Seangio v. Reyes PRs, Alfredo Seangio et.

. al filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of the lateSegundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that Segundo left a holographic willdisinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the disinheritance was due to Alfredosmaltreatment to his father Segundo. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event thedecedent is found to have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automaticallysuspended and replaced by the proceedings of the will. PRs moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings contending that the allegedwill of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thatall other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir. Devisee or legateehence there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos w i l l d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a u n i v e r s a l h e i r o r h e i r s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o n e o r m o r e compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,petitioners and PRs alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate .ISSUE: WON THE COMPULSORY HEIRS IN THE DIRECT LINE WERE PRETERITED IN THE WILL. HELD: No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.A c c o r d i n g t o t h e S C , i t w a s S e g u n d o s l a s t e x p r e s s i o n t o b e q u e a t h h i s e s t a t e t o a l l h i s compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to theexclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name wasincluded only as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

Alonzo vs iac

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents. Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. Luis R. Reyes for private respondent. Ponente: CRUZ FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code. HELD: YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated. RATIO: The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will.

Alonzo vs. IAC Facts Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal a pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents In 1963, Celestino Padua sold his undivided share to the petitioners for the sum of P550 In 1964, Eustaquia Padua sold her share to the petitioners for the sum of P440

Tecla Padua filed a complaint invoking her right of redemption to the said property Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the right had lapsed not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice the co heirs have actual knowledge of the sales The respondent court reversed the decision and declared that actual notice would not suffice as substitute citing the cases of De Conejero and Butte, both cases conformed to a similar requirement under Art. 1623 of NCC which provides that the notice must be in writing Issue W/N the SC should the case based on the strict letter of the law or to the spirit or intent of the lawmakers in enacting the said law? Ruling SC deviated from the strict letter of the law . They emphasized that themselves did not abandoned the DE Conejero and Buttle doctrines they merely adopted an exception to the general rule. The right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made. Sc declared that by requiring written proof of such notice they will be favoring the palpable false claim of ignorance of the petitioners, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.