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People vs. Mabug-at Facts: The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts.

One day, the accused invited Juana to take a walk with him, but the latter refused him on account of the accused having frequently visited the house of another woman. Later on, the accused went to the house of Cerilo Bayan where Juana had gone to take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, waited until Juan and her niece, Perfecta, came downstairs. When they went in the direction of their house, the accused follow them. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver at Juana but which wounded Perfecta, the slug passing through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left eye. Perfecta did not die due to proper medical attention. Issue: 1. 2. Whether or not the accused committed a frustrated murder Whether or not that the evidence presented by the defense, finding the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling: 1. The accused is guilty of frustrated murder, qualified by treachery, committed on the person of Perfecta Buralo. The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.) In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder. With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no other aggravating circumstance. The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the appellant. So ordered.

2.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-12155 FACTS The accused rushed upon the girl and struck her from behind with a sharp bolo.The blow was directed toward a vital part of the body, producing a frightful gash severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, and threw the body into the bushes.The accused gave himself up and declared that he had killed the girl, not knowing that she survived the stabbing. The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl who charged him criminally of rape before the local officials and with being the cause of her pregnancy. ISSUE 1. 2. Is the accused guilty of murder or homicide? Is the felony frustrated or attempted? February 2, 1917

RULING 1. The accused is guilty of murder due to the circumstance of alevosia, where the accused attacked his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo.

2.

Such an attack necessitates the finding that it was made treacherously; and that being so the crime would have been qualified as murder if death had resulted. The accused is guilty of frustrated murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as follows: A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

An attempted felony is defined thus: There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance. To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed. On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control. The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CABALLERO G. R. No. 149028-30. April 2, 2003 Facts: Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Jr. of the murder of Leonilo Broce and Eugene Tayactac and meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to pay damages; and of the frustrated murder of Arnold Barcuma and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Robito Caballero remained at-large. On the evening of August 3,1994, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma Broce whether the latter was going to buy something from the store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he and Armando had no quarrel between them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of the Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their brother, appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. When Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up on Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to the place of the crime to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew twice on his forearm. For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded to

his uncle for help. The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the compound. Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they sustained. Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting Arnold. They also denied having any altercation with the victims. They also denied stabbing Leonilo. They assert that the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting their defenses of denial and alibi. They claim that at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital for the treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr. In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting accused-appellants despite the fact that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common objective and purpose. Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime. Patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.

However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo. There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. The decision of the trial court is therefore affirmed, with modifications. GR. NO 33634 December 18, 1930 People of Philippine Islands vs Basilio Borinaga FACTS: Harry H. Mooney, an American and a resident of the municipality of Calubian Leyte, made a contract with Juan Lawaan for the construction of fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was an associate of Lawaan in construction of fish corral. On March 4, 1929, Lawaan went and tried to collect the fixed amount of the contract. However, Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon for the reason that about two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished. Thus, Lawaan warned Mooney that something would happen to him if he did not pay. On the evening of the same day, Mooney took a seat on the chair in the store of the neighbor, Perpetua Najarro, when Borinaga appeared from the window and strike the knife at Mooney. Fortunately, the knife lodged at the back of the chair which results of mooney to fell on the chair, and he was not injured. Borinaga left, after ten minutes he returned to renew the act, but, he unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were on their guard and turned the flashlight to Borinaga which frightened him. ISSUE: Whether the facts constitute frustrated murder within the meaning of Article 3 of the Penal Code RULING: The majority of the courts answer the question by stating that the crime committed was frustrated murder. It is true, notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured. The essential condition of frustrated crime, the assailant performs all the acts of execution, attended the attack. In art. 3, par 2 of Penal Code states when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent will of the perpetrator. In this present case, the assailant unable to accomplish the act. The failure to attack arose by reason of forces independent will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted the further acts. The judgment rendered is guilty of frustrated murder with the cost of instance against the appellant. People vs. Alconga G.R. No. L-162 Facts: The deceased, Silverio Barion was playing black jack against Maria De Raposo. The latter and Alconga were partners in the game. The deceased suffered losses and was outraged upon knowing that Alconga and De Raposo were cheating on him. The next days, when Alcongo was doing his job as a home guard, the deceased came along and swing his bamboo stick onto Alconga. The deceased executed two succeeding blows but missed. On the third blow, Alconga was able to grab his revolver and shoot it to the deceased. The latter was able to stand up, and there they had a hand to hand fight. The deceased April 30, 1947

sustained several wounds and ran away. He was followed by Alconga and was overtaken. A second fight took place and the deceased died due to mortal blow. Alcongo was turned over by Collado to the municipal policeman of San Dionisio. Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga. Held: No, because he acted beyond self- defense. It was evident that the deceased fled w/o having inflicted wound to Alconga. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he is still not safe. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion. However the latter pursued over the deceased and was able to kill him since he has superiority in terms of weapons. The second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the case in the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating circumstance (MC) of Provocation. According to Article 13 of RPC, Mitigating circumstances, That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by the accused; however Alconga failed to do it. GR No L-12936 US, plaintiff-appellee, Vs MARIANO BATUNGBACAL, defendant-appellant. FACTS: Defendant had in his service the married couple Pedro Dilig and Hilaria Tianko who took care of the defendants children of tender age. On the morning of February 25, 1917, defendant was awakened by the cries of Hilaria, who had his two children. Pedro was infuriated and was carrying a bolo. The defendant then seized a loaded shotgun that was near him, aimed it at Pedro Dilig, ordered him to drop the bolo, and fired at him, killing him at once. The trial court didnt find it reasonable to use the shotgun as necessary means to avoid any harm and that exempting circumstances ought not to be reckoned in the defendants favor. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

ISSUE: WON defendant is exempted from criminal liability by acting in lawful defense. RULING: YES, the defendant was justified in believing reasonably that the lives of his two children and that of Hilaria Tianko were in imminent peril. Abruptly awakened by the information that Hilaria Tianko and the defendant's two children were being pursued by the deceased, and upon awakening seeing that the deceased in fact was pursuing them, bolo in hand and with his arm raised as if ready to strike with this weapon, the defendant was justified in believing that the lives of Hilaria and his two children were in imminent danger. Under these circumstances, in view of the eminence of the danger, the only remedy which could be considered reasonably necessary to repel or prevent that aggression, was to render the aggressor harmless.

March 15, 1930; G.R. No. L-32066 .R. No. L-32066 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS , plaintiff and appellee, vs. GONA (Mansaca), defendant and appellant. FACTS: The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of homicide. The said accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted the MansacaMapudul , causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died. There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged, but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not Gona should be guilty of intentional homicide rather than homicide through negligence HELD: Yes RULING: In these case of United State vs. Mendieta(34 Phil. 242), the court said: Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure HilarioLauigan instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter, in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstances. The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS ADIAO, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-13785 October 8, 1918 Facts: The defendant was charged in MTC of City of Manila with the crime of theft. However, found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft and later appealed to CFI of City of Manila but still held liable for the crime of the same which the defendant sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Nonetheless, the sole error assigned in appeal is that lower court erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the crime frustrated theft as disclosed by the facts which the defendant, Tomas Adjao, a custom inspector abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T. Murakami and secreted the same in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by the other customs employees. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in its decision of imposing lesser crime of frustrated theft. Held: Yes. The lower court erred in its decision of imposing lesser crime of frustrated theft. Based on the facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in the Article 3 of the Old Penal Code (Art. 6 of Revised Penal Code), but that since the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment crime of theft. All the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant is sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against him. The merchandise in question, attached to the record as Exhibit A, shall be returned to the lawful owner, T. Murakami. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NARCISO CABUNGCAL, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-28451 August 1, 1928 FACTS: On March 21, 1926, Narciso Cabungcal invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery of his property. They spent the day at said fishery and in the afternoon returned in two boats, one steered by the appellant and the other by an old woman named Anastasia Penaojas. The deceased Juan Loquenario was another passenger in this boat. Upon reaching a place of great depth the deceased rocked the boat which started it to take water, and the appellant, fearing the boat might capsize, asked the deceased not to do it. As the deceased paid no attention to this warning and continued rocking the boat, the appellant struck him on the forehead with an oar. The deceased fell into the water and was submerged, but a little while after appeared on the surface having grasped the side of the boat, saying that he was going to capzise it and started to move it with this end in view, seeing which the women began to cry, whereupon the appellant struck him on the neck with the same oar, which submerged the deceased again. With the movement that the appellant made in giving him the second blow, the boat upset and then the appellant proceeded to save his passengers. In the meantime the aged Anastasia Penaojas, who steered the other boat, and who at that time was about 200 or 300 meters away, having heard the cries of the wrecked persons, quickened its speed, repaired to and arrived in time to pick up the passengers who are clinging to the side of the capsized boat, taking them later to the river bank. The appellant, after having thus saved his passengers, proceeded to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body was recovered later.

ISSUE: Whether or not Narciso Cabungcal is exempted from criminal liability in defense of his wife and child. HELD/RULING: Yes, Narciso Cabungcal is exempted from criminal liability. Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal code states that: Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the one defending be not induce by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. What the appellant did was in lawful defense of the lives of the passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of taking the boat to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require sometime, whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time to arrive at the shore. The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability. G.R.No. L-41036-B October 10, 1934 The People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Juan Moreno, defendant-appellant Facts: On August 17, 1933, the defendant and Aurelio Lee came to Manila from San Pedro Makati in the defendant's automobile. On the way they stopped at a Chinese store in Tejeron Street to drink some gin. From there they went to the San Lazaro Jockey Club, and then to the house of the Pabalan brothers, where Fabian Pabalan joined them, and the three went to the Bureau of Labor to get Eulogio Pabalan. While they were waiting for the latter, the defendant remained in the automobile and went to sleep. Aurelio Lee drove the automobile until they reached Sagandaan, Caloocan, when he was relieved by the defendant.As soon as the defendant took the wheel, he began to drive very fast, and the course of the automobile was crooked. The companions of the accused protested and told him to stop the automobile and let them go out, but he did not heed their request. The defendant continued to drive in a reckless manner, and in going around a curve leading to a concrete bridge in Meycauayan he violently struck the railing of the bridge and crushed the left side of the automobile. Eulogio Pabalan received injuries from which he died the same day. Fabian Pabalan and Aurelio Lee were also injured.The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence.The trial judge found the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Eulogio Pabalan, in the sum of P1,000, with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.The accused appealed to this court and the principal contention of appellant is that when the defendant and his companions were approaching the bridge they saw a truck coming towards them, and the deceased became frightened and pulled defendant's left sleeve, causing the automobile to swerve to the left, and that it would have gone into the river if the defendant had not suddenly swerved to the right; that in executing this maneuver he struck the bridge. Issue: Whether or not the appellant can be sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonent in case of insolvency

Held: YES, the appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than two years and not more than four years of imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eulogio Pabalan in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs. Section 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, effective January 1, 1933, provides that no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway in these Islands recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and to the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. Section 67 (d) of the same Act provides that if, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the motor vehicle driver or operator at fault shall, upon conviction be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen days nor more than six years in the discretion of the court. It is clear therefore that the acts of the defendant as alleged and proved constitute a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, and that he should have been sentenced in accordance with section 67 (d) thereof, because it supersedes the corresponding provision of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the penalty in cases of accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person as a consequence of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving. Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, effective January 1, 1932 states that offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and article 39 provides that if the convict has no property with which to meet the reparation of the damage caused, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each two pesos and fifty centavos, subject to the rules given in said article for the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment. We are of the opinion therefore that although the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, is a special law, the provisions of article 100 and article 39 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to a person found guilty of a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, because of the provision of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws under which offenses are punishable, unless the latter shall specially provide the contrary, and there is nothing to the contrary in the Revised Motor Vehicle A further reason for applying to the present case the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code respecting indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment for the non-payment thereof is that said provisions were not affected by the approval of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. G.R. No. 76493-94 February 26, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO URIBE, defendant-appellant.

These cases were originally before us on automatic review arising from the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court. However, subsequent to the commutation of death as a penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the accused manifested his desire to continue the cases as appealed cases. Accused-appellant Virgilio Uribe was charged with the crimes of murder and illegal possession of firearm in two separate informations filed with the then Court of First Instance of Leyte. For the crime of murder. FACTS Gaspar Tibay the victim in this case, armed with .22 caliber, he is undergoing a PC training at Camp Petik, RECOM 8, Palo. Leyte as a Second Class inside the Constabulary headquarters. Virgilio Uribe the Senior PC in the Constabulary, armed with .45 caliber who known to be the Accussed was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearm. Inside the Constabulary there was a canteen, were the victim and the accused met. The accused called the victim for a shot of fundador and ask him if he know Seargent Cabacanan. The Victim answered the question of the Accused, yes sir I know him. Somehow in their conversation took a sudden turn and there was an argument between them concerning guard duties. The accused boxed the Victim, the Victim went out the Canteen and then the Accused followed him outside and boxed the victim once more. The Victim runs toward the guardhouse. The Acuused went back to the canteen and put his shirt on and followed the victim to the guardhouse. Sgt. Cabanacan followed then but before he could reach the guardhouse he saw the accused with a drawn .45 cal. pistol. He shouted at the accused to stop but it was too late. The accused fired two (2) shots at the victim who fell dead. The Accused surrendered his .45 cal. pistol to Sgt. Cabanacan. The Accused admitted the Killing; however he claimed it as self Defense. His Version of his incident for Self-defense was found by the court not credible. To Shorten the Story, there were issues and conversation about the .45 caliber ownership and the foregoing investigation about the Victims death, because the Accused insisted that the act of his is a self-defense. In the Trial court founds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. Issues WON the Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder? WON the Accused was found guilty of illegal Possession of Firearm? Ruling No, the Accused was not found guilty of murder. Section 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code states that "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Moreover, evidence must be shown that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The evidence on record shows that the deceased Tibay was also armed with a .22 caliber gun when he was chased by the appellant. In fact, after the fist fight between the two protagonists, Tibay went out from the canteen ahead of the appellant. The appellant then followed him after which, at about four (4) meters distance between the two, while Tibay was trying to hide near a guard the appellant shot him in the arm. Under this scenario, there was the possibility that the appellant himself could have been hit by Tibay had the latter drawn his gun and used it before the appellant shot him. It is evident that in committing the crime, the appellant did not take any precautionary measures to insure no risk upon himself. Neither can it be said that the appellant consciously adopted a mode of attack to

insure the impossibility of Tibay's retaliating. Both protagonists had firearms. It was in an open field where the incident happened. With these findings, we find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and not MURDER. No, the accused was not charged of illegal possession of firearm, The prosecution's evidence confirms the testimony of the appellant that the subject .45 caliber pistol was issued to him through a memorandum receipt signed by the commanding officer. Furthermore, when queried as regards the certification issued by Captain Prudencio Erfe of Camp Crame that he is not a firearm licensee of the subject.45 caliber pistol, the appellant answered that "when the entire Philippine Constabulary Command was divided to regions, the Philippine Constabulary Command was authorized to issue firearms. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED as follows: (1) appellant Virgilio Uribe is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The prescribed penalty isreclusion temporal in its medium period but applying the Intermediate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby SENTENCED to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM and SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS as MAXIMUM. The Court imposed indemnity is increased to P30,000.00; and (2) the appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPO1 ARMANDO LOZANO (ACQUITTED) @ AMID, DAVE SAMSON (ACQUITTED), EUTIQUIANO PACANA JR. @ TOKING PACANA (ACQUITTED), AND RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER, (ACCUSED) RAUL OCO, APPELLANT FACTS: HerminigildoDamuag, was driving his motorcycle (first motorcycle) with his backride, Alden Abiabi. Suddenly, an SUV overtook their motorcycle which caused them to slow down. Another motorcycle (second motorcycle) with two (2) riders on it, appeared behind their motorcycle. From a distance, about two (2) or three (3) meters one of the riders of the second motorcycle suddenly fired two (2) shots in close succession. Damuag attempted to look at his mototrcycles tires, thinking that they have exploded. Then, A biabi pushed him with his body. After which, Abiabi fell on the motorcycle hitting the ground with his face down. As Damuag was trying to control his motorcycle, he noticed another motorcycle (third motorcycle) passed by from behind him. Damuags motorcycle zigzagged towards the gutter which caused him to hit the ground. He then stood up realizing that he was hit at the right side of his body. Damuag saw the third motorcycle at about two (2) to three (3) meters. It was on a stop. Appellant was at the back of the third motorcycle, holding a short firearm in his right hand. Appellant fired his gun at him but missed. Although wounded, Damuag was able to run. However, the third motorcycle chased him. Upon reaching the vicinity of Five Brothers restaurant, Damuag stopped because he could not pass anymore. From a distance of about four (4) to five (5) meters, the appellant again fired two (2) more shots at Damuag. The third motorcycle sped away towards B. Rodriguez Street. Damuag was initially rushed to the Southern Islands Hospital. About three (3) hours later, his wife brought him to the Sacred Heart Hospital. He survived the attack due to the timely medical attention given to him at the latter hospital. Forthwith, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest of the appellant and his co-accused. Lozano, Oco, and Pacana surrendered themselves to the authorities. Appellant now was charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder, and frustrated murder, with the supreme penalty of death. ISSUE:

Whether or not appellants voluntary surrender to the authorities cause his penalty to be reduced? RULING: Like any other common criminal, the appellant could have opted to go on hiding. But he chose to surrender himself to the authorities and face the allegations leveled against him. True, he did not admit his complicity to the crimes charged against him but he nonetheless spared the government of time and expense. For this, he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This offsets the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle, and pursuant to Art. 63(4) of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant should be meted the lesser of the two penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua. For the serious wounding of Damuag, the appellant committed frustrated murder, the same having been committed with intent to kill and with treachery, as afore explained. A crime is at its frustrated stage when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The means and method employed by the appellant clearly show intent to kill. Indeed, Damuag could have died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained if it were not for the timely operation performed on him. Under Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Applying the same offsetting of the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle and of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty should have been reclusion temporal in its medium period. However, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.[107]Considering all the circumstances, the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum would be proper. We come to the award of damages. The trial court ordered the appellant to indemnify the heirs of Abiabi and the victim HerminigildoDamuag the amount of P1,000,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively, without specifying what these amounts represent. In line with the recent jurisprudence, we modify the amount due the heirs of Abiabi as follows: (a) P50,000.00 as actual damages representing the duly receipted expense for the purchase of the coffin, (b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Except for the cost of the coffin, the remainder of P250,000.00, which Mrs. Abiabi claimed to have spent for funeral and burial services, is unsubstantiated and therefore, cannot be awarded. Furthermore, although Mrs. Abiabi testified that her husband earned P8,000.00 monthly as a legal researcher of Clear, Inc., we cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the absence of documentary evidence.[108] There are only two exceptions to the general rule requiring documentary evidence for claims for damages for loss of earning capacity: (1) if the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) if the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. [109] Clearly, this case does not fall under the exceptions.

We reduce the amount due the victim HerminigildoDamuag. Damuag cannot recover actual damages for aside from his bare allegations that he spent P160,000.00 for hospitalization and P5,000.00 for medicinal needs, there is nothing on the record to substantiate his claim. In lieu of this, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he has suffered some pecuniary loss because of the incident. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the joint decision on review is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS. (1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-46172, appellant RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Alden Abiabi the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. In Crim. Case No. CBU-46173, appellant RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED MURDER and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ORDERED to indemnify HerminigildoDamuag the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2)

Costs de officio. SO ORDERED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO LARA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-24014 October 16, 1925 Facts: Gregoria Lara, the defendant is a resident of the Municipality of Lapaz, Abra. He was accused of the crime of homicide committed upon the person of one, Cayetano Querido. Lara entertained rancor towards Querido suspected the former had induced his concubine to seek another man. It is further stated that, upon addressing to Lara the offensive expressions on that night concerning his concubine, the deceased placed the palms of his two hands in such a position as to form the tube of a trumpet, for the purpose of changing the pitch of his voice. Now, it happened that upon the same night, a friend of Lara who is an employee of the Bureau of Lands, named Rufino Roque, had occasion to stop in La Paz upon an official errand and carried a revolver, and upon retiring to bed he suspended the weapon, with its holster, from a peg on a beam in the house. The fact that the revolver had been placed in this position was noted by Lara; and after his patience had become exhausted towards Querido and his companions he took the revolver down with two cartridges in the cylinder, at the same time starting for the street. Upon seeing this movement on the part of Lara, Querido and his companions scattered and hid themselves behind a fence. When Lara was approaching to where Querido was, the latter jumped out from behind and threw his arms around Lara in an effort to pinion his hands and get possession of the pistol. Lara at once attempted to free himself from his assailant and succeeded in breaking Querido's hold. At the same time he turned so as to confront Querido, and the struggle for the possession of the revolver was continued. In the course of this struggle, perhaps immediately after Lara turned, the revolver was discharged. The bullet passed into Querido's abdomen on the left side, passed entirely through the body, and emerged in the right gluteal region. The shot did not immediately disable Querido, who continued his efforts to get possession of the pistol. Then here came Roque to recover his pistol. Thus, he was held captive too in the hands of Querido. Nevertheless, a person named Dolor take possession of the pistol and all went together to the municipal office building for the purpose of official investigation. Thus, the wound, produced in the manner above stated, caused the death of Querido within about three days. It appears that a few days after the homicide the appellant himself was subjected to an examination by Lieutenant Garcia, and on that occasion he stated that he discharged the revolver as soon as he succeeded in breaking loose from the person who had seized him. Issue: Whether or not there was a reasonable necessity for the means employed by the appellant to repel the attack.

Held: Yes. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind the following circumstances, namely, the darkness of the night (where the accused being attack from the back), the element of surprise involved in the assault, and the revealed intention of the deceased to beat the appellant up. Under these conditions the appellant might well have reasoned that if the struggle continued upon equal terms his assailant would undoubtedly in a moment get possession of the revolver. If this should happen there was great and real danger that in the excitement of the moment the deceased would have shot the appellant a thing which he could have done with impunity. Thus, upon the foregoing state of facts, that a case of self-defense is completely made out, under subsection 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, and that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. People of the Philppines vs Efren Mendoza Facts: At around 7:00 p.m. of July 14, 1993, in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Anchito Nano and Marianito Rafael passed by appellant's house and asked for a drink from appellant's wife, Emily Mendoza. Anchito began talking with Emily and they were about four arms-length from Marianito when appellant suddenly appeared. Appellant hacked Anchito on the nape, which prompted Marianito to flee out of fear for his life. At around 9:00 p.m. of that day, Trinidad delos Santos reported the hacking incident to the sub-station of Aguit-it, Vinzons. SPO2 Silverio Rafael proceeded to the crime scene and saw Anchito's body still in a kneeling position with hackwounds at the back of the neck and body. Brgy. Kagawad Pedro Saman, together with Ernesto Cribe and Trinidad delos Santos, arrived later at the scene of the crime. Kagawad Saman discovered Anchito in a kneeling position already dead. He also found (3) three hack wounds on the nape and two (2) hack wounds at the back of Anchito's body. The Barangay officials led by Kgwd. Saman and Kgwd. Cribe informed Rafael that the perpetrator was appellant Efren Mendoza. SPO4 Rafael later observed that the appellant's house was in total disarray and he surmised that things might have been taken in a hurry. He also noted that there was no weapon anywhere near the victim's body. Later that night, appellant surrendered to Senior Police Officer Leonardo Almadrones who promptly turned him over to Chief Investigator Joel Guinto for the requisite investigation. During investigation, appellant claimed that Anchito ransacked his house and hacked his seven (7) year old son Ernie Mendoza. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrendered was offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Rulling: yes, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor (maximum) to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (maximum). All other awards are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1. Treachery is a qualifying circumstance in the present case therefore it cannot offset the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Therefore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. G. R. NO. 26298 January 20, 1927 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs JULIAN ERIIA Y VINOLLA

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the defendant guilty of consummated rape. The victim is 3 years and 11 months old. The defendant is living in the house of the victim as a guest. The incident happened the time when the mother of the child is not around. Evidence shows that the defendant had done carnal intercourse with the child but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded since there was a timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the child.

The mother of the child testified that she found a sticky substance covered in its genital organ. The physician who examined the genital of the child a few hours after the commission of the crime states that there found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an effort had been made to penetrate the vagina but in testifying before the court he doubts as to whether the entry had been affected. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is consummated rape. RULLING: No. it is frustrated rape, since there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. It had been suggested that the child with such tender age has the impossibility of penetration. The crime for consummated rape was also impossible. The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant is hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor. But there was a different perception about the case since the evidence shows that there was a penetration on the genital organ of the child. In the case of Kenney vs. State, where the victim is 3 years and 8 months old, the statements of the several physicians indicates that the labia of the privates of the child even t hough that age can be entered by a mans male organ to the hymen.

G.R. No. L-43187 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS , plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANSELMO CALALO, defendant-appellant. FACTS: On March 31, 1934 in Mangahan, Dolores, Tayabas, Quezon, a young bull owned by Eugenio Canoso was stolen. Justo Bulahan and his son were charged and convicted by the Court of First Instance with theft and are serving their sentence. Anselmo Calalo, who was the co-principal of the crime was tried separately and has appealed that he is not guilty. Issue: Whether or not Calalo should be punished as co-principal of the crime even if he did not profit from it. Ruling: No, Calalo should not be punished. Evidence has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Calalo had participated in taking away the stolen animal, but did not partake of the sacrifice. The trial court has ruled correctly that the appellant is clear of liability as principal of the crime. Sc has made no finding since there is no evidence to support that the appellant has profited and had knowledge of its commission. The lower court has erred, in

the absence of a finding, that the appellant is an accessory after the fact of the crime charged penalizing him. To profit by effects of a crime is an element not of itself sufficient to determine a class, among others defined by law. There is lacking in the presence of another legal requirement- knowledge after the fact of the commission of the crime before or at the time he profited by its effects. Judgment is reversed and appellant has been acquitted.

People of the Philippines, apellee Vs. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, appellant G.R.No. 148912. September 10,2003

Facts: A review of a case finding appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentancing him to death. One evening on a benefit dance there came a conflict wherein the victim Brgy.kagawad Antonio Baliscan sustained stabbed wounds from the accused, Timoteo Escarlos, the body was unmoved for certain minutes until the victims son came and rush the wounded to the hospital, still the victim died, autopsy conducted revealed that the victim sustained four (4) stabbed wounds, and of these, two were fatal, cutting lobes of the lungs; causing the death due to massive blood loss. The trial court believed that the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of Murder qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea of self-defense because there had been no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the persons who filed a case of malicious mischief against appellant, said case was filed five (5) months before the instant case happened. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Prosecutions evidence is sufficient? 2. Whether or not the Appellants plea of self-defense cognizant?

Ruling: Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence as an issue, the Court nonetheless, deliberated on it motu propio, because an automatic appeal in a criminal action opens he whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecutions evidence must be passed upon, especially in cases in which death penalty has been imposed by the trial court. Carefully examined the evidence for the prosecution and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution witness, son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident, undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant is clear and undisputed. He did not deny all the allegations against him and openly admitted that he killed the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from criminal liability. When the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of proving the elements. The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense . Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of appellant

that the victim, was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative. When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of appellant. Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased. Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the Attack. Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or determine the effects of his blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own life. As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense. The claim of appellant that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for the third time, even when the latter was about to fall. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor. Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.]The grant of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.

Related laws: Art.11 Par.1 of RPC Art. 249 of RPC People of the Phils. vs Reny De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 140680, 28 May 2004 FACTS: According to the prosecution, the appellant, Reny de los Reyes, went to the house of his uncle, took a stainless kitchen knife, and went out. At around the same time, Felomeno Omamos and his 5 year old son were leaving their house to tether their cow. The appellant appeared on a bicycle, pedalled behind them, and suddenly stabbed Omamos in the back, chest and elbow. This was witnessed by Omamos' wife who was went out of the house to give her husband an umbrella. Omamos died in the hospital due to his wounds, particularly the stab in the chest. (Also, the deceased was not autopsied nor was the medico-legal officer able to testify on the victim's medical records. The prosecution and appelant agreed to waive the said witness' presentation) The appellant is appealing the decision of RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of

Omamos. According to him, it was Omamos who first attacked him with the knife when he refused to heed the latter's threats of having him go another way. During the confrontation, de los Reyes managed to wrest the knife away from Omamos, then stabbed the latter then fled with the knife still on Omamos' chest. He later surrendered voluntarily to the police. He contends that he was merely acting in self-defense and that the RTC erred in believing the prosecution's testimony over his. ISSUES: 1. WON the RTC erred in believing the prosecution's testimony over his; 2. WON the appellant's alleged acting in self-defense is sufficiently justifiable RULING: The petition is dismissed, with modification that the civil indemnity and moral damages be lessened based on the prevailing jurisprudence. 1. In the appellant's invoking of self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in the defense of himself. For even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it is only in the strength of his own evidence that he can escape conviction for the killing his claim of self-defense already admits to. In this regard, the inconsistent testimony of his uncle and other incredible evidence failed to convince the court. But even if his testimony is the truth, 2. he cannot be said to have acted in self-defense. When the appellant managed to wrest the knife away from Omamos, the danger or risk to his life and limb has ceased. However, he persisted in attacking his adversary and delivered multiple stab wounds. Retaliation is not self-defense nor is it a justifiable circumstance. ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. Burden of proof, and Self-defense (page 155 of Reyes). Retaliation is not self-defense, and Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance (pages 166 and 167).

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee Vs. ISAGANI DESLATE and ROMY FRANCISCO alias "Romeo Francisco", Accused ISAGANI DESLATE, Appellant. Facts: On December 7, 1980, the victim was with Ben San Miguel in Barangay Estancia, Kalibo, Aklan, attending a town fiesta. At or about 9:30 in the evening, the two were at a nearby store where San Miguel purchased cigarettes. The victim was then settled on a bench when the accused Romy Francisco emerged from behind, and thrust a knife on his back. By instinct, he rose to confront his assailant and as he faced him, the accused, Isagani Deslate, appeared and buried his own knife on his chest. As he fell down, his companion, San Miguel, scampered away. Deslate gave him a chase but lost him. Placido Aguirre told the court further that he saw Francisco and Deslate on the night in question walking toward the store, and heard Deslate tell Francisco: "he is . . . the one." 2 Moments later, he saw Francisco knifing the victim at the back. The latter, he said, was seated on a bench facing Kalibo (meaning, the opposite direction), and who, upon being hit, swung his head to the right. As he turned, however, Deslate lunged at him with a knife and hit him on his chest. The victim fell down.: nad The victim was shortly dead. Issue: Whether or not reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty for Deslate Held:

Yes, reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty for Deslate. There is no merit in his contention that the penalty for murder, in view of the provision of the Constitution banning death sentences, has been amended to reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, for which reason, the proper penalty is allegedly the middle ground between these two penalties. In the case of People v. Muoz, 7 the Court held, over the dissent of six Justices, 8 that the penalty for murder is still reclusion temporal maximum to death, although where death appears to be the proper penalty, the court shall not impose it, but shall sentence the accused to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding the aforementioned dissent, Muoz has apparently gone down as the prevailing law. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that attended the offense, reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty.

Pp vs. GERONIMO G.R. No. L-35700 October 15, 1973 Facts Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo, and the deceased, Fermin Magbanua, arrived from the market place of Sigma, Capiz, already drunk and stopped at the store of one Fesertas Bacalangco to buy ten liters of tuba. After drinking, Fermin Magbanua and the accused started to go home, but after having gone several meters away from the store of Fesertas Bacalangco, Fermin Magbanua was hit on the face by a sling shot wielded by one Eleodoro Carlos. Fermin fell to the ground and Romeo Geronimo ran to where he had fallen and held him, while Jose Geronimo went around and hit Fermin on the head with a stone, rendering him unconscious. While Fermin was held unconscious by Romeo, Enrico Geronimo took Fermin's bolo from his waist and hacked the latter on the right ankle joint and Jose also boloed his left ankle joint, almost severing it. Fermin Magbanua died as a result of his wounds. Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo were charged before the Court of First Instance of Capiz with murder committed. Hence, this appeal. Issue Whether both appellants should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting appellant Romeo Geronimo inspite of his alleged non-participation in the aggression against the deceased Held Appellant's acts were committed with treachery which qualifies the offense as murder punishable, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As appellant Jose Geronimo lacked the intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, this mitigating circumstance may be appreciated in his favor. Accordingly, the penalty should be imposed upon him in its minimum period, or reclusion temporal, maximum. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, a penalty ranging from prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporal, medium, shall be imposed.

As regards appellant Romeo Geronimo, who is liable as an accomplice, a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for a principal should be imposed. Accordingly, an indeterminate penalty ranging from the maximum of prision correccional, minimum, to the medium of prision mayor, as maximum should be imposed on him. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified by sentencing appellant Jose Geronimo to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Romeo Geronimo as accomplice is sentenced to serve from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day toprision mayor, as maximum.

People vs Pugay CASE DIGEST (Criminal Law Art. 8) FACTS: Bayani Miranda, deceased, and the accused, Fernando Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book.Sometime after midnight Pugay and Benjamin Samson with several other companions arrived drunk and started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Not content with what they were doing, Pugay took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Mirandas body.Gabion told Pugay not to d o the deed but Samson was already in the process of pouring the gasoline.Samson then set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident, gave their written statements. ISSUES: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused? HELD: There is no conspiracy in this case. Under Art. 8 of the RPC, conspiracy is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed. Since there was no animosity between Miranda and the accused, and add to that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of Miranda. Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against Miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim. Pugay, having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased is GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE.

Samson since there are no sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy) and granted the mitigating circumstance that he never intended to commit so grave a wrong is GUILTY OF HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. Us vs Suningsubing Pareng Eduard Facts: One evening of October1914, Pablo Montealtos wife was walking along one of the streets of the municipality of San Remigio, Cebu, and when near the cockpit she was accosted by a Japanese called Mariano who made to her unchaste and indecent proposals, which she at once rejected. Thereupon said Japanese violently seized one of her hands and refused to turn her loose in spite of the suggestion of Juan Subingsubing who approached the place where they were and told the Japanese to let the woman go because she was married. At that instant her husband, Pablo Montealto, came up to take part in the struggle that had been begun, whereupon the Japanese, after having insulted the woman with a slanderous phrase, let her go and immediately turning upon her husband Pablo Montealto, and old man of 78 years, suddenly hit him in the face, shoved him down to the ground, then got on top of him and with one hand choke while beating him with his fist. In this situation, Juan Subingsubing (defendant), fearing that the person assaulted would come to grief, according to his declaration on the stand, approached the combatants and said to Montealto, Dont move, for he was going to pull the assailant off; whereupon he heard Montealto say that he (Montealto) had stabbed the Japanese with a gaff such as is used on gamecocks. When Montealto was asked why he had wounded his assailant, he replied that it was because the latter had attempted to abuse his wife and had attacked him. But it appears in the case that the eyewitnesses of the fight, Alipio Sinining, 12 years of age, testified that in the midst of the fight, when Montealto was stretched out on the ground, with the Japanese on top of him choking him, Juan Subingsubing went up close and handed him something, but the witness did not clearly see the object (actually it is a small knife used by the defendant for his self-defense). According to further investigation the Japanese lay seriously wounded shows that the latter had a wound in his abdomen toward the left side under the last rib and in the next day the man died because of this serious injuries he acquired. Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of homicide. Ruling: No. the defendant Juan Subingsubing is not guilty of homicide. For the reason, that the defendant is in the bridge of a critical position and plainly unable to defend himself he used the small knife as an assistance of his act. If one who defends a third person under the conditions and with the requisites the penal law lays down for exempting him from responsibility should be acquitted of the charge in a case prosecuted against him, then when a person who did nothing more than furnish a weapon to one whom he saw in peril and in great need of defending himself and repelling a serious assault as defendant was doing. Assaulted made lawful and reasonable use of the weapon furnished him and he has been declared exempt from responsibility, it is illogical and unjust to deny to said assistant the same exemption from responsibility and the exoneration granted the slayer on the grounds of self-defense. Principle(s) used: Exemption from criminal responsibility on the ground of defense No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code.

US V. LAUREL FACTS: On the night of December 26, 1909, while Concepcion Lat was walking along the street on her way from the house of Exequiel Castillo, her current suitor, she was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately ran off in the direction of Castillos house. On the 28th, while Castillo and Laurel, together with Domingo Panganiban and several others of the defendant were at an entertainment held on an upper floor of the parochial building of Tanauan, it is alleged that Castillo and Laurel were invited by Panganiban to come out into the yard. After the exchange of a few words and explanations concerning the kiss given to Lat on the night of the 26th of that month, a quarrel arose between Laurel and Castillo, in which Panganiban, Vicente Garcia, and Conrado Laurel took part. As a result of the quarrel, Castillo was seriously wounded but he succeeded in reaching a drug store near by where he received first aid treatment and Laurel also received two slight wounds on the head. Dr. Sixto Rojas rendered medical assistance to Castillo stated that his examination of the latters injuries disclosed a wound in the left side of the chest, on a level with the fourth rib, from 3 to 4 centimeters in depth, reaching into the lung; another wound in the back of the left arm and in the conduit through which the ulnar nerve passes, from 10 to 11 centimeters in length, penetrating to the bone and injuring the nerves and arteries of the said region, especially the ulnar nerve, which was served; a contusion on the right temple, accompanied by ecchymosis and hemorrhage of the tissues of the eye; and, finally, another contusion in the back of the abdomen near the left cavity, which by reaction injured the stomach and the right cavity. After the trial, it is concluded that it was Castillo who invited Laurel to come down from the upper story of the parochial building, and that it was he, therefore, who provoked the affray aforementioned, and, also, it was he who unlawfully assaulted Laurel by striking the latter two blows with a cane in as much as it is not likely that after having received a dangerous wound in the left breast, he would have been able to strike his alleged assailant two successive blows and much less pursue him. It is very probable that he received the said wounds after he had assaulted Jose Laurel with the cane, and Laurel, on his part, in defending himself from the assault employed rational means by using the knife that he carried in his pocket. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants should be acquitted on the basis of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code? RULING: Yes. Exequiel Castillos wounds were very serious, but, in view of the fact that conclusive proof was adduced at the trial, of the attendance of the requisites prescribed in Nos. 4 and 5 of article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of those who inflicted the said wounds, it is proper to apply to this case the provision contained in the next to the last paragraph of rule 51 of the provisional law for the application of the said code. GR No. 42607 September 28, 1935 People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee Vs Juan Quianzon, defendant-appellant FACTS

There is one Andres Aribuado who went to ask food in the kitchen from Juan Quianzon who had the victuals in his care. Aribuado approached the accused often for the same purpose and after a while exclaimed that he is wounded and was dying, raising his shirt which shows the wound in his abdomen below his navel. Aribuado died as a result of his wound in the tenth day. A Roman Bagabay, also testified that he saw the accused attacked Aribuado. The accused then admitted that he attacked the victim with a bamboo spit and had applied a fireband to the victims neck which is approved by another witness named Llaguno. ISSUE Whether or not, the crime of homicide should be filed against the accused? RULING No, accused cant be liable of homicide but only of serious physical injury. The contention of homicide is without merit because the accused never intend to kill the victim, whereas, the latter died because of the infection he got from not following his doctors prescription. According to 13 R. C. L., 748, one who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not reli eve the actor of responsibility. However, the court ruled to give appellant an indeterminate penalty of prison correctional and prison mayor, with costs.

Related Article: 13 R. C. L., 748 Article in the RPC - Homicide