Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 50464, Jan.

29, 1990

FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable. CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable

HELD: The SC affirmed. Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., Respondents.

NARVASA, J.: Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of land.

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The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
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Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. 1 In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the oppositors.
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The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded chanr obles virtual law librar y

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

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2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares; 3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and

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4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.

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The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
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In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
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The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that chanr obl es virtual law library

1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;

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2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement;
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3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
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4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
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The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
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1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;

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2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
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3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
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4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.
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Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. 5
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In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.
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And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition.
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It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
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The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
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As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more thanprima facie evidence of possession. 7
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Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." 8
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It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
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WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Imperial, G.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR. FACTS: On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted. HELD: Yes. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide." The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secretary. There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City,

disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved. The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course. Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government would lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public domain. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO , vs. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997 Facts Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 on June 13,1913 which reserved some square meters of land in Barrio Naga, Albay for provincial park purposes. On December 9, 1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of landcovered by E.O. No. 40 to Diego Palomo. Two months before his death, Diego Palomo donatedthese parcels of land to his heir, Ignacion Palomo and Carmen Palomo which was allegedlycovered by an Original Certificate of Title. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into Tiwi Hot Spring National Parks andWildlife. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of public domain andtherefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The Palomos, however continued in possession of the property and paid r eal estate taxes and introduced improvements by planting b a n a n a , p a n d a n a n d c o c o n u t s . O n M a y 7 , 1 9 7 4 p e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a c i v i l c a s e a g a i n s t p r i v a t e respondents who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered their landand cut down bamboos. The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the annulmentand cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. RTC ad CA ruledagainst the Palomos. Issue Whether or not the lands claimed by the Palomos are alienable lands of the public domain whichmay be acquired by adverse possession? Held No. The lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. There was no proof that the petitioners predecessors in interest derived title from an o ld Spanish grant. The d e c i s i o n s o f t h e C F I w e r e n o t s i g n e d b y t h e j u d g e b u t m e r e l y c e r t i f i e d t r u e c o p i e s o f notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof no matter how lengthly, cannot beconverted into private property unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable andalienable. CAs decision was affirmed.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 402 February 1997 En Banc

FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the managers check. One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution COURT RULING: The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as proFilipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Lee Hong Hok vs David G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972 FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to hismiscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an orderof award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds thenissued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor fileany adverse claim. ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that thepatent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof norhad they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformitywith the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the governmentand set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the granteeand the government. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolutionof March 14, 1969 are affirmed.

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986), G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds) FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and AcerInfiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of thenon-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when theMunicipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc 1. YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of thetitle as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred bythe decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

ISSUES:

Carino v Insular Government G.R. No. 2869 (1907)

J. Arellano Facts: Mateo Cario, on February 23 , 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration for a title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet. This was heard with a petition for a title for a portion of the land. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, because they alleged that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State. According to Carino, in 1884, he erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question. They said that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim. Carino abandoned the house and lived on the land in question. The court of land registration ruled against their favor. They also ruled that the land was "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public land. Issue: Is Carino the rightful possessor of the land? Held: No, petition denied. Ratio: Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. There was no proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government. The possessory information was not the one authorized in substitution for the one in adjustment of the royal decree of February 13, 1894. This was due to: 1. the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated Or such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated 2. Under Spanish law, there was a period of one year allowable to verify the possessory information. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this

chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, from the record of the case The right of possession in accordance with civil law remained at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands even until after February 13, 1894. 3. The advent of American sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with the Organic Act of 1902 and other laws like Act No. 648, herein mentioned by the petitioner. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claim the title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use from time immemorial. But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands not exceeding more that 16 hectares in extent." Under Sec. 6 of said act. The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, therefore it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration.