Part II, Philosophy of Mind Tues 2pm, LB12

Dr. Will Davies (wd243)

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS

WEEK 1
1. Overview Week 1: Introduction to the Problems of Other Minds. Weeks 2 and 3: Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory. Week 4: Animal Minds. 2. Whats in a Mind? What are we interested in when we think about the minds of ourselves and others? Beliefs and desires; connection with ordinary psychological explanation and prediction of action. Emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, etc. Perceptions: seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. Qualitative states; the what its like aspect of feeling pain, experiencing a certain shade of orange, tasting cinnamon, etc. 3. The Fundamental Asymmetry How do I know about my own mental states? It seems that our self knowledge is in some sense privileged. All I need to do to know whether I believe that Arsenal will win, or whether I am feeling happy, is introspect. How do I know about the mental states of others? Our knowledge of other minds is not privileged in this way. We typically attribute mental states to others on the basis of their behaviour and things that they say. We cannot take the position of another subject in order to introspect their mental states. This asymmetry motivates various problems about other minds.

Part II, Philosophy of Mind Tues 2pm, LB12

Dr. Will Davies (wd243)

4. The Sceptical Problem of Other Minds

"By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds?" J. S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamiltons Philosophy , p190

Q. How can we be certain that there are other minds, given that our beliefs about other minds are based only on observable behaviour? Q. How can we rule out the possibility that everyone around us is simply behaving as if they had certain mental states, but that in fact all is dark within? The implication here is that I can at least be certain of the existence of my own mind. This thought has origins in Descartes cogito. The sceptical problem of other minds seems particularly vivid within his dualist conception of mind and body. The structure of this problem is similar to traditional external world scepticism: I. If I know that Bruce is in pain, then I also know that Bruce is not a zombie exhibiting pain behaviour. II. I do not know that Bruce is not a zombie exhibiting pain behaviour. III. Therefore, I dont know that Bruce is in pain. Readings: B. Russell, Analogy, in The Nature of Mind, D. Rosenthal (Ed.), 1991. A. J. Ayer, 'One's Knowledge of Other Minds', in Philosophical Essays, 1954. 5. The Conceptual Problem of Other Minds
The interesting problem of other minds is not the epistemological problem, how I can know that other people are not zombies. It is the conceptual problem, how I can understand the attribution of mental states to others... Each of us is the subject of various experiences, and to understand that there are other people in the world as well, one must be able to conceive of experiences of which one is not the subject: experiences that are not present to oneself. Nagel, The View From Nowhere, pp19-20

Q. How is it possible for us to think about other minds?

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Part II, Philosophy of Mind Tues 2pm, LB12

Dr. Will Davies (wd243)

Q. How can we understand statements about other minds? The Acquisition Argument I. We acquire our concept of pain by undergoing first person experiences of pain. II. Our concept of pain therefore applies only to our first person experiences of pain. III. Our concept of pain therefore cannot be applied to third person cases of pain. The Verification Argument I. Our method of verifying first person pain involves introspection. II. Our method of verifying third person pain involves the observation of behaviour. III. A difference in the method of verification of a concept implies a difference in the meaning or content of that concept. IV. Therefore our first and third person concepts of pain differ in meaning or content. Readings: N. Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds, in The Nature of Mind, D. Rosenthal (Ed.), 1991. A. Avramides, Other Minds, 2001. See particularly Chapter III. C. McGinn, What is the Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 58: 11937, 1984. 6. The Practical Problem of Other Minds Q. Leaving the sceptical and conceptual problems aside, how in practice do we acquire knowledge of other minds? Q. What kinds of abilities underlie our understanding of each others mental states? Theory-Theory claims that we understand other minds by deploying certain theoretical knowledge regarding mental states, and the relationships between mental states and behaviour. Simulation Theory claims that our understanding of other minds derives from an ability or skill to simulate or replicate the thinking or feeling of others.
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