www.howardscasedigests.webs.com G.R. No. L-36249: ANIANO OBAA vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETOSANDOVAL 1985 March 29, 135 scra 557Contract of Sale Ownership Rescissible Contract Unjust EnrichmentOn November 21, 1964, Chan Lin offered to buy 170 cavans of rice from SandovalatP37.25/sack (P6332.50). Sandoval agreed so from Rosales, Pangasinan, Chan Linaccompanied Sandovals driver to have the rice be delivered to San Fernando, La Union. Uponarriving, the sacks of rice were unloaded but when Sandovals driver tried to collect thepayment, Chan Lin was nowhere to be found. The driver then tried to collect from Aniano, whowas the storeowner where they unloaded the rice. But Aniano refused to pay, saying that hemade the payment to Chan Lin for P33/cavan and that he will not return the sacks of rice toSandoval as they were paid already. Apparently, Aniano and Chan Lin had an earlier agreementthat Chan Lin will sell him 170 cavans of rice for P33 each. Aniano said Chan Lin swindledSandoval. Sandoval filed for replevin. ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the 170 cavans of rice? HELD: Ownership was transferred to Chan Lin when the cavans of rice were delivered toAnianos store. This was agreed upon in the contract between Sandoval and Chan Lin.However, it was found that 3days after the delivery, Chan Lin returned Anianos money. Anianoclaimed that he then returned the cavans of rice to Sandoval. But Sandovals driver said Anianonever returned the sacks of rice. They would have withdrawn the replevin case had the sacks of rice been returned. Sandoval has all the right to recover the rice and rescind the contract as hewas not paid. Aniano cannot unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Sandoval.

Constantino vs. Mendez 209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work. Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA. ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD: Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RCPI vs. CA Facts: 24th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins through the herein petioner RCPI. The telegram was in perfect resemblance as to what was intended by the spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was sealed in on a Christmasgram envelope. The spouses contended there was a breach of contract on the part of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial court where it rendered its decision in favor of the spouses whereas, it was appealed in the CA where also the judgment in the lower court was affirmed in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this Court for relief contending issues that the CA erred in rendering such judgment. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed a breach of contract? Whether or not the RCPI are held liable for damages? Held: The Court agrees with the appellate court in its decision and per endorsement of the trial courts findings that the RCPI as a corporation dealing with telecommunication are engaged in public interest and therefore rests in their shoulders an obligation to serve the public with care and without negligence. The reason of shortage in their production of the appropriate envelope is of no value to merit for it is their duty to have produced such. The negligence committed is evidentially sufficient to recover damages because the spouses suffered from ridicule amongst the people who have come to have knowledge of such activity.

PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE M. PANLILIO, respondent. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 15, 1998 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which ruled that: xxx Consequently, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634. x x x We also leave it to the respondent Judge to decide whether he will return Civil Case No. 96-635 to Branch 146 or keep it in his docket but should he opt for the latter, he should act on it as a separate case from Civil Case No. 941634.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted and the assailed Orders dated July 23, 1996 and September 17, 1996, allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634 and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the consequent complete severance of the two (2) cases.[2] The facts follow: On April 27, 1994, petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634. On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment[3] by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03 with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. On February 10, 1995, a writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo. On June 2, 1995, private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million. On June 9, 1995, the trial court denied Panlilios motion for intervention: Submitted for resolution is Jose M. Panlilios Motion for Intervention dated May 31, 1995. This Court has to deny the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action.*4+\ On January 29, 1996, the trial court declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof. On May 3, 1996, Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City[5]. In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 941634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634. On June 13, 1996, Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno but its motion was denied.

On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634. In a decision dated January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998. In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96365. It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished. We disagree. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case.[6] In general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[7] Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala.

Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition less in its docket. The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case No. 94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it wasted the precious time not only of the parties but also of this Court. All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96-365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935. March 23, 1909. FACTS: In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippines entered into a contract whereby the former shall serve as stenographer in the Philippines for a period of 2 years. The contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms, Mr. Frank shall be liable for the amount incurred by the Philippine Government for his travel from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period. After serving for 6 months, defendant left the service and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract, therefore the Government sued him to recover the amount of $269.23 plus damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hence the defendant appealed presenting minority as his special defense. By reason of the fact that under the laws of the Philippines, contracts made by person who did not reach majority age of 23 are unenforceable. Defendant claim that he is an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived in Manila and at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid. RULING: Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a minor under Philippine laws, he was nevertheless considered an adult under the laws of the state of Illinois,the place where the contract was made. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected to its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of its performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract is governed by national law. This is one case not involving real property which was decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law, what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci celebrationis. According to Conflict of Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Franks capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. In the instant case whether it is the place where the contract was made or Franks nationality, the result would be the same. However,as suggested by the mentioned author, for the conflicts rule in capacity in general, national law of the parties is controlling.

Villanueva vs Rosqueta This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.[1] Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary*3+ from implementing Valeras appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.[4] Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it. On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner. During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosquetas picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was under litigation. Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture but not Rosquetas. On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint[5] for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs of suit. But the RTC dismissed*6+ respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,*7+ holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages

from him.[8] Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

The Courts Ruling Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20[10] and 21[11] of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.[12] Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job. But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,*13+ a partys refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right. That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action. The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish*14+ in the cases specified in Article 2219[15] of the Civil Code.[16] Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her employment status.*17+ She had to endure being referred to as a squatter in her workplace.

She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the courts order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages. The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,*18+ moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendants grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00. The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. SO ORDERED.