalin had permitted few tourists to the Soviet Union, and had allowed few Soviets to travel.[141] Khrushchev let Soviets travel (over 700,000 Soviet citizens travelled abroad in 1957) and allowed foreigners to visit the Soviet Union, where tourists became subjects of immense curiosity.[141] In 1957, Khrushchev authorized the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students to be held in Moscow that summer. He instructed Komsomol officials to "smother foreign guests in our embrace".[142] The resulting "socialist carnival" involved over three million Moscovites, who joined with 30,000 young foreign visitors in events that ranged from discussion groups throughout the city to events at the Kremlin itself.[143] According to historian Vladislav Zubok, the festival "shattered propagandist clichs" about Westerners by allowing Moscovites to see for themselves.[140] In 1962, Khrushchev, impressed by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, persuaded the Presidium to allow publication.[144] That renewed thaw ended on December 1, 1962, when Khrushchev was taken to the Manezh Gallery to view an exhibit which included a number of avant-garde works. On seeing them, Khrushchev exploded with anger, describing the artwork as "dog shit",[145] and proclaiming that "a donkey could smear better art with its tail".[146] A week later, Pravda issued a call for artistic purity. When writers and filmmakers defended the painters, Khrushchev extended his anger to them. However, despite the premier's rage, none of the artists were arrested or exiled. The Manezh Gallery exhibit remained open

for some time after Khrushchev's visit, and experienced a considerable rise in attendance after the article in Pravda.[145] Political reform Under Khrushchev, the special tribunals operated by security agencies were abolished. These tribunals (known as troikas), had often ignored laws and procedures. Under the reforms, no prosecution for a political crime could be brought even in the regular courts unless approved by the local Party committee. This rarely happened; there were no major political trials under Khrushchev, and at most several hundred political prosecutions overall. Instead, other sanctions were imposed on dissidents, including loss of job or university place, or expulsion from the Party. During Khrushchev's rule, forced hospitalization for the "socially dangerous" was introduced.[147] According to author Roy Medvedev, who wrote an early analysis of Khrushchev's years in power, "political terror as an everyday method of government was replaced under Khrushchev by administrative means of repression".[147] In 1958, Khrushchev opened a Central Committee meeting to hundreds of Soviet officials; some were even allowed to address the meeting. For the first time, the proceedings of the Committee were made public in book form; a practice which was continued at subsequent meetings. This openness, however, actually allowed Khrushchev greater control over the Committee, since any dissenters would have to make their case in front of a large, disapproving crowd.[148] In 1962, Khrushchev divided oblast (province) level Party committees into two parallel structures, one for industry and one for agriculture. This was unpopular among Party apparatchiks, and led to confusions in the chain of command, as neither committee secretary had precedence over the other. As there were limited numbers of Central Committee seats from each oblast, the division set up the possibility of rivalry for office between factions, and, according to Medvedev, had the potential for beginning a twoparty system.[149] Khrushchev also ordered that one-third of the membership of each committee, from low-level councils to the Central Committee itself, be replaced at each election. This decree created tension between Khrushchev and the Central Committee[150] and upset the party leaders upon whose support Khrushchev had risen to power.[28] Agricultural policy Since the 1940s, Khrushchev had advocated the cultivation of corn in the Soviet Union.[151] He established a corn institute in Ukraine and ordered thousands of acres to be planted with corn in the Virgin Lands.[152] In February 1955, Khrushchev gave a speech in which he advocated an Iowa-style corn belt in the Soviet Union, and a Soviet delegation visited the U.S. state that summer. While their intent was to visit only small farms, the delegation chief was approached by farmer and corn salesman Roswell Garst, who persuaded him to insist on visiting Garst's large farm.[152] The Iowan visited the Soviet Union in September, where he became great friends with Khrushchev, and Garst sold the USSR 5,000 short tons (4,500 t) of seed corn.[153] Garst warned the Soviets to grow the corn in the southern part of the country, and to ensure there were sufficient stocks of fertilizer, insecticides, and herbicides.[154] This, however, was not done, as Khrushchev sought to plant corn even in Siberia, and without the necessary chemicals.

While Khrushchev warned against those who "would have us plant the whole planet with corn", he displayed a great passion for corn, so much so that when he visited a Latvian kolkhoz, he stated that some in his audience were probably wondering, "Will Khrushchev say something about corn or won't he?"[154] He did, rebuking the farmers for not planting more corn.[154] The corn experiment was not a great success, and he later wrote that overenthusiastic officials, wanting to please him, had overplanted without laying the proper groundwork, and "as a result corn was discredited as a silage crop and so was I".[154] Khrushchev sought to abolish the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) which not only owned most large agricultural machines such as combines and tractors, but also provided services such as plowing, and transfer their equipment and functions to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes (state farms).[155] After a successful test involving MTS which served one large kolkhoz each, Khrushchev ordered a gradual transition but then ordered that the change take place with great speed.[156] Within three months, over half of the MTS facilities had been closed, and kolkhozes were being required to buy the equipment, with no discount given for older or dilapidated machines.[157] MTS employees, unwilling to bind themselves to kolkhozes and lose their state employee benefits and the right to change their jobs, fled to the cities, creating a shortage of skilled operators.[158] The costs of the machinery, plus the costs of building storage sheds and fuel tanks for the equipment, impoverished many kolkhozes. Inadequate provisions were made for repair stations.[159] Without the MTS, the market for Soviet agricultural equipment fell apart, as the kolkhozes now had neither the money nor skilled buyers to purchase new equipment.[160] One adviser to Khrushchev was Trofim Lysenko, who promised greatly increased production with minimal investment. Such schemes were attractive to Khrushchev, who ordered them implemented. Lysenko managed to maintain his influence under Khrushchev despite repeated failures; as each proposal failed, he advocated another. Lysenko's influence greatly retarded the development of genetic science in the Soviet Union.[161] In 1959, Khrushchev announced a goal of overtaking the United States in production of milk, meat, and butter. Local officials, with Khrushchev's encouragement, made unrealistic pledges of production. These goals were met by forcing farmers to slaughter their breeding herds and by purchasing meat at state stores, then reselling it back to the government, artificially increasing recorded production.[162] In June 1962, food prices were raised, particularly on meat and butter (by 2530%). This caused public discontent. In the southern Russian city of Novocherkassk (Rostov Region) this discontent escalated to a strike and a revolt against the authorities. The revolt was put down by the military. According to Soviet official accounts, 22 people were killed and 87 wounded. In addition, 116 demonstrators were convicted of involvement and seven of them executed. Information about the revolt was completely suppressed in the USSR, but spread through Samizdat and damaged Khrushchev's reputation in the West.[163] Drought struck the Soviet Union in 1963; the harvest of 107,500,000 short tons (97,500,000 t) of grain was down from a peak of 134,700,000 short tons (122,200,000 t) in 1958.[164] The shortages resulted in bread lines, a fact at first kept from Khrushchev.[164] Reluctant to purchase food in the West,[164] but faced with the alternative of widespread hunger, Khrushchev exhausted the nation's hard currency

reserves and expended part of its gold stockpile in the purchase of grain and other foodstuffs.[165] Education

Khrushchev with cosmonauts Valentina Tereshkova, Pavel Popovich and Yury Gagarin While visiting the United States in 1959, Khrushchev was greatly impressed by the agricultural education program at Iowa State University, and sought to imitate it in the Soviet Union. At the time, the main agricultural college in the USSR was in Moscow, and students did not do the manual labor of farming. Khrushchev proposed to move the programs to rural areas. He was unsuccessful, due to resistance from professors and students, who never actually disagreed with the premier, but who did not carry out his proposals.[166] Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, "It's nice to live in Moscow and work at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. It's a venerable old institution, a large economic unit, with skilled instructors, but it's in the city! Its students aren't yearning to work on the collective farms because to do that they'd have to go out in the provinces and live in the sticks."[167] Khrushchev founded several academic towns, such as Akademgorodok. The premier believed that Western science flourished because many scientists lived in university towns such as Oxford, isolated from big city distractions, and had pleasant living conditions and good pay. He sought to duplicate those conditions in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's attempt was generally successful, though his new towns and scientific centers tended to attract younger scientists, with older ones unwilling to leave Moscow or Leningrad.[168] Khrushchev also proposed to restructure Soviet high schools. While the high schools provided a college preparatory curriculum, in fact few Soviet youths went on to university. Khrushchev wanted to shift the focus of secondary schools to vocational training: students would spend much of their time at factory jobs or in apprenticeships and only a small part at the schools.[169] In practice, what occurred is that schools developed links with nearby enterprises, and students went to work for only one or two days a week; the factories and other works disliked having to teach, while students and their families complained that they had little choice in what trade to learn.[170] While the vocational proposal would not survive Khrushchev's downfall, a longerlasting change was a related establishment of specialized high schools for gifted students or those wishing to study a specific subject.[171] These schools were modeled after the foreign-language schools that had been established in Moscow and Leningrad beginning in 1949.[172] In 1962, a special summer school was established in Novosibirsk to prepare students for a Siberian math and science Olympiad. The following year, the Novosibirsk Maths and Science Boarding-School became the first permanent residential school specializing in math and science. Other such schools were soon established in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. By the early 1970s, over 100 specialized schools had been established, in mathematics, the sciences, art, music, and sport.[171] Preschool education was increased as part of Khrushchev's reforms, and by the time he left office, about 22% of Soviet children attended preschool about half of urban children, but only about 12% of rural children.[173]

Foreign and defense policies

Nikita Khrushchev with the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander in a rowing boat 1964 When Khrushchev took control, the outside world still knew little of him, and initially was not impressed by him. Short, heavyset, and wearing ill-fitting suits, he "radiated energy but not intellect", and was dismissed by many as a buffoon who would not last long.[174] British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan wondered, "How can this fat, vulgar man with his pig eyes and ceaseless flow of talk be the head the aspirant Tsar for all those millions of people?"[175] Khrushchev biographer Tompson described the mercurial leader: He could be charming or vulgar, ebullient or sullen, he was given to public displays of rage (often contrived) and to soaring hyperbole in his rhetoric. But whatever he was, however he came across, he was more human than his predecessor or even than most of his foreign counterparts, and for much of the world that was enough to make the USSR seem less mysterious or menacing.[176] United States and allies
Early relations and U.S. visit (19571960)

Khrushchev (right) with U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon, 1959

Khrushchev with Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge during his visit on September 16, 1959 to the Agricultural Research Service Center Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of West Berlin deep within East German territory. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and France six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city.[177] This ultimatum caused dissent among the Western Allies, who were reluctant to go to war over the issue.[178] Khrushchev, however, repeatedly extended the deadline. Khrushchev sought to eliminate many conventional weapons, and defend the Soviet Union with missiles.[179] He believed that unless this occurred, the huge Soviet military would continue to eat up resources, making Khrushchev's goals of improving Soviet life difficult to achieve.[180] In 1955, Khrushchev abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either conventional or nuclear attack.[181] In January 1960, Khrushchev took advantage of improved relations with the U.S. to order a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops.[182] While conscription of Soviet youth remained in force, exemptions from military service became more and more common, especially for students.[183] The Soviets had few operable ICBMs; in spite of this Khrushchev publicly boasted of the Soviets' missile programs, stating that Soviet weapons were varied and numerous. The First Secretary hoped that public perception that the Soviets were ahead would result in psychological pressure on the West and political concessions.[184] The Soviet space program, which Khrushchev firmly supported, appeared to confirm his claims when the Soviets launched Sputnik 1 into orbit, a launch many westerners, including United States Vice President Richard Nixon were convinced was a hoax.[184] When it became clear that the launch was real, and Sputnik 1 was in orbit, Western governments concluded that the Soviet ICBM program was further along than it actually was. Khrushchev added to this misapprehension by stating in an October 1957 interview that the USSR had all the rockets, of whatever capacity, that it needed.[179] For years, Khrushchev would make a point of preceding a major foreign trip with a rocket launch, to the discomfiture of his hosts.[179] The United States learned of the primitive state of the Soviet missile program from overflights in the late 1950s, but only high U.S.

officials knew of the deception.[184] In January 1960, Khrushchev told the Presidium that Soviet ICBMs made an agreement with the U.S. possible because "main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first times in their lives".[185] The perceived "missile gap" led to a considerable defense buildup on the part of the United States.[184] In 1959, during Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union,[186] Khrushchev took part in what later became known as the Kitchen Debate, as Nixon and Khrushchev had an impassioned argument in a model kitchen at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, with each defending the economic system of his country.[28] Khrushchev was invited to visit the United States, and did so that September, spending thirteen days. Khrushchev arrived in Washington, DC on his first visit to the United States on September 15, 1959. The first visit by a Soviet premier to the United States resulted in an extended media circus.[187] Khrushchev brought his wife, Nina Petrovna, and adult children with him, though it was not usual for Soviet officials to travel with their families.[188] The peripatetic premier visited New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco (visiting a supermarket), Iowa (visiting Roswell Garst's farm), Pittsburgh, and Washington,[189] concluding with a meeting with U.S. President Eisenhower at Camp David.[190] Khrushchev was supposed to visit Disneyland, but the visit was canceled for security reasons, much to his disgruntlement.[191] He did, however, visit Eleanor Roosevelt at her home in Hyde Park, New York.[192] While visiting Thomas Watson, Jr.'s IBM headquarters, Khrushchev expressed little interest in the computers, but greatly admired the self-service cafeteria, and, on his return, introduced self-service in the Soviet Union.[193] Khrushchev's U.S. visit resulted in an informal agreement with U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower that there would be no firm deadline over Berlin, but that there would be a four-power summit to try to resolve the issue, and the premier left the U.S. to general good feelings. Khrushchev returned from the U.S. convinced that he had achieved a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower (who in fact was unimpressed by the Soviet leader) and that he could achieve dtente with the Americans.[194] He pushed for an immediate summit, but was frustrated by French President Charles de Gaulle, who postponed it until 1960, a year in which Eisenhower was scheduled to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.[195]
U-2 and Berlin crisis (19601961)

Nikita Khrushchev at the United Nations, September 1960 A constant irritant in SovietU.S. relations was the overflight of the Soviet Union by American U-2 spy aircraft. On April 9, 1960, the U.S. resumed such flights after a lengthy break. The Soviets had protested the flights in the past, but had been ignored by Washington. Content in what he thought was a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, Khrushchev was confused and angered by the flights' resumption, and concluded that they had been ordered by CIA Director Allen Dulles without the U.S. President's knowledge. On May 1, a U-2 was shot down; its pilot, Francis Gary Powers captured alive.[196] Believing Powers to have been killed, the U.S. announced that a weather plane had been lost near the Turkish-Soviet border. Khrushchev risked destroying the summit, due to start on May 16 in Paris, if he announced the shootdown, but would look weak in the eyes of his military and security forces if he did nothing.[196] Finally, on May 5, Khrushchev announced the shootdown and Powers' capture, blaming the overflight on "imperialist circles and militarists, whose stronghold is the Pentagon", and suggesting the plane had been sent without Eisenhower's knowledge.[197] Eisenhower could not have it thought that there were rogue elements in the Pentagon operating without his knowledge, and admitted that he had ordered the flights, calling them "a distasteful necessity".[198] The admission stunned Khrushchev, and turned the U-2 affair from a possible triumph to a disaster for him, and he even appealed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson for help.[199] Khrushchev was undecided what to do at the summit even as he boarded his flight to Paris. He finally decided, in consultation with his advisers on the plane and Presidium members in Moscow, to demand an apology from Eisenhower and a promise that there would be no further U-2 flights in Soviet airspace.[199] Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev communicated with the other in the days before the summit, and at the summit, Khrushchev made his demands and stated that there was no purpose in the summit, which should be postponed for six to eight months, that is until after the 1960 United States presidential election. The U.S. President offered no apology, but stated that the flights had been suspended and would not resume, and renewed his Open Skies

proposal for mutual overflight rights. This was not enough for Khrushchev, who left the summit.[196] Eisenhower accused Khrushchev "of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested".[200] Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, for which the premier had even built a golf course so the U.S. President could enjoy his favorite sport,[201] was canceled by Khrushchev.[202] Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the United States in September 1960. He had no invitation, but had appointed himself as head of the USSR's UN delegation.[203] He spent much of his time wooing the new Third World states which had recently become independent.[204] The U.S. restricted him to the island of Manhattan, with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on Long Island. The notorious shoe-banging incident occurred during a debate on October 12 over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Infuriated by a statement of the Filipino delegate Lorenzo Sumulong which charged the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe, Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately, and accused Sumulong of being "a fawning lackey of the American imperialists". Sumulong resumed his speech, and accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk.[205] This behavior by Khrushchev scandalized his delegation.[206]

Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, Vienna, June 1961 Khrushchev considered U.S. Vice President Nixon a hardliner, and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, as a far more likely partner for dtente, but was taken aback by the newly inaugurated U.S. President's tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration.[207] Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with the first manned spaceflight and Kennedy a defeat with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy's determination to make no concessions at the Vienna summit scheduled for June 3, 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy on the other hand had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to await easing of EastWest tensions. Kennedy described negotiating with Khrushchev to his brother Robert as "like dealing with Dad. All give and no take."[208]

The maximum territorial extent of countries in the world under Soviet influence, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and before the official Sino-Soviet split of 1961 An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev if for no other reason than that East Germany was suffering a continuous "brain drain" as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the boundary between the two German states had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbright that East Germany had every right to close its borders, which were not disavowed by the Kennedy Administration, Khrushchev authorized East German leader Walter Ulbricht to begin construction of what became known as the Berlin Wall, which would surround West Berlin. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, August 13, 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster, and marked the end of Khrushchev's attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states.[209] That treaty would not be signed until September 1990, as an immediate prelude to German reunification.
Establishing relations with Cuba

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba were officially restored in May 1960.[210] Alexandr Alexeyev was named Soviet Ambassador to Cuba two years later, in May 1962.[211]
Cuban crisis and test ban treaty (19621964)

Superpower tensions culminated in the Cuban missile crisis (in the USSR, the "Caribbean crisis") of October 1962, as the Soviet Union sought to install medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba, about 90 miles (140 km) from the U.S. coast.[28] Cuban President Fidel Castro was reluctant to accept the missiles, and, once he was persuaded, warned Khrushchev against transporting the missiles in secret. Castro stated, thirty years later, "We had a sovereign right to accept the missiles. We were not violating international law. Why do it secretly as if we had no right to do it? I warned Nikita that secrecy would give the imperialists the advantage."[212]

On October 16, Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights over Cuba had discovered what were most likely medium-range missile sites, and though he and his advisors considered approaching Khrushchev through diplomatic channels, could come up with no way of doing this that would not appear weak.[213] On October 22, Kennedy addressed his nation by television, revealing the missiles' presence and announcing a blockade of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour before) the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion of Cuba. Even before Kennedy's speech, they ordered Soviet commanders in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack except atomic weapons.[214] As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the U.S.; less so in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev made several public appearances, and went to the Bolshoi Theatre to hear American opera singer Jerome Hines, who was then performing in Moscow.[28][215] By October 25, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy's full intentions, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be withdrawn from Cuba. Two days later, he offered Kennedy terms for the withdrawal.[216] Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba and a promise that the U.S. would withdraw missiles from Turkey, near the Soviet heartland.[217] As the last term was not publicly announced at the request of the U.S., and was not known until just before Khrushchev's death in 1971,[28] the resolution was seen as a great defeat for the Soviets, and contributed to Khrushchev's fall less than two years later.[28] Castro had urged Khrushchev to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the U.S. in the event of any invasion of Cuba,[218] and was angered by the outcome, referring to Khrushchev in profane terms;[219] Khrushchev invited him to Moscow later, and was able to restore good relations.[220] After the crisis, superpower relations improved, as Kennedy gave a conciliatory speech at American University on June 10, 1963, recognizing the Soviet people's suffering during World War II, and paying tribute to their achievements.[221] Khrushchev called the speech the best by a U.S. president since Franklin Roosevelt, and, in July, negotiated a test ban treaty with U.S. negotiator Averell Harriman and with Lord Hailsham of the United Kingdom.[222] Plans for a second Khrushchev-Kennedy summit were dashed by the U.S. President's assassination in November 1963. The new U.S. President, Lyndon Johnson, hoped for continued improved relations but was distracted by other issues and had little opportunity to develop a relationship with Khrushchev before the premier was ousted.[223] Eastern Europe

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev at Bucharest's Baneasa Airport in June 1960. Nicolae Ceauescu can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right hand side.

Khrushchev (left) and East German leader Walter Ulbricht, 1963 Khrushchev (right) on his visit to East Germany with Nikolai Podgorny (left) The Secret Speech, combined with the death of Polish communist leader Boleslaw Bierut, who suffered a heart attack while reading the Speech, sparked considerable liberalization in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, a worker's strike in Poznan developed into disturbances which left more than 50 dead in October 1956.[224] When Moscow blamed the disturbances on Western agitators, Polish leaders ignored the claim, and instead made concessions to the workers. With anti-Soviet displays becoming more common in Poland, and crucial Polish leadership elections upcoming, Khrushchev and other Presidium members flew to Warsaw. While the Soviets were refused entry to the Polish Central Committee plenum where the election was taking place, they met with the Polish Presidium. The Soviets agreed to allow the new Polish leadership to take office, on the assurance there would be no change to the Soviet-Polish relationship.[224] The Polish settlement emboldened the Hungarians, who decided that Moscow could be defied.[225] A mass demonstration in Budapest on October 23 turned into a popular uprising. In response to the uprising, Hungarian Party leaders installed reformist Premier Imre Nagy.[226] Soviet forces in the city clashed with Hungarians and even fired on demonstrators, with hundreds of both Hungarians and Soviets killed. Nagy called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops, which a Khrushchev-led majority in the Presidium decided to obey, choosing to give the new Hungarian government a chance.[227] Khrushchev assumed that if Moscow announced liberalization in how it dealt with its allies, Nagy would adhere to the alliance with the Soviet Union. However, on October 30 Nagy announced multiparty elections, and the next morning that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact.[228] On November 3, two members of the Nagy government appeared in Ukraine as the self-proclaimed heads of a provisional government and demanded Soviet intervention, which was forthcoming. The next day, Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising, with a death toll of 4,000 Hungarians and several hundred Soviet troops. Nagy was arrested, and was later executed. Despite the international outrage over the intervention, Khrushchev defended his actions for the rest of his life. Damage to Soviet foreign relations was severe, and would have been greater were it not for the fortuitous timing of the Suez crisis, which distracted world attention.[226] In the aftermath of these crises, Khrushchev made the statement for which he became well-remembered, "We will bury you" in Russian, " !" My vas

pokhoronim!)). While many in the West took this statement as a literal threat, Khrushchev made the statement in a speech on peaceful coexistence with the West.[229] When questioned about the statement during his 1959 U.S. visit, Khrushchev stated that he was not referring to a literal burial, but that, through inexorable historical development, communism would replace capitalism and "bury" it.[230] Khrushchev greatly improved relations with Yugoslavia, which had been entirely sundered in 1948 when Stalin realized he could not control Yugoslav leader Josip Tito. Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in 1955. Though a hostile Tito did everything he could to make the Soviets look foolish (including getting them drunk in public), Khrushchev was successful in warming relations, ending the Informbiro period in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.[231] During the Hungarian crisis, Tito initially supported Nagy, but Khrushchev persuaded him of the need for intervention.[232] Still, the intervention in Hungary damaged Moscow's relationship with Belgrade, which Khrushchev spent several years trying to repair. He was hampered by the fact that China disapproved of Yugoslavia's liberal version of communism, and attempts to conciliate Belgrade resulted in an angry Beijing.[135] China

Khrushchev with Mao, 1958 After completing his takeover of mainland China in 1949, Mao Zedong sought material assistance from the USSR, and also called for the return to China of territories taken from it under the Tsars.[28] As Khrushchev took control of the USSR, he increased aid to China, even sending a small corps of experts to help develop the newly communist country.[233] This assistance was described by historian William Kirby as "the greatest transfer of technology in world history".[234] The Soviet Union spent 7% of its national income between 1954 and 1959 on aid to China.[235] On his 1954 visit to China, Khrushchev agreed to return Port Arthur and Dalian to China, though Khrushchev was annoyed by Mao's insistence that the Soviets leave their artillery as they departed.[236] Mao bitterly opposed Khrushchev's attempts to reach a rapprochement with more liberal Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's government, on the other hand, was reluctant to endorse Mao's desires for an assertive worldwide revolutionary movement, preferring to conquer capitalism through raising the standard of living in communist-bloc countries.[28] Relations between the two nations began to cool in 1956, with Mao angered both by the Secret Speech and by the fact that the Chinese had not been consulted in advance about it.[237] Mao believed that de-Stalinization was a mistake, and a possible threat to his own authority.[238] When Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1958, Mao refused proposals for military cooperation.[239] Hoping to torpedo Khrushchev's efforts at dtente with the U.S., Mao soon thereafter provoked the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, describing the Taiwanese islands shelled in the crisis as "batons that keep Eisenhower and Khrushchev dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don't you see how wonderful they are?"[240] The Soviets had planned to provide China with an atomic bomb complete with full documentation, but in 1959, amid cooler relations, the Soviets destroyed the device and

papers instead.[241] When Khrushchev paid a visit to China in September, shortly after his successful U.S. visit, he met a chilly reception, and Khrushchev left the country on the third day of a planned seven-day visit.[242] Relations continued to deteriorate in 1960, as both the USSR and China used a Romanian Communist Party congress as an opportunity to attack the other. After Khrushchev attacked China in his speech to the congress, Chinese leader Peng Zhen mocked Khrushchev, stating that the premier's foreign policy was to blow hot and cold towards the West. Khrushchev responded by pulling Soviet experts out of China.[243]

Removal
Beginning in March 1964, Supreme Soviet head Leonid Brezhnev began discussing Khrushchev's removal with his colleagues.[244] While Brezhnev considered having Khrushchev arrested as he returned from a trip to Scandinavia in June, he instead spent time persuading members of the Central Committee to support the ousting of Khrushchev, remembering how crucial the Committee's support had been to Khrushchev in defeating the Anti-Party Group plot.[244] Brezhnev was given ample time for his conspiracy; Khrushchev was absent from Moscow for a total of five months between January and September 1964.[245]

Nikita Khrushchev with Anastas Mikoyan in Berlin The conspirators, led by Brezhnev, Aleksandr Shelepin, and KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny, struck in October 1964, while Khrushchev was on vacation at Pitsunda, Abkhazia. On October 12, Brezhnev called Khrushchev to notify him of a special Presidium meeting to be held the following day, ostensibly on the subject of agriculture.[246] Even though Khrushchev suspected the real reason for the meeting,[247] he flew to Moscow to be attacked by Brezhnev and other Presidium members for his policy failures and what his colleagues deemed to be erratic behavior.[248] Khrushchev put up little resistance, and that night called his friend and Presidium colleague Anastas Mikoyan, and told him, I'm old and tired. Let them cope by themselves. I've done the main thing. Could anyone have dreamed of telling Stalin that he didn't suit us anymore and suggesting he retire? Not even a wet spot would have remained where we had been standing. Now everything is different. The fear is gone, and we can talk as equals. That's my contribution. I won't put up a fight.[249] On October 14, 1964, the Presidium and the Central Committee each voted to accept Khrushchev's "voluntary" retirement from his offices. Brezhnev was elected First Secretary (later General Secretary), while Alexei Kosygin succeeded Khrushchev as premier.[250]

Universal Newsreel about Khrushchev's resignation

Life in retirement
Khrushchev was granted a pension of 500 rubles per month, and was assured that his house and dacha were his for life.[251] Following his removal from power, Khrushchev fell into deep depression.[252] He received few visitors, especially since Khrushchev's security guards kept track of all guests and reported their comings and goings.[253] In the fall of 1965, he and his wife were ordered to leave their house and dacha to move to an apartment and to a smaller dacha. His pension was reduced to 400 rubles per month, though his retirement remained comfortable by Soviet standards.[254][255] The depression continued. His doctor prescribed sleeping pills and tranquilizers, but even so, when one of his grandsons was asked what the ex-premier was doing in retirement, the boy replied, "Grandfather cries."[256] He was made a nonperson to such an extent that the thirty-volume Soviet Encyclopedia omitted his name from the list of prominent political commissars during the Great Patriotic War.[28] As the new rulers made their conservatism in artistic matters known, Khrushchev came to be more favorably viewed by artists and writers, some of whom visited him. One visitor whom Khrushchev regretted not seeing was former U.S. Vice President Nixon, then in his "wilderness years" before his election to the presidency, who came to Khrushchev's Moscow apartment while the former premier was at his dacha.[257] Beginning in 1966, Khrushchev began his memoirs. He dictated them into a tape recorder, and, after attempts to record outdoors failed due to background noise, recorded indoors, knowing that every word would be heard by the KGB. However, the security agency made no attempt to interfere until 1968, when Khrushchev was ordered to turn over his tapes, which he refused to do.[258] However, while Khrushchev was hospitalized with heart ailments his son, Sergei, was approached by the KGB and told that there was a plot afoot by foreign agents to steal the memoirs. Since copies had been made, some of which had been transmitted to a Western publisher, and since the KGB could steal the originals anyway, Sergei Khrushchev turned over the materials to the KGB, but also instructed that the smuggled memoirs be published, which they were in 1970 under the title Khrushchev Remembers. Under some pressure, Nikita Khrushchev signed a statement that he had not given the materials to any publisher, and his son was transferred to a less desirable job.[259] Upon publication of the memoirs in the West, Izvestia denounced them as a fraud.[260] When Soviet state radio carried the announcement of Khrushchev's statement, it was the first time in six years he had been mentioned in that medium.[28]

In his final days, Khrushchev visited his son-in-law and former aide, Alexei Adzhubei, and told him, "[n]ever regret that you lived in stormy times and worked with me in the Central Committee. We will yet be remembered!"[261] Khrushchev died of a heart attack in a hospital near his home in Moscow on September 11, 1971, and is buried in the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow, having been denied a state funeral, and interment in the Kremlin Wall. Fearing demonstrations, the authorities did not announce Khrushchev's death until the hour of his wake, and surrounded the cemetery with troops. Even so, some artists and writers joined the family at the graveside for the interment.[262] Pravda ran a one-sentence announcement of the former premier's death; Western newspapers contained considerable coverage.[263] Veteran New York Times Moscow correspondent Harry Schwartz wrote of Khrushchev, "Mr. Khrushchev opened the doors and windows of a petrified structure. He let in fresh air and fresh ideas, producing changes which time already has shown are irreversible and fundamental."[264]

Legacy

A khrushchyovka is destroyed, Moscow, 2008. Many of Khrushchev's innovations were reversed after his fall. The requirement that one-third of officials be replaced at each election was overturned, as was the division in the Party structure between industrial and agricultural sectors. His vocational education program for high school students was also dropped, and his plan for sending existing agricultural institutions out to the land was ended. However, new agricultural or vocational institutions thereafter were located outside major cities. When new housing was built, much of it was in the form of high rises rather than Khrushchev's low-rise structures, which lacked elevators or balconies.[265] Some of Khrushchev's agricultural projects were also easily overturned. Corn became so unpopular in 1965 that its planting fell to the lowest level in the postwar period, as even kolkhozes which had been successful with it in Ukraine and other southern portions of the USSR refused to plant it.[266] Lysenko was stripped of his policy-making positions. However, the MTS stations remained closed, and the basic agricultural problems, which Khrushchev had tried to address, remained.[265] While the Soviet standard of living increased greatly in the ten years after Khrushchev's fall, much of the increase was due to industrial progress; agriculture continued to lag far behind, resulting in regular agricultural crises, especially in 1972 and 1975.[267] Brezhnev and his successors continued Khrushchev's precedent of buying grain from the West rather than

suffer shortfalls and starvation.[265] Neither Brezhnev nor his colleagues were personally popular, and the new government relied on authoritarian power to assure its continuation. The KGB and Red Army were given increasing powers. The government's conservative tendencies would lead to the crushing of the "Prague Spring" of 1968.[268] Though Khrushchev's strategy failed to achieve the major goals he sought, Aleksandr Fursenko, who wrote a book analyzing Khrushchev's foreign and military policies, argued that the strategy did coerce the West in a limited manner. The agreement that the United States would not invade Cuba has been adhered to. The refusal of the western world to acknowledge East Germany was gradually eroded, and, in 1975, the United States and other NATO members signed the Helsinki Agreement with the USSR and Warsaw Pact nations, including East Germany, setting human rights standards in Europe.[269] The Russian public's view of Khrushchev remains mixed.[270] According to a major Russian pollster, the only eras of the 20th century that Russians evaluate positively are those under Nicholas II, and under Khrushchev.[270] A poll of young Russians found that they felt Nicholas II had done more good than harm, and all other 20th-century Russian leaders more harm than good except Khrushchev, about whom they were evenly divided.[270] Khrushchev biographer William Tompson related the former premier's reforms to those which occurred later: Throughout the Brezhnev years and the lengthy interregnum that followed, the generation which had come of age during the 'first Russian spring' of the 1950s awaited its turn in power. As Brezhnev and his colleagues died or were pensioned off, they were replaced by men and women for whom the Secret Speech and the first wave of deStalinization had been a formative experience, and these 'Children of Twentieth Congress' took up the reins of power under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues. The Khrushchev era provided this second generation of reformers with both an inspiration and a cautionary tale.[271]

See also

History of the Soviet Union (19531964)

Notes
Explanatory 1. ^ English: Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, /nkit sre.vt kr.tv/; Russian: , [nkit srejvt xrof] (
listen)

2. ^ Soviet era reports list his birth date as April 17 (April 5 old style) but recent discovery of his birth certificate has caused biographers to accept the April 15 date. See Tompson 1995, p. 2. Footnotes 1. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 2.

2. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 20. 3. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 18. 4. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 23. 5. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 27. 6. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 26. 7. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 30. 8. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 67. 9. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 3738. 10. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 8. 11. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 141. 12. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 89. 13. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 3840. 14. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 47. 15. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 4748. 16. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 4849. 17. ^ a b c d Taubman 2003, p. 50. 18. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 12. 19. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 52. 20. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 5455. 21. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 55. 22. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 14. 23. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 5657. 24. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 5859. 25. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 1617. 26. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 63. 27. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 6466. 28. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Whitman 1971. 29. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 66. 30. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 68. 31. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 73. 32. ^ a b Tompson 1995, pp. 3132. 33. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 78. 34. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 3334. 35. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 9495. 36. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 10506. 37. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 98. 38. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 99. 39. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 57. 40. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 99100. 41. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 100. 42. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 10304. 43. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 104. 44. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 69. 45. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 11415. 46. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 116. 47. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 118. 48. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 60. 49. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 13537. 50. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 72. 51. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 149.

52. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 150. 53. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 163. 54. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 16264. 55. ^ Khrushchev 2004, p. 347. 56. ^ Khrushchev 2004, pp. 34950. 57. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 16468. 58. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 16871. 59. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 81. 60. ^ a b c Birch 2008. 61. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 15758. 62. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 82. 63. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 158. 64. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 15862. 65. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 17172. 66. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 17778. 67. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 8182. 68. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 73. 69. ^ a b c Tompson 1995, p. 86. 70. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 179. 71. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 180. 72. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 181. 73. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 19395. 74. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 8788. 75. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 195. 76. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 91. 77. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 199. 78. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 199200. 79. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 200201. 80. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 92. 81. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 203. 82. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 93. 83. ^ Khrushchev 2000, p. 27. 84. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 95. 85. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 205. 86. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 96. 87. ^ a b Tompson 1995, pp. 9697. 88. ^ Khrushchev 2006, pp. 1617. 89. ^ Khrushchev 2006, pp. 1822. 90. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 210. 91. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, pp. 21115. 92. ^ Khrushchev 2006, p. 43. 93. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 99. 94. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 226. 95. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 10001. 96. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 22830. 97. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 23641. 98. ^ Khrushchev 2006, pp. 16768. 99. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 114. 100. ^ The New York Times, 1953-03-10. 101. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 245.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

^ Taubman 2003, p. 258. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 246. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 247. ^ Khrushchev 2006, p. 184. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 121. ^ Khrushchev 2006, p. 186. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 123. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 12526. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 259. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 263. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 26263. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 174. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 260. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 26364. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 264. ^ Fursenko 2006, pp. 1517. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 141. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 142. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 266. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 26667. ^ Fursenko 2006, p. 27. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 26869. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 275. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 276. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 27980. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 153. ^ Khrushchev 2006, p. 212. ^ The New York Times, 1956-05-06. ^ a b Taubman 2003, pp. 28691. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 282. ^ Khrushchev 2000, p. 200. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 17683. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 36164. ^ a b c Tompson 1995, p. 189. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 307. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 308. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 385. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 628. ^ a b Zubok 2007, p. 175. ^ a b Zubok 2007, p. 172. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 174. ^ Zubok 2007, pp. 17475. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 52528. ^ a b Tompson 1995, pp. 25760. ^ Neizvestny 1979. ^ a b Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 4142. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 198199. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 154157. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 153. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 374.

152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201.

^ a b Carlson 2009, p. 205. ^ Carlson 2009, pp. 20506. ^ a b c d Taubman 2003, p. 373. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 85. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 8687. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 8789. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 8991. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 9293. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 9192. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 216. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 21415. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 519523. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 607. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 16061. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 221. ^ Khrushchev 2007, p. 154. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 108. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 192193. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 193. ^ a b Kelly 2007, p. 147. ^ Laurent 2009. ^ Perrie 2006, p. 488. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 146. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 149. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 150. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 195. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 196. ^ a b c Tompson 1995, p. 187. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 217. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 127. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 21617. ^ Zubok 2007, pp. 18384. ^ a b c d Tompson 1995, p. 188. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 131. ^ UPI 1959 Year in Review. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 247. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 42122. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 63. ^ Carlson 2009, pp. 22627. ^ Carlson 2009, pp. 15559. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 133. ^ Khrushchev 2000, p. 334. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 211. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 218. ^ a b c Tompson 1995, pp. 21920. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 223. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 224. ^ a b Tompson 1995, p. 225. ^ UPI 1960 Year in Review. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 441.

202. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 469. 203. ^ Carlson 2009, pp. 26566. 204. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 230. 205. ^ Carlson 2009, pp. 28486. 206. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 139. 207. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 232. 208. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 23335. 209. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 23536. 210. ^ Farber, Samuel (2006). The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 149. 211. ^ Alexeyev, Alexandr. "Interview". The National Security Archives. Retrieved March 30, 2013. 212. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 248. 213. ^ Fursenko 2006, pp. 46566. 214. ^ Fursenko 2006, pp. 46972. 215. ^ Life, 1962-11-09. 216. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 145. 217. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 575. 218. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 148. 219. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 579. 220. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 59798. 221. ^ Kennedy 1963. 222. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 602. 223. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 60405. 224. ^ a b Tompson 1995, pp. 16668. 225. ^ Fursenko 2006, p. 122. 226. ^ a b Tompson 1995, pp. 16870. 227. ^ Fursenko 2006, pp. 12324. 228. ^ Fursenko 2006, p. 125. 229. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 42728. 230. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 96. 231. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 14547. 232. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 169. 233. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 336. 234. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 337. 235. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 111. 236. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 33637. 237. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 338. 238. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 136. 239. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 391. 240. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 392. 241. ^ Zubok 2007, p. 137. 242. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 394. 243. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 47071. 244. ^ a b Taubman 2003, p. 615. 245. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 617. 246. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 5. 247. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 6. 248. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 1113. 249. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 13.

250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271.

^ Taubman 2003, p. 16. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 1617. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 622. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 62223. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 278. ^ Taubman 2003, p. 623. ^ Taubman 2003, pp. 62324. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 279. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 280. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 28081. ^ Shabad 1970. ^ Tompson 1995, p. 281. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 28283. ^ Carlson 2009, p. 299. ^ Schwartz 1971. ^ a b c Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, pp. 18082. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 128. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 185. ^ Medvedev & Medvedev 1978, p. 184. ^ Fursenko 2006, p. 544. ^ a b c Taubman 2003, p. 650. ^ Tompson 1995, pp. 28384.

References
Print

Birch, Douglas (2008-08-02), "Khrushchev kin allege family honor slurred", USAToday, retrieved 2009-08-14 Carlson, Peter (2009), K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist, PublicAffairs, ISBN 9781-58648-497-2 Laurent, Coumel (2009), "The scientist, the pedagogue, and the Party official: Interest groups, public opinion, and decision-making in the 1958 education reform", in Ili, Melanie; Smith, Jeremy, Soviet state and society under Nikita Khrushchev, Taylor & Francis, pp. 6685, ISBN 978-0-415-47649-2 Fursenko, Aleksandr (2006), Khrushchev's Cold War, W.W. Norton & Co., ISBN 978-0-393-05809-3 Kelly, Catriona (2007), Children's world: growing up in Russia, 18901991, Yale University Press, p. 147, ISBN 978-0-300-11226-9 Khrushchev, Nikita (1960), For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. Khrushchev, Nikita (2004), Khrushchev, Sergei, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 1: Commissar, The Pennsylvania State University Press, ISBN 978-0-271-02332-8 Khrushchev, Nikita (2006), Khrushchev, Sergei, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 2: Reformer, The Pennsylvania State University Press, ISBN 978-0-271-02861-3

Khrushchev, Nikita (2007), Khrushchev, Sergei, ed., Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, The Pennsylvania State University Press, ISBN 978-0-271-02935-1 Khrushchev, Sergei (2000), Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, The Pennsylvania State University Press, ISBN 978-0-271-01927-7 Medvedev, Roy; Medvedev, Zhores (1978), Khrushchev: The Years in Power, W.W. Norton & Co. Perrie, Maureen (2006), The Cambridge History of Russia: The twentieth century, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-81144-6 Schwartz, Harry (1971-09-12), "We know now that he was a giant among men", The New York Times, retrieved 2009-09-25 (fee for article) Shabad, Theodore (1970-11-24), "Izvestia likens 'memoirs' to forgeries", The New York Times, retrieved 2009-09-25 (fee for article) Taubman, William (2003), Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, W.W. Norton & Co., ISBN 978-0-393-32484-6 Tompson, William J. (1995), Khrushchev: A Political Life, St. Martin's Press, ISBN 978-0-312-12365-9 Whitman, Alden (1971-09-12), "Khrushchev's human dimensions brought him to power and to his downfall", The New York Times, retrieved 2009-09-25 (fee for article), free version Zubok, Vladislav (2007), A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, University of North Carolina Press, ISBN 978-08078-5958-2

Periodicals and journals

Kennedy, John F. (1963-06-10), President Kennedy Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Speech, American University 1963 Commencement, American University, retrieved 2011-12-31 Neizvestny, Ernst (1979), "My dialogue with Khrushchev", Vremya i my (Times and us) (in Russian) (41): 170200, retrieved 2011-01-01 "Text of Speech on Stalin by Khrushchev as released by the State Department", The New York Times, 1956-05-06, retrieved 2009-08-23 (fee for article) "The historic letter that showed Mr. K's hand", Life (Time Inc) 53 (19), 1962-1109, ISSN 0024-3019, retrieved 2009-11-05 "Vast Riddle; Demoted in the latest Soviet shack-up", The New York Times, 1953-03-10, retrieved 2009-08-23 (fee for article) 1959 Year in Review; Nixon visits Russia, United Press International, 1959, retrieved 2011-12-31 1960 Year in Review; The Paris Summit Falls Apart, United Press International, 1960, retrieved 2011-12-31

External links
Wikisource has original text related to this article: Author:Nikita Khrushchev Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Nikita Khrushchev

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Nikita Khrushchev

Nikita Khrushchev Archive at marxists.org The CWIHP at the Wilson Center for Scholars: The Nikita Khrushchev Papers Obituary, The New York Times, September 12, 1971, Khrushchev's Human Dimensions Brought Him to Power and to His Downfall The Case of Khrushchev's Shoe, by Nina Khrushcheva (Nikita's greatgranddaughter), New Statesman, Oct. 2, 2000 Modern History Sourcebook: Nikita S. Khrushchev: The Secret Speech On the Cult of Personality, 1956 "Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise." Khrushchev's "Secret Report" & Poland Thaw in the Cold War: Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Gettysburg, a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan Khrushchev photo collection Part One of Booknotes interview with William Taubman on Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, April 20, 2003. o Part Two of Booknotes interview with Taubman, April 27, 2003.

Dmitry Lelyushenko
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Dmitry Lelyushenko

Born Died

2 November 1901 Rostov Oblast, Russian empire 20 July 1987 (aged 85)

Allegiance Awards

USSR Soviet Union

Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko (Russian: ; (November 2 [O.S. October 20] 1901 July 20, 1987) was a Soviet military commander, Army General (1959). Twice the Hero of the Soviet Union (April 7, 1940 and April 5, 1945), Hero of Czechoslovakia (May 30, 1970). Member of the CPSU from 1924. Born in Rostov Oblast, ethnically Ukrainian.[1] He commanded the 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps in October 1941. For nine days, soldiers of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps heroically battled on fields outside Mtsensk. At the height of fight for the city of Mtsensk where the tankmen of the 4th tank brigade (colonel M.E. Katukov) especially distinguished themselves, Lelyushenko received an order to proceed to the 5th Army which was setting up defenses in the area of Mozhaysk... However, he did not command the 5th Army for longin one of the fights he was badly wounded, and was sent to hospital in Gorky.

References
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Rodion Malinovsky
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Rodion Malinovsky

Minister of Defence In office 26 October 1957 31 March 1967 Nikolai Bulganin Nikita Khrushchev Alexei Kosygin Georgy Zhukov Andrei Grechko Personal details Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky 23 November 1898 Odessa, Russian Empire 31 March 1967 (aged 68)

Premier

Preceded by Succeeded by

Born

Died

Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Nationality Soviet

Political party Communist Party of the Soviet Union Military service Allegiance Russian Empire Soviet Union Russian Imperial Army Soviet Army 19141967 Marshal Southern Front 2nd Guards Army Southwestern Front 3rd Ukrainian Front 2nd Ukrainian Front Transbaikal Military District Far Eastern Military District World War I Russian Civil War Great Patriotic War

Service/branch Years of service Rank

Commands

Battles/wars

Awards

Cross of St. George, 3rd class (2) George Medal, 4th class Order of Victory Order of Lenin (5) Order of Red Banner (3) Order of Suvorov, 1st class (2) Order of Kutuzov, 1st class Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 1st class

Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky (Russian: ; 23 November 1898 31 March 1967) was a Soviet military commander in World War II and Defense Minister of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and 1960s. He contributed to

the major defeat of Germany at the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Budapest. During the post-war era, he made a pivotal contribution to the strengthening of the Soviet Union as a military superpower.

Contents

1 Early life o 1.1 Before and during World War I o 1.2 Interwar 2 World War II commander o 2.1 Early assignments o 2.2 Battle of Kharkov o 2.3 Stalingrad and Ukrainian Front o 2.4 Romania and Hungary o 2.5 Japanese Front 3 Post-war career o 3.1 Far East o 3.2 With Khrushchev o 3.3 Final years 4 Awards 5 Notes 6 References 7 External links

Early life
Before and during World War I

Born in Odessa, some historians believe that Malinovsky's father was of Karaite descent.[1] In search for a livelihood after his father was killed, his mother[citation needed] left the city for the rural areas of Ukraine, and remarried. Her husband, a povertystricken Ukrainian peasant, refused to adopt her son and expelled him when Malinovsky was only 13 years old. The homeless boy survived by working as a farm-hand, and eventually received shelter from his aunt's family in Odessa, where he worked as an errand boy in a general store. He was known to have brilliant courage and resiliency.[citation needed] After the start of World War I in July 1914, Malinovsky, who was only 15 years old at the time (too young for military service), hid on the military train heading for the German front, but was discovered. He nevertheless convinced the commanding officers to enlist him as a volunteer, and served in a machine-gun detachment in the frontline trenches. In October 1915, as a reward for repelling a German attack, he received his first military award, the Cross of St. George of the 4th degree, and was promoted to the rank of corporal. Soon afterwards, he was badly wounded and spent several months in the hospital. After his recovery, he was sent to France in 1916 as a member of the Western Front Russian Expeditionary Corps. Malinovsky fought in a hotly contested sector of the front

near Fort Brion and was promoted to sergeant. He suffered a grave wound in his left arm, and received a decoration from the French government. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the French government disbanded Russian units, but offered some of the best Russian soldiers service in the French Foreign Legion. Malinovsky fought against the Germans until the end of the war. During this time, he was awarded the French Croix de guerre and promoted to senior NCO.
Interwar

He returned to Odessa in 1919, where he joined the Red Army in the Civil War against the White Army and fought with distinction in Siberia. He remained in the army after the end of the conflict, studying in the training school for the junior commanders, and rose to commander of a rifle battalion. In 1926, he became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a membership which was a prerequisite for advancement in the military ranks. In 1927, Malinovsky was sent to study at the elite Frunze Military Academy. He graduated in 1930, and during the next seven years he rose to the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, where his commander was Semyon Timoshenko (a protg of Joseph Stalin's). After the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Malinovsky volunteered to fight for the Republicans against the right-wing nationalists of General Francisco Franco and their Italian and German allies. He participated in planning and directing several main operations. In 1938, he returned to Moscow, being awarded the top Soviet decorations, the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, in recognition of his service in Spain; he was appointed a senior lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy. In the spring of 1941, Timoshenko, who then served the People's Commissar for Defence, was alarmed by the massive German military build up on the Soviet borders, as the Wehrmacht was secretly preparing for Operation Barbarossa. In order to strengthen the Red Army field command, he dispatched some of the top officers from the military academies to the field units. Malinovsky was promoted to General-Major, and took command over the freshly raised 48th Rifle Corps, 9th Army in the Odessa Military District. A week prior to the start of the war, Malinovsky deployed his corps close to the Romanian border.

World War II commander

Early assignments

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, with the Red Army suffering enormous defeats and losing hundreds of thousands of troops in German encirclements, Malinovsky emerged as one of the few competent Soviet generals. His corps of three partly formed rifle divisions faced German Blitzkrieg along the line of the Prut River. While, as a rule, Red Army generals would lead their forces from behind the frontline, Malinovsky went to the crucial sectors of the battles to be with his soldiers and encourage them. Unable to stop the technically and tactically superior forces of the seasoned Wehrmacht, Malinovsky had to retreat along the Black Sea shore, while

frustrating enemy attempts to encircle his troops. The Germans succeeded in cornering his corps in Mykolaiv, but Malinovsky breached their ring and retreated to Dnipropetrovsk. In August, he was promoted to Chief of Staff of the badly battered 6th Army, and soon replaced its commander. He halted the German advance in his section of the front and was promoted to General-Leytenant. After the retreat of the Red Army to the Donbass, Malinovsky commanded a joint operation of the 6th and 12th armies, managing to drive the Wehrmacht out of the region. In December 1941, Malinovsky received command of the Southern Front, consisting of three weak field armies and two division-sized cavalry corps. They were short of manpower and equipment, but Malinovsky managed to push deep into the German defenses who, after 6 months of fighting, were suffering from fatigue and shortages as well.
Battle of Kharkov

On 12 May 1942, Malinovsky and the Southwestern Front, under the overall command of Timoshenko, launched a joint attack in the Second Battle of Kharkov pushing the Germans back 100 kilometres (62 mi). Timoshenko overestimated the Red Army's offensive capabilities and suffered a heavy defeat. Although Stalin, in spite of opposition by his top military advisers, supported the ill-fated Kharkov offense, he became suspicious that Malinovsky had intentionally failed his troops (he feared that Malinovsky had established and kept connections with foreign interests during his World War I stay in France). In July 1942, the Southern Front was taken out of combat, its units and staff were transferred to the North Caucasian Front as a Don Operational Group under the command of Malinovsky (who also became Front's deputy commander). Stalin ordered Malinovsky to stop the intrusion of the German Army Group A towards Rostov-on-Don and the vital oilfields of Caucasus; the Germans had a sizeable technical superiority over Malinovsky, and cut through his weak defenses. As a consequence, Stavka disbanded the Don Operational Group in September.
Stalingrad and Ukrainian Front

The Red Army was hard-pressed by Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad, and Stalin entrusted Malinovsky with the command of the hastily formed 66th Army to held positions north-east of Stalingrad. At the same time Stalin ordered Nikita Khrushchev, who served as his top political officer in Stalingrad, to "keep an eye" on Malinovsky. The 66th Army had no combat experience, but this was the first time in the war Malinovsky had commanded a unit that was near full strength in both troops and equipment. In September and October 1942, he went on the offensive. His territorial gains were marginal, but he denied the Germans an opportunity to encircle Stalingrad from the north, and, slowed down, they decided to push into the city. Later that month, Stavka dispatched Malinovsky to the Voronezh Front as its deputy commander; in December 1942, he was sent back to Stalingrad. There the Red Army achieved its greatest success to that point in the war: on 22 November the Red Army fronts encircled the German Sixth Army. The German Army Group Don, commanded by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, gathered its Panzer troops in the town of Kotelnikovo 150 kilometres (93 mi) west of Stalingrad and launched a desperate counterattack to save the Sixth Army.

Malinovsky led the powerful Soviet Second Guards Army against Hoth. In vicious fighting he forced the Germans to retreat, breached deeply echeloned and well-prepared German defenses, and destroyed the Kotelnikovo army grouping. It was the first World War II large-scale clash of armor to be lost by Germany. Malinovsky's victory sealed the fate of 250,000 German and other Axis Powers soldiers trapped in the Stalingrad pocket. Stalin promoted Malinovsky to Colonel General, and awarded him with the highest Soviet decoration for outstanding generalship the Order of Suvorov of the 1st degree. In February 1943, Malinovsky resumed his command of Southern Front, and in less than two weeks he expelled Manstein from Rostov-on-Don, opening the road to Ukraine to the Red Army. In March 1943, Stalin elevated him to rank of Army General and gave him command of Southwestern Front, tasked to drive German troops away from the industrially rich Donbass. Through a sudden attack in mid-October, Malinovsky managed to surprise a large German force in the region's key city of Zaporizhia and captured it. The campaign split German forces in the South and isolated German forces in Crimea from the rest of the German Eastern Front. On 20 October, the Southwestern Front was renamed 3rd Ukrainian Front. From December 1943 to April 1944, Malinovsky smashed the German Army Group South, and liberated much of the southern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mykolaiv and his home city of Odessa. By that time, according to Khrushchev's opinion, Stalin grew much more confident of Malinovsky's loyalty.
Romania and Hungary

In May 1944, Malinovsky was transferred to the 2nd Ukrainian Front. He expelled the Germans from the remaining Soviet territory and participated in an unsuccessful invasion of the Balkans (the first Jassy-Kishinev Offensive) together with Army General Fyodor Tolbukhin (who received Malinovsky's former command over the smaller 3rd Ukrainian Front). However, during the second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive in late August and early September 1944, Malinovsky unleashed a highly successful Soviet version of the Blitzkrieg. Together with Tolbukhin, he destroyed or captured some 215,000 German,[2][3] and 200,000 Romanian troops,[4] forcing Romania to overthrow pro-German Conductor Ion Antonescu, and switch from the Axis to the Allies camp (see Romania during World War II). A triumphant Stalin recalled Malinovsky to Moscow, and on 10 September 1944 made him Marshal of the Soviet Union. Malinovsky was also nominal head of the Allied Commission in Romania (represented by Vladislav Petrovich Vinogradov).[5] He continued his offensive drive, crossed the Southern Carpathians into Transylvania (entering Hungarian-ruled Northern Transylvania), and on 20 October 1944, captured Debrecen, defended by a large Axis force. His troops were tired after several months of combat and needed to be replenished and resupplied, but Stalin ordered Malinovsky to take the Hungarian capital Budapest (see Battle of Budapest), in order to open the road to Vienna and preempt the Western Allies from conquering the former Austrian capital. With the help of Tolbukhin and the Romanian First and Fourth armies, Malinovsky carried out Stalin's order, and faced Adolf Hitler's determination to defend Budapest at any cost. The Germans and their Hungarian Arrow Cross Party allies tried to turn Budapest into a "German Stalingrad"; Hitler engaged the bulk of his Panzer troops

(among them six elite panzer Waffen SS divisions and five Panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht one-fourth of the Wehrmacht's armor), weakening German forces fighting the Soviets in Poland and Prussia, as well as those engaging the Western Allies on the Rhine. Malinovsky's strategic and operational skills enabled him to overcome his troops' weakness and to conquer Budapest on 13 February 1945, following an exceptionally harsh battle. He captured 70,000 prisoners. Continuing his drive westward, Malinovsky routed Germans in Slovakia, liberated Bratislava, on 4 April 1945 captured Vienna, and finally, on 26 April 1945 freed Brno, second largest city in Czechoslovakia. These new victories established the Soviet's supremacy over the Danubian heartland of Europe. In return, Stalin rewarded him with the highest Soviet military decoration of the period, the Order of Victory. Malinovsky ended his campaign in Europe with the liberation of Brno in the Czech lands, observing a jubilant meeting of his and American advance forces.
Japanese Front

After the German surrender in May 1945, Malinovsky was transferred to the Russian Far East, where he was placed in command of the Transbaikal Front. In August 1945, he led the last Soviet offensive of World War II: he invaded Manchuria, which was under the occupation of the one million men strong Japanese Kwantung Army, renowned for its troops' qualities (see Soviet invasion of Manchuria). Malinovsky crushed the Japanese in ten days, in what was since considered a model of mechanized Blitzkrieg warfare and a classical double envelopment, as well as being the most successful achievement of Soviet World War II military craft (in audacity, scale, as well as in surgical execution and tactical innovation). His capture of Manchuria gave an enormous emotional uplift to the Russian nationalist sentiment, as it seemed to erase memories of the humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 19041905 war. Malinovsky was awarded the Soviet Union's greatest honor, the order of a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Post-war career
Far East

During the next decade Malinovsky was involved in key decisions involving Soviet strategic interests in the Far Eastern region. Initially the commander of TransbaikalAmur Military District (19451947), with the start of the Cold War he was appointed the Supreme Commander of Far Eastern Forces in charge of three military districts (19471953). He trained and supplied North Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army prior to and during the Korean War (19501953). As an expression of Malinovsky's belonging to the Soviet Party-state elite, Stalin made him a Member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union (1946), the candidate (nonvoting) member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952). After the end of the Korean War, Moscow disbanded Far Eastern Supreme Command. Malinovsky continued to control the major Soviet force in the region as the commander of the Far Eastern military district.

With Khrushchev

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev became the Soviet leader and, during the DeStalinization process and the consolidation of his power in the Kremlin, he promoted Malinovsky to Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and First Deputy to Minister of Defense Marshal Georgy Zhukov (1956). To confirm Malinovsky's high status in the Soviet Party-state hierarchy, he was selected a full member of the Communist Party Central Committee. In October 1957, Khrushchev, who had grown apprehensive of Zhukov's political ambitions, ousted him and entrusted his post as minister to Malinovsky, who served in this position until his death, gaining lasting reputation as the best person ever to lead the Ministry[citation needed]. Although a personal friend of Khrushchev, Malinovsky maintained his independent position regarding military affairs. Khrushchev and several members of the Soviet military establishment were convinced that future wars would be won by nuclear missile attack. They advocated main investment to the development of the missiles and a drastic reduction of conventional forces. Malinovsky supported the adaptation of strategic nuclear missiles, but saw them as a useful deterrent of war, rather than as a main weapon within it. He developed the concept of a broad based military and vigorously argued that while the nature of war had changed, the decisive factor would still be a standing army proficient in modern military technology and capable of conquering and controlling the enemy's territory. Soviet military policy during these years was a compromise between the views of Malinovsky and of Khrushchev. Malinovsky built the Soviet army into the most accomplished and powerful force in the world[citation needed] by achieving nuclear parity with the United States and by modernizing the army's huge conventional force.
Final years

The Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe, alienated Malinovsky. Following the crisis, he publicly demanded in army publications for the military to be given a greater say in formulating Soviet strategic policy. The army's discontentment with Khrushchev encouraged a coup within the Party, which resulted in the removal of Khrushchev from power in October 1964. The new Party leadership accepted Malinovsky's demand for an autonomous and professional military establishment, as well as his concept of balanced development of the armed forces. Malinovsky died on 31 March 1967 after an illness. He was honored with a state funeral and cremated. His urn was placed in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis. The government gave his name to the leading Soviet Military Academy of Tank Troops in Moscow and to the 10th Guards Uralsko-Lvovskaya Tank Division. Malinovsky continued to be regarded as one of the most important military leaders in the history of Russia even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Awards
This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Russian Empire

Cross of St. George, 3rd class, twice George Medal, 4th class

Awards of the USSR

Hero of the Soviet Union, twice (8 September 1945, 22 November 1958) Order of Victory ( 826 April 1945) Five Orders of Lenin (17 July 1937, 6 November 1941, 21 February 1945, 8 September 1945, 22 November 1958) Order of Red Banner, three times (22 October 1937, 3 November 1944, 15 November 1950) Order of Suvorov, 1st class, twice (January 28, 1943 March 19, 1944) Order of Kutuzov, 1st class (17 September 1943) Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 1st class[citation needed] Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Defence of the Caucasus" Medal "For the Defence of Odessa" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Medal "For the Capture of Budapest" Medal "For the Capture of Vienna" Medal "For the Victory over Japan" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"

Foreign Awards

Order of the People's Hero (Yugoslavia, 27 May 1964) a highly professional command of the troops, and heroism in the struggle against the common enemy, for his merits in the development and strengthening of friendly relations between the armed forces of the USSR and the armed forces of Yugoslavia Order of Partisan Star, 1st class (Yugoslavia, 1956) Order of Sukhbaatar (Mongolia, 1961) Order of the Red Banner (Mongolia, 1945) Medal "25 Years of the Mongolian People's Revolution" (Mongolia, 1946) Medal "For Victory over Japan" (Mongolia, 1946) Order of the White Lion, 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Order of the White Lion "For Victory", 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Czechoslovak War Cross (1945) Dukelskaya Memorial Medal (Czechoslovakia, 1959) Medal "25 Years of the Slovak National Uprising" (Czechoslovakia, 1965) Legion of Merit, Chief Commander (United States, 1946) Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour (France, 1945) Croix de guerre 1914-1918 (France, 1916) Croix de guerre 1939-1945 (France, 1945) Order "Protecting the motherland", 1st, 2nd and 3rd Classes (Romania, all in 1950) Medal "For Liberation from Fascism" (Romania, 1950) Order of the Republic of Hungary, 1st class (1947) Order "For Services to Hungary", 1st class, twice (1950 and 1965) Order of the Hungarian Freedom (1946)

Order of the Star of Indonesia, 2nd class (1963) Order of the Star of Valour (Indonesia, 1962) Medal "20 Years of the Bulgarian People's Army" (1964) Order of the Blazing Banner, 1st class (China, 1946) Medal "Sino-Soviet friendship" (China, 1956) Order of Military Merit, 1st Class (Morocco, 1965) Order of the National Flag, 1st class (North Korea, 1948) Medal "For the liberation of Korea" (1946) Medal "40 years of the liberation of Korea" (1985, posthumous) Medal "Brotherhood in Arms", 1st class (East Germany, 1966) Cross of Independence (Mexico, 1964)

Notes
1. ^ . . . .; : 2005. ISBN 5-86090113-5 2. ^ Pat McTaggart: Red Storm in Romania 3. ^ K.W.Bhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in sowjetischer Hand. Eine Bilanz, Mnchen 1966, p.112. (German) 4. ^ (German) Siebenbrgische Zeitung: "Ein schwarzer Tag fr die Deutschen", 22 August 2004 5. ^ Adrian Cioroianu, Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere n istoria comunismului romnesc, Editura Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2005, p.59

References
This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (September 2009)

John Erikson, "Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky" in Harold Shukman, ed., Stalin's Generals, Grove Press, New York City, 1993 David M. Glantz, The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945. 'August Storm', Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003 Mark Shteinberg, Evrei v voinakh tysiachiletii, Moscow, Jerusalem, 2005, pp. 316318 Joseph E. Thach, Jr., "Malinovskii, Rodion Yakovlevich" in The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, vol. 21 Alexander Werth, Russia At War, 19411945, Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., New York City, 1999

External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Rodion Malinovsky

"Monument to Malinovsky in Odessa".

Colour poster and biography from site of ETS Publishing House

Political offices Preceded by Georgy Zhukov Minister of Defence of Soviet Union 19571967 Succeeded by Andrei Grechko

Yakov Pavlov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Not to be confused with Ivan Dmitriyevich Pavlov, another veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad. This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (May 2012) Yakov Fedotovich Pavlov

Pavlov in 1945.

Nickname Born Died Allegiance Years of service Rank Unit Battles/wars

October 4, 1917 Krestovaya, Russian Empire September 29, 1981 (aged 63) Novgorod, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Soviet Union 19381946 Starshina Soviet 13th Guards Rifle Division Great Patriotic War

Awards

Other work

Battle of Stalingrad Hero of the Soviet Union Order of Lenin Order of the October Revolution Orders of the Red Star Numerous other medals Three-time Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR

Alexander Rodimtsev
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2009) Alexander Rodimtsev 8 March 1905 Scharlyk. Orenburg Oblast, Russia 13 April 1977 (aged 72) Moscow, Russia Soviet Union; Second Spanish Republic Red Army sometime during the 1920s unknown, but after 1945 Colonel-General 13th Guards Rifle Division; 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, which included the 13th Guards Rifle Division, the 66th Guards Rifle Division, and the 6th Guards Airborne Division Deputy Commander of the Eastern Siberian Military District and the Northern Military District Spanish Civil War; Eastern Front of the Second World War, including the Battle of Kharkov[disambiguation needed], Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, and Operation Bagration

Born Died Allegiance Service/branch Years of service Rank Unit Commands held Battles/wars

Awards

Order of Lenin; Order of the October Revolution; Order of the Red Banner; Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st class; Order of Suvorov; Order of the Red Star; Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad"; Medal "For the Defence of Kiev", Medal "For the Liberation of Prague";, Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", Jubilee Medal "Thirty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" as well as multiple medals from foreign governments.

Aleksandr Ilich Rodimtsev (19051977, Russian: ) was a Colonel-General in the Soviet Red Army during World War II and twice won the Hero of the Soviet Union award (in 1937 and 1945). Rodimtsev joined the Red Army in the 1920s. He fought in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Republicans against Francisco Franco in 1936-1937, where he earned his first decoration as a Hero of the Soviet Union. During the course of the Second World War, he is best remembered for his role in the Battle of Stalingrad, where he brilliantly commanded the 13th Guards Rifle Division which earned him his second order of Hero of the Soviet Union. The division was charged to hold the Germans between Mamaev Kurgan and Tsaritsa Gorge, which his outnumbered and outgunned force successfully did. Rodimtsev was vastly popular with his troops and was well known for his bravery. In 1943, after the Battle of Stalingrad, Rodimtsev commanded the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, which included the 13th Guards Rifle Division, the 66th Guards Rifle Division, and the 6th Guards Airborne Division. The 32nd Guards Rifle Corps was an element of the 5th Guards Army, which was a part of the Steppe Front (commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Konev), and engaged SS Panzer divisions at the Battle of Kursk. After the war Rodimtsev served as the Deputy Commander of the Eastern Siberian Military District, then served as a military attach in Albania, before serving again as a deputy commander for a Military District, this time for the Northern Military District.

References

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Battle of Stalingrad

Konstantin Rokossovsky
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Konstantin Rokossovsky

Rokossovsky as a Lieutenant-General. Born December 21, 1896 Warsaw, Russian Empire August 3, 1968 (aged 71) Moscow, Soviet Union Kremlin Wall Necropolis Russian Empire (19141917) Soviet Union (19171949) Poland (19491956) Soviet Union (19561968) 19141937, 19401962 Marshal of the Soviet Union Marshal of Poland 16th Army Central Front (commander) Don Front 1st Belorussian Front 2nd Belorussian Front Polish Armed Forces World War I Russian Civil War World War II

Died Buried at

Allegiance

Years of service Rank

Commands held

Battles/wars

Awards

Order of Victory Order of Lenin (7) Order of the Red Banner (6) Order of Suvorov, 1st Class Order of Kutuzov, 1st Class Virtuti Militari Cross of Grunwald Order of the Bath Lgion d'honneur Cross of St. George 4th class, Medal of St. George 4th, 3rd and 2nd class

Konstantin Rokossovsky (Polish: Konstanty Ksawerowicz Rokossowski, Russian: ; December 21 [O.S. December 9] 1896 August 3, 1968) was a Soviet officer of Polish origin who became a Marshal of the Soviet Union, a Marshal of Poland and served as Poland's Defence Minister. He was among the most prominent Red Army commanders of World War II, especially renowned for his planning and executing of Operation Bagration, one of the most decisive Red Army successes of the War.

Contents

1 Biography o 1.1 Early military career o 1.2 Great Purge, trial, torture and rehabilitation o 1.3 World War II o 1.4 Postwar o 1.5 Dates of rank 2 Honours and awards 3 References 4 External links

Biography
Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw, then part of the Russian Empire. His family had moved to Warsaw with the appointment of his father as the inspector of the Warsaw Railways. The Rokossovsky family was a member of the Polish nobility, and over generations had produced many cavalry officers. However, Konstantin's father, Ksawery Wojciech Rokossowski, was a railway official in Russia and his Russian mother was a teacher.[1] Orphaned at 14, Rokossovsky earned a living by working in a stocking factory, and some time later he became an apprentice stonemason. Much later in his life, the government of People's Republic of Poland used this fact for propaganda, claiming that Rokossovsky had helped to build Warsaw's Poniatowski Bridge. Rokossovsky's patronymic Ksaverovich was Russified on his enlistment into the Russian Army at the start of the First World War to Konstantinovich, which would be

easier to pronounce in the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment where he volunteered to serve.
Early military career

On joining the regiment, Rokossovsky soon showed himself a talented soldier and leader; he ended the war in the rank of a junior non-commissioned officer, serving in the cavalry throughout the war. He was wounded twice during the war and awarded the Cross of St George.[2][3] In 1917, he joined the Bolshevik Party and soon thereafter, entered the ranks of the Red Army. During the Russian Civil War he commanded a cavalry squadron of the Kargopolsky Red Guards Cavalry Detachment in the campaigns against the White Guard armies of Aleksandr Kolchak in the Urals. Rokossovsky received Soviet Russia's highest (at the time) military decoration, the Order of the Red Banner. In 1921 he commanded the 35th Independent Cavalry Regiment stationed in Irkutsk and played an important role in bringing Damdin Skhbaatar, the founder of the Mongolian People's Republic, to power in Ulan Bator.[4] It was here that he met his wife Julia Barminan, whom he married in 1923. Their daughter Ariadna was born in 1925.[5] In 1924 and 1925 he attended the Leningrad Higher Cavalry School and then returned to Mongolia where he was a trainer for the Mongolian People's Army. Soon after, while serving in the Special Red Banner Eastern Army under Vasily Blcher, he took part in the Russo-Chinese Chinese Eastern Railroad War of 1929-1930 when the Soviet Union intervened to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to joint Chinese and Soviet administration, after Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang of the Republic of China attempted to seize complete control of the railway. It was in the early 1930s that Rokossovsky's life first became intertwined with Georgy Zhukov (later Marshal of the Soviet Union), when Rokossovsky was the commander of the 7th Samara Cavalry Division, and Zhukov a brigade commander under him. A sense of the nature of the beginning of their famous World War II rivalry can be gathered from reading Rokossovsky's comments on Zhukov in an official report on his character:[6] "Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in his demands. A somewhat ungracious and not sufficiently sympathetic person. Rather stubborn. Painfully proud. In professional terms well trained. Broadly experienced as a military leader." Rokossovsky was among the first to realise the potential of armoured assault. He was an early supporter of the creation of a strong armoured corps for the Red Army, as championed by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in his theory of "deep operations".
Great Purge, trial, torture and rehabilitation

Rokossovsky held senior commands until 1937, when he became caught up in Joseph Stalin's Great Purge and accused of being a Polish spy. His association with the cutting edge methods of Marshal Tukhachevsky may have been the real cause of his conflict with more traditional officers such as Semyon Budenny, who still favoured cavalry tactics, and whose policy disagreements with Tukhachevsky triggered the Great Purge

of the Red Army, which resulted in the execution of the latter and many others.[7] Rokossovsky, however, survived. It is reported that he escaped the fate of so many other officers caught up in the purge by proving to the court that the officer whom his accusers claimed had denounced him had been killed in 1920 during the civil war.[8] According to Alexander Solzhenitsyn he endured two mock shooting ceremonies where people were shot dead around him.[8] In his famous "secret speech" of 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, when speaking on the subject of the purges, mentioned Rokossovsky, saying, "suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive, despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the Fatherland.".[9] After his trial Rokossovsky was sent to the Kresty Prison in Leningrad, where he remained until he was released without explanation on March 22, 1940. Semyon Timoshenko, who had been named People's Commissar for Defence of the Soviet Union after the debacle of the Winter War and was in desperate need of experienced officers to fill command posts for the rapidly expanding Soviet army, returned Rokossovsky to the command of the 5th Cavalry Corps at the rank of Colonel.[7] Subsequently the 5th Cavalry Corps participated in the occupation of Bessarabia and he was soon promoted to the rank of a Major General and given the command of the 9th Mechanised Corps under Kirponos in the Kiev Military Region, which would later be renamed the Southwestern Front at the outbreak of hostilities with Germany.
World War II

Rokossovsky (on the right) in Berlin, 1945

Rokossovsky on 1976 Soviet stamp

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 Rokossovsky was serving as the commander of the 9th Mechanised Corps, where his command participated in the Battle of Dubnoan early Soviet counter-attack that ended in the destruction of most of the participating Soviet forces against Von Rundstedt's Army Group South in the Ukraine. As the counter-attack progressed German resistance stiffened; Kirponos, the commander of the Southwestern Front, initially issued instructions to cease offensive operations and then argued with Chief of General Staff G.K. Zhukov, when Zhukov insisted that the counter-attack continue. As a result Rokossovsky's command was bombarded with conflicting orders, and according to Lieutenant-General D.I. Rjabyshev, Rokossovsky "expressed no ambivalence about the proposed counteroffensive" and resolved the dispute by refusing a direct order, saying: "We had once again received an order to counterattack. However, the enemy outnumbered us to such a degree, that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering to halt the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defences." [10] Despite this insubordination Timoshenko brought Rokossovsky to Smolensk in July, in an effort to prevent the fall of the city during Battle of Smolensk. He was given the unenviable task of cobbling together the remnants of D.G. Pavlov's Western Front, which had collapsed under the weight of the attack by the Wehrmacht's Army Group Centre during the Battle of BiaystokMinsk. With a limited force of 90 tanks and two rifle regiments, four artillery regiments and elements of the 38th Rifle Division, he is credited with blunting the advance of Field Marshal von Bock's 7th Panzer, 17th Panzer and 20th Motorized Division at Vyazma and allowing numerous Soviet soldiers to escape encirclement.[11] In September 1941 Stalin personally appointed Rokossovsky to the command of 16th Army, which was the first Soviet army group composed entirely of soldiers serving in shtrafbats (Soviet penal battalions); Stalin reportedly viewed Rokossovsky, the former

disgraced Gulag inmate who had barely escaped his imprisonment alive, as the perfect candidate to lead the brutal penal units, even going so far as to wryly comment on Rokossovsky's missing fingernails (pulled out by the NKVD torturers during his imprisonment) at the meeting where he was assigned his command. Rokossovsky's army was ordered to defend the approaches to Moscow, and was now under the direct command of General Georgy Zhukov, his former subordinate. The 16th Army (later renamed the 11th Guards Army) played a key role in the Battle of Moscow when it was deployed along the main axis of the German advance along the Volokolamsk Highway that was a central junction of the bitter fighting during the German winter offensive of 1941 (Operation Typhoon), as well as the subsequent Soviet counter-attack of 1941 42. On November 18, during the desperate last-ditch efforts of the Wehrmacht to encircle Moscow in 1941, General Rokossovsky, his soldiers under heavy pressure from Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group, asked his immediate superior, Zhukov, if he could withdraw the 16th Army to more advantageous positions. Zhukov categorically refused. Rokossovsky went over Zhukov's head, and spoke directly to Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, now Chief of the General Staff in Zhukov's place; reviewing the situation Shaposhnikov immediately ordered a withdrawal. Zhukov reacted at once. He revoked the order of the superior officer, and ordered Rokossovsky to hold the position. In the immediate aftermath, Rokossovsky's army was pushed aside and the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were able to gain strategically important positions north of Moscow, but this marked the high point of the German advance upon Moscow. Throughout Operation Typhoon, Rokossovsky's 16th army had taken the brunt of the German effort to capture Moscow. In March 1942 Rokossovsky was badly injured by a shell splinter. It was widely rumored that Valentina Serova was a mistress of Rokossovski during this time. While it's true that Serova, working as a hospital volunteer, met Rokossovski several times while he was recovering from his wound, there is no evidence that they were lovers.[12] Rokossovski already had a mistress at this time, Dr. Lt. Galina Talanova, with whom he had a daughter in 1945.[13] He spent two months in a Moscow hospital and was transferred to the Bryansk Front to take up command of the 16th Army once more.[5] He commanded the right flank of the Soviet forces as they fell back before the Germans towards the Don and Stalingrad in the summer of 1942. During the Battle of Stalingrad Rokossovsky, commanding the Don Front, led the northern wing of the Soviet counterattack that encircled Paulus' Sixth Army and won the decisive victory of the SovietGerman war. In 1943, after becoming commander of the Central Front, Rokossovsky successfully conducted defensive operations in the Kursk salient, and then led the counterattack west of Kursk which defeated the last major German offensive on the eastern front and allowed the Soviet armies to advance to Kiev. The Central Front was then renamed 1st Belorussian Front, which he commanded during the Soviet advance through Byelorussia (Belarus) and into Poland. In a famous incident during the planning in 1944 of Operation Bagration, Rokossovsky disagreed with Stalin, who demanded in accordance with Soviet war practice a single break-through of the German frontline. Rokossovsky held firm in his argument for two points of break-through. Stalin ordered Rokossovsky to "go and think it over" three times, but every time he returned and gave the same answer "Two break-throughs, Comrade Stalin, two break-throughs." After the third time Stalin remained silent, but

walked over to Rokossovsky and put a hand on his shoulder. A tense moment followed as the whole room waited for Stalin to rip the epaulette from Rokossovsky's shoulder; instead, Stalin said "Your confidence speaks for your sound judgement," and ordered the attack to go forward according to Rokossovsky's plan.[14] The battle was successful and Rokossovsky's reputation was assured. After crushing German Army Group Centre in Belarus, Rokossovsky's armies reached the east bank of the Vistula opposite Warsaw by mid-1944. For these victories he gained the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Stalin once said: "I have no Suvorov, but Rokossovsky is my Bagration."[citation needed] While Rokossovsky's forces stood stalled on the Vistula, the Warsaw Uprising (August - October, 1944) broke out in the city, led by the Polish Home Army (AK) on the orders of the Polish government in exile in London. Rokossovsky did not order reinforcement to the insurgents. Soviet assistance was limited to airdrops. There has been much speculation about Rokossovsky's personal views on this decision. He would always maintain that, with his communications badly stretched and enemy pressure against his northern flank mounting, committing forces to Warsaw would have been disastrous. In November 1944, Rokossovsky was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which advanced into East Prussia and then across northern Poland to the mouth of the Oder at Stettin (now Szczecin). At the end of April he linked up with British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's forces in northern Germany while the forces of Zhukov and Ivan Koniev captured Berlin. It has been speculated, without evidence, that he was not allowed to capture Berlin because he was Polish; this is according to Antony Beevor, author of the book Berlin: The Downfall 1945.
Postwar

As one of the most prominent Soviet military commanders of the Second World War, Rokossovsky was present at the Victory Parade in Red Square in Moscow in 1945, riding on a black stallion next to Marshal Georgy Zhukov. After the end of the war Rokossovsky remained in command of Soviet forces in Poland (Northern Group of Forces). In October 1949, with the establishment of a fully Communist government under Bolesaw Bierut in Poland, Rokossovsky, on Stalin's orders, became the Polish Minister of National Defense, with the additional title of Marshal of Poland. Together with Rokossovsky, several thousand Soviet officers were put in charge of almost all Polish military units, either as commanding officers or as their advisors.[15] In 1952 he became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. Although Rokossovsky was nominally Polish, he had not lived in Poland for 35 years, and most Poles regarded him as a Russian and Soviet emissary in the country.[16] As Rokossovsky himself bitterly put it: "In Russia, they say I'm a Pole, in Poland they call me Russian".[16] Rokossovsky took part in the suppression of the Polish independence movement and stalinization and sovietization of Poland in general and the Polish Army in particular.[17] As the superior commander of the Polish Army, he introduced various ways of suppression of anti-Soviet activity. Among the most notorious were the labour battalions of the army, to which all able-bodied men found socially or politically insecure or guilty of having their families abroad[18] were drafted. It is estimated that roughly 200,000 men were forced to work in labour camps in hazardous conditions,

often in quarries, coal and uranium mines, and 1,000 died in their first days of "labour", while tens of thousands became crippled.[18] Other groups targeted by the repressions were former soldiers of the pre-war Polish Army and wartime Home Army. In June 1956 during Pozna protests against poverty of working class, and Soviet occupation of Poland, Rokossovsky approved the order to send military units against protesters.[17] As a result of the action of over 10,000 soldiers and 360 tanks,[19] at least 74 civilians were killed.[20] When Communist reformers under Wadysaw Gomuka tried to come to power in Poland in 1956, Rokossovsky went to Moscov and tried to convince Nikita Khrushchev to use force against the Polish state.[21] After Gomuka managed to negotiate with the Soviets, Rokossovsky left Poland. He returned to the Soviet Union, which restored his Soviet ranks and honours; and in July 1957, following the removal from office of Defence Minister Zhukov, Nikita Khrushchev appointed him Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958 he became chief inspector of the Ministry of Defence, a post he held until his retirement in April 1962. He died in August 1968, aged 71. His ashes were buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis on Red Square.
Dates of rank

promoted Major General, 4 June 1940 promoted Lieutenant General, 14 July. 1941 promoted Colonel General, 15 Jan. 1943 promoted Army General, 28 April 1943 promoted Marshal of the Soviet Union, 29 June 1944 declared Marshal of Poland 2 November 1949

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Russian Empire

Cross of St. George, 4th class Medal of St. George, 2nd, 3rd and 4th classes

Soviet Union

Order of Victory ( 6 - 3/30/1945) "Gold Star" Hero of the Soviet Union, twice (29 July 1944, 1 June 1945) Seven Orders of Lenin (16 August 1936, 2 January 1942, 29 July 1944, 21 February 1945, 26 December 1946, 20 December 1956, 20 December 1966) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of the Red Banner, six times (23 May 1920, 2 December 1921, 22 February 1930, 22 July 1941, 3 November 1944, 6 November 1947)

Order of Suvorov, 1st class (28 January 1943) Order of Kutuzov, 1st class (27 August 1943) Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" (22 February 1938) Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" (22 December 1942) Medal "For the Defence of Moscow" (1 May 1944) Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" (9 May 1945) Medal "For the Capture of Knigsberg" (9 June 1945) Medal "For the Capture of Berlin" (9 June 1945) Medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw" (9 June 1945) Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" (22 February 1948) Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" (18 December 1957) Medal "For the Defence of Kiev" (21 June 1961) Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" (7 May 1965) Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" (26 December 1967) Medal "In Commemoration of the 800th Anniversary of Moscow" Honorary weapon with gold National Emblem of the USSR (1968)

Polish awards

Order of the Builders of People's Poland (1951) Grand Cross of the Virtuti Militari (1945) Cross of Grunwald, 1st class (1945) Medal "for Warsaw 1939-1945" (17 March 1946) Medal "For the Oder, Neisse, and the Baltic Sea" (17 March 1946) Medal of Victory and Freedom 1945 (1946)

Foreign Awards

Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour (France, 9 June 1945) Croix de guerre 19391945 (France, 1945) Honorary Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (UK, 1945) Chief Commander of the Legion of Merit (USA, 1946) Order of the Red Banner (Mongolia, 1943) Order of Sukhbaatar (Mongolia, 18 March 1961) Order of Friendship (Mongolia, 12/10/1967) Medal "For Freedom" (Denmark, 1947) Medal "For Service to the Army of China" (China, 1956)

References
1. ^ " " (in Russian). Retrieved 2009-05-09. site dedicated to Rokossovsky 2. ^ http://www.rokossowski.com/bio.htm 3. ^ http://english.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/2248959/4515909/index.html | Voice of Russia in New York City 4. ^ [1] THE HISTORY OF KYAKHTA 5. ^ a b http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/military/konstantin-rokossovsky/ | Russiapedia 6. ^ Soviet strategic thought, 1917-91 By dre f evich Kokoshin. Page 43

7. ^ a b Sphar (1997-06-17). Stalin's lieutenants: a study of command under duress. ISBN 978-0-89141-564-0. 8. ^ a b Helen Rappaport (1999). Joseph Stalin: a biographical companion. ISBN 978-157607-208-0. 9. ^ http://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm | Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. 10. ^ Lieutenant General D.I. Rjabyshev. On the role of the 8th Mechanized Corps in the June 1941 counteroffensive mounted by the South-Western Front. 11. ^ Robert Kirchubel (2007-08-21). Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3): Army Group Center, Volume 3. ISBN 978-1-84603-107-6. 12. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric; Moscow, 1941, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 295 13. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric; Moscow, 1941, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 208 14. ^ Chris Bellamy (2007). "18". Absolute War. London: Panmacmillan. p. 610. ISBN 978-0330-51004-2. 15. ^ Norman Davies (1982). God's Playground. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-05353-3. (also ISBN 0-231-05351-7) 16. ^ a b (Polish) W e w B k w k (1994). Rokossowski - na ile Polak? (Rokossowski How Much of a Pole?). Warsaw: Alfa. p. 326. ISBN 83-7001-755-X. 17. ^ a b (Polish) P we P tr w k , Barbara Polak (6 2001). " er e f cer w e ge er w e (S d er Off cer Ge er )" ( Scholar search). Biuletyn IPN 6 (7/2001). ISBN 1641-9561 Check |isbn= value (help). Archived from the original on March 22, 2005. Retrieved 2006-04-17.[dead link] 18. ^ a b (Polish) Anna Witalis Zdrzenicka (2005). "P k gu g. Z p m kr ywd powraca (Polish Gulag: the Forgotten Lesion Returns)". Gazeta Oglnopolska 1 (1). Retrieved 2006-04-17. 19. ^ (English) Grzegorz Ekiert; Jan Kubik (2001). Rebellious Civil Society : Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 2729. ISBN 0-472-08830-0. 20. ^ according to official figures, as in: (Polish) Maciej Szewczyk (2005). "P k czerwiec 1956". Poznaoczyk. Retrieved 2006-04-17. 21. ^ Wprost 24 - Rezydent Wolski

External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Konstantin Rokossovsky

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Konstanty Rokossowski

Rokossowski speech on National Unity Congress in Poland (December 1949)

Alexander Shcherbakov
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Alexander Shcherbakov on postage stamps Aleksandr Sergueyevich Shcherbakov (Russian: ; 1901[1] 10 May 1945), was a founding member of the Soviet Writers' Union, along with Maxim Gorky. Following the latter's death in 1936, Shcherbakov was transferred from his role as First Secretary to the lower role of Second Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee where he reported to Andrei Zhdanov. He was also a notable critic of Ivan Gronsky. He became First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Party Committee in 1938, a post he held until his death. During the German-Soviet War, Shcherbakov served as the head of the political directorate of the Red Army (with the rank of colonel general) in Moscow, and at the same time was director of the Soviet Information Bureau. According to Antony Beevor's book, Stalingrad, The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943, "One of the richest sources in the Russian Ministry of Defence central archive at Podolsk consists of the very detailed reports sent daily from the Stalingrad Front to Aleksandr Shcherbakov." After suffering from years of alcoholism, Shcherbakov died of heart failure on 10 May 1945, right after Victory Day, and the following year the town of Rybinsk was renamed Shcherbakov in his honour (its original name was restored in 1957).

References
1. ^ Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich. "The Unknown Stalin" , 2005

Semyon Timoshenko
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2012)

Marshal Semyon Timoshenko

People's Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union In office 7 May 1940 19 July 1941 Vyacheslav Molotov Premier Joseph Stalin Kliment Voroshilov Preceded by Succeeded by Joseph Stalin Personal details Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko 18 February 1895 Born Furmanivka, Bessarabia Governorate, Russian Empire 31 March 1970 (aged 75) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Died Union Soviet Union Nationality Communist Party of the Soviet Political party Union Military service Russian Empire Allegiance Soviet Union Russian Imperial Army Service/branch Soviet Army Years of service 1914 1960 Marshal Rank Kiev Military District Northwestern Front Commands Belorussian Military District World War I Battles/wars

Russian Civil War Polish-Soviet War Winter War Great Patriotic War / World War II Awards Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (Russian: , Semn Konstantinovi Timoenko; Ukrainian: , Semen Kostiantynovych Tymoshenko) (18 February [O.S. 6 February] 1895 31 March 1970) was a Ukrainian military commander and senior professional officer of the Red Army at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

Contents

1 Early life 2 The Russian Civil War and the 1930s 3 The Winter War 4 World War II 5 Postwar 6 Awards 7 References 8 External links

Early life
Timoshenko was born into a Ukrainian farmer family at Furmanivka, in the Budjak region (Southern Bessarabia). In 1914, he was drafted into the army of the Russian Empire and served as a cavalryman on Russia's western front (commonly referred to in Western European and American sources as the Eastern Front given the geographical perspective of nations west of Germany). On the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he sided with the bolsheviks, joining the Red Army in 1918 and the Bolshevik Party in 1919.

The Russian Civil War and the 1930s

During the Russian Civil War, Timoshenko fought on various fronts. His most important encounter occurred at Tsaritsyn (later renamed Stalingrad, and now Volgograd), where he met and befriended Joseph Stalin. This would ensure his rapid advancement after Stalin gained control of the Communist Party by the end of the 1920s. In 19201921, Timoshenko served under Semyon Budyonny in the 1st Cavalry Army; he and Budyonny would become the core of the "Cavalry Army clique" which, under Stalin's patronage, would dominate the Red Army for many years. By the end of the Civil and Polish-Soviet Wars, Timoshenko had become commander of the Red Army cavalry forces. Thereafter, under Stalin, he became Red Army commander in Belarus (1933); in Kiev (1935); in the northern Caucasus and then

Kharkov (1937); and Kiev again (1938). In 1939, he was given command of the entire western border region and led the Ukrainian Front during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. He also became a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. As a loyal friend, Timoshenko survived Stalin's Great Purge, to be left as the Red Army's senior professional soldier.

The Winter War

In January 1940, Timoshenko took charge of the Soviet armies fighting Finland in the Soviet-Finnish War. This had begun the previous November, under the disastrous command of Kliment Voroshilov. Under Timoshenko's leadership, the Soviets succeeded in breaking through the Finnish Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, prompting Finland to sue for peace in March. His reputation increased, Timoshenko was made the People's Commissar for Defence and a Marshal of the Soviet Union in May. John Erickson writes: "Although by no means a military intellectual, Timoshenko had at least passed through the higher command courses of the Red Army and was a fully trained 'commander-commissar'. During the critical period of the military purge, Stalin had used Timoshenko as a military district commander who could hold key appointments while their incumbents were liquidated or exiled."[1] Timoshenko was a competent but traditionalist military commander who nonetheless saw the urgent need to modernise the Red Army if, as expected, it was to fight a war against Nazi Germany. Overcoming the opposition of other more conservative leaders, he undertook the mechanisation of the Red Army and the production of more tanks. He also reintroduced much of the traditional harsh discipline of the Tsarist Russian Army.

World War II
When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union Stalin collapsed from depression for trusting Hitler as a "friend" So Timoshenko took over until Stalin "recovered" enough to return to his "job". When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin took over the post of Defence Commissar and sent Timoshenko to the Central Front to conduct a fighting retreat from the border to Smolensk. In September, he was transferred to Ukraine, where the Red Army had suffered 1.5 million casualties while encircled at Uman and Kiev. In May 1942, Timoshenko, with 640,000 men, launched a counter-offensive (the Second Battle of Kharkov) which was the first Soviet attempt to gain the initiative in the war. After initial Soviet successes, the Germans struck back at Timoshenko's exposed southern flank, halting the offensive and turning the battle into a Soviet defeat. General Georgy Zhukov's success in defending Moscow during December 1941 had persuaded Stalin that he was a better commander than Timoshenko. Stalin removed Timoshenko from front-line command, giving him roles as overall commander of the Stalingrad (June 1942), then North-Western (October 1942), Leningrad (June 1943), Caucasus (June 1944) and Baltic (August 1944)[specify] fronts. In 1944, his daughter Ekaterina married Stalin's son Vasily.[2]

Postwar
After the war, Timoshenko was reappointed commander of the Baranovichi Military District (Belorussian Military District since March 1946), then of the South Urals Military District (June 1946); and then the Belorussian Military District once again (March 1949). Primo Levi mentions the arrival of Timoshenko at Starye Dorogi holding camp in September 1945, to announce their repatriation, in his book The Truce. In 1960, he was appointed Inspector-General of the Defence Ministry, a largely honorary post. From 1961 he chaired the State Committee for War Veterans. He died in Moscow in 1970.

Awards
This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Russian Empire

Cross of St. George, 2nd, 3rd and 4th classes

Soviet Union

Hero of the Soviet Union (21 March 1940, 18 February 1965) Order of Victory 11 - 06/04/1945) Five Orders of Lenin (22 February 1938, 21 March 1940, 21 February 1945, 18 February 1965, 18 February 1970) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of the Red Banner, five times (25 July 1920, 11 May 1921, 22 February 1930, 3 November 1944, 6 November 1947) Order of Suvorov, 1st class, three times (9 October 1943, 12 September 1944, 27 April 1945) Honorary revolutionary weapon - a sword with a nominal Order of the Red Banner (28 November 1920) Honor inscribed sword with a gold National Emblem of the Soviet Union (22 February 1968) Medal "For the Defence of Moscow" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "In Commemoration of the 800th Anniversary of Moscow" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"

Foreign awards

Order of the Tudor Vladimirescu, 1st class (Romania) Military Order of the White Lion "For Victory" (Czechoslovakia) Golden Order of the Partisan Star (Yugoslavia)

Medal "30 Years of Victory in the Khalkhin-Gol" (Mongolia)

Political offices

Preceded by Kliment Voroshilov

People's Commissar of Defense 19401941

Succeeded by Joseph Stalin

References
1. ^ John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany, Vol. 1 (Yale University Press, 1999: ISBN 0-300-07812-9), pp. 96, 107. 2. ^ Aleksandr Kolesnik, [Chronicle of the life of Stalin's family] (Interbuk, 1990), p. 108.

External links

Quotations related to Semyon Timoshenko at Wikiquote Media related to Semyon Timoshenko at Wikimedia Commons Portrait of Marshall Semyon Timoshenko at the UK national archives

Aleksandr Vasilevsky
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search For other people named Aleksandr Vasilevsky, see Aleksandr Vasilevsky (disambiguation). Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky

Native name Born

September 30, 1895 Novaya Golchikha, Vichuga, Russian Empire December 5, 1977 (aged 82) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Kremlin Wall Necropolis

Died Buried at Allegiance Years of service Rank

Russian Empire (19151917) Soviet Union (19171959)

19151959 Marshal of the Soviet Union

Commands held

Chief of General Staff Minister of Defense 3rd Belorussian Front World War I Russian Civil War Polish-Soviet War Winter War World War II Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation

Battles/wars

Awards

Order of Victory (2) Order of Suvorov, 1st Class Order of Lenin (8) Order of the Red Banner (2) Virtuti Militari

Other work

Memoirs: The Matter of My Whole Life, 1973.

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky (Russian: , September 30 [O.S. September 18] 1895, Vichuga December 5, 1977) was a Russian career officer in the Red Army, promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1943. He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense during World War II, as well as Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1953. As the Chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky was responsible for planning and coordinating almost all decisive Soviet offensives, from the Stalingrad counteroffensive to the assault on East Prussia and Knigsberg. Vasilevsky began his military career during World War I, earning the rank of captain by 1917. At the start of the October Revolution and the Civil War he was conscripted into the Red Army, taking part in the Polish-Soviet War. After the war, he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a regimental commander by 1930. In this position, he showed great skill in organizing and training his troops. Vasilevsky's talent was noticed, and in 1931 he was appointed a member of the Directorate of Military Training. In 1937, following Stalin's Great Purge, he was promoted to General Staff officer. At the start of the 1943 Soviet counteroffensive of World War II, Vasilevsky coordinated and executed the Red Army's offensive on the upper Don, in the Donbass, Crimea, Belarus and Baltic states, ending the war with the capture of Knigsberg in April 1945. In July 1945, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East, executing the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation and subsequently accepting Japan's surrender. After the war, he became the Soviet Defense Minister, a position he held until Stalin's death in 1953. With Nikita Khrushchev's rise, Vasilevsky began losing power and was eventually pensioned off. After his death, he was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis in recognition of his past service and contributions to his nation.

Contents

1 Biography o 1.1 Childhood and early years o 1.2 World War I and Civil war o 1.3 The interwar period o 1.4 World War II 1.4.1 Start and Battle of Moscow 1.4.2 Summer and fall 1942 1.4.3 Soviet victory

1.4.4 Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation o 1.5 After World War II 2 Awards 3 Personality and opinions 4 Footnotes 5 References

Biography
Childhood and early years

Vasilevsky was born on September 30 [O.S. September 18], 1895 in Novaya Golchikha in the Kineshma Uyezd (now part of the city of Vichuga in the Ivanovo Oblast). Vasilevsky was the fourth of eight children.[1] His father, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Vasilevsky, was a priest to the nearby St. Nicholas Church. His mother, Nadezhda Ivanovna Sokolova, was the daughter of a priest in the nearby village of Ugletz. Vasilevsky reportedly broke off all contact with his parents after 1926 because of his Communist Party of the Soviet Union membership and his military duties in the Red Army; three of his brothers did so also. However, the family resumed relations in 1940, following Joseph Stalin's suggestion that they do so.[2][3] According to Vasilevsky, his family was extremely poor. His father spent most of his time working to earn money, while the children assisted by working in the fields. In 1897, the family moved to Novopokrovskoe, where his father became a priest to the newly-built Ascension Church,[4] and where Aleksandr began his education in the church school. In 1909, he entered Kostroma seminary,[5] which required considerable financial sacrifice on the part of his parents.[6] The same year, a ministerial directive preventing former seminarists from starting university studies initiated a nationwide seminarist movement, with classes stopping in most Russian seminaries. Vasilevsky, among others, was expelled from Kostroma, and only returned several months later, after the seminarists' demands had been satisfied.[7]
World War I and Civil war

World War I Russian infantry.

After completing his studies in the seminary and spending a few years working as a teacher, Vasilevsky intended to become an agronomist or a surveyor, but the outbreak of the First World War changed his plans. According to his own words, he was "overwhelmed with patriotic feelings"[8] and decided to become a soldier instead. Vasilevsky took his exams in January 1915 and entered the Alexander Military Law Academy in February. As he recalls, "I did not decide to become an officer to start a military career. I still wanted to be an agronomist and work in some remote corner of Russia after the war. I could not suppose that my country would change, and I would."[9][10] After four months of courses that he later considered to be completely outdated, theoretical, and inappropriate for modern warfare,[11] he was sent to the front with the rank of praporshchik, the highest non-commissioned rank in the Russian infantry, in May 1915.[12] From June to September, Vasilevsky was assigned to a series of reserve regiments, and finally arrived at the front in September as a half-company commander (polurotny) in the 409th Novokhopersky regiment, 109th division, 9th Army.[13] In the spring of 1916, Vasilevsky took command of a company, which eventually became one of the most recognized in the regiment.[14] In May 1916, he led his men during the Brusilov offensive, becoming a battalion commander after heavy casualties among officers, and gaining the rank of captain by age 22.[15][16] In November 1917, just after the Russian Revolution, Vasilevsky decided to end his military career. As he wrote in his memoirs, "There was a time when I led soldiers to battle, thinking I was doing my duty as a Russian patriot. However, I understood that we have been cheated, that people needed peace.... Therefore, my military career had to end. With no remorse, I could go back to my favorite occupation, working in the field."[17] He travelled from Romania, where his unit was deployed in 1917, back to his own village. In December 1917, while back at home, Vasilevsky learned that the men of the 409th regiment, which had been relocated to Ukraine, had elected him as their commander (at the start of the Russian Revolution, commanders were elected by their own men). However, the local military authorities recommended that he decline the proposal because of the heavy fighting taking place in Ukraine between pro-Soviet forces and the pro-independence Ukrainian government (the Central Rada). He followed this advice and became a drill instructor in his own Kineshma uezd.[18] He retired in September 1918 and became a school teacher in the Tula Oblast.[19] In April 1919, Vasilevsky was again conscripted into the Red Army and sent to command a company fighting against peasant uprisings and assisting in the emergency Soviet policy of prodrazvyorstka, which required peasants to surrender agricultural surplus for a fixed price. Later that year, Vasilevsky took command of a new reserve battalion, and, in October 1919, of a regiment. However, his regiment never took part in the battles of the Russian Civil War, as Anton Denikin's troops never got close to Tula.[20] In December 1919, Vasilevsky was sent to the Western front as a deputy regimental commander, participating in the Polish-Soviet War.[5][21][22]

Aleksandr Vasilevsky in 1928.

As deputy regimental commander of the 427th regiment, 32nd brigade, 11th division, Vasilevsky participated at the battle of Berezina, pulling back as the Polish forces had been slowly but steadily advancing eastward, and in the subsequent counterattack that began on May 14, 1920, breaking through Polish lines before being stopped by cavalry counterattacks.[23] Later, starting from July 4, 1920, he took part at the Soviet offensive towards Wilno, advancing to Neman river despite heavy Polish resistance and German fortifications erected in the region during World War I. Vasilevsky's regiment arrived near Wilno by mid-July and stayed there on a garrison duty until the Treaty of Riga.[24]
The interwar period

After the Treaty of Riga, Vasilevsky fought against remaining White forces and peasant uprisings in Belarus and in the Smolensk Oblast until August 1921.[25] By 1930, he had served as the regimental commander of the 142nd, 143rd, and 144th rifle regiments,[5] where he showed great skill in organizing and training his troops. In 1928, he graduated from the Vystrel regimental commander's course.[5][26] During these years, Vasilevsky established friendships with higher commanders and Party members, including Kliment Voroshilov,[27] Vladimir Triandafillov[28] and Boris Shaposhnikov.[29] Shaposhnikov, in particular, would become Vasilevsky's protector until the former's death in 1945. Vasilevsky's connections and good performance earned him an appointment to the Directorate of Military Training in 1931.[30] While at the Directorate of Military Training, Vasilevsky supervised the Red Army's training and worked on military manuals and field books. He also met several senior military commanders, such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Georgy Zhukov, then the Deputy Cavalry Inspector of the Red Army. Zhukov would later characterize Vasilevsky as "a man who knew his job as he spent a long time commanding a regiment and who earned great respect from everybody."[31] In 1934, Vasilevsky was appointed to be the Senior Military Training Supervisor of the Volga Military District (Privolzhsky voyenny okrug).[5] In 1937, he entered the Academy of the General Staff,[32][33] where he studied important aspects of military strategy and other topics under experienced generals, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky.[34]

By mid-1937, Stalin's Great Purge eliminated a significant number of senior military commanders, vacating a number of positions on the General Staff. To his amazement, Vasilevsky was appointed to the General Staff in October 1937 and held "responsible for operational training of senior officers."[5][35] In 1938, he was made a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (a sine qua non condition for a successful career in the Soviet Union); in 1939, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, while holding the rank of divisional commander.[5] While in this position he and Shaposhnikov were responsible for the planning of the Winter War, and after the Moscow peace treaty, for setting the demarcation line with Finland.[36] As a senior officer, Vasilevsky met frequently with Joseph Stalin. During one of these meetings, Stalin asked Vasilevsky about his family. Since Vasilevsky's father was a priest and thus a potential "enemy of the people", Vasilevsky said that he had ended his relationship with them in 1926. Stalin, surprised, suggested that he reestablish his family ties at once, and help his parents with whatever needs they might have.[2][3]
World War II

Start and Battle of Moscow By June 1941, Vasilevsky was working around the clock in his General Staff office.[37] On June 22, 1941, he learned of the German bombing of several important military and civilian objectives,[38] starting Operation Barbarossa. In August 1941, Vasilevsky was appointed Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff,[39] making him one of the key figures in the Soviet military leadership. At the end of September 1941, Vasilevsky gave a speech before the General Staff, describing the situation as extremely difficult, but pointing out that the northern part of the front was holding, that Leningrad still offered resistance, and that such a situation would potentially allow some reserves to be gathered in the northern part of the front.[40] In October 1941, the situation at the front was becoming critical, with German forces advancing towards Moscow during Operation Typhoon. As a representative of the Soviet General Staff (Stavka), Vasilevsky was sent to the Western Front to coordinate the defense and guarantee a flow of supplies and men towards the region of Mozhaisk,[41] where Soviet forces were attempting to contain the German advance. During heavy fighting near the outskirts of Moscow, Vasilevsky spent all of his available time both in the Stavka and on the front line trying to coordinate the three fronts committed to Moscow's defense.[42] When most of the General Staff (including its chief Marshal Shaposhnikov) was evacuated from Moscow, Vasilevsky remained in the city as liaison between the Moscow Staff and the evacuated members of the General Staff.[42] In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev described Vasilevsky as an "able specialist" even so early in the war.[43] On October 28, 1941, Vasilevsky was promoted to Lieutenant General.[44] The Battle of Moscow was a very difficult period in Vasilevsky's life, with the Wehrmacht approaching close enough to the city for German officers to make out some of Moscow's buildings through their field glasses. As he recalls, his workday often ended at 4 a.m.[45] Moreover, with Marshal Shaposhnikov having fallen ill, Vasilevsky

had to make important decisions by himself.[46] On October 29, 1941, a bomb exploded in the courtyard of the General Staff. Vasilevsky was slightly wounded but continued working. The kitchen was damaged by the explosion, and the General Staff was relocated underground without hot food. Nevertheless, the Staff continued to function.[47] In December 1941, Vasilevsky coordinated the Moscow counteroffensive, and by early 1942, the general counteroffensive in the Moscow and Rostov directions, further motivated in his work by the return of his evacuated family to Moscow.[48] In April 1942, he coordinated the unsuccessful elimination of the Demyansk pocket, the encirclement of the German 2nd Army Corps near Leningrad. On April 24, with Shaposhnikov seriously ill again, Vasilevsky was appointed as acting Chief of Staff and promoted to Colonel General on April 26. Summer and fall 1942

Vasilevsky inspecting the front.

In May 1942 one of the most controversial episodes in Vasilevsky's career occurred: the Second Battle of Kharkov, a failed counteroffensive that led to a stinging Red Army defeat, and ultimately to a successful German offensive (Operation Blue) in the south. After repelling the enemy from Moscow, Soviet morale was high and Stalin was determined to launch another general counteroffensive during the summer. However, Vasilevsky recognized that "the reality was more harsh than that."[49] Following Stalin's orders, the Kharkov offensive was launched on May 12, 1942. When the threat of encirclement became obvious, Vasilevsky and Zhukov asked for permission to withdraw the advancing Soviet forces. Stalin refused,[50][51] leading to the encirclement of the Red Army forces and a total defeat. In his memoirs, Khrushchev accused Vasilevsky of being too passive and indecisive, as well as being unable to defend his point of view in front of Stalin during that particular operation.[52] As he wrote, "It was my view that the catastrophe... could have been avoided if Vasilevsky had taken the position he should have. He could have taken a different position... but he didn't do that, and as a result, in my view, he had a hand in the destruction of thousands of Red Army fighters in the Kharkov campaign."[53] In June 1942, Vasilevsky was briefly sent to Leningrad to coordinate an attempt to break the encirclement of the 2nd Shock Army led by General Andrei Vlasov. On June 26, 1942 Vasilevsky was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and, in October 1942, Deputy Minister of Defense.[39] He was now one of the few people responsible for the global planning of Soviet offensives. Starting from July 23, 1942, Vasilevsky was a

Stavka representative on the Stalingrad front, which he correctly anticipated as the main axis of attack.[54] The battle of Stalingrad was another difficult period in Vasilevsky's life. Sent with Zhukov to the Stalingrad Front, he tried to coordinate the defenses of Stalingrad with radio links working intermittently, at best.[55] On September 12, 1942, during a meeting with Stalin, Vasilevsky and Zhukov presented their plan for the Stalingrad counteroffensive after an all-night brainstorming session.[56][57] Two months later, on November 19, with Stalingrad still unconquered, Operation Uranus was launched. Since Zhukov had been sent to near Rzhev to execute Operation Mars (the Rzhev counteroffensive), Vasilevsky remained near Stalingrad to coordinate the double-pincer attack that ultimately led to the German defeat[39] and annihilation of the armies entrapped in the cauldron, all a result of the plan he had presented to Stalin on December 9.[58][59] This plan sparked some debate between Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky, who wanted an additional army for clearing Stalingrad, which Rokossovsky continued to mention to Vasilevsky even years after the war.[60] The army in question was Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Guards' which Vasilevsky committed against a dangerous German counter-attack launched from Kotelnikovo by the 57th Panzer corps and designed to deblockade the Stalingrad pocket. Soviet victory

Vasilevsky and Budyonny in the Donbass, 1943.

In January 1943, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives on the upper Don River near Voronezh and Ostrogozhsk, leading to decisive encirclements of several Axis divisions.[39][61] In mid-January, Vasilevsky was promoted to General of the Army and only 29 days later, on February 16, 1943, to Marshal of the Soviet Union. In March 1943, after the creation of the Kursk salient and the failure of the Third Battle of Kharkov, Stalin and the Stavka had to decide if the offensive should be resumed despite this setback, or if it was better to adopt a defensive stance. Vasilevsky and Zhukov managed to persuade Stalin that it was necessary to halt the offensive for now, and wait for the initiative from the Wehrmacht.[62] When it became clear that the supposed German offensive was postponed and would no longer take place in May

1943 as expected, Vasilevsky successfully defended continuing to wait for the Wehrmacht to attack, rather than making a preemptive strike as Khrushchev wanted.[63] When the Battle of Kursk finally began on July 4, 1943, Vasilevsky was responsible for coordinating the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.[39] After the German failure at Kursk and the start of the general counteroffensive on the left bank of the Dnieper, Vasilevsky planned and executed offensive operations in the Donbass region.[39][64] Later that year, he developed and executed the clearing of Nazi forces from Crimea.[65] At the start of 1944, Vasilevsky coordinated the Soviet offensive on the right bank of the Dnieper, leading to a decisive victory in eastern Ukraine. On April 10, 1944, the day Odessa was retaken, Vasilevsky was presented with the Order of Victory, only the second ever awarded (the first having been awarded to Zhukov).[66] Vasilevsky's car rolled over a mine during an inspection of Sevastopol after the fighting ended on May 10, 1944. He received a head wound, cut by flying glass, and was evacuated to Moscow for recovery.[67] During Operation Bagration, the general counteroffensive in Belarus, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.[68] When Soviet forces entered the Baltic states, Vasilevsky assumed complete responsibility for all the Baltic fronts, discarding the 3rd Belorussian.[69] On July 29, 1944, he was made Hero of the Soviet Union for his military successes.[39] In February 1945, Vasilevsky was again appointed commander of 3rd Belorussian Front to lead the East Prussian Operation, leaving the post of General Chief of Staff to Aleksei Antonov.[70] As a front commander, Vasilevsky led the East Prussian operation and organized the assaults on Knigsberg and Pillau.[39] He also negotiated the surrender of the Knigsberg garrison with its commander, Otto Lasch. After the war, Lasch claimed that Vasilevsky did not respect the guarantees made during the city's capitulation. Indeed, Vasilevsky promised that German soldiers would not be executed, that prisoners, civilians and wounded would be treated decently, and that all prisoners would return to Germany after the end of the war. Instead, Lasch remained in prison for 10 years and returned to Germany only in 1955, as did many of the Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, while all German population was expelled from Eastern Prussia.[71] For the brilliant successes at Knigsberg and in Eastern Prussia, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Order of Victory.[66] Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation

Vasilevsky in Port Arthur, China, 1945.

During the 1944 summer offensive, Stalin announced that he would appoint Vasilevsky Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East once the war against Germany ended. Vasilevsky began drafting the war plan for Japan by late 1944 and began fulltime preparation by April 27, 1945. In June 1945, Stalin approved his plan. Vasilevsky then received the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East and flew to Chita to execute the plan. During the preparation phase, Vasilevsky further rehearsed the offensive with his army commanders and directed the start of Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, also known as the Battle of Manchuria. In twenty-four days, from August 9 to September 2, 1945, the Japanese armies in Manchukuo were defeated, with just 37,000 casualties out of 1,600,000 troops on the Soviet side.[72] For his success in this operation, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Hero of the Soviet Union decoration on September 8.[39]
After World War II

Between 1946 and 1949, Vasilevsky remained Chief of Staff, then became Defense Minister from 1949 to 1953. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Vasilevsky fell from grace and was replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, although he remained deputy Defense minister. In 1956, he was appointed Deputy Defense Minister of Military Science, a secondary position with no real military power. Vasilevsky would occupy this position for only one year before being pensioned off by Nikita Khrushchev, thus becoming a victim of the bloodless purge that also saw the end of Zhukov. In 1959, he was appointed General Inspector of the Ministry of Defense, an honorary position. In 1973, he published his memoirs, The Matter of My Whole Life. Aleksandr Vasilevsky died on December 5, 1977.[5] His body was cremated and his ashes immured in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis.[16]

Awards

A reconstruction of Vasilevsky's ribbon bar, without foreign decorations.

In his memoirs, Vasilevsky recalls Stalin's astonishment when, at a ceremony taking place in the Kremlin on December 4, 1941, the Soviet leader saw just a single Order of the Red Star and a medal on Vasilevsky's uniform.[73] However, Vasilevsky eventually became one of the most decorated commanders in Soviet history. Vasilevsky was awarded the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union twice for operations on the German and Japanese fronts. He was awarded two Orders of Victory (an achievement matched only by Zhukov and Stalin) for his successes in Crimea and Prussia. During his career, he was awarded eight Orders of Lenin (several of them after the war), the Order of the October Revolution when it was created in 1967, two Orders of the Red Banner, a first class Order of Suvorov for his operations in Ukraine and Crimea, and his first decoration, an Order of the Red Star, earned in 1940 for his brilliant staff work during the Winter War. Finally, he was awarded a third class Order for Service to the Homeland as recognition for his entire military career when this order was created in 1974, just three years before Vasilevsky's death. Vasilevsky was also awarded fourteen medals. For his participation in various campaigns, he was awarded the Defense of Leningrad, Defense of Moscow, Defense of Stalingrad and Capture of Knigsberg medals. As with all Soviet soldiers who took part in the war with Germany and Japan, he was awarded the Medal For the Victory Over Germany and the Medal "For the Victory over Japan". He also received several commemorative medals, such as Twenty, Thirty, Forty, and Fifty Years Since the Creation of the Soviet Armed Forces medals, Twenty and Thirty Years Since the Victory in the Great Patriotic War medals, the Eight Hundredth Anniversary of Moscow medal (awarded in 1947 for his participation in the battle of Moscow) and the Hundredth Birthday of Lenin medal. In addition to Soviet orders and medals,

Vasilevsky was awarded several foreign decorations such as the Polish Virtuti Militari Order from the Polish communist government.[39]
Soviet Union

"Gold Star" Hero of the Soviet Union, twice (29 July 1944, 8 September 1945) Eight Orders of Lenin (21 May 1942, 29 July 1944, 21 February 1945, 29 September 1945, 29 September 1955, 29 September 1965, 29 September 1970, 29 September 1975) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of Victory tw ce ( 2 d 7 10 pr 1944 19 pr 1945) Order of Red Banner, twice (3 November 1944, 20 June 1949) Order of Suvorov, 1st class (28 January 1943) Order of the Red Star (1939) Order for Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd class (30 April 1975) "For military valour. To commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army"(1938) Medal "For the Defence of Moscow" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Capture of Knigsberg" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Medal "For the Victory over Japan" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "Thirty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Medal "In Commemoration of the 800th Anniversary of Moscow" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Honorary weapon with gold National Emblem of the USSR (1968)

Foreign awards

Order of Sukhbaatar, twice (Mongolia, 1966, 1971) Order of the Red Banner (Mongolia, 1945) Order "The People's Republic of Bulgaria", 1st class (1974) Order of Karl Marx (East Germany, 1975) Order of the White Lion, 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1955) Military Order of the White Lion "For Victory", 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Virtuti Militari, 1st class (Poland, 1946) Order of Polonia Restituta, 2nd and 3rd classes (Poland; 1968, 1973) Cross of Grunwald, 1st class (Poland, 1946) Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour (France, 1944) Croix de guerre 19391945 (France, 1944) Legion of Merit, Chief Commander (USA, 1944) Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire (UK, 1943) Order "Partisan Star", 1st class (Yugoslavia, 1946) Order of National Liberation (Yugoslavia, 1946) Order of the National Flag, 1st class (North Korea, 1948) Order of the Precious bowl, 1st class (China, 1946)

Czechoslovak War Cross 1939-1945 (Czechoslovakia, 1943)

Personality and opinions

Vasilevsky was regarded by his peers as a kind and soft military commander. General Sergei Shtemenko, a member of the General Staff during the war, described Vasilevsky as a brilliant, yet modest officer with outstanding experience in staff work. Shtemenko pointed out Vasilevsky's prodigious talent for strategic and operational planning. Vasilevsky also showed his respect for subordinates and demonstrated an acute sense of diplomacy and politeness, which Stalin appreciated. As a result, Vasilevsky enjoyed almost unlimited trust from Stalin.[74] Several years before the war, Zhukov described Vasilevsky as "a man who knew his job as he spent a long time commanding a regiment and who earned great respect from everybody."[31] During the war, Zhukov described Vasilevsky as an able commander, enjoying exceptional trust from Stalin, and able to persuade him even during heated discussions.[75] Vasilevsky never mentioned his awards (including the two orders of Victory) in his memoirs, attesting to his modesty. Vasilevsky's actions and personality were sometimes the object of dispute, while less controversial than those of Zhukov. In particular, Nikita Khrushchev defined Vasilevsky in his memoirs as a passive commander completely under the control of Stalin, and blamed him for the Kharkov failure in Spring 1942.[76] Among Vasilevsky's strongest critics was Rokossovsky, who criticized Vasilevsky's decisions during the Stalingrad counteroffensive, especially his refusal to commit the 2nd Army to the annihilation of the encircled German divisions, and for general interference with his own work.[77] Rokossovsky even wrote in his memoirs: "I do not even understand what role could Zhukov and Vasilevsky play on Stalingrad front."[78] In fairness to Vasilevsky it needs noting that he only diverted the 2nd army from the assault on the Stalingrad pocket to commit it against a dangerous German counter-attack from Kotelnikovo, designed to deblockade the pocket, which was enjoying great numerical superiority. Vasilevsky, it seems, was dismayed by Rokossovsky's opposition to the transfer. On the other hand, the writer Victor Suvorov held up Vasilevsky over Zhukov. According to him, Vasilevsky was the only officer responsible for the successful planning and execution of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, and Zhukov played no role whatsoever in it. He claimed that Vasilevsky was the best Soviet military commander and that Soviet victory was mainly due to his actions as the Chief of Staff. According to Suvorov, Zhukov and the Soviet propaganda machine tried, after the war, to reduce the role of the General Staff (and thus Vasilevsky's importance) and to increase the role of the Party and Zhukov.[79] A post-1991 view on Vasilevsky was elaborated by Mezhiritzky in his book, Reading Marshal Zhukov. Mezhiritzky points out Vasilevsky's timidity and his inability to defend his opinions before Stalin. Reportedly, Vasilevsky was appointed to such high military positions because he was easy to manage.[80] However, Mezhiritzky recognizes Vasilevsky's intelligence and assumes that Vasilevsky was indeed the main author of the Stalingrad counteroffensive. He also points out that Vasilevsky and Zhukov probably deliberately under-reported the estimated strength of the 6th Army to gain Stalin's approval for that risky operation.[81]

Footnotes
1. ^ Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, The matter of my whole life, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p. 8. 2. ^ a b Vasilevsky, p.96. 3. ^ a b Constantine Pleshakov, Stalin's Folly, Houghton Mifflin Books, ISBN 0-618-367012, 2005, p.5556. (online link) 4. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 9. 5. ^ a b c d e f g h K.A. Zalessky, Stalin's empire (biographic dictionary), Moscow, Veche, 2000 (entry: Vasilevsky). 6. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 10. 7. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 12. 8. ^ Vasilevsky, p.14 9. ^ This is a reference to the 1917 Russian Revolution and Vasilevsky's emerging communist beliefs 10. ^ Vasilevsky, p.14. 11. ^ Vasilevsky, p.15. 12. ^ Vasilevsky, p.16 13. ^ Vasilevsky, p.19. 14. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 23. 15. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 27. 16. ^ a b Shikman A.P., Actors of our History, biographical dictionary, Moscow, 1997, entry "Vasilevsky". 17. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 30. 18. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 31. 19. ^ Vasilevsky, p.33. 20. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 35. 21. ^ Vasilevsky, p.4149. 22. ^ Spencer C Tucker, Who's Who in Twentieth-Century Warfare, Routledge (UK), 2001, ISBN 0-415-23497-2, p. 339, (online link) 23. ^ Vasilevsky, p.4244 24. ^ Vasilevsky, p.45 25. ^ Vasilevsky, p.4950 26. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 61. 27. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 5960. 28. ^ A Russian warfare theoretician, famous for his deep operations theory. 29. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 63. 30. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 70. 31. ^ a b Zhukov, p.110. 32. ^ Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1969 1978, entry "Vasilevsky". 33. ^ Vasilevsky, p.80 34. ^ Vasilevsky, p.81. 35. ^ Vasilevsky, p.82. 36. ^ Kees Boterbloem, The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 18961948, McGill-Queen's Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7735-2666-8, p. 203 (online link) 37. ^ Vasilevsky, p.106 38. ^ Vasilevsky, p.110 39. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Moscow, 19761979, tome 2, entry "Vasilevsky" 40. ^ S.M. Shtemenko, The General Staff during the war, 2nd ed., Moscow, Voenizdat, 1989, p.26 41. ^ Shtemenko, p.25

42. ^ a b Shtemenko, p. 27 43. ^ Nikita Khrushchev, Time. People. Power. (Memoirs), tome 1, Moscow, IIK "Moscow News", 1999, p. 296 44. ^ Vasilevsky, p.146 45. ^ Vasilevsky, p.145 46. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 150 47. ^ Shtemenko, p. 29 48. ^ Vasilevsky, p.159 49. ^ Vasilevsky, p.184 50. ^ Zhukov, p.64 51. ^ Shtemenko, p.40 52. ^ Khrushchev, p. 297 53. ^ Sergei Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Penn State Press, 2004, ISBN 0271-02332-5, p.299 (online link) 54. ^ Shtemenko, p.5253 55. ^ Shtemenko, p. 60 56. ^ Shtemenko, p.6364 57. ^ Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, Routledge (UK), 1988, ISBN 0-415-07863-6, p.171 (online link) 58. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 243 59. ^ Stanley Rogers, Duncan Anderson, The Eastern Front, Zenith Imprint, 2001, ISBN 07603-0923-X, p. 127 60. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 248 61. ^ Shtemenko, p. 90 62. ^ Shtemenko, p.122123 63. ^ Shtemenko, p. 131 64. ^ Shtemenko, p. 141 65. ^ Shtemenko, p.154 66. ^ a b http://mondvor.narod.ru/OPobeda.html, retrieved on July 8, 2006. 67. ^ Vasilevsky, p.395 68. ^ Steven J Zaloga, Bagration 1944, Osprey Publishing, 1996, ISBN 1-85532-478-4, p. 21.(online link) 69. ^ Shtemenko, p. 208 70. ^ Shtemenko, p.219 71. ^ Otto von Lasch, So fell Knigsberg, Moscow, 1991, chapter "Capitulation". 72. ^ Daniel Marston, The Pacific War Companion, Osprey Publishing, 2005, ISBN 1-84176882-0, p. 242, (online link). 73. ^ Vasilevsky, p. 151152 74. ^ Shtemenko, p.105108 75. ^ Zhukov, p. 345 76. ^ Khrushchev, p.362370 77. ^ Marshal K. Rokossovsky, Soldier's duty, Moscow, Politizdat, 1988. 78. ^ Rokossovsky, p.235 79. ^ Viktor Suvorov, Shadow of Victory, Moscow, ACT, 2002, chapter 15 80. ^ P.Ya.Mezhiritzky, Reading Marshal Zhukov, Philadelphia, Libas Consulting, 2002, ch. 32 81. ^ P.Ya.Mezhiritzky, ch. 60

References

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Aleksandr Vasilevsky

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Aleksandr Vasilevsky

Nikita Khrushchev (1999), Time. People. Power. (Memoirs), vol. 1. Moscow: IIK Moscow News. Otto von Lasch (1991), So fell Knigsberg ('So fiel Knigsberg'). Moscow. P.Ya. Mezhiritzky (2002), Reading Marshal Zhukov'. Philadelphia: Libas Consulting. Marshal K. Rokossovsky (1988), Soldier's duty. Moscow: Politizdat. A.P. Shikman (1997), Actors of our History (biographical dictionary). Moscow. S.M. Shtemenko (1989), The General Staff during the war. 2nd ed., Moscow: Voenizdat. Viktor Suvorov (2002), Shadow of Victory. Moscow: ACT. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky (1978), The matter of my whole life. Moscow: Politizdat. K.A. Zalessky (2000), Stalin's empire (biographical dictionary). Moscow: Veche. Marshal G.K. Zhukov (2002), Memoirs. Moscow: Olma-Press. (19691978) Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Moscow. (19761979) Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Moscow.

Nikolay Voronov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2009)

The interrogation of Friedrich Paulus at Don Front HQ, 1943. Left to right: Rokossovsky, Voronov, translator Nikolay Dyatlenko and Field Marshal Paulus. Nikolay Nikolayevich Voronov (Russian: ; born May 5 [O.S. May 17] 1899 in Saint Petersburg, Russian Empire; died February 28, 1968, in Moscow, Soviet Union) was a Soviet military leader, Chief Marshal of Artillery (1944), and Hero of the Soviet Union (May 7, 1965). He was commander of artillery forces of the Red Army from 1941 until 1950.

Honours and awards

Hero of the Soviet Union Order of Lenin, six times Order of the October Revolution Order of the Red Banner, four times Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, three times Order of the Red Star Medal "For the Defence of Leningrad" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Defence of Moscow" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Medal "For the Victory over Japan" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Medal "In Commemoration of the 800th Anniversary of Moscow" Medal "In Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of Leningrad" Honorary weapons

Foreign awards:

Order of Sukhbaatar (Mongolia) Order of Red Banner (Mongolia) Order of the Partisan Star, 1st class (Yugoslavia) Order of National Liberation (Yugoslavia) Cross of Grunwald, 1st class (Poland) Commander of the Order of Polonia Restituta (Poland)

Nikolay Voronov is interred in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis at the Red Square.

Dates of rank
o o o o o

Kombrig November 26, 1935 Komkor June 20, 1937 Colonel General May 7, 1940 Marshal of Artillery January 18, 1943 (equivalent to NATO four star rank) Chief Marshal of Artillery February 21, 1944

Andrey Yeryomenko
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Eremenko" and "Yeremenko" redirect here. For other uses, see Eremenko (disambiguation).

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2008) Andrey Ivanovich Yeryomenko

Andrey Yeryomenko in 1938. Native name Russian: Ukrainian:

Born

October 14, 1892 Markovka, Kharkov Governorate, Russian Empire (now Ukraine) November 19, 1970 (aged 78) Moscow, Soviet Union Kremlin Wall Necropolis Russian Empire (19131918) Soviet Union (19181958) Russian Imperial Army Red Army 19131958 Marshal of the Soviet Union North Caucasus Military District Stalingrad Front

Died Buried at Allegiance

Service/branch Years of service Rank Commands held

1st Baltic Front 2nd Baltic Front Carpathian Military District World War I Russian Civil War Great Patriotic War Hero of the Soviet Union Hero of Czechoslovakia Order of Lenin (5) Order of the Red Banner (4) Order of the October Revolution Order of Suvorov, 1st Class (3) Order of Kutuzov, 1st Class[1]

Battles/wars

Awards

Andrey (Andrei) Ivanovich Yeryomenko (or Yeremenko, Eremenko; Russian: ; Ukrainian: ; October 14 [O.S. October 2] 1892 November 19, 1970) was a Soviet general during World War II and, subsequently, a Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Contents

1 Military career o 1.1 Draft and early service o 1.2 World War II 2 After the war 3 Honours and awards 4 Commands [4] 5 References

Military career
Draft and early service

Born in Markovka in the province of Kharkov in Ukraine to a peasant family, Yeryomenko was drafted into the Imperial Army in 1913, serving on the Southwest and Romanian Fronts during World War I. He joined the Red Army in 1918, where he served in the legendary Budyonny Cavalry (First Cavalry Army). He attended the Leningrad Cavalry School and then the Frunze Military Academy, graduating in 1935.
World War II

In 1940, Yeryomenko was placed in command of the 6th Cavalry Corps, which was responsible for invading Eastern Poland following the MolotovRibbentrop Pact. The

operation was characterized by poor organization and command. Yeryomenko had to request an emergency airlift of fuel so as to continue his advance. Afterwards, he held a number of commands, ending up in control of the Transbaikal Military District, the post he held when Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941. Eight days after the invasion began, Yeryomenko was recalled to Moscow, where he was made the Acting Commander of the Soviet Western Front, two days after its original commander, General of the Army Dmitri Pavlov, was dismissed (and later convicted and executed) for incompetence. Yeryomenko was thrust into a very precarious position. Ironically, during a political purge, Stalin had executed the most experienced army officers just prior to the German invasion. Stalin did not expect Hitler to invade the Soviet Union until 1942 at the earliest. The Nazi Blitzkrieg approach to warfare quickly dominated the Western Front, but Yeryomenko motivated the remaining troops, and halted the German offensive just outside of Smolensk. During this vicious defensive Battle of Smolensk, Yeryomenko was wounded. Because of his injuries, he was transferred to the newly created Bryansk Front. In August 1941, Yeryomenko was ordered to launch an offensive along the Bryansk Front, despite the obvious superiority of the German forces. The offensive failed to accomplish its objective despite a valiant effort. In October the Germans launched Operation Typhoon, which was an offensive aimed at capturing Moscow. Yeryomenko's forces were pushed back, but eventually a number of counterattacks were able to halt the German push. On October 13, Yeryomenko was once again wounded, this time severely. He was evacuated to a military hospital in Moscow, where he spent several weeks recovering. In January 1942, Yeryomenko was appointed commander of the 4th Shock Army, part of the North-Western Front. During the Soviet Winter Counteroffensive, Yeryomenko was again wounded; this time on January 20, when German planes bombed his headquarters. Yeryomenko refused to evacuate to a hospital until the battle surrounding him finished. Stalin gave Yeryomenko the command of the Southeastern Front, on August 1, 1942,[2] where he proceeded to launch vicious counterattacks against the German offensive into the Caucasus, Fall Blau. Yeryomenko and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev planned the defense of Stalingrad. When his subordinate, Gen. Lopatin, doubted his ability to defend Stalingrad, Yeryomenko replaced him with lieutenant general Vasily Chuikov as 62nd Army commander on September 11, 1942.[3] On September 28, the Southeastern Front was renamed the Stalingrad Front. During Operation Uranus, November 1942, Yeryomenko's forces helped surround the German 6th Army, which was eventually destroyed or captured in the Battle of Stalingrad. After German General Erich von Manstein attempted to counterattack the Soviet forces and break through the line to relieve the surrounded Germans. Yeryomenko's successfully repelled the attack. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was renamed Southern Front. After the end of the winter offensive, in March 1943, Yeryomenko was transferred north to the Kalinin Front, which remained relatively quiet until September, when Yeryomenko launched a small, but successful offensive. In December, Yeryomenko was once again sent south, this time to take command of the Separate Coastal Army, which was put together to retake Crimea, which was accomplished with assistance from Fyodor Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front. In April, Yeryomenko once again was sent north, to command the 2nd Baltic Front. During the summer campaign, 2nd Baltic was very successful in crushing

German opposition, and was able to capture Riga, helping to bottle up some 30 German divisions in Latvia. On March 26, 1945, Yeryomenko was transferred to the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the unit he controlled until the end of the war. Fourth Ukrainian was positioned in Eastern Hungary. Yeryomenko's subsequent offensive helped capture the rest of Hungary, and paved the way for the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. His army occupied many cities and towns in Czechoslovakia, most notably Ostrava. Today, many streets in the Czech Republic bear his name.

After the war

After the war, Yeryomenko had three major commands: between 19451946, he was the Commander in Chief of the Carpathian Military District, from 1946-1952 he was the Commander in Chief of the Western Siberian Military District, and from 1953-1958 he was the Commander in Chief of the North Caucasus Military District. On March 11, 1955, Yeryomenko, along with five other noteworthy commanders, was given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was made Inspector General for the Ministry of Defense in 1958, a largely ceremonial role that allowed him to retire that same year. He died November 19, 1970. The urn containing his ashes is buried in the Kremlin.

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Soviet Union

"Gold Star" Medal Hero of the Soviet Union (29 July 1944) Five Orders of Lenin (22 February 1938, 29 July 1944, 21 February 1945, 13 October 1962, 13 October 1967) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of the Red Banner, four times (15 June 1926, 22 February 1941, 3 November 1944, 20 June 1949) Order of Suvorov, 1st class, four times (23 January 1943, 16 May 1944, 23 May 1945) Order of Kutuzov, 1st class (22 September 1943) Honorary weapon with a National Emblem of the Soviet Union in gold (22 February 1968) Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army"

Foreign Awards

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (28 April 1970) Legion of Merit, Commander (USA) Order of Klement Gottwald Honorary Citizen of Volgograd (4 May 1970), Smolensk, Daugavpils (27 July 1964) and Ostrava (Czech Republic)

Commands [4]

Military offices Preceded by Unidentified Commanding Officer of the 79th Cavalry Regiment 1929 - 1936 Commanding Officer of the 22nd Cavalry Regiment 1937 Commanding Officer of the 14th Cavalry Division 1937 - 1938 Commanding General of the 6th Cavalry Corps 1938 - 1940 Commanding General of the 3rd Mechanized Corps 1940 Commanding General of the North Caucasus Military District 1940 - 1941 Commanding General of the 1st Red Banner Army Jan 1941 - Jun 1941 Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Unidentified Succeeded by Marshal Timoshenko, Yeryomenko as vice commander of Western Front Succeeded by Major General Georgiy Fedorovich Zakharov Succeeded by Lieutenant General Filipp

Preceded by Army General Dumitry Pavlov

Commanding General of the Western Front 28 June 1941 2 July 1941

Preceded by Newly Formed

Commanding General of the Bryansk Front 16 Aug 1941 13 Oct 1941 Commanding General of the 4th Shock Army December 25th 1941 February

Preceded by 27th Army renamed as

4th Shock Army Preceded by Unidentified

13th 1942 Commanding General of the Southwestern Front 1942 - 12 Jul 1942 Commanding General of the Stalingrad Front 12 Jul 1942 - 7 Aug 1942 Commanding General of the Southeastern Front 7 Aug 1942 - 28 Sep 1942 Commanding General of the Stalingrad Front 28 Sep 1942 - 1 Jan 1943 Commanding General of the Southern Front 1 Jan 1943 - Feb 1943 Commanding General of the Kalinin Front April 7 - October 12, 1943 Commanding General of the 1st Baltic Front October 12 - November 19, 1943 Commanding General of the Separate Coastal Army Feb 3, 1944 Apr 18, 1944

Golikov Succeeded by Unidentified

Preceded by Newly Formed Preceded by Newly Formed by splitting the Stalingrad Front Preceded by Reformed from Southeastern Front Preceded by Reformed from Stalingrad Front Preceded by Army General Maksim Purkayev Preceded by Renamed from Kalinin Front Preceded by Army General Ivan Yefimovich Petrov

Succeeded by Unidentified

Succeeded by Disbanded

Succeeded by Unidentified Succeeded by General Lieutenant Rodion Malinovsky Succeeded by Renamed 1st Baltic Front Succeeded by Army General Hovhannes Bagramyan Succeeded by Lieutenant General Kondrat Semenovich Melnik Succeeded by 2nd Baltic Front was merged into Leningrad Front Succeeded by Redisgnated as Carpathian Military

Preceded by Army General Markian Popov Preceded by Army General Ivan Yefimovich Petrov

Commanding General of the 2nd Baltic Front April 23, 1944 - Feberuary 1945 Commanding General of the 4th Ukrainian Front 26 Mar 1945 - 25 Aug 1945

District Preceded by Newly Formed from 4th Ukrainian Front Preceded by General Lieutenant V.I. Kurdyumov Preceded by Colonel General S G Trofimenko Preceded by Unidentified Commanding General of the Carpathian Military District 25 Aug 1945 - October 1946 Commanding General of the Western Siberian Military District Oct 1946 - Nov 1953 Commanding General of the North Caucasus Military District November 1953 - April 1958 Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense April 1958 Succeeded by Colonel General K.N. Galytskyy Succeeded by Disbanded to form Siberian Military District Succeeded by Army General Issa Alexandrovich Pliyev Succeeded by Unidentified

References
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Andrey Yeremenko

1. ^ (Russian) Biography on War Heroes site. 2. ^ Craig, William (1973). Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky and Konecky. p. 25. ISBN 1-56852-368-8. 3. ^ Craig, William (1973). Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky and Konecky. p. 83. ISBN 1-56852-368-8. 4. ^ http://generals.dk/general/Eremenko/Andrei_Ivanovich/Soviet_Union.html

Vasily Zaytsev
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Vasily Grigoryevich Zaytsev

Zaytsev with his Mosin-Nagant rifle in Stalingrad, October 1942 Nickname Vasya 23 March 1915 Yeleninskoye, Russian Empire (now Chelyabinsk Oblast) 15 December 1991 (aged 76) Kiev, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union Soviet Union 19371945 Captain

Born

Died Allegiance Years of service Rank

Eastern Front (World War II)

Battles/wars

Battle of Stalingrad

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2013)

Vasily Grigoryevich Zaytsev (Russian: ; IPA: [vsilj rorjevt zajtsf]; 23 March 1915 15 December 1991) was a Soviet sniper during World War II, notable particularly for his activities between 10 November and 17 December 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad; during this five-week period he killed 225 soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht and other Axis armies, including 11 enemy snipers.[1]

Prior to 10 November, he had already killed 32 Axis soldiers with the standard-issue MosinNagant rifle effective range of 900 meters.[1] Between October 1942 and January 1943, Zaytsev made an estimated 400 kills, some of which were over 1000 meters.[citation
needed]

Contents

1 Early life 2 War career o 2.1 World War II 3 Commemoration 4 In popular culture 5 Honours and awards 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links

Early life
Zaytsev was born in Yeleninskoye and grew up in the Ural Mountains, where he learned marksmanship by hunting deer and wolves with his grandfather and younger brother.He brought home his first trophy at the age of twelve: a wolf that he shot with a single bullet from his first personal weapon, a large single-barreled Berdan rifle, which he was just barely able to carry behind his back at the time.

War career
Zaytsev served in the Soviet Navy as a clerk in Vladivostok. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Zaytsev, like many of his comrades, volunteered to be transferred to the front line. He was a chief petty officer in the Navy, and was assigned the rank of senior warrant officer upon transfer to the army.
World War II

Zaytsev's grave at Volgograd (former Stalingrad).

On 22 September 1942, while still in training, Zaytsev and a comrade were hidden in one building, with a German sniper in another building. When Zaytsev's friend was shot by the German, Zaytsev found himself locked into a duel with the German sniper over the next three days. When Zaytsev finally killed his opponent, he examined the body expecting that the German was of high rank, but instead discovered that his victim was a regular soldier. During Zaytsev's career as a sniper, he would conceal himself in various locations on high ground, under rubble, in water pipes, etc. After a few kills, he would change his position. Together with his partner Nikolay Kulikov, Zaytsev would exercise his hide and sting tactics. One of Zaytsevs common tactics was to cover one large area from three positions, with two men at each point a sniper and scout. This tactic, known as the sixes, is still in use today, and was implemented during the war in Chechnya.[2] Zaytsev took part in the Battle of Stalingrad until January 1943, when he suffered an injury to his eyes from a mortar attack. He was attended to by Professor Filatov, who is credited with restoring his sight. On 22 February 1943, Zaytsev was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He then returned to the front and finished the war in Seelow Heights in Germany with the military rank of Captain. After the war, Zaytsev settled in Kiev, where he studied at a textile university before he obtained employment as an engineer. He rose to become the director of a textile factory in Kiev, and remained in that city until he died in 1991 at the age of 76, just 10 days before the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. He was initially buried in Kiev despite his final request to be buried at Volgograd. Vasily was later reburied in 2006, at Volgograd.

Commemoration

Zaytsev's rifle on display

On 31 January 2006, Vasily Zaytsev was reburied on Mamayev Kurgan in Stalingrad (now Volgagrad) with full military honours. Zaytsev's dying wish was to be buried at the monument to the defenders of Stalingrad. His coffin was carried next to a monument where his famous quote is written: "For us there was no land beyond (the) Volga". Colonel Donald Paquette of the US Sniper School was present and laid a wreath as a sign of respect to a legendary sniper. US Army News quoted Colonel Paquette: "Vasily Zaytsev is a legend and every USA sniper must memorize his tactics and methods. He is a legend in the sniper community. May he rest in peace."[1]

In popular culture
In 2001, a feature length film, Enemy at the Gates, starring Jude Law as Zaytsev, was based on part of William Craig's book Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad, which includes a "sniper's duel" between Zaytsev and a Wehrmacht sniper school director, Major Erwin Knig. Zaytsev himself indicates in his own memoirs that a threeday duel did indeed occur and that the sniper he killed was the head of a sniper school near Berlin. However, there is no evidence that any Major Erwin Knig ever existed, despite the claim made by the Armed Forces Museum of Moscow that they are in possession of his telescopic sight.

Honours and awards

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia.

Hero of the Soviet Union Order of Lenin Order of the Red Banner, twice Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class Medal "For Courage" Jubilee Medal "In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary since the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "Thirty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "Forty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "60 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "70 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Honorary Citizen of the Hero City of Volgograd

References
1. ^ a b c Biography (in Russian) at the website on Heroes of the Soviet Union and Russia 2. ^ Russiapedia

Further reading

Zaitsev, Vassili (2003). Notes of a Sniper. Trans. David Givens, Peter Kornakov, Konstantin Kornakov. Ed. Neil Okrent. Los Angeles: 2826 Press Inc. ISBN 0-615-121489. Beevor, Antony (1998). Stalingrad. London: Penguin Books Ltd. ISBN 0-14-100131-3. Robbins, David L. (2000). War of the Rats. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 0-55358135-X. The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II (1989). London: Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN 0-89577-333-3

External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Vasily Zaytsev

(Russian) Biography of Vasily Zaytsev at WarHeroes.ru (Russian) Zaytsev, Vasily (1981). Notes of a Sniper. (ZIP). Moscow: Sovremennik. Zaytsev, Vasily Russiapedia Military Prominent Russians at Russiapedia.rt.com Stick-Breaker and the Hare (Poem) World War II sniper list

litchenko tireur d'elite sovietique pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, creditee de 309

ennemis tues.

Snipers photos -

1,

2,

3,

4,

5,

Top WW2 Snipers

Not all of the scores are full, because of unknown some data of 1945. "Erwin Konig", "Heinz Thorvald" and "Sulo Kolkka" are not in this list, because these names are apocryphal. Trying to track down correct military data from World War II can be a daunting task. There are missing fight dates, casualty numbers, and more.
kills 702 country name Mihail Ilyich Surkov (4th rifle division) Vladimir Gavrilovich Salbiev (71 and 95 at 20.12.1944 Guards rifle divisions) Vasiliy Shalvovich Kvachantiradze (259th rifle regiment) Simo Hayha Ahat Abdulhakovich Ahmetianov (260 rifle regiment) Ivan Mihailovich Sidorenko (1122nd rifle regiment) Nikolay Yakovlevich Ilyin (50th Guards rifle regiment) Vladimir Nikolayevich Pchelintsev (11th rifle brigade) Nikolay Yedokimovich Kazyuk Pyotr Alexeyevich Goncharov (44th Guards rifle regiment) Mihail Ivanovich Budenkov (59th Guards rifle regiment) until September 1944; ~100 - by machinegun at 15.01.1944

601

534 505 502 ~500 and 1 tank, 3 tracktors 494

456 [inc. 14 snipers]

446

441

437

429

Fyodor Matveyevich Ohlopkov (1243rd, 234th, 259th rifle regiments) 425 Fyodor Trofimovich Dyachenko (187th rifle regiment) Afanasiy Yemelianovich Gordienko (136th Guards rifle division) Vasiliy Ivanovich Golosov (81st Guards until July 1943 rifle regiment) Stepan Vasilievich Petrenko (59th Guards rifle regiment) Nikolay Ivanovich Galushkin (50th division) Tuleugali Nasyrhanovich Abdybekov (8th Guards rifle regiment) Semen Danilovich Nomokonov Ivan Petrovich Antonov (160th separate rifle company) Gennadiy Iosifovich Velichko (1008th rifle regiment) Ivan Grigorievich Kalashnikov (1st Guards artillery regiment) Alexandr Alexeyevich Govoruhin (296th rifle regiment) Aduhagi Idrisov (1232nd rifle regiment) Philipp Yakovlevich Rubaho (393rd separate marine batalion) Leonid Vladimirovich Butkevich (1331st until July 1943 rigle regiment) Matthaus Hetzenauer (144th Gebirgsjager Regiment of the 3rd until July 1943 sniper-only score the data of September 1944

425

422 [inc. 70 snipers]

422 [inc. 12 snipers]

418 [inc. 17 snipers]

397

367 [inc. a general]

362 [inc. 20 snipers]

360 ~350 (inc. 45 during nights) 349

349 346 and 1 tank , 8 strongpoints 345 and 22 MGs

345

Mountain Division) 340 Ivan Ivanovich Larkin (1183rd rifle regiment) Ivan Pavlovich Gorelikov (29th Guards rifle regiment) Arseniy Yetobayev M. (1238th rifle regiment) Victor Ivanovich Medvedev (969th rifle regiment) Ilya Leonovich Grigoriev (252th rifle regiment) Yevgeniy Adrianovich Nikolaev (14th rile regiment NKVD) Mihail Adamovich Ivasik (380th rifle regiment) Zhambyl Yesheyevich Tulaev (580th rifle regiment) Ludmila Mihaylovna Pavlichenko (54th female rifle regiment) Alexander Pavlovich Lebedev (1287th rifle regiment) Vasiliy Alexandrovich Titov (301st separate artillery division) Ivan Timofeyevich Dobrik (14th rifle regiment) Moisey Timofeyevich Usik (547th rigle regiment) until October 1943 until June 1943 from 1941 to 1942 the data on 28.04.1943

338

335 and 2 planes

331

328 [inc. 18 snipers]

324 [inc. a general]

320

313 [inc. 30+ snipers]

309 [inc. 36 snipers]

307

307

302

300

~300

Nikolay Stepanovich Vedernikov (969th the data including rifle regiment) machinegun score Maxim Semyonovich Bryksin (726th

~300

rifle regiment) 299 298 [inc. 5 snipers] and 2 tanks by grenades 287 Nikifor Samsonovich Afanasiev (250th Guards rifle regiment) Ivan Filippovich Abdulov (849th rifle regiment) Grigoriy Simanchuk M. (72nd rifle division) Ivan Grigorievich Ostafeychuk (397th rifle division) Yakov Mihaylovich Smetnyov (210th rifle regiment) Vitaliy Mefodievich Bezgolosov (227th rifle regiment) Tsyrendashi Dorgiev (202nd rifle division) Anatoliy Ivanovich Chehov (39th Guards rifle regiment) Mihail Stepanovich Sohin (44th Guards rifle regiment) Pavel Georgievich Shoretz Josef 'Sepp' Allerberger (144th Gebirgsjager Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division) Ivan Nikolayevich Kulbertinov (23rd separate ski brigade ; 7th Guards airbone regiment) Fyodor Kuzmich Chegodaev (595th rifle until May 1942 regiment) Nikolay V. Nikitin (248 artillery until March 1943

until July 1943

280

279 and 1 captive

279

270

265

261

261

257

252 and some MGs and cars

250 and 1 plane

~250

regiment) 248 and 5 captives Ivan Ivanovich Bocharov (481st rifle regiment) Nikolay Vasilievich Palmin (234th rifle division) Mihail Ignatievich Belousov (1179th rifle regiment) Vasiliy Grigorievich Zaytsev (1047th rifle regiment) Liba Rugova female not including machinegun score until September 1944 on summer 1943 until June 1943 until March 1944

247

245

242 [inc. 11 snipers]

242

240

Yegor Konstantinovich Petrov Vladimir Nesterovich Dmitrienko (333rd Guards rifle regiment) Ibragim Suleymenov (8th Guards rifle division) Maxim Alexandrovich Passar (117th rifle regiment) Kalimulla Zeinutdinov (417th rifle division) David Teboevich Doyev (1133rd rifle regiment) Pyotr Ivanovich Golichenkov (1st rifle divisio NKVD) Mihail Yakovlevich Mironov (92nd rifle regiment) Nikolay V. Gorbatenko (239th rifle regiment)

239

239

236

226

226

225 [inc. 23 snipers]

not including machinegun score

223

222

at 1.7.1943

218

Nikolay Fyodorovich Semyonov (169th the data of June rifle regiment) 1943

217

Ivan Grigorievich Naymushin (375th rifle division) Vasiliy S. Ratayev (13th rifle division) Nikolay Ivanovich Samsonov Bruno Sutkus (68th infantry division) Ilya Borisovich Elkin (16th NKVD border 1942-1943 regiment) Vahit Gazizovich Galimov (100th Guards rifle regiment) Ahat A. Ahmetyanov (260th rifle regiment) Elkin Noj Petrovich Adamia (7th marine brigade) Vasiliy Ivanovich Talalayev (12th Guards cavalry regiment) the data of 19421943 including 50+ by MG

214 209 209

207

207

204

203 200+ ; and 2 tanks by ATR 200+ ; and 1 strongpoint by grenades 200+

Fahretdin Atnagulov Friedrich Pein (12th company Gebirgsjagerregiment 143, 2nd company Jagerregiment 227) Vasiliy Mihaylovich Komaritzkiy (1183rd rifle regiment) the data on December 1942

200+

200

~200 and 1 plane

Vasiliy Timofeyevich Kurka (726th rifle teenager boy regiment) Vladimir Nikiforovich Krasnov Nikolay Terentievich Tkachyov (21st Guards rifle division)

~200

~200

194 ; and 2 tanks by grenades and 3 halftracks 193

Anatoliy Vladimirovich Kozlyonkov (483rd Guards rifle regiment)

Dorgi Uhinov Mahmut Mutiyevich Amayev (87th Guards rifle regiment) Janis Voldemarovich Vilhelms (201st rifle division) Mamed Ali Abbasov (69th marine brigade) Phillip Andreyevich Ivanov (288th rifle regiment) Gavriil Nikiforovich Handogin (922nd, 674th rifle regiments) Alexey Fedorovich Kochegarov (286th and 372nd rifle divisions) Stepan Petrovich Denisenko (336th rifle division) Gefreiter Meyer Zagid Kalievich Rahmatullin (14th rifle division NKVD) Ivan S. Brezgin (713th rifle division) Zahar Kilya Matvey M. Zvyagintsev (163rd rifle coprps) Guriy A. Borisov (234th rifle division) Dusenbay Shinibekov including machinegun score the data on the end of 1943 data of June 1943

192

190 and 1 tank

187 183 ; and 3 tanks by ATR, 1 mortar 182 ; and 1 tank by grenades 182

181

180

177

176 176

175

170+ 172

170

Garma G. Baltyrev the data of November 1942

170

Studentov Timofey Gerasimovich Bondarenko (200th rifle division) Alexey Abdurahmanovich Kurbanov (282nd Guards rifle regiment) Nikolay Petrovich Lepskiy Nikolay M. Voznov (29th Guards rifle regiment) Vasily A. Proshagin (22th rifle division) Alexander Andreyevich Kalinin (201st separate recon company) Yekaterina Zhdanova

167

165

at 20.10.1943

162

160

until May 1943

156

155

until December 1941

155

female

154

Dmitriy Iosifovich Chechikov (34th rifle until April 1942 division) Pyotr Nikolayevich Sofronov (801st rifle regiment) Ivan Vasilievich Vazhyorkin (30th rifle regiment) Pyotr Alexeyevich Belyakov Ivan Petrovich Merkulov (610th rifle division) Ivan Romanovich Izegov (60th rifle regiment) Inna Semyonovna Mudretsova Alexey Ivanovich Trusov at June 1942 the data of 1943

150

148

147

145

144

143 141

female

138 138

Nikolay P. Aksakov Mihail G. Gannochka Nikolay N. Ostudin (296th rifle regiment) Iosif I. Pilyushin (14th NKVD rifle regiment) Ivan Dmitrievich Vezhlivtsev (1st rifle division) Said Davydovich Aliyev (35th Guards rifle regiment) Ivan Ivanovich Shmarin (29th Guards rifle division) Pavel Erastovich Chhediany (1080th rifle regiment)

the data of 1943

137

136

134

the data of February 1942

133

132

until October 1942

131

130

Grigoriy Semyonovich Gaponov (453rd until December 1944 rifle regiment) Alexey Afanasievich Mironov Ashirali Osmanaliev (8th Guards rifle division) Georgiy Vyuzhin (143rd rifle regiment) V.I. Osipov Mihey Mitrofanovich Minchenkov (184th rifle division) Fyodor Uhov Tatiana Ignatovna Kostyrina (691st rigle regiment) Feodosiy Artyomovich Smolyachkov (14th separate motorized recon until June 1942 until May 1943

129

128

127 127

125 ; and 10 captives

125

125

female

125

company) 125 Sh. S. Zhambora (10th Guards rifle division) Nikolay A. Zalesskih Ivan Timofeyevich Seliverstov (128th rifle division) Nina Pavlovna Petrova Ole Dir Leonid Vasilievich Ivanov Nikolay K. Bayan (71st Guards rifle division) Vasily K. Morozov (10th Guards rifle division) Stepan Petrovich Loskutov (857th rifle the data of July 1942 regiment) Janis Roze (130th rifle coprps) Georgiy Konstantinovich Fyodorov the data of 19421943 the data of 19421943 the data of 19421943 female

125

124

122 120 119

117

unil 1.02.1943

117

117

116 116

116

Grebenyuk Pyotr V. Opara (86th border regiment NKVD) Nikolay A. Karasyov (16th border regiment NKVD) M. I. Cherdantsev (1291rd rifle regiment) Grigoriy Imohonovich Kumchenko

114

112

110

109

109

Nikolay Alexeyevich Grunin (16th border regiment NKVD) Voytenko

the data of 19421943 the data of 19421943

108

105

Fyodor Vasilyevich Yakovlev Magamed A. Mutchayev(10th Guards rifle division) Midov(10th Guards rifle division) Midov (10th Guards rifle division) Dmitriy Alexeyevich Gulyayev (1289th the data of and 1106th rifle regiments) December 1942 Ahmet Zhumagulov (8th Guards rifle division) Vasily G. Smirnov (296th rifle regiment) Popov (296th rifle regiment) Kanischin (296th rifle regiment) Ivan I. Saltykov (296th rifle regiment) Grigory Gavrilovich Vdovchenko (296th rifle regiment) Nikolay Dmitriyevich Harlamov (296th rifle regiment) Galim Koyshibayev (1280 rifle regiment) Grigoriy Tihonovich Sumchenko Fyodor Alexeyevich Harchenko (13th rifle regiment) including close combats on summer 1943

105

105 104

102

101

100+ 100+ 100+ 100+

100+

100+

100+

100

~100

~100

Husen Andruhaev Yelizaveta F. Mironova (255th marine brigade) P.P. Chernomaz N.A. Vakser V.S. Bednyagin Yegor Ivanovich Dergilev (605th rifle regiment) Osman T. Gochiayev (10th Guards rifle division) Semyon Ye. Karpachev Aliya N. Moldagulova (54th separate rifle brigade) Nina A. Lobkovskaya Vera Ivanovna Artamonova Fyodor Ivanovich Krivokon Lubov M. Makarova Alexandra Yegenievna Vinogradova (21st Guards rifle division) Maria G. Zubchenko Tatiana Chernova Andrey T. Halin Losev (10th Guards rifle division) Yulia P. Belousova female female, including close combats female female inc. 14 Japanese female

~100

female

98

98

93

~90

89 89 86 83

83

female

83 81 81 81 80+

female female

80

Solovyov

the data of June 1942 female

79

Klavdia F. Marinkina Pavel Yegorovich Shikunov (515th rifle regiment) Lidiya Bakieva Nikolay Vasilievich Prohorov Lidiya S. Gudovantseva Ivan Ivanovich Bogatyr (456th rifle regiment) Maria I. Morozova Ye. N. Hentadze Hastiyulin (10th Guards rifle division) Mihail H. Larionov (255th marine brigade) Alexander Vasilievich Ivkov (629th rifle regiment) Parfyon I. Gryaznov Olga S. Maryenkina Nina Pavlovna Belobrova I.M. Mamedov Yegor Ivanovich Myreyev (213rd rifle regiment) Malgazhdar Zhakeyev (1138th rifle regiment)

78

78 77 76

female

female

75

75 75 75

female

74

until 1.07.1943

73

70+ 70 70 70

female female

65

65

64

Ivan Ivanovich Zorin (479th rifle regiment) Nina Pavlovna Obuhovskaya Helmut Wirnsberger Alexandra K. Shlyahova (21st rifle division) Alexey P. Bryzgalin (232nd rifle regiment) Hasan S. Salimzyanov

data of March 1943

64 64

female

63

female

62

KIA 25.02.1943 data of September 1942

61 60+ [inc many snipers] ; and 1 tank by ATR 60+ ~60 and 16 captives; and 3 tanks 58

Vasiliy Yefimovich Pospelov (16th NKVD regiment)

Galina Rivkina Dmitriy Grigorievich Sergienkov (166th Guards rifle regiment) Ivan A. Levkin (109th rifle division) Grigoy Yesifovich Menagarishvili (83rd marine brigade) Yegor Ye. Fedchenkov (473rd rifle regiment) V.M. Zhuravlyov

female

until 20.03.1942

58

56+

56

55 54 [inc. 12 snipers]; and 6 captives 53

A.F. Fedoseyev (105th border regiment data of 1943 NKVD) Roza Ye. Shanina female

I.F. Kolesnikov

50+

Nikolay Sanin (21st Guards rifle division) Ivan Timofeyevich Pronkin (123rd rifle division) Konstantin P. Kizirov (25th border regiment) I.S. Petrykin (105th border regiment NKVD) data of 1943

50+

50+

50

If you can add a data to this list, please E-mail me.

Thanks for help to Yuri Nikitin, Alexander Abramov, John Baskeyfield.

Of course, the number of confirmed kills is much lower than the real number of kills. For example, F.Ohlopkov killed over 1000(!) enemy soldiers and officiers. On 1943, Soviet snipers included over 1000 woman-snipers; they were credited with 12000+ confirmed kills during the war. Top ten of Soviet snipers have 4200 confirmed kills, top twenty of Soviet snipers have 7400 confirmed kills. Sniper of 82nd rifle division Mihail Lysov shot down a dive bomber Ju87 in October 1941, using an automatic sniper rifle. Sniper of 796th rifle division Vasily A. Antonov shot down a bomber Ju88 by four rifle shots in July 1942. Talking about "Enemy at the gates" movie, I should say it's a good film. Only thing I can't understand: What a war they mean? Very similar to the eastern front of WW2, but how these stupid morons (called "the Russians" in the film) finally destroyed "the Germans" at "Stalingrad" ? Such opinions about the history would be laughable if wouldn't be so sad.

Georgy Zhukov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Zhukov" redirects here. For other uses, see Zhukov (disambiguation). For Russian footballer, see Georgi Yevgenyevich Zhukov. This article's factual accuracy is disputed. Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably sourced. See the relevant discussion on the talk page.
(February 2012)

Georgy Zhukov

Minister of Defence In office 9 February 1955 26 October 1957 Nikolai Bulganin Premier Nikolai Bulganin Preceded by Succeeded by Rodion Malinovsky Full member of the Politburo In office 29 June 29 October 1957 Candidate member of the Politburo In office 27 February 1956 29 June 1957 Personal details Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov Born

1 December 1896 Strelkovka, Kaluga, Russian Empire 18 June 1974 (aged 77) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Died Union Soviet Nationality Communist Party of the Soviet Political party Union Alexandra Dievna Zuikova (19201953) Spouse(s) Galina Alexandrovna Semyonova (1965 - 1973) Era Zhukova (b. 1928) Children Margarita Zhukova (1929-2011) Ella Zhukova (1937-2010)

Profession Religion Signature

Maria Zhukova (b. 1957) Soldier Russian Orthodox

Military service Russian Empire Allegiance Soviet Union Russian Imperial Army Service/branch Soviet Army Years of 19151957 service Marshal of the Soviet Union Rank Kiev Military District Western Front Commands 1st Belorussian Front Odessa Military District World War I Russian Civil War SovietJapanese Border War Battles/wars (Battles of Khalkhin Gol) Great Patriotic War Awards This name uses Eastern/Southern Slavic naming customs; the patronymic is Konstantinovich and the family name is Zhukov. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (Russian: ; IPA: [ukf]; 1 December [O.S. 19 November] 1896 18 June 1974), was a Soviet career officer in the Red Army who, in the course of World War II, played a pivotal role in leading the Red Army drive through much of Eastern Europe to liberate the Soviet Union and other nations from the occupation of the Axis Powers and ultimately, to conquer the capital of Germany itself, Berlin. He is the most decorated general officer in the history of the Soviet Union and Russia. Amongst many notable generals in World War II, G. K. Zhukov was placed at the top in the respect of number and scale of victories[1] and his talent in operational and strategic command was recognized by many people.[2] Many famous military leaders in the world such as Bernard Law Montgomery, Dwight David Eisenhower and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had already recognized Zhukov's great contributions in many important victories in the Second World War.[3] His combat achievements became valuable heritages in humanity's military knowledge, exerted great influence on both the Soviet and the whole world's military theory.[4]

Contents

1 Early life and career 2 Peacetime service until Khalkhin Gol 3 Khalkhin Gol 4 Before World War II o 4.1 Bessarabia campaign o 4.2 Pre-war military exercises o 4.3 Controversy about a plan for war with Germany 5 World War II o 5.1 First struggles o 5.2 Kiev and Yelnya o 5.3 Siege of Leningrad o 5.4 Battle of Moscow o 5.5 Rzhev sector and Operation Mars o 5.6 Battle of Stalingrad and Operation Uranus o 5.7 Breaking the siege of Leningrad o 5.8 Battle of Kursk o 5.9 On the Left-bank Ukraine o 5.10 On the Right-bank Ukraine o 5.11 Operation Bagration and the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive o 5.12 Jassy - Kishinev Offensive o 5.13 Vistula and East Prussian Offensives o 5.14 VistulaOder Offensive o 5.15 Battle of Berlin 6 Post war service under Stalin o 6.1 Reasons for Zhukov's rises and falls under Stalin 7 Rise and fall after Stalin o 7.1 Arresting Beria o 7.2 Political career after 1953 8 Retirement 9 Family 10 Controversy and praise 11 Awards o 11.1 Russian Imperial decorations o 11.2 Soviet Orders and Medals o 11.3 Foreign awards 12 Legacy o 12.1 Memorials o 12.2 Recollections o 12.3 Popular culture 13 References 14 References 15 Primary sources 16 Additional reading 17 External links

Early life and career

Born into a poverty-stricken peasant family in Strelkovka, Maloyaroslavsky Uyezd, Kaluga Governorate (now merged into the town of Zhukov in Zhukovsky District of Kaluga Oblast in modern-day Russia), Zhukov was apprenticed to work as a furrier in Moscow. In 1915, he was conscripted into the Army of the Russian Empire, where he served first in the 106th Reserve Cavalry Regiment (then called the 10th Dragoon Novgorod Regiment).[5][6] During World War I, Zhukov was awarded the Cross of St. George twice, and promoted to the rank of non-commissioned officer, for his bravery in battle. He joined the Bolshevik Party after the October Revolution, where his background of poverty became a significant asset. After recovering from a serious case of typhus, he fought in the Russian Civil War over the period 1918 to 1921, serving with the 1st Cavalry Army, among other formations. He received the decoration of the Order of the Red Banner for subduing the Tambov rebellion in 1921.[7]

Peacetime service until Khalkhin Gol

Georgy Zhukov, the commander of the 39th Buzuluk Cavalry Regiment, 7th Cavalry Division Samara in 1923 At the end of May 1923, Zhukov became a commander of the 39th Cavalry Regiment.[8]:p.79 (1st part) :p.90 (1st part) In 1924, he entered the Higher School of Cavalry,[8]:p.87 (1st part) from which he graduated the next year, returning afterward to command the same regiment.[8]:p.89 (1st part) In May 1930, Zhukov became commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division.[8]:p.99 (1st part) In February 1931, he was appointed the Assistant Inspector of Cavalry of the Red Army.[9] In May 1933, Zhukov was appointed a commander in the 4th Cavalry Division.[9] In 1937, he became a commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, later of the 6th Cavalry Corps.[8]:p.151 (1st part)[9] In 1938, he became a deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District for cavalry.[8]:p.158 (1st part)[9]

Khalkhin Gol
In 1938, Zhukov was directed to command the First Soviet Mongolian Army Group, and saw action against Japan's Kwantung Army on the border between Mongolia and the Japanese-controlled state of Manchukuo. This campaign was an undeclared war that lasted from 1938 to 1939. What began as a routine border skirmish - with the Japanese

testing the resolve of the Soviets to defend their territory - rapidly escalated into a fullscale war, with the Japanese pushing forward with an estimated 80,000 troops, 180 tanks, and 450 aircraft. These events led to the strategically decisive Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan). Zhukov requested major reinforcements, and on 20 August 1939, his "Soviet Offensive" commenced. After a massive artillery barrage, nearly 500[10]:p.579 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks advanced, supported by over 500[10]:p.590 fighters and bombers. This was the Soviet Air Force's first fighter-bomber operation.[10]:p.633 The offensive first appeared to be a typical conventional frontal attack. However, two tank brigades were initially held back and then ordered to advance around on both flanks, supported by motorized artillery, infantry, and other tanks. This daring and successful maneuver encircled the Japanese 6th Army and captured the enemy's vulnerable rear supply areas. By 31 August 1939, the Japanese had been cleared from the disputed border, leaving the Soviets clearly victorious.[10]:p.633 This campaign had significance beyond the immediate tactical and local outcome. Zhukov demonstrated and tested the techniques later used against the Germans in the Eastern Front of the Second World War. These innovations included the deployment of underwater bridges[10]:p.998 and improving the cohesion and battle-effectiveness of inexperienced units by adding a few experienced, battled-hardened troops to bolster morale and overall training.[10]:p.991 Evaluation of the problems inherent in the performance of the BT tanks led to the replacement of their fire-prone petrol (gasoline) engines with diesel engines, and provided extremely valuable practical knowledge that was essential to the success in development of the T-34 medium tank, widely considered the most outstanding all-around general purpose tank of World War II.[10]:p.998 After this campaign, Nomonhan veterans were transferred to units that had not seen combat, to better spread the benefits of their battle experience.[10]:p.998 For his victory, Zhukov was declared a Hero of the Soviet Union. However, the campaign - and especially Zhukov's pioneering use of tanks - remained little known outside of the Soviet Union itself. Zhukov considered Nomonhan invaluable preparation for conducting operations during the Second World War.[10]:p.996

Before World War II

In June 1940, Zhukov was appointed Commander of the Kiev Military District.[specify] One month before this appointment, the reorganization of the Soviet military rank system had bestowed Zhukov with the rank of Army General, an equivalent of the former rank of "First-Rank Army Commander".[specify]

Bessarabia campaign
See also: Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

General Zhukov in Kishinev on the 4th of July 1940. On 9 June 1940, Zhukov was appointed to command the Odessa Military District,[specify] and was given the mission of guarding the border at Bessarabia. On 28 June, nearly 500,000 troops of the Southern Front, under his command, drove over the SovietRomanian border and claimed Bessarabia. When the Romanians counterattacked, Zhukov deployed the 201st and 204th Paratrooper Brigades, together with the Soviet Marines, and pushed the Romanian troops back. Finally, on 2 September, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were incorporated into the newly formed Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, with a population of 776,000 and an approximate area of 50,762 square kilometres (19,599 sq mi).[11]

Pre-war military exercises

In the autumn Zhukov started planning border defenses against German aggression. At this time, the Soviet border had moved west due to the annexation of Eastern Poland[12] (pursuant to terms of the "secret protocol" agreement between Germany and Russia). In his memoirs, Zhukov reported that during this command he was in charge of the "Western" or "Blue" forces (the supposed invasion troops), while his opponent, Colonel General Dimitry Pavlov, was the commander of the "Eastern" or "Red" forces (the supposed Soviet troops). This action was part of a huge military exercise intended to gauge the effectiveness of plan of defence of USSR. Zhukov noted that the "Blue Armies" had 60 divisions, while the "Reds" had only 50. The details of these exercises were reported differently in the memoirs of the various participants (not uncommon for that period). Historian Bobylev reported that two exercises were completed, one on 26 January 1941 (for the North-West direction), and another on 811 January (for the South-West direction). The conditions of the first exercise explained that "Western" forces had attacked the "Eastern" forces on July 15 (as part of a general assault), but "Eastern" forces counterattacked, and by August 1, had reversed their initial setbacks and reached the original border from where the attack was launched. As the exercise began, "Eastern" forces had the numerical advantage (51 infantry divisions, as against 41 divisions, 9 armored divisions against 3, and 8,811 tanks, as against 3,512), with the exception of numbers of anti-tank guns. Bobylev describes that, by the end of the exercise, the "Eastern" forces did not manage to surround and destroy the "Western" forces, which - in their turn - threatened to surround the "Eastern" forces. The same historian reported that the second exercise/game was won by the "Easterners" - meaning that, basically, both games were won by the side that was commanded by Zhukov.[13] Interestingly, almost at the same time, in December

1940, the German General Staff was holding its own staff games (a series of three games) which were devoted to rehearsing the invasion of the Soviet Union. On 1 February Zhukov became Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.[8]:p.89 (1st part)

Controversy about a plan for war with Germany

From 2 February, as the Chief of the General Staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Zhukov took part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deploying of the Soviet Union in the case of war with Germany and its allies"[14] The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941. In this document, one paragraph states: Germany is mobilizing most of its army to the border and actively building its reserves. That fact warns us that a surprise attack may take place. In order to prevent this, I suggest it is necessary to take the strategic initiative against the Third Reich in any case, including forestalling the enemy and deploying a pre-emptive offensive against the German units when we definitely verify the time when they will attack. We must ensure they have no time to prepare in order to create an advantage in combat power.[citation
needed]

Some researchers conclude that, on 14 May, Soviet Minister of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Zhukov suggested to Joseph Stalin a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland. Soviet forces would occupy the Vistula Border and continue to Katowice or even Berlin (should the main German armies retreat), or the Baltic coast (should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and East Prussia). The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach Siedlce, Deblin, and then capture Warsaw before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at Lublin.[15] Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, or whether Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov stated that Stalin did not approve the plan. However, Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. As of 1999, no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found.[16] During 1930-1940, with the approval of Soviet leaders, Soviet artists and writers created fictitious works about a Red Army invasion of German territory. Such approval may have caused a misunderstanding that the offensive had been accepted. This misunderstanding was exploited by extremists, who believed that the Soviet Union should attack. Consequently, many people argued that Stalin had ruled it out. However, the Soviet counter-blows against the German invasion seem to have been some kind of preemptive offensive deployment.[17][18] Zhukov did not mention such plans in his memoirs.[5]:p.310 According to Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the war-game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not known widely, but the victory of Zhukov's Red Troops against Kulik was widely propagandized, thus creating a popular illusion about easy success for a preemptive offensive.[19]:p.24 Zhukov predicted that the Soviet-German war could not be avoided and that the Red Army needed to build independent motorized and tank units to satisfy the new conditions of the expected war. His suggestions, however, were not accepted by Soviet

leaders. When war broke out, the harsh reality of the battlefield painfully proved the correctness of most of Zhukov's ideas about the role of tanks and motorized units in modern warfare.[20]

World War II
See also: Eastern Front (World War II)

First struggles
See also: Operation Barbarossa On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the USSR. As a General Chief of Staff, Zhukov requested Stalin to promulgate No. 1 Directive (at 0:25 AM on 22 June). At 7:15 AM, he requested the Soviet Supreme Command to promulgate No. 2 Directive about general mobilization in all USSR territories.[21] At 1:00 PM, Stalin ordered him to fly to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to monitor the tactical situation. At 11:50 PM, Stalin ordered Deputy General Chief of Staff N. F. Vatutin to prepare Directive No. 3, which ordered the deployment of all Soviet forces in a counteroffensive. As Zhukov explains in his memoirs, he called Moscow from Tarnopol to object to Stalin's decision, as Stalin didn't know the full situation. However, Vatutin replied that Stalin had already made the decision, leaving Zhukov no choice but to sign the Directive.[22] The careless and premature counteroffensive failed badly, and the Western and Northwestern Fronts suffered heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the Southwestern Front, guided by Zhukov, managed to considerably slow the German offensive.[23]:p.41 Volume 1

Kiev and Yelnya

See also: Battle of Kiev (1941), Yelnya Offensive, and Battle of Smolensk (1941) As the Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov and his colleagues reasoned that after intensive movements, the German Panzers (tanks) would need time to be refitted. Thus they would not strike directly at Moscow, but at more vulnerable Soviet positions. For example, Zhukov believed that the Germans would attack on the Central Front, then from that position, launch a strike toward the right flank of the Southwestern Front at Kiev. From these conclusions, Zhukov suggested an audacious plan: moving the troops guarding the west of the Moskva River to the Central Front. He advocated abandoning Kiev, and retreating to the East of the Dnepr River to avoid encirclement and destruction. The Western Front would clear the German forces at the Yelnya salient, preventing the Germans from using Yelnya as a bridgehead for a Moscow offensive.[24]:p.307 However, Stalin wouldn't approve the abandonment of Kiev. On the night of July 29, during a violent argument, Stalin stated that the reasoning for abandoning Kiev was "nonsense." Despite knowing of Stalin's hot-headed temperament, Zhukov replied angrily: "If you think the Chief of the General Staff talks nonsense, then I have no business here. I ask that you relieve me from the post of Chief of the General Staff and send me to the front. There, apparently, I shall be of greater use to the country."[6]:pp.121122

Zhukov's "wish" was granted and he was appointed Commander of Reserve Front.[19]:p.43 However, Stalin kept Zhukov as a member of the Soviet High Command STAVKA. Arriving at his new post, Zhukov commanded the Reserve Front on the successful Yelnya Offensive, inflicting heavy casualties and clearing the Germans from Yelnya. The German casualties included the powerful and well-equipped Grossdeutschland regiment, which was almost annihilated.[24]:p.307 While commanding the Reserve Front, Zhukov tracked events on other fronts. On 19 August 1941, he noted the German II Panzer Army changing their direction southward, to Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop, and Lokhvitsa. Zhukov sent Stalin a telegram predicting that the Germans would assault the rear of the Southwestern Front, with the aim of encircling it (in what the Germans called a "Kesselschlacht" or "cauldron battle") and destroying it. This, he predicted, would secure the southern flank of German Center Army Group, and would enable the Germans to attack Donbass. If the Soviet troops were defeated, and German gains consolidated, the bulk of the German army would be able to attack Moscow in strength. Zhukov recommended that a strong force be established at the Glukhov - Chernigov - Konotop line in order to forestall this possibility.[19]:p.53 Just as Zhukov predicted, the Germans executed this offensive on the 5th of September. Unfortunately for the USSR, insufficient forces, the passivity of generals F. I. Kuznetsov and A. I. Yeriomenko and the lateness of Stalin's retreat orders, the Southwestern Front was encircled and completely demolished.[19]:pp.58-59[25]

Siege of Leningrad
On 30 August, German forces cut the strategic Leningrad-Moscow railroad and severed other connections to Leningrad. Stalin told his staff, at a meeting with his military commanders, "Leningrad may be lostthe situation is hopelessly bad there." Zhukov was present and was summoned by Stalin for a private discussion that had a significant impact on the course of the war. Zhukov and Stalin agreed that Leningrad and its surrounding territory were absolutely critical to avoid losing the war, and therefore, that everything became strategically related to the defense of Leningrad and given first priorityincluding the Red Army and Navy operations in Karelia and Northern Russia, partisan guerrilla resistance in Novgorod and the Leningrad area, control over Lake Ladoga and the Svir River, the seaports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk that were receiving significant British, Canadian, and American help through Arctic convoys, and the evacuation of civilians, millions of whom were trapped in the encircled city and its suburbs.[8][26][27][28] Stalin ordered Zhukov to save Leningrad by any means, because if the city fell, 11% of the national economy and the invaluable wealth of the Hermitage Museum and the palaces of the Russian tsars from Peter the Great onwards would be in the hands of the enemy. German forces could unite with the small, but tough, motivated and skilled Finnish forces. These combined forces could quite possibly drive through Northern Russia and attack Moscow, which might well win the war for Germany. At that time, German forces had already cut the important Moscow railroad, and the Finnish forces north of Leningrad had attacked and obliterated the roads connecting Leningrad to the logistically important seaports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. These developments had potentially dire consequences for both Leningrad and Moscow, which were highly dependent on the British, Canadian and American supplies. On 10

September 1941, following the encirclement of Leningrad, Zhukov was made the commander of the Leningrad Front.[8]:p.382 (1st part) In an important clandestine surveillance operation, Zhukov and his staff flew over Lake Ladoga and landed on the partially destroyed airstrip of Rzhevka Airport, in Leningrad. Zhukov found the huge city and its suburbs, which had a population of 3.5 million, flooded by 460 thousand refugees from the Nazi-occupied provinces. Shortages of food and munitions were critical, and the situation as a whole was dire. In order to save this strategically and psychologically important city and its important Navy base, Zhukov had to accomplish three tasks: 1. Stop the offensive before it entered Leningrad city proper 2. Protect the civilians that were fleeing the besieged city and its suburbs 3. Reorganize the joint command and civilian resistance to prepare for a lengthy siege Zhukov ordered the executions of several inadequate officers, thus strengthening the siege perimeter. To bolster resistance, Zhukov organized a special armed regiment that was empowered to shoot anyone who retreated from the perimeter. He also ordered the laying of dense minefields and the deployment of artillery batteries in all critical directions, and redeployed some fifty thousand Navy men from the Baltic Fleet, creating additional infantry and helping to reinforce the regular land-based contingents. During the period September through October, Zhukov launched a series of attacks and counterattacks, with the purpose of harassing and wearing out the German and Finnish forces who held the siege perimeter to the north and south. One of these deadly counteroffensives stopped the enemy forces after they had penetrated the defense lines near the seaport of Leningrad, just two miles from the Kirov Plant which was building KV heavy tanks. With intense fire support from land- and sea-based artillery batteries, the counteroffensive effectively stopped the attack in that sector.[24]:p.309-311 Zhukov's brutal and unceasing efforts produced resultsthe attack was stopped in its tracks, and the fierce battle was transformed into a deadly siege. The city was saved, and thus Hitler's plan to win the war outright using this strategy failed. An outraged Hitler together with Wilhelm Keitelvisited Finland on 4 June 1942, meeting with Finnish president Ryti and the commander of the armed forces of Germany's (nominal) ally Finland (Mannerheim), after which they renewed their joint attack on Leningrad. Subsequently, Mannerheim again visited with Fhrer Hitler and members of his top leadership (including Reichsfhrer SS Heinrich Himmler and Reichsmarschall and Luftwaffe Commander Hermann Gring) in Germany on 2728 June about the situation. However, all sides in this battle were exhausted by this time, lacking the combat power, equipment, and logistics to push the campaign to a decisive conclusion. The battle of Leningrad lasted until January 1944, making it the single most deadly and one of the most cruel sieges in human history. Zhukov was present in the city during only parts of the siege, secretly flying in and out when he and Stalin felt his presence was absolutely required. He nevertheless constantly oversaw the efforts against the Wehrmacht's 900-day-long siege and its related operations, including defensive preparations and operations, the evacuation of about 1.5 million civilians, the movement of various important industries and their equipment and materials away from the city and reorganizing the entire front after the failure of the 2nd

Shock Army in 1942, Operation Iskra in 1943, the LeningradNovgorod Offensive in 1944 and other operations around the besieged city.[29][30][31]

Battle of Moscow
After Leningrad stabilized, Zhukov was sent to the Reserve Front on akind 8 October 1941. At that time, the USSR's situation was critical: the Battle of Moscow was taking place, and nearly the entire Soviet Western Front was being encircled in what eventually became a huge "cauldron battle" at in the RzhevVyazma salient, where it was estimated that some 775,000 Soviet personnel were lost.[32] Its commander, S. M. Budyonny, wasn't even present at headquarters and the officers in the High Command didn't seem to know what was happening at the front. An enraged Zhukov was thus forced to go to the front lines himself to grasp the battlefield situation, and then to search for Budyonny.[24]:p.311-313 To unify the operations of the huge numbers of Soviet forces, he sent a suggestion to Stalin that the Reserve and the Western Fronts be merged. After that, Zhukov became the de facto leader of the forces defending the Soviet capital city. After a brief period, Zhukov established communication links with the encircled Soviet troops of the Western Front. After analyzing the situation and pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the German troops surrounding them, he gave specific instructions to their commanders and political personnel. Unable to break the Kessel (Ger. "kettle", or encirclement area), the surrounded Soviet troops did manage to strengthen their positions under Zhukov's leadership. Their efforts to some extent wore out some German units and thereby reduced the overall striking power of the offensive.[24]:p.311-313 On 15 November, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow. At Krasnaya Polyana and Kryukovo , northwest of the capital, the Germans advanced to about 20 km from Moscow.[32] Zhukov recognized an important error in the German planwhile the German forces seemed to attack aggressively from both their flanks, those in the center remained relatively inactive. From this observation, Zhukov made a rather daring decision: he ordered the repositioning of many of his centrally-located battle forces to reinforce his two flanks. With this tactical change, the Soviets stopped several German attacks with few losses among their reserve troops. Later on, these better-rested reserve forces played an important role in the counteroffensive.[24]:p.311-313 Zhukov reasoned that the Germans would realize that this tactical scheme was problematic and would begin to attack in the now-weakened center. Zhukov therefore ordered the remaining forces in the center to prepare for an offensive. Just as he had predicted, the Germans began to attack the central sector troops. The Soviet preparations, however, managed to stop the German offensive.[24]:p.311-313 After intense fighting, Moscow remained under Soviet control, while the German forces were exhausted and had lost equipment and supplies, a critical weakness given the long logistical tail. Although the Soviet combat forces were in no way superior compared to their German foes,[33][34] Zhukov decided to launch his counteroffensive. On 1 December Zhukov was coordinating the Western, Bryansk, and the Kalinin Fronts preparatory to the counteroffensive. On 6 December the Soviet forces began a massive assault. After two months of bloody and brutal fighting, the Soviets pushed their

German foes between 100 and 250 km away from Moscowin some areas, up to 400 kmand had taken approximately 582,000 German soldiers out of action.[35] This battle was the first time up to that point in World War II that the German army had been defeated in a large-scale battle involving millions of soldiers. Ultimately, Operation Barbarossa failed. Perhaps most importantly, the great Soviet stand, counterattack, and ultimate victory at Moscow convinced the Allies that they could win.[36] Zhukov received widespread accolades as the "savior of Moscow". Even Stalin heaped praise on Zhukov: The Motherland and the Party will never forget the action of the Soviet commanders in the Great Patriotic War. The names of the victorious generals who saved the Motherland will forever be engraved in the honorary steles placed at the battlefields. Amongst these battlefields, there is one battlefield with exceptional meanings, and that is the great one at Moscow. And the name of Comrade Zhukov, as a symbol of victory, will never be apart from this battlefield. I.V.Stalin[24]:p.314

Rzhev sector and Operation Mars

In February 1942, the psychological benefits of the Soviet victory at Moscow had started to dissipate as Germany began transferring large numbers of reinforcements to the Eastern Front. Although lacking large numbers of reinforcements and with limited supplies, Zhukov ordered attacks to proceed. Due to the impatient action of the Kalinin Front, its 33rd Army, the 1st Guards Cavalry Army, and the 4th Paratrooper Army were surrounded by the Germans at the Rzhev-Vyazma salient. Two relieving operations were able to rescue most of the 1st Guards Cavalry, the 4th Paratrooper Army, and parts of the 33rd Army. Nevertheless, losses were very highsome 194,000 soldiers were dead, wounded or captured, comprising just over half of the troops who were initially encircled.[37] While some Soviet generals claimed that these offensives were unnecessary, the German General Kurt von Tippelskirch countered: There appeared a difficult situation in the Rzhev-Sychevka direction during the first months of this year. The Russians nearly destroyed our first defensive line. This breakthrough was only stopped when we kept three Panzer divisions and some infantry units at this place - according to the plan, these units should have been deployed to the south. With regard to tactics, the Germans were successful as they managed to mend the hole in this direction, but the Russians received a greater strategical profit when they managed to detain a large amount of German troops at this place and to prevent them from reinforcing the main battlefield. Kurt von Tippelskirch[38] At the end of 1942, Operation Mars began. It was concurrent with the first phase of Operation Uranus, but it was not prepared by Zhukov, nor did he command the operation. At that time, Zhukov was carrying out his task as Deputy Commander-inChief and Representative of General Headquarters at Stalingrad. He only coordinated the forces at Rzhev during the later half of this operation, again as the "firefighter" who conducted the rescue tasks for the encircled Soviet forces there. Mars was a tactical failure because, despite inflicting considerable losses, the Soviets could not encircle and eliminate the German 9th Army. Within 25 days, Soviet losses were some 215,000 KIA

(killed in action), WIA (wounded in action), and POW's (prisoners of war), while 1,315 important pieces of armor (i.e. tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces) were destroyed or lost. The average casualties per day that were sustained in these engagements were even higher than those suffered at the much more famous Battle of Stalingrad. M. A.Gareev used Stavka orders to claim that Mars' goal was to lure the German forces to the Rzhev sector, preventing them from reinforcing Stalingrad. Thus, it ensured the success of Uranus and the Soviet offensives in the south. Indeed, according to Gareev, "there is not any convincing reason to say that Operation Uranus was a failure, or was the greatest failure of Marshal Zhukov, as David Glantz and other Western scholars have described".[39] Glantz quoted A. V. Isaev about Operation Mars: Aside from causing the influences about the local events of the fronts in November and December 1942, "Operation Mars" also influenced the fighting situation in 1943. In the winter of 1942, the 9th Army of General Walther Model was tightly pinned against the Rzhev salient. And in summer 1943, this Army was so exhausted that it could not be used in Operation "Citadel". A. V. Isaev[40] Also, according to Vladimir Chernov and Galina Yaroslavovna, Glantz and other Western historians paid too much attention to Zhukov and forgot the fact that he did not participate in this offensive, as since the late August 1942 he had already stopped commanding the Western Front and went to Stalingrad area to guide the Soviet forces there.[41]

Battle of Stalingrad and Operation Uranus

In late August 1942 Zhukov was made Deputy Commander-in-Chief and sent to the Southwestern Front to take charge of the defence of Stalingrad.[6] :pp.212-213 In October 1942, Zhukov and Vasilevsky planned the Stalingrad counteroffensive[6] :pp.224 named "Operation Uranus", which was noted as "having a clarified mission, a daring idea, and an extensive scope, which made everybody pay attention to it".[24]:p.314-315> The counteroffensive was launched on 19 November and four days late with the encirclement of the entire German 6th Army (the single largest Nazi troop formation at the time). After two more months of desperate fighting, the demoralized and decimated Sixth Army surrendered on 2 February. Zhukov was the coordinator of the Southeastern and the Stalingrad Fronts while Vasilevsky coordinated the Southwestern and Don Fronts. At Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht lost over 200,000 men, while another 91,000 were taken prisoner; of whom only 6,000 returned to Germany in 1955. On the battlefield were buried 140,000 soldiers and officers (not counting the tens of thousands of Nazi soldiers who were killed in the kessel during the 73 days of encirclement). Due to his great skill in planning and commanding large forces, Zhukov was awarded the 1st Order of Suvorov (together with Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, Vatutin, Andrey Yeryomenko, and K. K. Rokossovsky). Noteworthy, however, was the "No. 1" engraved distinctly on the medal that was given to Zhukov.[24]:p.314-315

Breaking the siege of Leningrad

In January 1943 Zhukov (with Kliment Voroshilov) coordinated the actions of the Leningrad Front and Volkhov Front, in accord with the Baltic Fleet, in Operation Iskra. This led to the partial breaking of the German lines at the perimeter of the Leningrad siege, where a narrow passage was opened between the German armies stationed there and the waterfront of Lake Ladoga. This path allowed the delivery of food and munitions by the railroad name The Road of Victory. The Germans knew of its importance, however, and intensively bombarded it, costing the lives of over 300,000 defenders. The siege continued for another year, until 27 January 1944, when the besieging forces were driven back from the city in the Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Offensive. Even so, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet granted Zhukov the rank Marshal of the Soviet Union on 18 January 1943. He was the first field commander that was granted this rank during World War II.[42]

Battle of Kursk
On 17 March 1943, Zhukov was in charge of all combat forces to the south of the Russian city of Kursk. He organized the Voronezh Front, under Vatutin to face the expected offensive of Army Group South (under the command of German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein) in the Belgorod-Kharkov area. On 8 April, based on Soviet intelligence, Zhukov sent a telegram to Stalin noting that: According to the situation of the Soviet-German front, the enemy will attempt to cut off the Kursk salient, to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces of Central Front and Voronezh Front deployed here. At the moment, both fronts only have 15 tank divisions, meanwhile the German forces in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction have already gathered 17 tank divisions - most of them include the new types of tanks, such as Tiger I, improved Panther, Jagdpanzer IV, and some kinds of tank destroyers such as Marder II, Marder III. Konstantinov.[43] The German High Command had not completed the planning of Operation Citadel yet, Hitler's final orders arrived only on 15 April 1943. In an 8 April 1943 telegram, Zhukov suggested how to cope with the coming German offensive: I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to the offensive in the very first days of the campaign in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defenses, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force. Konstantinov.[23]:p.256 Volume 1

Zhukov and Kliment Voroshilov inspect a captured German Tiger I tank, August 1943 Zhukov's insights proved to be correct. Due to his understanding of German intentions, the Soviet Army prepared massive defenses at Kursk. On 15 July 1943, the Germans' Army Group Center and South attacked but within a week, the German attack stagnated. Follow-up Soviet counteroffensives liberated Orel and Belgorod on 5 August, and Kharkov on 23 August. Zhukov himself guided the Voronezh Front, facing the Germans to the north of Kharkov, which was in the southern sector of the Kursk salient.[23]:p.209
Volume 1

Although he disagreed with preemptive offensives such as those suggested by Vatutin and Rokossovsky, Zhukov did agree with them about "preemptive preparation", on a smaller scale, against attacking forces right before an offensive began. The very heavy bombardment from Soviet artillery, Katyusha rocket launchers, and air forces inflicted considerable casualties on German assault forces and sharply reduced their penetrating power.[23]:p.273 Volume 1[44]

On the Left-bank Ukraine

See also: Battle of the Dnieper and Battle of Kiev (1943) On 28 August 1943, G. K. Zhukov was called back to Moscow. Next day, he told I. V. Stalin about his new plan about a quick and large scale assault (from Kharkov to the sea of Azov) against the German Army Group South when it was still heavily exhausted after being defeated at the battle of Kursk. However, I. V. Stalin rejected this idea.[45] During August and September 1943, Zhukov was the coordinator of the Voronezh Front and Steppe Front (later became the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts)[8]:p.205 (2nd part) , which conducted a more restricted offensive at the left flank of Army Group South at the Dnieper and then occupied several bridgeheads at this river. From 12 October to 23 October, the Voronezh Front assaulted Kiev. At first, the Soviets attacked the Burkin bridgehead at the south of Kiev, but the Germans quickly reinforced this area and stopped the Soviet offensive. Zhukov then, from 25 October to 3 November, secretly moved the 3rd Guards Tank Army and 7th Guards Army out of Burkin and then launched a surprise attack at the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev. The Germans then had no choice but to abandon this city.[46] On 23 December, the Germans launched many counteroffensives in order to retake Kiev and managed to push the Soviets back at several small sectors. However, Zhukov quickly transferred strong reserve forces to this area and stopped the German assaults.

On the Right-bank Ukraine

See also: Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket The year 1944 began with the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive, conducted by the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts under the coordinated command of G. K. Zhukov. During this battle, the German 42nd Panzer Corps was encircled[47] and eliminated. The German suffered 55,000 casualties, 18,200 being captured with a large amount of

materials (271 tanks, 32 amoured vehicles, 110 self-propelled artilleries, 944 cannons, 536 mortars, 1,689 machine guns.[48] Unfortunately for the Red Army, on 17 March, the commander of First Ukrainian Front N. F. Vatutin was shot by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and died in hospital in Kiev on 15 April. Therefore, on 10 April, I. V. Stalin appointed Zhukov to be the commander of Vatutin's front[8]:p.209 (2nd part) and he remained in charge of this front until early May.[8]:p.217 (2nd part). Under Zhukov's command, during March and April 1944, the First Ukrainian Front successfully conducted the Chernovtsy - Proskurov offensive and pushed the German to the Carpathian Mountains[49]

Operation Bagration and the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive

During the Russian summer offensive in 1944, Zhukov became the coordinator of the 1st Belorussian Front (whose commander was Rokossovsky), the 2nd Belorussian Front (whose commander was Georgiy Zakharov), and later, the First Ukrainian Front (commanded by I. S. Koniev) as well.[8]:p.222 (2nd part) This summer offensive was a decisive Soviet victory that crippled the German Army Group Center, encircling and eliminating some 30 German army divisions, advancing 350500 km and pushing the Germans completely out of Soviet territory. In the south, in July, Zhukov guided Koniev's offensive, launched by the 1st Ukrainian Front at Lvov and Rava-Russkaya, pushing the Germans out of Ukraine and penetrating to the Stanislavsk-Sandomirsk line. On 8 July Zhukov secretly moved the 5th Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov from the Third Belorussian Front to the First Prebaltic Front, completely surprised the Germans. This movement of armor helped the Soviet Army win significant victories in the Memel Offensive and East Prussian Offensive.[19]:p.418

Jassy - Kishinev Offensive

Main article: JassyKishinev Offensive (August 1944) In August Zhukov was appointed coordinator of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, which were under Colonel-General Rodion Malinovsky and Colonel-General Fyodor Tolbukhin. These two fronts launched the JassyKishinev Offensive, which virtually demolished the southwestern sector of the German defensive line. This offensive captured both Romania and Bulgaria, knocking these German allies out of the war, and penetrated to Yugoslavia and Hungary. In this campaign, Zhukov ordered the two fronts to narrow the penetrated sectors from 22 km to 16 km to increase the concentration of artillery fire from 220 guns per kilometer of front to 240.[50] When the masses of Soviet troops marched into Bulgaria, Zhukov saw to it that aid was provided to the Bulgarian Communist Government so that they might build their own forces (eventually including 2 armies and 5 independent corps) and begin to fight alongside Soviet forces.

Vistula and East Prussian Offensives

At the end of September Zhukov returned to General Headquarters and was immediately appointed to be the coordinator of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts in Eastern Poland. He supported Rokossovsky's recommendation as the commander the 1st Belorussian Front, that they refrain from crossing the Vistula because the Red Army

needed rest after continuously attacking for three months. In addition, the spearhead units had moved so fast that the logistics units and airbases had fallen behind. They recognized that German supply lines had been significantly reduced as the front line moved back toward Germany.[51] Zhukov demanded that the First and Second Belorussian Fronts had to keep the Saldomirsk, Pulava and Nareva bridgeheads to provide "jumping off points" for future offensives into Germany.[52] In November Stalin decided to transfer Rokossovsky to the 2nd Belorussian Front. It is believed that Stalin did not want a commander of Polish descent to take Berlin. Zhukov was thus made Commander in Chief of the 1st Belorussian Front. During the East Prussian Offensive, Zhukov suggested that the Red Army should not send its tank units into this battlefield, because the terrain of East Prussia and Knigsberg was relatively unfit for tanks. He preferred air forces and artillery units instead of armor, to pull the German garrisons from their stone fortresses into open areas so that they could be eliminated more easily and at less cost. Stalin rejected this proposal, leading Zhukov to comment: I think this was a grave mistake of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The later events proved that using tanks in the intricate East Prussian streets made the battle become bloody.[53]

VistulaOder Offensive
On 15 January 1945, Zhukov visited Lublin for a discussion with the Polish Liberation Committee of Bolesaw Bierut. He accepted the Committee's suggestion about sending the Polish 1st and 2nd Armies of Stanislav Poplavsky and Zygmunt Berling (both Polish) to fight alongside the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts in Poland. Zhukov also suggested sending Soviet weapons and ammunition for the purpose of reinforcing the Polish People's Army. The Polish army then received about 3,500 artillery pieces, 1,200 aircraft, 1,000 tanks, 700,000 guns, and 18,000 cars, giving them greatly increased combat power, mobility and flexibility as a fighting force. [54] Zhukov went to the front lines to inspect the attacking forces. When one Soviet military officer asked him about the reasons for such large scale and careful preparations for the offensive, Zhukov answered: We have to ensure, that the offensive not only is 100% successful, but 200%! G. K. Zhukov[24]:p.316 In the VistulaOder Offensive, the original target was the line Vistula-Bromberg (Bydgoszcz)-Pozna-Breslau Wrocaw . However, by 17 January, the First Polish Army of Stanislav Poplavsky had already captured Warsaw, and on 2 February, the main German forces of Army Group Center had been virtually destroyed, with both the First Belorussian and the Ukrainian Fronts successfully reaching the German border on the Oder-Neisse line.[55] The furthest Soviet units were at this time a mere 68 km away from Berlin. For the Germans the Vistula-Oder offensive was a devastating turn of events.[24]:p.316-319

Battle of Berlin

Signing the German Instrument of Surrender at the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst, Berlin. Standing in the middle is Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov

Zhukov in Berlin talking to British officers, 1945

The Supreme Commanders in Berlin on 5 June 1945; from left to right: Bernard Montgomery (Great Britain), Dwight D. Eisenhower (US), Zhukov and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (France) Zhukov was present when German officials signed the official Instrument of Surrender in Berlin,[8]:p.332 (2nd part) ending the Soviet-German conflict, which was the largest and deadliest campaign ever fought between two nations.

Post war service under Stalin

After the German capitulation Zhukov became the first commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany. On 10 June Zhukov returned to Moscow to prepare for the Moscow Victory Parade of 1945 in Red Square. On 24 June, I. V. Stalin appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the Parade. After the Victory Ceremony, on the night of 24 June, Zhukov went to Berlin to resume his command.[56] During May 1945, Zhukov signed three important resolutions regarding the maintenance of an adequate standard of living for the German people living in the Soviet occupation zone:

Resolution 063 (11 May 1945): dealing with the provision of food for the people living in Berlin Resolution 064 (12 May 1945): allowed for the restoration and maintenance of the normal activities of the public service sector of Berlin Resolution 080 (31 May 1945): dealt with providing milk supplies for the children living in Berlin.

Zhukov requested the Soviet Government to urgently transport to Berlin 96,000 tons of grain, 60,000 tons of potatoes, 50,000 cattle, and thousands of tons of other foodstuffs, such as sugar and animal fat. He issued strict orders that his subordinates were to "Hate the Nazism but respect the German people", and to make all possible efforts to restore and maintain a stable living standard for the German population.[57] From 16 July to 2 August, G. K. Zhukov participated in the Potsdam Conference with the other Allied governments. As one of the four commanders-in-chief of Allied forces in Germany, Zhukov established good relationships with the other commanders-inchief, General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower (US), Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (UK) and Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (France). These four generals exchanged views about matters such as judging war criminals, rebuilding Germany, relationships between the Allies and defeating the Japanese Empire. Eisenhower seemed to be especially satisfied with, and respectful of, his relationship with Zhukov. Eisenhower's successor, General Lucius Dubignon Clay, also praised the Zhukov-Eisenhower friendship, and commented: The Soviet-America relationship should have developed well if Eisenhower and Zhukov had continued to work together. Lucius Dubignon Clay.[5]:p.356

Eisenhower and Zhukov, June 1945 American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied commander in the West, was a great admirer of Zhukov,[specify] and the two toured the Soviet Union together in the immediate aftermath of the victory over Germany.[6]:pp.346-47 Zhukov was not only the supreme Military Commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany, but became its Military Governor on 10 June 1945. A war hero, hugely popular with the military, Stalin viewed Zhukov as a potential threat to his leadership.[citation needed] He replaced Zhukov with Vasily Sokolovsky on 10 April 1946. After an unpleasant session of the Main Military Councilin which Zhukov was

bitterly attacked and accused of political unreliability and hostility to the Party Central Committeehe was stripped of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.[58]:pp.200205 He was assigned command of the Odessa Military District, far from Moscow and lacking in strategic significance and troops. He arrived there on 13 June. Zhukov suffered a heart attack in January 1948, spending a month in hospital. In February 1948, he was given another secondary posting, this time command of the Urals Military District. Throughout this time Lavrentiy Beria was apparently trying to topple Zhukov. Two of Zhukov's subordinates, Marshal of the Red Air Force Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov and Lieutenant-General Konstantin Fyodorovitch Teleghin (Member of the Military Council of 1st Belorussia Army Group) were arrested and tortured in Lefortovo prison at the end of 1945. During the confrontation, G. K. Zhukov unmasked the calumniation of Director of Intelligent Bureau F. I. Golikov about Zhukov's misspending of war booty and exaggeration of Nazi Germany's strength. During this time Zhukov was accused of being a Bonapartist.[59] In 1946, seven rail carriages with furniture that Zhukov was taking to the Soviet Union from Germany were impounded. In 1948, his apartments and house in Moscow were searched and many valuables looted from Germany were found.[60] In his investigation Beria concluded that Zhukov had in his possessions 17 golden rings, three gemstones, the faces of 15 golden necklaces, more than 4,000 meters of cloth, 323 pieces of fur, 44 carpets taken from German palaces, 55 paintings and 20 guns".[61] Zhukov admitted he would avoid such "errors and follies" thereafter.[62] These incidents were ironically called "the Investigation of the Cup" by the Soviet military. About Beria's "inspection", Zhukov wrote his comment in a memorandum explaining this matter to Andrei Zhdanov: I do not need to defend myself because, actually, these things are completely not necessary for me, and probably somebody had placed them into my storehouse. I demand a public inspection with clear undertakings in order to avoid misunderstandings and calumniations. Surely I still and will wholeheartly serve the Motherland, the Party, and the Great Comrade Stalin. G. K. Zhukov[63] When learning of Zhukov's "misfortunes" and despite not understanding all the problems Eisenhower expressed his sympathy for his "comrade-in-arms" (Zhukov).[64] On February 1953, I. V. Stalin ordered Zhukov to leave the post of commander of Ural Military Zone, and then recalled him to Moscow. Several opinions suggested Zhukov was needed for the war at Korea, but in fact during one month at Moscow, Stalin did not give Zhukov any tasks. At 9:50AM on 5 March 1953, Stalin suddenly died, and since this event, Zhukov's life stepped to a brand new stage.[65]

Reasons for Zhukov's rises and falls under Stalin

During the Great Patriotic War, G. K. Zhukov was one of only a few people who understood Stalin's personality. As the Chief of Staff and later Deputy Supreme Commander, Zhukov had hundreds of meetings with Stalin, both private and during STAVKA conferences. Consequently, Zhukov well understood Stalin's personality and methods. According to Zhukov, Stalin was a strong and secretive person, but he was also hot-tempered and sceptical. Zhukov was even able to gauge Stalin's mood; for example, when Stalin drew deeply on his tobacco pipe, it was a sign of a good mood. Conversely, if Stalin failed to light his pipe once it was out of tobacco, it was a sign of an imminent outburst.[66] An outstanding knowledge of Stalin's personality was very helpful to Zhukov, and it assisted him to deal with Stalin's rages in a way other generals could not.[67] Both Zhukov and Stalin were hot-tempered, and, at different times, one or other of them always had to make concessions in order to sustain the relationship. While Zhukov simply viewed his relationship with Stalin as one of subordinate-senior, Stalin was in awe and possibly a little bit jealous toward Zhukov. Both were military commanders, but whilst Stalin's experience was restricted to a previous generation of non-mechanised warfare, by contrast Zhukov was highly influential in the development of contemporary combined operations of highly mechanised armies. The differences in these outlooks were responsible for many tempestuous disagreements between the top two of them at Soviet STAVKA meetings. Nonetheless, Zhukov was much less competent than Stalin as a politician, an inadequacy which accounted for Zhukov's many failures in Soviet politics. In fact, Stalin's unwillingness to value Zhukov beyond the marshal's military talents was one of the reasons why Stalin recalled Zhukov from Berlin.[68] Another significant element of their relationship was Zhukov's straightforwardness toward Stalin. Stalin was dismissive of the fawning of many of his entourage and openly criticised it.[69] Many, however, around himsuch as Beria, Yezhov, Mekhlis, and some other peoplefelt the need to flatter Stalin to remain on his good side.[70] Zhukov was different. By contrast he was stubbornly willing to express his views, often going openly against Stalin's opinion even to the point of risking his career. His heated argument with Stalin on the subject of abandoning Kiev in 1941 was a typical example of Zhukov's approach.[71] Such independence in Zhukov's thinking gained Stalin's respect. It caused Zhukov considerable difficulties on occasions but was the main reason through which the decision-making of STAVKA become more objective and effective. After the war, things were less successful for Zhukov, and his independentmindedness caused him many problems. Indeed, under the personality cult of the Stalinist regime and its overweening bureaucracy and emphasis on conformity, there was little place within the government for people such as Zhukov.[72]

Rise and fall after Stalin

This article may be confusing or unclear to readers. Please help us clarify the article; suggestions may be found on the talk page. (February 2012) After Stalin's death Zhukov returned to favor, becoming Deputy Defense Minister in 1953. He then had an opportunity to avenge himself on Beria.

Arresting Beria

With Stalin's sudden death, the Soviet Union fell into a leadership crisis. Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov became temporarily First Secretary. Malenkov and his allies attempted to purge Stalin's influence and personality cult, however Malenkov himself did not have the courage to do this alone. Moreover, Beria remained dangerous. The politicians sought reinforcement from the powerful and prestigious military men. In this matter, Nikita Khrushchev chose Zhukov because the two had forged a good relationship, and, in addition, in the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov had twice saved Khrushchev from false accusations.[19]:p.137[73] On 26 June 1953, a special meeting of the Soviet Politburo was held by Malenkov. Beria came to the meeting with an uneasy feeling because it was called hastilyindeed, Zhukov had ordered General K. S. Moskalenko to secretly prepare a special force and permitted the force to use two of Zhukov's and Bulganin's special cars (which had black glass) in order to safely infiltrate the Kremlin. Zhukov also ordered the NKVD Guard replaced by the guard of the Moscow Military District. In this meeting, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and their allies denounced "the imperialist element Beria" about his "antiParty", "anti-socialist" activities, "sowing division", and "acting as a spy of England", together with many other crimes. Finally, Khrushchev suggested expelling Beria from the Communist Party and bringing him before a military court. Immediately, the prepared special force rushed in. Zhukov himself went up to Beria and shouted: "Hands up! Follow me!". Beria replied, in a panic, "Oh Comrades, what's the matter? Just sit down." Zhukov shouted again, "Shut up, you are not the commander here! Comrades, arrest this traitor!". Moskalenko's special forces obeyed.[74][75] Marshal Zhukov was a member of the military tribunal during the Beria trial, which was headed by Marshal Ivan Konev.[76] On 18 December 1953, the Military Court sentenced Beria to death. During the burial of Beria, I. S. Koniev commented: "The day this man was born is deserved to be damned !". Then Zhukov simply said: "I considered it is my duty to contribute my little part in this matter (arresting and executing Beria)."[77][78]

Political career after 1953

When Bulganin became premier in 1955, he appointed Zhukov Defense Minister.[76] Zhukov participated in many political activities. He successfully opposed the reestablishment of the Commissar system, because the Party and political leaders were not professional military, and thus the highest power should fall to the army commanders. Until 1955, Zhukov had both sent and received letters from Eisenhower. Both leaders agreed that the two superpowers should coexist peacefully.[79]:p.237 In July 1955, Zhukovtogether with Khrushchev, Bulganin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Gromyko participated in a Summit Conference at Geneva after the USSR signed a peace treaty with Austria and withdrew its army from that country. Zhukov followed orders from the then Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov and Communist Party leader Khrushchev during the invasion of Hungary following the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.[80] Along with the majority of members of the Presidium, he urged Khrushchev to send troops to support the Hungarian authorities and to secure the Austrian border. Zhukov and most of the Presidium were not, however, eager to see a full-scale intervention in Hungary. Zhukov even recommended the withdrawal of Soviet troops when it seemed that they might have to take extreme measures to suppress the revolution. The mood in the Presidium changed again when Hungary's new Prime

Minister, Imre Nagy, began to talk about Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. That led the Soviets to attack the revolutionaries and to replace Nagy with Jnos Kdr. In the same years, when the UK, France and Israel invaded Egypt during the Suez crisis, Zhukov expressed support for Egypt's right of self-defense. In October 1957, Zhukov visited Yugoslavia and Albania aboard the Chapayev class cruiser Kuibyshev, attempting to repair the TitoStalin split of 1948.[58] During the voyage, Kuibyshev encountered units of the United States Sixth Fleet"passing honors" were exchanged between the vessels. On his 60th birthday (in 1956), Zhukov received his fourth Hero of the Soviet Union title. He became the highest-ranking military professional who was also a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He further became a symbol of national strength. Zhukov's prestige was even higher than the police and security agencies of the USSR, and thus rekindled concerns among political leaders. For examplegoing even further than KhruschevZhukov demanded that the political agencies in the Red Army report to him before the Party. He demanded an official condemnation of Stalin's crimes during the Great Purge[citation needed]. He also supported the political vindication and rehabilitation for M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Yegorov and many others. In response his opponents accused him of being a Reformist and Bonapartist. Such enviousness and hostility proved to be the key factor that led to his later downfall.[58] The relationship between Zhukov and Khrushchev reached its peak during the XX Congress of the Communist Party (1957). After becoming the First Secretary of the Party, Khrushchev moved against Stalin's legacy, criticizing his "personality cult", and had Stalin's body moved out of his mausoleum to the Kremlin Wall Necropolis (as had other Soviet leaders). To complete such startling acts, Khrushchev needed the approvalor at least the acquiescenceof the military, headed by Minister of Defense Zhukov. At the Central Conference of the Communist Party held in June 1957, the conservative Stalinists led by Malenkov and Nikolai Bulganin tried to remove Khrushchev by using a mechanical voting majoritywith a draft of a resolution about dismissing Khrushchev. The coup failed and the strongest supporter of Khrushchev was none other than Zhukov. At that Central Conference, Zhukov personally stated: The Army went against this resolution and not even a tank will leave its position without my order! G. K. Zhukov[81] Zhukov later paid a high price for this statement. He was removed from the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense, entering forced retirement at age 62. These things happened behind his back, when Zhukov "left his tanks" to participate in a visiting trip to Albania at the invitation of Gen. Col. Beqir Balluku. Interestingly, the same issue of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) that announced his return also reported that he had been relieved of his duties.[82] Even Khrushchev did nothing to help Zhukov. According to many researchers, Soviet politicians (including Khruschev himself) had a deep-seated fear of "powerful people".[83]

Retirement

After being forced out of the government, Zhukov stayed away from politics. Many peopleincluding former subordinatesfrequently paid him visits, went with him on hunting excursions, and waxed nostalgic. In September 1959, while visiting the United States, Khrushchev told US President Eisenhower that the retired Marshal Zhukov "liked fishing". Eisenhower, in response, sent Zhukov a set of fishing tackle. Zhukov respected this gift so much that he is said to have exclusively used Eisenhower's fishing tackle for the remainder of his life.[citation needed] After Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, Brezhnev restored Zhukov to favour (though not to power) in a move to use Zhukov's popularity to strengthen his political position. Zhukov's name was put in the public eye yet again when Brezhnev lionized Zhukov in a speech commemorating the Great Patriotic War. On 9 May 1965, Zhukov was invited to sit on the tribunal of the Lenin Mausoleum and given the honor to review the military forces in Red Square.[5]:p.277 In 1958, Zhukov started writing his memoirs "Reminiscences and Reflections" ( ). He worked intensively on them, which together with steadily deteriorating health, served to worsen his heart disease. In December 1967, Zhukov had a serious stroke. He was hospitalized until June 1968, and continued to receive medical and rehabilitative treatment at home under the care of his second wife, Galina Semyonova, a former officer in the Medical Corps. His memoirs were published in 1969 and became a best-seller. Within several months of the date of publication of his memoirs, Zhukov had received more than 10,000 letters from readers that offered comments, expressed gratitude, gave advice, and lavished praise. Supposedly, the Communist Party invited Zhukov to participate in the XXIV General Assembly in 1971 but the invitation was canceled.[58] On 18 June 1974, Zhukov died after another stroke. His ashes were buried at the Kremlin Wall Necropolis alongside fellow generals and marshals of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

Family

Father: Konstantin Artemyevitch Zhukov (18511921), a shoemaker. Konstantin was an orphan who was adopted by Ms. Anuska Zhukova at the age of two. Mother: Ustinina Aktemievna Zhukova (1866-1944), a farmer descended from a poor family. According to Zhukov his mother was a person with considerable strength who could carry five put (about 80 kilograms) of wheat on her shoulder. Zhukov thought he had inherited his strength from his mother. Elder sister: Maria Kostantinovna Zhukova (b. 1894). Younger brother: Alexei Konstantinovich Zhukov (b. 1901), died prematurely. First wife: Alexandra Dievna Zuikova (1900-1967), common-law wife since 1920, married in 1953, divorced in 1965. Died after a stroke. Second wife: Galina Alexandrovna Semyonova (1926 - November 1973[84]), Colonel, military officer in the Soviet Medical Corps, worked at Burdenko Hospital, specialized in therapeutics. Married in 1965. Died of breast cancer. First daughter: Era Zhukova (b. 1928), mothered by Alexandra Dievna Zuikova. Second daughter Margarita Zhukova (1929-2011), mothered by Maria Nikolaevna Volokhova (1897-1983).

Third daughter: Ella Zhukova (1937-2010), mothered by Alexandra Dievna Zuikova. Fourth daughter: Maria Zhukova (b. 1957), mothered by Galina Alexandrovna Semyonova.

Controversy and praise

After the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov's fame was not well known by the world, since he was mistreated even in USSR, the country which he fought wholeheartly to protect.[85] Even today, appraisals of Zhukov's career vary. For example, historian Konstantin Zaleski claimed that Zhukov exaggerated his own role in the Patriotic War.[86] Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky said that the planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon after.[87] Andrei Mertsalov stated that Zhukov was rude and wayward. Mertsalov further accused Zhukov of setting unnecessarily and terribly strict rules toward his subordinates.[88] Others note Zhukov's "dictatorial" approach. For example, Major General P. G. Grigorienko stated that Zhukov demanded unconditional compliance with his orders. Some notable examples for these points include the time, on 28 September 1941, that Zhukov sent ciphered telegram No. 4976 to commanders of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Navy, announcing that returned prisoners and families of soldiers captured by the Germans would be shot.[89] This order was published for the first time in 1991 in the Russian magazine (Beginning) No. 3. In the same month, Zhukov apparently ordered that any soldiers who left their positions would be shot.[90] Some historians stated that Zhukov was a typical "squander-soldier general" who was unmoved by his forces' loss of life. Others such as Isaev reject this idea, and quote some of Zhukov's orders stored by the Russian Ministry of Defence and Government of Moscow to prove that Zhukov did care about the lives of his soldiers.[91] The reason why 49th Army failed to accomplish the attacking mission and suffered heavy loss of lives is because the commanders of the units terribly violated the regulations of using artillery in preparing shot in order to persecuted and broke the enemy's lines and did not pay attention to reinforcing the shelters and trenches for the soldiers to take cover in. The units of 49th Army repeated many useless head-on assaults toward Kostino, Ostrozhnoye, Bogdanovo, Potapovo; that lead to heavy loss of lives and failure of the mission. Even a person with a primary education level can understand that these strong points are very suitable for defence and shelter. The area in front of these strong points was arranged with many perfect firing posts. Repeating many assaults in winter condition is the result of the indiscipline and the lack of preparing to the idiotic extent that led to heavy and useless loss of lives of the Motherland and for thousands of Mothers. If you still want to stay at your commanding positions, execute my following order: Stop immediately the head-on assaults. Terminate instantly the pointless bombardment of artillery in the front. When moving, soldiers must make full use of mountain creeks

and forests in order to reduce casualties. Secretly isolate the strong points and do not stop in order to assault Sloboda and Rassvet and develop to Levshina. I demand you to execute the order before 24:00 of 27 January. Order of G. K. Zhukov to the High Command of 49th Army on 27 January 1942[92] You have created such a useless thinking that victory can be achieved by tactic of "using meat to crush people." Victory can only achieved by combat arts and fighting skills, not by people's lives. Order of G. K. Zhukov to Zakharkin on 7 March 1942[93] Tactics of Western Front recently indicated a completely unacceptable attitude about saving forces. Commanders of armies, corps, and divisions just threw the units into the battlefields, however they were irresponsible about preparing medical care for the soldiers. Recently, casualty rates of Western Front was two or three times more than other areas; however wounded soldiers were still abandoned. It seems to be that saving lives of the wounded and maintaining health of the soldiers was only considered as a petty problem. Order of G. K. Zhukov on 15 March 1942[94] Zhukov also received many positive comments, mostly from his Army companions, from the modern Russian Army, and from his Allied contemporaries. General of the Army Eisenhower stated that, because of Zhukov's achievements fighting the Nazis, the United Nations owed him much more than any other military leader in the world. The war in Europe ended with victory and nobody could have did that better than Marshal Zhukov - we owed him that credit. He is a modest person, and so we can't undervalue his position in our mind. When we can come back to our Motherland, there must be another type of Order in Russia, an Order named after Zhukov, which is awarded to everybody who can learn the bravery, the far vision, and the decisiveness of this soldier. Dwight D. Eisenhower[95] Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky commented that G. K. Zhukov is one of the most outstanding and brilliant military commanders of the Soviet Military Force.[96] Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief of Staff of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, described Zhukov as a friendly person.[97] US writer John Gunther, who met Zhukov many times after the war, said that Zhukov was more friendly and honest than any other Soviet leaders.[98] John Eisenhower - Dwight Eisenhower's son - claimed that Zhukov was really ebullient and was a friend of his.[79] Albert Axell in his work "Marshal Zhukov, the one who beat Hitler" claimed that Zhukov is a military genius like Alexander the Great and Napolon. Axell also commented that Zhukov is a loyal communist and a patriot.[99] At the end of his work about Zhukov, Otto Chaney concluded: But Zhukov belongs to all of us. In the darkest period of World War II his fortitude and determination eventually triumphed. For Russians and people everywhere he remains an enduring symbol of victory on the battlefield. Otto Chaney[100]

Awards

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev laying a wreath at a monument to Zhukov in Ulan Bator, whilst on a state visit to Mongolia in August 2009. This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Russian Wikipedia. Zhukov was a recipient of decorations. Most notably he was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union four times. Aside from Zhukov, only Leonid Brezhnev was a four-time recipient (the latter's were self-awarded). Zhukov was one of only three recipients to receive the Order of Victory twice. He was also awarded high honors from many other countries. A partial listing is presented below.

Russian Imperial decorations

Cross of St. George (4th and 3rd classes)

Soviet Orders and Medals

Order of Victory (Serial No. 1, 10 April 1944 and Serial No. 5, 30 March 1945) Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union (29 August 1939, 29 July 1944, 1 June 1945, 1 December 1956) Order of Lenin (16 August 1936, 29 August 1939, 21 February 1945, 1 December 1956, 1 December 1966, 1 December 1971) Order of the October Revolution (22 February 1968) Order of the Red Banner (31 August 1922, 3 November 1944, 20 June 1949) Order of Suvorov, 1st class (Serial No. 1, 28 January 1943 and Serial No. 39, 28 July 1943) Marshal's Star Honorary weapon - sword inscribed with golden national emblem of the Soviet Union (22 January 1968) Jubilee Medal "In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary since the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Medal "For the Defence of Moscow" Medal "For the Defence of Leningrad" Medal "For the Defence of Stalingrad" Medal "For the Defence of the Caucasus"

Medal "For the Capture of Berlin" Medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 19411945" Medal "For the Victory over Japan" Jubilee Medal "XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" Jubilee Medal "30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy" Jubilee Medal "40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Jubilee Medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" Medal "In Commemoration of the 800th Anniversary of Moscow" Medal "In Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of Leningrad" Jubilee Medal "Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"

Foreign awards

Order of the Red Banner (Mongolian People's Republic, 1939 and 1942) Order of the White Lion, 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Military Order of the White Lion "For Victory", 1st class (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Czechoslovak War Cross (Czechoslovakia, 1945) Cross of Grunwald, 1st class (Poland, 1945) Grand Cross of the Virtuti Militari (Poland, 1945) Chief Commander, Legion of Merit (USA, 1945) Honorary Knight Grand Cross, Order of the Bath, (military division) (UK, 1945) Grand Cross of the Legion d'Honneur (France, 1945) Medal "For Warsaw 1939-1945" (Poland, 1946) Medal "for Oder, Nisu, and the Baltic Region" (Poland, 1946) Medal "Sino-Soviet friendship", (China, 1953 and 1956) Order of Freedom (SFR Yugoslavia, 1956) Order of Military Merit, 1st class (Grand Cross of the Officer) (Egypt, 1956) Garibaldi Medal (Italy, 1956) Honorary Italian Partisan (Italy, 1956) Commander's Cross with Star of the Polonia Restituta, (Poland, 1968, and Commander's Cross, 1973) Order of Sukhbaatar (Mongolian People's Republic, 1968, 1969, 1971) Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolian People's Republic, 1969) Croix de guerre (France) Medal "30 year anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol" (Mongolian People's Republic, 1969) Medal "50 years of the Mongolian People's Republic" (Mongolian People's Republic, 1971) Medal "50 years of the Mongolian People's Army" (Mongolian People's Republic, 1971) Medal "For Victory over Japan" (Mongolian People's Republic) Medal "to the 90th anniversary of the birth of Georgiy Dimitrov" (Bulgaria) Medal "25 years of the Bulgarian People's Army" (Bulgaria)

Legacy
Memorials

This section requires expansion with: More information about other monuments, Zhukov museum in Zhukovo. (August 2011)

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and Mongolian president Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj visit the monument to Georgy Zhukov in Ulan Bator, near the Zhukov Museum in Zhukov Street (Mongolian: ) in memory of the Battle of Khalkin Gol. The first monument to Georgy Zhukov was erected in Mongolia, in memory of the Battle of Khalkin Gol. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this monument was one of the few that did not suffer from anti-Soviet backlash in former Communist states. There is a statue of Zhukov on horseback as he appeared at the 1945 victory parade on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow. A minor planet, 2132 Zhukov, discovered in 1975 by Soviet astronomer Lyudmila Chernykh, is named in his honor.[101] In 1996, Russia adopted the Order of Zhukov and the Zhukov Medal to commemorate the 100th anniversary of his birthday.

Recollections
Nobel laureate Joseph Brodsky's poem On the Death of Zhukov ("Na smert' Zhukova", 1974) is regarded by critics as one of the best poems on the war written by an author of the post-war generation.[102] The poem is a stylization of The Bullfinch, Derzhavin's elegy on the death of Generalissimo Suvorov in 1800. Brodsky draws a parallel between the careers of these two famous commanders. In his book of recollections,[103] Zhukov was critical of the role the Soviet leadership played during the war. The first edition of Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya, was published during the reign of Leonid Brezhnev only on the conditions that criticism of Stalin was removed, and that Zhukov add a (fictional) episode of a visit to Leonid Brezhnev, politruk at the Southern Front, to consult on military strategy.[104]

Popular culture
Zhukov is a character in Robert Conroy's Red Inferno: 1945. The novel follows his career as Marshal of the Soviet Union in a fictional situation where the Soviet Union attacks America and the remaining Allied nations. Toward the end of the novel an American Boeing B-29 Superfortress drops a nuclear bomb near the city of Paderborn, Germany, where Zhukov has set up his headquarters. This fictional bomb kills both him

and his protg and second in command, Vasily Chuikov, as well as a large portion of the elite forces of the Soviet military. In the title song in the Swedish band Sabaton's album Attero Dominatus includes a strain about Georgy Zhukov during the Battle of Berlin as well as a line referring to him. The line being, "Marshall Zhukov's orders: Serve me Berlin on a plate". The Cigar City Brewing Company in Tampa, Florida, brews a Russian imperial stout named after Zhukov. The USS Zhukov, an Ambassador-class starship, is referred to several times in Star Trek: The Next Generation. Alternate history writer Harry Turtledove uses Zhukov in several of his novels, including the novel The Man With the Iron Heart where he is killed by Heydrich's irregular fighters. Zhukov is the name of the mentor and superior of the KGB spy Elizabeth in the FX TV series "The Americans". He was a hero of the Great Patriotic War.

References
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17. ^ - - .. 18. ^ - ". . ." - 4. 19. ^ a b c d e f Vasilevsky, A. M. (1978)). The matter of a whole life. Moscow: Politizdat. 20. ^ Davis Dragunsky. Cuc i mt ngi lnh. NXB Ngoi vn. Moskva. 1977, trang 52. 21. ^ I. K. Bagramian. This is How the War Began, p. 95. 22. ^ G. K. Zhukov. Vol 2, p. 83. (Vietnamese) 23. ^ a b c d Stemenko, S. M. The Soviet General Staff in the war. (Vietnamese) 24. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Thm, C Vn. 10 i Tng soi th gii. 25. ^ I. Kh. Bagramian. This is How the War Began, pp. 350-353, 397. 26. ^ Carell, Paul (1966), Verbrannte Erde: Schlacht zwischen Wolga und Weichsel (Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War 1943-1944), Verlag Ullstein GmbH, (Schiffer Publishing), 27. ^ Werth, Alexander, Russia at War 1941-1945 (1964) 28. ^ Salisbury, Harrison The 900 Days; the Siege of Leningrad (1969) 29. ^ Skrjabina, Elena. Siege and Survival: The Odyssey of a Leningrader. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971 30. ^ Richard Bidlack and Nikita Lomagin. The Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1944. A New Documentary History from the Soviet Archives. 2007, Yale University Press 31. ^ Jones, Michael. Leningrad: State of Siege. Perseus Books, New York, 2011 32. ^ a b Shirer WL. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. 33. ^ Soviet/German forces at the beginning of the Moscow counter-offensive: Manpower: 1,100,0000/1,700,000. Tanks: 774/1,170. 34. ^ S. V. Perevezentsev and V. A. Volkov. Battle of Moscow . ., . ., 35. ^ - " , 1941-1942" - II. 36. ^ Grigori Doberin. Nhng b mt ca chin tranh th gii th hai, trang 134. 37. ^ : , : . ./ . . , . . , . . . .: , 1993., p. 225 38. ^ Kurt von Tippelskirch. History of World War II. p. 328. 39. ^ M. A. . // 10, 2003.] 40. ^ " 1942 ." 1999 by the University Press of Kansas c " ", 2005 .: : , 2006. - 666, (6) .:. 27-29 41. ^ Vladimir Aleksnadrovich Chernov and Galina Yaroslavovna Grin. 70th Anniversary of Pogorelov-Gorodishche and Rzhev-Sychevska Offensive (second time) in 1942. Review of the Basic Bookset of The Great Patriotic War Museum. Solda.ru. 1-8-2012 42. ^ Chaney, Zhukov, p. 237

43. ^ " " - 17. . 130. 44. ^ A. M. Vasilevsky. S nghip c cuc i, trang 273-274. 45. ^ " " - 18. p. 178. 46. ^ A. M. Vasilevsky. The matter of a whole life, pp. 341-341 47. ^ I. B. Moshchansky. 1944 - From Korsun to Belgrade. Moskva. 2007, p. 55 . . 1944 . , , 2007, . 55 48. ^ I. S. Koniev. Stalingrad on the banks of Dnieper. Military Publisher. Moskva. 1965, p. 61. 49. ^ A. M. Vasilevsky. p. 337. 50. ^ S. M. Stemenko. The Soviet General Staff in war. Vol. 2, p. 148. (Vietnamese) 51. ^ K. K. Rokossovssky. Duty of a soldier. Moskva, p. 285. 52. ^ S. M. Shtemenko. The Soviet General Staff in war. vol 2, p. 129. (Vietnamese) 53. ^ " " - 19. . 238 54. ^ Karol Sverchevsky. Tnh on kt chin u. NXB Qun i. Warsawa. 1956, trang 285. 55. ^ S. M. Shtemenko. The Soviet General Staffs in War. Vol, 2, pp. 131-132 (Vietnamese) 56. ^ S. M. Shtemenko. The General Staff in the War Years. Vol 1, pp. 566-569. (Vietnamese) 57. ^ Grigori Doberin. Nhng b mt ca chin tranh th gii th hai, trang 340343. 58. ^ a b c d Spahr, William J. (1993). Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-551-3. 59. ^ . ., . .: , 1991, . 594599 (I. S. Konev. Diary of the Front Commander. Miliatry Publisher. Moscow. 1991, pp. 594-599) 60. ^ .. : . (Unknown Zhukov by Boris Sokolov. .: -, 2000. 608 . " " . ISBN 985-448-036-4. 61. ^ . 62. ^ . ., 1993. . 244. 63. ^ Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Moscow, 1993, p.244 64. ^ New York Times. 29 July 1955. 65. ^ Albert Axell. Marshal Zhukov, p. 356. 66. ^ G. K. Zhukov. Reminiscences and Reflections. Vol. 2, pp. 139, 150. 67. ^ Alber Axell, Marshal Zhukov, p. 280. 68. ^ Chaney, Otto Preston. Zhukov. Revised ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, ISBN 0-8061-2807-0. 69. ^ S. M. Shtemenko. The General Staff in the War Years. Vol. 2, p. 587 70. ^ A. M. Vasilevsky. The matter of the whole life, p. 62. 71. ^ A. I. Sethi. Marshal Zhukov: The Great Strategician. New Delhi: 1988, p. 187. 72. ^ Report of Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Vietnamese) 73. ^ Sergei Khrushchev. Khrushchev on Khrushchev. An Inside Account of the Man and His Era. Boston. 1990, pp. 243, 272, 317.

74. ^ K. S. Moskalenko. The arrest of Beria. Newspaper . No. 23, year 1990. 75. ^ Yu. N. Afansiev ch bin . Khng cn ng no khc. NXB Khoa hc x hi v NXB S Tht. H Ni. 1989, p. 141. 76. ^ a b Associated Press, 9 February 1955, reported in The Albuquerque Journal page 1 of that date. 77. ^ K. S. Moskalenko. The arrest of L. P. Beria. Newspaper . No. 23, year 1990. 78. ^ Yu. N. Afansiev (editor-in-chief). There is no other way. Social Science Publisher and Truth Publisher. Hanoi. 1989, p. 141. (Vietnamese) 79. ^ a b Eisenhower, John (1974). Strictly Personal. New York. 80. ^ Johanna Granville, The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, Texas A & M University Press, 2004. ISBN 158544-298-4 81. ^ Yu. N. Afanasiev ch bin . Khng c con ng no khc. NXB Khoa hc x hi v NXB S Tht. H Ni. 1989, trang 151-152 82. ^ Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 October 1957, pp. 3,4, quoted in Spahr, 1993, p.238 83. ^ Yu. N. Afanasiev ch bin . Khng c con ng no khc. NXB Khoa hc x hi v NXB S Tht. H Ni. 1989, trang 152 84. ^ Tissier, p.258 85. ^ Albert Axell. Marshal Zhukov, p. 9 86. ^ . . . . , , 2000; . , (Russian) 87. ^ - , 1992 N3 p. 31 88. ^ . . , 6, 2004. (Russian) 89. ^ (Russian)Sokolov, Boris. : ? Grain.ru Retrieved on 2002-07-17 90. ^ . . , -, 1981. 91. '^ . . : ' (Russian) 92. ^ . . . 15 4 1 . .: 1997. . 271272 (Russian) 93. ^ . . . . .: , 1994. . 137 (Russian) 94. ^ , . 208, . 2513, . 209, . 142. (Russian) 95. ^ Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York.1948. 96. ^ A. M. Vasilevsky. The matter of a whole life, p. 568. 97. ^ Sir Francis de Guingand. Generals at War. London. 1972 98. ^ John Gunther. Inside Russia Today. New York. 1958. 99. ^ The general who defeated Hitler 8 May 2005. BBC Vietnamese (Vietnamese) 100. ^ Chaney, Zhukov, p. 483 101. ^ Schmadel, Lutz D. (2003). Dictionary of Minor Planet Names (5th ed.). New York: Springer Verlag. p. 173. ISBN 3-540-00238-3. 102. ^ Shlapentokh, Dmitry. The Russian boys and their last poet. The National Interest. 22 June 1996 Retrieved on 2002-07-17 103. ^ Zhukov, Georgy. http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/10.html . . 2 . .: -, 2002. 104. ^ Mauno Koivisto Venjn idea, Helsinki. Tammi. 2001.

References

Axell, Albert. Marshal Zhukov. Toronto: Pearson Education Ltd., 2003, ISBN 0582-77233-8 Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan; Japan Against Russia, 1939. 1985; Two volumes. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1160-7. Pavel N. Bobylev, Otechesvennaya istoriya, no. 1, 2000, pp. 4164 (Russian) Zhukov, Georgy. . . 2 . .: -, 2002. Zhukov's memoirs online in Russian. Tony Le Tissier. Zhukov on river Oder - Berlin won the battle decided. London. 1996

Primary sources

Johanna Granville, trans., "Soviet Archival Documents on the Hungarian Revolution, 24 October 4 November 1956", Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 5 (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC), Spring, 1995, pp. 2223, 2934.

Additional reading

Goldman, Stuart D. Nomonhan 1939; The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II. 2012, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-329-1. Granville, Johanna The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, Texas A & M University Press, 2004. ISBN 158544-298-4. Spahr, William J. Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993 (paperback, ISBN 0-89141-551-3).

External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Georgy Zhukov Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Georgy Zhukov

Marshal Zhukov from the Voice of Russia website (in English) (Russian) The Memoirs of Georgy Zhukov (Russian) Zhukov's Awards (Russian) Shadow of Victory and Take Words Back, books by Viktor Suvorov, highly critical of Zhukov (Russian) .. : , .: -, 2000. B.V.Sokolov. Unknown Zhukov) (Russian) . (On the Death of Zhukov by Joseph Brodsky), 1974 (Serbian) Georgy Zhukov

Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence. PartyMilitary Relations in the USSR and the Fall of Marshal Zhukov, 8 June 1959.

Volgograd
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search For other uses, see Volgograd (disambiguation). "Tsaritsyn" redirects here. See also Tsaritsyno. "Stalingrad" redirects here. For the World War II battle, see Battle of Stalingrad. For other uses, see Stalingrad (disambiguation).

Volgograd (English) (Russian)

- City[1] -

Top: View of Bolgogradsky Bridge across the Volga River, Middle left: Komsomolskaya station of the Volgograd metrotram, Center: Volgograd railroad station, Middle right: Propylaea on the Central embankment square at the Volga River, Bottom: View The Motherland Calls on the Mamayev Kurgan Hill

Location of Volgograd Oblast in Russia

Volgograd Location of Volgograd in Volgograd Oblast Coordinates: 4842N 4431ECoordinates: 4842N 4431E

Coat of arms

Flag

City Day

Second Sunday of September[citation needed] Administrative status (as of February 2010)

Country Federal subject

Russia Volgograd Oblast[2]

Administratively subordinated to city of oblast significance of Volgograd[2] Administrative center of Volgograd Oblast,[citation needed] city of oblast significance of

Volgograd[2] Municipal status (as of March 2010) Urban okrug Administrative center of Head[citation needed] Representative body Volgograd Urban Okrug[3] Volgograd Urban Okrug[3] Roman Grebennikov[citation needed] City Duma[citation needed] Statistics Population (2010 Census)
- Rank in 2010

1,021,215 inhabitants[4]
12th

Time zone Founded Previous names Postal code(s) Dialing code(s)

MSK (UTC+04:00)[5] 1589[6] Tsaritsyn (until 1925),[6] Stalingrad (until 1961)[6] 400001..400138[citation needed] +7 8442[citation needed] Official website Volgograd on WikiCommons

Volgograd (Russian: ; IPA: [vlrat] ( listen)), formerly called Tsaritsyn (Russian: (helpinfo); 15891925) and known as Stalingrad (Russian: (helpinfo)) from 1925 to 1961, is an important industrial city and the administrative center of Volgograd Oblast, Russia. It is 80-kilometer (50 mi) long,[7] north to south, situated on the western bank of the Volga River. Population: 1,021,215 (2010 Census);[4] 1,011,417 (2002 Census);[8] 1,022,578 (1989 Census).[9] The city became famous for its resistance, as well as the extensive physical damage and death toll it suffered during the Battle of Stalingrad against the German Army in World War II. Since February 2013, the city's name is to be commemorated as Stalingrad six days each year.

Contents

1 History o 1.1 Tsaritsyn o 1.2 Stalingrad 2 Administrative and municipal status 3 Economy 4 Transportation 5 Climate 6 Culture and recreation 7 Education 8 Sports 9 Notable people 10 International relations o 10.1 Twin towns and sister cities 11 References o 11.1 Notes o 11.2 Sources 12 External links

History

Coat of Arms of Tsaritsyn (1857)

Map of Tsaritsyn (Volgograd) City map, Russian edition on 1909

City tram on Gogolya Street in 1914 Tsaritsyn

Although the city may have originated in 1555, documented evidence of Tsaritsyn located at the confluence of the Tsaritsa and Volga Rivers dates only from 1589.[6] The fortress Sary Su (a local Tatar language name meaning: yellow water/river), was established to defend the unstable southern border of the country. It was located slightly above the mouth of the Tsaritsa River on the right bank.It soon became the nucleus of a trading settlement. In 1607 the fortress garrison rebelled against the tsar's troops for six months. In 1608 the city had its first stone church, St. John the Baptist. At the beginning of the 17th century, the garrison consisted of 350-400 people. In 1670 troops of Stepan Razin captured the fortress; they left after a month. In 1708 the insurgent Cossack Kondraty Bulavin held the fortress. In 1717, Bulavin (who died in July 1708) was sacked[clarification needed] by the Crimean Tatars and Kuban. Later, in 1774, Yemelyan Pugachev unsuccessfully attempted to storm the city. In 1691, Tsaritsyn established customs. In 1708, Tsaritsyn was assigned to Kazan Governorate; in 1719[citation needed], to Astrakhan Governorate; According to the census in 1720, the city's population was 408 people. In 1773, the city became the provincial and district town. From 1779, it belonged to Saratov Viceroyalty. In 1780, the city was under Saratov Governorate. In the 19th century, Tsaritsyn became an important river port and commercial center. The population expanded rapidly during the 19th century, increasing from fewer than 3,000 people in 1807 to about 84,000 in 1900. The first railroad was constructed to the town in 1862. The first theatre opened in 1872, the first cinema in 1907. In 1913, Tsaritsin's first tram-line was built, and the city's first electric lights were installed in the city center. During the Russian Civil War, Tsaritsyn came under Soviet control from November 1917. In 1918, Tsaritsyn was besieged by White troops under Ataman Krasnov. Three assaults by White troops were repulsed. However, in June 1919 Tsaritsyn was captured by the White forces of General Denikin, which left the city in January 1920. This was known as the Battle for Tsaritsyn.

Stalingrad

The city was renamed Stalingrad after Joseph Stalin on April 10, 1925. This was officially to recognize the city's and Stalin's role in its defense against the Whites between 1918 and 1920.[10] In 1931, the German settlement-colony Old Sarepta (founded in 1765) subsequently became the largest area of the city Krasnoarmeysky. The first institute was opened in 1930; a year later the Pedagogical Institute was opened. Under Stalin, the city became a center of heavy industry and transshipment by rail and river. It was attacked by Germany and Axis forces during World War II. In 1942, the city became the site of one of the pivotal battles of the war. The Battle of Stalingrad had perhaps the greatest casualty figures of any single battle in the history of warfare (estimates are between 1,250,000[11] and 1,798,619[12]). The battle began on August 23, 1942, and on the same day, the city suffered heavy aerial bombardment that reduced most of it to rubble. By September, the fighting reached the city center. The fighting was of unprecedented intensity; the central railway station of the city changed hands thirteen times, and the Mamayev Kurgan (one of the highest points of the city) was captured and recaptured eight times. By early November, the German forces controlled 90 percent of the city and had cornered the Soviets into two narrow pockets, but they were unable to eliminate the last pockets of Soviet resistance in time. On November 19, Soviet forces launched a huge counterattack. This led to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army and other Axis units. On January 31, 1943 the Sixth Army's commander, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus surrendered, and by February 2, with the elimination of straggling German troops, the Battle of Stalingrad was over. In 1945 the Soviet Union awarded Stalingrad the title Hero City for its resistance. Great Britain's King George VI awarded the citizens of Stalingrad the jeweled "Sword of Stalingrad" in recognition of their bravery. As Stalingrad was destroyed during the war, in 1946, the construction of the modern city started. It included the memorial complex on the Mamayev Kurgan. A number of cities around the world (especially those that had suffered similar wartime devastation) established sister/friendship/twinning links (see list below) in the spirit of solidarity or reconciliation. One of the first "sister city" projects was that established between Stalingrad and England's Coventry during World War II (both suffered extensive devastation from aerial bombardment). In 1961, Nikita Khrushchev's administration changed the name of the city to Volgograd ("Volga City") as part of his programme of de-Stalinization following Stalin's death, as he was trying to reduce the "cult of personality". This action was and remains somewhat controversial, given Stalingrad's importance as a symbol of resistance during the war. During Konstantin Chernenko's brief administration in 1985, proposals were floated to revive its historic name. There remains a strong degree of local support for a reversion but intermittent proposals have yet to be accepted by the Russian government.

Building of the Oblast Duma

On May 21, 2007, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation obtained an important success in the Volgograd mayoral election. Communist candidate Roman Grebennikov was elected as mayor with 32.47% of the vote. Grebennikov is Russia's youngest mayor of a federal subject administrative center. On January 31, 2013, the Volgograd City Council passed a measure to use the name "Stalingrad" in city statements on six specific dates annually.[13][14] On the following dates Volgograd's name officially reverts to Stalingrad: February 2(end of the Battle of Stalingrad), May 9 (Victory Day (9 May)), June 22 (start of Operation Barbarossa), August 23(start of the Battle of Stalingrad), September 2 (Victory over Japan Day), and November 19 (start of Operation Uranus).[15] In addition, 50,000 people signed a petition to Vladimir Putin, asking that the city's name be permanently changed to Stalingrad.[13]

Administrative and municipal status

View of Voroshilovsky City District of Volgograd

Volgograd is the administrative center of the oblast.[citation needed] Within the framework of administrative divisions, it is incorporated as the city of oblast significance of Volgogradan administrative unit with the status equal to that of the districts.[2] As a municipal division, the city of oblast significance of Volgograd is incorporated as Volgograd Urban Okrug.[3]

Economy

Volgograd on the 1979 map

Modern Volgograd remains an important industrial city. Industries include shipbuilding, oil refining, steel and aluminum production, manufacture of machinery and vehicles, and chemical production. A large Volgograd Hydroelectric Plant is located a short distance to the north of Volgograd.

Transportation
Volgograd is a major railway junction serviced by Pri Volga Railway. Rail links include Moscow; Saratov; Astrakhan; the Donbas region of Ukraine; the Caucasus and Siberia. It stands at the east end of the Volga-Don Canal, opened in 1952 to link the two great rivers of Southern Russia. European route E40, the longest European route connecting Calais, France with Ridder, Kazakhstan, passes through Volgograd. The M6 highway between Moscow and the Caspian Sea also passes through the city. The Volgograd Bridge, under construction since 1995, was inaugurated in October 2009.[16] The city river terminal is the center for local passenger shipping along the Volga River. The Volgograd International Airport provides air links to major Russian cities as well as Antalya, Yerevan, and Aktau. Volgograd's public transport system includes a light rail service known as the Volgograd metrotram. Local public transport is provided by buses, trolleybuses and trams. The Volga River still is a very important communication channel. Volgograd hosts one of the few floating churches in the world:[17] the floating church of Saint Vladimir of Volgograd.[18]

Climate
Under the Kppen climate classification Volgograd has a humid continental climate (Dfa)
[hide]Climate data for Volgograd

Month

Jan

Feb Mar Apr May Jun

21.4 29.3 37.7 ) ) ) 40.1 )

Jul
40.9 )

Aug Sep
38.8 )

Oct Nov Dec

31.5 )

Year

Record high 12.0 14.0 41.1 18.9 11.5 41.1 (70.5 (84.7 (99.9 (104.2 (105.6 (101.8 (88.7 C (F) (53.6) (57.2) (106) (66) (52.7) (106) Average 3.5 3.3 26.4 29.3 21.3 2.0 12.6 (37.9 (58.1 (70.5 (82.6 (54.9 (38.1 high C (F) (25.7) (26.1) (79.5) (84.7) (70.3) (28.4) (54.7)
) ) ) ) ) ) 3.3 14.5 21.4 28.1 12.7 3.4

Daily mean 6.3 6.6 21.0 23.6 15.6 4.7 8.2 (31.1 (48.6 (60.6 (72.1 (46.6 (32.5 C (F) (20.7) (20.1) (69.8) (74.5) (60.1) (23.5) (46.8)
) ) ) ) ) )

0.5

9.2

15.9

22.3

8.1

0.3

Average low 9.2 9.9 15.0 17.5 10.3 3.9 7.6 3.7 (24.8 (39.4 (50.2 (61.2 (27.5 C (F) (15.4) (14.2) (59) (63.5) (50.5) (39) (18.3) (38.7)
) ) ) ) )

4.0

4.1

10.1

16.2

2.5

Record low 27.8 0.0 (26.7 (25.8 (13.8 (27.3 C (F) (18) (32)
) ) ) )

32.6 32.1

10.1 2.6

12.0 30.5 7.0 2.8 3.0 23.9 32.6 (10.4 (22.9 (44.6) (37) (26.6) (11) (26.7) ) )

Precipitatio 20 24 41 25 26 28 23 39 36 28 25 32 347 n mm (0.79 (0.94 (1.61 (0.98 (1.02 (1.1) (0.91) (1.54) (1.42) (1.1) (0.98) (1.26) (13.66) (inches) ) ) ) ) )
Avg. rainy days Avg. snowy days
9 20 88 7 17 86 8 11 81 12 2 64 12 0 57 12 0 56 11 0 53 8 0 51 10 0 61 11 1 73 12 9 86 11 18 89 123 78 70 2,225. 1

% humidity
Mean monthly sunshine hours

66.1

96.9 138.4 204.2 290.8 308.4 329.3 300.2 228.9 155.8 63.6

42.5

Source #1: Pogoda.ru.net[19] Source #2: Weatherbase (sun only)[20]

Culture and recreation

The Volgograd synagogue (1911), Port-Said street

A memorial complex commemorating the battle of Stalingrad, dominated by an immense allegorical sculpture of Mother Russia, was erected on the Mamayev Kurgan, the hill that saw some of the most intense fighting during the battle. The Panorama Museum sited on the Volga contains artifacts from World War II. These include a panoramic painting of the battlefield from the location of the monument on Mamayev Kurgan. A rifle of the famous sniper Vasily Zaytsev (popularized in Western media in the film Enemy at the Gates) is also on display.

Education
Higher education facilities include:

Volgograd State University Volgograd State Technical University (former Volgograd Polytechnical University)[21] Volgograd State Agriculture University Volgograd State Medical University[22] Volgograd State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering Volgograd Academy of Industry Volgograd Academy of Business Administration[23] Volgograd State Pedagogical University

Sports
Club Rotor Volgograd Sport Football Founded 1929 1989 1929 Current League League Rank Stadium Central Stadium Olimpia Stadium Dynamo Sports Complex Dynamo Sports Complex Trade Unions Sports Palace CVVS

National Football League 2nd Russian Second Division Handball Super League 3rd 1st

Olimpia Volgograd Football Kaustik Volgograd Handball

Dynamo Volgograd Handball Krasny Oktyabr Volgograd Spartak Volgograd

1929

Women's Handball Super 1st League Basketball Super League 2nd Russian Water Polo Championship

Basketball 2012 Water Polo

1994

1st

Notable people

Kurt Adler, conductor Sasha Filippov, spy

Oleg Grebnev, handball player Larisa Ilchenko, long distance swimmer Yelena Isinbayeva, pole vaulter Lev Ivanov (football manager), association football manager Yuriy Kalitvintsev, association football manager Elem Klimov, film director Vladimir Kryuchkov, statesman Tatyana Lebedeva, jumper Maxim Marinin, figure skater Maxim Opalev, sprint canoer Denis Pankratov, Olympic swimmer Yevgeny Sadovyi, Olympic swimmer Aleksandra Pakhmutova, composer Natalia Shipilova, handball player Yelena Slesarenko, high jumper Igor Vasilev, handball player Oleg Veretennikov, association football player Evgeni Plushenko, Olympic figure skater Nikolay Davydenko, tennis player

International relations
See also: List of twin towns and sister cities in Russia Twin towns and sister cities

Volgograd is twinned with:[24][25]

Coventry, United Kingdom (1943) Ostrava, Czech Republic (1948) Kemi, Finland (1953) Lige, Belgium (1959) Dijon, France (1959) Turin, Italy (1961) Port Said, Egypt (1962)

Chennai, India (1966) Hiroshima, Japan (1972)[26] Cologne, Germany (1988) Chemnitz, Germany (1988) Cleveland, Ohio, United States (1990) Toronto, Canada (1991) Chengdu, China (1994)

Jilin, China (1994) Yerevan, Armenia (1998) Krue c, Serbia (1999) Ruse, Bulgaria (2001)[27] Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, United States (2003) Orlando, Florida, United States (2008) Baku, Azerbaijan (2008)[28]

Several communities in France and Italy have streets or avenues named after Stalingrad, hence Place de Stalingrad in Paris and the eponymous Paris Mtro station of Stalingrad.

References

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. ^ Official website of Volgograd ^ a b c d Law #139-OD ^ a b c Law #1031-OD ^ a b " 2010 . 1" [2010 All-Russian Population Census, vol. 1]. 2010 (2010 AllRussia Population Census) (in Russian). Federal State Statistics Service. 2011. Retrieved June 29, 2012. ^ . 725 31 2011 . . 7 . : " " 197 6 2011 . (Government of the Russian Federation. Resolution #725 of August 31, 2011 On the Composition of the Territories Included into Each Time Zone and on the Procedures of Timekeeping in the Time Zones, as Well as on Abrogation of Several Resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation. Effective as of after 7 days following the day of the official publication.). ^ a b c d . M c w: . 2003. pp. 8183. ISBN 5-7107-7399-9. ^ " ". geo.1september.ru (in Russian). 2009 [last update]. Retrieved January 4, 2012. ^ " 3 " *P pu t f Ru t feder d tr ct feder ubject districts, urban localities, rural localitiesadministrative centers, and rural localities with population of over 3,000]. 2002 (AllRussia Population Census of 2002) (in Russian). Federal State Statistics Service. May 21, 2004. Retrieved February 9, 2012. ^ Demoscope Weekly (1989). " 1989 . - ." [All Union Population Census of 1989. Present population of union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krais, oblasts, districts, urban settlements, and villages serving as district administrative centers]. 1989 (All-Union Population Census of 1989) (in Russian). Institute of Demographics of the State UniversityHigher School of Economics. Retrieved February 9, 2012. ^ Breweres Dictionary of 20th Century Phrase and Fable ^ Grant, R. G. (2005). Battle: A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat. Dorling Kindersley. ISBN 0-7566-1360-4. ^ Wagner, Margaret, et al. (2007). The Library of Congress World War II Companion. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-5219-5. ^ a b "Russia revives Stalingrad city name". The Daily Telegraph. 2013-01-31. Retrieved 2013-02-07. ^ "Stalingrad name to be revived for anniversaries". BBC News Online. 2013-02-01. Retrieved 2013-02-07. ^ "Russia marks 70 years since Battle of Stalingrad", BBC UK, Accessed 2013-02-02.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. ^ " " (in Russian). Vesti. Retrieved 2011-02-09. 17. ^ SELF-PROPELLED FLOATING CHURCH LAUNCHED IN VOLGOGRAD 18. ^ Unique Floating Church 19. ^ "Pogoda.ru.net" (in Russian). Retrieved September 8, 2007. 20. ^ "Weatherbase: Historical Weather for Volgograd, Russia". Weatherbase. Retrieved November 17, 2012. 21. ^ "Volgograd State Technical University - Main page". Vstu.ru. 2011-08-21. Retrieved 2011-09-15. 22. ^ . " ( )". Volgmed.ru. Retrieved 2011-09-15. 23. ^ "Internet Archive Wayback Machine". Web.archive.org. 2007-06-27. Retrieved 201109-15. 24. ^ Friendly relationship at Official website of Volgograd 25. ^ "VISIT VOLGOGRAD - RUSSIA - WELCOME TO THE CITY - THE HERO VOLGOGRAD!". www.visitvolgograd.info. Retrieved 2010-01-05. 26. ^ "". City.hiroshima.jp. Retrieved 2009-07-17. 27. ^ "Ruse Municipality - Fraternize Cities". 2008-2009 Ruse Municipality. Retrieved 2009-07-06. 28. ^ Executive power of Baku city Sources

. 139- 7 1997 . - . 101- 10 2012 . 7 1997 . 139- " ". . : " " 207 1 1997 . (Volgograd Oblast Duma. Law #139-OD of October 7, 1997 On the Administrative-Territorial Structure of Volgograd Oblast, as amended by the Law #101OD of October 10, 2012 On Amending the Law #139-OD of Volgograd Oblast "On the Administrative-Territorial Structure of Volgograd Oblast" of October 7, 1997. Effective as of the day of the official publication.). . 1031- 21 2005 . - . 2013- 22 2010 21 2005 . 1031- " - ". (22 2005 .). : " " 49 22 2005 . (Volgograd Oblast Duma. Law #1031-OD of March 21, 2005 On Granting Urban Okrug Status to the Hero City of Volgograd and on Establishing Its Borders, as amended by the Law #2013-OD of March 22, 2010 On Amending the Law of Volgograd Oblast #1031-OD of March 21, 2005 "On Granting Urban Okrug Status to the Hero City of Volgograd and on Establishing Its Borders". Effective as of the day of the official publication (March 22, 2005).).

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Volgograd

Official website of Volgograd (Russian) Official website of Volgograd (Russian) Unofficial website of Volgograd Over 2,000 original German World War II soldier photographs from the Eastern Front Volgograd tourist information Sights of Volgograd Photo Gallery from Volgograd (German) Stalingrad - Bilder einer erbitterten Schlacht Volgograd State University [show]

v t e

Administrative divisions of Volgograd Oblast

[show]

v t e

Hero Cities of the Soviet Union

Categories:

Volgograd World War II sites in Russia Populated places established in 1589 Populated places on the Volga Hero Cities of the Soviet Union

Estamos todos mortos aqui

2/02/2013 Reportagem combinada Reveja a histria da Batalha de Stalingrado (atual Volgogrado) atravs dos olhos de pessoas que estavam ali presentes. As citaes abaixo foram encontradas em dirios e cartas de participantes de uma das mais sangrentas disputas da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Relacionadas

Volgogrado volta a ser Stalingrado por alguns dias A grande prova da Segunda Guerra Mundial Stalingrado: a cidade que mudou o curso da histria

Tags stalingrado segunda guerra mundial Cultura Manchetes

Estao quente traz tambm as feiras de produtores rurais

Face feminina da guerra tem uma longa histria

Cultura da literatura ao cinema, pas inspira o mundo

Nos bastidores do novo Mariinski

Foto: TASS

Em 23 de agosto, comeou um bombardeio macio depois do almoo. Em dois dias, a cidade foi destruda. Primeiro lugar destruram o bairro central onde eu morava. Fomos a um abrigo antiareo e, no dia seguinte, nossa casa deixou de existir. (Das memrias de Boris Krjijanovski, natural de Stalingrado) 23 de agosto. Temos uma tima notcia: nossas tropas chegaram ao Volga e tomaram parte da cidade. Os russos tm apenas duas opes: recuar ao longo do rio Volga ou se render. Na verdade, verificamos algo incompreensvel. Enquanto nossas tropas do norte tomaram a cidade e chegaram ao Volga, as divises russas no sul continuam resistindo duramente. Eles so fanticos... (Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman)

Leia mais:

A batalhna de Stalingrado: Infogrfico

A batalhna de Stalingrado: Timeline

A grande prova da Segunda Guerra Mundial 21 de setembro. Ontem dois soldados vieram para pedir gua para beber. Perguntamos a eles: Quando isso vai acabar? Responderam que no sabiam e que jamais haviam lutado antes durante tanto tempo quanto em Stalingrado. Hoje faz 30 dias desde o primeiro bombardeio e 30 dias que no samos do abrigo. (Do dirio de Serafina Voronina, moradora de Stalingrado) 26 de setembro. Depois de tomarmos o silo, os russos continuaram lutando de forma dura. Eles no podem ser vistos, esto escondidos em prdios e pores, disparando de seus abrigos em todas as direes e usando a ttica de bandidos. Os russos pararam de se render. Se conseguimos fazer um prisioneiro, s porque ele mortalmente ferido e incapaz de se mover. Stalingrado est um inferno. Aqueles que ficaram feridos tm

sorte, pois eles iro para casa comemorar a vitria em famlia... (Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman) Lembro-me de meus companheiros dizendo na Frana: Bem, agora vamos Rssia, vamos provar ali a carne de urso, eles tm de tudo ali! Eles pensavam que iramos continuar na Rssia com o mesmo sucesso de nossa campanha na Frana. Foi um verdadeiro choque ver como as coisas aconteceram. (Das memrias do soldado de artilharia Heinz Hoon) 25 de outubro. Estou aqui lutando h mais de um ms. Os combates so duros. Destrumos todos os dias uma centena de nazis. Vamos expuls-los de Stalingrado! Vamos cumprir a ordem e defender o Cucaso! (De uma carta de Nikolai Danilov, oficial responsvel pela educao ideolgica de soldados) 30 de novembro. Nossa situao ruim. Os russos cercaram nosso corpo de exrcito. No ltimo sbado, fomos atacados e perdemos muitos soldados entre mortos e feridos. O sangue corria como um rio. Nossa retirada foi terrvel e o comandante est gravemente ferido. Agora no temos nenhum oficial. (De uma carta do suboficial George Krieger) 1 de dezembro. O tempo est ruim e os avies com alimentos no conseguem chegar. Mesmo assim, continuo acreditando que tomaremos Stalingrado. Se conseguirmos ficar aqui at maro, a situao vai melhorar. (De uma carta de um soldado alemo) Ele chegou e disse: Bem, adeus, pouco provvel que continuemos vivos...Ele me abraou, mas no me beijou. No ocasio para nos beijarmos, mas para nos despedirmos dessa maneira. (Das memrias de Maria Fustova, operadora de rdio) 26 de dezembro. Comemos todos os cavalos. Eu comeria um gato, dizem que a carne de gato tambm deliciosa. Os soldados parecem cadveres ou sonmbulos buscando qualquer coisa que possam comer. No se escondem mais de balas russas, no tm foras para se mover nem para se esconder. (Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman) 26 de dezembro. Hoje cozinhamos um gato por ocasio de festa. (Do bloco de anotaes do oficial Werner Clay) 19 de janeiro. O barulho de tiros de canho contnuo. Recebemos o reforo de dois mil soldados. Estamos acabando com esses filhos da me dos nazi. (Do dirio do capito Kornienko) 24 de janeiro de 1943. Caro irmo, desculpe pela minha caligrafia ruim. Tenho as mos queimadas pelo frio e a mente confusa. S as recordaes e pensamentos sobre minha Utah e a pequenininha Margo me aquecem. No vou sair daqui. No haver nenhum rompimento do cerco. J estamos todos mortos aqui e, se ainda no nos apodrecemos, s por causa do frio russo. (De uma carta do tenente Helmut Quandt) Eu te digo adeus porque depois desta manh tudo ficou claro. No vou te escrever sobre a situao na frente, ela evidente e est nas mos dos russos. A questo saber

quanto tempo conseguiremos aguentar; alguns dias ou algumas horas. (De uma carta de um soldado alemo) Eu entrei para falar a Paulus que chegou uma mensagem dizendo que ele foi promovido a marechal de campo. Ele disse: Agora sou o mais jovem general do exrcito e tenho de me render. Eu fiquei pasmo porque esperava, como Hitler, que ele se matasse. Mas Paulus me disse: Sou crente, cristo e condeno o suicdio, embora, h 14 dias, ele tivesse dito que um oficial no tinha o direito de acabar prisioneiro. Agora est dizendo outra coisa. (Das memrias do tenente Gerhard Hindenlanga) 2 de fevereiro de 1943. Stalingrado caiu. (Do dirio do sargento croata Eurich)

Batalha de Stalingrado: 70 anos

Pginas: 1 2 | primeira | anterior | prxima | ltima CLOULD

Mensagens: 4176 Cadastro: 11/11/2006

Nvel 3 #1

Esta imagem foi redimensionada. Clique para ver em tamanho original 900x1613. infrografico: http://gazetarussa.com.br/multimidia/2013/02/02/batalha_de_stalingrado_17425.html

Estamos todos mortos aqui: Em 23 de agosto, comeou um bombardeio macio depois do almoo. Em dois dias, a cidade foi destruda. Primeiro lugar destruram o bairro central onde eu morava. Fomos a um abrigo antiareo e, no dia seguinte, nossa casa deixou de existir. (Das memrias de Boris Krjijanovski, natural de Stalingrado) 23 de agosto. Temos uma tima notcia: nossas tropas chegaram ao Volga e tomaram parte da cidade. Os russos tm apenas duas opes: recuar ao longo do rio Volga ou se render. Na verdade, verificamos algo incompreensvel. Enquanto nossas tropas do norte tomaram a cidade e chegaram ao Volga, as divises russas no sul continuam resistindo duramente. Eles so fanticos...(Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman)

21 de setembro. Ontem dois soldados vieram para pedir gua para beber. Perguntamos a eles: Quando isso vai acabar? Responderam que no sabiam e que jamais haviam lutado antes durante tanto tempo quanto em Stalingrado. Hoje faz 30 dias desde o primeiro bombardeio e 30 dias que no samos do abrigo. (Do dirio de Serafina Voronina, moradora de Stalingrado) 26 de setembro. Depois de tomarmos o silo, os russos continuaram lutando de forma dura. Eles no podem ser vistos, esto escondidos em prdios e pores, disparando de seus abrigos em todas as direes e usando a ttica de bandidos. Os russos pararam de se render. Se conseguimos fazer um prisioneiro, s porque ele mortalmente ferido e incapaz de se mover. Stalingrado est um inferno. Aqueles que ficaram feridos tm sorte, pois eles iro para casa comemorar a vitria em famlia...(Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman)

Lembro-me de meus companheiros dizendo na Frana: Bem, agora vamos Rssia, vamos provar ali a carne de urso, eles tm de tudo ali! Eles pensavam que iramos continuar na Rssia com o mesmo sucesso de nossa campanha na Frana. Foi um verdadeiro choque ver como as coisas aconteceram.(Das memrias do soldado de artilharia Heinz Hoon) 25 de outubro. Estou aqui lutando h mais de um ms. Os combates so duros. Destrumos todos os dias uma centena de nazis. Vamos expuls-los de Stalingrado! Vamos cumprir a ordem e defender o Cucaso! (De uma carta de Nikolai Danilov, oficial responsvel pela educao ideolgica de soldados) 30 de novembro. Nossa situao ruim. Os russos cercaram nosso corpo de exrcito. No ltimo sbado, fomos atacados e perdemos muitos soldados entre mortos e feridos. O sangue corria como um rio. Nossa retirada foi terrvel e o comandante est gravemente ferido. Agora no temos nenhum oficial. (De uma carta do suboficial George Krieger) 1 de dezembro. O tempo est ruim e os avies com alimentos no conseguem chegar. Mesmo assim, continuo acreditando que tomaremos Stalingrado. Se conseguirmos ficar aqui at maro, a situao vai melhorar. (De uma carta de um soldado alemo) Ele chegou e disse: Bem, adeus, pouco provvel que continuemos vivos...Ele me abraou, mas no me beijou. No ocasio para nos beijarmos, mas para nos despedirmos dessa maneira. (Das memrias de Maria Fustova, operadora de rdio) 26 de dezembro. Comemos todos os cavalos. Eu comeria um gato, dizem que a carne de gato tambm deliciosa. Os soldados parecem cadveres ou sonmbulos buscando qualquer coisa que possam comer. No se escondem mais de balas russas, no tm foras para se mover nem para se esconder.(Do dirio do soldado alemo William Hoffman) 26 de dezembro. Hoje cozinhamos um gato por ocasio de festa. (Do bloco de anotaes do oficial Werner Clay) 19 de janeiro. O barulho de tiros de canho contnuo. Recebemos o reforo de dois mil soldados. Estamos acabando com esses filhos da me dos nazi.(Do dirio do capito Kornienko) 24 de janeiro de 1943. Caro irmo, desculpe pela minha caligrafia ruim. Tenho as mos queimadas pelo frio e a mente confusa. S as recordaes e pensamentos sobre minha Utah e a pequenininha Margo me aquecem. No vou sair daqui. No haver nenhum rompimento do cerco. J estamos todos mortos aqui e, se ainda no nos apodrecemos, s por causa do frio russo.(De uma carta do tenente Helmut Quandt) Eu te digo adeus porque depois desta manh tudo ficou claro. No vou te escrever sobre a situao na frente, ela evidente e est nas mos dos russos. A questo saber quanto tempo conseguiremos aguentar; alguns dias ou algumas horas. (De uma carta de um soldado alemo)

Eu entrei para falar a Paulus que chegou uma mensagem dizendo que ele foi promovido a marechal de campo. Ele disse: Agora sou o mais jovem general do exrcito e tenho de me render. Eu fiquei pasmo porque esperava, como Hitler, que ele se matasse. Mas Paulus me disse: Sou crente, cristo e condeno o suicdio, embora, h 14 dias, ele tivesse dito que um oficial no tinha o direito de acabar prisioneiro. Agora est dizendo outra coisa. (Das memrias do tenente Gerhard Hindenlanga) 2 de fevereiro de 1943. Stalingrado caiu. (Do dirio do sargento croata Eurich)

A grande prova da Segunda Guerra Mundial Durante a Grande Guerra Patritica (como a Segunda Guerra Mundial conhecida na Rssia) houve tambm outras vitrias, no menos brilhantes, das foras soviticas tanto pelos seus resultados estratgicos, quanto pelo nvel da arte militar. Por que, ento, a batalha de Stalingrado recebe tanto destaque? Os interesses da cincia histrica e o desenvolvimento da cooperao entre os povos obrigam a histria militar libertar-se do esprito de confronto e subordinar as investigaes dos cientistas aos interesses da verdadeira e objetiva da histria da Segunda Guerra Mundial, incluindo a batalha de Stalingrado. Em primeiro lugar, algumas pessoas tentam adulterar a histria da Segunda Guerra Mundial, combater novamente a guerra no papel. Na historiografia mundial no h um nico entendimento sobre o significado da batalha de Stalingrado para o curso e o resultado da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Aps o fim da guerra, surgiram afirmaes na literatura ocidental de que no foi a batalha de Stalingrado, mas a vitria das tropas aliadas em El Alamein, o ponto mais importante da mudana no decorrer da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Naturalmente, por uma questo de objetividade, preciso reconhecer que, em El Alamein, a vitria dos aliados foi grande, trazendo uma contribuio substancial para a derrota do inimigo comum.

No entanto, em termos militares estratgicos, a batalha de Stalingrado aconteceu em um territrio enorme (quase 100 mil quilmetros quadrados), enquanto a operao de El Alamein foi conduzida na relativamente estreita costa africana. Alm disso, mais de 2,1 milhes de pessoas, 26 mil armas e morteiros, 2,1 mil tanques e 2,5 mil avies de combate participaram de ambos os lados em diferentes fases da batalha em Stalingrado. O comando alemo atraiu 1.011.000 homens, 10.290 armas, 675 tanques e 1.216 avies, enquanto em El Alamein, o Afrika Korps de Rommel contava somente com 80 mil homens, 540 tanques, 1.200 armas e 350 avies. A batalha de Stalingrado durou 200 dias e noites (de 17 de julho de 1942 at 2 de fevereiro de 1943); j o combate de El Alamein durou 11 dias (e 23 de outubro a 4 de novembro de 1942), sem falar da impossibilidade de comparar a tenso e a crueldade entre estas duas batalhas. Se em El Alamein o bloco fascista perdeu 55 mil pessoas, 320 tanques e cerca de mil armas, as perdas alems em Stalingrado e seus satlites foram 10 a 15 vezes maiores. Ali cerca de 144 mil pessoas foram aprisionadas e um agrupamento de 330 tropas foi destrudo. Foram tambm muito grandes as perdas das tropas soviticas, chegando a 478.741 pessoas. tambm incomparvel o significado poltico e militar dos eventos ocorridos. A batalha de Stalingrado aconteceu no principal palco europeu das aes militares, onde decidia-se o destino da guerra. Realizada no norte da frica, a operao em El Alamein ocorreu em um palco secundrio da guerra, portanto, sua influncia sobre o curso dos acontecimentos pode ser considerada indireta. A ateno do mundo inteiro no estava voltada para El Alamein, mas justamente para Stalingrado. Por sua vez, as grandes derrotas e os enormes prejuzos da Wehrmacht em Stalingrado pioraram drasticamente a situao poltico-militar e econmica na Alemanha, afundando o pas em uma crise violenta. Os prejuzos dos tanques inimigos e veculos na batalha de Stalingrado equivaleram, por exemplo, a seis meses de fabricao de armas da Alemanha. E para compensar essas perdas to grandes, a indstria militar alem foi forada a operar sob extrema tenso. As perdas humanas tambm intensificaram a crise. O desastre no Volga teve um impacto significativo sobre a moral da Wehrmacht alem. Cresceu o nmero de casos de desero e desobedincia e os crimes militares no exrcito alemo tornaram-se mais frequentes. Depois de Stalingrado, o nmero de sentenas de morte proferidas por tribunais para os soldados alemes aumentou significativamente. Esses soldados passaram a ser menos obstinados nas suas aes militares, comearam a temer ataques dos flancos e vizinhanas. Entre alguns polticos e representantes dos oficiais de alto escalo cresceu a oposio a Hitler. A vitria do Exrcito Vermelho em Stalingrado chocou o bloco militar fascista, causou um efeito deprimente sobre os satlites da Alemanha, e levou pnico e contradies insolveis para o seu acampamento. Para escapar da catstrofe iminente, os governantes da Itlia, Romenia, Hungria e Finlndia comearam a procurar pretextos para sair da guerra, ignorando as ordens de Hitler de enviar as tropas para o conflito. Em 1943, no s soldados e oficiais se

rendiam ao Exrcito Vermelho, mas tambm divises inteiras e partes dos exrcitos romeno, hngaro e italiano. As relaes tornaram-se tensas entre os soldados da Wehrmacht e os Aliados. A derrota esmagadora dos fascistas em Stalingrado causou um efeito de sobriedade sobre os crculos governantes do Japo e Turquia. Eles desistiram de suas intenes de sair para a guerra contra a URSS. O sucesso alcanado pelo Exrcito Vermelho em Stalingrado e nas operaes subsequentes da Campanha de Inverno de 1942-1943, Alemanha foi ficando cada vez mais isolada na arena internacional. Nessa poca, o governo sovitico estabeleceu relaes diplomticas com a ustria, Canad, Holanda, Cuba, Egito, Colmbia, Etipia, e retomou os laos, suspensos anteriormente, com Luxemburgo, Mxico e Uruguai. Por todos os motivos supracitados, possvel perceber que foi justamente a batalha de Stalingrado que desestruturou a coluna vertebral da Wehrmacht e deu incio a uma mudana radical na Segunda Guerra Mundial em favor da coligao anti-Hitler. fonte: gazeta russa
Natal Em Stalingrado

Foras russas em Stalingrado Goebbels considerou este relato, do correspondente de guerra Heinz Schrter, muito impressionante para ser publicado na poca : No dia previsto, os combatentes de Stalingrado celebraram sua festa de Natal. Um cu cor de cinza estendia-se pesadamente sobre a estepe nevada. Um frio implacvel cristalizava a paisagem. Em Stalingrado no havia mesas cobertas com toalhas brancas, nem nozes, nem mas: s algumas pequenas rvores de Natal, enviadas pelo correio. Aquele que dispunha de uma vela, acendia-a por momentos, colocando-a no gargalo de uma garrafa, calcando-a sobre uma tboa, dentro do capacete ou em algum ramo de rvore. Depois, apagava-se e guardavase para outra noite. As rvores de Natal e os discursos alusivos festividade perdiam todo o valor simblico no meio das munies, quase sem po e naquele ambiente de promiscuidade. Os homens sentavam-se muito perto uns dos outros. Tboas e caixotes serviam de mesas, os recipientes de metal faziam-se de copos. Os mais favorecidos bebiam aguardente, ou mesmo vinho. A maioria contentava-se com ch, ou neve derretida. difcil descrever os sentimentos que animavam estes homens a minha volta. Aqueles soldados apenas tinham de comum as suas mos vazias e a abbada do cu, cercada por uma fumarada cor de sangue. Perguntavamse por que motivo permitia Deus voltasse o Natal, quando os homens, dominando a Sua voz com o tumulto da guerra, continuavam a matar-se uns aos outros. Houve muitas companhias que passaram o Natal assim. S a nossa viveu um verdadeiro conto de Natal - o primeiro e o ltimo. Chegara da Alemanha quatro semanas antes. Avanava em estado de alerta sobre uma camada de neve com 40 centmetros de espessura. Depois de trs horas de marcha, as primeiras filas da companhia detiveram-se. Com os rostos aoitados pela neve, vimos, repentinamente, uma apario fantstica. Uma estaca de trs metros de altura, sobre a qual mo desconhecida colocara uns paus transversais, que estavam cravejados de velas, cujas

chamas tremeluziam sobre a estepe. Diante dessa rvore de Natal improvisada, recortava-se a estranha silhueta de um homem que sustentava na mo direita uma tosca cruz, feita com duas tbuas. Por detrs das rvores apinhava-se um grupo alucinante: uma dzia de homens, envoltos em mantas, apoiados em muletas e cajados e com as cabeas cobertas de ligaduras. Espontaneamente nossa companhia formou em redor um semicrculo. Tiramos os capacetes. O homem que empunhava a cruz aproximou-se e disse: - Sabamos que passavam por aqui esta noite. Quisemos fazer-lhes esta surpresa. Os da companhia sorriram um pouco amargamente... - Vivemos hoje - prosseguiu o homem - a noite de Natal; e amanh ser o dia em que a cerca de dois mil anos, teve incio a Redeno. Aquele dia e aquela noite deveriam trazer a paz. Lutamos contra um inimigo que no conhece aquela noite nem aquele dia. Agora, saibamos dar a Deus o que de Deus; quando esta hora tenha decorrido, dareis a Csar o que de Csar. Depois o homem recitou o Glria: "E paz na terra aos homens de boa vontade". Disse em voz alta o texto latino e no o envergonhou falar de paz. Rezou um Pater Noster em alemo, para os protestantes. Os cento e vinte e um homens acompanharam-no a uma s voz diante da "rvore" iluminada: "...mas livrai-nos do mal. Amm". As ladeiras geladas do barranco repetiram surdamente aquele "Amm". Depois a 9 Companhia cantou as trs estrofes de Stille Nacht, heilige Nacht. Jamais este cntico ter tido tal vibrao, no meio de uma desolao semelhante a esta. No que respeita ao correio, esse monto de cartas e postais destinados a vencer a distncia que os separava de seu pas, j quase nada chegava s suas mos. Algumas sacas tinham sido atiradas para dentro da grande mala: que representava, porm, to pequena quantidade para tanta gente? Basta dizer que 380 das sacas de correio destinadas a Stalingrado foram queimadas em Chiov porque, no dia da ofensiva russa, um transporte ambulante de correio que vinha de Dresden atrapalhou-se e, ao ouvir anunciar que os carros russos se encontravam a apenas 10 quilmetros, no se lembrou de colocar uma saca em cada um dos veculos que circulavam sem interrupo no caminho de Nijni-Chircaya. A maioria dos soldados passou tristemente o Natal e com uma secreta angstia ao ver reduzida para 100 gramas a sua rao de po. Quanto ao tempo dedicado ao Natal pela emissora Grande Alemanha, foi tomado como piada de mau gosto e acolhido com palavres. Os homens sofriam, tinham fome. A organizao do abastecimento no era suficiente. A bolsa de resistncia dispunha dos aerdromos de Pitomnik e Gumrak, do campo auxiliar de Bassargino e do de Stalingradsky, para as aterrissagens foradas. O exrcito dera ordem de disparar contra os que praticassem pilhagens. Nos setores de quatro divises, situadas a oeste e ao sul de Stalingrado, 364 homens foram executados em trs dias, por covardia, desero, roubo de provises... Sim, por roubo. Certa manh, arrancaram o soldado Wolf do buraco onde se encontrava. ouvido, julgado e condenado morte. A execuo realiza-se num quarto mobiliado com uma mesa, trs cadeiras e um fogo. Na parede est pendurado um retrato de Lnin. Nada h como a fome para levar ao crime...

31 January, 16:48

Lyudnikovs Island in the Battle of Stalingrad

 Photo:

Lyudnikovs Island is a small isolated corner in the city of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) which came down in the history of the legendary Battle of Stalingrad (19421943). The defense of this piece of land was a great feat of the 138th rifle division under command of Colonel Ivan Lyudnikov. The Voice of Russia spoke to the only survived participant of those battles.
The Soviet soldiers held this piece of land for forty days and forty nights and did not let German units reach the Volga River. Vasily Matyushkov is today the only survived participant of those battles. He told the Voice of Russia corresponded about the days spent on Lyudnikovs Island and the battle that 50 000 Soviet officers and men. On October 14, 1942 the 6th German army started the offensive towards the Barrikady Tractor Factory. The 138th division under command of Colonel Ivan Lyutnikov was sent to Stalingrad to replenish the forces of the Soviet army. They held the plant for about a month but on November 11 the Nazis managed to take the southern part of the facility cutting Lyudnikovs division from the 62nd Soviet army and from the rear area. They were blocked by Nazis from three sides and on the fourth side they were restricted by the Volga River. There was no place for retreat. During the next 40 days (till midDecember the Soviet soldiers held this area. The fronts length was 700 meters and the depth was 400 meters. In October 1942 Vasily Matyushkov was only 18 but even today, more than 70 years after those events he remembers everything in detail. "The first thing I saw was a running communication agent with a machine gun. Our rifle unit was on the bank of the river behind the fence while Germans had taken the plant. The agent was running and shouting Get ready for the attack. They will start at 11. He

was running across the area repeating the words. The commander of our unit told us to prepare grenades and small arms. We had to spare shells using them very economically." The ammunition and food were thrown from planes or delivered by boat from the nearby island. Meals were scanty. It was mainly dehydrated cooked food soldiers had to dilute with water. There was a shortage of food, ammunition and fuel for tanks. Tanks continued to fire staying on same place. Sometimes the soldiers did not even have rifle ammo, Matyushkov recalls. "Sometimes sergeant major took a handful of rifle bullets from a pot saying This is for you for the whole day. Dont waste them. We did not receive everything of what was sent to us. Germans attacked everything day and night. The most horrible for me was waiting for the beginning of the attack. You never knew what it would be in the end." Since the end of November Nazis bombed the positions of Lyudnikovs division daily, leaving the soldiers no moment for rest. Sleeping was not on our time-table, the veteran recalls. The divisions nearness to the river was advantageous for Germans - water reflected all the moves and sounds. It was very difficult to transport the sick and wounded across the river safely but several times it turned out well. Vasily Matyushkov who was wounded in one of the battles was among those who had to cross the river. In December, Lyudnikovs division went into the offensive in the area of the Barrikady plant. The Soviet soldiers managed to push Germans and united with the division of the Soviet army. By the end of January 1943 the whole territory of the Barrikady plant was freed from the Nazi troops. Alexandra Dibizheva Read more: http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_31/Lyudnikov-s-Island-in-the-Battle-ofStalingrad/

Stalingrad: East of the Barrikady Gun Factory, 11/11/42

th

By the beginning of November 1942, the landsers of the 305 Infantry Division had pushed the stubborn S out of the Barrikady Gun Factory in Stalingrad into the ruins of the housing settlements and administrative build east. Exhausted, the German infantry could go no further. Fresh troops were needed to complete the job. So si battalions were taken from their parent divisions around the perimeter of the advancing German attack and flown the sharp edge of the battle. Not one would ever return to its original formation.

Backed up against the icy Volga, the remaining veterans of the 138 th Rifle Division c foothold in the shattered city. Defending from cellars, dugouts and grimy tunnels, they tenaciously against the advancing Germans. Would they be able to resist the crack engineer face in the coming battle? As the gray dawn of the early morning of November 11 th arrived, the find out. Except for roads, all ground is considered rough terrain for movement. Troops in she under cover for spotting and all fire. The Soviet Commander has 10 wooden bunkers to be plac lines prior to the attack. He also has 15 indirect fire pre-plots. The German attack begins at 0600.

Historically, two battalions of Werfer Regiment 53 delivered a smoke barrage that preceded the general German Commander has 2 separate 5x30 inch corridors of smoke to drop when and where he orders. On the fol

smoke diminishes to a 3x15 inch corridor and drifts one die roll times one inch downwind. Most of the German corps and divisional artillery were dedicated to counter battery fire. To simulate this, u table to reduce or eliminate Soviet fire capability. Every 15 minute turn, the Soviet Commander rolls two hidden dice, one to identify the battery being targe determine the effectiveness of the fire mission. With 18 total batteries, a 1-9 targets the corresponding battery in zero is a complete miss. For the second turn, batteries numbered 10-18 are targeted.

Cartas de Stalingrado

Amados pais. Se esto lendo esta carta, porque ainda temos o aeroporto. Tenho certeza que esta ser a ltima que seu amado filho lhes escrever. Temos russos por todos os lados e no nos mandam ajuda de Berlim. Lhes tenho uma triste notcia, Granstsau morreu semana passada. Estava ele, eu e mais trs andando quando simplesmente caiu no cho com a cabea aberta. Amados pais, chorei muito ao v-lo, porque crescemos juntos, lembram-se? Quando ramos crianas, quebrei a perna, ele me levou a casa nas suas costas com a minha perna quebrada. Sinto muito pelos pais dele. Perdi meu nico amigo. E aqui haver o fim. Nosso comandante se matou com um tiro na boca ontem de noite. Nossa moral no existe mais. Mas espero que essa maldita guerra acabe, pouco me importa o que acontea. Se no receberem mais cartas minhas, vo para Espanha o quanto antes, sabemos que uma questo de tempo dos russos chegarem em Berlim. Amados pais, aps essa guerra, a Alemanha ficar atnita ao saber que o soldado que lhes escreve teve a vida salva por um mdico judeu. Estou bem dos ferimentos, mas a cicatriz enorme e horrvel. Amados pais, se cuidem. Se no receberem mais cartas minhas, vo para Espanha, o dinheiro vocs j tem. Logo estaremos de novo conversando com Hilse, nos bons tempos dos dias de sol. Com muita devoo, seu filho querido.

Me assustei quando vi o papel. Estamos completamente isolados, sem ajuda exterior. Hitler nos abandonou. Esta carta vai seguir se o aeroporto ainda estiver nas nossas mos. Estamos no norte da cidade. Os homens da bateria tambm pensam nisso, mas no o sabem to bem como eu. O fim est prximo. Hannes e eu vamos priso. Ontem vi os russos apanharem quatro homens, depois da nossa infantaria ter recuperado a iniciativa. No, no vamos para a priso. Quando Stalingrado cair, voc ficar sabendo que nunca mais voltarei.

Voc o coronel, querido pai e do Estado-Maior. Voc sabe o que significa tudo isto, por isso evita de eu explicar o que poderia ser sentimentalismo. o fim. Acho que ainda agentamos uma semana, depois, fecha o cerco. No quero falar dos motivos a favor ou contra nossa situao. Esses motivos so perfeitamente insignificantes e no tem importncia, mas se pudesse dizer qualquer coisa, gostaria de dizer que no devem procurar em ns a razo dessa situao, mas sim em vocs e quem o responsvel por isso tudo. Levantai a cabea! Voc pai, e os que so da mesma opinio, estejam com ateno para no acontecer uma coisa pior nossa ptria. Que o inferno do volga sirva de aviso. Por favor, no deixem que o vento leve esta lio.

No sei se voltarei a te escrever mais uma vez, preciso que esta carta chegue s suas mos e que fique a saber desde j, para o caso de voltar alguma vez. Perdi as mos no princpio do ms de dezembro. Na mo esquerda me falta o dedo mnimo, mas o pior que na direita congelaram os trs dedos do meio. Posso pegar um copo com o polegar e o mnimo. Me sinto um intil. S quando perdemos os dedos que percebemos para que servem, mesmo nas coisas mais pequenas. Kurt Hahnke, acho que voc conhece, porque iam juntos escola em 1937, ele tocou a msica Passionata num piano, h 8 dias, numa pequena rua paralela praa vermelha. No acontece todos os dias, o piano estava literalmente na rua. A casa tinha sido bombardeada, mas o instrumento, talvez por compaixo, tinha sido afastado e colocado no meio da rua. Cada vez que passava um soldado, tocava um pouco. Em que outro lugar do mundo que se pode encontrar pianos no meio da rua?

Fonte: Cartas de Stalingrado, Coleo Einaudi, 1958.

Operation Hubertus. Operation Hubertus Ljudnikov's Last Stand in Stalingrad By Wolf Hpper taken from http://www.flamesofwar.com I would like to thank Mr. Wolf Hpper a lot for this excellent and very interesting work about Operation Hubertus.

Foreword Most of the time, when a student of military history stumbles across a subject, he is not aware of the significance of the information he has just read. Back in my younger years, I stumbled across a magazine-sized publication named Sonderheft II. Weltkrieg Pioniere (lit. Special issue WWII pioneers). I was hooked, since it featured an in-depth (from my point of view back then) history of the German combat engineers in WWII, and in it a special operation in a well-known city was detailed. In most publications about the battle of Stalingrad the different small scale combats and actions are covered only with slim, often too personalised, chapters. The reader usually gets a good feeling about the vicious, humanity defying fights that took place. This should not minimise the suffering of anybody who was involved directly or indirectly. However, on the historical side, the reader most often doesnt get enough information about specific parts of the battle. The intention of this article is to flesh out the detail of the operations of the German pioneers in Stalingrad. The last offensive efforts of the German 6th Army to conquer Stalingrad between 11 and 19 November 1942 are mostly covered within two or three sentences in books that are at average 250 pages long! Most of the time no details about this time period can be found at all in many, often highly acclaimed, publications by

well-known historians. Even a highly praised German TV historian (I dont want to name him for fear of reprisals), states only 4 sentences about this subject in one of his best sellers. By writing this article about this last offensive, codenamed "Operation Hubertus", I will try to fill the holes found in the history books. A Brief History of the Battle for Stalingrad... I. Prologue On 8 November 1942 the commander-in-chief of Germany announced his plans to Germany for an offensive to take the last part of Stalingrad. I wanted to come to the Volga at a specific location at a specific city. By chance it carries the name of Stalin himself. So dont think I marched there for this reason it could carry another name but because there is a very important goal... this goal I wanted to take and you know we are very modest, we have it already. There are only some very small places remaining. Now the others say: Why arent they fighting faster? Because I dont want to have a second Verdun there, Id rather take it with small assault groups. - Adolf Hitler 8 November 1942 in his annual Brgerbrukeller speech (Authors translation) Several thousand of miles away in the nearly levelled city of Stalingrad many German soldiers also heard

this speech over their radios, among them about 3000 assault troops forming into small assault groups. What was so specific about this speech and the reality behind the words of the announcer? At the time of Hitlers speech the German troops held nearly 90% of Stalingrad. Only small islands of resistance were still held by the Soviets: The 39th Rifle Division defended parts of the Krasny Oktyabr (Red October) steel factory, supported by the 284th Rifle Division on their left flank defending the workers housing area. The few remaining parts of Krasnaya Barrikady (Red Barricades) ordnance factory was defended by shattered units of 138th, 308th, and parts of 244th Rifle Division. They held less than 10% of that factory. The workers housing area of this factory was also defended by remnants of the 138th Rifle Division, particularly its 768th Rifle Regiment. Another hard fought for area was the chemical factory "Lazur" and its surrounding train yards, the so-called "tennis racket". The name was derived from the look of the railway tracks depicted from aerial photos. An amalgam of units from 284th Rifle Division, 9th and 38th Mechanized Rifle Brigades and other already shattered rifle and tank units defended this area stubbornly. These remaining strongholds were connected by the thin defensive lines of the 161st Rifle Regiment and 95th Rifle Division (241st Rifle Regiment) in the south,

and the 37th Guards Rifle Division (118th Rifle Regiment) in the north. In between these more or less cohesive units a number of soldiers from various shattered units were mixed: 42nd Rifle Brigade, 347th Rifle Regiment, 685th Rifle Regiment, 895th Rifle Division, 45th Rifle Division to name but a few. The German 71., 76. , 79. , 94., 100. Jger (Light), 305. and 389. Infanterie divisions who, supported by other major units (14., 16. and 24. Panzer divisions), had been assaulting the city for weeks. Supported by massive artillery, air and tank support, they were not able to sweep the stubborn and fearless fighting Soviet defenders into the Volga and thereby end the atrocious house-to-house fighting, which was taking a bloody toll on both sides. The Germans especially were unable to start a last effort to take these few remaining strongholds, since most of their combat companies were so weakened. Many of them were down to about 50, some 30 or 40, rifle carrying soldiers. German commanders doubted if these divisions should be used in such a manner at all. The 14. and 24. Panzer divisions were particularly low in manpower. On 2 November at 1800 hours, Chief of Staff of 6th Army General Schmidt, reported that 79., 94. and 305. Infanterie divisions were no longer able to attack as whole cohesive units. Some of these units were very low in strength, for example the 94. Infanteriedivision had a combat strength of only 535 men. The 6th Army ordered at

this point to disband units, reduce the guns per battery to three, reduce the staff strengths, signal battalions and other support units to 10% of their manpower. Additionally Russian "Hilfswillige" (Hiwi or willing helper) should be increasingly employed in non-combat roles to free German personal for strengthening the decimated combat units. Additionally as a last resort 10 battalions of Turkic soldiers from the Caucasus were to be sent to the Stalingrad area. This order from 6th Army high command was dated 6 November. All divisions would receive their Turkic battalions at the end of December. II. First Steps, First Plans Hitler agreed on 2 November to send additional pioneer battalions to Stalingrad. The Chief of the German Army General Staff, Zeitzler, made this proposal, and Hitler probably envisioned an assault attack with small storm-trooper units, much like the German tactics at the end of WWI. But Zeitzler was not the initiator of this idea. On 1 November Oberst-General Freiherr von Richthofen, commander-in-chief of Luftflotte 4 (Air Army), operating mainly over Stalingrad, contacted General Jeschonnek in Berlin and made a proposal. Richthofen recognized that the ongoing bombardments and close support missions of the VIII Fliegerkorps were taking their toll on machines and men alike. During a conference earlier the same day with von Paulus and Schmidt, he complained, that his air support was not

fully utilized by the infantry units of 6th Army. Since he was not rebutted by Paulus, Richthofen was convinced his point was right. From this grew a deep mistrust between Richthofen and Paulus, especially from the former's point of view. Zeitzler spoke with Hitler on 2 November during the daily conference and the latter agreed. Another proposal, to send the 29. Motorized Infanteriedivision into the city, was denied. After Oberst I.G. (Oberst in the generals staff) Werner of 6th Army heard this on the phone, he replied to the chief of staff of Army Group B that reinforcement with some pioneers will not end the fighting, since missing covering infantry was the problem. Why pioneers and not a fresh infantry division? This question is very easily answered: The German pioneers were the masters of demolition, highly trained specialists in house-to-house fighting and the use of explosives. The regular Grenadier was not very versed in these areas and up to this point used tactics of bombardment-advance-close combat that led to horrible losses for the attacker. The Soviets in particular were the ruling masters of defence during this period of the war. Their ability to camouflage fortified positions, combined with an above average training in the use of the bayonet and excessive use of hand grenades, even at the risk of injuring their own comrades, allowed them time and time again to throw attackers back.

The Soviets, to some extent, had the psychological upper hand. The German Grenadiers did not have the same deep desire to repulse the fascist aggressors, further enhanced and cultivated by propaganda. Together with the cruel handling of so-called deserters, cowards and fascist collaborators, by the NKVD, the normal Red Army soldier had but one choice: fight and maybe survive or dont fight and die by the hands of the NKVD. Stalins well known order of No step back reminded them that their choices were very narrow. The Pioneers on the other side had the special training in the above mentioned fields, which made them far better suited for taking the remaining, well fortified, positions from the brave Soviet defenders. As for additional infantry divisions, there were none! The only probably possible infantry division, which would have been able to be transferred to the eastern front, the 334. Infanteriedivision, was just forming at Grafenwhr, Germany. They were later transferred to Africa. So General of Artillery von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Commander of LI. Armeekorps proposed the following idea for the upcoming attack: First attack to the Volga bank in the area of 295. Infanteriedivision, then attack out of the metallurgic factory to the south. Another proposal was to take the chemical factory Lazur itself (if the Fhrer

orders). The later was approved by the 6th Army high command. On 3 November the 6th Army issued the order for LI. Armeekorps to first attack the northern part of Lazur on 10 or 11 November. At first LI. Armeekorps considered attacking the factories and the Volga bank with groups Seydel and Scheele simultaneously, and gave out order no. 109, dating 7 November. However, since even the most optimistic commander could see that this was to be a suicide mission, the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army and Chief of Staff of LI. Armeekorps conferred and a new attack plan was proposed (7 November 1215 hours). So order no. 109 was revoked and the new corps order no. 110, dating 8 November 0400 hours, was issued. In this new order the seizure of the factory halls and Volga bend in the area of group Schwerin was not even mentioned. For that attack LI. Armeekorps had to regroup its forces. On 4 November they raised the group Schwerin, under the commander of 79. Infanteriedivisions Major-General von Schwerin. It consisted of 79. Infanteriedivision and all infantry and infantry-like troops of 14. and 24. Panzer divisions. From the panzer divisions only the infantry, and comparable units like recon, Kradschtzen (motorcycle infantry) and pioneers remained in the area. All other units were sent to the rear areas for regrouping and refitting. The artillery of these units was placed under command of artillery regiment 179. (Armeekorps order no. 105 dating 5 November). III. The final plan

On 5 November General von Sodenstern contacted AOK 6 (6th Army command) and asked if an attack against the eastern area of the metallurgic factory and the gun factory could be started. After von Paulus conferred with Army Group B, and then with Hitler, he ordered that the proposal should be set into action. Planning for the attack was coordinated between LI. Armeekorps and 6th Army and von Seydlitz-Kurzbach issued on 8 November his order to attack, codenamed Operation Hubertus. As the proliferation of confusing orders, and especially attack objectives, of the upcoming operation were changed and changed again, Army Group B contacted 6th Army on the evening of 6 November and informed them that the Fhrer has decided, that the bridgeheads north of the gun factory and the metallurgic factory should be taken first. The attack plan was finalised as the following: The whole area from the Volga bank east of gun factory Red October to the fuel depot to south east of the brickyard will be attacked with all available forces simultaneously. In detail: The 305. Infanteriedivision, reinforced by the pioneers, along with the reinforced 389. Infanteriedivision would attack with a lightning blow on the left flank and reach the Volga bank.

The 71., 295. Infanterie and 100. Jger divisions together with group Schwerin were to undertake prepared assault attacks to confuse the enemy about the true nature of the offensive. Strong forces of VIII Air Corps should support the attack. After that first act the Volga bank east of Lazur should be taken, and finally the chemical factory Lazur itself. The question arose, who should plan and execute the crucial part of the operation, the pioneer attack in the north of this last offensive? After long discussions between von Paulus, von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and Oberst Herbert Selle, commander of pioneers of 6th Army, the later proposed (an up to this point quiet man during the planning) one of his Pioneer officers, an expert in his field. The man proposed for the task was Major Josef Linden, a 38-year old professional officer from Essen, commander of army Pionier Bataillon 672. His unit was mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht (armed forces report) after their grand bridge operations over the Dnieper and the clearing of large mine fields in front of the Stalingrad fortress lines. At Kalatsch he was building up the pioneer training school of the 6th Army. Linden received the order from Oberst Selle on the evening of 6 November to report the next day at 0900 at liaison point X for a special mission. He left Pionier Bataillon 672 behind and 14 hours later he reported with his staff personnel at this point X, the so called ring-binder, the command post of 305.

Infanteriedivision in Stalingrad North. The divisions Chief of Staff Oberst Steinmetz informed him of the special mission. He was to clear the remaining Soviet bridgeheads on the western bank of the Volga river: the ordnance factory Red Barricade, metallurgic chemical factory Lazur, the tennis racket (the train yards), the White house (chemists shop) and the Red House (Commissars house). For this difficult task he was assigned the following troops as an assault force: Pionier Bataillon 50 (mot), Hauptmann Gast, from 22. Panzerdivision Pionier Bataillon 162, Major Krger, from 62. Infanteriedivision Pionier Bataillon 294, Hauptmann Weimann, from 294. Infanteriedivision Pionier Bataillon 305, Hauptmann Traub, from 305. Infanteriedivision Pionier Bataillon 336, Hauptmann Lund, from 336. Infanteriedivision Furthermore Pionier Bataillons 41 and 45 (the later under Hauptmann Drewitz) were also assigned to Oberst Linden from Pionier Regiment Stab 604 (pioneer regimental staff). Additionally he was to command Pionier Bataillon 389 under Hauptmann Pfitzner, which had already been fighting for several weeks in this area. Oberst Selle estimated a mere 6 to 8 days duration for this final operation.

So on paper this made up for an impressive eight pioneer battalions. Numerically major Linden should have about 4800 assault pioneers at his command. But the following points give another picture entirely: 1) Pioneer Battalion 50 (mot) contributed only 2 companies since their 3rd (panzer pioneer company 140) remained, along with their half-tracks, with the rest of 22. Panzerdivision. The unit was dispatched to the LI. Armeekorps about 2 weeks before the scheduled attack for street fighting, so after serious combat this unit was not at full strength. 2) Pionier Bataillons 305 and 389 had been already fighting for weeks in Stalingrad and they were down to more or less company sized battlegroups. 3) Pionier Bataillons 41 and 45 had also already suffered causalities, since they took part, alongside Pionier Bataillon 295 in the forced Don crossing earlier in the campaign. The 3rd company of Pioneer Battalion 45 was especially under-strength. They participated in the earlier fighting for the grain elevator and southern railway station, so the 3rd company was held back. Both battalions were combined into one battlegroup under Hauptmann Sprenger, designated Pionier Bataillon Sprenger. 4) Pionier Bataillon 162 was drawn from their positions behind the Italian 8th Army. They were just scheduled for a rest and refit phase. The exact strength cant be verified, but the unit must certainly be considered less than fresh, although the last weeks before their front were relatively quiet. Therefore the only relatively fresh units were

Pionier Bataillons 294 and 336, but they, together with Pionier Bataillon 162, were several hundred miles away. Pionier Bataillon 294 was behind the Don bend, Pionier Bataillon 162 with the Italian 8th Army and Pionier Bataillon 336 with XXIV Armeekorps with the 2nd Hungarian Army near Voronezh. Although the exact strengths of the transferred units cant be verified 100%, available sources are not very specific here, one seems to be quite correct: According to the diary of general Oberst von Richthofen the strength of the battalions were as following (officers/NCOs/ranks): Pioneer Battalion 45 9/30/246 Pioneer Battalion 50 (mot) 10/44/405 Pioneer Battalion 162 7/31/281 Pioneer Battalion 294 4/29/275 Pioneer Battalion 336 8/38/336 So they totalled only 1753 men. None of these units were at full strength. After the numbers became obvious, General Schmidt from 6th Army made a last plead to the Army Group on 3 November at 1100 hours demanding, in addition to the pioneers, that the infantry from 29. and 60. Motorised divisions be made available. He, like the rest of the commanding frontline officers, foresaw the problem of holding the newly gained ground with their depleted infantry units. Army Group Bs General von Sodenstern, denied this request since it is not approved by the Fhrer.

The greatest problem for bringing the units into Stalingrad, was the bad road situation, combined with the always scarce transport capacities. After conferring with von Richthofen, major Linden was informed, that it would take about 3 days before this units would become available, because some of them had to be flown into the Stalingrad area to meet the time schedule for the attack. Again the train transportation capacity was so low, that only Pionier Bataillon 336 was considered to be sent to Stalingrad by train. After close examination of the available transport space, this unit also had to be flown in by air. Additionally von Paulus, after realizing the lack of infantry support and conferring with GeneralLeutnant von Seydlitz-Kurzbach ordered, that 10 battle groups should be formed from the 71., 79., 94., 100. Jger, 295., 305., 389. Infanterie and 14. and 24. Panzer divisions, to back up the assaulting pioneers and take up the newly gained positions. These battle groups, as far as can be ascertained, were formed as follows: 1) 14. Panzerdivision: Parts of Panzer Regiment 36, the half-track battalion, and Panzer Artillery Regiment 4 were withdrawn to Kotelnikowo. All non-mobile panzers, vehicles and weapons were transferred there. The Panzergrenadier regiments were ordered to stay at Stalingrad, holding their positions and they contributed a roughly oversized battalion combat group. Besides that the 14. Panzerdivision was ordered

to build up a panzer company and artillery battalion as a mobile reserve. This group was designated Kampfgruppe Seydel. They had (without staff and the heavy company) a personal strength of 11/60/507. Weapon strength: 43 light MG, 13 heavy MG, 5 mortars, 9 light infantry guns, 3x 3.7cm anti tank guns, 6x 5cm anti tank gun, 5x 7.5cm anti tank guns, 6 Panzer III long , 1 Panzer IV short. 2) 24. Panzerdivision: On 11 November Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 formed an assault company under Oberleutnant Beyersdorff. Additionally Kradschtzen battalion 4 (KB 4) was reinforced with companies 3, 4 and 5 of the armoured recon battalion (Panzeraufklrungsabtielung, PzAA 24). Their strength was 3(34)/23(197)/98(953). The numbers in parentheses are the required strength! 1st and 2nd companies (armoured cars and half-tracks) of KB 4 were withdrawn to the great Don bend. They were attached to the 389. Infanteriedivision. 3) 24. Panzerdivision also formed "Kampfgruppe Scheele" with a total strength of 23/122/640. 4) The Croatian 369. Grenadier Regiment received a newly arrived battalion (4 November) and was boosted up to the strength of a reinforced battalion. They numbered a full infantry battalion (the arriving reinforcements) plus the remnants of the original regiment: 1 infantry company with 98 men and 8 light MG, 1 heavy MG company (73 men and 11 heavy MG) and 1 anti-tank company with 20 men and 6 guns.

They were first attached to 212. Grenadier Regiment (79. ID, 6 November), then later to the 305. ID (11 November). 5) 79. Infanteriedivision withdrew its Pionier Bataillon 179 under Hauptmann Weltz and reinforced it with the following units: 1 heavy mortar detachment, 13./208., 13./212., 13./226. Grenadier Regiment (the light infantry gun companies of these regiments), 2 groups of Radfahrabteilung 179 (bicycle riders),1 platooon of 2cm Flak38 guns from 4./37., and 2 heavy infantry guns (sIG 33). On request they were allocated fire from I./Artillerie Regiment 179 (1st battalion artillery regiment 179). They were later to be attached to the 389. Infanteriedivision. 6) 79. Infanteriedivision also formed on 5 November, from its II Battalion, 212. Grenadier Regiment, Sturmkompanie 212. Strength: 3/28/146, weapons: 9 light MG, 2 heavy MG, 4 mortars, 2x 3.7cm Pak36 guns. 7) 79. Infanteriedivision also withdraws I./226. Grenadier Regiment out of the front line (6 November) and places it as reserve behind II./226. Grenadier Regiment. This enables them to form Sturmkompanie 226. 8) 94. Infanteriedivision withdrew parts of their 274. Grenadier Regiment along with Radfahrabteilung 194 (bicycle riders) and put it under command of Hauptmann Brendel. They were also attached to 389. Infanteriedivision.

9) Since 578. Grenadier Regiment (305. ID) was so badly mauled, its 2nd battalion for example only had 41 men left, Kampfgruppe 578 was formed, where all survivors of the regiment were concentrated. The commander was Hauptmann Rettenmaier. They were later reinforced with Pionier Bataillon 50 (mot). 10) The other regiments of 305. Infanteriedivision (576 and 577) also formed similar battlegroups, although they were reinforced with personnel from their service units. Before Major Linden planned his attack he took a look at the upcoming battlefield. His illusions about the operation, if he ever had them, were blown away. Through the Scherenfernrohr (periscope binoculars) and binoculars he saw a giant field of debris. The area was littered with rubble heaps of blown up walls, levelled buildings, loosely formed roofs of hanging steel plates, gigantic bombshells, piles of semi-finished gun barrels, bent steel supports, destroyed machines and electrical devices. Where the ground was not open, he could only see craters and earth ploughed up by explosions. All of this unnameable chaos was bristling with bunkers, fortifications and trenches. A truly shocking sight, a snake pit, for every troop commander who feels responsible for his men. Behind all of this the ground smoothly sloped to the Volga, where it stopped on the eastern bank of the river. This bank would later prove impenetrable and from above it gave the viewer the impression that it was cut with a giant sword.

After his recon tour major Linden spoke with von Seydlitz-Kurzbach. He outlined that an offensive with his pioneer battalions split between the different assault units would spell doom upon the attacking soldiers. He convinced his superior commander that the pioneers should attack one enemy position after the other. Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach then split the planned operation in to two stages, Schwerin I and Schwerin II. He planned to let the Group Schwerin assault force attack, with the to be assigned pioneer battalions attacking from the north, on 13 November between metallurgic factory and ordnance factory. On 20 November the second attack was to take the ground from the fuel depot southeast to the Red October factory and simultaneously destroy the enemy in the Martin oven hall (no. 4) of Red October. For the second attack he held whole of group Schwerin in reserve and it was not initially to be committed for the opening phase of Operation Hubertus! OPERATION HUBERTUS - PART TWO Soviets and preparations. By Wolf Hpper IV. The other side of the battlefield How were Soviets placed? Vassilij Tschuikov was forced to move his army command post four times in seven weeks. Finally he took up a position in a tunnel system in the north behind the lines of 45th Rifle

Division. His Soviet units were not in much better shape than the Germans. His 95th Rife Division (Polkovnik Gorischny) was badly mauled, most of the remaining soldiers had to be assigned to neighbouring units, the 37th Guards Rifle Division (Polkovnik Schodulov) was disbanded and the survivors assigned to 118th Rifle Regiment of 138th Rifle Division (Polkovnik Ivan Iljitsch Ljudnikov). The later also received the rest of 308th Rifle Division (Polkovnik Gurtjev). Another difficulty arose when the STAVKA (Soviet high command of Red Army) withdrew many batteries of the long-range artillery from the east side of the Volga to other parts of the front. This major defensive factor, which contributed so much to the successful defence of the last weeks, was weakened. Tschuikov also concluded that these movements, and the lessened barrages, would be recognised and utilised by the Germans to their advantage. The most crucial difficulty for Tschuikov to overcome was that the shipment of supplies and reinforcements across the Volga, it had become more and more a battle of its own. Not only were the advancing Germans gaining further parts of the Volga bank daily, which enabled them to better coordinate their artillery and air attacks, but the weather itself turned against him. On 9 November the thermometer dropped to minus 18 degrees Celsius and the great river began to carry ice flows. The shipping would have normally been stopped, but nonetheless the boat crews and sailors still undertook

trips across the dangerous water and supplied the remaining defenders with the much needed food, ammunition and reinforcements. Later a German soldier recognized the sound of the colliding, cracking ice flows as spooky and doom spelling. The death knell was rung, but for whom? On average Tschuikovs soldiers had about 30 rounds per rifle and only received 55 grams of dry bread per day. Sometimes not even these scarce food rations were available. V. Before the Offensive In the first nine days of November the Germans only undertook small, but nonetheless very vicious, local assaults. In one example the Germans attacked the main Volga crossing point and a company of the 347th Rifle Regiment, only consisting of nine soldiers, dug-in 200 meters before the Volga. When the Germans attacked, the Soviet commander, Leitenant Andrejev, collected his surviving men and counterattacked with sub-machine guns. They fought the Germans to a standstill allowing time for an arriving task force to help them hold the northern ferry point. These small islands of resistance were proving time and time again a true fortress of impenetrable strong points. Nonetheless the Germans maintained these attacks to keep up the pressure and not to give the defenders rest. Another major disadvantage for the Germans lay in their dwindling artillery ammunition from 31 October.

The assault troops support and the night disrupting bombardments could not be sustained at the levels they were conducted the previous weeks. Worsening was the situation with hand grenades and mortar ammunition. Paulus complained to the Army Group about this and recommended that the operation should be postponed until 15 November. The Army Group headquarters, under General von Sodenstern, considered this a total time catastrophe. The time schedule was not changed. During the whole of 8 and 9 November Major Linden and his command staff spent planning the attack based on his recon tour. Since the orders from the higher command were changed several times during the last days, he conferred with von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and came up with a final plan, which was, again after several phone calls (including with Hitler), approved. During one of these phone calls, von Seydlitz-Kurzbach also assigns Sturmgeschtz abteilungen 244 and 245 (Assault Gun Battalions) from 79. and 71. Infanterie divisions and an additional two pioneer companies from Pionier Bataillon 635 to the attack. His plans were laid down as following: Pionier battalions 294, 50 (mot), 305 and 336, backed up by several battle groups, are to attack on 2500 meters broad 305. Infanteriedivision sector towards the fuel depot and into the gun factory. Pionier battalions 162 and 389, in the combat sector of 389. Infanteriedivision, were to attack directly towards the Volga bank. All other neighbouring units, along the

whole front of LI Armeekorps, were to undertake supporting attacks in their sectors, so that no enemy reserves could be moved toward the northern sector. These mock attacks were to be coordinated between LI Armeekorps and the responsible sector commanders seperatly. Major Linden wanted the pioneers to blow holes into vital Soviet defence points, especially bunkers and fortified houses. The following battle groups would secure connecting screening lines to the attacking pioneers. He would then clear, with parts of both assault forces, the strong points and attack the next cornerstone until their goal, the Volga bank as a whole, was reached. Only specific, very dominating, points should be attacked directly, connecting front lines were to be bypassed. Thereby he wanted to concentrate his scarce forces into narrow attack corridors to maximise the pioneers firepower. The bypassed units were to be constantly attacked by air, and the directly adjoining Soviet infantry units would be forced to mostly only defend their own lines. The result would be that small isolated pockets of resistance would remain, which could be mopped up bit by bit. The attack of the pioneers would be initiated by a massive air/artillery strike, this short lightning-like barrage would then move 50 meters forward to enable the storm pioneers to get out of their cover and into the positions of the still pinned, demoralized and probably

dislodged Soviet defenders. Direct air support would only be flown on special request of the assault pioneers and against strong point targets. After all the preparations and troop shifting, both sides were ready for the final act of this drama on the Volga. Part Three: Day by Day account. VI. The operation a day by day account 9 November: Attacks in the sector of 79. ID capture of the oil refinery In the area of 79. Infanteriedivision the Soviets flew strong bomber sorties against the factory positions. In the same sector of 79. ID, between 0310 and 0420 hours, the Soviet 180th Guards Rifle Regiment undertook a number of weak recon thrusts against factory hall no. 2. All were repulsed. During the day the 138th Rifle Regiment attacked no less then 12 times against hall no. 10. The strength varied, but on average 200 men attacked each time. Most of them were repulsed in close combat. Some local breaches into the hall itself were cleared with counterattacks. In the morning Sturmgeschtzabteilung 244 was withdrawn from the division and sent north to the upcoming attack. During the night heavy air raids accompanied by artillery bombardments hit the German lines of 79. ID. The 79. ID was suffering more than their neighbouring

units under the constant bombardments, since it was covering the right flank of 24. Panzerdivision, which was guarding the vital Mamayev Kurgan hill preferred by German artillery and air observers for coordination on the shipping on the Volga. Since the Germans here also threaten large parts of chemical factory Lazur, the Soviets constantly attacked their positions. German assault activities in this sector were also weakened for the upcoming attack. The Soviets saw a chance for a local counteroffensive, not realizing, that 79. ID and 24. PzD were withdrawing and regrouping their forces for the upcoming attack against the factory. In the sector of 295. Infanterie/100. Jger divisions, Pionier Bataillon 100 and 295, together with assault groups of their divisions, managed to capture the oil refinery and breakthrough the left flank of Soviet 284th Rifle Division to the Volga river. Otherwise only some houses were conquered and the attack comes to a standstill. Here the Germans have gained another foothold on the Volga bank, from where they intended to attack north to finally take Lazur and the tennis racket itself. 24. Panzerdivision finally managed to assemble the ordered assault company and sent it immediately to the 389. Infanteriedivision. 10 November: The Soviets kept up their constant attack against 79.

Infanteriedivision Major Linden worried about infantry strength. The 79. Infanteriedivisions reported that during the night the Soviets again bombed their positions. At 0730 hours the Soviets attacked with stronger force of 138th Rifle Regiment out of the fuel depot against hall no. 10 and penetrate the southern part. At 0845 hours this attack was halted, but resumed one hour later after reinforcements. Although 79. ID started an immediate counterattack, the penetration could not be cleared. The 79. ID simply lacked the reserves for a strong counterattack. The reserve battle groups were not committed because von Seydlitz-Kurzbach denied the request from the divisions commander to release them. He didnt want the assault forces to be weakened. Since the Germans were not effectively counterattacking, the Soviet commander, Polkovnik Batjuk, threw more troops into the arena in six more attacks, each about 200 300 men strong, to further the initial success. None of the attacks gained substantial ground. In the morning the Soviet 180th Guards Rifle Regiment attacked, with between 30 and 40 men, hall no. 7 three times and tried to increase their penetration into the hall, but the attacks were deflected. In the afternoon four more similar attacks were undertaken, but all of them were unsuccessful, the last after bloody close combat. From 7 November the Soviet positions in the sector of

79. ID had been hit every day by fifty 21cm shells of I/Artillerie Regiment 733, to neutralize specific targets. This brought some relief and certainly disrupted Soviets plans, but they were still able to fortify their defences and bring in their scarce reserves. The Martin oven hall (no. 4) was hit twice with very good results by German Stukas, each flight 15 planes strong. The constant Soviet attacks in the sector of 79. ID certainly disrupted the German plans for an offensive here. Although the Soviet commander, Polkovnik Batjuk, was not aware of the German plans, he realised that his positions were vital for the survival of Stalingrad and taking of the important Mamayev Kurgan hill. He constantly sought to improve them so a counter-offensive in his sector could be started. Tschukov also saw a slim chance at this point and constantly shipped reserves into the area of 284th Rifle Division so they could keep up their efforts. Other sectors, like that of the 138th Rifle Division, suffered because these measures. Major Linden was very concerned about the low attack strengths of some infantry units, he constantly contacted von Seydlitz-Kurzbach to demanded reinforcements. Even his observation, that too many highly trained specialists would be lost in the attack and be missed in the upcoming spring offensive, were swept aside and ignored.

11 November: The Germans attack chimneys of Red Barrikady are levelled Slow progress by the attackers chemists shop is captured Attack against Commissars House fails first breakthroughs to the Volga river Red October factory is attacked Casualities for the Germans are running high Shortly after midnight assault groups moved as quietly as possible into the machinery halls of Red Barrikady. The pioneers were burdened with satchel charges, explosives, machine gun belts, tons of hand grenades and additional pioneer equipment like large wire cutters, ignition boxes and flame-throwers. All were quiet and they knew exactly where to position themselves. These hardened veterans had done this over and over before. Some of the hard nerved even smoked in anticipation of the soon to start bombardment. As Hauptmann Rettenmaier of 578. Grenadier Regiment remembers, they were confident that they would throw the Russians into the Volga. He commented to his troops that the Russians fight here harder than in other cities, they answer We saw worse in Rostov and Voronezh! Even Rettenmaier himself thought that this operation might just succeed. Suddenly an explosion was heard from a neighbouring room. One of the pioneers had stepped on a Soviet land mine. He and 18 of his comrades had died before the operation was even underway. They didnt have much

time to think about what happened, it was 0330 hours and the German artillery had begun an immense, not seen for a long time, artillery barrage on the Soviet positions of 138th Rifle Division. All the artillery of LI Armeekorps fired on a thin line 3000 meters wide right before the pioneers eyes. The earth shook under the massive pounding of the German artillery fist. The Soviets answered with a barrage of their own. General Voronov immediately ordered all available batteries on the eastern Volga bank to counter the bombardment. For nearly two hours Germans and Soviets alike were held in their positions as the gods of war exchanged their wrath. In the morning at 0630 hours, during the bombardment, von Richthofens Stukas managed to hit the chimneys of Red Barrikady directly and levelled them. This robs the Soviets of their superb artillery observation posts and some very good sniping positions. The first aim of Pionier Bataillon 305, in front of Rettenmaiers Kampfgruppe 578, was the White House, held by parts of 768th Rifle Regiment (138th Rifle Division). Pionier Bataillon 50 attacked the Red House, defended by 241st Rifle Regiment (95th Rifle Division). The reinforced II Battalion/576. Grenadier Regiment, under Hauptmann Kemper of about 150 200 men

strong, attacked the fortified positions of 650th Rifle Regiment (18th Rifle Division) in the left sector of the Red Barricades factory. Although they were supported by Pionier Bataillon 294, they made slow progress. During the first day they only gained an average of 30 meters. They dearly paid for that ground with heavy casualties. The most vicious fighting was centred around hall no. 7. This large 700 x 100 metre multi-story building, and its neighbouring heating plant, were well fortified and stubbornly defended by the Russians. Obviously the barrage had some effect on the Soviet defenders. The I and III/576. Grenadier Regiment, intended as flank covering forces for their II Battalion, manage to break through at the 161st Rifle Regiment (95th Rifle Division) and partially reached the Volga bank. They immediately tried to smoke the retreating Soviets out of their river bank dungeons, but the hand grenades rolled uselessly into the Volga. They had to stay and guard the exits, since at night the Soviets would pour out and counterattack. The attack against the White House proved to be well planned and executed. At first the pioneers overcome the weak defences of the remaining Russians and gain good ground. It was not until they reached the area surrounding the chemists shop that the Soviet defenders scrapped-up some reserves, among them staff and signals personal from 37th Guards Rifle Division, and attacked the pioneers on their right flank. Suddenly the storm troopers had to seek cover. For many long minutes the situation was desperate, the

Germans were under fire from two sides. The covering infantry, Kampfgruppe 578, was held back by still active and often lone Soviet soldiers (308th and 344th Rifle Divisions) fighting for their lives from hidden and changing positions. The commander of 3rd platoon, Pionier Bataillon 305 drew up the following plan: The whole company fires on their two side threats and thereby covering a group of five men with a flamethrower. The remaining three groups set up heavy machine guns and fire at the window holes and known positions of the defenders to force them to take cover. They could only manage to keep up this fire for seconds, the Soviet snipers were a real menace for the attackers and shot very precisely. The flamethrower crew rushed, with sub-machine guns blazing around them, to the main entrance of the big austere building, the only point of cover and out of the sight of the hated snipers. They discover the entrance was blocked and they shouted back to their comrades and demanded a second hail of covering fire. One reckless pioneer ran back to the old positions for the shaped charges. After a few seconds, that seemed like minutes, he returned. The remaining pioneers waited in anticipation. There was a sharp explosion followed by minutes of silence. Suddenly there was a sound like a beast crying out its rage and agony. Black smoke came out of the buildings openings. The flamethrower moved room to room, floor to floor, spaying doom on the poor, hapless defenders.

Finally Kampfgruppe 578 arrived, and the combined two-side attack routed the Soviet snipers. When the Germans advanced and took the few surrendering, frightened and shocked Soviet prisoners, the building was already ablaze and started to crumble into debris. Further advance towards the Volga bank was abandoned, since the Soviets, 768th Rifle Regiment and 42nd Rifle Brigabe had taken up positions and dug in only 200 meters from the Volga bank. After what they just experienced, they were still willing to defend to the last bullet and man. Even the Germans were worn out and decided to regroup for the next day. The attack of Pionier Bataillon 50 was less successful. They crawled more than they were advancing upright over the debris, cutting their way through remaining barbed wire towards the Soviets. They were not able to infiltrate the house itself, since here the Soviets had the building uniquely fortified. The ground floor didnt have any entrances, all of them were walled up! Although the pioneers reached the house, they were unable to get in since the debris was not high enough to support them up to the second level. After several direct assaults the Germans retreated to safe positions and their intention to attack further was abandoned. Major Linden decides to regroup for the next day. Pionier Bataillon 336 was able to take several blocks from 344th Rifle Division and 308th Rifle Division in their sector, but had to abandon the gains later, since

they had totally run out of ammunition. Pionier Bataillon 389, reinforced with Pionier Bataillon 162, attacked straight and partially reached the Volga bank. They were able to drive back 118th Rifle Regiment (37th Guards Rifle Division), but otherwise the southern aimed attack came to a standstill. Russian resistance proved too stiff. At 0355 hours 79. ID attacked the Soviet positions of 120th Rifle Regiment and 117th Guards Rifle Regiment at the Martin oven hall (hall no. 4), in conjunction with their lefthand neighbours. The plan: They assigned reinforced Pionier Bataillon 179 and Pionier Bataillon Sprenger (41st + 45th) for this task. Their first goal was the southeast side of this hall. They attacked in the following order: right flank: Pionier Bataillon Sprenger, centre 1st and 3rd companies, left 2nd company. The southwestern hall wall was designated as dividing line for the responsible sectors. The northeastern hall wall was assigned as the dividing line between 3rd and 2nd company. Artillery Regiment 179 and the assigned infantry guns shelled the nortwestern part of hall no. 4 for 5 minutes to hold down the defenders, after that the assault groups advanced quickly locating and fighting local nests of resistance. The artillery observers advanced with the leading assaulters to provide effective fire support on the spot.

The artillery spotters were assigned to Pionier Bataillon Sprenger, the observers for the light infantry guns with 1st and 3rd company, Pionier Bataillon 179. 2cm FlaK38 guns hold down snipers in the roof from their positions at the ladder house. Croatian Regiment 369 was to conquer and secures the newly gained ground behind the assault groups. One company was held in reserve. Assembly was to be completed at 03.00 hours under codename Martin. But all did not go the plan: Assault group 1 was not able to get out of its assembly positions. Groups 2 and 3 only advanced with heavy flamethrower support about 30m inside the hall. Group 4 advanced on the northern side of the hall, but had to retreat at dawn towards their starting positions due to heavy fire from the Soviet positions of the 120th Rifle Regiment. Groups 2 and 3 suffered heavy causalities, during their dangerous advance over the debris, rubble, old machinery and wrecked iron parts. The Soviets employed a number of unique defensive measures. They reinforced positions with steel plates, so only small slits remain from where they fired their weapons. These fortifications were very difficult to spot and even harder to suppress and destroy. The attackers did manage to capture some badly wounded Soviet soldiers. After interrogating them the commander of Pionier Bataillon 179, Hauptmann

Wenz, learnt that the Soviets themselves planned an attack inside the hall no. 4. The Germans had simply thrust with their assault groups into the assembling 112th and 120th Rifle Regiments. At first no substantial breakthroughs were achieved, but after a redirection of the attack axis, both assault groups broke through on the right, northern, side of the Red October factory and reached the Volga bank. This, together with the successful thrust on the northern part by Grenadier Regiment 208 and Grenadier Regiment 226 against the Soviet 339th, 347th and 685th Rifle Regiments of 99th Rifle Division, established a cauldron in which about 2000 Soviet defenders of 95th and 99th Rifle Divisions were trapped. This success was highly regarded by the German 6th Army and seen as the beginning of the end for Tschuikovs forces. Together with their neighbours, 79. ID, the 14. Panzerdivision ordered a local attack in the sector of Motorcycle battalion 64 (MB 64) south of bread factory no. 2, to reach the Volga in the sector of 241st Rifle Regiment. After a short bombardment from the divisions artillery at 0345 hours the Germans stormed forward and reached the river bank with one group. They were quickly cut off and counterattacked. A second volunteer group, assembled to relieve their comrades, attacked and broke the resistance of Soviet 241st and 161st Rifle Regiments, but was later also cut off. Both groups were annihilated by the Soviets, only

one wounded man escaped and reported the fate of his comrades. The goal to reach the river and hold the positions here was not achieved. After the reports of the causalities floated into the 305. Infanteriedivisions headquarters, General Major Oppenlnder contacted von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and demanded the attack be aborted. At this point the German assault forces had already suffered up to 30% casualties. Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was not willing to do so and remarks This is a Fhrerbefel!, Oppenlnder resigns from his post and is replaced by the Chief of Staff of the VIII Armeekorps, Oberst Steinmetz. Major Linden listened to the battle reports of the different unit commanders and drew the following conclusions: 1. The pioneers were heavily burdened by their clumsy and awkward combat equipment. These street fighting specialists were thereby unable to carry enough ammunition for their infantry weapons to successfully keep up the fire-fight in the long term. They simply ran out of bullets. 2. The debris filled, many times bombed, ground proved to be very helpful for the defenders and often blocked line of sight. This slowed the advance to a mere crawl for the next cover and prevented the coordinated attacks of the different assault groups.

3. The following infantry units were not able to provide ample fire support and it took them too long to clear isolated pockets of defenders. He reported these points to von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and demanded immediate infantry reinforcements. But all he received was a sharp denial from his superior with the remark that nothing could be taken away from other divisions, since the Soviets were preparing for an offensive in the Romanian sectors. Nonetheless he reconsidered the ups and downs of the day and ordered that the full attack in all sectors should only be revitalised after a regrouping and it should be started on 13 November. At about the same time the attack was started in the northern sector, between 0310 and 0420 hours the Soviet 138th and 180th Guards Rifle Regiment undertake minor attacks against hall 2 of Red October, in the area of 79. Infanteriedivision. These attacks were countered with close combat actions. Shortly thereafter they attacked in the same area of hall no. 10 twelve times with approximately 200 men each time. Some units managed to invade parts of hall 10, but were thrown out again by spontaneous local counterattacks. The old main line of resistance was reestablished and several weak counterattacks with tank support were repulsed by the Germans. In the evening the Soviet 95th Rifle Division undertook a counterattack southeast of the Red October factory, but raging German mortar and artillery fire immediately stopped this attempt in its tracks. The

intention of Schtscherbakov was to hinder the Germans from taking troops from his sector and reinforcing their advancing flanks. 12 November: 79. Infanteriedivision is constantly shelled and attacked The Commissars House or Red House is captured minor advances by the Germans During the night the Soviets flew aggressive sorties against the positions of 79. Infanteriedivision. At 0500 hours the German artillery laid a firestorm on the Soviet positions for one and a half hours. The Germans learnt from the mistakes of the previous day and equip Pionier Bataillon 50 with ladders. This battalion was moved into the former attack sector of Pionier Batailon 305. The later was moved towards 79. Infanteriedivision. The attack from the previous day was resumed. The 2nd platoon, Pionier Bataillon 50, managed to get to the house walls and set up the ladders, while the infantry together with the remaining pioneers set up precise screening fire to hold down the defenders. The pioneers suffered horrible losses while climbing into the rooms, with hand grenades and flamethrowers in use, they defeated the Russians room by room fighting. When the situation became more and more hopeless for the defenders, they retreated to the first floor and finally into the cellar. The German attackers were not able to penetrate the cellar through the descending

stairs, so they broke the wooden floor open with picks and threw fuel canisters, smoke grenades and explosives into the darkness below them. Thick smoke starts soon appeared, indicating, that intense fires were raging. This was too much for the defenders and they evacuated themselves through prepared escape tunnels to the positions of the 138th Rifle Division. The result was nonetheless a success for the Germans, they removed this strong point from the Soviet defensive line, which had dominated the Volga bank and connected areas for several hundred metres. After a brief break, the Germans regrouped and called in another artillery bombardment for their next advance. They intended to clear some neighbouring housing blocks to secure their positions. After they received their support, they assaulted a row of houses. At house no. 78, the attacked was halted by a Soviet machine-gun in a trench that had pinpointed the Germans positions. Leutnant Kretz of 578. Grenadier Regiment gathered some men, stormed forward, firing his sub-machine gun and took the enemy position. The final act of the attack came from a Red Army soldier to his left, who fired his PPsH and downed Leutnant Kertz. He was the last leutnant of 578. Grenadier Regiment to die on this day on the Volga. This loss shocks his men and nearly halted the whole attack, but they overcame their horror and took house no. 78. Shortly after they took up positions in the house itself, the sharp eyes and ears of one machine-gunner saved this newly gained

position. From the second floor he noticed a strong Soviet force sneaking up to the house. He opened fire, which alerts the rest of the Germans, and with a counterattack they were able to hold the building. After they received some fresh troops at 0950 hours, 305. Infanteriedivision gained control over all of the area east of the gun factory. The 389. Infanteriedivision reached the Volga bank on a 500 meter broad strip. The fuel tanks were taken and cleared by Pionier Bataillon 294 of all enemy resistance. During German attack, the 768th Rifle Regiment was split in two parts and it drove a deep wedge into the Soviet positions and divided 138th Rifle Division of Ljudnikov into two parts. One of his battalions only had a combat strength of 15 soldiers. The Soviets were partially driven back to within 70 metres of the Volga bank. Ljudnikov decided to commit his last reserve battalion and threw them against the advancing Pionier Bataillon 294. This cleared the situation for the moment. Another platoon fought until only 4 men were left and ammunition was running out. One of these brave men was sent back, already wounded, to order fire on their own positions. The 14. Panzerdivision and 79. Infanteriedivision resumed their attack from the previous day, this time together with Panzergrenadier Regiments 103 and 108, and gained the Volga bank. They were supported by Pionier Bataillon Sprenger and the usual heavy air/artillery barrage. The Soviet 241st Rifle Regiment

was totally destroyed and the few survivors fought their way to neighbouring units. The battle groups of 24. Panzerdivision repulsed a counterattack by 284th Rifle Division against the chemical factory Lazur. The advance of Pionier Bataillon 162 and 389 (389. Infanteriedivision sector) ground to a standstill. Only minor advances, often less than 20 metres against stubborn and unforgiving resistance by 138th Rifle Division and 37th Guards Rifle Division, forced the Germans to halt their offensive in this sector. The northernmost part of the offensive had failed after the first day. During the morning the Soviet 138th Rifle Regiment undertook several hazardous attacks in the area of hall no. 10, but a vicious melee develops, by which the Germans repulsed the Soviets with the large-scale use of hand grenades. A similar attack at 1350 hours against hall no. 7 was also repulsed. The front line soldiers in this sector observed strong movements between hall no. 10 and the fuel depot. They reported this back to their division headquarter and where it was rightly concluded that the Soviets were moving reserves into the area. They immediately warned 305. Infanteriedivision of this new danger. Von SeydlitzKurzbach, without knowing this fact, ordered the Panzer company of group Seydel (group Schwerin) to be withdrawn to the great Don bend to reunite with the parts of the 24. Panzerdivision.

At this point of the battle the situation was very serious for Tschuikov. His northern defensive strong point, the 138th Rifle Division under Polkovnik Ljudnikov, was split, severely thrown back and held only partial frontlines. Around Red October no gains were achieved and the connecting units between this two strong points were more and more reduced to thin, most often non-cohesive, improvised lines. A cohesive defence of the Volga bank was not guaranteed and the measures he was able to implement were less and less coordinated. After this second day of bloody combat von SeydlitzKurzbach reported to the headquarters of 6th Army that the newly arriving infantry replacements, especially for 79. Infanteriedivision, were insufficiently trained and therefore suffer high casualties. Part Four: 13 to 19 November (live 17 Dec)... OPERATION HUBERTUS - PART FOUR By Wolf Hpper 13 November: Germans regroup attacks partially stopped in several sectors German successes Red October finally cleared 138th Rifle Division isolated Situation for Tschuikovs troops worsens During the night Major Linden ordered Pionier Bataillon 162 to be withdrawn from the 389. Infanteriedivision since their progress was not looking

to be very successfully. He attached them to the Kampfgruppe 578 (Grenadier Regiment 578 and Pionier Bataillon 50). He doesnt change their objective although, they were to tighten their grip around the encircled Soviets and finally eliminate this strong pocket so as to free forces for the southern attack against Lazur. The assault groups attacked again and broadened their hold on the Volga banks. Here the Germans supported the attack with assault guns from Sturmgeschtzabteilung 244. Although most of the vehicles were knocked out, they reached their objectives. One objective was house no. 81. It was taken after heavy room to room fighting. The Soviet 344th Rifle Division, which was basically a battalion sized combat group, were forced to retreat. Pionier Bataillon 162 managed to split the bridgehead behind Red Barrikady and reached the Volga. Thereby elements of 308th, 344th and 45th Rifle Division were isolated. Pionier Bataillon 336 attacked on the left side of the Pionier Bataillon 162, but was stopped at a road junction where the Soviets had set up cross-fire positions to control the whole area. A further advance seemed very unlikely at this point. The supporting attacks were more successful. Pionier Bataillon Sprenger in conjuncture with Pionier Bataillon 305 and the assault forces of 79. Infanteriedivision cleared the rest of Red October factory and set up a connecting, but brittle frontline.

The Germans were now not more than 100 meters away from the Volga! At 0850 hours elements of 138th Rifle Division, 650th Rifle Regiment, undertook a strong counterattack out of the fuel depot against the assaulting Pioneers of 305. Infanteriedivision, but it was repulsed. These successful attacks finally cut off any chance of the defenders receiving any supplies at all. Success was now dependent on holding the Volga bank strips, but the Soviets were far from surrendering. Where even small groups were still alive, they fought on, especially one group of Russians, 3 men under their commander Rolik, who drove the Germans crazy. They were not simply holding a position, but roamed their whole sector. They undertook small guerrilla style actions, firing upon unwary Germans, cutting telephone wires and even cut off hand grenades on wire, which the Germans intend to direct into the command post of Tschuikov himself. Their example was spreading to the other defenders and evolved into an indicator for the whole battle itself. The Soviets believed as long as Rolik fights they can fight. The Soviet commander, Polkovnik Ljudinkov, demanded heavy artillery support so his soldiers could re-establish a line of supply. The artillery answered his request, they laid a devastating, very precise barrage on the Germans. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets attacked. They managed

to destroy the Germans and only one badly wounded man returned to tell of the fate of his comrades. A second group of volunteers was also gunned down to three men. The German attempt to hold the sand bank was aborted, but only after the gained ground was totally mined. In the sector of Kampfgruppe Scheele the Soviets, 39th Rifle Division and 284th Rifle Division, made weak recon attacks, which were again repulsed by hand grenade and close combat. During the entire day in the southern sector of 79. Infanteriedivision disrupting heavy barrages by artillery and mortars were reported. The high point was reached around midnight. At 1030 hours all regimental and group commanders met at the command post of 79. Infanteriedivision to confer about a possible attack in the sector of group Seydel to reach the Volga bank. Since the Soviets were again attacking halls no. 7 and no. 10 at 1100 hours, and the necessary forces were still with 305. Infanteriedivision, the attack was cancelled. At 2030 hours an order from LI Armeekorps arrived, which demands an attack for the next day between the debris heap and fuel depot to gain the Volga banks. The staff of Pionier Bataillon 179 was ordered to blow up the underground passages behind hall no. 7 for the next night. At the end of the day Tschuikovs troops were divided into several distinct pockets and islands.

138th Rifle Division was totally isolated from its neighbouring units. They still defend parts of Barrikady and one 350m by 200m bridgehead in the north. Polkovnik Ljudnikov conferred with Tschuikov and desperately demanded reinforcements. The later promised to do so, but it was only lip service, since the ice flow on the Volga still prohibited all major traffic. The situation was so desperate, that the phones were not encrypted, but both participants didnt state their names. At the end of the day 305. Infanteriedivision could only report the capture of two house blocks. All major goals, the elimination of the cauldron and connection with the southern battle groups, were not achieved. 14 November: Red Barrikady is finally captured Tschuikovs command post under threat Overall situation for the Soviets very precarious The night remains quiet. The commander of 79. Infanterie-division met with the commander of Grenadier Regiment 517 (295. Infanteriedivision), and discussed a possible attack to reach the Volga bank on 17 November. The regiment was so weak, that they could only muster one assault company with some heavy weapons, so the plan was aborted. II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 576 with pioneer

support under Hauptmann Kemper finally took the remaining parts of the Red Barrikady. The most vicious fighting occurred in the underground tunnels of the factory. For about three days only the heavy use of flamethrowers, explosives and hand grenades finally secured the German victory. The Germans themselves lost about 60% of their assaulting forces in this sector. The 650th and southern part of the 768th Rifle Regiments (138th Rifle Division) were driven towards the Volga bank. The message came as good news in the headquarters of LI Armeekorps. Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was very pleased and believed from this point (until the catastrophic 19 November) that his pioneers would take Stalingrad. Assault groups of 305. Infanteriedivision took two houses in the morning, but they were lost during the day. Pionier Bataillon 294 defended their positions around the fuel depot against strong flank attacks from the 241st and 650th Rifle Regiments, their planned attack in this direction therefore had to be aborted. In the sector of Pionier Bataillon 50 the attack was slow, but progressing. They were pressing forward in an eastern direction to further minimise the cauldron. They partially reached the Volga and the battle was on a knife edge. They, together with Pionier Bataillon 162, were right above Tschuikovs command post! On their left flank soldiers from the 45th Rifle Division were attacking the German pioneers with furious support

from the Soviet artillery. The Germans tried once more to smoke out the Soviet defenders, and once again the hand grenades roll right into the Volga without doing any damage. Tschuikov was aware of the situation and ordered all of his staff personnel to take up arms and repulse the aggressors. While reclining with his staff chief in his private rooms he proposed that staff chief and himself may have to clean their weapons. In the damp, wet and nearly dark room he awaited the Germans, but they never came. The efforts of the desperate soldiers, staff officers, clerks and the rest of units fighting in front of the command post pushed the pioneers back and secureed a small 200m x 100m defensive zone before Tschuikovs residence. At about the same time units of the 305. Infanteriedivision noted Soviet difficulties shipping supplies to the centre sector of 138th Rifle Division. The Soviets began to use air lifts to provide supply. Between the fuel depot and hall no. 10 troop movements and three tanks were observed at 1830 hours. The Soviet commander, Polkovnik Batjuk, was shifting some forces for an upcoming counterattack the following day. Grenadier Regiment 208 reported at 0400 hours that the moment of 40 men toward the Volga was observed from the Martin oven hall. An artillery barrages was ordered and the movement stopped. Shortly afterwards a up to this point unknown Soviet bunker was hit by a shell and

explodes. Kampfgruppe Scheele was attacked by 40-50 men, this attack was repulsed. 6th Army Chief of Staff, Schmidt phoned at 1145 hours the headquarters of 79. Infanteriedivision and ordered II Battalion/Panzerartillerie Regiment 4 and the observation battalion to withdraw. The divisions commander, von Schwerin, protested against it, he saw his chances for a successful attack against Lazur dwindle, but the order remained in place. The II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 226 was badly mauled during the last days of counterattacks and it was considered for replacement with the Croatian Grenadier Regiment 369. When the assault groups of 79. Infanteriedivision take up their positions around Red October, they faced the remnants of eight shattered Soviet divisions. Right behind Red Barrikady the steamer Spartakovets arrived and 400 soldiers and 40 tons of supplies were delivered to Ljudnikov. On its hazardous return trip it evacuated 350 wounded. East of the Red Barrikady two house blocks were captured by Pionier Bataillons 179 and Sprenger. An immediate Soviet counterattack by 150 men was bloodily repulsed. Tschuikov contacted his front headquarters and complained that for three days he hadnt received any

supplies and was running out. What he did not mention was that despite the emergency he had 12 tons of chocolate on hand. According to the calculations of his supply officer, if they handed out bar per day per man, they could hold out another two weeks. The day remained, compared to the previous days, quiet, if smaller attacks were not taken into account. Major Linden carefully read the incoming reports and took telephone calls from the different front commanders. The picture he was getting was not as happy as his superiors, especially von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, wanted it to be. Although his pioneers reached several points of the Volga bank, encircled the main defensive forces and partially split Tschuikovs 62nd Army into isolated islands and pockets, he lacked the forces to eliminate the defenders altogether. The pioneers had to be used to cover their own flanks and the lately formed infantry assault companies were suffering high casualties holding ground against the constant Soviet counterattacks. 15 November: Meagre reinforcements for the Germans Soviets fly air lifts to support their isolated troops desperate German attacks against 138th Rifle Division Only small pockets held by the Soviets

The houses that were lost the previous day were recaptured. The 79. ID received two march companies of returning wounded men from XII/79/4 and XII/79/5. Each company was 24 NCOs and 159 soldiers strong. They were at once incorporated into the assault groups, since this division planned to attack the remaining positions for the next day. At 0930 hours several weak attacks against the German held halls of 79. Infanteriedivision were repulsed. A strong Soviet group assembled in front of Kampfgruppe Scheele of about 80 men was destroyed by artillery. Another attack in the afternoon, 1530 hours, against hall 10 was repulsed by Kampfgruppe Scheele. One anti-tank gun, which was brought forward by the Soviets, received a direct hit from a light infantry gun (leIG18) and was destroyed. Other Soviet attack efforts against hall 2, held by Grenadier Regiment 226, were also repulsed. German Grenadier Regiment 212 was withdrawn to the reserve and Croatian Regiment 369 took up their positions. The Soviets continued to fly airlifts to supply the units of Ljudnikovs split division. The strips and bridgeheads held by them were so narrow and close to the Germans some supplies land in the sector of 305. Infanteriedivision. The Germans opened them and only find meagre rations of greasy bacon and dry bread and wrongly concluded that the defenders must certainly be at their end.

Major Linden decided to undertake one last desperate attack against the 138th Rifle Division in the south of the Red Barrikady. He shifted his remaining forces again, drawing them partially from other divisions, like Pionier Bataillon 305, and set them up in front of the 138th Rifle Division. The combined attacks of Pioner Bataillon 50, 294, 305 and 336 fell upon the 768th and 650th Rifle Regiments. The Soviets fought for every inch, every trench and rubble pile, like they had done the previous days and weeks in their besieged city. The attack gained minimum ground and proved too weak. Both sides were worn out. The final attack against the southern bridgehead of Krasnaya Barrikady was aborted, the German casualties were running too high. Major Linden considered aborting the operation in the northern sector altogether. However, the position of Tschuikovs 62nd Army was precarious: The 62nd army was surrounded at three parts. Their resistance lines were thinning, the still heavy ice flow on the Volga prevented supply shipments on a large scale, and the air lifts can only provide scant food and ammunition supply for the brave and fearless soldiers. 124th Rifle Brigade (Polkovnik S.F. Korochow) held a small bridgehead in the north, two bridgeheads around Barrikady were held by 138th Rifle Division. The size of the largest was only 250m by 100m deep. The

largest, but thinnest, was held by 14th Guards Rifle Division under General Rodimzev. The broadest part was around Mamayev Kurgan, where 2000m of depth was held, but otherwise only a few hundred metres could be occupied. Only the steep Volga bank was saving the Soviets. When the Germans broke through the Soviets retreated behind these banks, reformed and counterattacked. Even the German artillery was not able to hit these positions as their shells could not target accurately the thin beach strips. Into the bank itself, the Soviets drove deep tunnels where they could store supplies, let their men recuperate and assemble some reserves from stragglers and mauled units. They were able to form and reform shattered units for counterattacks and keep up a kind of cohesiveness for their hard hit Army. 16 November: Conferences and complaints on the German side local counter-attacks minor successes for the Germans The first snow falls in Stalingrad Since this last offensive was taking more and more time, an angry von Richthofen phoned Zeitzler at the Fhrers headquarter and demanded either the necessary combat actions should be ordered or the attack altogether aborted. He more or less says that the

commanding officer, General Oberst von Paulus, was the wrong man in this position. The underlying animosity against von Paulus was not unheard even by Zeitzler. The later spoke for von Paulus and put von Richthofen back in order with a sharp rebuke. Although on the difficulties of the offensive he agrees with von Richthofen. In the sector of 305. Infanteriedivision at 2300 hours the Soviets fired from at least eight newly established machine-gun positions from the island in the Volga. Lights were seen about a kilometre further up the river, and the Germans realised that the Soviets were bringing in new reserves and supplies by steamer. The next night they moved a 7.5cm anti-tank gun to the steep bank and destroyed the boats. No further shipping efforts were made and this marked the end of any supplies for Ljudnikovs 138th Rifle Division. During the night Soviet airlifts dropped supplies over hall no. 4 in the sector of 79. ID. The II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 208 was withdrawn and replaced by III Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 212. It was also intended that 79. ID should man the positions of 305. ID up to the fork balka. Hereby 305. ID should be able to free forces for another attack on 17 November. Otherwise the Germans and Soviets alike stayed relatively quiet in their sectors. Only Kampfgruppe 577 attacked together with Pionier Bataillon 336 and captured two houses in the so-called 70-es row. At 1245 hours the 95th Rifle Division started an attack against Kampfgruppe 517. The combined artillery of III

Bataillon/Artillerie Regiment 179 and the divisions own guns nearly halted that attack, but a local breach was achieved, which could not be cleared by the Germans. After a brief, but intense artillery barrage, the assault company of 24. Panzerdivision, supported by Pionier Bataillon 389, finally broke through to the Volga. Their objectives were the bridgeheads of 37th Guards Rifle Division east and northeast of Red Barrikady. However, the rest of 389. Infanteriedivision did not follow up, since they were held down by flanking fire from 118th Rifle Regiment. A third of the company died and their commander, Beyersdorff, was badly wounded. Their objective, to split both bridgeheads was not achieved. The remaining combat worthy parts of 24. Panzerdivision were still in the Lazur factory area. In the sector of group Seydel a flamethrower tank was destroyed by heavy infantry guns in what can be considered close combat. In this sector, the boundary between 305. ID and group Seydel was attacked by the 161st Rifle Regiment with about 350 to 400 men. They were repulsed and finally abort the attack, but only after heavy casualties were sustained by both sides. At night, between 2000 and 2100 hours, the Soviets dropped supplies to the defenders in front of hall no. 4 of Red October by air. 17 November:

Germans fool Soviet pilots changing orders new plans Freezing rain and blowing snow allowed only perhaps 50m of ground to be gained by the Germans in the sector of 79./305. Infanterie divisions. This resulted mainly from the very small scale of the actions against 95th Rifle Division. Even this division was finally at the end of its power. The Soviets started to retreat as no reinforcements were forth coming. When the news of such retreats reached Tschuikov, he became concerned about the morale of his troops, more so than he was the days and weeks before. He wondered if his soldiers morale will finally collapse. Meanwhile the German soldiers of 305. Infanteriedivision started fires to confuse the Soviet pilots who flying supplies for their encircled comrades. The Germans were aware that the nightly fires set up by their Russian counterparts were meant for the pilots to indicate their positions. They decided to trick the Soviet aircrews and cut the air lifts. It worked, instead of supplying their hard fighting ground soldiers, they drop the goods right into the hands of the Germans. At this point a wireless order reached LI Armeekorps headquarters, Hitler demanded that at least the gun factory and Lazur should be taken. This was the direct order for von Seydlitz-Kurzbach that his planned Operation Schwerin I must be executed. The moment seemed right, since the Soviets hadnt

started any attacks that day and their normally very active artillery was firing only sporadic disruptive fire. The German front line commanders noticed no substantial troop movement or any aggressive activity from their opponents. After some necessary regrouping, both battle groups, Scheele and Seydel were put into readiness. The troops were ready, the planes loaded, but at 1900 hours LI Armeekorps was informed, by the commanding officer von Schwerin, that due to fog and strong snow falls, the attack could not be started. Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach postponed it for the next day. Otherwise the day stayed quiet for both sides. 18 November: Changing tactics last efforts regroupings and final plans After a short barrage, the Germans lacked artillery ammunition after days of fighting, groups Scheele and Seydel attacked. The encircle forces of 95th Rifle Division in the leather factory and eliminate all but 2 men. Otherwise the attack started to slow, the weak, but determined, Soviet defenders were able to pin the attackers by carefully placed machine-gun posts and mobile defence. Houses could no longer be defended as stubbornly as the days before, so the responsible commanders abandon them instead, retreated to safe positions and counterattacked the Germans exposed flanks.

Thereby they drew German forces from their newly gained objectives to fight the threat to their flank. The Soviets retreated again and attacked the weakened Germans to regain their old positions. These see-saw battles occurred mainly between forces of 20 to 30 men on each side. The German attacks were basically meant to gain better positions for their upcoming general attack against chemical factory Lazur and the tennis racket. In the sector of 295. Infanteriedivision, I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 517, raised a reinforced assault company and sent it to 305. Infanteriedivision. There it reinforced Kampfgruppe 578. Before 0400 hours the Germans were able to take house no. 83. This attack was not as bloody for the Germans and they concluded rightfully that their opponents seemed to be almost spent. Otherwise the whole sector of 305. Infanteriedivision stayed quiet. Ljudnikovs defenders saw that the Germans were moving reinforcements forwards, drawn from rear area service units, to their front lines. When Ljudnikov received this information, he was absolutely and rightfully, sure that the Germans would renew their attacks the next day. His soldiers held a few hundred square metres and his division was down to a couple of hundred men. In front of their lines the bodies of 118th Rifle Regiment lay. They had thrown themselves against the assaulting pioneers to repulse them, but were gunned down. Their sacrifice saved the remaining defenders, only 6 out of 250 men survived.

About an estimated 600 soldiers held the last hope for Stalingrad. Polkovnik Ljudnikow knew that the next day might be his last, but he was not willing to give up. After ordering all possible preparations for the next day, he retired to the quiet of his command post and contemplated the coming day. 19 November: That night Stalingrad stayed quiet. Only sporadic artillery fire was exchanged. Both sides were weary and recuperate, like beasts in their lairs, knowing that one of them will be jumping out in the morning to rip the other to pieces. The temperature dropped to 25 degrees Celsius, a freezing and bone chilling wind was blowing through the rubble of the city. Snow was only lightly falling, but the wind ran through the ruins like banshees howling. The ice flows on the Volga crashed against each other and again struck up their cracking, unholy sound of doom. The soldiers of both sides sat in their trenches, holes, or behind crumbling walls and waited, some with fear and some with anticipation, for the morning light. Slowly the sun rose, the dimmed light seeped through the fog to create an unearthly twilight. Together with the sound of the wind, the rubble of Stalingrad created a scene like the forecourt of hell itself. The soldiers on both sides were filled with determination and the inextinguishable fire of will. Their nerves were stretched to the limit in anticipation of the upcoming fight for survival. Every soldier on each side knew that

this day would decide their fate. It was 06.00 hours in the morning and the Soviet men and women of Ljudnikovs 138th Rifle Division gripped their weapons tightly, holding down their heads in anticipation of the expected artillery and air barrage. Many of them prayed that they would not die without taking the lives of one of the enemy. Polkovnik Ivan Iljitsch Ljudnikov sat next to his staff comrades, his nerves calm and prepared. He peered through his binoculars observing the German positions, checking his maps again and again. He, like the other soldiers at the last positions in front of the Volga, waited. No word in the command post was spoken. They all waited for the inevitable to come. Both sides waited for the gods of war to open the gates of hell. The minutes crawled by on the wristwatches of the German assault group leaders, without the usual roar of incoming artillery shells. The attack never came. By 19 November the Soviets had launched Operation Uranus, which immediately brought Operation Hubertus to an end. The 6th Armys focus switched to the situations developing on their flanks out side the city. Note: For this special day only "sporadic attacks" are mentioned by several sources, but no specifics can be ascertained. No reference is found within the relevant German unit histories that they attacked the last

positions of 138th Rifle Division, especially a grand allout offensive is not mentioned. Besides some detailed information about the weather no other important references about the activities in Stalingrad, other than some unit regrouping within 79th ID, can be 100% ascertained. So this last day has to be more or less fictional, but it might have been like that.
Conclusions - Part five By Wolf Hpper Evaluation and Conclusions Oper t Hubertu w d med t f fr m the beg g. The f w gp t exp .

1) The constant bombardment and artillery shelling created a battlefield in which the Soviet defenders largely held the advantage over the assaulting Germans. The fields of rubble and craters were perfectly designed for defensive actions and could be improved with relatively little effort. This also provided ample hunting ground for the everpresent Soviet snipers. Like many surviving records and accounts of survivors indicate, they proved at points more devastating than the actual combat actions. Although it sounds the tr c the r e f the per theref re c t be u dere t m ted. 2) The Volga riverbanks proved over and over again impenetrable to the German attackers. The Russians dug tunnels into the banks like moles. This enabled them to move supplies, reserves and command staffs out of the reach of German artillery and air bombardment. The command structure of Tschuikovs 62nd Army stayed, considering the desperate situation, relatively intact. Most of the time he had a good overall view of the different situations. Even when telephone lines were cut, the banks enabled runners to move with relative safety from point to point. 3) The Germans lacked infantry support. Although before the final plans were drawn up the senior commanders, up to von Paulus himself, complained about inadequate infantry support for the assault pioneers. Often they advanced, fought down the main resistance only to lose their new positions because the Soviets counterattacked their overstretched and thinly held flanks. 4) The numbers of arriving German replacements was also very low. Mainly drawn from supply and rear area units, these nonetheless brave men lacked adequate infantry experience, and many f them h d t f red we p ce the r b c tr g. The u que pr b em f urb combat were absolutely alien to them.

Therefore they suffered high casualties. Their Soviet counterparts were often no better trained, but gained great experience during the previous fighting. 5) During the course of the operation von Seydlitz-Kurtzbach ordered large units of the attacking forces to be moved to other sectors, especially the panzers and artillery. Although panzers are not perfectly suited for urban warfare, they often brought relief to the hard fighting foot soldiers. The panzers from 24. Panzerdivision often stopped Russian attacks against their neighbouring units. His intention however cannot be misinterpreted or misjudged, since he read the reports about the developments on the 6th Army flanks and prepared for the likely Soviet counter-offensive. This only reinforces the lack of German reserves. 6) The operation was not executed according to the wider plan. The battle groups Seydel and von Scheele were m y he d b ck d d d t tt ck t re e e pre ure the ut g pioneers. Thereby the original intention, to stop the Soviets from retaking the lost ground, was not executed and enabled the Soviets to counterattack effectively and stop the attackers. 7) The assigned assault forces were too small and weak for the difficult task. Although at points substantial gains occurred and important bridgeheads were captured, the Germans simply lacked the necessary forces to finally annihilate their opponents and capture the city. One final personal opinion: The Germans were simply running out of time. The duration of the German effort to take the city was too long and badly coordinated between the different higher commanders. When the Germans started to thrust into the city suburbs they changed their attack axis several times and objectives changed accordingly. The repeated shifting of several divisions, for example 24. Panzerdivision, prohibited the Germans in the early stages from taking the city relatively easily. The Germ d d t c rd te the eff rt f the g e d c rrect y d d du y they had to take their assigned parts of city. This bleed the divisions white and led later to great problems holding their lines and prevented them from assisting the assault pioneers accordingly. Von Paulus seemed simply not the right commander for this task. Although he reported the h gh ru g c u ty rep rt t h uper r he d d t m ke y ub t t pr p f r solving the Stali gr d pr b em. He mp y m eu red u t r u d c u d t dec de final attack plan and therefore threw his soldiers uselessly into a bloody mill that rivals the senseless massacres of WWI by von Falkenhayn. When the daily objectives and the relevant division orders were examined it is astounding that large units like regiments were assigned to gain microscopic aims, such as single houses, factory halls and, considering the overall picture, similar unimportant objectives. On this point von Richthofen was probably right when he tt cked P u u erb y. V P u u ter he t t d u w g e t bre k ut f the encirclement seem another indication for this.

The final and most important reason for the operations failure is probably far simpler. If the Ru h d t h d t rted the r f m u re ef per t the Germ w u d pr b b y h e wept T chu k tr p t the V g 19 N ember. The t tt ck never happened, so all thoughts from this point on are purely hypothetical. Addendum After all German attacks had halted in Stalingrad Major Linden resigned from his command in this sector and was assigned to the construction pioneers. His responsibility until the German surrender was to keep roads free from the snow, to keep the runways of the airports clear for supply flights and maintain the efficiency of the overall infrastructure of 6th Army during the encirclement. He was captured at his command p t the Jger-P rk 30 J u ry 1943. fter he retur ed fr m c pt ty he ret red t pe er h me h h met w He never overcame the grief of the senseless sacrifice from his men. fE e .

The remaining assault pioneers were combined into a battle group under Hauptmann Krger, assigned to 305. Infanteriedivision and were amongst the last to surrender in the northern cauldron. Only 35 walked out on 2 February into an unknown future. One amongst the few returning home after long years of captivity was Eugen Rettenmair, the commander of battlegroup of Grenadier Regiment 578. State of historical research at the point of writing As I stated in my foreword, I am not a professional historian, so the following is based upon my own opinion, experienced through my own research. At the time I wrote this article, it was very difficult at best to gather any information about Oper t Hubertu t . I m t b k I me t ed the e e t re de cr bed ketch y at best. Only Manfred Kehrig in his unfortunately out-of-pr t b k St gr d y eu d D kume t t e er Sch cht ded c te wh e ch pter t the ubject. He qu te y original transcripts and orders. Another great asset in this book are the highly detailed and accurate maps and orders of battle. For every military student this book must be considered the definite source about the whole Stalingrad campaign. The historical interest in military nature of the battle of Stalingrad seems to mostly centred on either the early part, the combat actions in front of the city, or the events at and after the encirclement. The fighting in the city itself, and the specific actions, are most of the times neglected or, from a military historians point of view, only vaguely examined and pictured. For the subject of this article most general books can be ignored. Even the publications from veteran organisations, mostly former members of the Stalingrad divisions, are unfortunately most of the time not too accurate. They cannot be blamed, since their intentions to write about their history are probably different. Nonetheless such literature is always recommended for some in-depth analyses.

As a basic staring point for researching the Stalingrad battle two classics are recommended: W m Cr g E emy t the G te d t y Bee r St gr d. They g e m t y general overviews of specific events, but nonetheless provide ample information, some parts in-depth. w y g d urce the ed ted er f the Germ rmy w r d ry. Here the decisions and measures that were taken by Hitler are detailed and it can definitely serve as a first hand account for the greater picture. It partially provides detailed information about the different service branches. This eight-volume monster reference covers basically the period from 1940 to the end of the war. Very helpful for every student of military history concerning the German side is following Internet-Site: www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de. It is mainly based upon the multi-volume edition of Georg Te Verb de u d Truppe der deut che Wehrm cht u d W ffe SS m Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1935 Unfortunately I was not able to visit the German Bundesarchiv where there is certainly more original material, like orders, diaries, maps, sketches from commanding officers and the like. Another source for WWII subjects are the Russian archives. Certainly the Russian archives, especially the one at Volgograd itself, still contain vital, and up to this point mostly unexplored, information. The Russian point of historical examination cannot be ascertained, since not many Russian h t r c w rk h e bee tr ted f r. M y urce ke B tt e f r St gr d (The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study) edited by Louis Rotundo, seem too exaggerate and give mostly wrong information concerning the involved combat strengths and casualties. Modern historical research might differ nowadays, but were not available to me. A single book, which features and analyses the operation as the only subject, could not be found. Disclaimer & References The uth r t gr du te h t r . Th rt c e d e t y c m t be the f ex m t nor the final historical analysis of the Operation Hubertus. The author wrote this article as correctly as possible without bending historical accuracy or changing events, times or other relevant parts. It was intended as a try to provide the eager military student and every-day reader alike with a detailed telling of the events in the subject period and analise it from a mostly military point of view. All facts, as far as they can be ascertained by more than one independant source, were taken from books written in German and German written web-pages. So any mistakes which might occur through misinterpretation, wrong translation, wrong counter-checking the different urce r ther c rcum t ce re the uth r e. Wolf Hpper, Neu-Ulm, Gemany

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(veteran association), Germany 1985 Piekalkiewicz, Janusz "Stalingrad, Anatomie einer Schlacht" Lizenzausgabe fr Bertelsmann Club GmbH, Gtersloh Germany Buch Nr. 0400 5 Original edition by Sdwest Verlag, Mnchen, Germany no year Riebenstahl, Horst "Die deutschen Pioniere im Einsatz 1939-1945" Edition Drfler, licensed edition Nebel Verlag, Eggolsheim, Germany no year ISBN 389555040X S ger H D e 79. I f ter e D Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Markt 9, 6360 Friedberg 3 Gemany, no year ISBN 3-7909-0083-4 Schlager, Ferd d "P ere St gr d M t g k e e St trupp " in Sonderheft der II. Weltkrieg Jahr-Verlag KG, Burchardstr. 14, 2000 Hamburg 1 Germany Publisher: Dr. Christian Zentner, no year Schramm, Percy E. (Publisher) "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1942" (partial volume 1942, part 2) Special edition by Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn Gemany no year ISBN 3-7637-5933-6 Schulz, Hubertus "Die Aufklrer (Rf. 1, K4, PzAA 24) der 1 Kavallerie-Division/24. Panzer-Division" Ernst J. Dohany Verlag, Gro Umstadt Germany 1993 ISBN 3-924434-07-7 Selle, Herbert "Die Tragdie von Stalingrad", Hannover 1948 Dr. F. M. von Senger und Etterlin jr. "Die 24. Panzer-Division 1939 1945" Edition Drfler, licensed edition Nebel Verlag, Eggolsheim, Germany no year Stoves, Rolf "Die gepanzerten und motorisierten deutschen Grossverbnde 1935 1945" Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Kohlhuser Str. 8, 61200 Wlfersheim-Berstedt Germany Second printing 1994 ISBN 3-7909-0279-9 Tessin, Georg "Verbnde und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmach und

Waffen SS im zweiten Weltkrieg 1939 1945" Band 5 Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 1972 Band 6 Biblio Verlag, Osnabrck, Gemany 1972 ISBN 3-76-48-0872-1 Band 9 Biblio Verlag, Osnabrck, Germany 1974 ISBN 3-7648-0872-1 Band 10 Biblio Vrelag, Osnabrck, Gemany 1975 ISBN 3-7648-1002-5 Internet: http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/inhaltsverzeichnis1.htm http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstnmain.htm http://users.pandora.be/stalingrad/ http://www.pogledi.co.yu/galerija/staljingrad/index.php http://www.stalingrad-info.com/ http://niehorster.orbat.com/