G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555 November 6, 1989 SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs.

. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and MICHIYO YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and EDITA ENATSU, respondents. FACTS UDMC defaulted in paying its loan obligation of approximately P55 million to the DBP. UDMC's assets (principally its hospital) and those of the Crisostomos which had been given as collateral to the DBP, faced foreclosure by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), which had taken over UDMC's loan obligation to the DBP. To stave off the threatened foreclosure, UDMC, through its principal officers, Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji Yamada and Tomotada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh capital in UDMC. The wife of Tomotada Enatsu, Edita Enatsu, is a Filipina. They invested approximately P57 million in UDMC. The investment was effected by means of: (1) a Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2) an Amended Memorandum of Agreement whereby the group subscribed to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC. The board of directors and stockholders of UDMC duly authorized both transactions. They were submitted to, scrutinized by, and, finally, approved by the Board of Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The elaborate governmental approval process was done openly and with full knowledge of all concerned, including Sixto Crisostomo, the corporate legal counsel. Upon the completion of the governmental approval process, shares of stock, duly signed by UDMC's authorized officers, were issued to the Yamadas and Enatsus. This capital infusion not only saved the assets of the UDMC (especially the hospital) from foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos from their individual and solidary liabilities as sureties for the DBP loan. As it had been agreed in the Amended Memorandum of Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese group that upon the latter's acquisition of the controlling interest in UDMC, the corporation would be reorganized and a special stockholders' meeting and board of directors' meeting were scheduled to be held. However, on the eve of the meetings, Sixto Crisostomo, acting for himself, filed SEC Case against Juanito Crisostomo, Ricardo Alfonso, Shoji Yamada, Michiyo Yamada, Tomotada Enatsu and Edita Enatsu, praying, among other things, (1) to stop the holding of the stockholder's and board of directors' meetings; (2) to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a controlling interest in UDMC and from being elected directors or officers of UDMC; and (3) to annul the Memorandum of Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement because they allegedly did not express the true agreement of the parties. Two weeks later, Crisostomo filed Civil Case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, where he also sought a preliminary injunction and the identical reliefs prayed for by him in SEC Case. It was dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction and is pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision by issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents. Respondents appealed the decision to the SEC en Banc who lifted the preliminary injunction that was also affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE In allowing the Japanese group to have control of UDMC for it will result in culpable violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals or corporations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain, meaning corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens (Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) HELD The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do not violate the Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practicing a profession in the Philippines (Section 14, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) for they do not practice their profession (medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they applied for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a corporation that operates a hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of stock to doctors only. The ownership of such shares does not amount to engaging (illegally,) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it were otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would also be illegal. The P57 million investment of the Japanese group in UDMC violates the constitutional provisions restricting the transfer or conveyance of private lands (Art. XIII, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution) and the ownership of educational institutions (Art. XVI, Sec. 14[a], 1987 Constitution), to citizens of the Philippines or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens. While 82% of UDMC's capital stock is indeed subscribed by the

Japanese group, only 30% (equivalent to 171,721 shares or P17,172.00) is owned by the Japanese citizens, namely, the Yamada spouses and Tomotada Enatsu. 52% is owned by Edita Enatsu, who is a Filipino. Accordingly, in its application for approval/registration of the foreign equity investments of these investors, UDMC declared that 70% of its capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens , including Edita Enatsu. That application was approved by the Central Bank on August 3, 1988. G.R. No. L-22238 February 18, 1967

CLAVECILLIA RADIO SYSTEM, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. AGUSTIN ANTILLON, as City Judge of the Municipal Court of Cagayan de Oro City and NEW CAGAYAN GROCERY, respondents-appellees. FACTS New Cagayan Grocery filed a complaint against the Clavecilla Radio System alleging, the following message, addressed to the former, was filed at the latter's Bacolod Branch Office for transmittal thru its branch office at Cagayan de Oro: NECAGRO CAGAYAN DE ORO (CLAVECILLA) REURTEL WASHED NOT AVAILABLE REFINED TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP LATER REPLY POHANG The Cagayan de Oro branch office having received the said message omitted, in delivering the same to the New Cagayan Grocery, the word "NOT" between the words "WASHED" and "AVAILABLE," thus changing entirely the contents and purport of the same and causing the said addressee to suffer damages. After service of summons, the Clavecilla Radio System filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it states no cause of action and that the venue is improperly laid. The New Cagayan Grocery interposed an opposition to which the Clavecilla Radio System filed its rejoinder. Thereafter, the City Judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for hearing. Clavecilla Radio System filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance praying that the City Judge, Honorable Agustin Antillon, be enjoined from further proceeding with the case on the ground of improper venue. The lower court held that the Clavecilla Radio System may be sued either in Manila where it has its principal office or in Cagayan de Oro City where it may be served, as in fact it was served, with summons through the Manager of its branch office in said city. In other words, the court upheld the authority of the city court to take cognizance of the case. On appeal the Clavecilla Radio System contends that the suit against it should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal office. ISSUE Whether or not the proper venue is the City of Manila. HELD It is clear that the case for damages filed with the city court is based upon tort and not upon a written contract. Section 1 of Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, governing venue of actions in inferior courts, provides in its paragraph (b) (3) that when "the action is not upon a written contract, then in the municipality where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be served with summons ." Settled is the principle in corporation law that the residence of a corporation is the place where its principal office is established. Since it is not disputed that the Clavecilla Radio System has its principal office in Manila, it follows that the suit against it may properly be filed in the City of Manila. It is important to remember, as was stated by this Court in Evangelista vs. Santos, et al., supra, that the laying of the venue of an action is not left to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. Applying the provision of the Rules of Court, the venue in this case was improperly laid.

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents. FACTS In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered into by plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. (Sharp), through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages. The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of sum-mons against Sharp at its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the judgment became final and executory. Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp. The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the merits. Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer motion, holding that the foreign judgment of the Japanese court be enforce is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence, this appeal by Northwest. ISSUE Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed. HELD A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is pre-sumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of sum-mons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it. It is settled that the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accord-ingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof re-garding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similar-ity or the so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to re-ceive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the sum-mons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or at least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or any of its officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo Dis-trict Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine law holds no water. Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of JAPAN, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the proces-sual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. G.R. Nos. 79926-27 October 17, 1991 STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., petitioners, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI) obtained loans from Citibank, Bank of America and HSBC, all foreign corporations but with branches in the Philippines. Meanwhile, State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI), also creditors of CMI, filed collection suits against the latter with writs of preliminary attachment. Subsequently, the three banks jointly filed with the court a petition for involuntary insolvency of CMI. SHI and SFCI opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioners are not resident creditors in contemplation of the Insolvency Law. ISSUE Whether or not a foreign corporation with a branch in the Philippines and doing business therein can be considered a resident

HELD Foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines are considered residents of the Philippines, as the word is understood in Sec. 20 of the Insolvency Law, authorizing at least three resident creditors of the Philippines to file a petition to declare a corporation insolvent. The Tax Code declares that the term residen t foreign corporation applies to foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines as distinguished from a non-resident foreign corporation which is not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. The Offshore Banking Law sates that: Branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, extension offices or any other units of corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign country operating in the Philippines shall be considered residents of the Philippines. The General Banking Act places branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks in the category as commercial banks, rural banks, stock savings and loan association making no distinction between the former ad the latter in so far as the terms banking institutions and banks are used in said Act. G.R. No. 176579 June 28, 2011

WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, Respondent FACTS This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution that limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%, thus: Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens ; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) ISSUE Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility? HELD [The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.] Considering that common shares have voting rights that translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares that usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility. Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken by the corporation or its stockholde rs, or to receive notice of any meeting of stockholders. On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that each holder of Common Capital Stock sha ll have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes. It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a ma jority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the nonvoting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility. In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x. To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution. [Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by the Court to apply the foregoing definition of the term capital in determin ing the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. FACTS Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. On May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved. ISSUE Whether the petitioners and others who have retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189? HELD The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition. In a nutshell, Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it. Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground. As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189. Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non -residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.