Rule 129 case digest (by me )

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Municipal board of manila vs Agustin Held:

et

It is contended in the answer filed by the respondent that the Court of Appeals acted properly in taking judicial notice of the current political history of the Frete Popular in accordance with the decisions of this court in Bustos vs. Municipal Council of Masantol (43 Phil., 290), and Ysip vs. Municipal Council of Cabiao (43 Phil., 352). There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of subjects legislative, political, historial, commercial, scientific, and artificial in addition to a wide range of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events. The matter of judicial notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with advance of the sciences and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be well-established or autoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of mankind. Assuming without deciding that courts may take notice of the existence of the Sakdalista organization at one time or another, as matter of contemporary social and political history, the date of its organization or the time of its birth for the purposes of the application of the Election Law cannot be said to be of public knowledge. This information is not available from printed books, records or current literature. And though the judge himself or some other persons may known exactly when the Sakdalista Party came of public knowledge. A matter may be personally known to the

judge and yet not be a matter of judicial knowledge and, vice versa, a matter may not be actually known to an individual judge and, nevertheless, be a proper subject of judicial cognizance. If courts may take judicial notice of the organization of the Sakdalista Party, they may and should take equal notice of the dates of the organization of all the other component political organizations intergrating the Frente Popular, namely, "United Workers of the Philippines", "Philippines National Confederation of Peasants", "Partido Republicano"' " Liga ng mga Maralita," Katipunan na mga Anak-Pawis sa Filipinas", Pambansang Liga ng Kababaihan sa Filipinas", bagong Liga ng mga Kabataan sa Filipinas", etc. While judges will not live in monastic seclusion, they being expected to be live spectators of passing national events (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil., 136), they will not spread the mantle of judicial notice over the different dates of organization of divers political groups, when such dates are not recorded or found in books of general information or otherwise possessed of general public recognition. In the present case, where priority of organization is a material element for purposes of political representation on the board of inspectors, this fact must be proved and satisfactorily established. We have seriously reflected upon the argument that the Frente Popular has a more extended organization as an opposition party than the Partido Radical, and that the spirit of republicanism must be maintained and kept alive by the legitimate encouragement of wholesome criticism and the vigilance of a well-organized opposition. In the case at bar, however, we are not concerned with the denial of political representation to the opposition, but with the determination of which party of the opposition is entitled, under the provisions of the Election Law, to representation on the boards of election inspectors in the City of Manila.

Saludo Jr vs. American Express International Facts: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX).

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that petitioner Saludo "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance. Respondents raised the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action and improper venue because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. Furthere, petitioner Saludo asserted the court a quo to take judicial notice of his particular fact as a member of Congress, that he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. That he was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter. The lower court upheld petitioners residence at Ichon, Macrohon Southern Leyte which can be taken in judicial notice of. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision. Judicial notice could not be taken
since No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.

Issue: W/N judicial notice maybe taken of the fact that petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence of said district; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner; Held:

That petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was representing as Congressman, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, including its Constitution. The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits. Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected. In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part.