V.

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER **No Marino vs Gamilla ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Facts: Toribio claimed to have laid off workers from National Labor Union due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory. The Court of industrial relations, represented by the SolGen forwarded a motion for recon with the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the National Labor Union prays for the vacation of the judgment of the trial court and have a new trial in CIR on the grounds of: 1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis 2. the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work. 3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme 4. The company union was an employer dominated one ( National Workers Brotherhood) 5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable. 6. the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always been the rule 7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union. 8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents. 9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment. Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial? Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR. There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the

Government. The function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not

bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. Some examples that it must follow are: 1. right to a hearing 2. consideration of evidence by the court 3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached 4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules 5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies. 6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustnt merely accept the views of a subordinate. 7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision. The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law. Evidence was still inaccessible. The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him.However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved

Suntay vs People Facts: the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition to enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the petitioners passport without previous hearing On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old (so go rape diay ni si Alicia nubla) On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioners Claim: while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing Held: Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in

withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon are undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

(Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September 1959, in this tenor: "In reply to yours of even date requesting that you be furnished copy of the decision, order or resolution of the Board of Commissioners denying the application for extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be advised that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that Mr. Bisschop is hereby required to depart within five (5) days of this notice." No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Issues: (a) Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; b) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases. Ruling of the Court: We fully agree with appellant's contention on several grounds. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant. Facts of the Case: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports

uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on matters of petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing, appellee relies on Section 8 of the Immigration Act, which provides that in "any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail". However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the word "decision", as employed in this section, obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. The Sampaguita Shoe case (102 Phil., 850), which was taken into account by the lower court, is not applicable to the case at bar; it applies to judicial decision, as provided in Section 1, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in appellant's brief, where the intention of the lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay.

According to the Board, Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporationis involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations. A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Acting on the motion for recon filed by Solar, the Board issued an Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. Solar, however, went to the RTC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC dismissed. CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA declared the Writ of Execution null and void. Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. Ruling: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders. It may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, Facts: 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.

Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary. Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life." From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and

sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing regulations. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Montemayor vs Bundalian FACTS: Montemayor was the OIC-Regional Director, Region III of DPWH. He was removed from office due to a lettercomplaint submitted by respondent Bundalian to the Philippine Consulate where the petitioner was accused of accumulating unexplained wealth which he allegedly amassed through lahar funds. With the letter were attached documents such as the Grant Deed for a big-ass house in California and an SPA for petitioners sister-in-law authorizing her to purchase the property. The Consulate forwarded the complaint to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption for investigation. The petitioner then submitted his counter-affidavit but refused to submit his SALN. He also defended that similar charges against him were discharged due to insufficiency of evidence. PCAGC then submitted its report to the Office of the Pressident which concurred with the PCAGC that his property was unlawfully acquired. His appeal to the CA was likewise dismissed. On appeal to the SC, he contended that the decisions of the Office of the President and the PCGAC in establishing his guilt were not supported by evidence. ISSUES: 1. WON he was denied due process 2. WON the charges against him were not backed by substantial evidence WON the dismissals by the Ombudsman of similar complaints were binding on the current case (res adjudicata). HELD: 1. He was afforded due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard, he was represented by counsel and he was allowed to present his counter-affidavit. He also was able to attend the hearings and filed motions in his favor before the PCAGC. On the third issue, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.[15]Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and

control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. 3. LASTLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, on the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.[10] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.

2.

****NO OCAMPO vs OMBUDSMAN

JUDGMENT ****NO SERRANO vs PSC IN RE MATTER OFTHEPETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS( PIO NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION) FACTS: Pio Neria(Petitioner) seeks to inquire into the legality of his arrest by agents of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, and his subsequent detention at the Bureau of Immigration's detention station. Petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong. The immigration inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents, referred the matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen". The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing. The said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for petitioner's admission. into the Philippines. This written decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, who attest that he "was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines". The Secretary of Justice then issued a Memorandum Order directing that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is directed to review, all decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country. In compliance with the directive, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the petitioner's case. On September 4, 1962 the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the Philippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port from where he came. The present petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioner claiming that he "has been unlawfully and illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station by

Respondents agents. The lower court granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible because the question involved in this case is purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application in this case." ISSUE: WON the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioner valid so as to justify petitioners detention. HELD: The legality or illegality of the petitioner's detention or confinement3 depends upon resolution of the issue of whether the decision of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as amended, which provides in part that [t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision.... August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case. That date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision." HOWEVER, the minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners show that as late on August 8, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the case of the petitioner. The alteration of the date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. On August 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by section 27 (b). The said decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are therefore, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become "final." The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is vested with power of control and supervision over the said Board.11 We have already held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",12 or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon.13 The case at bar falls under this exceptions. ****NO MANILA ELECTRIC vs PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS ****NO NASIPIT vs NLRC Clavanovs HLURB

When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the HLURB Regional Office issued a Writ of Execution. Eventually, the spouses complained via a motion to the HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was unnotarized, and that the TCT was still in Clavanos name. They also asked Clavano to pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and taxes, among others. HLURB granted this motion via an Order.

Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB Order amended the final HLURB Decision which, according to Clavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses will be the ones to answer for the expenses involved in the transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order, denied Clavanos motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB Orders, and so the Sheriff demanded from Clavano the reimbursements sought by the spouses.

Held:

Facts: Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who paid 50% of the purchase price. Alleging the spouses default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent payments and instead sued them for rescission of the contract and forfeiture of all prior payments made. This was however dismissed.

Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is left with no other authority but to enforce the decisions dispositive portion, which it can no longer amend, modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment. Clavano is correct in availing of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity. Subsequent HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses incurred do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision. The Orders cannot be considered part of the decision which must be executed against Clavano. The obligation to pay for such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale and the certificate of title. The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative to the transfer of title when the spouses did not allege this obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to prove this cause of action. Sps. Tenaza only sought the enforcement of the mutually binding contract to sell so that

The spouses filed a specific performance complaint with the HLURB Cebu Regional Office against Clavano to compel it to honor the contract. They asked for judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, plus damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of the spouses, and this was upheld by the HLURB in its Decision, and the Office of the President. The petitions of Clavano in the CA and the SC were not given merit due to its failure to comply with rules on civil procedure.

they could finally own the house and lot but did not ask for the transfer of the title at Clavanos expense. Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may or may not result in its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for registering and titling the subject house and lot - a matter pre-dating the filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and in fact, written in the contract to sell - does not qualify as a supervening event. The foregoing matters, in addition to alleging them in the complaint, should have also been heard during the trial on the merits before the HLURB where the parties could have proved their respective claims. However, believing that the assailed rulings were merely part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB instead precipitately resolved the issue in favor of the spouses without notice and hearing. Since the Orders are a wide departure from and a material amplification of the final and at least executory HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and absolutely unenforceable for any purpose.After the decision has become final and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. Under the circumstances, SC has no authority to unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executed HLURB Decision. The general power of courts to amend their judgments or orders to make them conformable to justice cannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error as a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curable without a proper proceeding filed before the judgment had become final. The spouses are barred from raising the issue either in the instant case or in another action. Under Sec. 47, Rule 39, a final and executory judgment is conclusive upon any matter that could have been raised in relat ion thereto.

Facts of the Case: Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:. "168. Original jurisdictional interpartes proceedings. The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences taxes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official of the office designated by the Director but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.). In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Patents has authority to delegate the hearing of petitioners cases to hearing officers. Ruling of the Court: It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the general lawand Republic Acts Nos. 165 and 166 to sustain the contention of

Petition for certiorari GRANTED.

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ, respondents.

petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166). It has been held that power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings,decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent,cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of interference,cancellation cases under the Trademark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious

consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, vs. LUCINA S. SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila Facts: Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paraaque for P307,800.00 On July 18, 1989, Sendinopaid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI informed Sendinoof the cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989.

April 20, 1990, Sendinofiled a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be the to be the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023. April 3, 1991 the HLURBrendered its judgment in favor ofSendinoand ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to paySendino moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP) January 7, 1993. OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied. Issues: 1) Whether OP erred in declaring that the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of express grant by Executive Order No. 90 which created it. 2) And even if the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, whether OP likewise seriously erred in declaring that the Board of Commissioners is allowed to sit in a decision to render judgment and to delegate its quasi-judicial authority to a subordinate office.

special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the NHA (now HLURB) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. NHA and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency." Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasijudicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." 14 Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question. 2) Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample authority both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies

Ruling: 1) The President issued EO 90 S. 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the government.Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing development in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB,would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition. United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's

or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it.

The PCGG issued an order for the sequestration of the respondents Sipalay and Allied Bank for ill-gotten wealth of Lucio Tan and others. Sipalay and Allied opposed the orders in the Supreme Court buy the SC remanded the resolution to Sandiganbayan. PCGG also issued search and seizure orders against the bank documents of Sipalay and Allied Bank which are necessary for the investigation. However, despite Sipalays motions opposing the sequestration orders, the PCGG did not act on its motions and proceeded to start sequestration. In the Sandiganbayan, the validity of the search and seizure order was under question for lack of prima facie foundations. PCGG presented witnesses, all of whom testified for the validity of the search order by pointing out documents which would justify the issuance of the search order. The PCGG, however, never tendered any of the evidence pointed out by the witnesses. Instead, it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. PCGG likewise contends that its filing of a motion to dismiss should halt the period within which to present their evidence. The Sandiganbayan ruled against PCGG and considered only the testimonies of the witnesses without documentary evidence to support its claims. Sandiganbayan invalidated PCGGs orders. ISSUES: WON there was exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary before assailing the sequestration orders. WON the motion to dismiss halted the time within which to present evidence to the court. WON the search and seizure orders were backed by sufficient prima facie foundations. HELD: 1. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: "Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a

In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in ordering petitioners to comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract between the original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary incidents to the proper exercise of its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body those functions so necessary in carrying out its power to regulate housing and land use results in its effective emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area vital to the national economy. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SEARCH AND ARREST

REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN DISCLAIMER: The case was very long so there was some difficulty in consolidating it into a coherent piece. Try focusing your reading more on the last two paragraphs of the ruling portion. FACTS:

ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time. 2. The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved first and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the light of the "peculiarities" of this case where there was nothing left for the parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of the PCGG's written formal offer of documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. That the 20-day period was not suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay the running of the period for filing its written formal offer of evidence as agreed upon and ordered in open court could not have the effect of suspending the period. Without express leave of court, PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend the running of the period agreed upon. PCGG is deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence on record. 3. The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII. The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY " for lack of sufficient prima facie factual foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN'S exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has

not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence "must be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With respect to documents, however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer. Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the PCGG does not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista's supervening death in the course of her cross-examination, the controlling case is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the Court allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any crossexamination, with more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness' death (as in Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Dr. Doromal was basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming from Malacaang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered. Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all. That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself worthless. The same can be said of deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents she referred to were totally unrelated to the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY. The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the

PCGG; and the Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v.PCGG" simplified these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an active and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" and being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acid test for validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under which it was issued the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution. Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish probable cause. This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents she identified but which were never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge to bolster the PCGG'S claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a "judge" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY REFERS TO "all bank documents" which is too all embracing,

the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of seizure warrant is not a particular description, thus contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized. Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity.

****NO In RE: Harvey ****NO Guevara vs COMELEC

VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES PAAT vs. CA FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration of the order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents Regional Trial Court issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. ISSUE: Instances where disregarded. Exhaustion of Remedies may be

letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. 24 It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, the assumption by the trial courtof the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

HELD: The plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. A party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court; it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22 In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. In their letter of reconsideration, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus: xxx xxx xxx If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this

****NO LOPEZ vs MANILA ****NO Uy vs PALOMAR LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING BOARD, and JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA, respondents.

Facts: On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the "Board" for brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation Committee" which would look into the complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner, Leandro garcia, then administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed by him. The Investigation Committee, after conducting formal hearings on the charges against petitioner by complainant Antonio Pua found prima facie evidence that petitioner indeed committed a crime. The PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an administrative complaint, gainst herein petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young coconuts" or "buko." The Board, placed petitioner under preventive suspension.

The petitioner through his lawyer employ tactics that delayed the proceeding prompting the Board to issue Resolution No. 046-89 stating that the period of delay in the disposition of the case caused by petitioner shall not be counted in the computation of preventive suspension and petitioner's re-assumption of office shall require prior notice of reinstatement by the Board. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted by the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion, dated 04 July 1989, praying for the creation of a new investigating committee and that, pending resolution thereof, the Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting further proceedings. The RTC did not grant the petition, but ordered that evidence of petitioner will be received on whether a temporary restraining order shall be issued. Later, the Board issued Resolution No. 070-89 finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge and imposing upon him the penalty of forced resignation. However, the RTC issue a TRO stopping the respondent Board from implementing its resolution. Respondent appealed to CA which granted the lifting of TRO. Issue: 1. WON CA erred in granting the motion of lifting the TRO. (answer is in relation to exhaustion of administrative remedies) 2. WON the Philippine Coconut Authority violate administrative due process

competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. Petitioner would insist that the Grageda Investigation Committee defied the restraining order ("TRO") issued by the trial court when it submitted to the Board on 21 August 1989 its resolution finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charges and recommending the penalty of forced resignation, later adopted and approved by the Board in its Resolution No. 070-89 on 25 August 1989. There was no such defiance. The trial court issued the TRO on 26 July 1989, and it became functus oficio after 15 August 1989. Thus, when the Grageda Investigation Committee submitted its recommendation to the Board on 21 August 1989, which the latter adopted and approved on 25 August 1989 in its Resolution No. 070-89, respondents were no longer under any legal restraint. The second issue of alleged violation by the PCA of administrative due process must also be dealt with against petitioner. The petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to submit his case at the administrative level. He filed an answer to the administrative complaint and his refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. The essence of due process to him was that opportunity to be heard Petitioner imputes violation by the PCA of administrative due process for having conducted a hearing to determine a"prima facie case" against him when no such hearing is required. The proceedings, he asseverates, reflects PCA's departure from the administrative procedures set forth in Section 38, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, which provides: "SECTION 38.Procedure in Administrative Cases Against NonPresidential Appointees. (a) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons. "(b)In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If

Held: No on both issue. The records would show that petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the trial court even while the administrative investigation was yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be available to him. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special

a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case." Petitioner's stance is patently bereft of merit. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the conduct of a formal hearing or investigation to ascertain whether or not a "prima facie case indeed exists to warrant the filing of a formal administrative charges." Nor could petitioner rightly claim that the Investigation Committee was biased against him. It should be noted that the composition of the Investigation Committee was repeatedly changed, per PCA Board Resolution No. 039-89, No. 109-88, No. 011-89 and No. 017-89, all because of petitioner's claim of partiality. The PCA demonstrated its objectivity in proceeding with the investigation by accommodating petitioner to the fullest. An endless request for the recomposition of the Committee would be to unduly prolong the investigation and the PCA should not be faulted when it finally denied the subsequent like requests of petitioner. The conduct of administrative disciplinary cases are outlined in the Civil Service Law or P.D. 807 vesting it in the heads of agencies subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission under the circumstances outlined in the law. PCA Board Resolution No. 046-89 has expressed that "the period of delay in the disposition of the case, resulting from petitioner's requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by counsel of respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, shall not be counted in computing the period of preventive suspension." This holding accords with the provisions of Section 42 of P.D. 807

"SECTION 42.Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided."

The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy which should not be ignored. The doctrine insures an orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible

Gonzales vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders dated November 27, 1990 and April 22, 1991 from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director Antonio S. Maraya, and issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 3 . Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles 4 to her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land.

On December 20, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petitionwith Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land.

the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

the proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. 24 From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just compensation. 25 Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. IaDcTC KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents. Facts of the Case: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 20012002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and ElissaBaladad, respectively, as teachers. In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals failed to exhaust the administrative remedies

Held: The petition is devoid of merit. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. 8 It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. 9 Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. 10 Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applicable in this case.

The petitioner raises the following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as applicable to the case at bar: (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process; and (3) where the question involved is a purely legal one.

attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and ElissaBaladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy. On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaintfor damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. Ruling of the Court: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. . . . Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified. Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is

applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. BATELEC II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC., vs. ENERGY INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB), PUYAT STEEL CORP. (PSC) AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC),

Facts: BATELEC II is an electric cooperative authorized to distribute electric power in Rosario, Province of Batangas. PSC is a galvanizing steel sheet company in the Philippines having been established in 1956. Granted a pioneer status by the Board of Investments, it embarked to build in Rosario, Batangas Province, its new plant, envisioned as a modern galvanizing plant utilizing a state-of-the-art nonoxidizing furnace-type process, the first of its kind in the country. As this new plant would entail a delivery voltage of 69 kilovolts (kv), PSC commenced on 14 November 1997 its negotiations for the supply of said energy requirement with BATELEC II, the electric franchise holder in the area. As the 69 kv transmission lines owned by the NPC are located about 1.4 kilometers away from the plant, PSC and BATELEC II entered into an agreement wherein the latter, not having any 69 kv transmission lines at present, shall handle the construction of the needed 69 kv transmission lines. 02 December 1996, BATELEC IIsubmitted to PSC a Bill of Materials for the proposed construction, P2,956,838.56 with a proviso that additional costs shall later be incurred for other items. December 1996, PSC accepted BATELEC II's proposal.BATELEC II vouched to complete the installation of the needed facilities by April 1997. Yet, BATELEC II botched in making good its part of the bargain.The scheduled completion was never fulfilled by BATELEC II even several months after the targeted date.

17 November 1997, PSC filed with the Bureau an application for direct connection with the NPC.The Bureau, under the umbrella of the Department of Energyderives its mandate from Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 7638. As a standard operating procedure, the Bureau, in its evaluation of an application for direct power connection, whether new or for renewal, takes into account the technical or financial capability of the electric franchise holder in the applicant's site, in this case BATELEC II, to serve the energy needs of the applicant. For the purpose of looking for any possibility of settlement, the parties concerned were invited to a conference on 17 December 1997. Bureau decreed that BATELEC II's claim that it had already constructed the needed 69 kv transmission lines has remained a bare claim, not supported by evidence on record as BATELEC II itself admitted in the meeting of 17 December 1997 that it has yet to construct said facility. Further, the Bureau made the determination that BATELEC II was neither technically nor financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power supply to PSC. From all the findings, it is clear that BATELEC II failed to meet the performance standards set forth by ER 1-97.It is thus concluded that it is not capable of serving applicant's bulk energy needs. Accordingly, in a resolution dated 16 March 1998, the Bureau approved PSC's application for bulk power supply with the NPC after it made the determination that BATELEC II is not technically and financially capable of serving the bulk energy needs of PSC. PSC filed a complaint for Damages With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with RTC to enjoinBATELEC II from committing acts that would prevent direct power connection between respondents PSC and the NPC. RTC granted. BATELEC II filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. CA denied the petition on the grounds of: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies as petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Bureau's resolution; and (2) failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original copy of the Bureau's resolution in defiance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96. Relevant Issue: Whether the CA commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65

Ruling: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide controversies within their competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, however, there being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of administrative relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the Bureau's resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which under Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 31 has the power over the bureaus under the Department. It has not, as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the Court of Appeals against the Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner shown that the instant case falls among the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. 32 As found by the appellate court, petitioner has, likewise, failed to establish that it had filed a motion for reconsideration before its direct recourse to judicial review nor has it amply argued why it should be excused from the observance of such requirement. Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. As found by the appellate court, petitioner has,

likewise, failed to establish that it had filed a motion for reconsideration before its direct recourse to judicial review nor has it amply argued why it should be excused from the observance of such requirement. Equally specious is petitioner's train of thought that the requisite of filing a motion for reconsideration of the challenged resolution of the Bureau prior to filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals is dispensable in this case inasmuch as such petition is anchored on a purely question of law. 33 It is a settled rule, it is true, that on purely legal question the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies. This is because nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done in the administrative forum. But the pivotal issue in this case of whether petitioner, not the NPC, should supply the power needs of PSC requires a probe into the technical and financial capability of petitioner to meet the requirements of bulk power supply of PSC a question of fact, the determination of which is within the expertise of the Bureau. The contention of petitioner that the issue is on pure question of law is, therefore, hollow. Petitioner cannot in the guise of raising pure question of law, seek judicial intervention without exhausting the available administrative remedies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and of the Court of Appeals dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs DEFENSOR FACTS: The petitioner, Holy Spirit, is assailing the validity of the implementing rules of RA 9207. RA 9207 is a law which was passed by President Arroyo to secure land tenure for the urban poor. The respondents are ex-officio officers of the National Government Center Administration Committee which is an administrative body in charge of the National Government Center, a housing project. The respondents passed implementing rules and regulations for RA 9207 but was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the IRR were void for being inconsistent with RA 9207 and for being capricious, whimsical and arbitrary. ISSUE: WON the petitioners case should prosper. HELD: NO.

Merits: The policy of preference to the franchise holder is premised on the condition that such franchise holder must in the first place be capable of supplying adequately the power requirements of the BOI-registered customer and that such capability must first be ascertained through a hearing in due course. If after a hearing (or an opportunity for such hearing) it is established that the affected franchise holder is incapable or unwilling to match the reliability and rates of NPC, then a direct connection with NPC may be granted. This is the prevailing situation in the case at bar. Here, after due hearing and after careful consideration of the pleadings submitted by petitioner franchise holder and respondent PSC, the Bureau made the distinct finding that petitioner is not technically and financially capable of satisfying the power requirements of PSC. This determination by the Bureau, an administrative government agency which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In scores of cases, it is an elementary rule, sanctified by long and consistent usage, that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power.[13] The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14] Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and

injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15] True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[16] A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[17] In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[18] the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[19] A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,[20] the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.[23]Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an

ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. In a number of petitions,[24] the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.[25]

****NO DIMSON vs LOCAL WATER ****NO SAMAR ELECTRIC VS SELUDO INFORMATIONAN COMELEC FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act 8046,5 which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the elections in ARMM. Initially intending to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its Resolution No. 2985 eventually decided against full national implementation and limited the automation to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu.8 The Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid," which invites interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors to apply for eligibility and to bid for the procurement by purchase, lease, lease with option to purchase, or otherwise, supplies, equipment, materials and services needed for a comprehensive Automated Election System. TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION vs.

Out of the 57 bidders,13 the Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) found Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. Fve individuals and entities protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted. Respondents claim that petitioners acted prematurely, since they had not first utilized the protest mechanism available to them under RA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, for the settlement of disputes pertaining to procurement contracts. Respondents assert that throughout the bidding process, petitioners never questioned the BAC Report finding MPC eligible to bid and recommending the award of the Contract to it (MPC). According to respondents, the Report should have been appealed to the Comelc en banc, pursuant to the aforementioned sections of RA 9184. In the absence of such appeal, the determination and recommendation of the BAC had become final. ISSUE: WON there is a need to Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. HELD: Section 55 of RA 9184 states that protests against decisions of the Bidding and Awards Committee in all stages of procurement may be lodged with the head of the procuring entity by filing a verified position paper and paying a protest fee. On the other hand, Section 58 provides that court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated by the statute shall have been completed. Cases filed in violation of this process are to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to Respondent MPC even before the BAC managed to issue its written report and recommendation. Thus, how could petitioners have

appealed the BACs recommendation or report to the head of the procuring entity (the chairman of Comelec), when the Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation? It is claimed25 by Comelec that during its April 15, 2003 session, it received and approved the verbal report and recommendation of the BAC for the award of the Contract to MPC, and that the BAC subsequently re-affirmed its verbal report and recommendation by submitting it in writing on April 21, 2003. However, it is obvious that petitioners could have appealed the BACs report and recommendation to the head of the procuring entity (the Comelec chair) only upon their discovery thereof, which at the very earliest would have been on April 21, 2003, when the BAC actually put its report in writing and finally released it. And even assuming arguendo that petitioners had somehow gotten wind of the verbal BAC report on April 15, 2003, the Comelec en banc itself made it legally impossible for petitioners to avail themselves of the administrative remedy that the Commission is so impiously harping on. There is no doubt that they had not been accorded the opportunity to avail themselves of the process provided under Section 55 of RA 9184, according to which a protest against a decision of the BAC may be filedwith the head of the procuring entity. Some Observations on the BAC Report to the Comelec Respondents may not have realized it, but the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. In the light of Paat v. Court of Appeals.29 Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded. The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable."

Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of RTC Olongapo City, Branch 72, issued an order denying respondents' motions to dismiss and granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

****NO Philhealth vs Chinese General Hospital *****NO SUNVILLE vs ABAD ALFREDO ESTRADA, RENATO T. CANILANG and MANUEL C. LIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION (BCC), respondents.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision, granting BCC's petition on motion to dismiss on the grounds of :

1.

denial of said Motion to Dismiss by the Court a quo, was a grave abuse of discretion because of the doctrine of Administrative Remedy the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is general in character while the jurisdiction of DENR is very specific xxxx xxxx the complaint filed by the private respondents has no prayer for preliminary injunction

2. 3. 4. 5.

Facts: Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract, which in turn became the basis of a sublease in favor of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a violation of the first lease because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue, Subic, Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC's cement plant is a nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of their properties.

Issue: Whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court

Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with.

Defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC filed separate motions to dismiss, both alleging that the complaint states no cause of action. BCC, in its motion, added that: the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court; that the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the matter. Respondent Serrano of the DENR also filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was no cause of action insofar as he is concerned since there was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on his part.

Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the DENR first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondent's cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying for. We do not agree. Republic Act No. 3931, An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission, was passed on June 18, 1964 to maintain reasonable standards of purity for the waters and air of the country with their utilization for domestic, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate purposes. It created the NPCC which had the power, to issue, renew, or deny permits, for the prevention and abatement of pollution. 26 In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 984 was enacted to strengthen the NPCC giving it, among others, the following: Sec. 6.Powers and Functions. . . . xxx xxx xxx (e)Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. EAISDH (f)Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of

pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof . . . xxx xxx xxx (j)serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. P.D. No. 984 also empowered the commission to issue ex parte orders directing the discontinuance or temporary suspension or cessation of operation of an establishment or person generating sewage or wastes without the necessity of prior public hearing whenever it finds a prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceed the allowable standards set by the commission. 27 Executive Order No. 192 was passed, reorganizing the DENR. It transferred the power of the NPCC to the Environmental Management Bureau 28 and created the PAB, under the Office of the Secretary, which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984.

Cases where doctrine of administrative remedy is not observed: (1)when there is a violation of due process, HCacDE (2)when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(g)Issue,

(4)when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)when there is irreparable injury, (6)when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,

On July 19, 1986, the Philippine Ports Authority canceled its arrastre management contract with Metro Port Services, Inc. and directly assumed the cargo handling operations in the South Harbor of Manila.

(7)when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)when it would amount to nullification of a claim, a

Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those positions of trust and confidence, shall be absorbed by grantee. Labor or employees benefits provided for under existing CBA shall likewise be honored. Marina retained the bulk of the 2,700-man personnel of Metro but refused to continue the employment of 65 of the 123 persons constituting the security force. The guards excluded were served with notices of separation effective on various dates during the period from July 19 to August 24, 1986. Their reaction was to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Department of Labor and Employment on August 5, 1986.

(9)when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11)when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12)when no administrative review is provided by law, (13)where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and

Labor Arbiter Crescencio R. Iniego held in favor of the complainants. he ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of back salaries, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 1

his decision was affirmed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission except for the award of moral and exemplary damages,

held: (14)when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and confidence from the employer as that is one reason why he was employed in the first place. One certainly does not employ a person he distrusts. Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in some measure if only because he is the one who opens the office in the morning and closes it at night and in this sense is entrusted with the care or protection of the employer's property. The keys he holds are the symbol of that trust and confidence.

C. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION Abejovsdela Cruz ***note: unsa man tawnningakaso irrelevant kaayusaatong topic nga doctrine of primary jurisdiction labor case ni for the information of everyone ***

Facts:

The employer's trust and confidence in him is limited to that ministerial function. He is not entrusted, in the Labor Arbiter's words, "with the duties of safekeeping and safeguarding company policies, management instructions,

and company secrets such as operation devices." He is not privy to these confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher echelons of management. It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge these sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and confidence. The security guard does not belong in such category. It follows that the Labor Arbiter did not err in interpreting Paragraph 7 and assuming jurisdiction over what is clearly a labor dispute involving employer-employee relations. Turning now to the alleged illegal dismissal of the private respondents, we affirm first of all that loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissal under our labor laws. However, that ground, like any other ground, must first be established in proper proceedings before an employee can be lawfully dismissed.

APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents. Facts of the Case: When respondent electric cooperative charged increased power rates against the petitioner for the month of May, 1991, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Illegal Collection of Power Bills against respondent before the trial court. Petitioner contended that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) or the regular trial court, while respondent's position was that jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Petitioner also claimed that because of the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness of the imposition of the charges, the case is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Issue: Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power bills by an electric cooperative? Ruling of the Court: Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to investigate the case is the NEA. The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration, despite the enactment of Executive Order No. 172, creating the Energy Regulatory Board. The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is that respondent charged its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA. Electric cooperatives, such as the respondent, are vested under Presidential Decree No. 269 with the power to fix, maintain, implement and collect rates, fees, rents, tolls, and other charges and terms and conditions for service. However, the NEA requires that such must be in furtherance of the purposes and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 269. NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or controlled entities, is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations. It may also, motuproprio or upon petition

The record shows that the above procedure was not followed by the petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents. There was no hearing conducted as required by the rules, only an alleged background investigation that supposedly linked them to pilferages in the pier. No charges were formally preferred against the private respondents nor where they given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated and served notices of termination in disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure

It remains to say that if the petitioner distrusts the private respondents, it may still seek to establish its lack of confidence and trust in them by proving that ground for their dismissal at an investigation conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. But before it can do so, it must first reinstate all of them as among the personnel of the previous operator to be absorbed by the grantee of the permit, conformably to its commitment in the aforesaid Paragraph 7. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 30, 1987, is AFFIRMED with the modification that the payment of back salaries shall be limited to only three years. The temporary restraining order dated January 6, 1986, is LIFTED. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

of third parties, conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters, affecting electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities. Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that may be charged. Consequently, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ERB. In case a party feels aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons. True, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered

moot. Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. A party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, , vs. NHA, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the NHA, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, Facts: (Contract to Sell) 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to Yuson as embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by

rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Aggrieved, Yusponbrought his dispute with Antipolo Realty beforeNHA. NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. SC denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979 Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same. Issue: Whether in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform. Ruling: Petitioner's arguments are lacking in merit. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the 'sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered' In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special

knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]" Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts." In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of PD 957. Presidential Decree No. 1344 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA. Merits: Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent,

it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of all installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for Declaration of Nullity (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession and Damages, at about the same time he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources at to the Office of the President. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which on appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this recourse, petitioner assailing the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to acquire public lands. ISSUE: WON the petitioner can assail the decisions of the RTC and CA in relying on the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources HELD: NO. The findings of fact of an administrative agency, such as the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources, must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even, if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. "In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the

VILLAFLOR vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On December 2, 1948, petitioner filed a sales application with the Bureau of Lands covering a tract of public lands consisting of 140 hectares. In paragraph 6 thereof, he recognized that the land is of public domain. On August 16, 1950, petitioner entered into a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights in favor of private respondent in consideration of P5,000. On the same date, August 16, 1950, private respondent filed a sales application over two parcels of land which was correspondingly awarded the following day. On January 31, 1974, petitioner protested the sales application of private respondent claiming ownership with the Bureau of Lands, and claiming that it has not paid the P5,000 provided for in the deed. The Director of Lands, however, found that petitioner was paid the stipulated amount, the same being part of the administrative process in the disposition of the land in question, that his sales application was rejected for leasing the same to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights thereto and that he recognized the public character of the land in his application and relinquished any and all rights he may have by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation thereon. The same was affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources. aTcIEH

factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency. Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, 29 by the courts. 30 The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence.

Petitioners moved to dismiss LBPs petition on the ground that they already accepted the RARADs decision, which, perforce rendered it final and executory. They alleged that LBPs petition must be considered barred by the RARADs decision on the ground of res judicata. Nevetheless, the SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone (since petitioners held in default), fixing the just compensation. Petitioners insist that the RARAD, in exercising quasijudicial powers, has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. Hence, the RARADs decision, being a final determination of the appraisal of just compensation by the DARAB, should be appealed to SC and not the SAC. For its part, LBP insists that the RARAD/DARAB decision is merely a preliminary valuation, since the courts have the ultimate power to decide the question on just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the decision of RARAD is binding and thus would constitute res judicata. HELD: The PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide: Section 50. Quasijudicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters x x x Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the

****NO PALOMA vs MORA ****NO EURO-MED vs BATANGAS HEIRS OF LORENZO vs. LBP FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Isabela. The land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.[5] Of the entire area. By virtue of Executive Order No. (EO) 405 vesting LBP with primary responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation for all lands covered by RA 6657. Petitioners rejected the valuation. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DARAB. The DARAB dismissed the petition. Unable to agree on the revalued proposal, petitioners instituted a case before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of determining the just compensation for their land. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof. On the other hand, LBP moved for reconsideration. Pursuant to Section 57[18] of RA 6657, LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as a SAC.

implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DARs original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. We do not agree with petitioners submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation filed by LBP after the RARAD rendered its decision. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[51] we had the occasion to rule that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the determination of just compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and excusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the States power of eminent domain.[55] The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties. On the other hand, the determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree, there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. ****NO GUY vs IGNACIO ****NO SAMAR II vs SELUDO