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EMINENT DOMAIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE Section 19. Eminent Domain.

- A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Complaint for expropriation was filed. Suguitan filed MTD on several grounds, primarily saying that the power was not exercised in accordance with law, because SP passed a mere resolution, not an ordinance. Respondents argue that the Resolution would suffice, pursuant to Article 36 of IRR which speaks about a resolution authorizing the Mayor to file an expropriation suit in behalf of the LGU. Held: Suguitans contention is meritorious. The exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights. Hence the authority must be strictly construed. When the law authorizes the appropriation of land without the owners consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. There must be strict observance of substantial provisions of law to prevent abuse. The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative, but it can be delegated. When so delegated, the power becomes narrower, and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law, in this case the LGC. Under the LGC, for there to be a valid exercise of ED, the following requisites must be complied with: 1. Ordinance enacted by the local legislative council (LLC) authorizing the local chief executive (LCE) to exercise ED in behalf of the LGU 2. Exercised for public use, purpose or welfare 3. Payment of just compensation 4. Valid and definite offer previously made to the owner of the property, but said offer was not accepted. Sec. 19 of the LGC is clear. What is required is an ordinance, not a resolution. An ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is law, general and permanent in character, and third reading is necessary. A resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion, temporary in character, without need for third reading unless decided otherwise by a majority of the Sanggunian members. CITY OF CEBU v. COURT OF APPEALS July 5, 1996 Doctrine: Requirement of valid and definite offer previously made and rejected is initially satisfied by an allegation that negotiations were conducted prior to instituting the complaint. Proof of compliance is evidentiary, and cannot be passed upon in an MTD on the ground of failure to establish a cause of action. Facts: Cebu filed complaint for eminent domain pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418 authorizing mayor to expropriate a parcel of land for the purpose of providing for socialized housing project of the city. Respondent filed MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action due to failure to comply with a condition precedentvalid and definite offer previously made, and unaccepted. Par. 7 of the complaint alleges to the effect that repeated negotiations were made, but the negotiations failed. Respondent is saying that negotiation implies uncertainty, and is not the valid and definite offer contemplated by law. Cebu on the other hand insists that negotiation is a broad term encompassing all acts preparatory to concluding an agreement.

CASES: BRGY SAN ROQUE v. HEIRS OF PASTOR June 20, 2000 Doctrine: Expropriation suit is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a complaint for expropriation. This was dismissed by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and hence within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC also dismissed the complaint, holding that it is a real action affecting title to real property, hence the assessed value would determine the jurisdiction of the court. The value being less than P20,000, jurisdiction is with the MTC. Held: Jurisdiction is with the RTC. An expropriation suit deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use, a subject incapable of pecuniary estimation. The primary question in such cases is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for taking of private property. The value of property is merely incidental to the expropriation suit, as it is only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of expropriation that said amount is determined. Two stages of an expropriation proceeding: 1. Determination of propriety of exercise 2. Determination of just compensation. HEIRS OF SUGUITAN v. MANDALUYONG March 14, 2000 Refresher: Case of the Resolution, instead of an Ordinance, for expropriation Facts: Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong passed a Resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings against the property of Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Suguitan refused to sell.

Held: Complaint states a cause of action. Complaint should not be dismissed on a mere ambiguity when nevertheless a cause of action can in any manner be made out therefrom. The remedy in case of ambiguity or uncertainty is a bill of particulars, not MTD. 1. Inflexible application of the rule that in an MTD based on lack of cause of action, no evidence may be allowed: There are cases wherein the court upheld the right of the trial court to consider other pleadings and documents attached to resolve MTD. 2. Here the Ordinance attached to the complaint should have been considered, as its due execution was not denied under oath. 3. Moreover, MTD on LCOA hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO May 7, 2002 Refresher: Quarrel over the just compensation over the land. The issue here is whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of filing of the complaint. Facts: Eminent domain case against Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo for construction of public road. Respondents filed an MTD. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, in essence saying that just compensation will be determined by the court. Court appointed three commissioners who came up with a report, which was subsequently accepted by the TC. Cebu now objects to the amount. Held: Just compensation shall be determined as of the actual time of taking. Sec. 19, last proviso is clear on this. Although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of filing of the complaint (Rule 67, Sec.4), the rule admits of an exception, that is, where the Court fixed the value of the of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Rule 67, Sec. 4 cannot prevail over Sec.19 of the LGC, which is a substantive law. Moreover, City of Cebu is bound by the prior compromise agreement, where the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commission. It constitutes a contract between the parties. FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL v. COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 1998 Refresher: This is the pingpong case between Filstream and Manila regarding the parcels of land owned by the former and desired by the latter for its socialized housing program. Facts: Filstream (F) is registered owner of the parcels of land subject of this complaint. It filed an ejectment suit against the tenants, which it subsequently won. Eventually, this decision became final and executory in Filstreams favor. It appears however that during the pendency of this ejectment suit, City of Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Lim to acquire the parcel of land for sale and distribution pursuant to Land Use Development Program of Manila. Pursuant to the expropriation suit filed, RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of Manila. Filstream filed an MTD as well as motion to quash alleging in the main lack of cause of action and circumvention of the writ of execution in its favor in the ejectment suit. Fs

motion was denied and RTC issued an order condemning the property. F appealed to CA, but CA dismissed because of technical grounds. Meanwhile, F obtained a writ of execution in its favor. Respondents seek to quash this writ alleging the supervening event of order of condemnation in favor of Manila. Undeterred, F obtained an order for demolition. City of Manila obtained a TRO. The cases were consolidated and subsequently dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. Subsequently, an alias writ of execution and demolition was obtained. This was countered by respondents with a petition for prohibition before the CA, which granted the prayer. Hence this petition before the Supreme Court. Held: 1. As to the propriety of dismissal of Filstreams first appeal to CA, it should not have been dismissed. When substantial rights are affected, stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed. 2. As to the propriety of the restraining order, it is but a mere incident on the issue of conflicting rights of the parties. a. City of Manila indeed has the right to exercise eminent domain, pursuant to LGC and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. b. It can exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding a final and executory judgment over the property (PCA v. Panis) c. However, it must still comply with the requirements of substantive law, to wit: i. Sec. 19, LGC eminent domain may be exercised pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws ii. Pertinent law is RA 7279 (UDHA), Secs. 9 and 10 1. With respect to the order of priority in acquiring lands for socialized housing programs, private lands rank last. 2. With respect to mode of acquisition, expropriation ranks last. Expropriation is to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted 3. Compliance with these requirements is mandatory 4. In this case, there is no showing that Manila tried to acquire government land first, in the order of priority under Sec.9, before it chose to expropriate Filstreams private land. Neither is there showing that Manila resorted to community mortgage, land swapping, etc. and failed in such efforts before it decided to expropriate. CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO June 20, 2001 Refresher: This is another case of a socialized housing program of the City of Manila. The subject property here is in the name of Demetria De Guia, predecessorin-interest of respondents, from whom they inherited the property by intestate succession. RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila upon deposit of the 15% FMV of the property. Respondent filed certiorari before CA, alleging in the main that: 1) the land is exempt from the coverage of UDHA, as it does not exceed 300 m (if divided among the coowners, each would receive only about 49 square

meters); and 2) they are the actual occupants thereof and they own no other land. CA went into the propriety of the exercise of ED, and held that there was non-compliance with Sec. 9 and 10 of UDHA. It thus enjoined permanently CM from expropriating the property. City of Manila now assails this before the SC. Held: It was premature for CA to determine whether the requirements of UDHA has been complied with, since at this stage of the proceedings (issuance of writ of possession), no evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the trial court. A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. CITY OF MANDALUYONG v. AGUILAR January 29, 2001 Refresher: This involves another socialized housing program, this time by the City of Mandaluyong. The issue centers on the limitation of the size of land that can be expropriated for the purpose of socialized housing. Held: Under R.A. 7279 (UDHA), private lands intended for socialized housing can only be acquired through expropriation subject to two conditions: 1. It shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and 2. Parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. R.A. 7279 qualifies small property owners as those owners (1) whose real property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) not owning real property other than the same. The respondents in this case qualify as small land owners, their individual holdings being less than 300 square meters and there being no proof that they own real property elsewhere. Their lands being exempt from expropriation under the UDHA, it follows that Mandaluyong cannot expropriate their lands for the purpose stated. *NB: It is only for the purpose of socialized housing that the 300/800 square meter retention limit applies. For other purposes, e.g., construction of a road, LGU may expropriate your property, even if it is as small as 50 square meters. BARDILLON v. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA April 30, 2003 Facts: Baranggay Masili is seeking to expropriate 144 sm of land owned by the petitioner in order to construct a multi-purpose hall. An expropriation suit was filed before the MTC of Calamba, Laguna, but was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Later, a second expropriation suit was filed with the RTC of Calamba. Petitioner filed an MTD on the ground of res judicata. Judge denied MTD, saying that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the first expropriation proceedings Held: There is no res judicata because MTC had no jurisdiction over the first expropriation proceeding. An

expropriation proceeding is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, jurisdiction lies with RTC. As to the writ of possession, it was properly issued. Under Sec. 2 Rule 67, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are: a. Filing of complaint sufficient in form and substance b. Deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the property based on latest tax declaration CITY OF ILOILO v. LEGASPI November 25, 2004 Doctrine: Prior hearing is not required before a writ of possession can be issued. Refresher: This case reaffirmed the doctrine in City of Manila v. Serrano, which states that issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial after compliance by the LGU with the two requisites. Held: For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency of the complaint [and deposit of the provisional payment] can be determined by mere examination of the complaint. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession. It can choose to immediately take possession, or delay such action, without being held in estoppel. FRANCIA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN March 24, 2008 Refresher: A writ of possession was issued in favor of Meycauayan after depositing the 15% downpayment for expropriation of petitioners property. Petitioners impute GAD on the trial court, saying it issued the writ without conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. Held: Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. JESUS IS LORD v. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG August 9, 2005 Refresher: This is the case where JIL is arguing that its property, devoted to religious and educational purposes, can no longer be expropriated because it is already being used for a public purpose. Court summarized the basic principles behind the exercise of eminent domain by LGUs, and found for JIL on the principle that eminent domain is in derogation of private rights and must be strictly construed. Held: The power of eminent domain must be strictly construed since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property ownership. The requirements of the law must be strictly complied with. Compliance with such requirements cannot be presumed but must be proved by the local government exercising the power.

The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. Corollarily, the LGU has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. The following are the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by an LGU: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the LLC authorizing the LCE, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings; 2. Public use; 3. Payment of just compensation 4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, but said offer was not accepted. The offer must be valid and definite, and its making and subsequent rejection cannot be presumed and must be proved. As to public necessity, it is immaterial that the private property is already devoted to a public purpose, for as long as the expropriator proves its public purpose behind the expropriation. Actual devotion of private property to public use is not a defense. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. GOPUCO June 30, 2005 Refresher: This is the case which ruled on the issue of reversion. The general rule is that private property, once expropriated, does not revert to the owner once the public purpose behind the expropriation is abandoned. The exception is if there is a compromise agreement or contract to the effect that the land will revert to the private owner if public purpose is abandoned. This exception is laid down in the string of cases involving the Lahug Airport in Cebu. Facts: This case involved the expropriation of several private lands for the expansion of Lahug Airport. Subsequently, the plan for expansion was abandoned when Lahug Airport was closed after Mactan Cebu International Airport was opened. The respondent is essentially petitioning for the reversion of his land. The issue is: when the private land is expropriated for a particular public purpose, and that particular purpose is abandoned, does the land so expropriated return to its former owner? Held: It depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator. If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned then the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, upon the contrary, the decree of expropriation gives to the expropriator a fee simple title, then the land becomes absolute property of the expropriator, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (citing Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan)

In this case, the terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and granted title to the Republic in fee simple. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to the previous owner. In expropriation cases, there is no implied contract that the properties will be used only for the public purpose for which they were acquired. Thus, the land cannot revert to Gopuco. RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS LGC Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: (1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%); (2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and (3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act. (b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph. (c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans. (d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof. (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the

provisions of R.A. No. 6657. Administrative Order No. 363 (1997) PRESCRIBING GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF AREAS NON-NEGOTIABLE FOR CONVERSION AND MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 20 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 1. Declaration of Principles and Governing Policies A. General Principles 1. The State shall give priority to the provision for a rational and sustainable allocation, utilization, management and development of the country's land resources. 2. The State shall protect prime agricultural lands for food production activities, and give highest priority to the completion of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). xxx xxx xxx B. Governing Policies 1. The following areas shall not be subject to or non-negotiable for conversion: a. Protected areas designated under the National Integrated Protected Areas (NIPAS), including watershed and recharge areas of aquifers, as determined by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), pursuant to RA 7586 (1992); b. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the Department of Agriculture (DA) and/or the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and approved by the President, where water is available to support rice and other crop production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other crop production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the DA and the NIA, pursuant to Presidential Administrative Order 20 (1992); and c. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA and approved by the President. For this purpose, the Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (as of 1991), as determined by the DA and/or NIA shall serve as guide in determining non-negotiable areas. The Network may only be revised upon the approval of the President, upon favorable recommendation by the Cabinet Cluster on Agro-Industrial Development. In all cases, applications for conversion involving lands protected from and non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due course by the DAR. 2. The following areas shall be highly restricted from conversion: 4. a. Lands classified as 'Highly Restricted from Conversion' in the Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture as delineated by the DA, as follows: a.1 Irrigable lands not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments; a.2 Agro-industrial croplands, or lands presently planted to industrial crops that support the economic viability of existing agricultural infrastructure and agro-based enterprises; and a.3 Highlands, or areas located in elevations of 500 meters or above and have the potential for growing semitemperate and usually high value crops. b. Lands issued a Notice of Acquisition/Valuation under the agrarian reform program or subject of a perfected agreement between the landowner and the beneficiaries under Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) or Direct Payment Scheme (DPS) under CARP, as determined by the DAR; and c. Areas identified as environmentally critical as determined by the DENR, pursuant to PD 1586 (1978) and its implementing rules and regulations; Lands classified as highly restricted from conversion may be converted only upon compliance with existing laws, rules and regulations. An additional requirement of the social benefit cost analysis approved by the DA shall also be required before these lands may be approved for conversion. Applications for conversion covering areas under 2 (c) above shall be subject to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and/or Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) of the DENR. 3. Conversion of priority areas under Executive Order 124 (1993), as identified below, falling within the areas highly restricted from conversion may be allowed and the social benefit cost analysis for these areas may be waived; PROVIDED that the requirement of an EIC or ECC shall always be required; PROVIDED FURTHER that in no case shall conversion be allowed if these sites fall under those classified as non-negotiable areas: a. specific sites in regional agri-industrial centers/regional industrial centers (RAICs/RICs) identified by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture (DA), attached as Annex A; b. tourism development areas (TDAs) identified by the Department of Tourism (DOT), attached as Annex B; and c. sites identified by the local government units (LGUs) for socialized housing. In all cases, farmers or prospective

beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program affected by the conversion shall be paid sufficient disturbance compensation. In addition, the owners and or developers of the land shall be encouraged to provide capital which will enable the affected farmers and other legitimate stakeholders to shift to another livelihood, skills training, relocation sites, and priority in employment for them and their children. Investment arrangements which give affected farmers and other legitimate stakeholders a stake in the development of the land, such as, but not limited to, joint ventures and partnerships, shall also be encouraged. 5. No application for reclassification by LGUs shall be given due course by HLURB without the approved Comprehensive Land Use Plan approved by the HLURB for provinces, highly urbanized cities, independent component cities and the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, or the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for component cities and municipalities, after 1 January 1989. The following requirements or certifications from various agencies shall also be required: a. Certification from the local HLURB specifying the total area of zoned agricultural lands in the local government concerned based on the approved Comprehensive Land Use Plan or Zoning Ordinance prior to the application for conversion; b. Certification from the NIA that the area to be reclassified is not covered under Presidential A.O. 20, s. 1992; c. Certification from the DAR indicating that such lands are not distributed or covered by a Notice of Valuation under CARP; and d. Certification from DENR that the area applied for reclassification has been classified as alienable and disposable, and is not needed for forestry purposes in case the area applied for falls within public lands. 6. No application for conversion shall be given due course by DAR without the following certifications from various agencies: a. Certification of the Viability or Non Viability of Agricultural Land from the DA and that the land is not part of the area identified as nonnegotiable for conversion or a certification as to whether the land is classified as highly restricted from conversion or not; b. Certification that the land does not fall under the NIPAS area or is not classified as environmentally critical from the DENR. For applications for conversion involving environmentally critical areas, the DAR may issue an Order of Conversion, subject to the issuance of an ECC by the DENR. The DENR, in coordination with the DAR, shall institute an Environmental Guarantee Fund to ensure environment protection and to provide

government the financial capability to handle negative impacts of the conversion; c. Certification from the NIA stating that the area is not covered under Presidential A.O. 20, S. 1992; and d. Certification from the HLURB that the land has been reclassified and that said reclassification is within or outside the maximum allowable limits set by law. 7. In all cases, the decision of the DAR Secretary shall be appealable to the Office of the President. The President may allow the conversion of areas considered non-negotiable for conversion only upon the favorable recommendation of the Cabinet Cluster on Agro-Industrial Development; PROVIDED that where lands affected are irrigated, the owner/developer shall be required to replace the areas affected by an equal area of irrigated lands, whether within or outside the area/locality being applied for conversion; and PROVIDED FURTHER that such conversion shall not adversely affect the irrigation system. SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in and for purposes of this Memorandum Circular, the following terms shall mean: Agricultural Lands refer to lands devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land (Sec. 3 (c), RA 6657). xxx xxx xxx Land Use refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. Land Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use. Land Use Plan refers to a document embodying a set of policies accompanied by maps and similar illustrations which represent the communitydesired pattern of population distribution and a proposal for the future allocation of land to the various land-using activities. It identifies the allocation, character and extent of the area's land resources to be used for different purposes and includes the process and the criteria employed in the determination of the land use. xxx xxx xxx Reclassification of Agricultural Lands refers to the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for conversion. It also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memorandum Circular, s. 1995). xxx xxx xxx

Zoning refers to the delineation/division of a city/municipality into functional zones where only specific land uses are allowed. It directs and regulates the use of all lands in the community in accordance with an approved or adopted land use plan for the city/municipality. It prescribes setback provisions, minimum lot sizes, building heights and bulk. Zoning Ordinance refers to a local legislation approving the development control/zoning plan and providing for the regulations and other conditions, on the uses of land including the limitation on the infrastructures that may be places thereon within the territorial jurisdiction of a city or municipality. SECTION 3. Monitoring Compliance with Sec. 20 of RA 7160. The implementation of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7160 authorizing cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall observe the guidelines set by the Joint HLURB, DAR, DA and DILG Memorandum Circular, s. 1995, pursuant to M.C. 54, s. 1993 from the Office of the President. SECTION 4. Penalties and Sanctions. The following prohibited acts, defined and penalized in related laws and administrative issuances, specifically: RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), RA 7586 (National Integrated Protected Areas System Law), Executive Order 184 (Creation of Socialized Housing One-Stop Processing Centers), Executive Order 648. (Reorganizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board), DAR Administrative Order 12 (1994), DAR-DOJ Administrative Order 4 (1993) and 5 (1994), DA Administrative Order 2 (1992), and DENR Administrative Order 96-37 (1996) shall apply to this Administrative Order: 1. The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into non-agricultural use with the intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his landholdings and to dispossess the tenant farmers of the land tilled by them; 2. The sale, transfer, conveyance or change of the nature of lands outside of urban centers and city limits either in whole or in part after the effectivity of RA 6657; 3. Squatting, mineral exploration, or otherwise illegally occupying any land inside protected areas; 4. Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence, or enclosures and conducting any business enterprise without permit inside protected areas; 5. Failure of the developer/proponent to comply with his undertaking or socialized housing project; 6. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts in the application for land use conversion, and any other violations of the rules and regulations which are material to the grant of the conversion; 7. Failure to implement and complete the land

development of the area approved for conversion within the specified time; 8. Knowingly or willfully converting any agricultural land without the approval of the DAR; 9. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts for the issuance of the Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion (CEC) by the DA, or any attempt to misrepresent or conceal any material fact for the issuance of a CEC; 10. Any project or activity which has been classified as environmentally critical and/or located in an environmentally critical area established and/or operating without a valid Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR; 11. Projects violating ECC conditions, environmental management plans (EMP) or rules and regulations pertaining to the environmental impact statement (EIS) system; and 12. Misrepresentations in EIS/IEE (Initial Environment Examination) or any other documents submitted by the proponent pursuant to DENR A.O. 96-37. xxx xxx xxx R.A. 8435 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997 Sec. 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones. The Department, in consultation with the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Science and Technology, the concerned LGUs, the organized farmers and fisherfolk groups, the private sector and communities shall, without prejudice to the development of identified economic zones and free ports, establish and delineate, based on sound resource accounting, the SAFDZ within on (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, and lands with existing or having the potential for growing high-value crops so delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall not be converted for a period of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, that not more than five percent (5%) of the said lands located within the SAFDZ may be converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders relating to land use conversion: Provided, further, That thereafter: 1) a review of the SAFDZ, specifically on the productivity of the areas, improvement of the quality of life of farmers and fisherfolk, and efficiency and effectiveness of the support services shall be conducted by the Department and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization; 2) conversion may be allowed, if at all, on a case-to-

case basis subject to existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders governing land use conversion; and, 3) in case of conversion, the land owner will pay the Department the amount equivalent to the governments investment cost including inflation. Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. Any person or juridical entity who knowingly or deliberately causes any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7) hectares or larger, whether contiguous or not, within the protected areas for agricultural development, as specified under Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle and unproductive for a period exceeding one (1) year, unless due to force majeure, shall be subject to an idle land tax of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) per hectare per year. In addition, the violator shall be required to put back such lands to productive agricultural use. Should the continued agricultural inactivity, unless due to force majeure, exceed a period of two (2) years, the land shall be subject to escheat proceedings. Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the governments investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon. In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed: a) Cancellation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and b) Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications that they may file with the DAR. Department of Agrarian Reform Order No. 11 (March 30, 1999) Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses ARTICLE I. SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Order, the terms are defined as follows: (f) Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) refer to areas which are ecologically, socially, or geologically sensitive as declared by law such as: (1) Areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;

(2) Areas set aside as potential tourist spots; (3) Areas which are the habitats of endangered or threatened species of indigenous Philippine plants and animals; (4) Areas of unique historic, archeological or scientific interest; (5) Areas which are traditionally occupied by indigenous people or cultural communities; (6) Areas frequently hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons and volcanic activities); (7) Areas with critical slopes; (8) Areas classified as prime agricultural lands; (9) Recharged areas of aquifers; (10) Water bodies which are used for domestic supply, or support fisheries and wildlife; (11) Mangrove areas which have critical ecological functions or on which people depend for livelihood; (12) Coral reefs; (13) Mossy and virgin forests; (14) River banks; and (15) Swamp forests and marshlands. xxx xxx xxx (k) Land Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR. ARTICLE III Conversion Procedures SECTION 8. Criteria for Conversion. The following criteria shall guide the resolution of applications for conversion: (a) Conversion may be allowed if the land subject of application is not among those considered nonnegotiable for conversion as provided in Section 4 of these Rules; (b) Conversion may be allowed, in accordance with Section 65 of RA 6657, when the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes; or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have greater economic value for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes; (c) Conversion of lands within SAFDZs, as provided in Rule 9.5.2 of DA Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1998, shall take into account the following factors:

No such thing as III (f) and (k) there so I just took Article I, Sec. 2 (f) and (k) and the relevant provisions of Article III, land use conversion.

(1) The conversion of land use is consistent with the natural expansion of the municipality or locality, as contained in the approved physical framework and land use plan; (2) The area to be converted in use is not the only remaining food production area of the community; (3) The land use conversion shall not hamper the availability of irrigation to nearby farmlands; (4) The areas with low productivity will be accorded priority for use conversion; and (5) Sufficient disturbance compensation shall be given to the farmers whose livelihoods are negatively affected by the land use conversion as provided for by existing laws and regulations. (d) Conversion may be allowed when the environmental impact assessment or initial environmental examination, as may be appropriate, shall have determined that it shall not adversely affect air and water quality and the ecological stability of the area. SECTION 9. Who May Apply for Conversion. The following persons may apply for conversion: (a) Owners of private agricultural lands or other persons duly authorized by the landowner; (b) Beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program after the lapse of five (5) years from award, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), and who have fully paid their obligations and are qualified under these Rules, or persons duly authorized by them; or, (c) Government agencies, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and local government units, which own agricultural land as their patrimonial property. CASE CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM June 18, 2010 Doctrine: The rule as it now stands is that reclassification of agricultural lands is not sufficient to allow a landowner to change its use. The DAR must approve the conversion of agricultural lands (all agricultural lands and not only those covered by CARP) before it could be devoted to a non-agricultural purpose. Facts: This is a petition by CREBA to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memo No. 88, requiring prior approval of the SAR before an agricultural land is converted to non-agricultural use. The meat of the controversy centers on the definition

of agricultural land, with petitioners arguing that the SAR abused its discretion in including in the coverage of the Orders lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural use before June 15, 1988. In the main, the petitioner is arguing that it is a (a) violation of Sec. 65, RA 6657 because it covers agricultural lands already reclassified by LGU or by the President; (b) violation of Sec. 20, RA 7160, because it is not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. Held: Petitioners contentions has no merit. 1) DAR has the primary responsibility of implementing the CARP. Included in this authority is power to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation. Sec. 4(k) authorizes DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring, readjustment of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses. Sec. 5(l) also gives DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial, or other land uses As to lands not reclassified before June 15, 1988: SAR acted within the scope of his authority, as EO 129-A precisely gives him the power to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. The definition of agricultural lands is not in any way confined only to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution under CARP DOJ Opinion No. 44, s. 1990: after effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, DAR was given the authority to approve land conversion. Concomitant to that authority is to power to define what are agricultural lands Jurisprudence recognizes the difference between reclassification and conversion. Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural purposes such as residential, commercial, etc., as embodied in a land use plan. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR. Lands reclassified before CARP are exempt from conversion. However, any reclassification made after CARP is now subject to DARs conversion authority. Hence, as present law stands, a mere reclassification of agri land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the reclassified land for other purposes. After June 15, 1988, reclassification alone is insufficient. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. NB: The case is different for public agricultural lands (part of public domain) reserved for public use or purpose. In such cases, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. Public domain lands are outside the coverage of CARP

2) No violation of LGU autonomy. Sec. 20 itself shows that the power of LGU to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. LGC itself recognizes limitations imposed by CARP, saying nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying the provisions of RA 6657 CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS LGC Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided. (b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site. (c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned. (d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

governmental capacity hence beyond the commerce of man. Issue: Whether Provincial Board was authorized to close the road Held: 1) Provincial Board has authority to close the road and use or convey it for other purposes. Legal basis: RA 5185 in relation to Sec. 2246 of the Revised Admin Code. Sec. 2246 provides that the municipal council may close a municipal road Property thus withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property of the municipality which it can convey for any lawful purpose as any private real property Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene: Art. 422, CC: Property of the public dominion when no longer intended for public use or service shall form part of the patrimonial property of the state. 2) As to allegation of injury resulting from the change of easement: No basis since it is shown that petitioner had easy access anyway to the national road. The state is under no obligation to guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of the most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be cut off from the public thoroughfare, but he must content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may deem most compatible with public welfare. DACANAY v. ASISTIO May 6, 1992 Refresher: This case involves the flea market operated on Heroes del 96 street, Caloocan. The issue here is whether public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Council. Pursuant to MMC Ord. No. 79-02, flea markets were put up in Caloocan. OIC Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of these market stalls in Heroes, Gozon and Gonzales. This precipitated an action for prohibition, which was eventually decided in favor of Caloocan with finality. This second action is for mandamus to compel Asistio to execute the RTC judgment Held: The RTC judgment must be enforced. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. The city government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets. Such lease or license is null and void for being contra to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract.

CASES: CABRERA v. COURT OF APPEALS March 18, 1991 Refresher: Provincial Board of Catanduanes passed Resolution No. 158 closing the old road leading to the new Capitol Building in order to open another more convenient road. Pursuant to the Resolution, Governor entered into Deeds of Exchange with affected property owners. Petitioner, not in conformity with the change, filed a case for abatement of nuisance and annulment of Resolution No. 158, saying that the land so exchanged was owned by Catanduanes in its

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