LEGASLATIVE DEPARTMENT SEC 5 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong. With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect. Issues: WON RA 7675 is in: 1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule". 2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district. In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC 342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation) FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941. On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times. ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory. HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The

Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

same declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

Note: Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district representatives - x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows: 208 x .20 = 52 .80 The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No. 1.

FACTS: The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections. April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latters nominees not be proclaimed April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785 May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it.

ISSUES:

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections2.Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)

HELD: This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list participants.

BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ] Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. Issues: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections? Held: (1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an

unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. (3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, January 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment. Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and

therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations ofHouse Bill No. 4264.

since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Sema vs COMELEC Facts: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two st legislative districts. The 1 legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the st municipalities of the 1 district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the st 1 district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. st Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and

SECTION 6

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD:

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, MakatiCity, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the

residence qualification as a candidate forcongressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residencequalification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. Hisbirth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside inMakati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. Ratio: The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. read: The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV

1. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. 2. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He 3. decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes 4. of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

BENGZON VS DRILON (G.R. NO. 103524) Veto Power of the President FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocketveto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it 2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and 3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, whenreferring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a SenatePresident and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. Heexplained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Paredes V Sandiganbayan

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991

Issues: (1) Whether

or

not

the

Court

has

jurisdiction

over

the

petition

Facts: In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the presence of accused because the summon was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes. His motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing validity of the preliminary investigation that it was conducted without his notice. In the meantime, Paredes was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was reverted back to public domain. Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. He refused to post bail in protest against the injustice to him as Governor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging that the warrant for her husbands arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed. Issue: 1. WON the warrant of arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was conducted w/o notice to the accused. 2. WON the crime had already prescribed. Ruling: 1. Not void. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy is to demand that PI be conducted before entering his plea, the court should then suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a PI, that is, to file a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was

issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court . . . . The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so 2. The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. Whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus. The accused may file a bail bond of P20,000, fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty.

Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez Facts of the Case: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609. Issue of the Case: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. Held: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is

clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senateapproved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure ofthe House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Section 17

Chavez vs Comelec Case Digest FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315 Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor,

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President

Pimentel V Hret

Pimentel, et al. v. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal GR 141489, November 29, 2002 Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments GR 141490 Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become

Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,

Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOPNATCCO as co-petitioners. Issue: [1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. [2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who

among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. [2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

 in failing to comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the members of the CA in continuously conducting hearings and proceedings on the the appointments despite the above in failing, despite repeated demands from petitioner, to reorganize the CA members.

SEC 18

Article VI, Section 18 Case Digest - Madrigal v. Villar, G.R. 183055, July 31, 2009 Madrigal v. Villar G.R. 183055 July 31, 2009 FACTS On August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents int he Commission on Appointments (CA), with Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal as one of the contingents in the Senate under the PDP-Laban party. Sen. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters to Senator Manuel Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. With this claim, she requested for the reorganization of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional." Sen. Villar answered her letter noting that he intended to have the CA Committee study and deliberate on the matter. However, he also stated that copies of the letters of Madrigal would be transmitted to the Senate Secretary for it had better jurisdiction on the issue, as per Sen. Arroyo's comment which stated that, "if there is a complaint in the election of a member, or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House. Thus, it was just appropriate for the case presented by Madrigal to be included in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to be properly addressed. However, Sen. Madrigal, by letter, reiterated her request for the actions of the CA to be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents. Thereafter, she filed for a petition (2nd to that of Drilon, G.R. 180055) for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Sen. Villar in his capacity as Senate President and ExOfficio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA, alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction:

ISSUE Can a Senator challenge before the Supreme Court that she was denied proportional representation with the Commission on Appointments? HELD No. The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before Sen. Madrigal may bring her petition to Court. Sen. Villar's invocation of the said doctrine is thus well-taken. Furnishing a copy of the petitioner's letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. More to that, the Members of the House who claim that they have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the CA. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

SEC 21 and 22

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

Facts: 1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino. 2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by

the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." 3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4.

4.

Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation NO. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

Legislative Investigation Sabio Vs. Gordon FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Sen. M. Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors." Said Resolution was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. It was then transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises upon motion of Sen. F.Pangilinan. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator R. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services for the deliberation of the Senate Resolution. On May 9, 2006, Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 that No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." Sen. Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Resolution.

1.

2.

3.

The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.

Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. He sent a letter to Sen. Gordon invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors of Philcomstat Holdings raised the issues on the proper legislative inquiry. Another notice was sent to Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter but the same did not comply. Sabio again sent a letter reiterating his position. This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate. Unconvinced with the Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-AtArms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. Sabio was arrested. Hence, he filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. He together with Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-atArms, and the entire Senate. Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members. Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners alleged that: 1. Respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; 2. The inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; 3. The inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and 4. Respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt. Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged:

1. Respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455; 2. The same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; 3. The subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for having been issued without authority; 4. The conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and 5. The subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against selfincrimination. In their Comment, the respondents countered the petitioners arguments: 1. the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which SC has no jurisdiction 2. Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; 3. Respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; 4. Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; 5. Respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and 6. The inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies. ISSUES: WON Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. HELD: Petition for Habeas Corpus has became moot because Sabio was allowed to go home. Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or

staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Arnault vs. Nazareno : The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it." The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate." Considering these jurisprudential instructions, The Court find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." Article VI, Sections 21, 22 and 1 Case Digest - Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006 Senate v. Ermita G.R. 169777 April 20, 2006 FACTS Senate of the Philippines petitioned for certiorari and prohibition for E.O. 464, alleging that the Senate has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of its

validity, pointing out that the Executive Order directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate's powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern. Hence, Senate prayed for E.O. 464 to be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners alleged that the E.O. violated various provisions in the Constitution, specifically, Art. VI, Sections 21, 22, and 1, which mandate the publication of the Rules of Procedure, the appropriate steps that must be taken by the heads of department, and the state the legislative power which is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. ISSUE Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress, valid and constitutional? HELD Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege." The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress has the right to information from the Executive Branch. E.O. 464 somewhat allowed the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive. Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID. Thus, the petition is partially granted.

true or false. a proclamation of a state of emergency is sufficient to allow the President to take over any public utility.

prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry

False. it may be true that the president can declare state of emergency but only with a limited power, that is to cal...l-out to the military to prevent lawless violence. but with regards to taking over the public utility is beyond its control. for the latter to be possible, it needs to have the intervention of the congress, which is clearly stated in Article VII, section 18 "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest", this refers to the congress and not the president. whether or not the president can acquire such power still depends on congress. Because such power needs delegation from congress and its up to the congress to delegate it to the president or not.

RULING: We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress is based on Commander-in-chief powers As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander -in-chief are not hampered by the samelimitations as in executive privilege.

Gudani vs. Senga G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006

The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the samelimitations as in executive privilege.

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee,

RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitutionvests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Remedy is judicial relief

deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions.Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

Philippine National Broadband Network controversy From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Philippine National Broadband Network controversy (also referred to as the NBN/ZTE deal or NBN/ZTE mess) involved allegations of corruption in the awarding of a US$329 million construction contract to Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE for the proposed governmentmanaged National Broadband Network (NBN). The contract with ZTE was signed on April 20, 2007 in Hainan, China. Following the emergence of irregularities, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo cancelled the National Broadband Network project in October 2007. On July 14, 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed all three petitions questioning the constitutionality of the national broadband deal, saying the petitions became mootwhen the project was cancelled. History President Arroyo In April 2007, Philippine Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza and ZTE Vice President Yu Yong entered into a US$329.5 million contract for a National

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander -in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due

Broadband Network (NBN) that would improve government communications capabilities.

[1]

alleged that the agreement was sealed without public bidding and violated the Telecoms Policy Act, which required privatization of all telecommunications facilities. Congressman Padilla sued DOTC and ZTE officials of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Telecommunications Policy Act, the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Act and the Government Procurement Act at the Office of the Ombudsman. AHI also petitioned the Court to direct the DOTC to provide copies of the contract, since it should have won the same.
[2]

On August 29, Nueva Vizcaya Congressman Carlos Padilla hinted in a privilege speech that Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ChairmanBenjamin Abalos went to China to broker a deal for the NBN project. The following day, Abalos denied brokering for the NBN project, although he did admit going to China four times.
[1]

The younger de Venecia testified on

[1]

On September 5, Senator Aquilino Pimentel called for a Senate investigation about the NBN project.
[1]

September 18 that Mike Arroyo, PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo's husband, personally told him to "back off" from pursuing the NBN project. Neri's testimony On the September 20 Senate hearing, Cabinet officials attended the hearing except for former National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Chairman (now Commission on Higher Education Chairman) Romulo Neri, who was sick. On September 22, 2007, president Arroyo suspended the

As a result, three committees held joint hearings

about the issue: the Accountability of Public Officers & Investigations (aka the Blue Ribbon Committee) headed by Alan Peter Cayetano, the National Defense and Security committee headed by Rodolfo Biazon and the Trade and Commerce committee headed by Mar Roxas. Senate investigations De Venecia's testimony Jose "Joey" de Venecia III, son of House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., testified on September 10 that he was with Abalos in China and that he heard Abalos "demand money" from ZTE officials. The younger de Venecia was president of Amsterdam Holdings, the company that lost its bid to ZTE for the NBN project.
[1]

broadband contract with ZTE after the bribery scandal sparked major problems in her government.
[3]

Neri and Abalos finally faced each other on the September 26 Senate hearing; Neri testified that Abalos told him "Sec, may 200 ka dito (You have 200M pesos in this deal)" while playing golf at Wack Wack Golf Club; they had been discussing the ZTE deal at that time. Abalos denied making the apparent bribe attempt. Neri later invoked executive privilege in response to some Senators' questions.
[1]

On September 11, the Supreme Court of the Philippines promulgated a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the $329-million national broadbandnetwork (NBN) contract between the Philippine government and China's ZTE based on separate certiorari suits filed by Iloilo Vice-Governor and former Representative Rolex Suplico and Joey de Venecia III. Under political pressure from the opposition group, the court gave ZTE fifteen days to comment on the injunction. Suplico, a former opposition congressman,

He later shunned succeeding Senate hearings

still citing executive privilege On September 27, 2007, ZTE petitioned the Supreme Court to lift the TRO alleging, in its urgent omnibus motion, inter alia, that the injunction cost the company millions.
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Abalos announced his resignation as COMELEC chairman on October 1; Resurreccion Borra succeeded him as COMELEC chairman. President Arroyo on her October 2 trip to China, said to Chinese President Hu Jintao her "difficult decision" to cancel ZTE Corp.'s contract for the NBN project.
[1]

the kickbacks in the deal. Lozada's statement was made after he was "abducted" on the orders of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary Lito Atienza, Neri, former Presidential Management Staff head Michael Defensor, Secretary for Special Concerns Remedios Poblador and Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite.
[13]

On May 26, 2008, a Supreme Court decision (Neri vs. Senate) nullified the citation of contempt against Neri, ruling that conversations between Neri and President Arroyo are considered classified information. Lozada's kidnapping and testimony On January 30, 2008, the Senate produced warrants of arrest to Neri and Rodolfo "Jun" Lozada, Jr., former chief executive officer of the governmentrun Philippine Forest Corporation and a consultant of the NEDA. Neri then went into hiding while Lozada skipped the Senate hearing and went to Hong Kong.
[7] [5] [6]

On February 11, upon continuation of Senate hearings, the government denied on kidnapping Lozada. Lozada claimed he was driven around Metro Manila and even reached Los Baos, Laguna, before he was transported to the La Salle Green Hills seminary. According to DENR Secretary Atienza, Lozada, who is his boss as the Philippine Forest Corp. is under the DENR, asked for his help as "he feared for his life" as he returned from Hong Kong. Joey de Venecia later claimed that ZTE advanced USD 1 million to Abalos; senators pointed out that this qualifies as "plunder" under Philippine criminal law since the advance was given when the foreign exchange was at about PHP 50 to $1, thus equaling the PHP 50 million floor for plunder.
[14]

Meanwhile, House Speaker de Venecia lost a motion of

confidence vote on February 5, which unseated him as House Speaker; his partymate at Lakas-CMD, Prospero Nograles of Davao City, succeeded him as speaker.
[8]

Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite appeared on the February 26 hearing. He had previously said that the P500,000 he gave to Lozada's brother was for Lozada's expenses while staying at Hong Kong. Gaite said

On February 5, as the Senate arresting team waited on the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Lozada's arrival,
[10] [9]

he "can't rationally justify" the reason why he gave Lozada the hefty amount. He said that his action "was moved by my conscience and my faith." Lozada earlier claimed that the P500,000 was a bribe.
[15]

Lozada was taken by

unidentified people "out of town" and Lozada's kin appealed for help on his whereabouts. On February 7, Lozada finally surfaced as police took him

to La Salle Green Hills, Mandaluyong City. Lozada linked Mike Arroyo and Abalos to the ZTE scandal.
[11]

The Philippine Court of Appeals dismissed Jun Lozada's writ of amparo petition for lack of evidence on his claim that there were threats to his life and security.
[16]

On the same day, the Supreme Court stopped

[12]

the Senate from arresting Neri, ordering a status quo; Neri then resurfaced after the threat of arrest was taken off.

On September 23, 2008, Lozada asked the Supreme

[17]

Court of the Philippines to re-open and reconsider his case, thereby arguing for the protection of his siblings, Violeta and Arturo.

The next day, on a Philippine Senate hearing, Lozada confirmed his NEDA boss Romulo Neri's testimony that Commission on Elections (COMELEC) chairman Benjamin Abalos and Arroyo's husband Mike Arroyo were behind

Countersuit Mike Defensor, on July 4, 2008 filed a 6-page perjury lawsuit Friday versus Rodolfo Noel Lozada for "testifying under oath that he had paid Lozada P 50,000 to change his statement that he was not kidnapped at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) when he arrived from Hong Kong at the height of the Philippine National Broadband Network controversy (ZTE Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited scandal)."
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SECTION 24 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994 Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Madriaga testimony Also on the February 26 hearing, Dante Madriaga, a ZTE-employed engineer, claimed that USD 41 million was sought as "advances". ZTE then withheld more money, saying they needed to see President Arroyo's face at the signing of the contract. Ombudsman cases The Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez subpoenaed First Gentleman Mike Arroyo, Neri, the de Venecias and Abalos to hear their side of the story. The case was filed by former vice president Teofisto Guingona, Jr., several lawyers, Fr. Jose Dizon and party-list Representatives Joel Villanueva and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, among others. Judgment President Arroyo decided to cancel the National Broadband Network project on October 2, 2007 in a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.
[20] [19] [15]

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

On

July 14, 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed all three petitions questioning the constitutionality of the national broadband deal, saying the petitions became moot when President Arroyo decided to cancel the project.
[20]

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenuestatute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filingrevenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from theHouse of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitutionbecause the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the

President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Alvarez vs Guingona Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement Income Inclusion of IRAs In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should not be. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR. 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income. HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said st nd rd SB while the HB was on its 1 , 2 and 3 reading in the HOR. The Senate st only conducted its 1 hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well). 2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations. Section 25 Garcia vs. Mata Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who wasreversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject ofthe act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows: 1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. 2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), 3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. 4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). 5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special

Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers 5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. 7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional 3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional. HELD: Locus Standi We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). Veto of the Provisions The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while

allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service). The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-inChief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987] Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to themunicipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado 227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993 Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since

Tan vs Del Rosario G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994

FACTS: These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation. ISSUES: 1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) 2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not uniform and equitable. 3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rulemaking authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships? HELD: The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771). What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate. Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.

Section 27 Section 28 Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan [G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988] Facts: These four (4) petitions seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 issued by the President of the Philippines, and which amended certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted the valueadded tax, for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due processand equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by every seller, with aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00, to his purchase of goods and services, unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized from the sale of services. The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers, advance sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is principally aimed to rationalize the system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to enable the country to attain economic recovery. The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was issued. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single stage value added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or "cost deduction method" and was imposed only on original sale, barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of such articles were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October 1985, a 3% tax was imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD 2006 on 31 December 1985, to take effect 1 January 1986. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale, but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zerorated or exempt.

Issue: Whether

or

not

EO

273

is

unconstitutional

Held: No. Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been extensively discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past administration. As the Solicitor General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the exercise of her legislative powers. The legislative process started long before the signing when the data were gathered, proposals were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two days before it convened." Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive. The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on allgoods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%. The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public. The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers Association of the Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the National InternalRevenue Code, unduly discriminates against customs brokers. At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is

based upon material differences, in that the activities ofcustoms brokers (like those of stock, real estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT.

PROVINCE OF ABRA vs. HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO G.R. No. L-49336. August 31, 1981.

FACTS: The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. An action for declaratory relief by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such exemption, without even hearing the side of petitioner. In the rather vigorous language of the Acting Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for petitioner, respondent Judge "virtually ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; . . . wantonly violated the rights of petitioner to due process, by giving due course to the petition of private respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law, which goes into the competence of the Honorable Presiding Judge." The latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side of petitioner. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether the present requirement of actual exclusive and direct use of property for charitable and religious purposes is material.

HELD: Under Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, building, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The

present Constitution (Article VIII, Section 17, paragraph 3) added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the protection of procedural due process. If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge accepted at its face the allegation of private respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of land owned by it, are that they are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. In the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack of jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process.

students are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. The only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties are exclusively for education purposes? HELD: Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation The phrase exclusively used for educational purposes was further clarified by this Court, thusMoreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not limited to property actually indispensable therefor, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, a school for training nurses, a nurses home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents (84 CJS 6621), such as athletic fields including a firm used for the inmates of the institution. The exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose the lease of the first floor to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education; Case at bar.It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educational purposes as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC vs Aquino Case Digest ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA,petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra;ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE, respondents. FACTS: On June 8, 1972 the properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold to Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer. (a) that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and college

of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary pur-poseeducational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. Trial Court correct in imposing the tax not because the second floor is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes but because the first floor is being used for commercial purposes. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional.

Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private propertywhen the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. The decision appealed from is reversed.

Section 29

PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS [110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L10405; 29 DEC 1960] Facts: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and plannedsubdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was

Aglipay Vs. Ruiz Case Digest Aglipay Vs. Ruiz 64 Phil 201 G.R. No. 45459 March 13, 1937 Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion

wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education. ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991 FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment OSMEA VS. ORBOS [220 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 99886; 31 MAR 1993] Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive OrderNo. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil

companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows: (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution, viz.: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government; and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax."

invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board.

Held: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about byexchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources: a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy; b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy; c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products; d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the referenceforeign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy. Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from thespecial treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent. With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the Constitution. (2) Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and

additional

amounts

to

augment

the

resources

of

the

Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State. The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. 5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

6.

7.

SECTION 30

First Lepanto Ceramic v CA Facts: 1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Section 32 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs.COMELEC G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996 FACTS:

2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annulPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang BayanngMorong acted upon the petition by promulgating PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendumand providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10 2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD: 1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.