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A Study of Communication and Power System Infrastructure Interdependence on PMU-based Wide Area Monitoring and Protection
Hua Lin, Santosh Sambamoorthy, Sandeep Shukla, James Thorp, Lamine Mili

Abstract-- With the advent of the concept of smart-grid, the power system infrastructure is being equipped with highbandwidth data communication and embedded computing infrastructure. The communication infrastructure has gained importance in the transmissions subsystems due to increasing use of the wide area measurement and monitoring using Phasor measurement units (PMUs). The amount of data collected by PMUs is large and they need to be transferred to regional and global data centers where real-time state estimation, and protection, stabilization decisions are made. As a result, having sufficient bandwidth in the communication infrastructure as well as proper delay characteristics will matter in the correct operation of these various wide area measurement system (WAMS) based control schemes. We have created a communication and power system co-simulation infrastructure called GECO which allows us to co-simulate power systems dynamics along with the communication network activities in a more realistic manner than past simulation environment. In this paper, we consider the effect of the appropriate network topology, bandwidth, delay etc. on two PMU based WAMS applications, namely All-PMU monitoring, and out-of-step protection. These experiments not only show the efficacy of the GECO framework in planning the smart grid communication infrastructure, it also provides case studies on how to go about using GECO in smart-grid design activities. Index TermsInterdependence, Co-Simulation, WAMS, Outof-Step

I. INTRODUCTION As information technologies are boosting traditional power grid infrastructure into a more intelligent cyber-physical system (CPS), system engineers have to gradually pay more attention to the impact of underlying communication networks [1]. They must keep the characteristics of the communication infrastructure and their influence on the relevant applications running on it in mind as early as the design stage. Field testing could be too late to observe any major defect in the system and apply modifications. These new challenges require that system engineers now must be able to master the expertise of both areas. However, research efforts related to infrastructure interdependence of the power system and communication
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant NSF EFRI-0835879. All the authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA (e-mail: {birchlin, ssan, shukla, lmili, jsthorp}

network havent been widely seen until the recent decade. The infrastructure interdependence of power system and communication network may not be very obvious to the public or even to the professionals [2]. In general, the communication devices need power feeder lines to deliver electrical energy to maintain their normal functionalities. In the case that a power outage happens, those devices can be temporarily switched to backup power supplies such as battery etc. On the other hand, some advanced WAMS applications highly rely on the communication network to collect system data and make control decisions for local actuators. In the case that a communication outage happens, alternative communication channels can be built up or the WAMS applications can be tuned back to the autonomous mode. If the power system and communication network are closely interconnected, in either outage case, the performance of the entire system is expected to be degraded. Although the interdependence of the two individual systems is very crucial, currently there are no appropriate theoretical models for it. This is partially owing to the uniqueness and complexity of each individual system. Among all the related works, there are basically three ways to study this system interdependence. The first one is to simply study the communication network as a general network controlled system (NCS). The electrical properties of the power system are ignored. The focus of the study is to examine if the communication network can support a certain amount of data flows [3-5]. The second one is to study the two individual systems separately and sequentially. Examples are [6, 7]. In this case, the communication network is studied first either by theoretical modeling or simulations. The communication characteristics are extracted from the study and then integrated into the power system as state variables or functional blocks. By tuning the variables or the blocks, the impact of the communication on the power system will be shown in calculations or simulations. The third method is to study the entire system as a whole. Typical examples of this type are EPCOHS [8] and [9]. This method requires powerful tools to model and simulate the power system and communication network together but they are not widely available. In this paper, we favor the third approach to study the interdependence of the two systems since it can provide the best modeling capability and the deepest insight into this problem among the three. Also, instead of giving unanimous solutions or conclusions, we study the interdependence case

978-1-4673-2729-9/12/$31.00 2012 IEEE

by case. Two WAMS applications, All-PMU state estimation and PMU-based out-of-step protection are selected as case studies. A global event-driven co-simulation platform (GECO) is designed as the testbed to study these cases [10]. To address the characteristics of the infrastructure interdependence, several communication scenarios are created to test the performance of the WAMS applications. The rest of the paper is organized as: in section II, some related works contributing to the study of the infrastructure interdependence are summarized. The details of the cosimulation platform GECO are introduced. Then in section III and IV, All-PMU state estimation and PMU-based out-of-step protection are implemented and co-simulated on GECO respectively. The co-simulation results will show how much the performance of a certain application could degrade under different communication scenarios. The full paper will be concluded in section V. II. BACKGROUND A. Related Works In [3], the authors studied many system disturbance reports from NERC and pointed out the importance of the IT infrastructure for a modern power system. Based on the analysis of the disturbance data, deficiencies of the legacy system were concluded such as: lack of real-time system data, limited network facilities and low data bandwidth, frequent communication failure etc. Accordingly, a new conceptual IT infrastructure was proposed to improve the system performance across all the levels of the power system. The proposal brought in a lot of new computer techniques to the power domain although some of them were already popular in other network infrastructures like the Internet. [11] elucidated the requirements of the communication network for power system. In general, the author analyzed what is needed to achieve the communication goal instead of providing detailed solutions to fulfill the specification. Later in [4], a more detailed and practical study was applied to the wide area measurement system (WAMS). Current implementations of WAMS involve deployment of PMUs over the entire transmission network. The communication problems become prominent in such a wide area system. The authors classified the WAMS applications into three categories: monitoring, protection and control, according to their respective purposes. For each application task, the requirements of network throughput and latency were investigated and compared on the basis of published IEEE standard C37.118 [12]. In [5], a hypothetical WAMS network infrastructure was built in OPNET simulation software. The network represents a possible IT solution for PMUs in the Nordic region. Several combinations of wide area network (WAN) and local area network were considered in the simulation settings. The simulation results showed the minimal requirements of the communication delay to support a WAMS. In a successive research [7], the authors applied the communication requirements to a SVC-based voltage regulation scheme. The scheme was tested using sensitivity analysis. By gradually

increasing the communication delay, the voltage regulation scheme would finally reach a critical point where the protection fails. Then, the communication delay at this point gives a ceiling of the design specifications. Any network design with worse delay characteristics makes the system unstable. In [6], the communication delay impact for an inter-area mode damping scheme was studied. Instead of running simulations, the communication delay in their system was calculated from four classical delay models. For each single part of the network, a delay segment was calculated and added to the overall delay. Then a control block which represents the contribution of this delay was attached to the power system stabilizer (PSS) as a remote input. The simulation results showed that the performance of PSS could be degraded due to the communication delay. Another productive research highlight is the use of EPOCHS [8] to study the correlations between the power system and communication network [13]. EPOCHS is a hybrid simulation platform which integrates individual off-the-shell simulators. It is capable of modeling electromechanical and electromagnetic dynamics of the power system and the information flows of the communication network together. A runtime interface is designed to synchronize the individual simulators and enables the study of the cyber-physical system as a whole. Many research aspects have been addressed on this platform. However, the simulator synchronization mechanism in EPOCHS is not accurate enough in some cases. Timing errors can be accumulated during the simulation. Compared to other peoples works, in this paper, the cosimulation platform GECO has better simulation fidelity to model the realistic condition, in particular, when the communication activity is significant or the interaction between power system and communication network is frequent [10]. A global even-driven co-simulation framework is adopted in GECO to overcome the drawbacks of EPOCHS. The co-simulation results can give system designers advices that if their wide area applications can work in a real world. For the prospective PMU-based WAMS applications, it will be a very important design process before the final implementation in the system. B. Co-Simulation Platform GECO GECO is a simulation platform built on the basis of a global event-driven co-simulation framework for integrated power system and communication network. The implementation structure is shown in Fig. 1. It incorporates two well-known individual simulators: PSLF for the power system and NS2 for the communication network. PSLF is a GE product which can simulate power system dynamics up to 30000 buses. The main body of the simulator is written in Java but users can configure the simulation through a script language called EPCL. NS2 is an open-source communication network simulator which is mainly used in academia. It is written in C++ and Object Tcl (OTcl). Users can create new models and communication protocols with great flexibility. In GECO, the global event-driven framework guarantees

seamless time synchronization between PSLF and NS2. The power system dynamic simulation is modeled as a sequence of independent events and mixed up with other discrete communication network events. A global scheduler is maintained to process the events sequentially according to their timestamps. The fundamental device models for each system are implemented in PSLF and NS2 respectively. A new peripheral EPCL model epcmod is added to PSLF simulation as an interface to exchange data with NS2. The interface counterpart in NS2 called Tcl_PSLF is a standalone module written in both C++ and OTcl. The WAMS applications are encapsulated in NS2 as derivatives of the father class Application. Communication transport protocols are modified to be able to carry power system data across the communication network.
PSLF Simulation
Basic Model Dynamic Model

(PDC) is placed to collect the phasor data from all the PMUs in that region. In PDC, the integrity of the phasor data is checked. Bad data will be disposed. After that, all the phasor data will be sorted according to their timestamps. As long as all the phasors with the same timestamp are received and sorted, they will be handed out to local power applications or even higher level system controller: super phasor data concentrator (SPDC) for further system-wide analysis. Any missing phasor with required timestamp will trigger a timer in the PDC. When the timer expires, all the phasors with that timestamp have to be sent out without further waiting for the missing ones. The functionality of SPDC is very similar to PDC. The only difference is SPDC has better data processing capability.

NS2 Interface epcmod

Tcl_PSLF PSLF Interface

Power Applications

Power Applications

Fig. 2. Communication architecture for WAMS

Global Event List

Global Scheduler

Power Protocols

NS2 Simulation

Fig. 1. The implementation structure of GECO

III. PMU-BASED WIDE AREA MONITORING Traditional state estimators are built on legacy SCADA systems which feature low communication bandwidth and low data scanning rate. During each scanning period, the power system state is iteratively estimated based on measurement data which are collected via SCADA. The estimator is static and usually slow in response to system contingencies. Recently, synchronized phasor measurement techniques offer an alternative way to estimate the system state [14]. Phasor measurement units (PMUs) which measure system phasors with GPS synchronized timestamps can potentially improve the speed and accuracy of the state estimator. Prospective All-PMU estimators are already on the horizon. However, these new techniques require faster and more reliable communication infrastructure of larger scale than SCADA. A. Communication Architecture For an all-PMU state estimator, there will be at least one PMU at each bus. The PMUs measure voltage and current phasors 30 times per second and mark them with current time tags. Usually, in a regional area, a phasor data concentrator

Fig. 2 shows how PMUs, PDCs and SPDC are connected in a WAMS for all-PMU state estimation. PMUs are usually placed in substations. The phasor measurements are periodically routed via substation local area network (LAN) to the gateway switch/router and then to the backbone wide area network (WAN). Currently, the dominating LAN standard is Ethernet where network nodes share a common communication link and compete for the access of it. Most of the backbone WANs nowadays are packet-switch networks running IP-compatible protocols. All the phasors from PMUs will be finally sent to regional PDCs via WAN. It is very likely that PDCs are also placed in some of the system substations. After data processing, PDCs will re-send the reordered phasors to SPDC via WAN as well. To understand how this type of communication will affect the system state monitoring and estimation, a co-simulation case study is implemented on GECO accordingly. B. Simulation Settings A hypothetical All-PMU monitoring system of the New England 39-bus system is implemented on the co-simulation platform GECO as shown in Fig. 3. PMUs are placed at every bus in the system to measure the system state: voltage magnitude and angle. The whole system is subdivided into four regions. There is one PDC for each region. The four PDCs are located at bus 2, bus 6, bus 21 and bus 28 respectively. The SPDC is placed at bus 16 since it is in the center of the system and has the most connection degree

am mong all the buses. There are many ch hoices to build d a ba ackbone WAN for this monit toring system. In this paper, the ba ackbone WAN is assumed to o have the sam me topology as the po ower system.

Fig g. 3. Monitoring system on 39-bus system s [15]

C. Normal Cond dition Scenario o Under normal l conditions, th he 39-bus syste em is modeled d in the e PSLF part of the GECO O and the ba ackbone WAN N is mo odeled in the NS2 part of th he GECO. Th he communicat tion lin nks in the system are assume ed to have the e same bandwi idth an nd delay. The phasor p timer in PDC and SPD DC is set as 50m ms. Da ata collected beyond b this time will be ignored. i The cosim mulation resul lts for the normal n conditi ion scenario are sum mmarized in TABLE T I wher re combination ns of different link l ba andwidths and delays are se elected. The output o of the cosim mulation is the e average phas sor delay and phasor drop rate. Th he average pha asor delay is an n index showin ng how much ti ime as single phasor could c spend fro om the measur rement time to the tim me reaching SPDC. S The ph hasor drop ra ate calculates the pe ercentage of ph hasors that are lost during the e communicati ion. Th here are many reasons can le ead to the drop pping of phaso ors, for r example, netw work congestio on or timer exp piration in PDC Cs. From TABLE E I, we can fin nd that the rela ationship between the e average pha asor delay and d communicati ion link delay y is ap pproximately linear. l On th he other hand d, increasing the ba andwidth doesn nt give better results. r The rea ason of this is not dif fficult to revea al. According to IEEE stand dard C37.118, the pa acket size of phasor p measu urements is qu uite small. If the co ommunication network n is ded dicated only to o this applicati ion, the ere wont be any a congestion n in the netwo ork considerin ng a ba andwidth high her than 1M Mbps. The total delay is ap pproximately th he sum of comm munication link k delays on rou ute. he contribution n of bandwidth h and queuing delay in this case c Th is trivial. Also in i this co-simu ulation, none of the phasors s is dro opped during communication c n.

D. Back kground Traffi fic Scenario From m the normal co ondition co-sim mulation, we c can find that the ban ndwidths of th the communic cation links ar re not well utilized since the throughput from o one application n is small. In the futu ure WAMS im mplementation, , it is very lik kely to have multiple e WAMS appl lications runni ing simultaneo ously on the commun nication netwo ork. Some hea avy load applications may also be e included lik ke video surv veillance. Ther refore, it is necessar ry to test the e monitoring s system under background traffic c condition. In th his co-simulati ion, each substation in the system is assumed to send extra com mmunication t traffic to the SPDC n node. The thro oughput of thi is traffic is set as 1Mbps. The co- simulation resu ults are summa arized in TABL LE II. From m the results, , we can ea asily conclud de that the perform mance of the system is degraded signifi icantly. The linear r relationship be etween the av verage phasor r delay and commun nication link d delay cant hold d any more. This is due to the extr ra background d traffic induc ces network co ongestion in some pa art of the system. The phasor r data have to b be queued in the rou uter buffer an nd wait for p processing. T The network congesti ion not only re esults in higher r communicatio on delay and also forc ces the timer i in the PDCs to o expire. There efore a lot of phasors will be droppe ed during comm munication. Am mong all the settings in the normal l condition co o-simulation, th he best drop rate is s still higher than n 24% which means the com mmunication network k cant sustain such kind of traffic. The o only solution to this p problem is to u update the comm munication net twork. From the last row of TABL LE II, we can s see that if the b bandwidth is increase ed to 10Gbps a and delay is red duced to 1ms, t the drop rate will be back to norm mal again. In p practice, optica al fibers can reach th his specification n.

Parameters BW = 100Mbps, D = 5ms BW = 1 100Mbps, D = 10ms BW = 1Gbps, D = 5 5ms BW = 1Gbps, D = 10ms BW = 10Gbps, D = 1ms

Aver rage Delay 10 04.95ms 1 140ms 83 3.46ms 130.03ms 11 1.02ms

D Drop Rate 49.55% 90.36% 24.14% 41.34% 0%

E. Link k Failure Scena ario Anoth her scenario t to be verified is when the n network has commun nication link failure. It is quite common that the network k is put out of w work due to ha ardware failure e or software bugs. It happens even more frequent t than power sy ystem faults. In this c co-simulation, the communic cation link con nnecting bus 4 and bu us 14 is assum med to be cut o off. Then the co o-simulation results a are shown in T TABLE III. Th he results show w that when the link k delay is low w (5ms), after the loss of t the link, the system c can still work fine only with h higher phasor r delays. But if the de elay is high (10 0ms), the system has to be re-designed.

Parameters B BW = 100Mbps s, D = 5ms BW W = 100Mbps, D = 10ms BW = 1Gbps, D = 5ms B BW = 1Gbps, D = 10ms

Average Delay y 55.48ms 110.52ms 55.05ms 110.05ms

Drop Rat te 0% 0% 0% 0%

Parameters BW = 100Mbps, D = 5ms BW = 1 100Mbps, D = 10ms BW = 1Gbps, D = 5 5ms BW = 1Gbps, D = 10ms

Aver rage Delay 60 0.53ms 12 20.44ms 60 0.05ms 12 20.04ms

D Drop Rate 0% 31.5% 0% 31.5%

F. System Monitoring at Contingency So far, the communication characteristics of the PMU-based wide area monitoring system have been studied by cosimulation. Another important issue for this system is the timeliness of the monitoring. Since there is a time delay associated with each phasor measurement, even if all the phasors are successfully delivered to SPDC via the communication network, the derived system state cant be the same as the actual system state by that time. To understand the difference of these two, especially when the system is under contingency, is very important. In this co-simulation, a fault is assumed to happen in the power system from bus 4 to bus 14 at 0.1 second. Since communication devices also need electrical power to maintain functionality, the communication link between bus 4 to bus 14 is assumed off as well. In this condition, the monitored system state (voltage magnitude and angle) is compared to the actual system state at that time. Buses close to the fault location are selected to show part of the system state. The co-simulation results are shown in TABLE IV. The table shows the monitored system state (the one at 0.2 second) at 0.26 second on the left and the actual system state at that time on the right. The difference of the magnitude is around 1% and the difference of angle is larger. Although the difference shown here is not significant, for some time-critical applications, this difference has to be considered at the design stage.

4 14 3 5 13 15 2 18 6 8 10 16

0.533754 0.39821 0.704158 0.756011 0.19528 0.334499 0.796981 0.505321 0.59653 0.683484 0.423932 0.39469

0.062188 0.18535 0.091734 0.080997 0.071091 0.205374 -0.023384 0.08167 0.060581 -0.049498 0.066175 0.214053

0.527733 0.388881 0.69638 0.747902 0.191683 0.326884 0.786927 0.499928 0.590446 0.672164 0.413925 0.385588

0.18586 0.363644 0.211367 0.199204 0.215899 0.385131 0.081129 0.209348 0.184127 0.061247 0.223414 0.398374

vibrations that could potentially damage these generators. During OOS conditions, huge transient swings are observed at the interface between these out-of-synchronous areas and the rest of the network. Thus, traditional OOS relays detect these swings and open the tie lines to prevent OOS operation [16]. With the availability of WAMS, these schemes can be made adaptive so that they are both dependable and secure, even in the event of drastic change in operating points due to severely stressed system conditions. An adaptive OOS scheme based on WAMS has been proposed in [4]. In this scheme, the rotor angles of all the major generators are monitored and collected at a central control center. After a major disturbance occurs, coherent groups of generators are identified using the trajectory of the rotor angles. When the centers of angles of these coherent groups differ by over 120 degree, OOS operations are performed to island the system. The above scheme is co-simulated on the New England 39 bus system to study the influence of the communication constraints on effective operation of such a scheme. Similar to the co-simulation in section III, the communication network for OOS protection is assumed to have the same topology as the power system. PMUs are placed at the generator buses to measure the rotor angles. A central OOS controller is placed at bus 16 to collectively monitor the rotor angle trajectories. A timer of 50ms is also designed in this controller for the same purpose as in PDCs or SPDC. In order to simulate an OOS condition, a sequence of events provided in [17] is used. A three phase fault is initialized on line 21-21. After clearing of the fault, machines on bus 35 and 36 lose synchronism. By the nature of their rotor angle trajectory, it is concluded that these two machines form a coherent group of machines. The rotor angles of all the machines are recorded and the centers of angles of all the coherent groups are calculated. When the difference between the centers of angles reaches 120 degree, existence of OOS conditions is confirmed and the lines 16-24 and 16-21 are opened, forming an island consisting of generators on bus 35 and 36. The circuit breaker operating times are not included in this co-simulation.
120 100

IV. PMU-BASED OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION Power system protection refers to the elaborate system of relays and other protection devices that limit damage to the power system equipment, in the event of occurrence of faults or loss of major elements. The protection schemes are designed based on extensive time domain simulations. These systems are expected to detect events and act quickly (sometimes within milliseconds), but at the same time, ensure that such actions are not detrimental to secure and reliable operation of the grid. The advent of WAMS and better intersubstation communication makes it possible to greatly improve existing protection schemes. One of the most complex protection schemes is the Out of Step (OOS) protection. OOS condition occurs when a generator or a group of generators lose synchronism with the rest of the system. Unless such groups of machines are isolated from the grid, it would result in large mechanical

Generator Angle (degree)

80 60 40 20 0 -20 0 2 4 6 8 10

Time (s) Fig. 4. Generator angels showing OOS condition (BW=1Gbps, D=5ms)


Generator Real Power Output (p.u.)

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 2 4 6 8 10


Generator Real Power Output (p.u.)

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0 2 4 6 8 10

Time (s) Fig. 5. Generator real power outputs (BW=1Gbps, D=5ms)

The response of the generators to the events described above can be observed in the real power outputs and rotor angles of the generators. Fig.4 and Fig.5 show these cosimulation results of the OOS protection when the communication bandwidth is 1Gbps and delay is 5ms. After placing the three phase fault at 1.0 second and the subsequent fault clearing by opening line 21-22 around 1.1 second, the generators experience transient oscillations. The rotor angle plots in Fig.4 show that the generators on bus 35 and 36 split from the rest of the generators, while remaining together. The phenomenon is sensed by the central controller and an islanding command is issued to the circuit breakers at line 1624 and 16-21. These two lines are finally open around 1.71 second. After the Out of Step separation, the rotor angle trajectories of these two generators separate faster from the rest of the system. This event can be observed in the power output of the generators as a spike at the same time as shown in Fig. 5. The real output of the power will come back to a stable condition at 4.95 second after a series of oscillations. After separation, the bigger island operates at a reduced frequency of 59.87Hz while the smaller island is overgenerated resulting in a frequency of 60.6 Hz. The frequency restoration problem is out of the scope of this paper.
120 100

Time (s) Fig. 7. Generator real power outputs (BW=100Mbps, D=10ms)

The OOS protection scheme is further stress tested on an inferior communication network where the bandwidth is 100Mbps and the delay is 10ms for each link. The cosimulation results in this condition are plotted in Fig.6 and Fig.7. The results show that the scheme can still restore the system but with a slower response. The OOS separation is at 1.77 second and the system comes back to stable around 5.02 second. This slower response results in larger spike compared to Fig.5 which could potentially damage system devices in practice. For the same network, if communication link failure is also considered in the co-simulation, the results will be totally different. The rotor angles and real power outputs of the generators, when a communication link failure follows the short circuit fault, are plotted in Fig.8 and Fig.9. It can be easily concluded that the OOS protection fails to form the island. This is because that the average phasor delay will be increased when the network loses an important path. Some of the angle measurements cant arrive at the central controller before its timer expires. Therefore, better communication network or longer timeout of timer is required to secure the protection scheme in this scenario.
120 100

Generator Angle (degree)

80 60 40 20 0 -20 0 2 4 6 8 10

Generator Angle (degree)

80 60 40 20 0 -20 0 2 4 6 8 10

Time (s) Fig. 6. Generator angels (BW=100Mbps, D=10ms)

Time (s) Fig. 8. Generator angels with link failure (BW=100Mbps, D=10ms)


Generator Real Power Output (p.u.)


[4] [5]






-1.0 0 2 4 6 8 10

Time (s) Fig. 9. Generator real power outputs with link failure (BW=100Mbps, D=10ms)


V. CONCLUSION Modern national power grids have been moving forward towards a ubiquitous trend where the communication infrastructure plays more crucial role in the power system monitoring, protection and control. Recent research has shown the importance to learn the nature of the communication network and its correlation with the power system applications running on it. Communication has to be considered as one of the key design factors of the WAMS applications before their realistic implementation in the system. From this point of view, co-simulation paves a way to model the integrated infrastructure and study the interdependence. In this paper, two WAMS applications are investigated in detail as case studies on the co-simulation platform GECO. First, a hypothetical PMU-based system monitoring system is applied to the New England 39-bus system. By tuning the communication bandwidth and delay, the characteristics of the communication in this system are captured. The results show that the monitoring functionalities degrade under bad network conditions. Even if the network is in good shape, there is still a difference between the monitored system state and the actual system state by that time. Power engineers have to keep this difference in mind while designing WAMS applications. Then, a new out-of-step protection scheme is implemented in the same system. Generators angles are periodically tracked by a central controller to identify if the out-of-step criteria are met. The co-simulation results prove the feasibility of this protection scheme. However, engineers have to be very careful dealing with this protection scheme since it is very sensitive to the quality of the communication network. VI. REFERENCE
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