Lecture 12: Dennett & Instrumentalism Reading for next weeks lecture Dennetts True Believers from Lycans

Mind and Cognition Instrumentalism This is the view in philosophy of science that theoretical entities are useful devices for predicting the data, not (necessarily) descriptions of reality. Note: You can be instrumentalist in philosophy of mind with out being an instrumentalist about science in general. Instrumentalism in philosophy of mind tends to be a reaction to some of the somewhat bizarre ontological claims made by dualists, behaviourists, identity theorists and functionalists. In philosophy of mind the theoretical entities are mental states. So the idea is to ask if we can explore intentional states at a level of abstraction that bypasses debates between functionalists, identity theorists etc. In a series of books (most recently The Intentional Stance) Dan Dennett asks us to think about how we predict the behaviour of systems with which we interact. He claims that there are three distinct strategies. The Physical Stance This predicts the system's behaviour by analysing the interactions of its physical parts under the laws of physics. There are limits to this strategy. There is a limit to the amount of complexity we can comprehend. There are also obvious limits to our ability to collect data within a very complex system. Thus, the physical stance is not much use in the prediction of human behaviour (although in principle that ought to be possible). The Design Stance Many systems are too complex for the physical stance. Human artefacts and evolved organisms can be understood by asking 'what is it for' and assuming that it will perform this function well. In this way, most of us use the design stance when dealing with technology. Few of us would be able to operate a TV if we had to rely upon the physical stance. The Intentional Stance Some systems can be only understood by assuming that they are rational, and that they will act so as to achieve their goals (desires) given their
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beliefs. This is how Dennett thinks folk psychology achieves its predictive power. It is called taking the intentional stance. This is not to say that people always act so as to maximise the achievement of their desires. That would be to legislate irrationality out of existence. Rather, by assuming that people behave rationally, we are on average good at predicting their behaviour. Somewhat more technically, the intentional stance works because we can employ a principle of charity. We assume that others are rational and in particular, we assume that their beliefs are similar to yours. Why are non-physical 'stances' needed? Dennett imagines a Martian who could use the physical stance. There is pattern in nature that the Martian is not seeing. Dennett notes how amazed the Martian would be at our ability to predict the behaviour of unimaginably complex systems with very limited intellectual resources. This is because we are aware of the dynamics of systems at a higher level of description. The Martian would thus be forced to accept the possibility of our higher level of analysis (in terms of intentionalty). Rationality Using the intentional stance requires that have a good story about what it is for something to be rational. This is hard to define. There are two common approaches. A 'thin' definition is: obeys the laws of the laws of probability and decision theories. This leaves some very mad people as purely rational. Furthermore, If we adhere to it strictly, it casts doubt on their being any rational people at all (for the claim that most people are most people are not good at obeying the laws of probability and decision theory see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). 'Thick' definitions involve value judgements, particularly about what it would be rational to desire. This is problematic because prima facie it is confusing rationality with morality. Is Dennett an Instrumentalist It is a charge that he denies. He insists that he is an intentional realist. According to his theory there really are beliefs and desires. He is certainly a realist about functionalism and about the syntactic nature of thought. But he doesn't seem to think that any 'taking apart' of the mind at any level of description will reveal structures that map neatly onto those of folk-psychology. He takes the ontology of higher level theories quite seriously, so apparently be does think that beliefs and desires are real and irreducible. What he denies is that intentional states are visible from the perspective of the physical stance.

Problems for the instrumentalists One problem for instrumentalism about intentional states is that the apparent ontology of mental states is so bizarre that it makes the subject inherently interesting. A second problem has to do with the breadth of the systems that we can analyse using the intentional stance. We talk all the time as if computers were intentional systems - the computer wants you to load more paper into the printer. In theory we can employ the intentional stance when analysing very simple systems - the thermostat turned on the heater because it believed the room was too cold. Dennetts answer in True Believers is that what makes us true believers is that we can employ the intentional stance as well as being able to be analysed in terms of it. Reading Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. Dennett, Daniel C. Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 8 (1971): 87-106. Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. Judgment under uncertainty : heuristics and biases. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Jackson, F. and D. Braddon-Mitchell (1996). The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. Chapter 9.