G.R. No. L-33048 April 16, 1982 EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA vs. VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, respondent.

FACTS: Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated August 18, 1970, of the Court of Appeals, rendered in CA-G.R. No. 41318-R, entitled "Victoriano T. Cuenco, Plaintiff-appellant, vs. Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia and Pacita W. Vallar, Defendants- appellees, " declaring Victoriano T. Cuenco (now the respondent) as the absolute owner of the coconut land in question. The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province), with an area of 29,150 square meters, more or less. The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipino citizens. On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00 .Ong King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof. On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a naturalized Filipino, for the sum of P5,000.00. Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom. On March 6, 1962, Epifania "usurped" the controverted property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania (through her only daughter and child, Emeteria Barsobia), sold a one-half (1/2) portion of the land in question to Pacita W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein .On September 19, 1962, respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of Sagay, Camiguin. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since, as the laws then stood, the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling that of ownership. On December 27, 1966, respondent instituted before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of the litigated land, against Epifania and Pacita Vallar (hereinafter referred to simply as petitioners). Issue: Whether or not Victoriano T. Cuenco ), a naturalized Filipino is the rightful owner of the land after buying it from Ong King Po, a Chinese. HELD: There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was 6 inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold 7 lands of the public domain. But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. and PACITA W. VALLAR , petitioners,

While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]). Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property. G.R. No. 151369 March 23, 2011

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN, Petitioners, vs. JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG, Respondent.

JOSE JUAN TONG is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to 3 the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail. In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein petitioner Pe and respondent is pending before the Court of Appeals (CA) where the ownership of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the resolution of the said action instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners also claimed that there was, in fact, no proper barangay conciliation 4 as Tong was bent on filing the ejectment case before conciliation proceedings could be validly made. MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent

G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005 MARIA CARLOS, represented by TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land with an area of 3,975 square meters located at Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Plan Psu-244418.

Petitioner alleged, among others, that Maria Carlos, is the owner of said parcel of land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership until she passed away on January 6, 2001; that there is no mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or naval reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and that there are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for 1 more than 50 years. However, during the hearing, it was became known to the court that the title of the land in litigation was promised to be delivered to Ususan Development Corporation which bought the property from Maria Carlos. Victoria admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria Carlos made a commitment to the corporation to 7 deliver the certificate of title so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The trial court granted the application but the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and noted that the applicant at the time she filed her application for registration of title was no longer in possession and occupation of the la nd in question since on October 16, 1996, the applicants mother and predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to Ususan Development Corporation. And as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land in question pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan Development Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant has no registrable title over the 11 land in question. Issue: Whether or not the Applicant is entitled to for the confirmation of the imperfect title? Held: The court held that all applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same 12 under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second. It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a certificate of title. The application was filed in court on December 19, 2001. Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the hearing that her mother had sold the property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of absolute sale executed by and between Maria Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation on October 16, 1996.This contradicts petiti oners claim that she was in possession of the property at the time that she applied for confirmation of title. Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his 16 belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.

We therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the issuance of a certificate of title to petitioner.

EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945. After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the respondents petition for registration of the land in question

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONSAND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS MERIDAV.PEOPLE G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which privatecomplainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about thefelled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating hisdefense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over thecase because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as providedunder Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner isbound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without anyDENR permit.I SSUE: 1)W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it wasbased on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. YES. 2)W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. YES. RATIO: 1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filedby specified individuals,

non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying suchcases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not tocases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit aninterested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD705, as amended.M o r e o v e r , h e r e , i t w a s n o t " f o r e s t o f f i c e r s o r e m p l o y e e s o f t h e B u r e a u o f F o r e s t Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, aprivate citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faultedfor not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support thecomplaint or report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's allegedviolation of Section 68 of PD 705. 2) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting , gathering, collecting,or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by the forest productsterm in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.

Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, et al. G.R. No. 137908 (November 22, 2000)

Facts:

The Caloses averred that their parents, Efipanio and Valentina were the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 23,7109 hectares located in Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukidnon covered by OCT No. P-2066 and issued by virtue of Homestead Patent No. V-42876. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land was placed under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries. The original farmer-beneficiaries, however, allegedly unlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them to third persons. The amended complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to these third persons. The PARAD rendered his decision ordering the revocation/cancellation of all EPs, CLTs, TCTs and other titles involving OCT No. P-2066 for being null and void ab initio. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and upheld the validity of the EPs and TCTs issued. This Decision was substantially affirmed by the Court of Appeals except on the part of petitioner Ramon Ocho and Vicente Polinar who were directed "to restore and surrender to the government their landholdings". Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the basis of the

resolution in a previous case docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. 006-90 which the respondents have purportedly allowed to lapse into finality. Issue:

Whether or not res judicata exists in the case at bar?

Held:

There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial authority (the hearing officer of the DAR) in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision became final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof after their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated. As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:

. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.

The findings of the Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long attained finality, averring that petitioner is not the owner of any other agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the same

parties and property. The CA thus erred in still making a finding that petitioner is not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns other agricultural lands.