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RESEARCH REPORT

t ACCESSION NO,.

2 91988
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Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL Vrt Knox Kentucky 1949- 1950

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ADVANCE~

COURSE

TIM, A.UMLOD SCHOOL 1949-19,5O

MAJOR WILLIAM F. JACKSON MAJOR JOHN E. WAALES III MAJOR MUARSHALL MAJOR
MA&JO
JOHN

B.

GARTH

!(3

r.

A. RANKIN

AIFR

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DPIBLLA.

MAJOR

ROBERT HALL, U'SMC

APTAIN CA TIOE

N JAME R S B RR L. E

F . P HIGGINS A R YRC.T

FORT. KNOX,

KENTUCKY

MAY 1950

ARMOR -The Mag : ine of~ Mobile Warf~are' Suite 418, 1145-19th St, N.W., ..-Washington, D.C. 20036

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 2 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page . 1

GENERAL MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF TAiK DESTROYER UNITS . . TIE 628TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

..

(SELF-FROPELLED)
4

.....

. . . . .12

644TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION OPERATIONS IN THE ARDENNES....... . . . . ..

. .

. 38

5
6

704TH TAAK DESTROYER BATTALION . . . . ..

. . . . .64

THE 823D TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (TOWED) AT IORTAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C ONTENIPORARY COMNT ... . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . .

.81

7 8

. 112 . .125

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOYIENDATIONS.

AF

~:NDICES

.....

........

.......

I. II.

628th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training. 623th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Combat History... . .......... ... 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training. 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training . Maps ..... .... ....... ....

. 132

. 135 . 141 144 147

III. IV. V.

PREFACE
Preparing a researah report on tank destroyers proved to be a more interesting task than most members of the Committee anticipated. The announcement of the subject oast some doubt upon the but not for Iong.

worth of a reort on a now obsolete weapon of war,

The splendid achievements of tank destroyer units in action, the outstanding esprit of officers and men in these units under all con-

ditions of combat, and the ingenuity and bravery they combined to stop the most feared menace of the battlefield in World War II

created admiration for them and professional interest in their methods. It is hoped that this report adequately describes the

courage and tenacity with which they fought and the skilful techniques they employed in outmaneuvering and outfighting their armored foe. Because tank destroyer units were employed as small elements attached to major combat organizations, reports of their activities have been found difficult to trace. Organizations to which they were

attached sometimes failed to mention these subordinate attached units in after action reports, and parent tank destroyer battalions were unaware, at times, of the scope of combat activities in which their companies and platoons took part. Considering this, and the

fact that tank destroyer organizations provided only a comparatively small group of combat units, it is not surprising that after action

reports on their activities tre few in numbe:' aic are not prepared with as much attention to detail as those cf, foL try Division or a Corps Headquarters. example, an Infan-

There is

additional reason for the shortage of reports from They were often separated Individuals

tank destroyer companies and platoons.

from parent organizations for days and weeks at a time. interviewed in

connection with this study agree this was a deterrent

to preparing more than casual records. With no complaint intended, it is an observation of the

Committee that combat records of battalion-size units are few in number and sketchily prepared.. This is apparently a result of the disinclination, on the part of line officers, reports, and a lack of appreciation, in to spend time preparing

terms of improved combat

efficiency, of the various purposes for which after action reports are used. In the directicn of correcting this situation and assistsimplifying their work of recording,. the

ing battalion staffs in

standard form of report used by lower echelons of the British Army could be examined as a method of preparing paperwork with no more than reasonable pangs of authorship. After some time was spent on research and interview, conflicts of fact made it seeming

desirable to analyze the slim stock of

available documents pertaining to tank destroyers and to determine their validity. scrutinized. It was decided that all could be more closely

For instance, more than one after action report listed, the elimination of thret: or more German However, ivsion and Corps

with understandable pride, "Tiger" tanks in

a day's operation.

staff officers who were at the scene of action dciare no enemy tanks of this type were near the areas described in
iii

post combat

records.

One ironically suggested "Tigert" tanks must have been

the xmzost prolific item of German war production, considering the

Vast numbers knocked out in after-action reports. Committee members have noted that well planned offensive operations were invariably recorded with greater preciseness than
defensive actions. German accounts, particularly in the ARDENNES

Offensive, gave a more accurate picture, a check of eyewitnesses reveals, than reports from United States units on the defensive. The Committee received invaluable assistance in the preparation of the report from former members of the four tank destroyer battalions. Without their aid it would not have been

possible to approach any semblance of accuracy in presenting the details of combat which are condensed in an after-action report and, of necessity, lost in the condensation. For their kindness

and cooperation, the Committee expresses its appreciation and thanks to Lieutenant Colonel James W. Bidwell, former commanding officer of the 704th TD Battalion, now stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Dettmer, former commander of the 823d TD Battalion, now residing at San Anselm.. California; Lieutenant Colonel Kfilliam A. Hamberg, commanding officer of the 10th Tank Battalion, 5th Armored Division, now stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Ashby I. Lohse, former operations officer of the 823d TD Battalion, now living in Tucson, Arizona; Major Edward R. Garton, executive officer of the 644th TD Battalion, now at The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; Major Crosby P.

Miller,
Fort

$-3

of the 7Q4th TD
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now at%

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the

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in

Battalion, naw a resident James Leach, commanding

Greensburg, Pannsylvania; Captain on

"B" Company, 37th Tank Battalion, ano

duty at Fort knox, Kentucky; Captain Edwin Leiper, commander of the 3d Platoon, Company "C", 704th TD Battalion, now a resident of Indianapolis, Indiana; Captain T. L. Raney, commander of the lst

Reconnaissance Platoon, 823d TD Battalion, now stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland; Lieutenant John E. Barron, commander of the 1st Platoon, Company "C", 823d TD Battalion, now residing in El Paso, Texas; Lieutenant Ellis McInnis, commanding officer of a platoon of Company "C", 823d TD Battalion, now living in Odessa, Texas;

Lieutenant Leon L. Neel, commander of. the 1st Platoon, Company "B", 823d TD Battalion, now residing in Thomasville,, Georgia; and Lieutenant Thomas Springfield, commander of the 1st Platoon, Company "A", 823d TD Battalion, now living in Dodge City, Kansas,

CHAPTER 1 INTS1DUCTION The motivating impulse for this report dates back to the European Campaigas of 1940,

wt)

the French Azy surrendered to swift-

moving German divisions whose success rested primarily on the spee4, firepower and shook action of tanks supported by planes, when remnants of the British Expeditionary Force prepared airplane and tank obstacles throughout the British Isles and regrouped for the lastditch battle of England, and when, in the United States, the majority of military thought was centered on a method by which the terrifyingly successful tnk-air combination could be stopped. One of the outcoes of those urgent times was the formation of tank destroyer units as a part of the United States Army and their use, particularly during the later European Campaigns of 1944-1945, in the greatest combined-arma offensive in h story.

That tank destroyer units never fulfilled the naster role for which they were intended is a quirk of circumstance plus the

introduction of other ingenious devices contrived to combat tanks. The original subject assigned this committee for research and report was "The Operation of the Tank Destroyer Battalion." The

topic covers a wide field, which fortunately was narrowed with the announcement of the scope as "A study of the employment of the tank destroyer battalion in the European Theater, with conclusions and recommendations," with limiting dates extending from June of 1944,. to May of 1945. Confined within reasonable bounds, the title assumed more

workable proportions, though it was still considered too general when committee members initiated individual research. After a more

thorough look at source material it was determined the best output of the committee's efforts would be achieved if the subject was restricted to operations of four outstanding tank destroyer battalions. Thus the subject was chosen. Research concerning tank destroyer operations has revealed an interesting and important field for further investigation. suggested that the overall subject, "The Operation of the Tank Destroyer Battalion," could be the basis for a group of studies aimed at a more complete picture of combat operations involving tank destroyers versus tanks. The subject is important because of its It is

possible effect on current antitank doctrine. Tank Destroyers entered and emerged from World War II as the center of a doctrinal controversy. Conceived in haste, they were

designated "Tank Chasers," before birth, by the French; "Antitank Regiments," by the British; "Self-propelled Artillery," by the Russians; and "Tank Destroyers" by our forces. characteristics as well as a common purpose. They had common All were team-operated,

super-velocity, low-trajectory weapons, self-propelled or towed, suitable for employment on direct-fire missions against tanks primarily German tanks. The argument which centered on tanks replacing tank destroyers in an antitank role entered the theoretical phase in this country as

tank armament was improved to exceed that of existing tank destroyer

weapons.

Major factors in the difference of opinion were the tank's armor and weapons weight, with loss of mobility, as thin-skinned, more agile and heavier-armed anti-

heavier vehicle,

against a lighter, tank vehicle.

This controversial side issue is though it well might be.

not a part of the report, high-v

The facts of combat operations,

lighted during the period June 1944, to May 1945, were an important influence on the decision which eliminated tank destroyers from' U. S. Army organization in 1946.

Although some aspects of the study were not immediately obvious to the researcher, was quickly noted. one feature of tank destroyer employment

This was the wide variety of combat assignments, in which tank destroyer organby those in

outside the scope of antitank combat, izations participated.

Many missions were considered,

subordinate command of the units, to be beyond the sphere of organi-

gational training or equipment.

Surprisingly,

the unorthodox

missions were quite successful from an overall viewpoint and added to the versatile reputation of the anti-tankers. This report is not concerned with the application of prinharassed by the However, the

ciples to a combat situation facing a commander,

problem of taking an objective with the means at hand.

statements of tank destroyer unit officers that they were rarely able to utilize the potential of their weapons and personnel because of restrictions imposed by unusual missions and attachments, by higher authority, is of interest. directed

The purpose of this report is to present a series of

illustrative general actions hiaging on the assignment of tank destroyer Units in two well-recognized roleas Supporting a muaor

organization and its subordinate elements on :the offensive, and

providing the same support when the larger element is situation. in a defensive

The combined actions will show the various methods of the adherean

employment of tank destroyers by major unit cammanders;

to ar departure from tank destroyer doctrine extant at the time of employment; and a comparison of unit actions with the objective of highlighting successful features of operation.

The four battalions selected for illustration are the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 644th, 704th and 823d. Although they

were shifted within Corps, the battalions spent the majority of combat time attached to the following divisions: 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 5th Armored Division 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2d Infantry Division 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 4th Armored Division 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion,
The first material,

O0th Infantry Division

concerned with background types of equipment

part of the report is

the organization of units for combat,

used during the period of operations and a brief of doctrine governing the training and contemplated employment of tank destroyers in the combined arms fighting team. Following background data, operaseparate

tions of the four tank destroyer battalions are described in

chapters, with another section devoted to comment by selected tank

destroyer unit commaders and a usi ns rind re dtos

'the

final ohapter devoted to eon-d

CstER 2 GENERAL MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF

TANK DESTROYER UNITS

Thishapter is pter

eveted to a general discussion of te hnioal

It contains in-

material on the employment of tank destroyer units.

formation on the missions for which tank destroyer units were trained, the contemplated principles of employment and methods of employment.
he chapter also includes organizational charts prepared and later

modified during World War II Hood, Texas.J

by the Tank Destroyer School at Camp

As with other special organizations of the armed forces, tank destroyers were given a specific goal to achieve. This goal, or pri-

mary mission, was the destruction of hostile tanks by direct gunfire. It is of interest to note that even the wording of direct gunfire When approach-

implies an aggressive as well as an offensive role. ing the subject of tank destroyer use, it is

of importance to difUnquestion-

ferentiate between antitank and tank destroyer units. ably the two elements have a great deal in related. However,

common and are closely

they are also quite different,

Antitank units are set up and equipped to be used in relatively fixed roles. Even when the larger units of which they their role is primarily defensive.

form a part are on the offensive,

Antitank units function generally by successively setting up defenses of certain critical areas such as avenues of approach of possible armored counterattack. When they do not succeed in stopping an

attack, their purpose is

to disrupt,

ay,delay and canalite hostile

armored forces, thus creatig conditions favorable for counterattack by highly mobile reserves, picture, ...Tank Destroyers are the highly mobile element in operations against armored forces. In contrast to Antitank units, their role is purely offensive, even when supporting large-scale defensive operations. Because of their characteristics, Tank Destroyers are not bound up with positions and places on the ground. In fact,..to bind their operations down to places takes much of the power out of their wallop. Tank Destroyers are organized and equipped to strike and strike hard at tanks with great fire power and great maneuverability. Their function is not to deny the use of certain terrain feature to tanks but to seek out and destroy the tanks themselves.. Suitable secondary missions for tank destroyer units are: 1. To reinforce or supplement the fire of artillery units Here is where tank destroyers enter the

with direct or indirect fire. 2. 3. 4. 5. To destroy pill boxes and permanent defensive works. To support landing operations. To defend beaches against waterborne attack. To be used on roving gun and roving battery missions

(more applicable to self-propelled units). With regard to the use of tank destroyers on secondary missions, the field manual on employment has the following to say:

,*.,Employment of tank destroyers on secondary missions When ammunition requirements for is a command decision. reinforcing artillery missions exceed the supply facilities of the units, higher headquarters assumes the responsibility of supplying the additional ammunition required. Except in an emergency, the organic ammunition loads of tank destroyer units should remain intact for primary missions,

Most sedndary missions require the use of highSince the trajectory of antiexplosive ainmunition. taik guns is too flat for the exeoution of many 2 missions, reduced charges are often referable. In order to use ta a destroyerw to their best advantage, and

to gain the maimnum possible results from their favorable characteristics, a commander would be governed in tank destroyer action by application of the following principles: 1. The seeking of information of hostile tanks by continuous

reconnaissance, 2. The movement to firing positions so as to intercept advance of the tanks to Tank

hostile tanks by arriving sufficiently in

permit proper emplacement and concealment of tank destroyers. destroyers ambush, ho 3.

le tanks, but do not charge nor chase them.

Holding ground and not firing until tanks get within

as close range as possible. 4. Occupying forward positions from which to pursue with-

drawing tnks by fire.

5.
This is

Using every practicable measure to secure concealment.

necessary because tank destroyers are vulnerable to hostile

tank, antitank and artillery fire. 6, 7. Digging in Digging in towed guns whenever time permits, and camouflaging tank destroyers in feature-

less terrain, It is important that tank destroyers be used aggressively. an

Their mobility permits them to be concentrated rapidly in

advantageous position.

SteIth and deoeptein are predomiate factors.

Tank destroyers are not ea

used in close ooperAtiN

l.e of indeSsp ent

With other troops.

action; they should be

The or g=aitio

of took destroyer units was a subject of

much discussion and the usual controversy, but was finally decided and established as brought out in Feld Manual 16-5 .. a. Tank destroyer units are organized as battalions,
groups, and brigades. The battalion is both a tactical and administrative unit. Groups and brigades are organized only as tactical units. There are two types of battalions, classilied according to their equipment as self-propelled d nd towed b. The self-propelled battalion consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, a reconnaissance company, three gun companies, and a medical detachments Each gun company has three platoons of four self-propelled guns each--a total of 36 guns within the batta. lion. c. The towed battalion is similar to the self-propelled battalion except that it is equipped with towed guns and has no reconnaissance company Two reconnaissance platoons are included in the headquarters company. d. Group. The group consists of a headquarters and headquarters company and two or more battalions. e. Brigade. The brigade is composed of a headquarters nd headquarters company and two or more groups... As to methods of employment, tank destroyer units certainly

have flexibility and maneuverability beyond the scope of most armored elements. They can be employed to attack the head, flanks, or the

rear of a hostile armored formation. simultaneously, hit another.

These points may be hit

or successively, engaging one while maneuvering to largely influenced by the

The choice of method is

relative size of the olements involved.

A tank destroyer battalion

ahotud be able to atta*k a hostile task cmcpany at three points simultaceosly. If

the

terrain is

favorabe it might be poesible to

attack a hostile tank battalion at three points. Tank destroyers shoald be kept in to the rear initially. in oncealed positions well

Their mobility will permit their use in mass

particular areas anywhere over a wide zone. Tank destroyers use the concept of surprise attack in masse

Therefore,

they should hold out small or no reserves,

initially

employing their maximum fire power and shifting it 4 gain and maintain the maxium tactical advantage.

continuously to

An outline distributed by the Tank Destroyer School at Camp Hood, Texas, compared the employment of tank destroyer units to that football, "...he stays well back with every-

of the man backing up the line in until he sees where the play is thing he has."

coming and then hits it

14OTE8
"T-6111

FOIR

ORAPTER 2
T

of . actijg,

(school doetrte), C*amp Hood, Texas, p 1,

p 3.

xk Destroyer School, Department

P'ield

18 July 1944,

Manual 18v.5, Tactical Employment

p 1,

x ~k Destroyer

Unit,

Ibid,
4 Op ci,

"T'61" (school doctrine), p 6.

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CHAPTER 3 TPE 628th TAK DESTR(OYER TATTALION (StL' PROPELLED) Introduction and Buildup General. The 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)

was selected for study in

the preparation of this report the European Theatre of

on tank destroyer operations in

Operations after a careful consideration of factors, situations and missions; the more important of which are as follows: (1) This unit was employed extensively in the primary tank destroyer role. (2) A self propelled unit, it worked throughout combat on the European Continent, except for one brief period, with an armored unit, the 5th Armored Division. (3) In the Battle of 'WALLENDORF, the battle selected for detailed study, this tank destroyer battalion was employed with an armored division in the penetration of a heavily fortified position; the SIEGFRIED LINE. (4) Also in the Battle of JVALL'NDORF, this battalion was heavily enga;ed in repelling armored attacks. (5) In addition to the above listed roles this battalion was employed in just about every manner to which it could be adapted, for example; reinforcing artillery, as assault guns, against personnel in the open, as road blocks, and to provide flank protection, On 5 August 1944, only a few days after the 628th was attached to

Tank Destroyer Battalion landed in Europe it the 5th Armored Division.

Neither the Battalion nor the 5th Thus a team

Armored Division had been committed to combat.

that was to work together through most of the European Campaign was formed. It is of crurse important that a team cooperation and coordination therefore,

remain intact if the ultimate in is to be achieved.

This permanent attachment was,

very desirable and led to understandings that could ohly have been bettered if the units had trained together.

In order to understand the operating procedure of this team, of which the 628th was a member, it is necessary

to explain that the 5th Armored Division employed "married companies" to make up tank-infantry teams.

One tank battalion and one infantry battalion were assigned to each combat command, but the cooperation between tanks and infantry was to go further than that. The "A" tank companies and "A" infantry companies were paired off. Likowise paired were the "B" and "C" tank and infantry companies. Within the companies each infantry platoon of five squad half-tracks was paired Within the with a platoon of five medium tanks. platoons each medium tank crew of five men was paired with its own infantry squad of 12 men, The final result of the marriage was a Sherman tank, a half-track and 17 men who were to eat, sleep and fight togother.1 It was also customary to att:.ch a platoon of tank destroyers

to a mar"ied company. CCB's tank-infantry teams were made up from the 81st Tank Battalion and the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, The B Companies of the medical battalion, engineer battalion,

ordnance battalion,

and Troop B or the cavalry reconnaissance and the 71st direct support.

squadron were the normal supporting troops,

Armored Field Artillery Battalion was normally in

It normally fought as two task forces; one heavy, containing two "married .companies", "m-Lrriod company". Each task force bore the name of its commander. Col. During and one light, containing one

the "TALL:E'..DORF operation the commanders were Lt.

13

Anderson and Lt.

Cole Winteemutea

CCr's two units were the 10th Tank Bat' alion and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, Its regularly supporting artillery the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and its normal supporting companies the "C" companies of the Engineers, ordnance and Medics and "C" Troop of the Cavalry. The heavy task force during this operation was commanded by rt.Col, Hamburg the CO of the 10th Tank Battalion and contained the married "A" and "C" Cos, Task force Boyer named for Lt, Col, Boyer the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion Commander was the light task force and was made up of the "married
' , Cos".2

Since CCA was occupied in a different sector protecting the City of Luxemburg, during the period while the and did not figure not im-

5th Armored Division was on German soil, in the '"TALLENDORF operation, omitted. its

organization is

portant and is

The 628th Ta~k Destroyer Battalion was committed to combat with the 5th Armored Division 2 August 1944, and with them fought through France into Belgium and liberated Luxemburg. During the advance the major actions participated 'ALAISE-ARGENTAN Gap and the SEINE River, By the end of August the

in were at the

Friendly Situation,

Allied force on the Continent included twenty American divisions, twelve British divisions, three Canadian divisions, one French division, and one Polish divisions and

the necessary supporting troops.

Against a defeated and Due to

demoralized enemy they were advancing rapidly.

limited port facilities and conditions of the railroads in

France it was impossible to support the armies supply lines lengthenend indefinitely.

as the

There was bound

to be a time when the rapid advance would of necessity stop, if not due to enemy resistance, then because the supply lines had been stretched to their elastic limits. All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forcef,.il American advances on the right, covered 195 miles, one of the many fine feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France. By September 5, Patton's Third Army reached Nancy and crossed the MOSELLE River between that city and 1\ TZ,
Hodge's First Army came up against the Siegfried de-

fenses by the thirteenth of the month and was shortly thereafter to begin the struggle for AACHEN.
Pushed back against the borders of the homeland, the
German defenses showed definite signs of stiffening. On September 4, Montgomery's armies entered ANTWNCRP ,...NARSEILLE had been captured on August 28 and this great port was being rehabilitated, 3 Enemy Situation, front existed. By September Ist no organized

The remnants of the German formations were

fighting unorganized rear guard actions in an attempt to

fall back into Germany and gain the protection of the WEST

WALL.
In the meantime the Germans were making a desperate belated attempt to prepare the defenses of the SIEGFRIED

LINE,

Labor battalions and Volksturm (home guard) troops

were being employed along with crippled units that had withdrawn from the battle of France.

Early in September 1944, when the German armed Forces in the West during their withdrawal through

F'anooBolgiu

app eabhodthe German frontier,

the

bulk of the formations could be designated only as of the 0KW According to the statistics romanants. (High Command of the Armed Forces), the YWesthecr, including the navy and the air forces, but including loss of about the fortresses, had suffered a total Principally as a 500,000 men since 1 June 1944. result of the absolute air supremacy of the Allies, the losses in material were oven more conspioious. As an example,, it may be mentioned that the I SS disposal only one tank fTltTor Pz Corps had at its -'PTiio'nnd the LXXIV Army Corps possessed only one All forfighting order. gun, which was in full mations w.-:re heavily intermixed, so that there were divisions consisting of men belonging to a variety of units of every branch of arms. During the entire withdrawal to the German frrntior, the controlling organs,, however, had remained intact, The army,, corps,, divisional,, as well as the bulk of the regimental and battalion staffs "oere in working order and h.d on hand more or less strong cadres of the troop formations4 The main German forces opposing the 5th Armored Division on 13 September wore the: S Panzer Regiment 256th Elements of the- 5th Pa'achute Division lemien-ts of the 130th anzer Lehr Division Iiscollaneous VolIstrm formationi Operations Pre battle to make its vicinity
movement,

The U.

S.

First Army planned the

entry into Germany with a main thrust in To assist in the

of AACH-'N.

execution of this

thrust V Corps, fantrv Division,

to the south,

consisting of the 4th I-" and 5th Armored CCR of the

28th Infantry Division, the much taunted

Division attacked

EST' '"ALL

5th Armored Division was ordered to ? netrate the SIDGCFRITD LIFE in

cross the OTUR River and

,

the vicinity of WALLENORr

The following quotation from the unit history of the 5th Armored Division indicates the Division had already done some reconnaissance of the Line on its own initiative. At 1815 on September 11, 1944, a strong patrol from B Troop 85th, crossed the Our River into Germany and made history. Word flashed back to division, to army, to the world that the first Americans were fighting on German soil. For the next three days patrols probed the Siegfried Line and found it manned by small lightly armed forces. The enemy began building up his strength, however, and the steep hills, mud and defiles threatened to make movement difficult for the tanks, 6 This action proved to be correct for On the 12th of Sept the 5th Armored Division was directed to conduct reconnaissance to the SIEGFRIED LINE, demonstrate to its front and be prepared to break through the German defenses in the general area WALLEYNDORF-ECTERNACE to secure objectives in Germany. By Corps order on 13 September the 5th Armd Div was told to reconnoiter and demonstrate against the Line in its sector. If the Line was not held in force one Combat Command with one Bn 112th Inf Regt was to break through and seize the high ground east of BITBURG. 7 CCB was to assist and cover the advance of CCR with artillery support. Company A (628th TD Bn) was attached to CCP for this purpose. The rest of the rattalion was attached to CCR. Operations 13 September. Elements of the 628th TD Bn

attached to CCR moved into position to fire into German on 13 Sept 1944. They fired all that afternoon, all the next morning and then An interesting

about 1300 hours on the 14th crossed into Germany.

observation made by members of the CCR task forces was that in all the time during the two days of firing the enemy did not fire in
return,

Dispositions of troops may be noted on map Figure 3. On the 13th the action, as is shown in the following quotations,

'

t!.

No ...............

consisted primarily of moving into positions and firing into the enemy pill-boxes, A demonstration against enemy fortifications of the Siegfried Line with tanks, tank destroyers and artillery fire was ordered by Corps and was carried out beginning at 1500, 13 September.... CCR delivered direct t-nk and artillery fire on enemy pill boxes between AnM)ELD Tr-ESN and rETE~E,-EN No enemy fire was returned, 9 On 13 September 1944, 2d Platoon, Company B (628th) in position on hill mear I .ELBACH, Luxemburg, used direct fire methods at 2000 yards range on German pill boxes and other enemy targets in the vicinity of [,TALLZNDRF and BI'SDORF. On the same day 2d Platoon, Company "C" moved across the MOSELLE River and fired on enemy pill boxes northeast of TTCESDORF, Germany. Direct fire methods were used and six pill boxed were knocked out, after which the platoon returned to the bivouac area, On 13 September 1944 Company "B" with Reconnaissance Platoon attached, moved with the 47th Armored Inf Bn into firing positions on high ground east and northeast of REISDRF, Luxemburg, on direct fire support for 47th Armored Infantry n.,, attacked fortifications of the Siegfried Line northeast of WALLT;'DORF' Three inch gun direct fire from massed M-10s was employed against the permanent fortifications of the Siegfried Line, It was observed that normal AP shells had .little effect against concrete, especially when 0 covered with earth.lO . Company "C" with Reconnaissance Platoon, still attached to the 10th Tank Battalion moved to an assembly area five miles east of GILSDnRF at 1315 hours. 1st Platoon, Company then moved to WALL0nTORP, Germany crossing the OUR River, and set up road blocks to protect the main body of CCR. 2d Platoon, Company 'C', assisted Ist Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division also attached to CCR in the seizing of REI DORF, Luxembourg, and the establishin of road blocks there, 3d Platoon Company tC' moved to a position one mil north of 7AT.ID TRF, Germany to guard the right flank of CCR. Pioneer Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, was attached to Company 'Cg 22d Armored Engineer Battalion for a bridge building mission. Company 'C' was in Germany and to Major Burgess, then Captain, go

"C'

the honors of being the first man in the Battalion to set foot on German Soil, The remainder of the Battalion excopt Company .' working with CCB. crossed into Gotmany on 15 September 1944 and at 1700 hours the Battalion CP was established on Hill 408 one mile east of FRThLITGE'N, aporoximatoly six miles into Germanyooa1ll Operations 14 Septombe was no large
r .

See Figure 4

Since there

caliber fire being returned

from the enemy positions

the task forces decided to cross the OUR River and go into position preparatory to crossing the Gay Bach the next morning. At 1130 B (14 September 44) Combat Command R with the 1st Battalion212th Infantry, attacked to break through in the vicinity of W;ALLEYNDORF The infantry, preceded by the armor crossod the OUR River at 1330 B crossing by ford since the bridge had been destroyed by the Germans before our forces reached the river.... Progress was slow due to automatic weapons and small arms fire., A hard rain also slowed the movement., 1 2 The advance continued and at 1825 the bulk of the CCR forces were across the river and on the high groundl

Company "C" (628th TD Bn) with Reconnaissance Platoon, still attached to the 10th Tank Battalion, moved to an assembly area 5 miles east of GILSDORF at 1315 hourse 1st Platoon Company "C'"then moved to .ALLE\i'ORF, Germany, crossing the 0 r River and set up road blocks to protect the main body of CCR, 2d Platoon Company "C", assisted 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division also attached to CCR in the seizing of REISDORF, Luxemburg, and the establishing of road blocks there., 4th Platoon, Company "C" moved to a position one mile north of WALLENDORF, Germany, to guard the right flank of CCR. Pioneer Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, was attached to Company "C" 22d Armored Engineer Battalion for a Bridge Building mission, 1 4

Operations

15 September,

"i

Y,

'

"

.vow.

tot

isV

ti~

CJ)4

Fog At 0800, 15 September CCR resumed the att ck, and low clouds made visibility very pooSb Some enemy tanks had moved in front of the combat command during The advance against heavy resistance conthe night. sisting of the enemy tanks and some 88 mm guns continued Soon and by noon elements had moved into HO ERDI TGEN, The BIESDORF, was in Info 112th Bn 1st the thereafter foreward momentum continued and by night Task Force Hamburg had advanced through ENZEN and STOCHEN to BETrTNGEN and Task Force Boyer was occupying Hill 408, which was about a thousand yards north of FREILE\TGEN and commanded the areal 5 Company "B" 628 TD Bn occupied positions to command the apprnaches to Hill 408618 Company "C" had moved through the fog to attack

HO :RSDTNTGEN and ORUCHTEN,

Part of the company pro-

vided flank protection for Task Force Hamburg and the remainder of the company established road blocks to protect CCR Headquarters- 17 On the evening 15 September V Corps ordered CCB released to division control to assist in the continuation of the division attack to seize the objective in the vicinity of Bitburgi18 Operations 16 September, CCB with Co "A" 628th attached crossed the Our into Germany on the 16th, passed through WALLENDORF and stopped for the night at HOM-'RDIWEN, with a force still engaged in cleaning out NIEDERSGEGEN,1 9 Co A 628th went into direct and indirect artillery positions po J CCR lines of communication, 2 0 CCP had continued its attack but at 1500 was still up against heavy enemy resistance and had made no advance during the day, At 2145 they reported that the enemy was counter-attacking five hundred yards Southeast of WETTE\TGEN.2 The 1st Bn 112th Inf, attached to CCR was dug in at WETTENGEN, During the day CCR threw back three strong counterattacks at 'ETTE" ,GEN,. and smashed an armored attack, 22

1st and 3d Platoon of Gom6tany "B, 62 h were in position southeast of k~ll 408,. and the 2d platoon was on Hill 298 near STOCHEN supoorting 1st Bn 112th Inf,. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Co "C" in anti-tank defense of Task Force Hamburg wore in positions southeast of STOCKER and northeast of HALSDORF, respoctivly, whilb the 3d Platoon provided anti-tank defense for CCR trains near HOfVERDINGEN, 23

Operations 17 September.

See Figure

On 17 Sept enemy small arms,.mortar and artillery fire increased in intensity in all areas. At 0745 CCR reported that its artillery was firing on enemy tanks to the northeast, that the 1st Bn 112th Inf Regt was receiving enemy machine gun and artillery fire northeast of 1WETTENGEN, that the right tank column was fight-ing in the vicinity of STOCKEM, that artillery fire w:s coming from the north, northeast and east and enemy tanks w.re to the northeast and east. At 0830 CCR reported the fifth enemy counter-attack repulsed, that a total of eight enemy tanks were knocked outt... The enemy attacks were supoortod by at least forty tanks. 2 4 The enemy counter-attacks against TaskForce Hamburg,. the right tank column of CCR, in and around HALSDORF and STOCKER were launched from the vicinity of BETTTNGEN Artillery and wore made by tanks accompanied by infantry. fire which was placed on the attacking forces separated The tank attack was then the infantry from the tanks. broken up by tank destroyers of 1st and 3d platoons of Co "C" 628th TD bn from positions in the vicinity of HALSDORF and STOCKE,. and tanks on the high ground northeast of HALSDORF. 2 5 Meanwhile...on the unforgettable Hill 298 the second platoon, (Co "B" 628th) under Lt, Leon Ronnebaum, was This platoon was supproting engaged in desperate fighting. In close support of the 112th R3gt of the 28th Inf Div,.... the foot sloggers, the platoon was successful in repulsing several enemy counter-attacks attempting to dislodge the Tank Destroyers from their excellent firing positions, Sgt Thomas R. K.;arney and Sgt. John Kalis had fired all their ammunition and accounted for many enemy dead and wounded....Pvt. Grizzle and Pfc. Masters accounted for After a good many casualties among the attacking force.

U)

44

throe destroyers wore hit and damaged by enemy fire and the romaining forces were just aboht out of ammunition Lt. Rennobaum gave the order to withdraw,26 For this bravo show of arms, .th second platoon was recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation and Lt Rennobaum subsequently received tho Distinguished Sorvice Cross,27 1st Bn 112th Inf was withdrawn to the vicinity nf STOCKEDM. They dug in on the high ground west of town . On the 17th CCB left elements of the married Cos "B" at HOFWERDINGEN to protect CCR's rear and moved to the WALLET',DORF, AMPI"ELDTNGEN, NIEDERSGTGEN area where they were employed destroying pill-boxes and to protect the loft flank of the penetration, Task Force Anderson, loss the "B" Cos elements occupied Hill 375,.between NIEDERS(EGEN and AMELDITGET, .which commanded the terrain in that sector, Task Force Wintormute continued to hold NIEDERSEGEy, 28 By the night of the 17th Sept th.., furthest penetration into ecrmany had been made, Operations 18 September. No appreciable changes in dispositions or locations took place on 18 Sopt.. CCR with Task Force Hamburg in the vicinity of HALSDORF IAD STOCKE'r, and Task Force Bover on Hill 408 were subjected to artillery fire, but sustained no major attacks. CCB continued to destroy pillboxes and to drive the enemy from NIEDERSGEGEN, FBIESDORF and .from around the bridge site at WALLENDORF, The Germans rooccupied these localities nightly by infiltration, 2 9 Operations 19 September, Ninteenth of September was the high point in the Bat alionts (628th TD Bn) combat history in so far as knocking out enemy tanks during any single twenty-fourhour period is concerned. Missions and positions had remained approximately the same .as on 17 September, 3 0 At 0400,.19 September, CCR reported enemy vehicles moving in its sector and placed artillery concentration on them. Considerable movement of enemy tanks was reported in the vricinity of METTETDORF, At 0740 the

positions of CCR were being heavily shelled by enemy At 0800 the enemy launched a two-pronged artillery. tank and infantry attack on CCR, moving southeast and Eighteen enemy Mark IV southwest from FETTEI T DORF. tanks are known to have been knocked out by CCR in reCP At 0910 CCR reported its pelling this attack,.,,. artillery enemy avoid to HOMERDTNGETN to moved had CCR was attacked at 1325 from the northeast. fire..... The attack was repulsed but CCR continued to receive fire, heavy artillery The 2d Bn,. 112th Inf Regt going up to relieve the north of EIESDORF. 1st Bn with CCR had been halted by fire the pressure on relieve to a force CCB was ordered to send was neutralized pressure This ccntinue, them so they could having Regt, Inf 112th 3n, 1st The by CCB at 1600,.,,. proof mission the been relieved from CCR was given 19-20 night tecting the bridge at WALLENDOR for the At 1800 the Commanding Officer, Division September. to the west artillery Artillery, was ordered to move all of the German border without delay, At 1830 CCR was ordered to have 2d Bn, 112th Inf Regt, East flank while the remainder of CCR withdrew protect its west of the frottier to a position south of DIEKICHo.... was given At 1845 Commanding Officer, Division irtillery, east of the line line and ordered to lay heavy fire a fire to cover the withdrawal of CCR.31 Prior to the CCR withdrawal both Companies B and C 1st Platoon, of the TDs had an artillerymants field day, Company "B" with Lt,. Jones commanding, while in position north of FRFILTNGEN, Germany, protecting the left flank of' CCR knocked out six Mark VI tanks attempting to approach their position from the vicinity of HUTJTIFGEN, Germany, Cpl. at range's from 1500 to 3600 yards. by direct fire Rice, Tank Destroyer gunner, knocked out three enemy tanks in quick succession at 1800 yards while Cpl,. Tomaszewski and Cpl, Kiwior knocked out tanks at 3600 Two unidentified enemy and 3200 yards respectively, In tanks were also knocked out by the 2d Platoon, addition, this Platoon assisted the tank attached to the 47th Armored Infantry Bn, in knocking out an additional five enemy tanks of undetermined designation, while Cpl. Giacomino knocked out two other enemy tanks but was unThe 3d Platoon,. able to identify the tanks due to enemy fire. OP and established commanding, Lt, Feldman "C", with Company yards 1500 of a hill slope the revers on positiona firing Germany,. Considerable enemy movenorth of HO'MERDINGEI, of HUTTINGEN .ad brought ment was observed in the vicinity

under fire at ranges from 1000 to 2000 yards which resulted in one enemy Mark V tank definitely knocked out and observed hits scored on six Mark VI's and one other Mark V, which the enemy either recover.d or else completed the destruction. This in one twenty-four hour period. The Battalion received credit for six Mark VI''s., one Mark V, and four unidentified tanks destroyed; six Mark VT's and one Mark V probably destroyed and assisted in the destruction of five unidentified tanks.,32 The sector held by CCB was also heavily attacked on the 19th. At 0800 they reported the enemy working west and northwest from rIESDORF with continuous light and medium enemy artillery fire coming from east and northeast. They had cleared the enemy

out of BIESDORF by 1037, but at 1030 enemy infantry attacked and took the bridge at WALLENDORF It was held for only a short

time for by 1250 they had been forced to withdraw to the scutheastern edge of WAJLEN DORF,. enemy tanks from the north. 3 3 One platoon of the TD company with CCB was sent back into Luxemburg to face into Germany and cover the approach lane from the north of Hill 375 located between AM ELDTNGEN and NEIDERSGEGE. Another TD was driven up on top of Hill 375 from At 1225 CCB repulsed an attack by

where it poured direct fire into the town of NEIDERSGEGEN in support of Task Force YWintermute. 3 4 Enemy fire continued to increase in intensity forcing movement of the Tank Force Anderson CP to a new saucer-like location on Hill 375, where they organized a tight defense,35 Task Force Winter.ute and the "morried" companies B

were ordered to cover the route of march of CCR in its withdrawal,36 'Operations 20 September. See Figure 6. CCB was

ordered to consolidate its on 20 September,

position and prepare however,

to follow CCR

Orders were,

received from Corps

at 2005 that CCB would not be withdrawn west of the ferman border except on Corps order,
3 7

CCR successfully completed its

withdrawal its

from assembly

Germany and at 0500 20 September was closing in area south of GILSDON,

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th subjected to but retained

Infantry protecting the WALLEDORF Bridge were heavy artillery and mortar fire

and enemy attacks,

possession of the bridge throughout the day.38 to be subjected to enemy attack and intensive

CCB continued artillery fire.

A column of eighty Werhmacht troops, marching along the river road from GE~TI GEN south toward AY ELDj''GEN was caught in the open by the TD platoon from "B" Company of the 628th Subjected to a heavy fire from the platoons' 50 cal, machine guns and three inch cannons, only one of the German soldiers managed to crawl away, 3 9 NEIDERSGEGEN was to retake infiltrated tecting the it lost to the enemy and the attempt During the night the enemy

was unsuccessful.

through the elements of the 112th Infnatry pro-

:TALL NDORF Bridge.

40

Both the threadway bridge

41

and timber bridge were demolished, Operations during the 21 September.

CB was continuously attacked and was subjected

21st by both infantry and tanks, 25

c A s "am , .! t N _ 3 7 "+ , i'i ;+ t

'

CJ3\' ,

to hostile artillery grew olde

.

fire

that grew in

intensity as'the day heavy fog prevented

To add to their difficulties

obser-{ien of enemy activities infiltrate

and enabled the Germans to

42

into CCB positions before they were detecte.d.

By now the Germans had moved an Air Force infantry division into BIESDORF, along with elements of five other and five divisions, a regiment of medium field artillery A tank brigade had battalions of assorted artillery. been badly beaten by CCR but the renamts were still thrown into the fight to hurl the Americans from German 4 3 soil, During the afternoon the Air Force to fly. as the afternoon the fog lifted and permit4+d but

This gave CCB temporary relief.,

passed and the planes had to return to their again opened up,
44

bases the German artillery At 1930 CCB was

ordered by dropped message

to with-

draw west of the river beginning at 2130,

CCR was ordered to

cover the withdrawal and to maintain forces along the river at

1: ALLENDORF.

The Division Artillery was to deliver heavy The withdrawal was executed
45

fire to cover the withdrawal.

as planned and by 0400 22 September CCB had cleared the ford, Summary. battles The Battle of W7rALLENDORF, fought on German soil one of the first was over. In

of World War II

this engagement the 628th TD Battalion had been put to a sever test, for it had operated in just about every role that could

be assigned the TDs.

During this

assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE in the followOng

the battalion employed its ways;

M-10 Tank Destroyers

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Anti-tank defense Road blocks Flank defense Assault of fortified positions and pill-boxes Direct fire against ground personnel Reinforcing Field i.rtillery 4 6

Several lessons concerning the TD's and their employment were further proven. For example:

(1) The TDs could best be employed by attaching companies to major commands of the supported unit, be. cause the Germans continued to employ their tanks piecemeal in delaying actions as du;g-in guns, and in such numbers as not to warrant the use of an entire TD 4 7 battalion against them, (2) None of the HE, AP, APC, or APCBT)F 3-inch types penetrate the concrete of ammunition could satisfactorily However, when Line. Siegfried fortifications of the used against the steel doors of the fortifications the APCBDF ammunition would make a satisfactory penetration and often blow the door open, 4 8 (3) The much vaunted German Tiger Tank (Mark VI) could be knocked out by the 3-inch gun by a direct frontal shot even at ranges up to 1500 yards. 4 9 T'e .50 cal. MG on the mount porvided on the M-10 (4) against destroyer was inadequate, particularly for firing A ring mount or coaxially mounted .50 cal. ground troops. MG's would be highly desirable, 5 0 were not satisfactory (5) Mannually operated turrets lubricants were Even when the lightest in cold weather. used it was almost impossible to turn the turret,5S Another deficiency that existed and was costly in this battle but which was borne out more strongly in later operations was that most of the casualties the TDsresulted the turret,52 sustained by

from the lack of an armored covering over

An interesting light is

thrown on this battle by

the statement of German Major General Frhr Von Gersdorff who was Chief of Staff of the Seventh German Army. questioned in November 1945 and asked if When

he recalled any

action where the American troops were thought to have blundered badly he replied6 It is my opinion that the thrust the 5th American Armored Div and the 28th Am Inf Div through the West ,Wall near WALLENDORF mid September 44 was neither planned nor executed skillfully. Admittedly the terrain presented special difficulties in that it restricted tank attacks to certain directions so that it would have been The objective of the necessary to use strong forces. operation is not known to me, but I presume it was an attempt to breach the West Wall in the First attack and Strategically this to thrust forward up to the Rhinedrive represented a grave danger for the German command but its execution was weak and inefficient and therefore we were able to contain and later eliminate by comparativoly weak German forces. This enterprise caused the Americans heavy losses and greatly improved the morale of the German troops who had suffered a series of defeats previously, For the first time once again it had been possible to defeat the American troops who were superior in every respect. The steady increasing feeling of inferiority on the German side was reduced substantially by this fighting, Thus the operation was disadvantageous to the American command in every respect, even if it was meant to be only a scouting raid or an attempt& For particulars I refer to the report presented to the Twelfth Army Group by General Bayerlein in April 1945,53 This of course need not in or TD operations any way reflect on TD's

LOGISTICS AND PERSO.NEL General, The status of logistics and personnel, of It is

course, has a direct bearing on military operatinns.

appropriate then that brief comments be made concerning these matters and how they affected the 628th TD Bn. In the penetration of the SIEGFRIED LITE equipment and material losses were heavier than at any other like Supply and evacuation period of time in the campaign. to protect the supply line due to inability was difficult In the previous phases of the within German territory. campaign it had been necessary for the combat units to keep their combat trains close behind, for protections This policy resulted in abnormal losses 6f the trains, in Germany when the train areas were subject to enemy The withdrawal from Germany artillery and mortar fire. was accomplished with the evacuation of the majority of the damaged vehicles which were repairable, 5 4 Class I, most part, meals. The platoons of the 628th were, for the serving of hot

scattered and had no organized

The men subsisted on emergency type rations, 5 5 Class II and IV, During the early part of the month This

supplies had to be hauled aporoximately 135 miles.

partially immobilized the service elements of the battalion due to the tire on the road to and from the supply point,

Later in the month a new T/O and E which would allow additional vehicles was placed in effect lessening to some extent this restriction caused by limited trarsportati'n.,56 Some items of ordnace were hard to replace, i, e, Replacements on M-IO and T-2 launchers rocket,. 2,.36 in, recovery vehicles were slow, 5 7

Class III. this period4

Class III supplies became critical during

After unit trairig had been withdrawn from Germany

CCB became out off and ammunition, gasoline and water supplies became nearly exhausted. It became necessary to form: armored

supply convoys using half-track vehicles and fight in to

the troops, 5 8
Class V. Procurement of class V supplies presented

no problem, however, because of the inability to maintain the supply lines open ammunition became critically short at times. It is noteworthy that one of the heaviest TD engagements during

this period, fought by the platoon of Lieutenant Rennebaum on Hill 298, was broken off when the TD's became very short of ammunition, 5 9 Maintenance. vehicles The performance of maintenance on the of

during this period was quite a problem because

enemy action which caused considerable damage to the vehicles and permitted little time for repair. This conditions exand follow-

istod for only a relatively short period of ti-e,

ing the withdrawal from Cermarrthe 628th was given time for repair and maintenance. Evacuation of Casualties,

During the month of September the Company Aid Men evacuated casualties through the 112th Infantry Bn Aid Station and the 75th Medical Collecting Company. During the time that the aid men were evacuating through the 112th Infantry Aid Station, the aid station was located approximately two miles from the front which was found to be the best'method of

ovacuati on

60

Communication. available usual

With the normal

communications

to armored units this phase presented no unBecause of the excellent communications

problems.

available it

was possible

to keep an accurate picture of

the situation at all times. Pers onne l.. The practice of making almost daily requisitions The rewas found to work well and was continued, placement battalion serving the command was moved closer thereby greatly facilitating the receipt of replacements. The quality of replaceomnts, as in the preceding month, ranged from very satisfactory to excellent, Difficulty was still experienced in obtaining certain categories of specialists., Too much time elapsed between requisition and receipt of personnel, This resulted in important positions remaining unfilled over too long a period; and in T OS getting converted to meet the requisitions -Sometimes without sufficient accuracy. It is appreciated that, this being a question of stockage, it goes back ultimately to training necessary specialists at home in sufficient numbers and of the needed kinds. To the extent that numbers and diversity of specialists available as replacements can be increased, it should be done, The number of our men returned to duty continued unsatifactory. The p esent policy of holding them for 30 days before use as replacements for other units is not enough,61 Battle losses for September Friendly Killed ''Tounded 11 38 62

Enemy Killed '527 Captured 205

Since most of the action of this unit for the month of September was fought during the battle. described

herein the casualties listed above are indicative of the results of that battle, Morale. Remained excellent throughout this period

despite a shortage of supplies indicated above, Enemy Material Losses63 Tanks and SP Guns P Kw VI Pz Kw V Pz Kw IV' Unidentified Armd Car w/20 mm gun
Transport

Destroyed

Damaged

Armd Personnel Carriers Command Cars (sedan) Gen Purpose (1 to 3 tons) Motorcycle s
Towed Guns 88 mm 40 mm

Enemy Installations Pill-boxes

OP' s

Mis cellane ous MG (emplacements) Mortar positions

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

The Victory Divisin in Europe, a unit history compiled bfTT-mber i '-'q -s t Tt-,ofAmredTi vi s ion (Enge hardRcyhersche Hofbuchdruckerei, Gotha (Germany) p4, 2 Ibid; p5. 3 Dwight D. Eisonhower, and Compan -y, New' o:--Ts) 14 Questions for consideration and reply by General - nT Frhr V'n G O T-s'su JF -g--T-I"S o-- Lino ub-section, .:lst rl cal-sec Tn Tovmber i9F 5 Crusade in .F Europe, (Doubleday

9 IMay 194 5 .p
6

V Corps Operatins in the

9T" 4y

ToT

E T 0,

6 January 1942

Op cit, Th. 7

Victory Division in

Europe,

p 83

Op cit, V Corps Operations in

8

the E T 0,

P 250.

Victory TD, a unit history of the 628th Tank Dostroyer Fittalion, compiled by nembers of the unit ("MusterSchmidt", Ltd., Germany) p 41 9 After-Action Report, p8 5th Armored Division, Sep 1944,

After-Action Report, 6e8th Tank D strovyr Battalion. September 1944, p4. 11 Op Cit, Victory T D, p 4.2, 12 Op cit, V Corps Ooorations in the E T 0, p 252

Op cit,.After-Action Report, p . 14 Op cit, Victory T D, p 42, 15 Op cit, After-Action Report, p9, 16 Op Cit, Victory TD, p 122,
9

5th.Armored: Division,

5th Armored Division,

Lt, Col, February 19 )50, 18

William A, Hamberg,

personal interview,

Op cit, After-Action Report, p10,

5th Armored Division,

19 Voodoo, unit history of 81st Tank Battalion compiled by members o~Tthat unit, (81st Tank Battalion Association 1947) p 42 20 Op cit, Victory TD, p43

Op cit,After-Action Report, p 10 22 Op cit, Victory Division in 23 Op cit, Victory Td, p 43 24 Op cit, After-Action Report, p 10 25 Op cit, Hamberg, 26 Op cit, Vic tor W p 123

5th Armored Division,

Europe,

P 83,

5th Armored Division,

personal interview,

Ibid, 28

p 123

Op cit, Voodoo,

p 42

Op cit, pas sim. 30 Op cit, 31 Op cit, p 12. 32 Op cit,. 33 Op cit,

After-Action Report,

5th Armored Division,

Victory TD,

p 44,

After-Action Report,

5th Armored Division.

Victory TD,

p 45

After-Action Report,

5th Armored Division,

p 12.
34 Op cit, 35 Ibid, p 43. 36 Ibid, 37 Op cit, After-Action report 5th Armored Division, passim. Voodoo, P 43

p 12,
38 Ibid, 39 p 13,

Op cit, Voodoo, 40 Ibid, 41

Op cit,

p 44

p 44

After-Action Report,

5th Armored Division,

p 13.

Ibid, 43

p 13,

Op cit, Voodoo, p 46, 44 Ibid, p 46. 45 Op cit,

pas s im.

After-Action Report, 5th ^rmored Division,

Battalion,

Op cit, After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer pass m,

47 Ibid, 48

p 7,

Ibid, p 7, 49 Ibid, p 7.

50 Ibid, p 6. 51 Ibid, p 6.

After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December 1944, p 7,

Op cit, Von Gersdorff,

Op cit,

After-Action

Report,

5th Armored Division,

p 14

Battalion,

Op cit, After-Action Report, Sp7T1944, p 6.

628th Tank Destroyer

56 Op cit,
passim,

After-Action Report,

5th Armored Division,

57 Op cit, After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, . p"T944, .p 6

Op cit,

After-Action Report,

5th Armored

Division,

p 14
Op cit, After-Action Report, 628th "ank Destroyer Battalion, Tpt-944, Passim.60 Ibid, p 5 61 Op cit,.After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

p 15.
62 Battalion, 63 Battalion, Op cit, After-Action Report,.628th Tank Destroyer p 6Op cit, p 6 After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer

CHAPTER 4 644th TANK DESTROYER -BATTALION OPERATIONS IN THE ARDSNNES Introduotion General. The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self Propelled) Gaham, Jr., sailed from The

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ephriam F.

United States on 2 January 1944, on board H.2.T. battalion landed in tinued its

Aqutania,

Northern Ireland on 13 January and there con-

%
training with emphasis placed on indireot fire,

This unit left the United States equipped with the 3 inch motor gun carriage, Y 10, the'vehicle it retained throughout its

operations in. Europe. On 10 May the Battalion moved to HUNGERFORD, England where

along with more training, preparations were made for the move to NORMANDY Peninsula. In order to provide protection for the crews a cover for each tank destroyer turret

against artillery fragments, was made.

These covers were made of one quarter inch armor plate..

They completely covered the' overhead openings of the turrets. The battalion landed in Europe on UTAH Beach on 11 July 1944. The major portion of the battalion moved across the English Channel on 11 July in Landing Ships, Tank. The remainder of the battalion, Major

executive officer, 2 Edward R. Garton, crossed the following day.

also in LST's and under the control of its

On 15 July the battalion was attached to the US 8th Infantry Division and although elements of the battalion were from time to time attached to other divisions, the battalion itself 38 remained so

lkV

,> -%t qkvo

,h4.We.Jh

i"r

Wa

uas

Heuwl#%

E te6Tfl AT.I
Ra.iT9Uid

S'

lms;Ied .e

Figure 7.

attached until early December 1944. Friendly situation. In late autumn 1944, the U. S. forces their

driving across Europe were confronted with the ROER River in northern sector. The crossing of the river itself However, as it

flowed at

this time presented no great problem. German river in

located on this

the vicinity of URFTTALSPERRE and PAULUSHOFF were The importance of these Should

two very important and well defended dams.

dams was fully realized by both the Allies and the Germans.

these dams be blown, the released water would cause the river below to become so swollen and swift that a relatively small defending force could render a military crossing in sible. The US First Army stated, in its this area next to imposreport of operations for

that period, "Since the middle of September our attention had been directed toward the problem presented by the ROER River dams. It

was realized at that time that no large-scale crossing of the ROER River below the dams could be undertaken until they were in friendly hands." The US First Army was commanded at that time by Lieutenant

General Courtney H. Hodges. V Corps, so that it these dams. ... Early in December changes were made in V Corps dispod On sitions in order to attack in the area of the Roer Dams. 7 December the newly attached 78th Division commenced to arrive and close one of its regiments into assembly areas in the zone of V Corps, its second regiment arriving the following day. On 10 December the 2d Division commenaed moving its units from front line positions in the Schnee Efel area US First Army, stretched thin its lines in the south sufficient strength to attack

might assemble a force in

to the area of V Corps. On 12 December CCB of the 9th Armored Division was attached to V Corps, and the 2d Division was attached at 1030 hours and closed in assembly areas. On 12 December the 78th Division took over the center of the corps front from Lammersdorf to Monschau, relieving the 102d Cavalry Group. To its left the 8th Division continued along the line of the Kall to include the Brandenberg Ridge. To its right the 99th Division still held the front from Monschau to the corps southern boundry in the Bucholz Forest northwest to the Losheim Gap. The 2d Division was now assembled in the Camp Elsenborn region ready to participate in the attack by passing through part of the 99th Division front... 4 V Corps order of the battle on 13 December 1944 was as follows, front line units being listed in order from north to south: V Corps 8th Div 78th Div 2d Div 99th Div CCB 9th Armd Div (in reserve) 102d Cav Gp (in reserve) CCR 5th Armd Div (in reserve) 5 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, wrote the following in this area: ... Through late November and early December the badly stretched condition of our troops caused constant concern... In order to maintain the two attacks that we then considered important we had to concentrate forces in the vicinity of the Roer dams on the north and bordering the Saar on the south. This weakened the static, or protective, force in the Ardennes For a period we had a total of only three divisions region. on a front of some seventy-five miles between Trier and Monschau and were never able to place more than four in that region...Our conclusion was that in the Ardennes region we were running a definite risk but we believed it to be a mistaken policy to suspend our attacks all along the front merely to make ourselves safe until all reinforcements arriving frcm the United States could bring us up to peak in his account of World War II,

connection with the situation existing in

'1 cAa

L+senbo?s

Are
d 4'tt

Isj Doc
'RaA#o

i
0 P

0
-0J0

GSc 1 4 ARick

ItsI ?*

Figure 8.

strengths . Enemy situation. In the fall of 1944 the German troops and a poor state after ten

equipment at the front were generally in

years of fighting and repeated Allied bombings of industries and transportation. The Germans were engaged in the east along a wide front against the Russians. On the western front the Allies were attackThe German defenders had been

ing the border of the Homeland.

forced back to the SIEGFRIED LINE and in the north to the line of the ROER River. Hitler, front morale, anxious to regain the initiative and bolster home was extremely desirous of mounting an offensive. He

reasoned that no decisive objectives could be gained on the eastern front against the unlimited Russian manpower. pects looked better to him. In the west prosbut

An attack through the difficult,

thinly held ARDENNES could with surprise cross the MEUSE River, capture the port of ANTWERP and destroy the northern half of the Allied Forces. The SIEGFRIED positions were to be held with a The best units were withdrawn, reorganized, and

minimum of troops.

completely reequipped for this grand offensive, Three armies were to attack. Panzer Army; in Sixth -

On the north, General Dietrich's General Manteuffal's Fifth Panzer

the center,

Army; on the south, General Brandenburg's Seventh Panzer Army Sixth Panzer A assigned the major effort was forced, be-

cause of the terrain and narrow front, to attack with the I SS

Panzer Corps followed by II SS. Panzer Corps. ... The plan was that the Corps was to break through on its own sector of the enemy's main field of combat with the three infantry divisions: the 277 VGD (right) to reach the area of Elsenborn, the 12 VGD (center) T-e-rah the area of Nidrum - Weywertz, and the 3 F JD (left) to reach the area of Schoppen - Elberdingen,,. General Kraemer, chief of staff of the Sixth Panzer Army,

in his report of the commitment of that army, wrote the following "The best division was the 12 VGD which had an especially skilled 8 Commander and had fought excellently in the Battle of Aachen," The 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were not to be used in the initial The strength of these divisions was to 9 be conserved for the thrust beyond this. ... On 14 Dec 44 at noon, the Corps took over the command of its attack sector. Following formations were committed in the sector: 277 VGD, the right wing of which stood at the edge of the wooe aout 2 kms southeast of Alzen, and thus, inside the sector of the contiguous corps (LXVII). The left wing was near Losheim. 1 Bn of the neighboring corps on the left (LXVI) was near Krewinkel. e. Moving into the assembly areas. In the evening of the 15 Dec 44, the 12 VGD and the 3 Para Div moved into their attack sectors aE assembly areas.. g. Situation immediately before the attack...., The reinforcedn o the 27 G,which was in the LXVII at Corps sector, had not been relieved, so that it was abs~ the beginning of the attack. This weakened the right wing attack group. The 12 VGD had completed its preparations according to plan, a13 a undertaken its own security. The 3 Para Division, which had been put under Corps command on 14 Dec 44 by Army Group (Heeresgruppe), arrived during the early evening of the 15 Dee 44 with only two regiments (the second regiment of which was without heavy weapons in some of the elements.)... At 0530 hrs, the artillery opened its preparatory fire l 9. breakthrough,

Operations

Pre-battle movement.

In the early days of December,

the way

US 8th Infantry Division of the US First Army was fighting its through the HURTGEN Forest in Dams.

an attempt to capture the ROER River

The resistance displayed by the Germans proved too stubborn First US Army

for such a head-on attack by this depleted division. commander, Lieutenant General Hodges,

organized a new plan calling

for a strong ground thrust from the south, just north of the ARDENNES, aimed at these all-important dams. 2d Infantry Division on 13 December. The attack was to be made by the To add more power to the

attack, US V Corps, on 8 December ordered the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion (minus one gun company and one reconnaissance platoon) detached from the 8th Division and attached to the 2d Division, then commanded by 1Major General Walter M. Robertson. The order was received on 8 December and the battalion commander accompanied by Captain Harry L. S-3, Godshall, Jr., the battalion

proceeded immediately to the headquarters VITH,

of the 2d Division

located at ST.

Belgium, where orders for the battalion to Belgium, on 11 December were received located at

proceed to SOURBRODT,

Graham and Godshall returned to the battalion area, HJRT GE , Germany,

on the 9th of December and plans were formulated

11
for the move. On 10 December the 817th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed), a unit believed to be less suited for offensive operations because its weapons were towed, relieved the 644th TD Battalion (minus

Company B and one platoon of Reconnaissance Company). moved to SOURBRODT the next day. when the 644th TD Battalion is that it is From this point on in i.t is

The battalion this report

mentioned,

to be understood

referring to the battalion minus Company B and one pla-

toon of Reconnaissance Company. On the morning of 11 December at approximately 0930 hours, the battalion set out on its move from HURTGEN to SOURBRODT. The dis-

tance was approximately 50 miles. all roads were covered with snow. untered, however,

The weather was very dold and No enemy intereference was enco-

and the battalion completed the move without in12 cident at 1745 hours the same day. The battalion CP was set up in SOURBRODT and the tank destroyers were serviced and made ready for the operations to come. On 12 December Company A was attached to the 9th Infantry Regiment, then located at ROCHERATH. Company A moved to the regi-

mont's assembly area located in NONSCHAU Forest north of ROCHERATH, and closed by dark. Company C was attached to the 38th Infantry Plans

Regiment which was at that time located at CAMP ELSENBORN.

were made to move Company C forward to the regiment's assembly area on order. The 644th TD Battalion was attached to the 2d Infantry 13 Division Artillery. The plan to capture the ROER River Dams initially called for the 9th Infantry Regiment to pass through the positions held by the 2d Reconnaissance Troop ard the 99th Infantry Division north of ROCHERATH, and to attack and seize that portion of the SIEGFRIED

Line located at the WEHLERSCHEID Road Junction.

The regiment was

then to swing north and seize the town of ROHREN lying to the north 14 beyond the MOSCHAU Forest. When the 9th Infantry had taken WEHLERSCHEID, the 38th Infantry was to pass through the 9th and 15 advance through the MONSCHAU Forest toward DREIBORN, Germany. Operations, 13 December. At 0830 hours the 9th Infantry began

the attack as planned.

The regiment advanced through the woods Road. Because the the tanks

along both sides of the ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIED

woods on both sides of this road contained many swamps, and tank destroyers were confined to the road. had come a sudden thaw. Visibility was very poor. preparations were fired.

With the morning

The snow on the road turned to slush. In order to gain surprise, no artillery

By 1330 hours the regiment had advanced There it The road

to within 600 yards of the 'WAEHLERSCHIED Road Junction. met a German strong point impervious to quick attack.

junction was defended by 24 enemy pillboxes placed 20 or 30 yards apart. In front of these pillboxes was an anti-tank ditch,. a wide

belt of barbed wire concertinas, and thickly sewn anti-personnel 16 The ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIELD Road was also mined, thereby mines. denying the infantry the direct fire support of the tanks and tank destroyers. Operations, successful in its 14 December. On 14 December the regiment was not This was

efforts to seize this strong point.

largely due to the lack of effective supporting artillery and to 17 On this the weather, which kept our tactical bombers grounded. 45

date the 644th TD Battalion forward CP moved to ROCHERATH. battalion forward CP, commander, as was normal,

The

consisted of the battalion and the Reconnaissance Company.

the S-2 and S-3 sections, 15 December.

Operations, weather still

The morning of 15 December found the The 9th

too hazy for the use of tactical bombing.

Infantry spent the day patrolling and probing the objective. The 38th Infantry made plans this date to relieve the 9th Infantry on the 16th. lion in The regiment planned to employ the 3d Batta-

a flank attack against the position from the southeast.

During the day routes and positions Were reconnoitered for the attached tanks and tank destroyers so that their direct fire weapons could be brought to bear on the objective, the 3d Battalion in the main attack. thereby assisting

Just after dark on 15 DecemJr., commanding officer,

ber Lieutenant Colonel Walter M. Higgins, 2d Battalion,

9th Infantry, sent a patrol to cross the German lines. strength

The patrol reported the Germans off guard and an attack in was made by the 2d Battalion. Operations, 16 December. The attack was successful.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 9th Inthe enemy lines, made by the By 1200 hours, and

fantry advanced through the gap in 2d Battalion,

prior to daylight on 16 December.

what was to be remembered as "Heartbreak Crossroads" was taken, the 9th Infantry was in

the process of consolidating its positions. the 38th Infan-

Due to the success of the 9th Infantry attack,

try did not carry out the attack planned the previous day, but advanced north to pass through the 9th Infantry as called for in the

original plan.

By 1700 hours the 38th Infantry was located in

defensive position for the night along the high ground approximately 1100 yards directly east of the WEHLERSCHIED Road Junction,. Company C, 644th TD Battalion, which had been in support of 2d Pla-

the 38th Infantry was disposed as follows on 16 December: toon located just east of ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIED

Road approximately

5500 yards north of ROCHERATH; 1st Platoon located approximately 3000 yards north of ROCHERATH and 600 yards east of the ROCHERATHVEHLERSCHIED Road in Regiment, located in 18 date. the vicinity of 2d Battalion, 395th Infantry

99th Infantry Division; the remainder of Company C was ROCHERATH where the company CP had been moved this

Late in

the evening of 16 December Companies A and C were

ordered released to 644th TD Battalion control as of 17 December. On 16 December the Germans launched their counteroffensive in the ARDENNES. Their attack extended from KESTERNICH in the south. the north, In the

to include all of the LUXEMBOURG frontier in

area immediately concerning the 2d Division the Germans had attacked the over-extended 99th Division lines and succeeded in trations. local pene-

The US lines held, however, and by the end of the day The Germans had, in their

the situation was partially restored. attack,

succeeded in breaking contact between the 99th Division on

and the 106th Division on the south of 19 MANDER ELD by capturing that town.

the north of MANDERFELD,

On the afternoon of 16 December the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, then located at CAMP ELSENBORN, received orders to attach its 1st and 3d Battalions to the 99th Division, The lst Battalion was attached to the 394th Infantry. This bat-

talion left on trucks at 2330 hours and proceeded to BULLINGEN where the troops were detrucked and marched southeast where the battalion took up a defensive position.

-to

HUNNINGEN

The 3d Battalion

was attached to the 393d Infantry, and .left its area on trucks at 1400 hours. At 1630 hours the battalion arrived at the western

edge of KRINKELT Forest and immediately deployed north and south of the road, in the 393d Infantry area. The 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, under 23d Infantry control, was moved at 1345 hours a distance of approximately 15 miles by truck to an assembly area 3000 yards north of KRINKELT, 20 arriving at 1430 hours. Operations, 17 and 18 December. Early on 17 December the

German 1st SS Panzer Division committed its armor in the attack. The division smashed to the northwest on the railroad running from LOSHIEM to BUTGENBACH, and averran the town of HONSFELD. hours the armored force was in BDLLINGEN, By 0830

and shortly thereafter

sent an armored thrust northwest toward the villages of WIRTZFELD 21 and KRINKELT. The 644th TD Battalion received information of the heavy armor attack advancing toward BULLINGEN. naissance Company, commanded by First Li

One platoon of the Recontenant Edward B. Patterson,

was immediately sent to establish and maintain contact with the enemy tanks. The platoon was surrounded in BULLINGEN and the

1st Section was captured.

The 2d Section escaped capture by

breaking from the encirclement. To meet the enemy armor thrust driving from the southeast 1st Platoon, Company C, 644th TD Battalion, and one platoon of the

741st Tank Battalion were ordered to pick up infantry of the 23d Infantry and proceed south. tanks contacted Company E. ROCHERATH. At 0845 hours the tank destroyers and 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, north of

With the company of infantry mounted on the tanks and the small force moved south through ROCHERATH and Colonel Stokes, assistant division commander, 2d

tank destroyers, into KRINKELT.

Infantry Division,

met these tanks and tank destroyers at KIIN~ELT.

He ordered the tank destroyers and that part of Company E mounted on them to go to WIRTZFELD. The four tanks and accompanying infanThe tanks had

try, he ordered to BULLINGEN under Captain Byrd.

gone only a short distance out of KRINKELT when they encountered a Mark IV tank, a half track, and an armored car. The infantry disMenn-

mounted and took cover while the tanks prepared to open fire. while the three tank destroyers hich .had turned right toward

WIRTZFELD sighted the enemy vehicles.. mounted,

After the infantry had dis-

the tank destroyers immediately, opened fire and knocked The infantry from the tanks and tank

out all three enemy vehicles.

destroyers joined forces and captured 12 prisoners who were hiding

22
along the road in the vicinity of the three enemy vehicles.

Company A (minus 2d Platoon),

644th TD Battalion, had been

ordered to WIRTZFELD early on the morning of 17 December and arrived just as the 1st Platoon, enemy vehicles. Company C, had knocked out the three Company A, was wounded by

The commanding officer,

a shell fragment and evacuated.

First Lieutenant Clarence Steves

assumed command of Company A and was ordered to provide anti-armor defense for WIRTZFELD, ing officer, relieving Company C without delay. Conmand-

Company C, was ordered to provide anti-armor defense With the bulk of the battalion located

for ROCHERATH-KRINKELT area. in WIRTZFELD and KRINKELT,

the forward CP (minus the Reconnaissance Captain Godshall, the battalion

Company) was moved to WIRTZFELD. S-3,

was ordered to take command of Company A late in the afternoon

of this date.

The commanding officer 38th Infantry assumed re23 sponsibility for the defense of ROCHERATH-KRINKELT area. The 2d Battalion, Company K), 9th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion (minus

9th Infantry had moved from WEHLERSCHIED down to The 2d Battalion was given

WIRTZFELD about noon on 17 December.

the mission of protecting the road out of WIRTZFELD to the east. The 3d Battalion (minus Company K) was positioned between WIRTZFELD and BULLINGEN with the mission of protecting WIRTZFELD from the direction of BULLINGEN which was in commanding officer, the hands of the Germans. The

9th Infantry was made responsible for the de-

fense of WIRTZFELD where his CP was now located. From the time the elements of the tank destroyer battalion moved to WIRTZFELD and KRINKELT, heavy artillery fell throughout

the area. On 17 December the Germans pushed forward directly from the east in an attempt to take ROCHERATH and KRINKELT, and joined its southern forces attacking toward BULLINGEN and BUTGENBACH. The

enemy unit making this attack directly from the east was the German 277 Volksgrenadier Division reinforced with assault guns. for this attack was recorded by General Kraemer as follows: .. ,The 277 Volks Gren Div was to continue their attach-on both sides of U rebrt past Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld fro a later assault on Sourbrodt, south Elsenborn. The division was reinforced by an assault gun detachment that had not been ready for the commitment on 16 Dec (because the last parts of this detachment could only be extricated during the night 15/15 Dec).: It was to be expected that the division with their attack in the direction of Elsenborn would gain terr' 4 n and contain the enemy forces that were situated in this area.o. The seriousness of the attack was realized by Major General Walter M. Robertson, the 2d Infantry Division commander. One platoon of The plan

Company A, 644th TD Battalion was sent to guard the crossroads located about 1400 yards east of ROCHERATH. Also sent to this lo-

cation were the Armunition and Pioneer Platoon, Company K and 1st Platoon, Company M,.. all elements of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry. Orders to proceed to this location were received while this unit was proceeding south between ROCHERATH and WIRTZFELD. The units

bearing the brunt of the German attack aimed east toward ROCHERATH were those of: the 23d and 393d Infantry Regiments. It was apparent

that this line was about to give way to the German thrust. The movement of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, to the south was intercepted by General Robertson about 4000 yards north of

ROCHERATH.

The battalion was ordered to move to the road junction 644th TD Battalion.

recently occupied by the platoon of Company A,

General Robertson punctuated the urgency of the situation by personally loading the leading elements of the infantry in 22 commandeered

ton trucks and leading them to within 1000 yards of the road 25 net. The commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry had orders to command all friendly troops in the area. The battalion managed

to get Companies A and B astride the road facing southeast just as darkness fell. The commanding officer, 1st Battalion, having of necessity the WEHLERSCHIED area,

left all the battalion anti-tank mines in

contacted the tank destroyer platoon leader and arranged for the use 26 of anti-tank mines in the possession of the tank destroyer platoon. The problem of setting up a defense in extremely difficult. falling back in The elements in this area, at this time, was contact with the enemy were The area was subjected to the units

a disorganized fashion.

direct enemy machine gun fire.

With darkness setting in an unfamiliar area.

attempted to set up their defenses in The commanding officer, out men from the east. defend when and if Company I,

23d Infantry arrived with-

He was shown the area he would occupy and A hurried

he could get control of his company.

defense plan was given the company commanders at the 1st Battalion CP, located 300 yards northwest of the crossroads. The battalion artillery liaison officer had been out of contact with his artillery battalion for over two hours. He worked

feverishly to restore cornunications and as darkness set in he succeeded, road in He immediately planned his defensive fires along the 27 front of the position. The entire

With the darkness came the first enemy attack. situation was confusing.

While the enemy was attacking, elements

of the withdrawing front line units were entering the battalion's position from the same direction. In attempting to allow friendly

elements to pass into this position, enemy vehicles, including tanks, were allowed to pass through, "daisy chain", When this was discovered, a

made of the tank destroyer platoon's antitank mines, This measure along with artillery fire

was dragged across the road.

support and direct fires from the battle position stopped the attack. By midnight this force had destroyed five enemy tanks and an undetermined number of foot troops. fire was placed continuously in Throughout the night artillery

front of the position.

At 0645 hours on 18 December the full force of the German armor fell in this zone. Every means at hand was employed to repel Had it not been for a

this attack, but the task became impossible.

platoon of Company A, 741st Tank Battalion, which was sent forward to the position about noon, this unit could not have been withdrawn.

By employing tremendous amounts of artillery fire and counterattacks by the tank platoon, 2d Battalion, ROCHERATH, For this action at the crossroads near ROCHERATH, known to the the defenders were able to withdraw through the and assemble 2000 yards northwest of

38th Infantry,

men of the battalion as "Purple Heart Corner", .9th Infantry, received a Presidential Citation. entire defensive action, lion, remained in its

the 1st Battalion, Throughout this 644th TD Battasupport

the 2d Platoon, Company A,

position at the crossroads,

lending its

to the 1st Battalion.

The platoon withdrew with the 1s-t Battalion.

This platoon proceeded to KRINKELT on the afternoon of 18 December and was attached to :Company C, 644th TD Battalion. The German's view of the action of 18 December on this front as expressed by General Kraemer, was as follows: ... The attempts, to win the roads from Monschau to Euskirchen to the camp at Elsenborn, and from there the roads from Bullingen to Weismes, were continued in cooperation with 277 V.G.D., that continued the attacks near Udenbreth. The 277 V.G.D. advanced well forward on 18 Dec, and took n or h of Wirtzfeld. With this the Division was the heigts freed and together with the 12 V.G.D. could attack in the This was ordered for the 19 Dec. direction of Elsenborn. The attacks -- Monschau -- and Elsenborn -- had to be under the direction of LXVII Corps. Cal togetr with the 12 SS Pz Div taken The 12 V.G.D, Both dTisions ought for Buellingen aFer a hard battle. the village Butgenbach against a strongly defended enemy, 8 time attacked with tanks. 2 who for the first When the 644th TD Battalion CP moved from ROCHERATH to WIRTZFELD on 17 December, remained in its the Reconnaissance Company (minus one platoon) ROCHERATH. At about 2030 hours that and to the south of the 9th Infantry, forced their the area of the Recon-

position in

night the Germans who had passed through, defensive position of the Ist Battalion, attack into ROCHERATH. naissance Company,

The attack fell in

The CP group was organized by the commanding The

officer and the company attempted to repel the enemy attack.

company managed to hold off the attackers until late in of 18 December, at which time the attack ceased.

the morning

During this action and accounted

the company destroyed an enemy tank,

damaged another,

for about 20 casualties among the enemy.

The company lost all ve-

hicles open to the attackers view, but suffered only minor personnel casualties. On 18 December the commanding officer, 644th TD Battalion, was

made responsible for the anti-armor defense of the WIRTZFELD area. Company C, 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed), the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) 644th TD Battalion. and three guns of

were attached to the

Throughout the day of 18 December elements of 23d Infantry withdrew through area,

the 394th Infantry and 1st Battalion, the defensive

positions of the WIRTZELD-KRINKELT

The 801st TD Battalion had been attached to the 99th Division since 9 November 1944. This battalion had met the brunt of the The three guns attached to

German attack with the 99th Division.

the 644th TD Battalion on 18 December were of the 1st Platoon, Company A. These were the only guns remaining in B. Horsfall, Company A. 801st TD

Lieutenant Colonel F.

commanding officer,

Battalion wrote of this in the unit's after action reports ..,18 Dec - At 0215A the 1st plat of Co A was ordered to proceed to WIRTZFELD thru KRINKELT. Upon reaching WIRTZFELD they met with the 23d Regt, 2d Div. There they set up AT defense on the North and East side of town with their remaining three guns. The rest of the Co. which had lost the majority of its equipment were employed with the infantry... All of the remaining guns of the Bn, less three in IRTZFELD, were placed East of Elsenborn in AT defense. A provisional 55

company was organized from these gun crews and placed under the command of the Co C commander... The concensus of opinions of the plat leaders and the gun crews are that if it had not been for the fact of the non-mobility of the towed gun and the lack of armor protection for the gun crews and in most cases the over-running of the gun positions by the infantry many more tanks and vehicles could have been destroyed... Enemy action on 18 December in the area consisted of armor None of the

and infantry attacks from the south and southeast. attacks were successful,

but the pressure being brought to bear by forces to plan a withdrawal to

the powerful enemy caused the U. S.

the better defensive terrain of ELSENBORN Ridge approximately two miles west of ROCHERATH and WIRTZFELD. forward units of V Corps resulted in The pulling back of the

the concentration of force in

a tight semicircle to the west of ELSENBORN. Operations, 19 December. night of 19 December. withdrawal. The withdrawal was planned for the

Enemy artillery fire was moderate during the

Company C covered the withdrawal from ROCHERATH Company A covered the withdrawal from The withdrawal was accomplished

KRINKELT as rear guard.

WIRTZFELD which was set on fire. without undue difficulty. On ELSE BORN Ridge,

Prior to daylight on 20 December,

one

platoon of Company C moved into position on the high ground east of BERG in in support of the 38th Infantry. Company A moved into reserve

ELSENBORN.

One platoon of Company A moved to high ground east The

of ELSENBORN to provide anti-armor protection from the east. battalion forward CP was established in BERG.

On the morning of 20 December the 2d Division commander, called the commanding officer, 30 Battalion, to personally commend the battalion. ajor General Robertson, 644th TD

General Kraemer recorded the actions of the Germans in this area on the 19th of December as follows: 19 December: On that day the enemy countermeasures were quite obvious.. The enemy resistance at the LXVII Army Corps was growing. he terrain captured Counterattacks were made in t henorth. during the preceding days had to be given up. Kalterherberg The 277 VG Div reached the road south of Monschau was taken. ER wole, no perceptible Forsterei Wahlerscheid-Rocherath. progress was made.- On 18 Dec, a Volksartillery Corps was attached to the LjX:I Army Cors and was moving up to the new positions. The 12 SS Pz Div and 12 VG Div of the I SS Pz Corps could no more aRvanoe against the increasing enemy fores. The terrain being very muddy, the .nfantry advanced only slowly, and the tanks could not be committed off from the road. Enemy anti-tank guns and tanks were Well emplaced. Stronger artillery fire and the difficult terrain would probably prevent our breakthrough past Buettgenbaoh, because it was no more possible f6r the attacking forces to move into the assembly positions. Evidently the two divisions did not find the appropriate terrain for the attack, the ba talions could not advance on the muddy ground and had to use the roads, where they were exposed to the enemy artillery. That caused temporarily an incoordiTanks, that during the nated direction of the two divisions, morning hours had found by-passing road south of Buettgenbach broke down in the mud at the west end of the village and only at night could be removed from there with great difficulties. A further advance was impossible the weather continued like this. Therefore, the Army gave order in the afternoon that the 12 SS Pz Div cease the attack, be extracted rapidly and assembe in te earea Baasen - Losheim - Mandoersfeld, and be sent either after the 1 SS Pz or the 9 SS Pz Div. mm . During the period covered by this report the 644th ...

TD Battalion's offensive operations were severely limited due to the terrain and weather. ted is shown however-, The method in which the battalion operathe battalion itself was

As was normal,

attached to division artillery. infantry regiments. battalions.

The companies were attached to the

The platoons were attached to the infantry the

'hen working with infantry on the offensive,

battalion attempted to operate in strength.

units no larger than platoon

On the defensive the battalion operated where possible in company strength. operated in ganization, At times however, when it was more suitable, it Also, because of their flexible or

platoon strength.

there were times when platoons were attached to com-

panies of the battalion other than their parent companies. In regard to destroying enemy armor in 38th Infantry recorded the following: ... In the attack, every effort was made to keep tanks and TD's well forward to place direct fire on enemy fortifications and to repel any counterattacks. When the enemy launched his offensive available elements of 741st Tk Bn and 644th TD Bn, SP, were employed to counter enemy armor. Because of the superior firepower and frontal armor of the enemy tanks, our armor was employed in TD fashion, taking up firing positions along the flanks of approaches and placing their fire on the flank and rear of enemy tanks. Normal procedure in countering enemy armored attacks on Rochorath and Krinkelt were to take enemy armor under fire with medium artillery before it reached our lines; then to hit individual tanks from the flank with our tanks, TD's and 57 mm AT guns, and mop up infiltrations. Destroyed were set afire with gasoline-oil mixes poured on them and with thermite grenades set in gunbarrels which burned through the barrels. The 57mm AT gun proved very unsatisfactory, only one effective hit being scored on the turret of one enemy tank. Medium artillery proved effective in breaking up enemy tank formations. The close teamwork between infantry, artillery, tanks and TD's accounted for 69 known enemy tanks, plus several armored trucks and scout cars3, When the 2d Division had completed its withdrawal to the this operation, the

ELSENBORN Ridge area, General Hodges phoned the following message

to General Robertson:

'WVhat the 2d Division has done in these past

four days will live forever in the history of the United States 33 Army." The 644th TD Battalion indeed playqd an important part in the defense of this area, for during the period starting on the morning of 17 December and ending on the night of 19 December, the battalion destroyed 17 enemy tanks, knocked out two SP guns, and damaged two enemy tanks,

Lsti@

and PerSomnl-

General.

The 644th TD Battalion during the period covered by

Moving

this report was well supplied with materiels and personnel.

supplies from the battalion CP located at SOURBRODT to the forward CP in ROCHERATH became a problem when the Germans launched their counteroffensive. The only practical route from SOURBRODT to the

forward CP was the ELSENBORN-BUTGEB3ACH-BULLINGEN-KRINKELT road. On the morning of 17 December a battalion supply convoy moving to the west, met the advancing Germans on the eastern edge of BULLINGEN. The supply vehicles were able to withdraw to ELSENBORN.

Only after much difficulty did they succeed in reaching the forward CP by moving over foot trails southeast of ELSENBORN. Many routes

appeared on the map in. this area but these routes proved to be but trails. An engineer unit made a road from WIRTZFELD to ELSENBORN

by enlarging one of these trails and it was used by all units in the area for both supply and withdrawal. 59

~:-

~i--

FIRST ARMOR ACROSS THE ROER

Figure 9. An M-10 of the 64.4th TD Battalion.

Class I.

At no time were Class I supplies short in

supplyb.

Prior to 17 December the rations were picked up by company vehicles from the battalion CP available, These consisted of 5 in 1 rations and wheh Three

fresh meats and vegetables were sent forward.

days supply of rations were carried with each unit. kitchen trucks were kept in Classes II problem. and IV. the battalion CP area.

The company

These classes of supply presented no

The only items not readily available were certain ordDue to the proximity of division and army supporting these needed

nance items.

ordnance units and readily available transportation, items could be obtained with little Class III. difficulty.

Because this unit was equipped with M-10 motor gun

carriage, the fuel problem would have been that of diesel fuel. There was at no time however, also no problem in Class V. any shortage in this fuel*. There was

the supply of gasoline.

Ammunition supply was no problem during this period.

There seemed to be always more than enough small arms ammunition available. This unit had opportunity to replace their 3 inch motor M-10 with the M-18 at various times in Europe. How-

gun carriage, ever,

because the supply of 3 inch ammunition seemed always to be the commander retained the M-10. Such was the case during

adequate,

this operation, times available.

an adequate supply of 3 inch ammunition was at all HVAP (high velocity armor piercing) proved most good supply.

effective and was in

Mnntenance maintenance. minimum,

this battaii

h Was well traihed in Vehidular

Because

of this the maintenance problem was kept to a

Also, because of the excellent availability of Class II

supplies and the availability of ordnance units, no serious problems were encountered,. Communications. This battalion used much wire. It made a

practice of installing wire between its the division to which it was attached.

CP and the switchboard of The forward CP also inBecause of

stalled wire to the nearest regimental switchboard.

this, radio had to be used only between platoons and as a supplementary means of communications for forward and rear CP's and the companies. Personnel. most of the time. stroyer personnel. This battalion was kept to its authorized strength

The replacements received were seldom tank deHowever, because the battalion had lost only landed with in

between 10 and 15 percent of the personnel it NORAtIDY,

the training of these replacements presented no problem.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER Iy

1

Unit History, 2 Ibid, p 18.

644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, p 17.

"FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY, Report of Operations, 1944 - 22 February 1945" (U.S. War Dept.), p 95. 4 Ibid, p 96.

1 August

Ibid, p 97. 6
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1948), p 337. 7 "Commitment of the I SS Panzer Corps during the Ardennes Offensive (16 Dec - 25 Jan 45)", a translation of interrogation of Gruppcnfuehrer Hermann Priess, Commanding General I SS Panzer

Corps, in March 1946, (MS # A-877), p 9. 8 "Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/

45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer Army, (MS #A-924), p 13. 9 "Commitment of the I SS Panzer Corps during the Ardennes Offensive (16 Dec - 25 Jan 45)", a translation of interrogation of Gruppenfuehrer Hermann Priess, Commanding General I SS Panzer Corps,

in March 1946, (MS #A-877), p 10. 10

"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/ 45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer Army, (MS #A-924), pp 24-26. 11 After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December

1944, p 2. 12
Ibid, p 2.

13
Ibid, p 2.

14
After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 5. 15 After-Action Report, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 2. 16 "Combat History of the Second Infantry Division in World War II", p 84. 17 After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 27. 18 After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December 1944, p 2. 19 After-Action Report, G-2, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 3.

20 After-Action Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 10.. 21 After-Action Report, G-2, 2d Infantry Division, December

1944, p 4. 22
After-Action Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December, 1944, p 11, 23 After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December

1944,
24 45",

p 3.
"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/ a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer Army,

(MS #A-924),

pp 29-30,
2d Infantry

25 After-action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, Division, December 1944, pp 12-13,. 26 Ibid, p 13. 27 Ibid, p 14.
28

45",

"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/ a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer

Army, (MS 29

#A-924),

p 33.

After-Action Report, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, December 1944, pp 5-6. 30 After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December

1944, p 4. 31
"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/ 45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer Army, (MS # A-924), pp 36-37. 32 After-Action Report, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 7. 33 After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, December 1944, p 19.

CHAPTER 8 704TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION On 11 July 1944 the marshalling area in hampton.

T04th

Tank Destroyer Battalion left

the

southern England and boarded LCT's at South-

On the following day the battalion landed on Utah Beach on Shortly afterwards the battalion

the iormandy coast of Prance.

joined the recently arrived 4th Armored Division. On the morning of 17 July the battalion left the beach area

with the 4th Armored Division and went into a defensive position in the vicinity of Raids, of CCB, France. The battalion was in general support

4th Armored Division with the mission of furnishing indirect

fire for the front line armored infantry battalions. The battalion took up firing positions in fields approxiThe

mately one half mile behind the armored infantry battalions. battalion remained under control of its his staff. It was assisted in its

own battalion commanddr and

fire missions, which consisted of snipers in buildings and church

firing at enemy observation posts, steeples, and area targets in

the orchards,

by the forward observers

of the 4th Armored Artillery battalions and by the mortar platoon leaders of the armored infantry battalions. was done, Although much firing

the extent of damage was never ascertained.

Through the month of August and early September the 404th moved with the 4th Armored Division in Battle of France. the exploitation phase of the in-

During this exploitation the 7O4th lost its

tegrity as a battalion operating under command of its battalion commander. It was decentralized and its 64 units were attached to the

Combat Commands of the 4th Armored Division. to Combat Command A; one

oompany

One company was attached

to Combat Command B; and the remain-

ing company and the Battalion Headquarters were attached to the Reserve Command. In this manner of attachment the company commanders remained at the Combat Command comoand post and received their orders from the Combat Command commander or his representative. In turn the

company conmmanders would transmit their orders to their platoon leaders whose platoons would normally be supporting a reinforced tank battalion. The battalion comrpander and his staff kept in close touch

with his company commanders by personal visits to the Combat Command command posts. Supply, evacuation, and replacements were executed

through the logistical channels of the 4th Armored Division. Undoubtedly one of the most descriptive and typical examples of the use of tank destroyers with both the infantry and armored units was the action of the 704th during the Battle of Arracourt, France. There the speed, maneuveribility and firepower of the tank

destroyers were exploited in their fullest; with results that were successful beyond even the highest hopes of the backers of this type 1 of anti-tank tactics. The general situation was as follows: During the early part

of September the Third Army was making rapid progress against what appeared to be a somewhat confused German Army, The unrelenting

pressure exerted against the enemy lines was practically impossible

for the Germans to contain for more than brief periods of time. Without a doubt the Americans were on the move; and they had every intent of keeping the offensive rolling. On the 16th of September General Patton got his Corps Commanders together and gave them two important objectives as their next missions. The XX Corps was to advance as rapidly as possible The XII Corps' mission was the capture of

and seize FRANKFORT.

DARMSTADT and the establishing of a bridgehead east of the Rhine. The XV Corps was to follow the XII Corps and be prepared to take MANTHEIM on order. The tentative target date for the XII Corps attack was set for the 18th of September. The maneuver plan was a column of diviIt was decided to

sions with the 4th Armored Division in the lead. 2 strike between SARREGUEMINES and SAARBRUCKEN. As was stated, Armored Division. It

the penetrating force was to be the 4th was to be followed by General Paul Baade's

35th Infantry Division whose mission was to send one regiment to accompany the armor, and to use the remainder in widening the gap,

General Horace McBride's 80th Infantry Division was told to mop up any remaining pockets of enemy resistance, column, take SAARBRUCKEN, got behind the attacking

and continue on to the RHINE.

This was the general plan for a rapid advance to the RHINE, but as usual, the Germans had ideas of their own. They were already

on the march to launch a counterattack with elements of their Fifth Panzer Army, which most certainly was going to interrupjhe 66

execution of the Third Army's plans. On the 18th of September General John 8. Wood, the 4th Armored Division, commander of

issued orders for the resumption of the CCB to move from DELME ON SAARBRUCKEN, the

advance on the following day:

CCA was to move from the ARRACOURT area along the center road in XII Corps zone (MORHANGE, PUTTELANGE)

and by using subsidiary roads

on the south flank towards SARREGUIMINES. But the Germans did a little 18th of September at LUNEVILLE, attacking of their own on the

forcing CCA to send a task force to

help CCR whose position at LUNEVILLE was being menaced. And so, on the night of the 18th of September the 4th Armored

Division was situated as follows: CCR had thrown off the German attack with minor losses and was holding its position. CCB was deployed near FRESNES-EN-SAULNOIS, attack on SAARBRUCKEN on the following day. CCA, minus the task force it had sent to CCR, 3 was assembled ready for its

about 12 miles southeast of ARRACOURT. Since our first account of tank destroyer action concerns itthe details as to the

self with the tank destroyers attached to CCA,

position of units of that command are of importance. The sector assigned to CCA was an extended one, from CHAMBREY south nearly to the MARNE-RHINE CANAL. reaching

The protection

of the north flank between CHAMBREY and ARRACOURT was the responsibility of an armored infantry battalion reinforced with a company of

medium tanks. Another medium tank company, Company C of the 37th Tank about

Battalion, was the combat outpost at the crossroads at LEZEY, 4 or 5 miles northeast of ARRACOURT, CCA Headquarters,

the attached field artillery, and a plaand around ARRACOURT. The

toon of tank destroyers were grouped in attached engineers held the south flank. It September, seems that at this time,

the night of the 18th of

CCA was additionally told to protect the city of NANCY.

Reports from air observers and ground reconnaissance patrols had stated that elements of a German Panzer Division, Brigade, the 111th Panzer

and units of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division were conIt was thought that the

centrating to the southeast of ARRACOURT.

Germans were preparing an attack against the bridgehead at NANCY; 4 hence, the mission of the protection of NANCY for CCA. What was actually occurring was that the German 113th Panzer Brigade, with 42 Panther tanks of the Mark V Battalion, and the a and

2113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had moved from BOURDONNAY in successful night march, was pushing its reorganized its advance guard near LEY,

way toward BEZANGE. is of extreme importance to talk about the

At this point it weather, ing. for it

actually played a major role throughout the fight-

There was a seemingly permanent heavy fog coupled with mist Actually, the fog was so dense at times that This fog

and rain at intervals.

visibility was to all practical purposes non-existent. 68

played a dual role in that it

protected the German armor from air

attack, but at the same time permitted American armor to fight at close quarters where the larger range of the German Panther tank gun 5 was of no advantage. The stage was now set for action. morning of the 19th of September. ally known to be in the area. It was early in the foggy

German armored units were gener-

CCA was deployed as described preown advance while awaiting the

viously, and was preparing for its return of the task force it Captain Evans, stroyer Battalion,

had sent to the aid of CCR at LUNEVILLE.

the commander of Company C, 704th Tank De-

(the company attached to CCA) stated that at this

time his mission was that of supporting the anti-tank mission of the tanks, and when necessary, to furnish protection for the combat

trains going to and from the Division Supply Point. The first reported contact with the German armor occurred near LESEY where Company C of the 37th Tank Battalion was outposted. A section of M-4 tanks were in position just south of LESEY when

suddenly out of the dense fog which permeated the area appeared a Panther tank, hardly 75 yards from the two American tanks. Panther, in The

and two additional German tanks were destroyed almost witha

a matter of seconds; the remaining German tanks turned away in 6 southerly direction. Now Lt. Leiper and the 3d Platoon of Capt. Evans'

company of

the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion enter the picture with their brilliant action against the German armored thrust. As told by

Lt. Leiper,

this is

what happened: Company C of

For some time prior to the 19th of September, the 704th was assisting in ground north of ARRACOURT.

manning the combat outpost on the high Its Command Post was located at XANREY

and the company had two platoons placed on the line on the ground east of MOYENVIC and its in ARRACOURT. 3d Platoon in reserve with CCA Headquarters

Their system was alternating the platoons every three The 51st

days to give each one some rest from the guard detail.

Armored Infantry was deployed along the MOYENVIC line and the tank destroyers were being used as an infantry support team. same line, but just west of LESEY was Capt. 35th Tank Battalion. On the night of the 18th of September the 3d Platoon of Company C, with Lt. Leiper in after being relieved from its command, was brought back to ARRACOURT It had spent an rest. Along the

Tanner with tanks of the

tour on the line.

extra day on the front and was tired and ready for a little

There had been no anti-tank action on the line, but the machine guns of the tank destroyers had been used effectively against enemy night patrols attempting to pierce the area. down, And so the platoon bedded the immediate future, the Communica-

with no forethought of any action in

About 0730 of the 19th of September Lt. Webb, tion Officer of CCA, rushed in

to Lt. Leiper and told him to alert

his platoon immediately but could offer no explanation as to the reason for the emergency. A short time later, Capt. Dwight, a

liaison officer from the 37th Tank Battalion hurried in

and asked if

the platoon was ready.

By this time Lt. Leiper was sure something

big was up, and his thoughts were confirmed with the arrival of Colonel Clark, CCA commander, who ordered the platoon to follow

Capt. Dwight to a certain HILL 279 and take up positions there as an outpost. But further than that, Lt. Leiper had no idea as to the enemy situation or as to what was occurring in the immediate area. except that there

Probably no one knew exactly what was happening,

were a lot of German tanks rumbling around the zone. Lt. Leiper and his platoon followed Capt. to RECHICOURT. toon leader, It is Dwight on the road as pla-

interesting to note that Lt. Leiper,

did not ride in a tank destroyer, a jeep.

but rode at the head

of his platoon in

This type of guidance had been decided

upon by the tank destroyer Battalion Commander in England who had reasoned that it gave the platoon leader a better chance to direct if he were squeezed

the actions of his 5 tank destroyers; whereas,

in one of the tank destroyers he would be more apt to fight the one tank destroyer rather than the five. As they reached RECHICOURT, from the east, and Capt. Leiper if Again, he thought it enemy fire started coming in

Dwight jumped from his jeep to ask Lt. was direct fire; and it certainly was.

the rain and fog made it

impossible to determine exactly

where the shooting was coming from. The platoon ontinued through RECHICOURT and was relieved to

recognize an American jeep barreling down the road from BESSINGEN.

Lt. Leiper turned his platoon off the main road in

RECHICOURT and

started north on a narrow lane for about one thousand yards to the vicinity of HILL 246. They then started cross country up toward

HILL 279 which had woods to the front and the right. As the hill was approached, Lt. Leiper, who was still in

front with his jeep, was startled to see the muzzle of a German tank gun sticking out through the trees at what seemed to be less than 30 feet away He immediately gave the dispersal signal and the worthiness as the

many months of continuous practice proved its platoon promptly deployed with perfect accord.

The lead tank destroyer, commanded by Sgt.

Stacey, had and

evidently seen the German tank at the same time as Lt. Leiper, opened fire immediately. ploding the German tank. others behind it in Its first

round scored a direct hit, ex-

The flames of the burning tank revealed and Sgt. Stacey's next round hit

a V-formation,

a second German tank, but immediately afterwards he had his own tank destroyer knocked out by fire from a third German tank. Mark IV was taken under fire by the No. 2 tank destroyer, destroyed. This enemy and was

The maneuver and fire of the 3d tank destroyer got antried to back out of the unhealthy situa-

other German tank as it tion,

after.

and a fifth enemy tank was destroyed almost immediately there-

The entire affair was over in

a matter of minutes,

and as

soon as the shooting had stopped, Lt. Leiper ordered the platoon to the area to make sure the enemy tanks were all out of action and to

be certain that there were no more there. The box score for that short action stood at 5 Gbmn tanks destroyed, and one tank destroyer knocked out of action. The tank gun barrel

destroyer had been hit on an angle along the base of its and through the gun shield.

The ricocheting round had bounced

around the interior of the tank. The platoon withdrew about five hundred yards to a defiladed position behind a small rise. Security sections were posted

around the perimenter and the damaged tank was sent back under its own power so that the injured could get medical care immediately. The assistant driver had been killed at once, and all the others except the gun sergeant had been wounded by the ricocheting shell. After this engagement Lt. Leiper stated that he no longer permitted

the assistant driver to stay in the tank destroyer when action was imminent. He served no practical purpose then as assistant driver

but just sat around and waited; and Lt. Leiper decided that to place a man in such a position uselessly was not good thinking; and there-

fore he put the assistant drivers at other tasks when fighting was close. The tank destroyers were placed in position as near as The fog raining...

possible in the direction that the enemy was thought to be. stayed in all the low areas continuously--and it was still

Lt. Leiper and his sergeant made a reconnaissance the next hour trying to find the enemy locations. only in

of the area for They succeeded

receiving small-arms fire from the left and in hearing tanks

moving about on the right of their positions. Shortly after returning to the platoon defense area, Lt. Leiper and some of his men saw a number of tanks moving on the crest of a hill some twenty five hundred yards away in BESSINGEN and RECHICOURT. the area between

They were able to see them because the Because it was the

fog was confined to the valleys and low spots.

known that the 1st Tank Destroyer Platoon of Company C was in area fire was withheld initially. counted it

However, when the sixth tank was and the platoon

was obvious that they must be German,

opened fire.

Either four or five of the tanks (they were Mark IVs) At this time the attached field artillery batta-

were knocked out.

lion under Lt Col Parker opened fire on the tanks who were accompanied by infantry, and the enemy was dispersed. More time of tense waiting went by. seen overhead dodgin in of Tajor Carpenter, kas to the wings. fire his bazookas. The flash from the exploding bazooka shells revealed three German tanks that had obviously circled around the 3d Platoon and were making their way up the back of the hill to their positions. Lt. Leiper pulled a tank destroyer around and brought its fire on the tanks destroying two of them before the 3d one's fire hit the right sprocket of the tank destroyer knocking it action. out of A liaison plane was The plane was that

and out of th$ clouds.

who had figured out a method of attaching bazooThey saw him dive behind them into the fog and

Lt. Leiper signalled for another tank destroyer to come up

with a tow to pull the damaged tank ddstroyer back, but before the plan could be put into action the second tank destroyer was also hit--this one through the gun shield, It was reported that most of

the tank destroyers that were destroyed were knocked out by hits on the gun shield, and it was thought that this was probably due to the a good target point.

fact that the gun blast made it Lt. defilade,

Leiper pulled back his one remaining tank destroyer to

dismounted his other men and set up a perimeter defense

using the machine guns from the damaged tank destroyers. There the platoon stayed until about 1500 when far to the right near RECHICOURT the 1st Platoon of Company C 704th made its appearance. For some unknown reason several German tanks came out of a wooded area and attempted to cross the cemetery near MONOCOURT making perfect targets of themselves. Before they could get back to the rear of their tanks by

cover two of them were stopped by hits in the 3d Platoon's last tank destroyer.

Then the enemy infantry tried an attack but the emplaced machine guns changed their minds immediately. Finally, Major Hunter, with a platoon of tanks from the 35th deter-

Tank Battalion arrived and relieved the dead-tired but still

mined members of the 3d Platoon who went back to ARRACOURT for their
7

well-earned rest.

Capt. Leach,

Company Commander of Company B of

the 37th Tank Battalion stated that the entire Combat Command was amazed at the terrific fight put up by the tank destroyer platoon

and confirmed the fact that fifteen German tanks had been destroyed 8 by the platoon's fire during that day. On the 20th of September CCA was ordered to continue toward SARREGU MINES. However, after several hours of road marching, CCA

received word that German tanks had returned to ARRACOURT which CCA had just left (actually, only eight German tanks had returned). CCA

dispatched a company of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers to take care of the Germans, This was done as ordered, with the entire 9 force of German tanks destroyed. On the 21st of September CCA received orders to utilize the remainder of the day and the nextday for a rest period. needed as a result of the tank battles around ARRACOURT, preparation for an attack against CHATEAU-SALINS. However, on the morning of the 22d of September the Germans left flank which was being protected by the 25th Mechanized. Company C 704 was dispatched to This was and for

attacked CCA on its

Reconnaissance Squadron, drive the Germans off.

Company C took the situation in hand,

and again against and then caused

numerically superior Germans destroyed seven tanks,

the remainder of the force to go into a disorganized retreat. While Company C 704th had been with CCA, Company A 704 was

attached to CCB, 4th Armored Division, and Headquarters 704th was attached to Reserve Command, 4th Armored Division. Company A worked with CCB in the area from DROUVILLE-

SALLONES on the 16th of September and remained there until the

21st of September when it

moved near PRESNES'EN-SAULNOIS

On the 24th of September the enemy was encountered near DROUVILLE-SALLONES were lost. and four tanks were destroyed. No tank destroyers

Capt. Ryan was wounded in

this action and evacuated and

on the 25th, Lt. Company A. lion in

Preneta from Company B was assigned to command

On the 27th of September Company A rejoined the batta10 the vicinity of ARRACOURT.

Headquarters 704th and Company B 704th were in bivouac on the 16th of September l~ miles southeast of LUNEVILLE. Its mission

was the protection of the left flank of CCR which had been scheduled to attack and take LUNEVILLE. However, it was discovered that LUNE-

VILLE was already occupied by friendly troops; and so the 704th went into bivouac on the high ground northwest of the city on the 17th of September and stayed there until the 20th of September. During this period the 3d Platoon of Company B, to LUNEVILLE, which was under heavy artillery fire, in 704th moved order to out-

post the city against German armored columns which were approaching from the east. The 1st Platoon of Company B, 704th was given the

mission of supporting the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion which was located on the high ground north of the city. In the area east of LUNEVILLE the 3d Platoon of Company B fought throughout the night and destroyed 3 MK V tanks. the platoon destroyed one MK V On the 19th one heavy

.tank,

one heavy SP gun,

machine gun and crew, and took five prisoners. In the afternoon of the 19th of September both the Battalion

Headquarters bivouac area and the position of the 1st Platoon Cornpany B, 704th wore shelled, Lt Col Bailey, the battalion commander LUTEVILLE,

was killed by enemy mortar fire in Headquarters

704th and Company B, 704th were relieved on the

afternoon of the 19th and moved twelve miles north to the vicinity of SERRES. On the 20th of September these units moved again--this P. Heid Jr.

time to the vicinity of ARRACOURT where Lt Col H. assumed command. flank of CCA. Company B,

704th took positions guarding the right

On the 20th the company destroyed 5 TMK V German tanks 704th de-

nd on the 22d of September the 2d Platoon of Company B, stroyed 3 more enemy tanks near RECHICOURT."

As a discussion and condensation of the activities of tank destroyers in out; (a) COURT (page From the employment of Capt. Evans' ) it is company at ARRAplatoons general there are several points which can be brought

noted that tank destroyers were used in supporting an outpost line,

under company control,

and moving from

place to place looking for enemy tanks or other suitable targets of opportunity. Company B had a similar mission (page ) when it was

told to support the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion north of LUNEVILLE. (b) Tank destroyers fought in tank destroyer versus tank

actions as shown by the fighting of Lt. Leiper's platoon near RECHICOUJRT (Page ), Company A's action near DROUVILLE-SALLONES,

Company B s fight with German tanks when guarding the right flank

of CGA (page
(c)

).
Missions of flank and outpost security were prevalent

for tank destroyers as described throughout the battles. (d) During the battles at ARRACOURT the Battalion Commander The control of

of the 704th lost complete control of his battalion.

his detached companies was established at Combat Command Headquarters. However, the tank destroyer Company Commanders did conduct close

liaison with the tank destroyer platoons when they supported other units. Bidwell, Both Major Miller, executive officer of the 704th and Lt Col a later battalion comrmander of the 704th, confirmed the Additionally, they both thought

above use of tank destroyer units.

that throughout the battles near ARRACOURT the tank destroyers were well employed under combat command control since the higher headquarters had a better picture of the overall situation and could dispatch tank destroyers to the right place at the appropriate time. (e) It was also generally agreed that the tank destroyer

missions at ARRACOURT could not have been as well performed by heavy tanks, such as M-26's, inasmuch as the tank destroyers were able to

utilize speed and maneuverability over rough and muddy terrain over which M-26 tanks would have been unable to move. It was also stated

that the open turrets of the tank destroyers were both a psychological and an actual discouraging feature to the crews inasmuch as they were always exposed to artillery airbursts and infantry grenades. 79

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1
History o the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, p 3-6.

2
Dr. Hugh M. Cole, The Tank Battles in Lorraine (Military Review, Volume XXIX Nov 194T 3 Ibid. 4 Interview with Lt Col Robert M. Parker, The Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky. 5 Cole, Op Cit. 6 Ibid. 7 Interview with Captain Edwin Leiper, Indianapolis, Indiana. 8 Interview with Captain James Leach, The Armored Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Cole,
10

Op Cit.

Afteraction Report, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 11 Ibid.

CHAPTER 6 THE 823D TANK DESTROYER. BATTALION (TOWED) AT MORTAIN Introdution arnd Buildup General. Much thought and study has gone into the selection

of a "typical action" invoVing the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed). reasons, The MORT IN operation was selected for four paramount They are as follows: Heavy enemy armor was encountered, This unit remained attached to one infantry division throughout the European campaign except for short periods.

(1) (2)

(3) 'The great significance, tactically, of the German counter-stroke at MORTAIN. (4) Last but not least, a general consensus of opinion from members of the 823d that this action typifies tank destroyer vs tank warfare.

A great opportunity in infantry-tank destroyer cooperation existed early in the history of this unit but whether this cooperaremains questionable. It

tion existed in its full potential still

goes back as early as the staging at HERTEFORD,

England, where it At this

was attached to the 30th Infantry Division in April, 1944.

town some 20 miles north of LONDON, began the relationship which brought mutual understanding and respect lasting throughout the European war.. During May and June the battalion drew vehicles,. weapons and other equipment and found time to spend two weeks on indirect firing training on the SALISBURY PLAIN. After completion

of this firing, it moved on to BASINGSTOKE, England, where all vehiles were waterproofed and last minute preparations were made for *81

thie thvion

of the EUo.pean continent.

The 823d was an extr mely

Wei -trained unit,. with high morale and plent;

6f eiprit'de4rps

this was proved correct in its later operations on the mainlad d

Europe. It had an added advantage,, too, in that it had made the

acquaintance of and enjoyed mutual respect with the 30th Infantry Division Liaison officers of the 823d TD Battalion landed 13 June 1944 in France but it was not until 24 June that the battalion The 823d participated in the and around ST. LO. This was an a

proper disembarked on OMAHA Beach. action of the beachhead breakout in

indoctrination and shakedown period which placed the battalion in high state of combat efficiency, much to be desired for its test at MORTAIN. capabilities in latter

This action was truly to be a test of tank destroyer their primary role against enemy armor where many

interesting aspects were brought forth regarding mobility, armament,

and lack of armor protection.

Friendly situatioa. of the MORTAIN operation, action of the 823d, it is For the proper buildup and importance as studied in the light of tank destroyer

necessary to pause a moment for the set15 July to 5 August 1944.

ting of the stage by the Allied Forces,

The Allied Forces in France were gaining a foothold against stubborn German resistance. By the middle of July, the Allied Front stretched LO and on west to LESSAY on. the

from CAEN through CAUMONT to ST.

western coast of the COTENTIN Peninsula . On 25 July General Omar

N. Bradley and his United States First Arna

broke out of ST.

LO,

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slashed downward to the base of .the COTENTIN Peninsula,

passing

through the bottleneck at AVRANOHES and bursting out in full. force upon the rear of the German Armies. (figure 10) On 1 August,

General George Patton (United States Third Army Headquarters) was brought up to take over operations on the First Army's right flank and to continue the exploitation deeper into France. situation Enemy The German High Command wasted little time

in realizing the seriousness of the situation now confronting them. Field Marshal von Kluge, in command of the Germans in France and the Low Countries, reported to General Warlimontz, Hitler's personal representative, on 31 July that AVRANCHES must be recaptured and held at all costs. From Field Marshal von Kluge's diary of 4 August:

Estimate of situation . * the American is trying to by pushing southwardly Avranches at penetration his exploit ...... the first mission is to cut off the enemy units which penetrated to the south from their rear communications and to reestablish communications with the Coast . .1 On 4 August, Hitler issued direct orders to Field Marshal von Kluge to stage a large scale counterattack with the objective of smashing through to the sea at AVRANCHES. Von Kluge had foreseen the neces-

sity of such an operation and had commenced the assembly of forces as early as 31 July. This counterattack plan, code named "Luttich", using two

contemplated an attack along the axis of the SEE River, good secondary roads, one on each side of the river,

for the advance

into AVRANTCHES to the west.

The main objective was the capture of

the high ridge paralleling the SEE River and gaining the commanding observation for the entire area. A secondary objective was the

capture of the tactically important HILL 314 at the eastern edge of MORTAIN, a few miles south of the intended breakthrough corridor. In German hands, HILL 314 would not only provide excellent obser-

vation of American dispositions south of the SEE River, but would serve to deny the Americans almost equally good observation eastward. The First Army history gives this German operation the code apparently the operation was the same as to mission",

name "Liege",

troops used and commanders assigned. Prior to this time, the German High Command had committed its armor by division or even an element thereof at a time. How-

ever, with the very survival of the German Army itself at stake, the High Command decided to employ no less than five Panzer divisions' plus attachments, for the counterattack. XLVII CORPS 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2d SS Panzer Division Das Reich filled up with what was let of t-he 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Goetz von Berlicbiger. 116th Panzer Division, plus miscellaneous troops. LXXXI CORPS 9th Panzer Division. 460th Artillery Battalion (motorized). One AA Regiment, 13th AA Division. 394th Assault Gun Brigade, plus miscellaneous troops. All of the above units were under the command of the German Seventh . 2 Army. These were the:

Pre-battle movement.

August 2d found the 823d TD Battalion

and the 30th Infantry Division in XIX Corps reserve south of ST. LO engaged in maintenance activities. Europe had fought with the The 823d after its leading in

3Oth Infantry Division, crossing the

the ST. LO breakout. Personnel and

VIRE River and participating in

equipment replacements had been coming through in battalion was nearly at 100% operational strength.

good order and the On 5 August, the

battalion and the 30th Infantry Division were attached to VII Corps and ordered to move into the vicinity of MORTAIN. These units were

to relieve the US Ist Infantry Division, which was in turn ordered to extend the Allied line southward and farther into the German rear. Little if units in any information was passed down to the battalion Infantry Division and none was

their relief of the lst

forthcoming.

Indeed a vague situation existed and along with this This

went the usual relaxation that is prevalent in a quiet sector. statement is substantiated as follows:

company commanders report

the relief of position took place without incident, that no enemy information was turned over during the relief, and that the units to which they were attached gave them none. One reconnaissance platoon

leader reports that information he received was "not much out there." From these observations it is clearly apparent that a true and determined defense of the sector was never considered, thus a great initial advantage was given to the enemy. According to reports

a warning of imminent attack reached the 30th Infantry Division from VII Corps approximately 20 minutes before the first signs of trouble appeared: "Enemy counterattack expected vicinity MORTAIN from east 4 or north within 12 hours.." Initial dispositions. On 6 August the 823d Tank Destroyer

Battalion was disposed on the ground as follows: Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, located in le CLOS MARION, about 3 miles west of JUVIGNY leTERTRE. Company A 1st Platoon initially south of MORTAIN guarding'roads from Barenton 2d Platoon on HILL 285 west of MORTAIN. 3d Platoon near the 1st Platoon, protecting approaches from east and south of MORTAIN. The 1st Platoon, Company A, commanded by Lt. Thomas Springfield, moved the same day, 6 August, to ABBAYE BLANCHE which is located north of MORTAIN. This platoon gained the distinction of halting This freedom of

the enemy's efforts to clean out the MORTAIN area. maneuver for a thrust west was badly needed. to 120th Regiment, 30th Infantry Division.

Company A was attached

Company B 1st Platoon on the road west of ST. BARTHELMY. 2d Platoon on the same road, echeloned slightly farther west toward JUVIGNY. 3d Platoon (reinforced) located in ST. BARTHELMY.

Actually Company B was disposed in depth from ST, BARTHELMY west along an important road net that the Germans proposed using as one

of their supply routes in

the attack to the sea to AVRANCHES.

It

is

not believed this disposition was I~deseen to the extent of the purpose served, its but it had much to do with the defeat of the enemy in Company B was attached to

attempted advance along that route.

the 117th Regiment,

30th Infantry Division.

Company C 1st Platoon near REFFtVIEILLE, in firing positions along main highway running west from JVIGNY le, TERTRE. 2d Platoon near la DAVIAIS protecting Battalion CP. 3d Platoon, in vicinity of 1st Platoon.

Company C, although not receiving the heavy fighting of Companies A and B, made many moves and their presence alone could have done much to thwart off the enemy movements in attached to the 119th Regiment, those areas. Company C was A recon-

30th Infantry Division.

naissance platoon was attached to each company and accompanied their respective companies to their new positions. For a further descrip-

tion of the disposition of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion on 6 August, see figure 11. most of the positions were taken over lock, stock

In general,

and barrel from the preceding tank destroyer unit and remained in the same location throughout the operation. considered here, because as indicated, much moving and it is The time fator must be

time was not available to do

doubtful whether a full study of the platoon The fact that the company commanders and

positions was ever made.

platoon leaders did not actually choose their own positions probably had much to do with the later loss of the 3d Platoons of Company A 87

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and B.

They were without infantry protection and the guns were not However, Springfield, commanding the 1st Pla-

mutually supporting. toon, Company A,

did make a study of the terrain after relief at his He was not satisfied with the location of the

particular position. guns,

so he moved them 200 yards north,

just across the bridge spanFrom this position All of these In Any

ning the railroad leading into ABBAYE BLANCHE.

seven roads and trails could be brought under fire.

led into ABBAYE BLANCHE and MORTAIN from the east and north. addition, southern approaches out of MORTAIN could be covered..

two guns could take under fire the same road. Infantry units were disposed as follows: 120th Regiment in vicinity of MORTAIN, particularly the important terrain feature east of MORTAIN (HILL 314) and west and north (HILL 285). 119th Regiment in ADELEE an assembly area, vicinity le

M SNIL

117th Regiment situated in north of MORTAIN.

the ST.

BARTHELLE.Y area,

For a further description of infantry locations,

see figure 11.

Tank destroyer gun positions as located on figures 11-14 are 5 substantiated by tank destroyer commanders and after-action reports.. Directions of fire of the main guns were variable, of course, and

daily changes were made without appreciable difference in mary mission assignments. It is

their pri-

interesting to note here that all

weapons were located generally to deny the use of roads to the enemy. Roads are always the principal avenues of approach and it is a known all

fact that although weather permitted cross-country operations, 88

defenses includihg infantry were generally set up to block roads.

The 823d paid particular attention to roads and road blocks for two reasons; their importance to the movement of enemy armor, secondly, weapons. and

the ease of movement and change of position for their own This point is brought out as doctrines teach cross-country

operation but very limited use was ever made of same by towed tank destroyer guns. One cannot pass from these remarks without mentionmost of which

ing the restrictions of movement due to hedgerows,

could not be traversed by halftracks without the use of demolitions or bulldozers which were not used in this operation. It can be

stated that generally the enemy was limited to the road nets, and that they made no serious penetration without that factor being present. Short penetrations were made by roving enemy armored units

at positions such as HILL 285 and along the deep valley on the 30th Division's left flank, but neither penetrations were extremely effective. Weather was a great benefit to the enemy at the start of

the battle, as they attacked at night or in the early morning hours 6 under cover of fog. It is not to be construed that the terrain was a total obstacle but it ment to the roads. did constrict, at least initially, all moveborne out by members of the infantry as

This is

well as the commanders of the tnnk destroyer units. 0perations, .7 August. the night of 6-7 August, A dark cloud sprang out of the east on

the German counterattack for AVRANCHES.

The actual time of attack was set for 2400 hours on 6 August but due to last minute difficulties encountered by the enemy in assembling

7 troops, it was delayed somewhat. Artillery observegs in the oarth

of the 30th Division zone reported tanks moving along the northern road paralleling the SEE River, where it bends south toward ST. BARTHELMY and MORTAIN. This enemy attack was directed along the SEE At 0130 tanks and infantry advanced

River towards le IESNIL ADELEE.

out of the FORET de MORTAIN and swept around and engulfed the road block manned by the 3d Platoon, south, Company A, guarding MORTAIN from the

and penetrated the town itself.

Actually the full force of The Germans had weather 8

the enemy attack came just before daylight.

conditions in their favor; "darkness gave way to fog-laden daylight." The first enemy action encountered at ABBAYE BL TCHE was at 0500 hours. A German armored halftraok mounting a 75mm assault gun was This vehicle was closely followed

knocked out by an anti-tank gun. by another halftrack,

loaded with ammunition, which was also taken "It was a foggy morning and we waited

under fire and destroyed.

until the cars were only 30 yards from the number three gun before we 9 opened fire." The anti-tank gun referred to was undoubtedly a tank destroyer 3-inch gun as only two anti-tank guns were in position and one was south of the overpass and could not have taken the enemy under fire. Much controversy arose later as to the composition and command of the roadblock at ABBAYE BLANCHE. It was this roadblock that

stood so determinately in the way of the enemy advance throughout the entire action. Most of the evidence points toward command by As

Springfield, and as to composition it varied daily, even hourly.

the fighting continued and pressure increased many individual soldiers drifted into the area, ,some with crew-served weapons and others with just individual arms. Eventually the defense of this roadblock con-

sisted of some 75 men including tank destroyer and machine gun crews. Best accounts put composition of the road block as follows: 1st Platoon, Company F, 120th Regiment. 1st Platoon, Company A, 823d TD Battalion.

1st Platoon, Anti-tank Company (minus 2 guns), 120th Regiment 1st Mortar section and 1 machine gun section, 120th Regiment. 1 0 Lt. Colonel J. W. Lockett, had this to say: it was learned that Company A of the 823d Battalion (towed) had established a roadblock at the intersection at ABBAYE BLANCHE, and that this roadblock, although supported by Company F of the 120th Infantry, stuck out rather precariously, and was weakly protected. I realized the importance of this position as an avenue of approach for enemy tanks and vehicles and agreed that Company E should move up and tie in with this tank destroyer unit and that the 2d Platoon of Company F, 120th Infantry should cover the guns while they organized and made further plans. This was done - placing machine guns and bazooka teams in support of the tank destroyer position. The wisdom~f this decision was borne out throughout the period of the counterattack. The area in front of the position became a graveyard for about 35 to 40 German tanks and vehicles. Lockett had nothing but praise for Springfield and his unit of tank 11 destroyers. An after-action interview with Colonel Hammond D. Birks, commanding the 120th Regiment and Lt. Thomas Andrew, 120th Regiment, of Company F, commanding 2d Battalion, Company F,.

117th Regiment,

substantiates the tactical importance of the ABBAYE

BLANCHE roadblok to the effect that it facto Ls in

*as one of ihe most important

the 120th infantry's successful repulse of the major enemy If this roadblock had not held, the

counterattack of 6-12 August.

whole position of the 120th Infantry would have been nullified and the resulting gap would have permitted the enemy to smash through the 12 MO RTAIN area. The enemy had once occupied this very ground around the railroad bridge and had set up defensive positions there. used these as there were no alternate positions in were adequate and time was short. Sprin.gfield They

the area.

A 3-inch gun was placed on either

side of the main road, with two 30-caliber machine guns nearby for support. placed in A bazooka and BAR team, plus half a squad of riflemen, were former enemy dug-in positions along a small hedgerow at the A 57mm anti-tank gun

sharp left turn north of the railroad bridge.

was placed at the end of the road paralleling the main north-south road, covering not only penetrations down this road, but from an additional road to the left that curved into it. guns were placed north of the railroad bridge, road, Two other 3-inch one to cover the main

the other facing southwest across the railroad to cover any from

enemy penetration along a straight stretch of the road coming in the northeast.

A 57mm anti-tank gun also covered this road from a

position at the road junction near the river in ABBAYE BLANCHE itself. Immediately south of the railroad bridge, ka teams were placed in riflemen and bazoo-

dug-in positions on either side of the road. 92

The right flank was pio'teoted by 8 men and & 30.caliber madhine gun at a big the river.

'ddk just off the road from the northeast ahd faing towa'ds
A line running through a cleft in the rook furnished the

communications with the mortar squad to the rear of this position. Along the important left flank, a squad of riflemen and two 30-caliber machine guns were placed in in an orchard that covered two road junctions, Six rifle-

addition to a short stretch of the north-south road.

men and a 50-caliber machine gun, manned by tank destroyer men, were placed in bridge. and among the houses between this orchard and the railroad Two belts of mines were laid near the bend of the road from at the south end of the roadblock, and these were

the southeast,

covered by a bazooka and BAR team. To sum up the defensive dispositions of the roadblock force, four 3-inch tank destroyer guns and two 57mm anti-tank guns were posted to cover all important roads, with the main emphasis on the north-south road to MORTAIN, and these guns were protected and sup-

ported by riflemen and bazooka and machine gun crews. On 7 August, Lieutenant Stewart with two squads of the 2d Platoon of Company F, 120th Infantry, joined the ABBAYE BLANCHE roadblock. He had established a roadblock to the south, but had been

forced to withdraw from his position. roadblock,

Upon joining the ABBAYE BLANCHE From time

he-organized and defended the rear (south) end.

to time during the next few days other men from different companies straggled into the roadblock, from Companies D, E, so that eventually Springfield had men

H, K and G, 120th Infantry, totalling some 150

men.

However,

the greater imber of these ieh wre battle fatigue part in the actual defense. The previous figure

cased and had little of 75 effectives still

Some of these extras were concentrated 13 to the south of the roadblock with Stewart, During 7 August, the roadblock was not only shelled repeatedly,

stands.

but was also attacked by the Luftwaffe twice, which strafed the little force with rocket guns. They were even hit by British planes this un-

with rocket guns,

two tank destroyer men being wounded in However,

fortunate and erroneous attack. force was concerned.,

as far as the roadblock

the British were soon forgiven as they were

quick to testify that the British did a wonderful job against the Germans on the front of the ABBAYE BLANCHE positions. The 3d Platoon of Company A had a less important existence particularly as to defensive contributions. summed up quickly. Its activities can be enemy tanks

Shortly after daylight on 7 August,

and infantry came out of the FORET de MORTAIN to the east and slightly south of MORTAIN and swept into that town from the south. The 3d Platoon was quickly surrounded and overrun along with some units of the 120th Infantry. Much happened here to cause bitterness

and scepticism among the tank destroyer units-their guns were not 14 protected by infantry. This one factor had a great deal to do with their capture and destruction, against an infantry attack. Hewitt, they could not protect themselves best told by Robert L. The tank German attack

This story is

author of the 30th Infantry Division History.

destroyer platoon south of MORTAIN fended off the first 94

with 50-caliber machine guns mounted on half tracks but was subsequently split asunder when the Germans swept around its making the platoon's 3-inch guns untenable. enemy was devastating to say the least. positions, of the

The close-in fire

Sixteen men reached the ist Nine

Platoon's positions north of MORTAIN after 5 days of fighting. others joined nearby infantry and fought their way into friendly lines on HILL 314. One man remained hidden in

a ditch for five days.

Thirteen men were still

missing when the battle ended.

The 2d Platoon of Company A held an important position along with doughboys of the 120th Infantry, MORTAIN. that of HILL 285, northwest of

Action on the slopes of HILL 285 began in

the "mist" about

0500 hours on 7 August. Battalion,

A bazooka team led by an officer of the ist

name unknown, went forward about 500 yards stalking a GerThe tank was finally stalked down and knocked out by Broussard was

man MK IV tank.

Sergeant Ames.Broussard of the tank destroyer platoon. unable to get back to his own lines for 14 hours.

At 0900 two more

German tanks approached, and were knocked out at 150 yards by one of the tank destroyer guns. can position, and it Another tank moved up, firing at the AmeriThis

also suffered the fate of his team mates.

last tank was set afire by a shot cealed tank destroyer gun.

from only 50 yards by a well con-

Two enemy self-propelled guns and an ar-

mored car also fell victim to the tank destroyers on HILL 285. The 3d Platoon of Company B met with a fate similar to that of the 3d Platoon of Company A. This unit was located in ST. BARTHELMY

and had one 3-inch gun from the 2d Platoon of Company B and a platoon

of 57mm anti-tank guns with it.-

These towed tank destroyer guns of although

Company B played an important part in halting the Germans,

particularly vulnerable to the well coordinated panzer grenadier-tank attack. is Weather enters the picture again: "handicapped by the fog"

used in

the same breath as a "well coordinated enemy attack" reAt the start the

garding the loss of positions at ST BARTHEMY.

gunners were firing at nothing more tangible than flashes of enemy tank guns. early in The 3d Platoon destroyers knocked out two German tanks but three of the four guns of the 3d Platoon were

the fight,

soon casualties.

The heavy towed tank destroyer guns were sitting Lt. Leon L.

ducks when they revealed their locations by firing. Neel, commanding the lst

Platoon, Company B, brought forward a rean attempt to BARTHELMY. His

placement gun from his platoon under heavy fire in reach the beseiged weapons of the 3d Platoon at ST.

platoon was 1000 yards in rear of the town-to the west. never reached ST. BARTHEL MY due to enemy action.

This gun

It was forced to knocked out a

take a position just west of the town and while there, MK V, killed another tank commander and "mowed down"

supporting in-

fantry with small arms fire.

A German 88 soon found the range on wounding most of the crew.

this gun and promptly eliminated it,

Another gun from the same platoon was brought forward and had an equally short but useful career. knocked out. range. Then, One enemy tank approached and was but halted out of gun

Two more enemy tanks appeared,

one of these advanced, covered by the second, and the About this time, however,

tank destroyer gun knocked this tank out.

the second tank opened fire and destroyed the tank destroyer guns Company B lost seven of its twelve guns and their respective halfOne intrepid ,crew,

track prime movers during the action of 7 August.

however, ventured out forward of the friendly lines and extricated one of the abandonedguns. Other members of Company B fought along-

side the infantry with their carbines or joined bazooka teams stalking enemy tanks. that first Company B accounted for eight MK V tanks during The

day of operations with a probable additional two.

2d Platoon added depth to the position and never actually engaged the enemy on the first day of operations. better on enemy information and friendAccording to Neel:

Company B fared little

ly infantry support than did Company A.

Lack of information probably destroyed the 3d Platoon before it made any defensive contribution whatever ., . we were requested at 0800 to reinforce troops within ST. BARTHELMY without being informed that our 3d Platoon was wiped out. Contact was inadequate with the infantry as it was not believed they ever realized their obligations to protect tank destroyer 15 A change of support mission had much units from enemy foot troops. to do with this inadequate cooperation. Neel's platoon was changed

from support of the 2d Battalion to support of the 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry, but was never able to contact that headquarters, thereby leaving the guns to operate alone. in Nothing could be gained

information other than that which came from personal observation. Company C was quite removed from the heavy action that

con-

fronted

Companies A and B.

They were in

position initially

with the

823d Battalion Headquarters and during the early morning of 7 August, they took up direct fire positions in vicinity of LA ROCHE and

REFFUVIEItLE along the highway running from ST BARTHELMY west to JUVIGNY and on to AVRANCHES, As the German counterattack became more definite in strength

and direction, many hurried calls arrived for additional tank destroyer support in the threatened sectors. Orders were received by 0630 to

send guns some 8000 yards to the south along the highway running northeast to southwest from MORTAIN to ST. HILAIRE du HARCOUET. This

order could not be carried out at the time but by 1200 hours, the 3d Platoon of Company C was released from control by the 119th Infantry and proceeded to this point'to meet this threat of approximately 35 enemy vehicles, including armor, to the south.

The other two platoons moved north toward IeBLAIRIE near the AMBROIS woods and took up direct fire positions, see figure 12.. The

mission of these two platoons was to prevent the withdrawal of a large number of enemy soft-skinned vehicles which were reported in AMBROIS woods. le MESNIL ADELEE. the

ctually these two platoons were to go as far north as Contact was made with a rifle company from the

119th Regiment and they proceeded to a point just south of the town. They were informed (by whom it is unknown but it is unimportant as it

was rather obvious in a few minutes) that the enemy was just ahead. A 57.mm anti-tank gun nearby knocked out a MK V tank with two flanking shots. Other German tanks were heard moving around in the woods to

the north.

By 0800 heavy enemy mortar fire began to fall on the tank

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destroyer positions.

"This action convinced us that le MESNIL ADELEE

was no place for us to take our armored care and halftracks, towing 3-in~h guns,

so

we se

Up a 'oad1ock in fpace," writes Captain T. L.

Raney (then 1st Lieutenant) commanding the 1 st Reconnaissance Pica 16 toon. Tho American 3d Armored Division took over the mission of taking le MESNIL ADELEE, somewhat relieving this situation. The 3d Platoon on the right flank down south was reinforced by a reconnaissance platoon, which moved by a circuitous route from the northern position. Many French families were moving to the west on

foot and in wagons, and managed to constrict movements on the roads. This type of movement by civilians usually points toward an attack or expected attack by the enemy. It was about 1700 when the reoonnaisIt was said

sance platoon reached the 3d Platoon at their position.

to have been a strong defensive position with an equally strong alternate position. Generally speaking this flank of the 30th Division For-

was open, making any defense by this platoon almost unfeasible. tunately, no enemy was encountered.

Here ends the first day of action at MORTAIN, the situation very obscure and the final outcome yet to be determined.. It was a touch and go proposition with a slight advantage to the defender. An

appropriate remark at this time comes from the 30th Infantry Division History: "with a heavy onion breath that day the Germans could have

achieved their objectives." Operations, A

August.

Throughout the night 7-8 August, the fog Stock was taken

of battle cleared a little,. probably for both sides.

of destruction to personnel

and positions,

resupply was effected The Germans put

where possible and a vigilant watch was established.

out heavy patrols, either iti in attempt to gain information or to gain positions to continue its attack or withdra wal. It is a fact

that much field recovery of personnel and vehicles was attempted and in some cases was carried out effectively. It was the German army

policy to pick up their dead close into the battle position even at a great risk. This was psychological in two respects; that of building

the morale of the German soldier because he wouldn't have to face these sights in his advance as well as that of knowing he was cared for, and from the American side, the possibility of assessing accuThis was particularly bad for the

rate enemy losses was eliminated. American soldier,

when after a heavy fire fight and he was sure the he pushed forward to find little evidence,

German had many casualties, if any, of same. In

telephone conversations during the night of 7-8 August by the Leibstandarte was spoken of as having been In instructions to the 1st SS Division for "Each man must give his

the German commanders,

stopped and in remnants.

the following day we have this remark: best.

. . if we have not advanced considerably by this evpning or to17 morrow morning, the operation will have been a failure......" The enemy had gained ground on the 7th but certainly not of any significance and the key terrain was still BARTHELMY, in the hands of the Americans. ST.

MORTAIN and the area south of MORTAIN were in the hands of

the enemy but HILL 314 and HILL 285 were in the hands of the 30th 100

Division, who also held control of the road nets leading west, The principal German attack of 8 Aui~it came fro BJ3RT1M the ST.

LMY area to the southwest against HILL 285 where the 2d PlaThe attack commenced at 0130 and conBy 0430 this

toon of Company A was located.

sisted of infantry supported by at least 8 tanks.

attack had pressed close to positions on HILL 285 and Company A, 120th Infantry, was forced back to a road traversing the hill. Two

flame throwers prevented tank destroyer crews from manning their guns and again tank destroyer men fought as infantry. broke up this attack but it Artillery fire soon

was resumed again farther to the south.

From all accounts the German attack on the 8th was more intense and better supported than it had been on the 7th. On the other hand, the

Americans had an additional regiment, from the 4th Infantry Division, attached and an attack was launched at the Germans at 0800. attack was in the direction of ST. It This

BARTHELMY and was supported by the relieved the immediate pressure Apparently the tank destroyer

629th Tank Destroyer Battalion. on HILL 285, but made little

progress.

unit on HILL 285 spent the day licking their wounds and reorganizing as this attacking force had now presented them with that opportunity. All along the line the American forces attacked with negligible success, but nevertheless it stopped the German assault.

The 1st Platoon of Company A was attacked at 1530 hours on 8 August by an enemy unit of patrol size, which was completely annihilated. Four anti-tank men at the roadblock were wounded. The Geri

mans had managed to mine a road to the south which was being used as

a supply and evacuation route,

A halftrack being used to evacuate This evened the score

casualties was knocked out by this amnefed. as a Germa

hial-track stopped to investigate the same minefield and Throughout the day, the 2d 1 wheeled vehicle

was promptly destroyed by our forces. credited with 2 tanks, 18 and 15 prisoners of war. Platoon is

4 half-tracks,

Company B had been receiving artillery fire all morning and at 1000 moved to a spot not so well "zeroed" in. had been lost. little Two ammunition trailers

Company B positions were held during the day with This situation occurred as a result of the

chance to fire.

American attacks to regain MORTAIN and towed tank destroyers served little purpose, if any, in the attack. the same localities with

Company C remained substantially in

exception of the 3d Platoon which moved to the vininity of JUVIGNY. Operations, and day in little 9 August. Fighting was almost continuous night BARTHELMY area. Hours and days meant

the MORTAIN - ST.

- survival was all important.

The enemy launched another

attack to the southeast on 9 August at 0430 toward the 2d Platoon, Company A on HILL 285. Less strength and aggressiveness was apparent one

but to the soldier on the ground and at the point of contact, attack is as strong as another. The 3d Reconnaissance Platoon

assisted materially against this thrust by giving close-in protection. No material gains were made by the enemy and by 1600 hours, the 117th and 12th Infantry Regiments launched a counterattack against the enemy attack. This left the 2d Platoon in an exposed position due to

a pocket created by earlier, Getwan gains.

In

order to cope wit :

the situation this platoon pulled back to a better position and the 2d and 3d Reconnaissance Platoons rendered the close protection that was needed. (see figure 13 ) Artillery fire destroyed one commanding Spring-

3-inch gun of the platoon and Lieutenant Cunningham,

the 3d Reconnaissance Platoon was wounded by mortar fire.

field's 1st Platoon was having a field day against local attacks and against movements across their front directed against HILL 285. The

1st Platoon had two 3-inch gun sights destroyed by artillery fire, *ven so he mentions destroying an enemy vehicle by sighting down the tube. Company B remained in occuring in their area, position with little or no activity causing little

Artillery fire continued,

damage but placing heavy strain and tension on all members of the company. They received one replacement, Lieutenant Rady, who must

have been counting his hours - entering combat at this particular time and place. Company C made only one change of any consequence during the period. The 1st Platoon was moved near the 3d Platoon in This completed a build-up to add the

vicinity of JUVIGNY.

necessary strength to hold the important road west out of BARTHELMY. Operations, 10 August. The German commander had reported

his heavy losses and inability to make any substantial gains in the MORTAIN area, but he did not receive that much desired order 103

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BARTTTELMY, he 20 remarked that the enemy was not entirely cleared from this area. References were undoubtedly made to the infantry on HILL 314 and the ABBAYE BLTANCHE roadblock. lst Platoon, Company A, "Springfield's shooting gallery", was creating the

Although he had taken MORTAIN and ST.

defense at ABBAYE BLANCHE,

quite a disturbance to the German program of operations. Hitler ordered the attack resumed and again on the early morning of 10 August, the push continued. noted as it A vast difference was

lacked the intensity and coordination of previous days.

A local attack was made against the 2d Platoon of Company A former position, but to the surprise of the Germans no one was present. Contact with the 1st Plat rn had been lost during the night due to a roadblock emplaced by the Germans, c-ntact ws reestablished. It was quickly removed and usual

The 1st Platoon was having its

field day by destroying several halftracks and nine other assorted vehicles. C ,paZny B suffered two casualties from intense artillery

fire which they had been subjected to for the past three days. No other action was reported outside of an integration of replacc:ments into that depleted unit. Company C remained in its former positions without incident.

The platoon :n the Division south flank made contact with the 35-i Division now moving up on-the right flank. this platoon had reported being in Final operations, You will recall that

an exposed position qarliej On 11 August the 2d Platoon

11-14 August,

104

of Company A was ordered back to its

original position on HILL Platoons. This was

285 alone with the 2d and 3d Reconnaissance accomplished by infiltration ih attention as possible. tered. fire.

an

effort to attract as little

No interference by the Germans was encoun-

This period was reported as quiet other than local artillery The 1st Platoon, Company A lost one 3-inch gun by such fire. only artillery and 2d

Company B reports no contact for this period, mortar fire in the area.

Company C completed movement of its

Platoon to area of the other two platoons,

closing at 2030 (figurel4).

This period of inactivity by the enemy meant two things; another attack was in to c ,mmence. the making or a general withdrawal was about as friendly infantry

The latter was more probable,

successes had been greater during 11 August and on the 12th contact was made with the besieged and isolated battalion rn HILL 314. c ntact also relieved pressure on the 1st P.Latoon, Company A. This The

high light of the day was the return of 11 men who for the past 5 days ha ' been fighting with the infantry on HILL 314. They were men

from the 3d Pla.t"n

vwhich

had been destroyed when their guns were The 1st Platoon of Company C

overrun south of MORTAIN on 7 August.

relieved the 2d Platoon of Company A nn HILL 286 at 2200 with the 2d Platorn

)cing

into assembly position near their company command Company B spent the day in On the 13th, reorganizing the

post (sec figurel4). 1st and 2d Platoons.

they moved into an assembly

position shown on figure 14 )~ The German withdrawal had cm -ooncod and the much needed rest

105

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and reorganization period had come.

Company C completed the relief

of the 1it Piatoon of Company A, allowing them to assemble near their company command post. The rest was less than 24 hours in duration;

In the late afternoon the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A moved to ac area southwest (f MORTAIN to give close support to the 119th Infantry* Platoon. On 14 August the MORTAIN battle ground cea&ed to be a scene of bitter struggle. The 30th Infantry Division published a field 119th and 120th The 3d Reconnaissance Platoon was attached to the 2'

order attaching A, B and C Companies to the 117th, Regime nts respectively.

In turn the 823d Headquarters attached the

1st, 2d and 3d Reconnaiseance Platoons to Companies C, B and A respectively. The infantry and tank destroyers moved some 14,000 yards a quick followup of the withdrawing enemy. This

east of VORTAIN in

move o-n 14 August completed the MORTAIN action, where defensive contributi -ns by the tank destroyers had been great.str':yer Battalion had proven it The 823d Tank Delosses had been

was here to stay, its

many but even so they were only proportionate to the intensity of co mbat. Logistics and Personnel General. It is appropriate at this time to summarize the

logistical and personnel problems that crnfronted the 823d TD Battalion. An account of enemy losses is also appropriate as at

no other time in

the European war did this battalion contribute so Generally supplies were

highly to the destruction of the enemy.. 106

adequate during the MORTAIN operation. Class I. dc'. r, e

=hre

Rations wore short on occasions but never to a 10 in 1 rations with Hot

unit offici3ncy was affected.

some K rations were used exclusively during the operation.

i

od was impossible during the battle as transportation was unable

to move effectively ancd the situation was too tense for that type of feeding. Moals, No units complained, in fact they were well satisfied.

using 10 in

1 rations could be served hot to small units at

any time desired. Cl-ss II and IV. Class IV supplies presented no immediate Class II presented a problem

prrblem and in most cases was adequate. with the loss of twr at the ti.:-e. plat ns and tieir

equipment was irreplaceable

Pers' r nol w- uld not have been available to man the The 1st Platoon of Company A desired mnd 50-caliber machine guns. Company

replaced items even so.

additional barrels for 30B had a replacement of ',ne

3-inch gun and halftrack on 11 August 21 and Co.'pany A h:-ad a like replacement on 10 August. Class III. Class III supplies presented no problem. With

few exceptions no moves wore made.

Company C shuffled around some

:n the 8th and 9th and again on the 11th and 12th of August, but all those moves were short. Class V. Class V presented a problem to those units heavily was replenished with some difficulty. No unit Each

enga ed, however, it

was defeated or forced to withdraw for lack of ammunition,

plat 'r carried a basic load of ammunition into this engagement. 107

For each 3inch gun,

90 rounds were car ied with an aditi

65% armors

piercing

and 35% higrh explosive

nal 50 hirnds

(mixed) carried

on : thr io-quarter ton truck for each four guns. ti-n was always adequate. Maintenance,

Small arms ammuni*

Maintenance was not a major problem in this Maintenance

opcration and was performed by each driver locally.

of dostr yod or disabled vehicles was nrt acc mplished during the operation duo to the intensity of fire which restricted evacuation procedues. After the enemy co.mmenced his withdrawal on the 12th

some battlefield rec',very took place to the limit of time available.

aad

maintenance was performed

Vehicular replacements were avail-

able and c-uld be had easily as the supply lines wore short, Evacuation of casualties, Evacuation of wounded personnel

from the front lines was performed exceptions. The 1st Platoon,

in

the usual manner with few evacuated a few casualties was .-n

Company A,

by use of their halftracks. its way to the rear. Communication, in other cases it

One of these struck a mine as it

In some cases communication was adequate, Actually the only communications as operatirn4 Three

did not exist.

neoded were th-se with the infantry units supported,

control was usually taken away from the company commanders. means of commurication were used; wire, wire and radi I, Lohse,

radio and messenger with Lt. Colonel Ashby

carrying the brunt of the load

Battalion S-3,, says "'le were in conmmunication with higher 22 headquarters at all tirie,." It was not quite the same story at 108

platoon level, where after all, the battle is

being fought and in-

formation must be forthcoming to properly understand the situation and control the units. had poor oommunidations As brought out previously, Companies A and B

Compdny A commander places the blame on

hi'.Self frr not moving his command post closer to his platoons. Personnel. The personnel situation is hard to summarize

exactly, as strength reports are not available for an accurate accounting of losses. From after-action reports and letter inter-

views with former unit personnel, the total losses add up as follows: 6 KIA, 47 WIA and 91 MIA with enemy losses at 130 KIA and 25 prisoners 23 of war taken. No accounting of the enemy wounded is available, but members of the 823d believe the number runs as high as 100. for the 823d were nearly 20% of their authorized strength. in the vicinity of 40 replacements were received to help fill Replacements were adequate for those units still Losses Somewhere these

losses.

intact.

Gunners and radio operators were the most difficult replacement problems; however, gunners were trained from old men on hand. placements were initially placed in Re-

less important positions until

they had their feet on the ground. Companies A and B received the Presidential Citation for their efforts at MORTAIN. dual awards. Many individual acts of heroism brought indivi-

Lt. Springfield was decorated with the Silver Star and his company Commander: "He deserved He was

according to Captain Crissinger, more.

I just wasn't smart enough to realize it at the time. 24 a wonderful platoon leader and a great soldier."

43 UHV)

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1 Report of OS 1944 tpo
r a

tions, 5.

First United States Army, 1 Auti

.

I id,

p 6.

Lt Col Dettmer, letter interview, 29 March 1950. Personal interview, General Freiherr von Gersdorff, November 1945. 3 Dettmer, op cit. Captain T. L. Lt Col Ashby I. 4 Robert L. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front -The visn, p 5. Story of the 30th Infantry Dettmor, Raney, op cit. op cit. letter interview, 10 January 1950. Raney, letter interview, Lohse, 30 December 1949. 16 December 1949.

letter interview,

Lt. Thomas Springfield, Lt. Ellis Melnnie,

letter interview,

27 March 1950. August

After-Action Report, 1944. 6 Dettmer, Lohse, 7 Gersdorff, 8 Hewitt, 9 op cit, p 58. op oit. op cit.

823d Tank Destroyer Battalion,

op cit.

Springfield, op cit.
10 Colonel A. H. Payton and Colonel H. A. Tribolte, Observations, 18 August 1944, Documents Section File No. Annored ool, Fort Inox, Kentucky. 110 Combat 1. , The

11 Ibid., passim.

12
Ibid, passim.

13 Ibid, passim. 14
Dottmer, op cit. letter interview, 21 December 1949.

Lt. Leon L. Neel,

15
Dettmer, op cit.

Neel,
16

op cit.
op cit. op cit.

Raney,

17
Report of Operations,

18 Dettmer,

op cit.
op cit. op cit. op cit.

After-action Report, Payton and Tribolte,

19

After-action Report, Springfield, 20 Gersdorff, 21 After-action Report, Springfield, 22 Lohse, 23 op cit. op cit. op cit. op cit.

op cit.

After-action Report, op oit. Neel, op cit.

Springfield, op cit. 24 Captain Bruce A. Grissinger,

letter interview, 4 February 1950.

111

CHAPTER 7 CONTEPORARY C ODMENT

The preceding chapters of this report have been concerned with the organization and tactics of TD units and an analysis of combat actions in which four TD battalions participated. the period from June of 1944 to May of 1945, units, observers from rearward headquarters, During

members of antitank and foreign military

authors with the same vital interest in the subject, prepared a number of articles and reports on the new team weapon designed to stop armor. It is the writings of this group of officers that are Author members of TD units are considered

of major consequence here. of primary importance,

foreigh authors are touched upon lightly, and confi-

observers passed over almost entirely because of the still dential nature of their reports.

Three military writers of the

1940 era are presented because of the impact of their studies on the subject. Publications from which articles were considered for comment are the Field Artillery Journal, Reports. the Infantry Journal, and Observer

There remains to the future researcher in

TDs a vast field if not

of similar untouched source material of at least equal, greater value. Particularly with reference to secret

VVar Department

Observer Reports,

which may be downgraded at a later date.

Authors writing for military journals and official observers have approached the subject of TDs from varying points of view.

112

Officer-observers with instructions to obtain specific information on various items of eqIipmehtj problems of personnel, tactical employment, the application and correctness of .doctrines and technique, and numerous other details of interest to those enh gaged in long-range support of the battle forces, had the detached and impersonal viewpoint of a reporter-commentator. Allied officers and enemy writers discussed the subject as it affected their battlefield successes or failures, and wrote from a position tempered by their experiences and differences in equipment and techniques. The TD officer on the job was generally too busy with more pressing problems to prepare choice items for analysis, but when he write, his material was directly influenced by the immediacy of combat requirements. His were the most personal and detailed of

all the sources of authorship.

Early Comment , 1940-1941 In the Field Artillery Journal of March, 1941, are ten articles of major interest. Four are on topics directly related to

the gun-armor problem, and are titled, "Field Artillery Organization, Armored Force," "The Artillery in Large Armored Units," "Can Grandma, 75-mm. 1879, Stop 'Em?" and "Some Thoughts on Emplacement of Antitank Guns." Two reviews are on activities of German field artillery

units,oneis on Japanese field artillery, two are on the procurement of artillery materiel and the establishment of an Artillery Replacement Center, and the tenth is a seven-page article, "Suggestions for

113

Equitation Instructors."

Even at that date,

it

can be seen that a

large share of spontaneous writing on military subjects probed methods of aiding or abetting the armored attack, and this issue of the Journal is typical of its time,

An erudite foreign writer of the period was an Italian infantryman, Colonel Oete Blatto, author of "The Artillery in Large

Armored Units," translated in the March, 1941 issue previously mentioned. The article is outstanding for its foresight. Colonel

Blatto presented a number of principles in the use of armor which were borne out in later combat, and of which some have since been Armored Force doctrine.

adopted as part of the current U. S. Of these, They are: 1.

four are considered for purposes of this report.

German tank success in Poland and France does not The most importhe next most

indicate the invincibility of the tank-air team; 2. tant task of an armored division is important the breakthrough; 3, the exploitation,

Armored divisions should be organized The

for counter-armored actions as well as the exploitation; and 4. armored division

... must have two types of weapons. The first should have the same mobility as the tank, to perform the functions of antitank or accompanying artillery. The other should be more powerful and possess long range, so that tactical mobility is less essential; this should assume any other function which the tactical situation may demand. It would seem that in the armies of the important powers the tendency is toward a caliber between 75 and 90 rm, on a tank or self-propelled mount, for the first type; and between 105 and 120 mm, motorized, for the second type.
'hile

the infantry and cavalry writers of the time were con-

triving new and ingenious methods of tracking tanks with the primary

114

antitank weapon of the U. S. Army, summary;

the 37-mm gun, a scholarly 1941 issue of A, C - Vedemeyer,

"Antitank Defenses" appeared in the liay, The author was

the Field Artillery Journal

1ajor

now Lieutenant General 'edemeyer,

an infantryman who, according to close study

the Journal of 1941,."has spent the last four years in of the whole aspect of antitank defense," As part of a "Proposed Antitank Defense," wrote:

Major Wedemeyer

... The 37-mm, antitank gun is sufficiently powerful to stop tanks protected by 2' inches of armor. If the constantly reported trend to thicker armor on tanks (over 3 inches) becomes an established fact, the present 37-mm, gun may be modified to increase its penetration, or a 47-mr., a 57-mm., or even a 75-mm. antitank gun may be necessary., . It is further suggested that the .8 75-mr,. antitank guns how assigned to the medium artillery battalions be removed entirely from the division and that 12 more 37-mrm, antitank guns be added to the recommended division antitank unit. This would result in a battalion of 36 37-mm. antitank guns. The commander of the unit would act as antitank advisor on the division staff. ... The medium tank is considered one of the most effective antitank weapons. It should mount at least a 3-inch gun and stress should be laid on its mobility and speed, rather than its armor. This tank is visualized primarily as a "tank chaser" - a positive means to seek, overtake and destroy enemy tanks. . .It is not believed desirable to employ the armored division or its tank elements in the antitank role. Armored divisions and corps are decisive means in the hands of the commander, to be employed primarily in large-scale offensive and defensive operations, leajor

vedemoyer's

article mentions the tremendous assault

aimed at the French Army by a German armored force of 45,000 motor vehicles striking through the ARDENNES FOREST in 1940. He writes,

... The French General Staff couldn't conceive of an armored thrust of any magnitude driving successfully through the rugged terrain of the Belgian Ardennes. Yet five armored divisions and three motorized divisions successfully penetrated

115

this deep forest and crossed the Ivhouse River in a:n unprecedented er ployent of arnlorod forces. An antitank doctrine suggested by Major vedemieyer was similar to that adopted for the employment of TD units when they became a part of the U, S, Armed Forces. ;W:,s: His suggested doctrine

"Vigorous searching for the armored foe,, tenaciously holding

on to his flanks, pursuing and destroying him at every turn." The article ends with several pertinent conclusions, among them the following: ... Tanks and airplanes have not deprived the infantry and artillery of their former supremacy, but have greatly accelerated the mcthods, changed techniques, and provided supplementary means for maneuver or denial of maneuver. . .The tank itself (or tank Other chaser) is the primary defensive weapon against tanks. antitank means, active and passive, create conditions, such as disruption, delay, casualties and canalization, which favor the employment of tank units. Shortly after this article appeared, the concept of tank

chasers was given additional support in a contribution to the Field

i

rtill ry Journal by Lajor

N. B.

Palmer,

which came out in

September

of 1941.

Writing on the subject "Field Artillery - 1941," Major

(now Lajor General) Palmer included a section on "The Antitank Artillery." In it he asserted,

.... It is probably true that the ideal antitank gun is the antiaircraft gun, with its expensive laying devices and terrific muzzle velocity. It can blow the tank apart. It is true, also, that an antitank gun should have a high muzzle velocity, an arr-Lor-piercing shell, grea:t mobility, and great maneuverability. It should have an armored tow vehicle or a seif-propelled mount; rather definitely the latter, if it is to chase tanks around the battlefield. The observations of these officers are of interest as examples of informed military thought which, in 1940 and 1941, was the basis

116

for the conception and formation of tank destroyer units.

Excerpts from Comment in 1944-1945 The concentrated emphasis on counter armor operations between 1940 and 1944 gave our ground forces a number of methods of dealing With the tank threat, particularly by the time U. S.

forces faced nfajor German strength on the European Continent after the invasions of 1944. TDs came into their own when a large-caliber,

high-velocity gun was placed on the mobile mount foreseen by earlier writers. role. Armed with this weapon, they enlarged on their prirrary

On antitank missions they worked in close support of, or As supporting

attached to, infantry and armored organizations.

units for artillery they served to reinforce fires and added greater range to the artillery capability. Vith these changes came alterations in basic missions. The

Tank Destroyer Field i.anual of 16 June 1942 gave the units primary antitank missions, and secondary missions as "beach defense, action against parachute and airborne troops, and the reduction of bunkers, pillboxes, and other weapon emplacements."l The same manual, revised and dated 18 July 1944, lists suitable secondary missions as: a. Direct or indirect fire to reinforce or supplement that of artillery units. b. Destruction of pillboxes and permanent defensive works. c. Support of landing operations. d. Defense of beaches against waterborne attack. e. Roving 2 'un and roving battery mission. Pursuing this secondary employment with reference to reinforcing or supplementing artillery fires, several combat authors

117

found time in 1944 to forward articles to the Field Artillery and Infantry Journals describing successful methods of using TDs as artillery. subjects. Among interesting comments on this debated method of employment was one by a Gerr.an officer, a Colonel Seither, written in November 1942 for a German service paper and translated in the Larch 1944 FA Journal. 3 Colonel Seither considered Others mention the practice in articles on associated

...The modern antitank gun is taking on the characteristics of a field gun, which may determine its future appearance. In view of these facts it can readily be irnagined that the field gun, which has, at all events, disappeared from the German Army, is experiencing a rebirth but is being provided with the special tochnical improvements characteristic of an antitank gun and is to be used primarily against tanks and secondarily for other artillery purposes. On the other hand the necessity of at least using the divisional artillery for antitank defense has compelled us to provide these guns also with the technical improvements that ensure that they will have the necessary flexibility and rate of fire. His conclusion is given as another approach to the evolution of heavy weapons. Returning to the employment of TDs in a role supplementing field artillery, five combat officers, a cavalryman and four artillerymen, are quoted from contributions to the Field Artillery Journal of August, October, and iovember of 1944.

In the August issue, lajor E. C. Hatfield, Cavalry, presented operations of four TD units in the supplementary artillery role.
4

They were the 630th, 776th,

803d, and 808th TD Battalions.

He says,

118

a. Reinforcing the The following missions were developed: b. Deepening and exfires of field artillery battalions. Targets c. tending the zones of fire of the field artillery. of opportunity. d. Counter-battery fire -- to a limited Interdiction missions. e. Harassing missions. f. extent. ... An example of the accuracy of the 3" gun was evidenced on the night of 14 January 1945 when "C" Company, 808th TD Bn, in the role of reinforcing artillery, was called upon to The target deliver emergency fires on a troop concentration. was over 800 mils outside the transfer limits, requiring a A K of shift of 1612 mils, and over 12,000 yards in range. A check round fired at the / 78 yards per 1000 was used. target in the morning showed that the deflection was correct, range 100 short. During a 24-hour period 21022 March 1945, Company "A" of the 630th TD Bn fired 17 harassing missions on a Rhine River bridge, a total of 4180 rounds of HE being expended. The.comparative cheapness of 3" aimnunition in tonnage and transport, and the fact that TDs are highly effective in performing harassing and interdiction missions, were the reasons which caused a marked increase in their use as reinforcing artillery in Europe. In the same issue of the Uield Artillery Journal, f. B. Bell, Field Artillery, Colonel

reported tank destroyers in the XIX providing fire support for the

Corps played a "prominent part" in ROER River crossings. dicting missions, require comment. ,6
5

The value of TD guns on harassing and inter"is too well known to

according to the Colonel,

The 90-mmi. guns were used mainly for long range missions. Because they can be sited well forward, their fire can be placed on targets beyond the range of most of the Corps Artillery. It should not be assumed, however, that their value is limited to long range missions only. As an illustration, three 90-mm. platoons were called upon to place interdiction fire upon roads leading to a junction at STEINSTRASS, approximately 11,000 yards distant. . .PWs from a horse-d:awn 150-mm. artillery battery, captured intact by the 30th Infantry Division, stated that they were unable to evacuate their materiel because of the terrific interdiction fire. ... A maximum degree of effect is obtained with tank destroyer ammunition, and the great saving in shipping weight and 7 space (over heavier calibers) is evident.

119

Statements of Lieutenant Colonel J. Artillery, and Captain F Ct leacham,"

i.. Barney

Jr.,8 Field

in the November 1944 issue

of the Field Artillery Journal, corroborate those of Colonel Bell and 11ajor Hatfield under different circumstances vMa jor Edward A..Raymond, ing off Kraut," cludes that ...The 1o10 is one of the most versatile weapons on the battlefield. It is a quadruple threat, not only doing its defensive job in spectacular fashion but also acting offensively as an infantry assault gun, as a mobile artillery weapon, and as an invaluable adjunct in tank attacks.10 Coordination of TD units with armor and infantry has been given detailed explanation in preceding chapters; however, two additional briefs on tne operation of the TD-Infantry team are presented here. It was developed on the battlefield, according to Colonel J. F. Barney, Jr., the artilleryman quoted previously, in an of combat.

Field Artillery, author of "Brass-

in the October 1944 Field Artillery Journal, con-

article written for the Infantry Journal of November 1944. Infantry commanders saw, he reports, "in the heavy fire power of a TD battalion, a powerful weapon to help Doughboys when the situation called for their use in this way." well pre-

A study of the results of Infantry-TD action is

sented in an article on the "Froper Use and Abuse of Tank Destroyers," by Lieutenant Eugene T. Oborn, Field Artillery, pub-

lished in the Field Artillery Journal of July, 1945. Lieutenant Oborn declares the success of the TD weapon depends cn an understanding of its capabilities by the infantry commander to whom it
120

is

attached for combat. 1 2

He produces a table showing a comparison

of accomplishments and losses in component comp.tLnie;s of the 899th TD Battalion, covering a period of seven months. During that tin ,

gun compa ni.s worked with the same infantry regiments of the 9th
Division under varying conditions of command and supervision. Describing the background for his statistics, Oborn writes, "A" Co was attached to a regiment which permitted use of the guns under company control. Recommendations of its commander have, in the main, been followed. This employment favors the present type of battalion tank destroyer organization; missions were assigned generally and the company officers and NCOs were permitted to use their own initiative in accomplishing these missions. In the case of "C' and (particularly) "B" companies, also attached to regiments, recommendations of the respective company commanders were frequently not followed. The result was the use of their destroyers on missions which should and could have beoo accomplished by tanks, artillery, heavy weapons, or the riflemen themselves all of which were available. A resume of the chart illustrating "A" Co Enemy tanks Guns, all types Pillbox and Strcngpoint iG nest 22 35 33 49 the article "B" Co 17 17 12 8 is as follows: Lieutenant

"C" Co 10 11 17 21

GP vehicle
P Own i10 or 1i8 lost in action

4
465 2

7
59 13

4
1173 9

Combat "Know-How" The complete 1946. v'hther tey inactivation of TD units was accomplished in will be revived to fill anotheremergency role

121

carnnot be foreseen, leaIaed by units in

However,

a certain amotunt of "know-how\t, experience, "tips" are as may

combat through some times bitter These

be repented fcr its value to other Arms. fellows:

1. Gun positions must be changed often to secure the element of surprise. It was noted that the enemy would attempt any trickery which he thought might have even a remote possibility cf bagging some of our guns. In several instances he would withdraw a knocked-out tank under cover of darkness and substitute a live tank in its place. Close observation on the part of the infantry and our gun crews exposed this trickery. It was found that the Kraut would re-man knocked-out tanks which had not burned and use them as pillboxes. It has become the policy of this TD unit to shell and setfire all enemy tanks knocked out. 1 3 2. Hand grenades are not carried by experienced units, as they may be set off by enemy shells striking the sides of the destroyer. 3. This TD battalion - like others in Italy - thinks that it should tie right in as a battalion to the divisional artillery when acting in its secondary role as artillery.15 4. Ancther artillery function of greUt importance to the division artillery has boan the use of TDs as roving guns. . The battalion sends out two or three destroyers to fire a few rounds from each of a number of positions up and down the line, firing at definitely located targets (such as houses, dugouts, trails, etc.) which ,ari6 known to be in current use. _iring is never done at random. 5. The bttalion wants the biggest gun it can carry. 17

6. ThL comparison of self-propelled TDs with the towed antitank guns of the British in the northern sector emphasized the superiority of the il10. Our TDs could follow the advance of our infantry much more closely, and when enemy infantry infiltrated into Allied positions could withdraw in daylight. The thin-skinned prime-movers fcr the towed guns could, in general, only approach the front at night. The limited traverse of towed guns also proved a serious handicap. The ch.vrcn type rubber track was the only logical type to be used in combat.l 8

122

7. A roadside position for the emplacement of heavy weapons has two advantages. I\uzzle blast will not show on the hard surface of the roadway, and extra elevation for increased range is readily obtained by placing vehicles on the slope of the ditch alongside the road.9 8. It is desirable, if the artillery can and will do it, to have the FA crew do all the survey work: this reduces the number of men milling around to draw enemy attention and fire upon the area. 2 0 .I believe most tank destroyers would gladly swap the air compressor in the pioneer platoon for one bulldozer, and I know the field artillery working with us would have parted with some of their most prized possessions for even a pint-sized bulldozer. 10. Amn:n'unition, and the range table for firing shell, illuminating, up to ranges of 4000 yards, should be placed in each destroyer. This will permit one destroyer of a platoon to illuminate an area, while the other three bring direct 2ire on enemy armor, if the enemy attacks with armor at night.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7 1FMI 18-5, (Washington: 16 June 1942), Far 11. United States Government Printing

Office,

'FIF18-5,
Office,

(!s'ashington: 18 July 1944), Par 6.

3 3Colonel Seither,

United States Government Printing

"The *odern Antitank Gun," translated from ehrtechnische Monatshofte for August, 1943, written in November 1942, translator unknown, Field Artillery Journal, 34 (,arch 1944) p 154. 4Major Ernest C. Hatfield, "Utilizing Tank Destroyers as Artillery," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (August 1945), p 495. 5Colonel Paul B. Bell, "Tank Destroyers in the Roer River Crossing," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (August 1945), p 497. 6Ibid, p 498.
7

Ibid, p 498.

8 Lt Colonel J. p. Barney, Jr., "TDs Approach katurity," Field Artillery Journal, 34 (November 1944), pp 775-778.

123

'C.'?ptoin I. iNw Fighting Teamr," pp 778-780.

10

C. ieacham as told to Lt. R. L. Barnhill, "A Field Artillery Journal, 34 (NTvemnber 1944),

Major Edward A. Raymond, "Brassing Off Kraut," Field Artillery Journal, 34 (.October 1944), p 698.
11

Journal,
12

Colonel J. P. Barney, Jr., LV (November .1944), p. 17.

"Tank Destroyers,"

Infantry

Lt Eugene T. Oborn, "Proper Use and Bause of Tank Destroyers," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (July 1945), p 399.
13 1iajor Edward A.

Raymond,

Op cit, p 697.

14bid. 15

"Ibid.

16 I Ibid. 17 d. Ibid.
19 9 1

Lt Colonel J. P.

rield Artillery Journal,

20

Barney, Jr., "TDs Approach Maturity," 34 (November 1944), p 776.

Ibid,

p 777. C. Meacham,
Oborn,

21Captain F.
22

Op cit, p 780.
p 399.

Lt Eugene T.
Lt Eugene T.

bor,

p cit, p 399.
Op cit,

124

CEAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND REC OME rNDATIONS

Findings in this chapter are derived from two sources an analysis of battle experiences of four TD battalions in the European Theater during the period from hay 1944 to June 1945, and general observations on the subject of TD combat activities written by military authors of the same period. It should be noted that other aspects of TD employment, those factors outside actual tactical operations, are not incorporated in Conclusions and kecommendations. Such factors play an important

part in determining the overall usefulness of a military Corps or Arm. They include problems of training and logistics and, as in

the case of TDs,

a comparision of the efficiency and usefulness of

the TD unit over other types of antitank equipment and personnel combinations. For the purposes of this study, the form followed in presentation of Conclusions and Recommendations is the Each

as follows:

conclusion is numbered and listed separately, with a brief descriptive explanation, followed by the Committee's recommendation.

1.

Offensive and Defensive Capabilities of TDs that TD units suc-

The initial conclusion of this study is

cessfully fulfilled their primary mission, that of defense against armored attack, and in addition proved to be capable of assuming the offensive against hostile ground forces, including armor, by operating

125

as highly-mobile,

lightly-armored and heavily-gunned assault units. TDs relied on mobility and of their light protective

In the offensive against tanks,

heavy firepower to offset the disadvantage armor.

They operated on the offensive in conjunction with friendly

armor and were utilized to supplement the speed and firepower of the slower but more heavily armored vehicles. They were particularly

adapted to this role when soggy terrain would not support the weighty tank. The 'TD vehicle, with less ground pressure, could maneuver

through friendly units., outmaneuvering hostile armor as well, using this capability to attain an advantageous position, accomplish its fire mission, and move to the flank or rear for another strike. The Conmmittee recommends that the characteristics self-propelled vehicle, high mobility, of the TD

light armor and a large gun,

be fully exploited; and that this vehicle be incorporated in an organization to operate with or as a part of armor, reformed TD units, infantry or

to realize on its dual capabilities on the of-

fensive as well as in a major defensive role against hostile forces.

2. Inherent in

TDs Can Be Used As Artillery TD organizations was their ability to accomplish only by artillery.

nany fire missions of a type normally performed

It was artillerymen who first

realized and developed this capability

and applied their specialized knowledge and individual ingenuity to work out successful methods of employing TDs on typical artillery tasks. Artilleryrmen-authors, who wrote on the use of TDs to

126

supplement their ben

Arm,

mentioned the following fire

missions as having

successfully accomplished by TDs: Direct or indirect fire to reinforce or supplement that of

artillery units. Roving gun and roving battery missions. Deepending and extending the zones of fire Targets of opportunity. of artillery.

Counter-battery fire. Harassing missions. Interdiction missions. In artillery connection with deepening and extending the zones of' fire, several writers pointed out that TDs, because of of

their mobility and armor protection, artillery

were sited well forward

emplacements and from that position placed fire of most Corps Artillery.

on targets

beyond the range It

was also emphasized that the comparative ini tonnage and transport,

cheapness of

TD ammunition,

was a great saving in

shipping weight and space heavier type artillery It armored, is

over ammunition normally required by same long-range job. of the lightlybe considered in

to do the

recommended that the possibilities

self-propelled gun for use by artillery

the future development of weapons for that arm; and should assault units be formed in mount, the future, employing a vehicle similar to the TD

that they be well trained in

a secondary mission of rein-

forcing and supplementing artillery.

127

3.

Employment Against Fillboxes and Defensive WVorks coupled gave TD

The high-velocity gun employed by TD organizations, with the armored protection its vehicle offered gun crews,

units a natural weapon to use in direct fire against fortified areas. The mobility of the gun permitted crews to capitalize on the element of surprise in attacking pillboxes and defensive works. quickly placed in Guns were

firing position, completed their mission of

placing rounds in embrasures or giving protective fire to units on the ground, and withdrew before effective hostile fire could be

placed on them. In recc

Dending that this capability be retained as a

secondary mission for units with characteristics the Committee does not infer that mobile, the best means cf reducing emplacements.

of TD organizations,

direct-fire weapons are

4.

TDs Posed Quadruple Threat to Enemy

The self-propelled, hard-hitting weapons used by most TD units during the latter part of vorld Wiar II made these organizations one of the most versatile antagonists on the battlefield. They were a quadruple threat to the enemy, being capable of maintaining a stiff defense against armor, could operate on the offensupported the infantry as an

sive against all hostile ground arms,

assault gun, and were successfully employed as mobile artillery. The priim.ry factor in their successful employment was the mobility inherent in the TD vehicle.

128

It

is

a general recommendation that in the future design of stress be placed on the n.obility of the mount

vehicular gun mounts,

under all conditions of terrain and weather.

5.

Considerations of Command and Employment

TD units attached to major commands in combat performed rmst successfully under commanders who had a knowledge of the techniques of TD operation, or who, lacking that knowledge, accepted It was the

the staff guidance of the attached TD unit commander. rule (correct

or not) that destroyer organizations were broken down particularly on the defense against

to platoon-size units for combat,

armor.

This procedure did not utilize the full capabilities of the TD company or battalion on the defensive (particularly in the counterattack) and more often placed small TD elements under junior commanders who were not remotely acquainted with their techniques, and, in addition, were not amenable to staff advice from an atsubordinate commnander. This general situation was a cause for constant complaint by TD organization officers and non-commissioned officers, whom wrote, in service papers and elsewhere, many of

tached,

that they were in-

efficiently employed. There is merit to the assertion they could have been used more effectively. unit show, Statistics prepared on a small scale by a TD

over an extended period of actual combat, major organi-

zation commanders who took advantage of the technical advice of

129

attached TD personnel had a more valuable weapon at their disposal than commanders who did not. Those coz anders using the technical

advice of their subordinate TD leader had working for them units which inflicted more than twice p much damage to the enemy, while

suffCringr one-fifth the casualties as those who did not consider this source of professional assistance. As a compromise between command authority and the best, overall utilization of troops trained for specific missions, it is

recormendced that such units be made an organic part of major commands, preferably at regimental or divisional level.

6.

Self-propelled uVeapon Superior 'to Towed Gun self-propelled,

TD organizations equipped with the armored, antitank gun

attained greater success

in combat than those equipped

with the towed antitank gun.

Using organizations considered the

superiority of the mobile mount so apparent that written remarks on the difference are scarce. granted. In countless operations, mobile guns with armor protection They could It was so obvious it could be taken for

used these characteristics to their decided advantage. mrove in or out of position freely; in combat,

towed weapons waited

for nightfall (except in extreme emergency) coimitted had little

before moving, and once

opportunity for their thin-skinned prime-movers Towed guns had

:a

to change them to another position. verse, of little

limited tra-

compared to the vehicular weapon,

and their prime-movers were The vehicular

assistance in altering their traverse.

130

weapon could follow the advance

of infantry or armor,

or become a

part of the forward elements of the assault, capability of the tcwed gun. The self-propelled weapon is

all well beyond the

recommended as the best type

for use by TD units or organizations charged with a similar mission.

iobile Gun Mvounts 7. Should Have Overhead As Well As Side Armor Several author-users wrote that TD self-propelled vehicles would have attained greater combat efficiency had they carried overhead as well as side armor. had not been provided, They also wrote that because it The improto metallic

most units improviscd their own.

visation ranged from a canvas spread,

to deflect grenades,

sheeting providing protection against overhead artillery bursts. In constructing vehicles with characteristics and capabilities sir:.ilar to those of the TD vehicle, it is recomrmended that overhead cover be provided for gun crews.

131

APPENDL

628TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Training On 10 July 1941, the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion was Indiantown Gap

organized as a provisional antitank battalion at iilitary Reservation. It owes its

conception to Lieutenant General U. S. Army, in and decided that

Hugh Drum,

who then commanded the First

his divisions should test vers artillery, of 1941.

antitank battalions

the Carolina Maneu-

This battalion was a divisional unit formed from the engineers, and medical troops of the 28th InKeystone Division. Peterson and and a

infantry,

fantry Division, Initially

Pennsylvania

National Guard,

the battalion was commanded by Major Carl L. Battery,

consisted of a Headquarters medical detachment. The battalion's 1941 at A, P.

six lettered batteries,

Attached was a company of the division engineers. first tactical field training was in July

Hill. Military Reservation, At this

Virginia,

as a part of the

28th Infantry Division. of towed mock guns made

time the main armament consisted wood, etc.,

of miscellaneous pieces of pipe,

towed by 2-ton weapons carriers. Early in Maneuvers, ber 1941, Majcr November, while participating in the Carolina On 15 Decem-

villiam Mi, Hernandez assumed command.

shortly after its

return to the Indiantown Gap Military into a permanent organi-

Reservation, the battalion was recrganized zation, absorbing D and E batteries,

redesignating the remaining

132

batteries as companies, Destroyer Battalion.

and redesignating the unit as the 628th Tank

In January 1942 an additional company originally known as the Pioneer Ccmpaniy, Company, was added. to Camp Livingston,
t: tber. Again it

but ultimately to become the Reconnaissance Also during this month the battalion was moved Louisiana, where training continued until Sep-

moved,

this time to the newly formed Tank Destroyer Here, after fifteen months of training fired live ammunition, using

Center at Camp hood, with dummy guns,

Texas.

the Battalion first

bcrrowed 75mm guns on half-tracks, weapon.

the original TD vehicle and

Early in December 1942 at Camp Bowie, successfully completed its first

Texas,

the Battalion

Army Ground Force tests.

In January 1942 the Battalion entrined for Camp Carabelle, Florida, (later designated Camp Gordon Johnston) where it rejoined

the 28th Infantry Division for intensive amphibious training. After receiving its first destroyers, combat vehicles, 36

10 tank
where driver

the Battalion moved to Camp Rucker, Alabana,

training was stressed prior to participaticn in the 1943 Tennessee a ne uve r s. Periods of armphibicus training at Camp Bradford, folk, Virginia,
kand Army Ground Force Firing Tests in

near Nor-

the West

Virginia kaneuver Area were completed before the Battalion departed for Camp Dix and the Port of Embarkation in December 1943. After leaving the U. S. by way of Camp Shanks on 28 January

133

1944,

the Battali.n arrived at Greenock,

ScotlAnd,

on 6 February (located

1944 and from there entrained for Packingham, between Birmingham and Coventry). After extensive range firing in moved to Dorchester, iales,

England,

the Battalion was

England, to run Marshalling Camps for the

Ncrrandy Invasion troops, Relieved of its Marshalling Area assignment, the Battalion

embarked on Navy LSTs on 28 July for France and the combat zone.

134

APFENDIX

II

628TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Combat History The 628th TD Battalion left from PUDDLET1OWN, England, on

26 July 1944 and loaded on Navy LSTs for France They landed on Utah Beach on 30 July,

on 28 July 1944.

and within a few days were Third Army.

assigned to the 5th Armored Division, XV Corps, The normal procedure of the Reconnaissance battalion, which in and to the reserve in

combat was to attach one platoon of the

Company to each of the gun companies

turn were attached to each of the combat commands command of the Division. The remainder of the

628th was attached to Headquarters,

5th Armored Division Artillery.

Falaise-Argentan Gap on 10 August 1944, Corps, still assigned to the Third Army, XV

and 5th Armored Division, in the vicinity

the Battalion moved out of the France, to participate Route of column in

bivouac area

of LE 1MANS,

the attempt to close the Falaise-Argentan Gap. passed through BRIOSNE and SEES, France,

1E

LELSE,

arriving in

the vicinity of

at 2145 hours,

12 August 1944.

During the march on

11 August

1944,

2d Platoon, Company A,

was acting as rear guard to

CCA's column.

Sometime during the night an unidentified column column from the west. and when it and .S/Sgt.

approached the route of march of CCA's Koczan, Company A,

challenged the leading vehicle;

failed to stop,

Sergeant Koczan fired his

.45 caliber pistol

135

killed the driver.

He then destroyed the next two vehicle.

gi',

hand grenades and brought .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine gun fire on the remaining five vehicles, while the M10's opened fire on the rear of the column with three-inch H.-E. to prevent a withdrawal. In all, eight enemy vehicles and 240 enemy troops were

destroyed.

Battle of the Seine River The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel vtilliam Hernandez,

wont out to contact Company A on 29 August 1944; and while directing

fire on enemy tanks, was killed at 1630 hours near DOUAINS, Major William J. Gallagher, Battalion Executive Officer, same date. France.

assumed

command of the Battalion at 1700 hours,

In the same

action in which Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez was killed, Corporals O'Brien and Tartaglia, 3d Platoon, Company A, each destroyed a

Mark

tank at 1700 yards range just west of DOUAIJS, one 110 Tank Destroyer knocked out.

while the platoon had

Drive to the Belgian Border On 27 August 1944, the 5th Armored Division with the 628th

Tank Destroyer Battalion attached was relieved of assignment to Third Army and XV Corps. On 30 August 1944, the 5th Armored Division

was given the mission of marching direct to the Belgian border with the least possible delay. France, The Battalion left bivouac near GUERVILLE, It passed through COIPEIGNE

at 0730 hours on 30 August 1944, with CCB.

the outskirts of PARIS and continued on through SENLIS,

136

Forest, NOYEN, CONDE, France,

GUISCARD,

VILIENEUVE,

and VALENCIENNES,

arriving at

on the Belgium border at 2330 hours on 2 September 1944.

Battle of the Hurtgen Forest On 23 October 1944, KALTERERBERG, the Battalion moved to the vicinity of time since entering a policy which was On 1 Novem-

Germany, where for the first

combat civilian homes were utilized for billets,

continued from that date until the end of hostilities.

ber 1944, the new Ni36 Tank Destroyers equipped with the 90mm guns arrived to replace the firing companies. On 3 December, CCA with Company A attached, was further

0l's

with the three-inch guns in the three

attached to the 4th Infantry Division in their attack on STRAUSS, Germany, sions. while Company B was attached to CCOB on indirect fire misThe battle of the UJRTGEN Forest in Germany was by far the this Bat-

most intense period of combat experienced by any unit in

talion, and full credit can be paid to CCR and Company C for their outstanding combat record in this engagement. This was the area

that the enemy had been able to strongly fortify and were determined to protect, as it controlled the approaches to the vitally important To the north,

network of dams which fed into the ROER River area.

British and American units were approachiing the west bank of the ROER but could not cross until the network of dams in the hills above their positions were held by our forces, It was known that

the German plan of defense was based on their ability to hold these dams to the last possible minute, and then release this vast supply

137

of water to flood the entire ROER River area. Enermy artillery employment in the HURTGEN-BERGSTEIN area was the heaviest encountered. The artillery fire was such as to confine and air bursts and

tank crews oto their tanks for hours at a time,

shrapnel caused many casualties to the men in the open M36 turrets. One

036 of

Company C hit a mine in the vicinity of BERGSTEIN on 6 and the crew climbed into another 1136 for protection. however, this other i36 with both crews aboard

December 1944,

Shortly afterwards,

received a direct hit in the open turret with a white phosphorous shell. As the result of this experience, plans were immediately tank destroyer

started to build an armored turret top for all vehicles.

This modification for all M36 Tank Destroyer vehicles January 1945 and proved invaluable in

was finally completed in

combat on a number of subsequent occasions.

Battle of the Ardennes Upon the arrival of all units in the new area around 1400 hours on 24 December 1944, in SOY, Company A took up a defensive position

Belgium; Company B was attached to the 83d Reconnaissance

Battalion, 3d Armored Division, and took up defensive positions in the vicinity of GI{ANDv NIL, Company, Belgium; Company C, Reconnaissance

and the Battalion Forward CF were established in EREZEE,

Belgium; and Headquarters Company and the Battalion rear echelon elements moved into BOM L, enemy had approached, A's position in SOY, but it Belgium, Belgium. No one knew just how near the Company

did not take long to find out.

came under artillery fire shortly after

138

their arrival, and the enemy launched a small infantry counterattack which approached to within 200 yards of Company A's position before withdrawing. At 0130 hours., 25 December 1944, the 2d Platoon, Belgium,

Company B, had a road block established in

GiRANDINIL,

when an enemy armored column was heard approaching the concealed position. Sergeant Moser, Tank Destroyer Gun Commander, permitted

the leading enemy vehicles to come up to 25 yards of his position before opening fire, and then in quick succession knocked out the first two tanks at almost pointblank range, both of which were later

identified as Mark V's. column to withdraw,

This caused the other vehicles in the enemy

and no further attempt was made by the enemy to

utilize this GRAiNDENIL-EREZEE-SOY road network which they needed to properly protect their northriern flank. Later in the same day,

members of Company B3found two hark V tanks abandoned by the German crows because they were out of gas; and these two enemy tanks were also destroyed.

The Roer to the Rhine River Company B attached to CCB was the first talion to cross the ROER at LINNICH, Germany, unit of the Baton 25 February 1945,

and the remainder of the Battalion followed the next day with Company A attached to CCA, Company C to CCR, and Battalion Headquarters,

Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance

Company, headquarters the Pioneer

Flatoon, and Medical Detachment moving with Division Artillery Headquarters. The initial assembly area east of the ROER River was in Germany. All elements of the 5th

the vicinity of KOFFERN-HOTTORF,

139

Armored Division then swung to the north, capturing RATH, ERKELENZ, HARDT, RHEINDALEN,. RBEYDT, bypassing HULS, UNCHEN-GLADI CH and continuing

through VIERSON, ANRATH,

TONISBURG, AND .VLUYNHEIDE where the Company A in the

Battalion CP was established on 4 March 1945.

meantime had proceeded with CCA in the attack against KREFALD, while Company C continued with. CCR in the attack on REPELEN and ORSOY on 7 March 1945.

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APPENDIX III 704TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION Training The 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion was probably better known to the Germans than it was to the people within the United States. The nucleus of the 704th was formed on 15 December 1941 from Battery D, 22d ield Artillery Battalion of the 4th Armored Division at Pine Camp, New York, where it was attached to the 4th Armored Division for training. The first commander of the 704th was Lieutenant Colonel Storck who relinquished the command to his executive officer, iajor Oden, who soon received nis promotion and commanded the battalion until Orleans, France.

After receiving its basic training with the 4th Armored Division at

line

Camp, New York, the 704th packed its equipment in

1942 and proceeded to the Tank Destroyer Center at for a three months training period where a fuller

early September Camp Hood, Texas,

knowledge of tactics and the use of equipment could be gained.

During this three months period, the battalion put emphasis on gunnery, camouflage, cover and concealment, and the employment

of tank destroyer companies

and platoons with armored units.

Specifically,

great emphasis was put on fire and maneuver

and individual tank destroyer versus tank tactics.

These tactics in

involved agile maneuvering by a tank destroyer so as to place it

141

a position to fire at enemy tanks in.their most vulnerable areas-their sides, suspension systems, or their rear..

From January to August 1943,. the 704th ianeuvered with the 4th Armored Division in vers, it the California Desert. During these maneu-

was found that in the majority of problems the battalion the companies were attached to the major In many instances, platoons

could be better utilized if

~ia~!

elements,

such as a combat command.

were attached to reinforced tank battalions. It was thought that by using the tank destroyer companies or platoons decentralized from battalion control, a better dispersion of the tank destroyers would be brought about, thus giving the tank

destroyers a better opportunity to be used in their primary role-that is, antitank. In late August 1943,. the 704th moved with the 4th Armored Division to Camp Bowie, Texas,. where it underwent physical conditionThe latter

ing training and the Army Ground Force combat tests..

consisted of small unit problems where a platoon leader would be given a situation such as that of a German tank attack against a defended position. The tankcdstroyer' platoon leader and his platoon

would then be graded on the following techniques used in deployment: setting up firing positions; maneuvering to the enemy flanks; and the degree of chance taken in action. A considerable amount of attention was given the tank destroyer versus tank technique,. inasmuch as the tank destroyers were a simulated tank destroyer versus tank

142

simply 76mm guns mounted on a medium tank chassis with only threeeighths inch armor plate for protection against small arms fire. Since the gun crews had no armor or a turret for protection, this mea:t that tiey would be completely ,t the mercy of any enemy weapon of .50 caliber or larger. Also, the crews would be exposed to any

type of overhead fire in their opon vehicles. On 18 February 1944, the 704th left the States and arrived 15 days later at Liverpool, England. From there the battalion en-

trained for Trowbridge, England, where the next four months were spent in final preparation for the job ahead. This preparation consisted mainly of review training of everything learned in the States. From time to time., the tank des-

troyer companies maneuvered with the 4th Armored Division which was unarby. These maneuvers consisted mainly of small unit problems

similar to those in the California Desert.

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APPENDIX IV 8:23D TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Training

The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion was activated 25 July 1942 at Camp Carson, Colorado. Major (now Colonel) Charles B. McClelland

was tho battalion commanding officer; Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) Robert W. Rayburn was the battalion executive officer. A small

officer cadre and a 77 enlisted men cadre was furnished by the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Fifteen new officer graduates of the Kansas.

Cavalry School were assigned from Fort Riley,

The battalion remained at Camp Carson for about six weeks, conducting cadre training and orientation of newly commissioned officer personnel. The unit participated in a good amount of

nountain-climbing during this period for the purpose of physical conditioning. The battalion climbed Pikes Peak in August 1942 and military unit to accomplish this, in formation.

claims to be the first

On 9 September 1942 the 823d moved to Camp Livingston, Louisiana. At this time it was still in a cadre status, with only On or about 1 October plus its general

the minimum essential items of TO&E equipment. it received 250 fillers

from Camp Robinson, Arkansas,

purpose vehicles. 1 January 1943, and California.

Basic training was then conducted until about received 400 newly inducted men from Texas

when it

On 5 January the battalion was transferred to the Camp Bowie, Texas. This center was a

Basic Unit Training Center,

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subordinate command of the Tank Destrtoyer Center at Camp Hood, Texas. Individual training, basic and advanced, .was completed at Camp Bowie, and on 13 April the battalion moved to Camp Hood, coming

under control of the Advanced Unit Training Center, the Tank Destroyer Center, At this time, the outfit was converted to a towed major

t-nk

dostroyer battalion (3-inch gun) and received its first a few 3-inch guns and halftracks.

items of equipment, time,

At this

a strenuous 3-month training program, including weapons and During

tactical training, was undertaken.

May,

McClelland was and Lieutenant

transferred to command the 101st Cavalry Group, Colonel Paul B. Bell, FA,

assumed command of the battalion.

The battalion completed its proficiency firing tests with the highest score then recorded for a towed tank destroyer unit. Other proficiency tests culminating the end of the training period at Camp Hood were accomplished in an excellent manner, July 1943, the battalion moved to Camp Claiborne, and on 31

Louisiana.

At Camp Claiborne, ing tests by Headquarters, the series of 6, 12, 18,

the battalion was given additional train1st Tank Destroyer Brigade. Then came

and 25-mile road marches.

In September the

battalion left for Third Army maneuvers in where it was attached to ,the 84th, 99th, respectively.

the Louisiana Maneuver Area

102d, and 103d Infantry

Divisions,

The battalion completed maneuvers around the only

the 15th of November with an overall rating of Excellent,

tank destroyer battalion to receive this rating during this particular

145

phase of r:aneuvers. Upon return to Camp Claiborne, preparing for AGF tests - tactical, it was given the mission of equipment, etc., and

physical,

getting every individual qualified for POM. was transferred, and the battalion executive,

About this time,. Bell Major Edward A. Cos-

toriris, assumed command. various AGF tests, which it the AGF physical tests.

In January 1944 the battalion took its passed with high scores, particularly Major (later During February with

Around the 1st of February,

Lieutenant Celcnel) Stanley Dettmer assumed command. Major General Frank v. representatives unit.

Milburn, Commanding General, XXI Corps, U. S.- Army,

of the Inspector General,

inspected the

Late in February the battalion received its alert orders from the War Department. as minimrnu All equipment other than that prescribed last-minute moved The

ossential by POM instructions was turned in,

personnel changes were effected, by rail to Camp Miles Standish,

and on or about 8 March it near Taunton, Massachusetts.

advance detail consisting of two officers had departed for England in late February. The battalion was scheduled to sail during the but the ship earmarked for it It developed

latter part of March, mechanical trouble,

did sail from Boston aboard the "SS Sea

Porpoise" on 6 April 1944.

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APPEDIX V MAPS 1. Gernvriny,. 1:x100,000 G4SGS 4416, Sheet No, S.1

-~Bonn

omi~tted.

2.

Germany (Cenitral Section),

1:25,000 GSGS 4414,

Sheet No.

5503

--

Else nborn

..

omitted.

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DOTD-2745-M-Army-Knox-Jan 85-30