G.R. No.

137377

December 18, 2001 INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

II. DEFICIENCY BRANCH PROFIT REMITTANCE TAX FY ended March 31, 1985 Undeclared gross income from Philphos and NDC construction projects P483,634,905.57 Less: Income tax thereon 169,272,217.00 314,362,688.57 47,154,403.00 23,577,201.50 12,305,360.66 P83,036,965.16

COMMISSIONER OF vs. MARUBENI CORPORATION, respondent. PUNO, J.:

Amount subject to Tax Tax due thereon Add: 50% surcharge 20% int. p.a.fr. 4-26-85 to 8-15-86 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE III. DEFICIENCY CONTRACTOR'S TAX FY ended March 31, 1985

In this petition for review, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assails the decision dated January 15, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42518 which affirmed the decision dated July 29, 1996 of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 4109. The tax court ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to desist from collecting the 1985 deficiency income, branch profit remittance and contractor's taxes from Marubeni Corporation after finding the latter to have properly availed of the tax amnesty under Executive Orders Nos. 41 and 64, as amended. Respondent Marubeni Corporation is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan. It is engaged in general import and export trading, financing and the construction business. It is duly registered to engage in such business in the Philippines and maintains a branch office in Manila. Sometime in November 1985, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a letter of authority to examine the books of accounts of the Manila branch office of respondent corporation for the fiscal year ending March 1985. In the course of the examination, petitioner found respondent to have undeclared income from two (2) contracts in the Philippines, both of which were completed in 1984. One of the contracts was with the National Development Company (NDC) in connection with the construction and installation of a wharf/port complex at the Leyte Industrial Development Estate in the municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte. The other contract was with the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos) for the construction of an ammonia storage complex also at the Leyte Industrial Development Estate. On March 1, 1986, petitioner's revenue examiners recommended an assessment for deficiency income, branch profit remittance, contractor's and commercial broker's taxes. Respondent questioned this assessment in a letter dated June 5, 1986. On August 27, 1986, respondent corporation received a letter dated August 15, 1986 from petitioner assessing respondent several deficiency taxes. The assessed deficiency internal revenue taxes, inclusive of surcharge and interest, were as follows: I. DEFICIENCY INCOME TAX FY ended March 31, 1985 Undeclared gross income construction projects) Less: Cost and expenses (50%) Net undeclared income Income tax due thereon Add: 50% surcharge 20% int. p.a.fr. 7-15-85 to 8-15-86 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE (Philphos and NDC P967,269,811.14 483,634,905.57 483,634,905.57 169,272,217.00 84,636,108.50 36,675,646.90 P290,583,972.40 xxx

Undeclared gross receipts/gross income from Philphos and NDC construction projects P967,269,811.14 Contractor's tax due thereon (4%) Add: 50% surcharge for non-declaration 20% surcharge for late payment Sub-total Add: 20% int. p.a.fr. 4-21-85 to 8-15-86 38,690,792.00 19,345,396.00 9,672,698.00 67,708,886.00 17,854,739.46 P85,563,625.46

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE IV. DEFICIENCY COMMERCIAL BROKER'S TAX FY ended March 31, 1985 Undeclared share from commission (denominated as "subsidy from Home Office") Tax due thereon Add: 50% surcharge for non-declaration 20% surcharge for late payment Sub-total Add: 20% int. p.a.fr. 4-21-85 to 8-15-86 income

P24,683,114.50 1,628,569.00 814,284.50 407,142.25 2,849,995.75 751,539.98 P3,600,535.68

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE

The 50% surcharge was imposed for your client's failure to report for tax purposes the aforesaid taxable revenues while the 25% surcharge was imposed because of your client's failure to pay on time the above deficiency percentage taxes. xxx xxx"1

Petitioner found that the NDC and Philphos contracts were made on a "turn-key" basis and that the gross income from the two projects amounted to P967,269,811.14. Each contract was for a piece of work and since the projects called for the construction and installation of facilities in the Philippines, the entire income therefrom constituted income from Philippine sources, hence, subject to internal revenue taxes. The assessment letter further stated that the same was

petitioner's final decision and that if respondent disagreed with it, respondent may file an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment. On September 26, 1986, respondent filed two (2) petitions for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The first petition, CTA Case No. 4109, questioned the deficiency income, branch profit remittance and contractor's tax assessments in petitioner's assessment letter. The second, CTA Case No. 4110, questioned the deficiency commercial broker's assessment in the same letter. Earlier, on August 2, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 41 declaring a one-time amnesty covering unpaid income taxes for the years 1981 to 1985 was issued. Under this E.O., a taxpayer who wished to avail of the income tax amnesty should, on or before October 31, 1986: (a) file a sworn statement declaring his net worth as of December 31, 1985; (b) file a certified true copy of his statement declaring his net worth as of December 31, 1980 on record with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), or if no such record exists, file a statement of said net worth subject to verification by the BIR; and (c) file a return and pay a tax equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the increase in net worth from December 31, 1980 to December 31, 1985. In accordance with the terms of E.O. No. 41, respondent filed its tax amnesty return dated October 30, 1986 and attached thereto its sworn statement of assets and liabilities and net worth as of Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 and FY 1986. The return was received by the BIR on November 3, 1986 and respondent paid the amount of P2,891,273.00 equivalent to ten percent (10%) of its net worth increase between 1981 and 1986. The period of the amnesty in E.O. No. 41 was later extended from October 31, 1986 to December 5, 1986 by E.O. No. 54 dated November 4, 1986. On November 17, 1986, the scope and coverage of E.O. No. 41 was expanded by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 64. In addition to the income tax amnesty granted by E.O. No. 41 for the years 1981 to 1985, E.O. No. 64 3 included estate and donor's taxes under Title III and the tax on business under Chapter II, Title V of the National Internal Revenue Code, also covering the years 1981 to 1985. E.O. No. 64 further provided that the immunities and privileges under E.O. No. 41 were extended to the foregoing tax liabilities, and the period within which the taxpayer could avail of the amnesty was extended to December 15, 1986. Those taxpayers who already filed their amnesty return under E.O. No. 41, as amended, could avail themselves of the benefits, immunities and privileges under the new E.O. by filing an amended return and paying an additional 5% on the increase in net worth to cover business, estate and donor's tax liabilities. The period of amnesty under E.O. No. 64 was extended to January 31, 1987 by E.O No. 95 dated December 17, 1986. On December 15, 1986, respondent filed a supplemental tax amnesty return under the benefit of E.O. No. 64 and paid a further amount of P1,445,637.00 to the BIR equivalent to five percent (5%) of the increase of its net worth between 1981 and 1986. On July 29, 1996, almost ten (10) years after filing of the case, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision in CTA Case No. 4109. The tax court found that respondent had properly availed of the tax amnesty under E.O. Nos. 41 and 64 and declared the deficiency taxes subject of said case as deemed cancelled and withdrawn. The Court of Tax Appeals disposed of as follows: "WHEREFORE, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from collecting the 1985 deficiency taxes it had assessed against petitioner and the same are deemed considered [sic] CANCELLED and
2

WITHDRAWN by reason of the proper availment by petitioner of the amnesty under Executive Order No. 41, as amended."4 Petitioner challenged the decision of the tax court by filing CA-G.R. SP No. 42518 with the Court of Appeals. On January 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, this recourse. Before us, petitioner raises the following issues: "(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which ruled that herein respondent's deficiency tax liabilities were extinguished upon respondent's availment of tax amnesty under Executive Orders Nos. 41 and 64. (2) Whether or not respondent is liable to pay the income, branch profit remittance, and contractor's taxes assessed by petitioner."5 The main controversy in this case lies in the interpretation of the exception to the amnesty coverage of E.O. Nos. 41 and 64. There are three (3) types of taxes involved herein income tax, branch profit remittance tax and contractor's tax. These taxes are covered by the amnesties granted by E.O. Nos. 41 and 64. Petitioner claims, however, that respondent is disqualified from availing of the said amnesties because the latter falls under the exception in Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 41. Section 4 of E.O. No. 41 enumerates which taxpayers cannot avail of the amnesty granted thereunder, viz: "Sec. 4. Exceptions. The following taxpayers may not avail themselves of the amnesty herein granted: a) Those falling under the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14; b) Those with income tax cases already filed in Court as of the effectivity hereof ; c) Those with criminal cases involving violations of the income tax law already filed in court as of the effectivity hereof; d) Those that have withholding tax liabilities under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, insofar as the said liabilities are concerned; e) Those with tax cases pending investigation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as of the effectivity hereof as a result of information furnished under Section 316 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; f) Those with pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth before the Sandiganbayan;

g) Those liable under Title Seven, Chapter Three (Frauds, Illegal Exactions and Transactions) and Chapter Four (Malversation of Public Funds and Property) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended." Petitioner argues that at the time respondent filed for income tax amnesty on October 30, 1986, CTA Case No. 4109 had already been filed and was pending; before the Court of Tax Appeals. Respondent therefore fell under the exception in Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 41. Petitioner's claim cannot be sustained. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 41 is very clear and unambiguous. It excepts from income tax amnesty those taxpayers "with income tax cases already filed in court as of the effectivity hereof." The point of reference is the date of effectivity of E.O. No. 41. The filing of income tax cases in court must have been made before and as of the date of effectivity of E.O. No. 41. Thus, for a taxpayer not to be disqualified under Section 4 (b) there must have been no income tax cases filed in court against him when E.O. No. 41 took effect. This is regardless of when the taxpayer filed for income tax amnesty, provided of course he files it on or before the deadline for filing. E.O. No. 41 took effect on August 22, 1986. CTA Case No. 4109 questioning the 1985 deficiency income, branch profit remittance and contractor's tax assessments was filed by respondent with the Court of Tax Appeals on September 26, 1986. When E.O. No. 41 became effective on August 22, 1986, CTA Case No. 4109 had not yet been filed in court. Respondent corporation did not fall under the said exception in Section 4 (b), hence, respondent was not disqualified from availing of the amnesty for income tax under E.O. No. 41. The same ruling also applies to the deficiency branch profit remittance tax assessment. A branch profit remittance tax is defined and imposed in Section 24 (b) (2) (ii), Title II, Chapter III of the National Internal Revenue Code.6 In the tax code, this tax falls under Title II on Income Tax. It is a tax on income. Respondent therefore did not fall under the exception in Section 4 (b) when it filed for amnesty of its deficiency branch profit remittance tax assessment. The difficulty herein is with respect to the contractor's tax assessment and respondent's availment of the amnesty under E.O. No. 64. E.O. No. 64 expanded the coverage of E.O. No. 41 by including estate and donor's taxes and tax on business. Estate and donor's taxes fall under Title III of the Tax Code while business taxes fall under Chapter II, Title V of the same. The contractor's tax is provided in Section 205, Chapter II, Title V of the Tax Code; it is defined and imposed under the title on business taxes, and is therefore a tax on business.7 When E.O. No. 64 took effect on November 17, 1986, it did not provide for exceptions to the coverage of the amnesty for business, estate and donor's taxes. Instead, Section 8 of E.O. No. 64 provided that: "Section 8. The provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 41 and 54 which are not contrary to or inconsistent with this amendatory Executive Order shall remain in full force and effect." By virtue of Section 8 as afore-quoted, the provisions of E.O. No. 41 not contrary to or inconsistent with the amendatory act were reenacted in E.O. No. 64. Thus, Section 4 of E.O. No. 41 on the exceptions to amnesty coverage also applied to E.O. No. 64. With respect to Section 4 (b) in particular, this provision excepts from tax amnesty coverage a taxpayer who has "income tax cases already filed in court as of the effectivity hereof." As to what Executive Order the exception refers to, respondent argues that because of the words "income" and "hereof," they refer to Executive Order No. 41.8

In view of the amendment introduced by E.O. No. 64, Section 4 (b) cannot be construed to refer to E.O. No. 41 and its date of effectivity. The general rule is that an amendatory act operates prospectively.9 While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always been contained therein, 10 it may not be given a retroactive effect unless it is so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no vested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired.11 There is nothing in E.O. No. 64 that provides that it should retroact to the date of effectivity of E.O. No. 41, the original issuance. Neither is it necessarily implied from E.O. No. 64 that it or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Executive Order No. 64 is a substantive amendment of E.O. No. 41. It does not merely change provisions in E.O. No. 41. It supplements the original act by adding other taxes not covered in the first. 12 It has been held that where a statute amending a tax law is silent as to whether it operates retroactively, the amendment will not be given a retroactive effect so as to subject to tax past transactions not subject to tax under the original act.13 In an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect.14 Moreover, E.O. Nos. 41 and 64 are tax amnesty issuances. A tax amnesty is a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law.15 It partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean slate. 16 A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law.17 If granted, the terms of the amnesty, like that of a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 18 For the right of taxation is inherent in government. The State cannot strip itself of the most essential power of taxation by doubtful words. He who claims an exemption (or an amnesty) from the common burden must justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or state law. It cannot be allowed to exist upon a vague implication. If a doubt arises as to the intent of the legislature, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the state.19 In the instant case, the vagueness in Section 4 (b) brought about by E.O. No. 64 should therefore be construed strictly against the taxpayer. The term "income tax cases" should be read as to refer to estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business while the word "hereof," to E.O. No. 64. Since Executive Order No. 64 took effect on November 17, 1986, consequently, insofar as the taxes in E.O. No. 64 are concerned, the date of effectivity referred to in Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 41 should be November 17, 1986. Respondent filed CTA Case No. 4109 on September 26, 1986. When E.O. No. 64 took effect on November 17, 1986, CTA Case No. 4109 was already filed and pending in court. By the time respondent filed its supplementary tax amnesty return on December 15, 1986, respondent already fell under the exception in Section 4 (b) of E.O. Nos. 41 and 64 and was disqualified from availing of the business tax amnesty granted therein. It is respondent's other argument that assuming it did not validly avail of the amnesty under the two Executive Orders, it is still not liable for the deficiency contractor's tax because the income from the projects came from the "Offshore Portion" of the contracts. The two contracts were divided into two parts, i.e., the Onshore Portion and the Offshore Portion. All materials and equipment in the contract under the "Offshore Portion" were manufactured and completed in Japan, not in the Philippines, and are therefore not subject to Philippine taxes. Before going into respondent's arguments, it is necessary to discuss the background of the two contracts, examine their pertinent provisions and implementation. The NDC and Philphos are two government corporations. In 1980, the NDC, as the corporate investment arm of the Philippine Government, established the Philphos to engage in the large-

scale manufacture of phosphatic fertilizer for the local and foreign markets. 20 The Philphos plant complex which was envisioned to be the largest phosphatic fertilizer operation in Asia, and among the largest in the world, covered an area of 180 hectares within the 435-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate in the municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte. In 1982, the NDC opened for public bidding a project to construct and install a modern, reliable, efficient and integrated wharf/port complex at the Leyte Industrial Development Estate. The wharf/port complex was intended to be one of the major facilities for the industrial plants at the Leyte Industrial Development Estate. It was to be specifically adapted to the site for the handling of phosphate rock, bagged or bulk fertilizer products, liquid materials and other products of Philphos, the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (Pasar),21and other industrial plants within the Estate. The bidding was participated in by Marubeni Head Office in Japan. Marubeni, Japan pre-qualified and on March 22, 1982, the NDC and respondent entered into an agreement entitled "Turn-Key Contract for Leyte Industrial Estate Port Development Project Between National Development Company and Marubeni Corporation." 22 The Port Development Project would consist of a wharf, berths, causeways, mechanical and liquids unloading and loading systems, fuel oil depot, utilities systems, storage and service buildings, offsite facilities, harbor service vessels, navigational aid system, fire-fighting system, area lighting, mobile equipment, spare parts and other related facilities. 23 The scope of the works under the contract covered turn-key supply, which included grants of licenses and the transfer of technology and know-how,24 and: ". . . the design and engineering, supply and delivery, construction, erection and installation, supervision, direction and control of testing and commissioning of the Wharf-Port Complex as set forth in Annex I of this Contract, as well as the coordination of tie-ins at boundaries and schedule of the use of a part or the whole of the Wharf/Port Complex through the Owner, with the design and construction of other facilities around the site. The scope of works shall also include any activity, work and supply necessary for, incidental to or appropriate under present international industrial port practice, for the timely and successful implementation of the object of this Contract, whether or not expressly referred to in the abovementioned Annex I." 25 The contract price for the wharf/port complex was 12,790,389,000.00 and P44,327,940.00. In the contract, the price in Japanese currency was broken down into two portions: (1) the Japanese Yen Portion I; (2) the Japanese Yen Portion II, while the price in Philippine currency was referred to as the Philippine Pesos Portion. The Japanese Yen Portions I and II were financed in two (2) ways: (a) by yen credit loan provided by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF); and (b) by supplier's credit in favor of Marubeni from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The OECF is a Fund under the Ministry of Finance of Japan extended by the Japanese government as assistance to foreign governments to promote economic development. 26 The OECF extended to the Philippine Government a loan of 7,560,000,000.00 for the Leyte Industrial Estate Port Development Project and authorized the NDC to implement the same.27 The other type of financing is an indirect type where the supplier, i.e., Marubeni, obtained a loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan to advance payment to its subcontractors.28 Under the financing schemes, the Japanese Yen Portions I and II and the Philippine Pesos Portion were further broken down and subdivided according to the materials, equipment and services rendered on the project. The price breakdown and the corresponding materials, equipment and services were contained in a list attached as Annex III to the contract.29 A few months after execution of the NDC contract, Philphos opened for public bidding a project to construct and install two ammonia storage tanks in Isabel. Like the NDC contract, it was

Marubeni Head Office in Japan that participated in and won the bidding. Thus, on May 2, 1982, Philphos and respondent corporation entered into an agreement entitled "Turn-Key Contract for Ammonia Storage Complex Between Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation and Marubeni Corporation."30 The object of the contract was to establish and place in operating condition a modern, reliable, efficient and integrated ammonia storage complex adapted to the site for the receipt and storage of liquid anhydrous ammonia31 and for the delivery of ammonia to an integrated fertilizer plant adjacent to the storage complex and to vessels at the dock. 32 The storage complex was to consist of ammonia storage tanks, refrigeration system, ship unloading system, transfer pumps, ammonia heating system, fire-fighting system, area lighting, spare parts, and other related facilities.33 The scope of the works required for the completion of the ammonia storage complex covered the supply, including grants of licenses and transfer of technology and know-how,34 and: ". . . the design and engineering, supply and delivery, construction, erection and installation, supervision, direction and control of testing and commissioning of the Ammonia Storage Complex as set forth in Annex I of this Contract, as well as the coordination of tie-ins at boundaries and schedule of the use of a part or the whole of the Ammonia Storage Complex through the Owner with the design and construction of other facilities at and around the Site. The scope of works shall also include any activity, work and supply necessary for, incidental to or appropriate under present international industrial practice, for the timely and successful implementation of the object of this Contract, whether or not expressly referred to in the abovementioned Annex I."35 The contract price for the project was 3,255,751,000.00 and P17,406,000.00. Like the NDC contract, the price was divided into three portions. The price in Japanese currency was broken down into the Japanese Yen Portion I and Japanese Yen Portion II while the price in Philippine currency was classified as the Philippine Pesos Portion. Both Japanese Yen Portions I and II were financed by supplier's credit from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The price stated in the three portions were further broken down into the corresponding materials, equipment and services required for the project and their individual prices. Like the NDC contract, the breakdown in the Philphos contract is contained in a list attached to the latter as Annex III.36 The division of the price into Japanese Yen Portions I and II and the Philippine Pesos Portion under the two contracts corresponds to the two parts into which the contracts were classified the Foreign Offshore Portion and the Philippine Onshore Portion. In both contracts, the Japanese Yen Portion I corresponds to the Foreign Offshore Portion. 37 Japanese Yen Portion II and the Philippine Pesos Portion correspond to the Philippine Onshore Portion. 38 Under the Philippine Onshore Portion, respondent does not deny its liability for the contractor's tax on the income from the two projects. In fact respondent claims, which petitioner has not denied, that the income it derived from the Onshore Portion of the two projects had been declared for tax purposes and the taxes thereon already paid to the Philippine government.39 It is with regard to the gross receipts from the Foreign Offshore Portion of the two contracts that the liabilities involved in the assessments subject of this case arose. Petitioner argues that since the two agreements are turn-key,40 they call for the supply of both materials and services to the client, they are contracts for a piece of work and are indivisible. The situs of the two projects is in the Philippines, and the materials provided and services rendered were all done and completed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.41 Accordingly, respondent's entire receipts from the contracts, including its receipts from the Offshore Portion, constitute income from Philippine sources. The total gross receipts covering both labor and materials should be subjected to contractor's tax in accordance with the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engineering Equipment & Supply Co.42 A contractor's tax is imposed in the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as follows:

"Sec. 205. Contractors, proprietors or operators of dockyards, and others. A contractor's tax of four percent of the gross receipts is hereby imposed on proprietors or operators of the following business establishments and/or persons engaged in the business of selling or rendering the following services for a fee or compensation: (a) General engineering, general building and specialty contractors, as defined in Republic Act No. 4566; xxx xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx50

(q) Other independent contractors. The term "independent contractors" includes persons (juridical or natural) not enumerated above (but not including individuals subject to the occupation tax under the Local Tax Code) whose activity consists essentially of the sale of all kinds of services for a fee regardless of whether or not the performance of the service calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties of such contractors or their employees. It does not include regional or area headquarters established in the Philippines by multinational corporations, including their alien executives, and which headquarters do not earn or derive income from the Philippines and which act as supervisory, communications and coordinating centers for their affiliates, subsidiaries or branches in the AsiaPacific Region. xxx xxx xxx43

The subdivision of Japanese Yen Portion I covers materials and equipment while Japanese Yen Portion II and the Philippine Pesos Portion enumerate other materials and equipment and the construction and installation work on the project. In other words, the supplies for the project are listed under Portion I while labor and other supplies are listed under Portion II and the Philippine Pesos Portion. Mr. Takeshi Hojo, then General Manager of the Industrial Plant Section II of the Industrial Plant Department of Marubeni Corporation in Japan who supervised the implementation of the two projects, testified that all the machines and equipment listed under Japanese Yen Portion I in Annex III were manufactured in Japan. 51 The machines and equipment were designed, engineered and fabricated by Japanese firms sub-contracted by Marubeni from the list of sub-contractors in the technical appendices to each contract.52 Marubeni sub-contracted a majority of the equipment and supplies to Kawasaki Steel Corporation which did the design, fabrication, engineering and manufacture thereof; 53 Yashima & Co. Ltd. which manufactured the mobile equipment; Bridgestone which provided the rubber fenders of the mobile equipment;54 and B.S. Japan for the supply of radio equipment.55 The engineering and design works made by Kawasaki Steel Corporation included the lay-out of the plant facility and calculation of the design in accordance with the specifications given by respondent.56 All sub-contractors and manufacturers are Japanese corporations and are based in Japan and all engineering and design works were performed in that country.57 The materials and equipment under Portion I of the NDC Port Project is primarily composed of two (2) sets of ship unloader and loader; several boats and mobile equipment. 58 The ship unloader unloads bags or bulk products from the ship to the port while the ship loader loads products from the port to the ship. The unloader and loader are big steel structures on top of each is a large crane and a compartment for operation of the crane. Two sets of these equipment were completely manufactured in Japan according to the specifications of the project. After manufacture, they were rolled on to a barge and transported to Isabel, Leyte. 59 Upon reaching Isabel, the unloader and loader were rolled off the barge and pulled to the pier to the spot where they were installed.60 Their installation simply consisted of bolting them onto the pier.61 Like the ship unloader and loader, the three tugboats and a line boat were completely manufactured in Japan. The boats sailed to Isabel on their own power. The mobile equipment, consisting of three to four sets of tractors, cranes and dozers, trailers and forklifts, were also manufactured and completed in Japan. They were loaded on to a shipping vessel and unloaded at the Isabel Port. These pieces of equipment were all on wheels and self-propelled. Once unloaded at the port, they were ready to be driven and perform what they were designed to do.62 In addition to the foregoing, there are other items listed in Japanese Yen Portion I in Annex III to the NDC contract. These other items consist of supplies and materials for five (5) berths, two (2) roads, a causeway, a warehouse, a transit shed, an administration building and a security building. Most of the materials consist of steel sheets, steel pipes, channels and beams and other steel structures, navigational and communication as well as electrical equipment. 63 In connection with the Philphos contract, the major pieces of equipment supplied by respondent were the ammonia storage tanks and refrigeration units. 64 The steel plates for the tank were manufactured and cut in Japan according to drawings and specifications and then shipped to Isabel. Once there, respondent's employees put the steel plates together to form the storage tank. As to the refrigeration units, they were completed and assembled in Japan and thereafter shipped to Isabel. The units were simply installed there. 65 Annex III to the Philphos contract lists down under the Japanese Yen Portion I the materials for the ammonia storage tank, incidental equipment, piping facilities, electrical and instrumental apparatus, foundation material and spare parts.

Under the afore-quoted provision, an independent contractor is a person whose activity consists essentially of the sale of all kinds of services for a fee, regardless of whether or not the performance of the service calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties of such contractors or their employees. The word "contractor" refers to a person who, in the pursuit of independent business, undertakes to do a specific job or piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods without submitting himself to control as to the petty details. 44 A contractor's tax is a tax imposed upon the privilege of engaging in business. 45 It is generally in the nature of an excise tax on the exercise of a privilege of selling services or labor rather than a sale on products;46 and is directly collectible from the person exercising the privilege. 47 Being an excise tax, it can be levied by the taxing authority only when the acts, privileges or business are done or performed within the jurisdiction of said authority. 48 Like property taxes, it cannot be imposed on an occupation or privilege outside the taxing district. 49 In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent was an independent contractor under the terms of the two subject contracts. Respondent, however, argues that the work therein were not all performed in the Philippines because some of them were completed in Japan in accordance with the provisions of the contracts. An examination of Annex III to the two contracts reveals that the materials and equipment to be made and the works and services to be performed by respondent are indeed classified into two. The first part, entitled "Breakdown of Japanese Yen Portion I" provides: "Japanese Yen Portion I of the Contract Price has been subdivided according to discrete portions of materials and equipment which will be shipped to Leyte as units and lots. This subdivision of price is to be used by owner to verify invoice for Progress Payments under Article 19.2.1 of the Contract. The agreed subdivision of Japanese Yen Portion I is as follows:

All the materials and equipment transported to the Philippines were inspected and tested in Japan prior to shipment in accordance with the terms of the contracts. 66 The inspection was made by representatives of respondent corporation, of NDC and Philphos. NDC, in fact, contracted the services of a private consultancy firm to verify the correctness of the tests on the machines and equipment67 while Philphos sent a representative to Japan to inspect the storage equipment.68 The sub-contractors of the materials and equipment under Japanese Yen Portion I were all paid by respondent in Japan. In his deposition upon oral examination, Kenjiro Yamakawa, formerly the Assistant General Manager and Manager of the Steel Plant Marketing Department, Engineering & Construction Division, Kawasaki Steel Corporation, testified that the equipment and supplies for the two projects provided by Kawasaki under Japanese Yen Portion I were paid by Marubeni in Japan. Receipts for such payments were duly issued by Kawasaki in Japanese and English.69 Yashima & Co. Ltd. and B.S. Japan were likewise paid by Marubeni in Japan. 70 Between Marubeni and the two Philippine corporations, payments for all materials and equipment under Japanese Yen Portion I were made to Marubeni by NDC and Philphos also in Japan. The NDC, through the Philippine National Bank, established letters of credit in favor of respondent through the Bank of Tokyo. The letters of credit were financed by letters of commitment issued by the OECF with the Bank of Tokyo. The Bank of Tokyo, upon respondent's submission of pertinent documents, released the amount in the letters of credit in favor of respondent and credited the amount therein to respondent's account within the same bank.71 Clearly, the service of "design and engineering, supply and delivery, construction, erection and installation, supervision, direction and control of testing and commissioning, coordination. . . "72 of the two projects involved two taxing jurisdictions. These acts occurred in two countries Japan and the Philippines. While the construction and installation work were completed within the Philippines, the evidence is clear that some pieces of equipment and supplies were completely designed and engineered in Japan. The two sets of ship unloader and loader, the boats and mobile equipment for the NDC project and the ammonia storage tanks and refrigeration units were made and completed in Japan. They were already finished products when shipped to the Philippines. The other construction supplies listed under the Offshore Portion such as the steel sheets, pipes and structures, electrical and instrumental apparatus, these were not finished products when shipped to the Philippines. They, however, were likewise fabricated and manufactured by the sub-contractors in Japan. All services for the design, fabrication, engineering and manufacture of the materials and equipment under Japanese Yen Portion I were made and completed in Japan. These services were rendered outside the taxing jurisdiction of the Philippines and are therefore not subject to contractor's tax. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engineering Equipment & Supply Co73 is not in point. In that case, the Court found that Engineering Equipment, although an independent contractor, was not engaged in the manufacture of air conditioning units in the Philippines. Engineering Equipment designed, supplied and installed centralized air-conditioning systems for clients who contracted its services. Engineering, however, did not manufacture all the materials for the air-conditioning system. It imported some items for the system it designed and installed.74 The issues in that case dealt with services performed within the local taxing jurisdiction. There was no foreign element involved in the supply of materials and services. With the foregoing discussion, it is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by the parties. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 42518 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 153793 August 29, 2006 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. JULIANE BAIER-NICKEL, as represented by Marina Q. Guzman (Attorneyin-fact) Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appeals from the January 18, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59794, which granted the tax refund of respondent Juliane Baier-Nickel and reversed the June 28, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in C.T.A. Case No. 5633. Petitioner also assails the May 8, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals denying its motion for reconsideration. The facts show that respondent Juliane Baier-Nickel, a non-resident German citizen, is the President of JUBANITEX, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in "[m]anufacturing, marketing on wholesale only, buying or otherwise acquiring, holding, importing and exporting, selling and disposing embroidered textile products."4Through JUBANITEXs General Manager, Marina Q. Guzman, the corporation appointed and engaged the services of respondent as commission agent. It was agreed that respondent will receive 10% sales commission on all sales actually concluded and collected through her efforts.5 In 1995, respondent received the amount of P1,707,772.64, representing her sales commission income from which JUBANITEX withheld the corresponding 10% withholding tax amounting to P170,777.26, and remitted the same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). On October 17, 1997, respondent filed her 1995 income tax return reporting a taxable income of P1,707,772.64 and a tax due of P170,777.26.6 On April 14, 1998, respondent filed a claim to refund the amount of P170,777.26 alleged to have been mistakenly withheld and remitted by JUBANITEX to the BIR. Respondent contended that her sales commission income is not taxable in the Philippines because the same was a compensation for her services rendered in Germany and therefore considered as income from sources outside the Philippines. The next day, April 15, 1998, she filed a petition for review with the CTA contending that no action was taken by the BIR on her claim for refund. 7 On June 28, 2000, the CTA rendered a decision denying her claim. It held that the commissions received by respondent were actually her remuneration in the performance of her duties as President of JUBANITEX and not as a mere sales agent thereof. The income derived by respondent is therefore an income taxable in the Philippines because JUBANITEX is a domestic corporation. On petition with the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the Decision of the CTA, holding that respondent received the commissions as sales agent of JUBANITEX and not as President thereof. And since the "source" of income means the activity or service that produce the income, the sales commission received by respondent is not taxable in the Philippines because it arose from the marketing activities performed by respondent in Germany. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision, reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated June 28, 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the

respondent court is hereby directed to grant petitioner a tax refund in the amount of Php 170,777.26. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.9 Hence, the instant recourse. Petitioner maintains that the income earned by respondent is taxable in the Philippines because the source thereof is JUBANITEX, a domestic corporation located in the City of Makati. It thus implied that source of income means the physical source where the income came from. It further argued that since respondent is the President of JUBANITEX, any remuneration she received from said corporation should be construed as payment of her overall managerial services to the company and should not be interpreted as a compensation for a distinct and separate service as a sales commission agent. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the income she received was payment for her marketing services. She contended that income of nonresident aliens like her is subject to tax only if the source of the income is within the Philippines. Source, according to respondent is the situs of the activity which produced the income. And since the source of her income were her marketing activities in Germany, the income she derived from said activities is not subject to Philippine income taxation. The issue here is whether respondents sales commission income is taxable in the Philippines. Pertinent portion of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), states: SEC. 25. Tax on Nonresident Alien Individual. (A) Nonresident Alien Engaged in Trade or Business Within the Philippines. (1) In General. A nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or business in the Philippines shall be subject to an income tax in the same manner as an individual citizen and a resident alien individual, on taxable income received from all sources within the Philippines. A nonresident alien individual who shall come to the Philippines and stay therein for an aggregate period of more than one hundred eighty (180) days during any calendar year shall be deemed a nonresident alien doing business in the Philippines, Section 22(G) of this Code notwithstanding. xxxx (B) Nonresident Alien Individual Not Engaged in Trade or Business Within the Philippines. There shall be levied, collected and paid for each taxable year upon the entire income received from all sources within the Philippines by every nonresident alien individual not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines x x x a tax equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of such income. x x x Pursuant to the foregoing provisions of the NIRC, non-resident aliens, whether or not engaged in trade or business, are subject to Philippine income taxation on their income received from all sources within the Philippines. Thus, the keyword in determining the taxability of non-resident aliens is the incomes "source." In construing the meaning of "source" in Section 25 of the NIRC, resort must be had on the origin of the provision. The first Philippine income tax law enacted by the Philippine Legislature was Act No. 2833,10 which took effect on January 1, 1920.11 Under Section 1 thereof, nonresident aliens are likewise subject to tax on income "from all sources within the Philippine Islands," thus

SECTION 1. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the Philippine Islands, a tax of two per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources within the Philippine Islands by every individual, a nonresident alien, including interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise. Act No. 2833 substantially reproduced the United States (U.S.) Revenue Law of 1916 as amended by U.S. Revenue Law of 1917.12 Being a law of American origin, the authoritative decisions of the official charged with enforcing it in the U.S. have peculiar persuasive force in the Philippines.13 The Internal Revenue Code of the U.S. enumerates specific types of income to be treated as from sources within the U.S. and specifies when similar types of income are to be treated as from sources outside the U.S.14 Under the said Code, compensation for labor and personal services performed in the U.S., is generally treated as income from U.S. sources; while compensation for said services performed outside the U.S., is treated as income from sources outside the U.S.15 A similar provision is found in Section 42 of our NIRC, thus: SEC. 42. x x x (A) Gross Income From Sources Within the Philippines. x x x xxxx (3) Services. Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the Philippines; xxxx (C) Gross Income From Sources Without the Philippines. x x x xxxx (3) Compensation for labor or personal services performed without the Philippines; The following discussions on sourcing of income under the Internal Revenue Code of the U.S., are instructive: The Supreme Court has said, in a definition much quoted but often debated, that income may be derived from three possible sources only: (1) capital and/or (2) labor; and/or (3) the sale of capital assets. While the three elements of this attempt at definition need not be accepted as all-inclusive, they serve as useful guides in any inquiry into whether a particular item is from "sources within the United States" and suggest an investigation into the nature and location of the activities or property which produce the income. If the income is from labor the place where the labor is done should be decisive; if it is done in this country, the income should be from "sources within the United States." If the income is from capital, the place where the capital is employed should be decisive; if it is employed in this country, the income should be from "sources within the United States." If the income is from the sale of capital assets, the place where the sale is made should be likewise decisive. Much confusion will be avoided by regarding the term "source" in this fundamental light. It is not a place, it is an activity or property. As such, it has a situs or location, and if that situs or location is within the United States the resulting income is taxable to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.

The intention of Congress in the 1916 and subsequent statutes was to discard the 1909 and 1913 basis of taxing nonresident aliens and foreign corporations and to make the test of taxability the "source," or situs of the activities or property which produce the income. The result is that, on the one hand, nonresident aliens and nonresident foreign corporations are prevented from deriving income from the United States free from tax, and, on the other hand, there is no undue imposition of a tax when the activities do not take place in, and the property producing income is not employed in, this country. Thus, if income is to be taxed, the recipient thereof must be resident within the jurisdiction, or the property or activities out of which the income issues or is derived must be situated within the jurisdiction so that the source of the income may be said to have a situs in this country. The underlying theory is that the consideration for taxation is protection of life and property and that the income rightly to be levied upon to defray the burdens of the United States Government is that income which is created by activities and property protected by this Government or obtained by persons enjoying that protection. 16 The important factor therefore which determines the source of income of personal services is not the residence of the payor, or the place where the contract for service is entered into, or the place of payment, but the place where the services were actually rendered.17 In Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue,18 the Court addressed the issue on the applicable source rule relating to reinsurance premiums paid by a local insurance company to a foreign insurance company in respect of risks located in the Philippines. It was held therein that the undertaking of the foreign insurance company to indemnify the local insurance company is the activity that produced the income. Since the activity took place in the Philippines, the income derived therefrom is taxable in our jurisdiction. Citing Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, the Court emphasized that the technical meaning of source of income is the property, activity or service that produced the same. Thus: The source of an income is the property, activity or service that produced the income. The reinsurance premiums remitted to appellants by virtue of the reinsurance contracts, accordingly, had for their source the undertaking to indemnify Commonwealth Insurance Co. against liability. Said undertaking is the activity that produced the reinsurance premiums, and the same took place in the Philippines. x x x the reinsured, the liabilities insured and the risk originally underwritten by Commonwealth Insurance Co., upon which the reinsurance premiums and indemnity were based, were all situated in the Philippines. x x x19 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC),20 the issue was whether BOAC, a foreign airline company which does not maintain any flight to and from the Philippines is liable for Philippine income taxation in respect of sales of air tickets in the Philippines, through a general sales agent relating to the carriage of passengers and cargo between two points both outside the Philippines. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court applied the case of Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, and reiterated the rule that the source of income is that "activity" which produced the income. It was held that the "sale of tickets" in the Philippines is the

"activity" that produced the income and therefore BOAC should pay income tax in the Philippines because it undertook an income producing activity in the country. Both the petitioner and respondent cited the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. British Overseas Airways Corporation in support of their arguments, but the correct interpretation of the said case favors the theory of respondent that it is the situs of the activity that determines whether such income is taxable in the Philippines. The conflict between the majority and the dissenting opinion in the said case has nothing to do with the underlying principle of the law on sourcing of income. In fact, both applied the case of Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue. The divergence in opinion centered on whether the sale of tickets in the Philippines is to be construed as the "activity" that produced the income, as viewed by the majority, or merely the physical source of the income, as ratiocinated by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent. The majority, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, as ponente, interpreted the sale of tickets as a business activity that gave rise to the income of BOAC. Petitioner cannot therefore invoke said case to support its view that source of income is the physical source of the money earned. If such was the interpretation of the majority, the Court would have simply stated that source of income is not the business activity of BOAC but the place where the person or entity disbursing the income is located or where BOAC physically received the same. But such was not the import of the ruling of the Court. It even explained in detail the business activity undertaken by BOAC in the Philippines to pinpoint the taxable activity and to justify its conclusion that BOAC is subject to Philippine income taxation. Thus BOAC, during the periods covered by the subject assessments, maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines. That general sales agent, from 1959 to 1971, "was engaged in (1) selling and issuing tickets; (2) breaking down the whole trip into series of trips each trip in the series corresponding to a different airline company; (3) receiving the fare from the whole trip; and (4) consequently allocating to the various airline companies on the basis of their participation in the services rendered through the mode of interline settlement as prescribed by Article VI of the Resolution No. 850 of the IATA Agreement." Those activities were in exercise of the functions which are normally incident to, and are in progressive pursuit of, the purpose and object of its organization as an international air carrier. In fact, the regular sale of tickets, its main activity, is the very lifeblood of the airline business, the generation of sales being the paramount objective. There should be no doubt then that BOAC was "engaged in" business in the Philippines through a local agent during the period covered by the assessments. x x x21 xxxx The source of an income is the property, activity or service that produced the income. For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived from activity within the Philippines. In BOAC's case, the sale of tickets in the Philippines is the activity that produces the income. The tickets exchanged hands here and payments for fares were also made here in Philippine currency. The situs of the source of payments is the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded from, and occurred within, Philippine territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the Philippine

government. In consideration of such protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of supporting the government. A transportation ticket is not a mere piece of paper. When issued by a common carrier, it constitutes the contract between the ticket-holder and the carrier. It gives rise to the obligation of the purchaser of the ticket to pay the fare and the corresponding obligation of the carrier to transport the passenger upon the terms and conditions set forth thereon. The ordinary ticket issued to members of the traveling public in general embraces within its terms all the elements to constitute it a valid contract, binding upon the parties entering into the relationship.22 The Court reiterates the rule that "source of income" relates to the property, activity or service that produced the income. With respect to rendition of labor or personal service, as in the instant case, it is the place where the labor or service was performed that determines the source of the income. There is therefore no merit in petitioners interpretation which equates source of income in labor or personal service with the residence of the payor or the place of payment of the income. Having disposed of the doctrine applicable in this case, we will now determine whether respondent was able to establish the factual circumstances showing that her income is exempt from Philippine income taxation. The decisive factual consideration here is not the capacity in which respondent received the income, but the sufficiency of evidence to prove that the services she rendered were performed in Germany. Though not raised as an issue, the Court is clothed with authority to address the same because the resolution thereof will settle the vital question posed in this controversy.23 The settled rule is that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be construed strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer.24 To those therefore, who claim a refund rest the burden of proving that the transaction subjected to tax is actually exempt from taxation. In the instant case, the appointment letter of respondent as agent of JUBANITEX stipulated that the activity or the service which would entitle her to 10% commission income, are "sales actually concluded and collected through [her] efforts."25 What she presented as evidence to prove that she performed income producing activities abroad, were copies of documents she allegedly faxed to JUBANITEX and bearing instructions as to the sizes of, or designs and fabrics to be used in the finished products as well as samples of sales orders purportedly relayed to her by clients. However, these documents do not show whether the instructions or orders faxed ripened into concluded or collected sales in Germany. At the very least, these pieces of evidence show that while respondent was in Germany, she sent instructions/orders to JUBANITEX. As to whether these instructions/orders gave rise to consummated sales and whether these sales were truly concluded in Germany, respondent presented no such evidence. Neither did she establish reasonable connection between the orders/instructions faxed and the reported monthly sales purported to have transpired in Germany. The paucity of respondents evidence was even noted by Atty. Minerva Pacheco, petitioners counsel at the hearing before the Court of Tax Appeals. She pointed out that respondent presented no contracts or orders signed by the customers in Germany to prove the sale transactions therein.26 Likewise, in her Comment to the Formal Offer of respondents evidence, she objected to the admission of the faxed documents bearing instruction/orders marked as Exhibits "R," 27 "V," "W",

and "X,"28 for being self serving.29 The concern raised by petitioners counsel as to the absence of substantial evidence that would constitute proof that the sale transactions for which respondent was paid commission actually transpired outside the Philippines, is relevant because respondent stayed in the Philippines for 89 days in 1995. Except for the months of July and September 1995, respondent was in the Philippines in the months of March, May, June, and August 1995,30 the same months when she earned commission income for services allegedly performed abroad. Furthermore, respondent presented no evidence to prove that JUBANITEX does not sell embroidered products in the Philippines and that her appointment as commission agent is exclusively for Germany and other European markets. In sum, we find that the faxed documents presented by respondent did not constitute substantial evidence, or that relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion31 that it was in Germany where she performed the income producing service which gave rise to the reported monthly sales in the months of March and May to September of 1995. She thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that her income was from sources outside the Philippines and exempt from the application of our income tax law. Hence, the claim for tax refund should be denied. The Court notes that in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Baier-Nickel,32 a previous case for refund of income withheld from respondents remunerations for services rendered abroad, the Court in a Minute Resolution dated February 17, 2003,33 sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent is entitled to refund the sum withheld from her sales commission income for the year 1994. This ruling has no bearing in the instant controversy because the subject matter thereof is the income of respondent for the year 1994 while, the instant case deals with her income in 1995. Otherwise, stated, res judicata has no application here. Its elements are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court that rendered the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 34 The instant case, however, did not satisfy the fourth requisite because there is no identity as to the subject matter of the previous and present case of respondent which deals with income earned and activities performed for different taxable years. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the January 18, 2002 Decision and May 8, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59794, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The June 28, 2000 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5633, which denied respondents claim for refund of income tax paid for the year 1995 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 179045-46 August 25, 2010 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. SMART COMMUNICATION, INC., Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The right of a withholding agent to claim a refund of erroneously or illegally withheld taxes comes with the responsibility to return the same to the principal taxpayer. This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated June 28, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc. Factual Antecedents Respondent Smart Communications, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine law. It is an enterprise duly registered with the Board of Investments. On May 25, 2001, respondent entered into three Agreements for Programming and Consultancy Services3 with Prism Transactive (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Prism), a non-resident corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Malaysia. Under the agreements, Prism was to provide programming and consultancy services for the installation of the Service Download Manager (SDM) and the Channel Manager (CM), and for the installation and implementation of Smart Money and Mobile Banking Service SIM Applications (SIM Applications) and Private Text Platform (SIM Application). On June 25, 2001, Prism billed respondent in the amount of US$547,822.45, broken down as follows: SDM Agreement CM Agreement SIM Application Agreement Total US$236,000.0 0 296,000.00 15,822.45 US$547,822.45
4

Ruling of the CTA Second Division In a Decision19 dated February 23, 2006, the Second Division of the CTA upheld respondents right, as a withholding agent, to file the claim for refund citing the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wander Philippines, Inc.,20 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation21 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Court of Tax Appeals.22 However, as to the claim for refund, the Second Division found respondent entitled only to a partial refund. Although it agreed with respondent that the payments for the CM and SIM Application Agreements are "business profits,"23 and therefore, not subject to tax24 under the RPMalaysia Tax Treaty, the Second Division found the payment for the SDM Agreement a royalty subject to withholding tax.25 Accordingly, respondent was granted refund in the amount of P3,989,456.43, computed as follows:26 Particulars 1. CM 2. SIM Application Total Particulars Tax Base Multiply by: Withholding Tax Rate Final Withholding Tax Multiply by: Prevailing Exchange Rate Tax Refund Due Amount (in US$) 296,000.00 15,822.45 US$311,822.45 Amount US$311,822.45 25% US$ 77,955.61 51.176 P3,989,456.43

Thinking that these payments constitute royalties, respondent withheld the amount of US$136,955.61 orP7,008,840.43,5 representing the 25% royalty tax under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty.6 On September 25, 2001, respondent filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final Income Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No. 1601-F)7 for the month of August 2001. On September 24, 2003, or within the two-year period to claim a refund, respondent filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), through the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD), an administrative claim for refund8 of the amount of P7,008,840.43. Proceedings before the CTA Second Division Due to the failure of the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to act on the claim for refund, respondent filed a Petition for Review9 with the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 6782 which was raffled to its Second Division. In its Petition for Review, respondent claimed that it is entitled to a refund because the payments made to Prism are not royalties10 but "business profits,"11 pursuant to the definition of royalties under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty,12 and in view of the pertinent Commentaries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Committee on Fiscal Affairs through the Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterization of Electronic Commerce Payments.13 Respondent further averred that since under Article 7 of the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty, "business profits" are taxable in the Philippines "only if attributable to a permanent establishment in the Philippines, the payments made to Prism, a Malaysian company with no permanent establishment in the Philippines,"14 should not be taxed.15 On December 1, 2003, petitioner filed his Answer16 arguing that respondent, as withholding agent, is not a party-in-interest to file the claim for refund,17 and that assuming for the sake of argument that it is the proper party, there is no showing that the payments made to Prism constitute "business profits."18

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CTA Second Division reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is partially GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ORDERED to REFUND or ISSUE a TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE to petitioner Smart Communications, Inc. in the amount of P3,989,456.43, representing overpaid final withholding taxes for the month of August 2001. SO ORDERED.27 Both parties moved for partial reconsideration28 but the CTA Second Division denied the motions in a Resolution29 dated July 18, 2006. Ruling of the CTA En Banc Unsatisfied, both parties appealed to the CTA En Banc by filing their respective Petitions for Review,30 which were consolidated per Resolution31 dated February 8, 2007. On June 28, 2007, the CTA En Banc rendered a Decision affirming the partial refund granted to respondent. In sustaining respondents right to file the claim for refund, the CTA En Banc said that although respondent "and Prism are unrelated entities, such circumstance does not affect the status of [respondent] as a party-in-interest [as its legal interest] is based on its direct and independent liability under the withholding tax system." 32 The CTA En Banc also concurred with the Second Divisions characterization of the payments made to Prism, specifically that the payments for the CM and SIM Application Agreements constitute "business profits," 33 while the payment for the SDM Agreement is a royalty.34 The dispositive portion of the CTA En Banc Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.35 Only petitioner sought reconsideration36 of the Decision. The CTA En Banc, however, found no cogent reason to reverse its Decision, and thus, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution37 dated July 31, 2007.

Unfazed, petitioner availed of the present recourse. Issues The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether respondent has the right to file the claim for refund; and (2) if respondent has the right, whether the payments made to Prism constitute "business profits" or royalties. Petitioners Arguments Petitioner contends that the cases relied upon by the CTA in upholding respondents right to claim the refund are inapplicable since the withholding agents therein are wholly owned subsidiaries of the principal taxpayers, unlike in the instant case where the withholding agent and the taxpayer are unrelated entities. Petitioner further claims that since respondent did not file the claim on behalf of Prism, it has no legal standing to claim the refund. To rule otherwise would result to the unjust enrichment of respondent, who never shelled-out any amount to pay the royalty taxes. Petitioner, thus, posits that the real party-in-interest to file a claim for refund of the erroneously withheld taxes is Prism. He cites as basis the case of Silkair (Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,38 where it was ruled that the proper party to file a refund is the statutory taxpayer.39 Finally, assuming that respondent is the proper party, petitioner counters that it is still not entitled to any refund because the payments made to Prism are taxable as royalties, having been made in consideration for the use of the programs owned by Prism. Respondents Arguments Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that it is the proper party to file a claim for refund as it has the statutory and primary responsibility and liability to withhold and remit the taxes to the BIR. It points out that under the withholding tax system, the agent-payor becomes a payee by fiction of law because the law makes the agent personally liable for the tax arising from the breach of its duty to withhold. Thus, the fact that respondent is not in any way related to Prism is immaterial. Moreover, respondent asserts that the payments made to Prism do not fall under the definition of royalties since the agreements are for programming and consultancy services only, wherein Prism undertakes to perform services for the creation, development or the bringing into existence of software applications solely for the satisfaction of the peculiar needs and requirements of respondent. Our Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. Withholding agent may file a claim for refund Sections 204(c) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provide: Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit Taxes. The Commissioner may xxxx (C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund. xxxx Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim

therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing, the person entitled to claim a tax refund is the taxpayer. However, in case the taxpayer does not file a claim for refund, the withholding agent may file the claim. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation,40 a withholding agent was considered a proper party to file a claim for refund of the withheld taxes of its foreign parent company. Pertinent portions of the Decision read: The term "taxpayer" is defined in our NIRC as referring to "any person subject to tax imposed by the Title [on Tax on Income]." It thus becomes important to note that under Section 53(c) 41 of the NIRC, the withholding agent who is "required to deduct and withhold any tax" is made "personally liable for such tax" and indeed is indemnified against any claims and demands which the stockholder might wish to make in questioning the amount of payments effected by the withholding agent in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC. The withholding agent, P&GPhil., is directly and independently liable for the correct amount of the tax that should be withheld from the dividend remittances. The withholding agent is, moreover, subject to and liable for deficiency assessments, surcharges and penalties should the amount of the tax withheld be finally found to be less than the amount that should have been withheld under law. A "person liable for tax" has been held to be a "person subject to tax" and properly considered a "taxpayer." The terms "liable for tax" and "subject to tax" both connote legal obligation or duty to pay a tax. It is very difficult, indeed conceptually impossible, to consider a person who is statutorily made "liable for tax" as not "subject to tax." By any reasonable standard, such a person should be regarded as a party in interest, or as a person having sufficient legal interest, to bring a suit for refund of taxes he believes were illegally collected from him. In Philippine Guaranty Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court pointed out that a withholding agent is in fact the agent both of the government and of the taxpayer, and that the withholding agent is not an ordinary government agent: "The law sets no condition for the personal liability of the withholding agent to attach. The reason is to compel the withholding agent to withhold the tax under all circumstances. In effect, the responsibility for the collection of the tax as well as the payment thereof is concentrated upon the person over whom the Government has jurisdiction. Thus, the withholding agent is constituted the agent of both the Government and the taxpayer. With respect to the collection and/or withholding of the tax, he is the Governments agent. In regard to the filing of the necessary income tax return and the payment of the tax to the Government, he is the agent of the taxpayer. The withholding agent, therefore, is no ordinary government agent especially because under Section 53 (c) he is held personally liable for the tax he is duty bound to withhold; whereas the Commissioner and his deputies are not made liable by law." If, as pointed out in Philippine Guaranty, the withholding agent is also an agent of the beneficial owner of the dividends with respect to the filing of the necessary income tax return and with respect to actual payment of the tax to the government, such authority may reasonably be held to include the authority to file a claim for refund and to bring an action for recovery of such claim. This implied authority is especially warranted where, as in the instant case, the withholding agent is the wholly owned subsidiary of the parent-stockholder and therefore, at all times, under the effective control of such parent-stockholder. In the circumstances of this case, it seems particularly unreal to deny the implied authority of P&G-Phil. to claim a refund and to commence an action for such refund. xxxx We believe and so hold that, under the circumstances of this case, P&G-Phil. is properly regarded as a "taxpayer" within the meaning of Section 309, 42 NIRC, and as impliedly authorized to file the claim for refund and the suit to recover such claim. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner, however, submits that this ruling applies only when the withholding agent and the taxpayer are related parties, i.e., where the withholding agent is a wholly owned subsidiary of the taxpayer. We do not agree. Although such relation between the taxpayer and the withholding agent is a factor that increases the latters legal interest to file a claim for refund, there is nothing in the decision to suggest that such relationship is required or that the lack of such relation deprives the withholding agent of the right to file a claim for refund. Rather, what is clear in the decision is that a withholding agent has a legal right to file a claim for refund for two reasons. First, he is considered a "taxpayer"

under the NIRC as he is personally liable for the withholding tax as well as for deficiency assessments, surcharges, and penalties, should the amount of the tax withheld be finally found to be less than the amount that should have been withheld under law. Second, as an agent of the taxpayer, his authority to file the necessary income tax return and to remit the tax withheld to the government impliedly includes the authority to file a claim for refund and to bring an action for recovery of such claim. In this connection, it is however significant to add that while the withholding agent has the right to recover the taxes erroneously or illegally collected, he nevertheless has the obligation to remit the same to the principal taxpayer. As an agent of the taxpayer, it is his duty to return what he has recovered; otherwise, he would be unjustly enriching himself at the expense of the principal taxpayer from whom the taxes were withheld, and from whom he derives his legal right to file a claim for refund. As to Silkair (Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue43 cited by the petitioner, we find the same inapplicable as it involves excise taxes, not withholding taxes. In that case, it was ruled that the proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax "is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another." In view of the foregoing, we find no error on the part of the CTA in upholding respondents right as a withholding agent to file a claim for refund. The payments for the CM and the SIM Application Agreements constitute "business profits" Under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty, the term royalties is defined as payments of any kind received as consideration for: "(i) the use of, or the right to use, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience; (ii) the use of, or the right to use, cinematograph films, or tapes for radio or television broadcasting."44 These are taxed at the rate of 25% of the gross amount.45 Under the same Treaty, the "business profits" of an enterprise of a Contracting State is taxable only in that State, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment.46The term "permanent establishment" is defined as a fixed place of business where the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. 47 However, even if there is no fixed place of business, an enterprise of a Contracting State is deemed to have a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State if it carries on supervisory activities in that other State for more than six months in connection with a construction, installation or assembly project which is being undertaken in that other State.48 In the instant case, it was established during the trial that Prism does not have a permanent establishment in the Philippines. Hence, "business profits" derived from Prisms dealings with respondent are not taxable. The question is whether the payments made to Prism under the SDM, CM, and SIM Application agreements are "business profits" and not royalties. Paragraph 1.3 of the Programming Services (Schedule A) of the SDM Agreement, 49 reads: 1.3 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) The SDM shall be installed by PRISM, including the SDM Libraries, the IPR of which shall be retained by PRISM. PRISM, however, shall provide the Client the APIs for the SDM at no cost to the Client. The Client shall be permitted to develop programs to interface with the SDM or the SDM Libraries, using the related APIs as appropriate.50 (Emphasis supplied.) Whereas, paragraph 1.4 of the Programming Services (Schedule A) of the CM Agreement and paragraph 1.3 of the Programming Services (Schedule A) of the SIM Agreement provide: 1.4 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) The IPR of all components of the CM belong to the Client with the exception of the following components, which are provided, without technical or commercial restraints or obligations: ConfigurationException.java DataStructures (DblLinkedListjava, DbIListNodejava, List EmptyException.java, ListFullException.java, ListNodeNotFoundException.java, QueueEmptyException.java, QueueFullException.java, QueueList.java, QueuListEx.java, and QueueNodeNotFoundException.java) FieldMappedObjeet.java LogFileEx.java

Logging (BaseLogger.java and Logger.java) PrismGeneric Exception.java PrismGenericObject.java ProtocolBuilders/CIMD2 (Alive.java, BaseMessageData. java, DeliverMessage.java, Login.java, Logout.java, Nack.java, SubmitMessage.java, TemplateManagement (FileTemplateDataBag.java, Template DataBag.java, TemplateManagerExBag.java, and TemplateParserExBag.java) TemplateManager.class TemplateServer.class TemplateServer$RequestThread.class Template Server_skel.class TemplateServer_stub.class TemplateService.class Prism Crypto Server module for PHP451 xxxx 1.3 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) The Client shall own the IPR for the Specifications and the Source Code for the SIM Applications. PRISM shall develop an executable compiled code (the "Executable Version") of the SIM Applications for use on the aSIMetric card which, however, shall only be for the Clients use. The Executable Version may not be provided by PRISM to any third [party] without the prior written consent of the Client. It is further recognized that the Client anticipates licensing the use of the SIM Applications, but it is agreed that no license fee will be charged to PRISM or to a licensee of the aSIMetrix card from PRISM when SIMs are supplied to the Client. 52 (Emphases supplied.) The provisions in the agreements are clear. Prism has intellectual property right over the SDM program, but not over the CM and SIM Application programs as the proprietary rights of these programs belong to respondent. In other words, out of the payments made to Prism, only the payment for the SDM program is a royalty subject to a 25% withholding tax. A refund of the erroneously withheld royalty taxes for the payments pertaining to the CM and SIM Application Agreements is therefore in order. Indeed, the government has no right to retain what does not belong to it. 1wphi1 "No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another."53 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is herebyordered to issue a Tax Credit Certificate to Prism Transactive (M) Sdn. Bhd. in the amount of P3,989,456.43 representing the overpaid final withholding taxes for the month of August 2001. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163653 July 19, 2011 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 167689 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION PEREZ, J.: Assailed in these twin petitions for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in the following cases: (a) Decision dated 16 December 2003 of the then Special Fifth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72992;1 and, (b) Decision dated 26 January 2005 of the then Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510.2 The Facts The owner of 80% of the outstanding shares of respondent Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI), respondent Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC) is a holding company which also owned 67.42% of the outstanding shares of Filinvest Land, Inc. (FLI). On 29 November 1996, FDC and FAI entered into a Deed of Exchange with FLI whereby the former both transferred in favor of the latter parcels of land appraised at P4,306,777,000.00. In exchange for said parcels which were intended to facilitate development of medium-rise residential and commercial buildings, 463,094,301 shares of stock of FLI were issued to FDC and FAI.3 As a result of the exchange, FLIs ownership structure was changed to the extent reflected in the following tabular prcis, viz.: Number and Percentage of Shares Held Prior to the Exchange 2,537,358,000 0 1,226,177,000 3,763,535,000 67.42% 0 32.58% 100% Number of Additional Shares Issued 42,217,000 420,877,000 0 463,094,301 Number and Percentage of Shares Held After the Exchange 2,579,575,000 420,877,000 1,226,177,000 4,226,629,000 61.03% 9.96% 29.01% (100%)

Stockholder

FDC FAI OTHERS

On 13 January 1997, FLI requested a ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to the effect that no gain or loss should be recognized in the aforesaid transfer of real properties. Acting on the request, the BIR issued Ruling No. S-34-046-97 dated 3 February 1997, finding that the exchange is among those contemplated under Section 34 (c) (2) of the old National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) 4 which provides that "(n)o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by a person in exchange for a stock in such corporation of which as a result of such exchange said person, alone or together with others, not exceeding four (4) persons, gains control of said corporation."5 With the BIRs reiteration of the foregoing ruling upon the 10 February 1997 request for clarification filed by FLI, 6 the latter, together with FDC and FAI, complied with all the requirements imposed in the ruling. 7 On various dates during the years 1996 and 1997, in the meantime, FDC also extended advances in favor of its affiliates, namely, FAI, FLI, Davao Sugar Central Corporation (DSCC) and Filinvest Capital, Inc. (FCI).8 Duly evidenced by instructional letters as well as cash and journal vouchers, said cash advances amounted toP2,557,213,942.60 in

19969 and P3,360,889,677.48 in 1997.10 On 15 November 1996, FDC also entered into a Shareholders Agreement with Reco Herrera PTE Ltd. (RHPL) for the formation of a Singapore-based joint venture company called Filinvest Asia Corporation (FAC), tasked to develop and manage FDCs 50% ownership of its PBCom Office Tower Project (the Project). With their equity participation in FAC respectively pegged at 60% and 40% in the Shareholders Agreement, FDC subscribed to P500.7 million worth of shares in said joint venture company to RHPLs subscription worth P433.8 million. Having paid its subscription by executing a Deed of Assignment transferring to FAC a portion of its rights and interest in the Project worth P500.7 million, FDC eventually reported a net loss of P190,695,061.00 in its Annual Income Tax Return for the taxable year 1996. 11 On 3 January 2000, FDC received from the BIR a Formal Notice of Demand to pay deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes, plus interests and compromise penalties,12 covered by the following Assessment Notices, viz.: (a) Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-96-00018-2000 for deficiency income taxes in the sum ofP150,074,066.27 for 1996; (b) Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 for deficiency documentary stamp taxes in the sum of P10,425,487.06 for 1996; (c) Assessment Notice No. SP-INC97-00019-2000 for deficiency income taxes in the sum of P5,716,927.03 for 1997; and (d) Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-97-00021-2000 for deficiency documentary stamp taxes in the sum of P5,796,699.40 for 1997.13 The foregoing deficiency taxes were assessed on the taxable gain supposedly realized by FDC from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FAI and FLI, on the dilution resulting from the Shareholders Agreement FDC executed with RHPL as well as the "arms -length" interest rate and documentary stamp taxes imposable on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates.14 On 3 January 2000, FAI similarly received from the BIR a Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income taxes in the sum of P1,477,494,638.23 for the year 1997.15 Covered by Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-0027-2000,16said deficiency tax was also assessed on the taxable gain purportedly realized by FAI from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FDC and FLI.17 On 26 January 2000 or within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days from notice of the assessment, both FDC and FAI filed their respective requests for reconsideration/protest, on the ground that the deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed by the BIR were bereft of factual and legal basis. 18 Having submitted the relevant supporting documents pursuant to the 31 January 2000 directive from the BIR Appellate Division, FDC and FAI filed on 11 September 2000 a letter requesting an early resolution of their request for reconsideration/protest on the ground that the 180 days prescribed for the resolution thereof under Section 228 of the NIRC was going to expire on 20 September 2000.19 In view of the failure of petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to resolve their request for reconsideration/protest within the aforesaid period, FDC and FAI filed on 17 October 2000 a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) pursuant to Section 228 of the 1997 NIRC. Docketed before said court as CTA Case No. 6182, the petition alleged, among other matters, that as previously opined in BIR Ruling No. S-34046-97, no taxable gain should have been assessed from the subject Deed of Exchange since FDC and FAI collectively gained further control of FLI as a consequence of the exchange; that correlative to the CIR's lack of authority to impute theoretical interests on the cash advances FDC extended in favor of its affiliates, the rule is settled that interests cannot be demanded in the absence of a stipulation to the effect; that not being promissory notes or certificates of obligations, the instructional letters as well as the cash and journal vouchers evidencing said cash advances were not subject to documentary stamp taxes; and, that no income tax may be imposed on the prospective gain from the supposed appreciation of FDC's shareholdings in FAC. As a consequence, FDC and FAC both prayed that the subject assessments for deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes for the years 1996 and 1997 be cancelled and annulled.20 On 4 December 2000, the CIR filed its answer, claiming that the transfer of property in question should not be considered tax free since, with the resultant diminution of its shares in FLI, FDC did not gain further control of said corporation. Likewise calling attention to the

fact that the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates were interest free despite the interest bearing loans it obtained from banking institutions, the CIR invoked Section 43 of the old NIRC which, as implemented by Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 179 (b) and (c), gave him "the power to allocate, distribute or apportion income or deductions between or among such organizations, trades or business in order to prevent evasion of taxes." The CIR justified the imposition of documentary stamp taxes on the instructional letters as well as cash and journal vouchers for said cash advances on the strength of Section 180 of the NIRC and Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 which provide that loan transactions are subject to said tax irrespective of whether or not they are evidenced by a formal agreement or by mere office memo. The CIR also argued that FDC realized taxable gain arising from the dilution of its shares in FAC as a result of its Shareholders' Agreement with RHPL. 21 At the pre-trial conference, the parties filed a Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues22 which was admitted in the 16 February 2001 resolution issued by the CTA. With the further admission of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence subsequently filed by FDC and FAI23 and the conclusion of the testimony of Susana Macabelda anent the cash advances FDC extended in favor of its affiliates,24 the CTA went on to render the Decision dated 10 September 2002 which, with the exception of the deficiency income tax on the interest income FDC supposedly realized from the advances it extended in favor of its affiliates, cancelled the rest of deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed against FDC and FAI for the years 1996 and 1997, 25 thus: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the instant petition partly meritorious. Accordingly, Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-96-00018-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on FDC for taxable year 1996, Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-9600020-2000 and SP-DST-97-00021-2000 imposing deficiency documentary stamp tax on FDC for taxable years 1996 and 1997, respectively and Assessment Notice No. SP-INC97-0027-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on FAI for the taxable year 1997 are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. However, [FDC] is hereby ORDERED to PAY the amount of P5,691,972.03 as deficiency income tax for taxable year 1997. In addition, petitioner is also ORDERED to PAY 20% delinquency interest computed from February 16, 2000 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249 (c) (3) of the Tax Code. 26 Finding that the collective increase of the equity participation of FDC and FAI in FLI rendered the gain derived from the exchange tax-free, the CTA also ruled that the increase in the value of FDC's shares in FAC did not result in economic advantage in the absence of actual sale or conversion thereof. While likewise finding that the documents evidencing the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates cannot be considered as loan agreements that are subject to documentary stamp tax, the CTA enunciated, however, that the CIR was justified in assessing undeclared interests on the same cash advances pursuant to his authority under Section 43 of the NIRC in order to forestall tax evasion. For persuasive effect, the CTA referred to the equivalent provision in the Internal Revenue Code of the United States (IRC-US), i.e., Sec. 482, as implemented by Section 1.482-2 of 1965-1969 Regulations of the Law of Federal Income Taxation. 27 Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, FDC filed on 5 November 2002 the petition for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 72992, pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Calling attention to the fact that the cash advances it extended to its affiliates were interest-free in the absence of the express stipulation on interest required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, FDC questioned the imposition of an arm's-length interest rate thereon on the ground, among others, that the CIR's authority under Section 43 of the NIRC: (a) does not include the power to impute imaginary interest on said transactions; (b) is directed only against controlled taxpayers and not against mother or holding corporations; and, (c) can only be invoked in cases of understatement of taxable net income or evident tax evasion.28 Upholding FDC's position, the CA's then Special Fifth Division rendered the herein assailed decision dated 16 December 2003,29 the decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 10, 2002 rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA

Case No. 6182 directing petitioner Filinvest Development Corporation to pay the amount of P5,691,972.03 representing deficiency income tax on allegedly undeclared interest income for the taxable year 1997, plus 20% delinquency interest computed from February 16, 2000 until full payment thereof is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, a new one entered annulling Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-00019-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on petitioner for taxable year 1997. No pronouncement as to costs. 30 With the denial of its partial motion for reconsideration of the same 11 December 2002 resolution issued by the CTA,31 the CIR also filed the petition for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 74510. In essence, the CIR argued that the CTA reversibly erred in cancelling the assessment notices: (a) for deficiency income taxes on the exchange of property between FDC, FAI and FLI; (b) for deficiency documentary stamp taxes on the documents evidencing FDC's cash advances to its affiliates; and (c) for deficiency income tax on the gain FDC purportedly realized from the increase of the value of its shareholdings in FAC.32 The foregoing petition was, however, denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit in the herein assailed decision dated 26 January 200533 rendered by the CA's then Fourteenth Division, upon the following findings and conclusions, to wit: 1. As affirmed in the 3 February 1997 BIR Ruling No. S-34-046-97, the 29 November 1996 Deed of Exchange resulted in the combined control by FDC and FAI of more than 51% of the outstanding shares of FLI, hence, no taxable gain can be recognized from the transaction under Section 34 (c) (2) of the old NIRC; 2. The instructional letters as well as the cash and journal vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are not subject to documentary stamp taxes pursuant to BIR Ruling No. 116-98, dated 30 July 1998, since they do not partake the nature of loan agreements; 3. Although BIR Ruling No. 116-98 had been subsequently modified by BIR Ruling No. 108-99, dated 15 July 1999, to the effect that documentary stamp taxes are imposable on inter-office memos evidencing cash advances similar to those extended by FDC, said latter ruling cannot be given retroactive application if to do so would be prejudicial to the taxpayer; 4. FDC's alleged gain from the increase of its shareholdings in FAC as a consequence of the Shareholders' Agreement it executed with RHPL cannot be considered taxable income since, until actually converted thru sale or disposition of said shares, they merely represent unrealized increase in capital. 34 Respectively docketed before this Court as G.R. Nos. 163653 and 167689, the CIR's petitions for review on certiorari assailing the 16 December 2003 decision in CA-G.R. No. 72992 and the 26 January 2005 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510 were consolidated pursuant to the 1 March 2006 resolution issued by this Courts Third Division. The Issues In G.R. No. 163653, the CIR urges the grant of its petition on the following ground: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND IN HOLDING THAT THE ADVANCES EXTENDED BY RESPONDENT TO ITS AFFILIATES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO INCOME TAX.35 In G.R. No. 167689, on the other hand, petitioner proffers the following issues for resolution: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY AMONG FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (FDC), FILINVEST ALABANG, INCORPORATED (FAI) AND FILINVEST LAND INCORPORATED (FLI) MET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NONRECOGNITION OF TAXABLE GAIN UNDER SECTION 34 (c) (2) OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (NIRC) (NOW SECTION 40 (C) (2) (c) OF THE NIRC. II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION OR CASH VOUCHERS EXTENDED BY FDC TO ITS AFFILIATES ARE NOT DEEMED LOAN AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES UNDER SECTION 180 OF THE NIRC. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT GAIN ON DILUTION AS A RESULT OF THE INCREASE IN THE VALUE OF FDCS SHAREHOLDINGS IN FAC IS NOT TAXABLE.36 The Courts Ruling While the petition in G.R. No. 163653 is bereft of merit, we find the CIRs petition in G.R. No. 167689 impressed with partial merit. In G.R. No. 163653, the CIR argues that the CA erred in reversing the CTAs finding that theoretical interests can be imputed on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997 considering that, for said purpose, FDC resorted to interest-bearing fund borrowings from commercial banks. Since considerable interest expenses were deducted by FDC when said funds were borrowed, the CIR theorizes that interest income should likewise be declared when the same funds were sourced for the advances FDC extended to its affiliates. Invoking Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC in relation to Section 179(b) of Revenue Regulation No. 2, the CIR maintains that it is vested with the power to allocate, distribute or apportion income or deductions between or among controlled organizations, trades or businesses even in the absence of fraud, since said power is intended "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades or businesses." In addition, the CIR asseverates that the CA should have accorded weight and respect to the findings of the CTA which, as the specialized court dedicated to the study and consideration of tax matters, can take judicial notice of US income tax laws and regulations.37 Admittedly, Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC38 provides that, "(i)n any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated and whether or not organized in the Philippines) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among such organization, trade or business, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organization, trade or business." In amplification of the equivalent provision39 under Commonwealth Act No. 466,40 Sec. 179(b) of Revenue Regulation No. 2 states as follows: Determination of the taxable net income of controlled taxpayer. (A) DEFINITIONS. When used in this section (1) The term "organization" includes any kind, whether it be a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a trust, an estate, or a corporation or association, irrespective of the place where organized, where operated, or where its trade or business is conducted, and regardless of whether domestic or foreign, whether exempt or taxable, or whether affiliated or not. (2) The terms "trade" or "business" include any trade or business activity of any kind, regardless of whether or where organized, whether owned individually or otherwise, and regardless of the place where carried on. (3) The term "controlled" includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is decisive, not its form or mode of exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily shifted.

(4) The term "controlled taxpayer" means any one of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. (5) The term "group" and "group of controlled taxpayers" means the organizations, trades or businesses owned or controlled by the same interests. (6) The term "true net income" means, in the case of a controlled taxpayer, the net income (or as the case may be, any item or element affecting net income) which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs (or, as the case may be, any item or element affecting net income) which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs (or, as the case may be, in the particular contract, transaction, arrangement or other act) dealt with the other members or members of the group at arms length. It does not mean the income, the deductions, or the item or element of either, resulting to the controlled taxpayer by reason of the particular contract, transaction, or arrangement, the controlled taxpayer, or the interest controlling it, chose to make (even though such contract, transaction, or arrangement be legally binding upon the parties thereto). (B) SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - The purpose of Section 44 of the Tax Code is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true net income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayer are assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the net income from the property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not been done and the taxable net income are thereby understated, the statute contemplates that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income or deductions, or of any item or element affecting net income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall determine the true net income of each controlled taxpayer. The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer. Section 44 grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will, nor does it grant any right to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to apply its provisions. (C) APPLICATION Transactions between controlled taxpayer and another will be subjected to special scrutiny to ascertain whether the common control is being used to reduce, avoid or escape taxes. In determining the true net income of a controlled taxpayer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income or deductions. The authority to determine true net income extends to any case in which either by inadvertence or design the taxable net income in whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arms length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. 41 As may be gleaned from the definitions of the terms "controlled" and "controlled taxpayer" under paragraphs (a) (3) and (4) of the foregoing provision, it would appear that FDC and its affiliates come within the purview of Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC. Aside from owning significant portions of the shares of stock of FLI, FAI, DSCC and FCI, the fact that FDC extended substantial sums of money as cash advances to its said affiliates for the purpose of providing them financial assistance for their operational and capital expenditures seemingly indicate that the situation sought to be addressed by the subject provision exists. From the tenor of paragraph (c) of Section 179 of Revenue Regulation No. 2, it may

also be seen that the CIR's power to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among controlled taxpayers may be likewise exercised whether or not fraud inheres in the transaction/s under scrutiny. For as long as the controlled taxpayer's taxable income is not reflective of that which it would have realized had it been dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer, the CIR can make the necessary rectifications in order to prevent evasion of taxes. Despite the broad parameters provided, however, we find that the CIR's powers of distribution, apportionment or allocation of gross income and deductions under Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC and Section 179 of Revenue Regulation No. 2 does not include the power to impute "theoretical interests" to the controlled taxpayer's transactions. Pursuant to Section 28 of the 1993 NIRC, 42 after all, the term "gross income" is understood to mean all income from whatever source derived, including, but not limited to the following items: compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items; gross income derived from business; gains derived from dealings in property;" interest; rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and partners distributive share of the gross income of general professional partnership. 43 While it has been held that the phrase "from whatever source derived" indicates a legislative policy to include all income not expressly exempted within the class of taxable income under our laws, the term "income" has been variously interpreted to mean "cash received or its equivalent", "the amount of money coming to a person within a specific time" or "something distinct from principal or capital."44 Otherwise stated, there must be proof of the actual or, at the very least, probable receipt or realization by the controlled taxpayer of the item of gross income sought to be distributed, apportioned or allocated by the CIR. Our circumspect perusal of the record yielded no evidence of actual or possible showing that the advances FDC extended to its affiliates had resulted to the interests subsequently assessed by the CIR. For all its harping upon the supposed fact that FDC had resorted to borrowings from commercial banks, the CIR had adduced no concrete proof that said funds were, indeed, the source of the advances the former provided its affiliates. While admitting that FDC obtained interest-bearing loans from commercial banks,45 Susan Macabelda - FDC's Funds Management Department Manager who was the sole witness presented before the CTA - clarified that the subject advances were sourced from the corporation's rights offering in 1995 as well as the sale of its investment in Bonifacio Land in 1997.46 More significantly, said witness testified that said advances: (a) were extended to give FLI, FAI, DSCC and FCI financial assistance for their operational and capital expenditures; and, (b) were all temporarily in nature since they were repaid within the duration of one week to three months and were evidenced by mere journal entries, cash vouchers and instructional letters."47 Even if we were, therefore, to accord precipitate credulity to the CIR's bare assertion that FDC had deducted substantial interest expense from its gross income, there would still be no factual basis for the imputation of theoretical interests on the subject advances and assess deficiency income taxes thereon. More so, when it is borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Considering that taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares, 48 the rule is likewise settled that tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. 49 Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication. 50 While it is true that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, it has been held that their assessment and collection should be in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself.51 In G.R. No. 167689, we also find a dearth of merit in the CIR's insistence on the imposition of deficiency income taxes on the transfer FDC and FAI effected in exchange for the shares of stock of FLI. With respect to the Deed of Exchange executed between FDC, FAI and FLI, Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC pertinently provides as follows:

Sec. 34. Determination of amount of and recognition of gain or loss.xxxx (c) Exception x x x x No gain or loss shall also be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by a person in exchange for shares of stock in such corporation of which as a result of such exchange said person, alone or together with others, not exceeding four persons, gains control of said corporation; Provided, That stocks issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return of property. As even admitted in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties,52 the requisites for the non-recognition of gain or loss under the foregoing provision are as follows: (a) the transferee is a corporation; (b) the transferee exchanges its shares of stock for property/ies of the transferor; (c) the transfer is made by a person, acting alone or together with others, not exceeding four persons; and, (d) as a result of the exchange the transferor, alone or together with others, not exceeding four, gains control of the transferee.53 Acting on the 13 January 1997 request filed by FLI, the BIR had, in fact, acknowledged the concurrence of the foregoing requisites in the Deed of Exchange the former executed with FDC and FAI by issuing BIR Ruling No. S-34-046-97.54 With the BIR's reiteration of said ruling upon the request for clarification filed by FLI, 55 there is also no dispute that said transferee and transferors subsequently complied with the requirements provided for the non-recognition of gain or loss from the exchange of property for tax, as provided under Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC. 56 Then as now, the CIR argues that taxable gain should be recognized for the exchange considering that FDC's controlling interest in FLI was actually decreased as a result thereof. For said purpose, the CIR calls attention to the fact that, prior to the exchange, FDC owned 2,537,358,000 or 67.42% of FLI's 3,763,535,000 outstanding capital stock. Upon the issuance of 443,094,000 additional FLI shares as a consequence of the exchange and with only 42,217,000 thereof accruing in favor of FDC for a total of 2,579,575,000 shares, said corporations controlling interest was supposedly reduced to 61%.03 when reckoned from the transferee's aggregate 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares. Without owning a share from FLI's initial 3,763,535,000 outstanding shares, on the other hand, FAI's acquisition of 420,877,000 FLI shares as a result of the exchange purportedly resulted in its control of only 9.96% of said transferee corporation's 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares. On the principle that the transaction did not qualify as a tax-free exchange under Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC, the CIR asseverates that taxable gain in the sum of P263,386,921.00 should be recognized on the part of FDC and in the sum ofP3,088,711,367.00 on the part of FAI.57 The paucity of merit in the CIR's position is, however, evident from the categorical language of Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC which provides that gain or loss will not be recognized in case the exchange of property for stocks results in the control of the transferee by the transferor, alone or with other transferors not exceeding four persons. Rather than isolating the same as proposed by the CIR, FDC's 2,579,575,000 shares or 61.03% control of FLI's 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares should, therefore, be appreciated in combination with the 420,877,000 new shares issued to FAI which represents 9.96% control of said transferee corporation. Together FDC's 2,579,575,000 shares (61.03%) and FAI's 420,877,000 shares (9.96%) clearly add up to 3,000,452,000 shares or 70.99% of FLI's 4,226,629,000 shares. Since the term "control" is clearly defined as "ownership of stocks in a corporation possessing at least fifty-one percent of the total voting power of classes of stocks entitled to one vote" under Section 34 (c) (6) [c] of the 1993 NIRC, the exchange of property for stocks between FDC FAI and FLI clearly qualify as a tax-free transaction under paragraph 34 (c) (2) of the same provision. Against the clear tenor of Section 34(c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC, the CIR cites then Supreme Court Justice Jose Vitug and CTA Justice Ernesto D. Acosta who, in their book Tax Law and Jurisprudence, opined that said provision could be inapplicable if control is already vested in the exchangor prior to exchange. 58 Aside from the fact that that the 10 September 2002 Decision in CTA Case No. 6182 upholding the tax-exempt status of the

exchange between FDC, FAI and FLI was penned by no less than Justice Acosta himself,59 FDC and FAI significantly point out that said authors have acknowledged that the position taken by the BIR is to the effect that "the law would apply even when the exchangor already has control of the corporation at the time of the exchange."60 This was confirmed when, apprised in FLI's request for clarification about the change of percentage of ownership of its outstanding capital stock, the BIR opined as follows: Please be informed that regardless of the foregoing, the transferors, Filinvest Development Corp. and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. still gained control of Filinvest Land, Inc. The term 'control' shall mean ownership of stocks in a corporation by possessing at least 51% of the total voting power of all classes of stocks entitled to vote. Control is determined by the amount of stocks received, i.e., total subscribed, whether for property or for services by the transferor or transferors. In determining the 51% stock ownership, only those persons who transferred property for stocks in the same transaction may be counted up to the maximum of five (BIR Ruling No. 547-93 dated December 29, 1993.61 At any rate, it also appears that the supposed reduction of FDC's shares in FLI posited by the CIR is more apparent than real. As the uncontested owner of 80% of the outstanding shares of FAI, it cannot be gainsaid that FDC ideally controls the same percentage of the 420,877,000 shares issued to its said co-transferor which, by itself, represents 7.968% of the outstanding shares of FLI. Considered alongside FDC's 61.03% control of FLI as a consequence of the 29 November 1996 Deed of Transfer, said 7.968% add up to an aggregate of 68.998% of said transferee corporation's outstanding shares of stock which is evidently still greater than the 67.42% FDC initially held prior to the exchange. This much was admitted by the parties in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues they submitted to the CTA.62 Inasmuch as the combined ownership of FDC and FAI of FLI's outstanding capital stock adds up to a total of 70.99%, it stands to reason that neither of said transferors can be held liable for deficiency income taxes the CIR assessed on the supposed gain which resulted from the subject transfer. On the other hand, insofar as documentary stamp taxes on loan agreements and promissory notes are concerned, Section 180 of the NIRC provides follows: Sec. 180. Stamp tax on all loan agreements, promissory notes, bills of exchange, drafts, instruments and securities issued by the government or any of its instrumentalities, certificates of deposit bearing interest and others not payable on sight or demand. On all loan agreements signed abroad wherein the object of the contract is located or used in the Philippines; bill of exchange (between points within the Philippines), drafts, instruments and securities issued by the Government or any of its instrumentalities or certificates of deposits drawing interest, or orders for the payment of any sum of money otherwise than at sight or on demand, or on all promissory notes, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, except bank notes issued for circulation, and on each renewal of any such note, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of Thirty centavos (P0.30) on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part thereof, of the face value of any such agreement, bill of exchange, draft, certificate of deposit or note: Provided, That only one documentary stamp tax shall be imposed on either loan agreement, or promissory notes issued to secure such loan, whichever will yield a higher tax: Provided however, That loan agreements or promissory notes the aggregate of which does not exceed Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) executed by an individual for his purchase on installment for his personal use or that of his family and not for business, resale, barter or hire of a house, lot, motor vehicle, appliance or furniture shall be exempt from the payment of documentary stamp tax provided under this Section. When read in conjunction with Section 173 of the 1993 NIRC, 63 the foregoing provision concededly applies to "(a)ll loan agreements, whether made or signed in the Philippines, or abroad when the obligation or right arises from Philippine sources or the property or object of the contract is located or used in the Philippines." Correlatively, Section 3 (b) and Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 provide as follows: Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Regulations, the following term shall mean:

(b) 'Loan agreement' refers to a contract in writing where one of the parties delivers to another money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid. The term shall include credit facilities, which may be evidenced by credit memo, advice or drawings. The terms 'Loan Agreement" under Section 180 and "Mortgage' under Section 195, both of the Tax Code, as amended, generally refer to distinct and separate instruments. A loan agreement shall be taxed under Section 180, while a deed of mortgage shall be taxed under Section 195." "Section 6. Stamp on all Loan Agreements. All loan agreements whether made or signed in the Philippines, or abroad when the obligation or right arises from Philippine sources or the property or object of the contract is located in the Philippines shall be subject to the documentary stamp tax of thirty centavos (P0.30) on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part thereof, of the face value of any such agreements, pursuant to Section 180 in relation to Section 173 of the Tax Code. In cases where no formal agreements or promissory notes have been executed to cover credit facilities, the documentary stamp tax shall be based on the amount of drawings or availment of the facilities, which may be evidenced by credit/debit memo, advice or drawings by any form of check or withdrawal slip, under Section 180 of the Tax Code. Applying the aforesaid provisions to the case at bench, we find that the instructional letters as well as the journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997 qualified as loan agreements upon which documentary stamp taxes may be imposed. In keeping with the caveat attendant to every BIR Ruling to the effect that it is valid only if the facts claimed by the taxpayer are correct, we find that the CA reversibly erred in utilizing BIR Ruling No. 116-98, dated 30 July 1998 which, strictly speaking, could be invoked only by ASB Development Corporation, the taxpayer who sought the same. In said ruling, the CIR opined that documents like those evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are not subject to documentary stamp tax, to wit: On the matter of whether or not the inter-office memo covering the advances granted by an affiliate company is subject to documentary stamp tax, it is informed that nothing in Regulations No. 26 (Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations) and Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 states that the same is subject to documentary stamp tax. Such being the case, said inter-office memo evidencing the lendings or borrowings which is neither a form of promissory note nor a certificate of indebtedness issued by the corporation-affiliate or a certificate of obligation, which are, more or less, categorized as 'securities', is not subject to documentary stamp tax imposed under Section 180, 174 and 175 of the Tax Code of 1997, respectively. Rather, the inter-office memo is being prepared for accounting purposes only in order to avoid the co-mingling of funds of the corporate affiliates. 1avvphi1 In its appeal before the CA, the CIR argued that the foregoing ruling was later modified in BIR Ruling No. 108-99 dated 15 July 1999, which opined that inter-office memos evidencing lendings or borrowings extended by a corporation to its affiliates are akin to promissory notes, hence, subject to documentary stamp taxes. 64 In brushing aside the foregoing argument, however, the CA applied Section 246 of the 1993 NIRC 65 from which proceeds the settled principle that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the BIR have no retroactive application if to so apply them would be prejudicial to the taxpayers.66 Admittedly, this rule does not apply: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. 67 Not being the taxpayer who, in the first instance, sought a ruling from the CIR, however, FDC cannot invoke the foregoing principle on nonretroactivity of BIR rulings. Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that both the CTA and the CA erred in invalidating the assessments issued by the CIR for the deficiency documentary stamp taxes due on the instructional letters as well as the journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997. In Assessment

Notice No. SP-DST-96-00020-2000, the CIR correctly assessed the sum of P6,400,693.62 for documentary stamp tax, P3,999,793.44 in interests and P25,000.00 as compromise penalty, for a total ofP10,425,487.06. Alongside the sum of P4,050,599.62 for documentary stamp tax, the CIR similarly assessedP1,721,099.78 in interests and P25,000.00 as compromise penalty in Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-97-000212000 or a total of P5,796,699.40. The imposition of deficiency interest is justified under Sec. 249 (a) and (b) of the NIRC which authorizes the assessment of the same "at the rate of twenty percent (20%), or such higher rate as may be prescribed by regulations", from the date prescribed for the payment of the unpaid amount of tax until full payment.68 The imposition of the compromise penalty is, in turn, warranted under Sec. 250 69 of the NIRC which prescribes the imposition thereof "in case of each failure to file an information or return, statement or list, or keep any record or supply any information required" on the date prescribed therefor. To our mind, no reversible error can, finally, be imputed against both the CTA and the CA for invalidating the Assessment Notice issued by the CIR for the deficiency income taxes FDC is supposed to have incurred as a consequence of the dilution of its shares in FAC. Anent FDCs Shareholders Agreement with RHPL, the record shows that the parties were in agreement about the following factual antecedents narrated in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues they submitted before the CTA, 70 viz.: "1.11. On November 15, 1996, FDC entered into a Shareholders Agreement (SA) with Reco Herrera Pte. Ltd. (RHPL) for the formation of a joint venture company named Filinvest Asia Corporation (FAC) which is based in Singapore (pars. 1.01 and 6.11, Petition, pars. 1 and 7, Answer). 1.12. FAC, the joint venture company formed by FDC and RHPL, is tasked to develop and manage the 50% ownership interest of FDC in its PBCom Office Tower Project (Project) with the Philippine Bank of Communications (par. 6.12, Petition; par. 7, Answer). 1.13. Pursuant to the SA between FDC and RHPL, the equity participation of FDC and RHPL in FAC was 60% and 40% respectively. 1.14. In accordance with the terms of the SA, FDC subscribed to P500.7 million worth of shares of stock representing a 60% equity participation in FAC. In turn, RHPL subscribed to P433.8 million worth of shares of stock of FAC representing a 40% equity participation in FAC. 1.15. In payment of its subscription in FAC, FDC executed a Deed of Assignment transferring to FAC a portion of FDCs right and interests in the Project to the extent of P500.7 million. 1.16. FDC reported a net loss of P190,695,061.00 in its Annual Income Tax Return for the taxable year 1996."71 Alongside the principle that tax revenues are not intended to be liberally construed, 72 the rule is settled that the findings and conclusions of the CTA are accorded great respect and are generally upheld by this Court, unless there is a clear showing of a reversible error or an improvident exercise of authority. 73 Absent showing of such error here, we find no strong and cogent reasons to depart from said rule with respect to the CTA's finding that no deficiency income tax can be assessed on the gain on the supposed dilution and/or increase in the value of FDC's shareholdings in FAC which the CIR, at any rate, failed to establish. Bearing in mind the meaning of "gross income" as above discussed, it cannot be gainsaid, even then, that a mere increase or appreciation in the value of said shares cannot be considered income for taxation purposes. Since "a mere advance in the value of the property of a person or corporation in no sense constitute the income specified in the revenue law," it has been held in the early case of Fisher vs. Trinidad, 74 that it "constitutes and can be treated merely as an increase of capital." Hence, the CIR has no factual and legal basis in assessing income tax on the increase in the value of FDC's shareholdings in FAC until the same is actually sold at a profit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CIR's petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 163653 is DENIED for lack of merit and the CAs 16 December 2003 Decision in G.R. No.

72992 is AFFIRMED in toto. The CIRs petition in G.R. No. 167689 i s PARTIALLY GRANTED and the CAs 26 January 2005 Decision in CA -G.R. SP No. 74510 is MODIFIED. Accordingly, Assessment Notices Nos. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 and SP-DST-97-000212000 issued for deficiency documentary stamp taxes due on the instructional letters as well as journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are declared valid. The cancellation of Assessment Notices Nos. SP-INC-96-00018-2000, SP-INC-97-000192000 and SP-INC-97-0027-2000 issued for deficiency income assessed on (a) the "armslength" interest from said advances; (b) the gain from FDCs Deed of Exchange with FAI and FLI; and (c) income from the dilution resulting from FDCs Shareholders Agreement with RHPL is, however, upheld. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157264 January 31, 2008 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioner, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), claiming that it terminated in 1995 the employment of several rank-and-file, supervisory, and executive employees due to redundancy; that in compliance with labor law requirements, it paid those separated employees separation pay and other benefits; and that as employer and withholding agent, it deducted from the separation pay withholding taxes in the total amount ofP23,707,909.20 which it remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), filed on November 20, 1997 with the BIR a claim for tax credit or refund of the P23,707,909.20, invoking Section 28(b)(7)(B) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code 1 which excluded from gross income [a]ny amount received by an official or employee or by his heirs from the employer as a consequence of separation of such official or employee from the service of the employer due to death, sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond the control of the said official or employee. 2 (Underscoring supplied) As the BIR took no action on its claim, PLDT filed a claim for judicial refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). In its Answer,3 respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, contended that PLDT failed to show proof of payment of separation pay and remittance of the alleged withheld taxes.4 PLDT later manifested on March 19, 1998 that it was reducing its claim to P16,439,777.61 because a number of the separated employees opted to file their respective claims for refund of taxes erroneously withheld from their separation pay. 5 PLDT thereafter retained Sycip Gorres Velayo and Company (SGV) to conduct a special audit examination of various receipts, invoices and other long accounts, and moved to avail of the procedure laid down in CTA Circular No. 1-95, as amended by CTA Circular No. 10-97, allowing the presentation of a certification of an independent certified public accountant in lieu of voluminous documents. 6 The CTA thereupon appointed Amelia Cabal (Cabal) of SGV as Commissioner of the court.7 Cabal's audit report, which formed part of PLDT's evidence,8 adjusted PLDT's claim to P6,679,167.72.9 By Decision10 of July 25, 2000, the CTA denied PLDT's claim on the ground that it "failed to sufficiently prove that the terminated employees received separation pay and that taxes were withheld therefrom and remitted to the BIR."11 PLDT filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration, praying for an opportunity to present the receipts and quitclaims executed by the employees and prove that they received their separation pay.12 Justifying its motion, PLDT alleged that x x x [t]hese Receipts and Quitclaims could not be presented during the course of the trial despite diligent efforts, the files having been misplaced and were only recently found. Through excusable mistake or inadvertence, undersigned counsel relied on the audit of SGV & Co. of the voluminous cash salary vouchers, and was thus not made wary of the fact that the cash salary vouchers for the rank and file employees do not have acknowledgement receipts, unlike the cash salary vouchers for the supervisory and executive employees. If admitted in evidence, these Receipts and Quitclaims, together with the cash salary vouchers, will prove that the rank and file employees received their separation pay from petitioner.13(Underscoring supplied) The CTA denied PLDT's motion.14 PLDT thus filed a Petition for Review15 before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision16 of February 11, 2002, dismissed the same. PLDT's Motion for Reconsideration 17 having been

denied,18 it filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 faulting the appellate court to have committed grave abuse of discretion A. . . . WHEN IT HELD THAT PROOF OF PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY TO THE EMPLOYEES IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO AVAIL OF REFUND OF TAXES ERRONEOUSLY PAID TO THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. B. . . . WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES RECEIVED THEIR SEPARATION PAY. C. . . . IN DISREGARDING THE CERTIFICA-TION/REPORT OF SGV & CO., WHICH CERTIFIED THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF THE AMOUNT OF P6,679,167.72. D. . . . IN NOT ORDERING A NEW TRIAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF.20 PLDT argues against the need for proof that the employees received their separation pay and proffers the issue in the case in this wise: It is not essential to prove that the separation pay benefits were actually received by the terminated employees. This issue is not for the CTA, nor the Court of Appeals to resolve, but is a matter that falls within the competence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment and/or the National Labor Relations Commission. x x x Proving, or submitting evidence to prove, receipt of separation pay would have been material, relevant and necessary if its deductibility as a business expense has been put in issue. But this has never been an issue in the instant case. The issue is whether or not the withholding taxes, which Petitioner remitted to the BIR, should be refunded for having been erroneously withheld and paid to the latter. For as long as there is no legal basis for the payment of taxes to the BIR, the taxpayer is entitled to claim a refund therefore. Hence, any taxes withheld from separation benefits and paid to the BIR constitute erroneous payment of taxes and should therefore, be refunded/credited to the taxpayer/withholding agent, regardless of whether or not separation pay was actually paid to the concerned employees.21 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) PLDT's position does not lie. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, and the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing the factual basis of his claim for a refund .22 Under the earlier quoted portion of Section 28 (b)(7)(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (now Section 32(B)6(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997), it is incumbent on PLDT as a claimant for refund on behalf of each of the separated employees to show that each employee did x x x reflect in his or its own return the income upon which any creditable tax is required to be withheld at the source. Only when there is an excess of the amount of tax so withheld over the tax due on the payee's return can a refund become possible. A taxpayer must thus do two things to be able to successfully make a claim for the tax refund: (a) declare the income payments it received as part of its gross income and (b) establish the fact of withholding. On this score, the relevant revenue regulation provides as follows: "Section 10. Claims for tax credit or refund. - Claims for tax credit or refund of income tax deducted and withheld on income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown on the return that the income payment received was declared as part of the gross income

and the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom."23 (Underscoring supplied) In fine, PLDT must prove that the employees received the income payments as part of gross income and the fact of withholding. The CTA found that PLDT failed to establish that the redundant employees actually received separation pay and that it withheld taxes therefrom and remitted the same to the BIR, thus: With respect to the redundant rank and file employees' final payment/terminal pay x x x, the cash salary vouchers relative thereto have no payment acknowledgement receipts. Inasmuch as these cash vouchers were not signed by the respective employees to prove actual receipt of payment, the same merely serves as proofs of authorization for payment and not actual payment by the Petitioner of the redundant rank and file employees' separation pay and other benefits. In other words, Petitioner failed to prove that the rank and file employees were actually paid separation pay and other benefits. To establish that the withholding taxes deducted from the redundant employees' separation pay/other benefits were actually remitted to the BIR, therein petitioner submitted the following: Exhibit a) Monthly Remittance Return of Income Taxes Withheld D for December 1995 b) Revised SGV & Co. Certification E to E-3-d c) Annual Information Return of Income Tax Withheld on E-6 Compensation, Expanded and Final Withholding Taxes for the year 1995 d) Summary of Income Taxes Withheld for the calendar E-6-a year ended December 31, 1995 e) Summary of Gross Compensation and Tax Withheld E-6-b to E-6-e However, it cannot be determined from the above documents whether or not Petitioner actually remitted the total income taxes withheld from the redundant employees' taxable compensation (inclusive of the separation pay/other benefits) for the year 1995. The amounts of total taxes withheld for each redundant employees (Exhs. E-4, E-5, E-7, inclusive) cannot be verified against the "Summary of Gross Compensation and Tax Withheld for 1995" (Exhs. E-6-b to E-6-e, inclusive) due to the fact that this summary enumerates the amounts of income taxes withheld from Petitioner's employees on per district/area basis. The only schedule (with names, corresponding gross compensation, and withholding taxes) attached to the summary was for the withholding taxes on service terminal pay (Exh. E-6-e). However, the names listed thereon were not among the names of the redundant separated employees being claimed by petitioner. xxxx It is worthy to note that Respondent presented a witness in the person of Atty. Rodolfo L. Salazar, Chief of the BIR Appellate Division, who testified that a portion of the Petitioner's original claim for refund of P23,706,908.20 had already been granted. He also testified that out of 769 claimants, who opted to file directly with the BIR, 766 had been processed and granted. In fact, x x x three claims were not processed because the concerned taxpayer failed to submit the income tax returns and withholding tax certificates. Considering that no documentary evidence was presented to bolster said testimony, We have no

means of counter checking whether the 766 alleged to have been already granted by the Respondent pertained to the P16,439,777.61 claim for refund withdrawn by the Petitioner from the instant petition or to the remaining balance of P6,679,167.72 which is the subject of this claim. 24(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The appellate court affirmed the foregoing findings of the CTA. Apropos is this Court's ruling in Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals :25 The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, aregenerally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon this Court, especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the C[ourt of] A[ppeals] which is normally the final arbiter of questions of fact.26(Underscoring supplied) While SGV certified that it had "been able to trace the remittance of the withheld taxes summarized in the C[ash] S[alary] V[ouchers] to the Monthly Remittance Return of Income Taxes Withheld for the appropriate period covered by the final payment made to the concerned executives, supervisors, and rank and file staff members of PLDT," 27 the same cannot be appreciated in PLDT's favor as the courts cannot verify such claim. While the records of the case contain the Alphabetical List of Employee from Whom Taxes Were Withheld for the year 1995 and the Monthly Remittance Returns of Income Taxes Withheld for December 1995, the documents from which SGV "traced" the former to the latter have not been presented. Failure to present these documents is fatal to PLDT's case. For the relevant portions of CTA Circular 1-95 instruct: 1. The party who desires to introduce as evidence such voluminous documents must, after motion and approval by the Court, present: (a) a Summary containing, among others, a chronological listing of the numbers, dates and amounts covered by the invoices or receipts and the amount/s of tax paid; and (b) a Certification of an independent Certified Public Accountant attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary after making an examination, evaluation and audit of the voluminous receipts and invoices x x x 2. The method of individual presentation of each and every receipt, invoice or account for marking, identification and comparison with the originals thereof need not be done before the Court or Clerk of Court anymore after the introduction of the summary and CPA certification. It is enough that the receipts, invoices, vouchers or other documents covering the said accounts or payment to be introduced in evidence must be pre-marked by the party concerned and submitted to the Court in order to be made accessible to the adverse party who desires to check and verify the correctness of the summary and CPA certification. Likewise the originals of the voluminous receipts, invoices and accounts must be ready for verification and comparison in case of doubt on the authenticity thereof is raised during the hearing or resolution of the formal offer of evidence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,28 citingCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation29 explains the need for the promulgation of the immediately-cited CTA Circular and its effect: x x x The circular, in the interest of speedy administration of justice, was promulgated to avoid the time-consuming procedure of presenting, identifying and marking of documents before the Court. It does not relieve respondent of its imperative task of premarking photocopies of sales receipts and invoices andsubmitting the same to the court after the independent CPA shall have examined and compared them with the originals. Without presenting these premarked documents as evidence - from which the summary and schedules were based, the court cannot verify the authenticity and veracity of the independent auditor's conclusions. (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied).30

On the denial of PLDT's motion for new trial: new trial may be granted on either of these grounds: a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.31 Newly discovered evidence as a basis of a motion for new trial should be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. 32 And the grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. 33 PLDT has not shown any such abuse, however. The affirmance by the appellate court of the CTA's denial of PLDT's motion for new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence," viz: xxxx The petitioner appended to its "Motion for New Trial", etc. , unnotarized copies of "Receipts, Release and Quitclaim" bearing the signatures purportedly of those employees for whom the Petitioner filed the"Petition" before the CTA, dated December 28, 1995 x x x[.]34 xxxx Although the Rules require the appendage, by the Petitioner, of the "Affidavits of Witnesses" it intends to present in a new trial, the Petitioner failed to append to its "Motion for New Trial" any affidavits of said witnesses. The "Receipts, Releases, and Quitclaims" appended to the Petition are not authenticated. Indeed, the said deeds were not notarized, despite their having been signed, allegedly by the employees, as early as December 28, 1995, or approximately two (2) years before the Petitioner filed the Petition before the CTA. It behooved the Petitioner to have appended the Affidavits of the separated employees to authenticate the "Receipts, Releases and Quitclaims" purportedly executed by them, respectively. The petitioner did not. The Petitioner wanted the CTA to believe that the employees executed the aforesaid "Receipts, Releases and Quitclaims" as early as December 28, 1995, and kept the same in its possession and custody. However, the petitioner divulged the existence of said Receipts, etc., only when it filed its "Motion for New Trial, etc." on August 18, 2000, or an interregnum of almost five (5) years. None of the responsible officers of the Petitioner, especially the custodian of said Receipts, etc., executed an "Affidavit" explaining why the same (a) were not notarized on or about December 28, 1995; (b) whether the said deeds were turned over to its counsel when it filed the Petition at bench; (c) why it failed to present the said Receipts to the SGV & Co., while the latter was conducting its examination and/or audit of the records of the Petitioner. It is incredible that, if it is true, as claimed by Petitioner, the employees, indeed, signed the said Receipts on December 28, 1995, the Petitioner, one of the biggest corporations in the Philippines and laden with competent execu-tives/officers/employees, did not bother having the same notarized on or about December 28, 1995. For sure, when the Petitioner endorsed the preparation and filing of the Petition to its counsel, it should have collated all the documents necessary to support its Petition and submit the same to its counsel. If the Petitioner did, its counsel has not explained why it failed to present the same before the Commissioner and/or adduce the same in evidence during the hearing of the Petition on its merits with the CTA. We are convinced that the said Receipts, etc. were antedated and executed only after the CTA rendered its Decision and only in anticipation of

the "Motion for New Trial, etc." filed by the Petitioner.35 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original), is thus in order. Finally, on PLDT's plea for a liberal application of the rules of procedure, 36 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A. Soriano Corporation37 furnishes a caveat on the matter: Perhaps realizing that under the Rules the said report cannot be admitted as newly discovered evidence, the petitioner invokes a liberal application of the Rules. He submits that Section 8 of the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals declaring that the latter shall not be governed strictly by technical rules of evidence mandates a relaxation of the requirements of new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This is a dangerous proposition and one which we refuse to countenance. We cannot agree more with the Court of Appeals when it stated thus, "To accept the contrary view of the petitioner would give rise to a dangerous precedent in that there would be no end to a hearing before respondent court because, every time a party is aggrieved by its decision, he can have it set aside by asking to be allowed to present additional evidence without having to comply with the requirements of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Rule 13, Section 5 of the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals should not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation of issues and their resolution. To do so would affect, to a considerable extent, the stability of judicial decisions." We are left with no recourse but to conclude that this is a simple case of negligence on the part of the petitioner. For this act of negligence, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of the Rules. For it should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of every action. In the case at bench, a liberal application of the rules of procedure to suit the petitioner's purpose would clearly pave the way for injustice as it would be rewarding an act of negligence with undeserved tolerance.38 (Underscoring supplied) At all events, the alleged "newly discovered evidence" that PLDT seeks to offer does not suffice to establish its claim for refund, as it would still have to comply with Revenue Regulation 6-85 by proving that the redundant employees, on whose behalf it filed the claim for refund, declared the separation pay received as part of their gross income. Furthermore, the same Revenue Regulation requires that "the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom." WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-53961 June 30, 1987 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

COMPANY, petitioner,

CRUZ, J.: We are asked to reverse the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals on the ground that it is erroneous. We have carefully studied it and find it is not; on the contrary, it is supported by law and doctrine. So finding, we affirm. Reduced to simplest terms, the background facts are as follows. The national Development Company entered into contracts in Tokyo with several Japanese shipbuilding companies for the construction of twelve ocean-going vessels. 1 The purchase price was to come from the proceeds of bonds issued by the 2 Central Bank. Initial payments were made in cash and through irrevocable letters of 3 credit. Fourteen promissory notes were signed for the balance by the NDC and, as required by the shipbuilders, guaranteed by the Republic of the 4 Philippines. Pursuant thereto, the remaining payments and the interests thereon were remitted in due time by the NDC to Tokyo. The vessels were eventually 5 completed and delivered to the NDC in Tokyo. The NDC remitted to the shipbuilders in Tokyo the total amount of US$4,066,580.70 as interest on the balance of the purchase price. No tax was withheld. The Commissioner then held the NDC liable on such tax in the total sum of P5,115,234.74. Negotiations followed but failed. The BIR thereupon served on the 6 NDC a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce collection of the claimed amount. The NDC went to the Court of Tax Appeals. The BIR was sustained by the CTA except for a slight reduction of the tax deficiency 7 in the sum of P900.00, representing the compromise penalty. The NDC then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari. The petition must fail for the following reasons. The Japanese shipbuilders were liable to tax on the interest remitted to them under Section 37 of the Tax Code, thus: SEC. 37. Income from sources within the Philippines. (a) Gross income from sources within the Philippines. The following items of gross income shall be treated as gross income from sources within the Philippines: (1) Interest. Interest derived from sources within the Philippines, and interest on bonds, notes, orother interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise; xxx xxx xxx The petitioner argues that the Japanese shipbuilders were not subject to tax under the above provision because all the related activities the signing of the contract, the construction of the vessels, the payment of the stipulated price, and their delivery 8 to the NDC were done in Tokyo. The law, however, does not speak of activity but of "source," which in this case is the NDC. This is a domestic and resident corporation with principal offices in Manila. As the Tax Court put it: It is quite apparent, under the terms of the law, that the Government's right to levy and collect income tax on interest received by foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines is not planted upon the condition that 'the activity or labor and the sale from which the (interest) income flowed had its situs' in the Philippines. The law specifies: 'Interest

derived from sources within the Philippines, and interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise.' Nothing there speaks of the 'act or activity' of nonresident corporations in the Philippines, or place where the contract is signed. The residence of the obligorwho pays the interest rather than the physical location of the securities, bonds or notes or the place of payment, is the determining factor of the source of interest income. (Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 8, p. 128, citing A.C. Monk & Co. Inc. 10 T.C. 77; Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 19 BTA 480; Estate of L.E. Mckinnon, 6 BTA 412; Standard Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 4 BTA 853; Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 4 BTA 867.) Accordingly, if the obligor is a resident of the Philippines the interest payment paid by him can have no other source than within the Philippines. The interest is paid not by the bond, note or other interest-bearing obligations, but by the obligor. (See mertens, Id., Vol. 8, p. 124.) Here in the case at bar, petitioner National Development Company, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with address and principal office at Calle Pureza, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines unconditionally promised to pay the Japanese shipbuilders, as obligor in fourteen (14) promissory notes for each vessel, the balance of the contract price of the twelve (12) ocean-going vessels purchased and acquired by it from the Japanese corporations, including the interest on the principal sum at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum. (See Exhs. "D", D-1" to "D-13", pp. 100-113, CTA Records; par. 11, Partial Stipulation of Facts.) And pursuant to the terms and conditions of these promisory notes, which are duly signed by its Vice Chairman and General Manager, petitioner remitted to the Japanese shipbuilders in Japan during the years 1960, 1961, and 1962 the sum of $830,613.17, $1,654,936.52 and $1,541.031.00, respectively, as interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the aforesaid vessels. (pars. 13, 14, & 15, Partial Stipulation of Facts.) The law is clear. Our plain duty is to apply it as written. The residence of the obligor which paid the interest under consideration, petitioner herein, is Calle Pureza, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines; and as a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, it is a domestic corporation, resident of the Philippines. (Sec. 84(c), National Internal Revenue Code.) The interest paid by petitioner, which is admittedly a resident of the Philippines, is on the promissory notes issued by it. Clearly, therefore, the interest remitted to the Japanese shipbuilders in Japan in 1960, 1961 and 1962 on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the vessels acquired by petitioner is interest derived from sources within the Philippines subject to income tax under the then Section 24(b)(1) of the National Internal Revenue 9 Code. There is no basis for saying that the interest payments were obligations of the Republic of the Philippines and that the promissory notes of the NDC were government securities exempt from taxation under Section 29(b)[4] of the Tax Code, reading as follows:

SEC. 29. Gross Income. xxxx xxx xxx xxx (b) Exclusion from gross income. The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this Title: xxx xxx xxx (4) Interest on Government Securities. Interest upon the obligations of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any political subdivision thereof, but in the case of such obligations issued after approval of this Code, only to the extent provided in the act authorizing the issue thereof.(As amended by Section 6, R.A. No. 82; emphasis supplied) The law invoked by the petitioner as authorizing the issuance of securities is R.A. No. 1407, which in fact is silent on this matter. C.A. No. 182 as amended by C.A. No. 311 does carry such authorization but, like R.A. No. 1407, does not exempt from taxes the interests on such securities. It is also incorrect to suggest that the Republic of the Philippines could not collect taxes on the interest remitted because of the undertaking signed by the Secretary of Finance in each of the promissory notes that: Upon authority of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the undersigned, for value received, hereby absolutely and unconditionally guarantee (sic), on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the due and punctual payment of both principal and interest of the above note. 10 There is nothing in the above undertaking exempting the interests from taxes. Petitioner has not established a clear waiver therein of the right to tax interests. Tax exemptions cannot be merely implied but must be categorically and unmistakably expressed. 11 Any doubt concerning this question must be resolved in favor of the taxing power.12 Nowhere in the said undertaking do we find any inhibition against the collection of the disputed taxes. In fact, such undertaking was made by the government in consonance with and certainly not against the following provisions of the Tax Code: Sec. 53(b). Nonresident aliens. All persons, corporations and general co-partnership (companies colectivas), in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal capacity, executors, administrators, receivers, conservators, fiduciaries, employers, and all officers and employees of the Government of the Philippines having control, receipt, custody; disposal or payment of interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or categorical gains, profits and income of any nonresident alien individual, not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines and not having any office or place of business therein, shall (except in the cases provided for in subsection (a) of this section) deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits and income a tax to twenty (now 30%) per centum thereof: ... Sec. 54. Payment of corporation income tax at source. In the case of foreign corporations subject to taxation under this Title not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines and not having any office or place of business therein, there shall be deducted and withheld at the source in the same manner and upon the same items as is provided in section fifty-three a tax equal to thirty (now

35%)per centum thereof, and such tax shall be returned and paid in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as provided in that section:.... Manifestly, the said undertaking of the Republic of the Philippines merely guaranteed the obligations of the NDC but without diminution of its taxing power under existing laws. In suggesting that the NDC is merely an administrator of the funds of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner closes its eyes to the nature of this entity as a corporation. As such, it is governed in its proprietary activities not only by its charter but also by the Corporation Code and other pertinent laws. The petitioner also forgets that it is not the NDC that is being taxed. The tax was due on the interests earned by the Japanese shipbuilders. It was the income of these companies and not the Republic of the Philippines that was subject to the tax the NDC did not withhold. In effect, therefore, the imposition of the deficiency taxes on the NDC is a penalty for its failure to withhold the same from the Japanese shipbuilders. Such liability is imposed by Section 53(c) of the Tax Code, thus: Section 53(c). Return and Payment. Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this section shall make return thereof, in duplicate, on or before the fifteenth day of April of each year, and, on or before the time fixed by law for the payment of the tax, shall pay the amount withheld to the officer of the Government of the Philippines authorized to receive it. Every such person is made personally liable for such tax, and is indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this section. (As amended by Section 9, R.A. No. 2343.) In Philippine Guaranty Co. v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, 13 the Court quoted with approval the following regulation of the BIR on the responsibilities of withholding agents: In case of doubt, a withholding agent may always protect himself by withholding the tax due, and promptly causing a query to be addressed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the determination whether or not the income paid to an individual is not subject to withholding. In case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue decides that the income paid to an individual is not subject to withholding, the withholding agent may thereupon remit the amount of a tax withheld. (2nd par., Sec. 200, Income Tax Regulations). "Strict observance of said steps is required of a withholding agent before he could be released from liability," so said Justice Jose P. Bengson, who wrote the decision. "Generally, the law frowns upon exemption from taxation; hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." 14 The petitioner was remiss in the discharge of its obligation as the withholding agent of the government an so should be held liable for its omission. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayno, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortez, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 108576 January 20, 1999 COMMISSIONER OF vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT CORP., respondents.

INTERNAL OF TAX APPEALS

REVENUE, petitioner, and A. SORIANO

MARTINEZ, J.: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 which affirmed the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) 2 that private respondent A. Soriano Corporation's (hereinafter ANSCOR) redemption and exchange of the stocks of its foreign stockholders cannot be considered as "essentially equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends" under, Section 83(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Act. 3 The undisputed facts are as follows: Sometime in the 1930s, Don Andres Soriano, a citizen and resident of the United States, formed the corporation "A. Soriano Y Cia", predecessor of ANSCOR, with a P1,000,000.00 capitalization divided into 10,000 common shares at a par value of P100/share. ANSCOR is wholly owned and controlled by the family of Don Andres, who are all non-resident aliens. 4 In 1937, Don Andres subscribed to 4,963 shares of the 5,000 shares originally issued. 5 On September 12, 1945, ANSCOR's authorized capital stock was increased to P2,500,000.00 divided into 25,000 common shares with the same par value of the additional 15,000 shares, only 10,000 was issued which were all subscribed by Don Andres, after the other stockholders waived in favor of the former their pre-emptive rights to subscribe to the new issues. 6 This increased his subscription to 14,963 common shares. 7 A month later, 8 Don Andres transferred 1,250 shares each to his two sons, Jose and Andres, Jr., as their initial investments in ANSCOR. 9 Both sons are foreigners. 10 By 1947, ANSCOR declared stock dividends. Other stock dividend declarations were made between 1949 and December 20, 1963. 11 On December 30, 1964 Don Andres died. As of that date, the records revealed that he has a total shareholdings of 185,154 shares 12 50,495 of which are original issues and the balance of 134.659 shares as stock dividend declarations. 13 Correspondingly, one-half of that shareholdings or 92,577 14 shares were transferred to his wife, Doa Carmen Soriano, as her conjugal share. The other half formed part of his estate. 15 A day after Don Andres died, ANSCOR increased its capital stock to P20M 16 and in 1966 further increased it to P30M. 17 In the same year (December 1966), stock dividends worth 46,290 and 46,287 shares were respectively received by the Don Andres estate 18 and Doa Carmen from ANSCOR. Hence, increasing their accumulated shareholdings to 138,867 and 138,864 19 common shares each. 20 On December 28, 1967, Doa Carmen requested a ruling from the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS), inquiring if an exchange of common with preferred shares may be considered as a tax avoidance scheme 21under Section 367 of the 1954 U.S. Revenue Act. 22 By January 2, 1968, ANSCOR reclassified its existing 300,000 common shares into 150,000 common and 150,000 preferred shares. 23 In a letter-reply dated February 1968, the IRS opined that the exchange is only a recapitalization scheme and not tax avoidance. 24 Consequently, 25 on March 31, 1968 Doa Carmen exchanged her whole 138,864 common shares for 138,860 of the newly reclassified preferred shares. The estate of Don Andres in turn, exchanged 11,140 of its common shares, for the remaining 11,140 preferred shares, thus reducing its (the estate) common shares to 127,727. 26 On June 30, 1968, pursuant to a Board Resolution, ANSCOR redeemed 28,000 common shares from the Don Andres' estate. By November 1968, the Board further increased ANSCOR's capital stock to P75M divided into 150,000 preferred shares and 600,000 common shares. 27 About a year later, ANSCOR again redeemed 80,000 common shares from the Don Andres' estate, 28 further reducing the latter's common shareholdings to 19,727. As stated in the Board Resolutions, ANSCOR's business purpose for both redemptions of stocks is to partially retire said stocks as treasury shares in order to reduce the company's foreign exchange remittances in case cash dividends are declared. 29 In 1973, after examining ANSCOR's books of account and records, Revenue examiners issued a report proposing that ANSCOR be assessed for deficiency withholding tax-at-source, pursuant to Sections 53 and 54 of the 1939 Revenue Code, 30 for the year 1968 and the second quarter of

1969 based on the transactions of exchange 31 and redemption of stocks. 31 The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) made the corresponding assessments despite the claim of ANSCOR that it availed of the tax amnesty under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 23 32 which were amended by P.D.'s 67 and 157. 33 However, petitioner ruled that the invoked decrees do not cover Sections 53 and 54 in relation to Article 83(b) of the 1939 Revenue Act under which ANSCOR was assessed. 34 ANSCOR's subsequent protest on the assessments was denied in 1983 by petitioner. 35 Subsequently, ANSCOR filed a petition for review with the CTA assailing the tax assessments on the redemptions and exchange of stocks. In its decision, the Tax Court reversed petitioner's ruling, after finding sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie correctness of the questioned assessments. 36 In a petition for review the CA as mentioned, affirmed the ruling of the CTA. 37 Hence, this petition. The bone of contention is the interpretation and application of Section 83(b) of the 1939 Revenue Act 38 which provides: Sec. 83. Distribution of dividends or assets by corporations. (b) Stock dividends A stock dividend representing the transfer of surplus to capital account shall not be subject to tax. However, if a corporation cancels or redeems stock issued as a dividend at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption, in whole or in part, essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be considered as taxable income to the extent it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen. (Emphasis supplied) Specifically, the issue is whether ANSCOR's redemption of stocks from its stockholder as well as the exchange of common with preferred shares can be considered as "essentially equivalent to the distribution of taxable dividend" making the proceeds thereof taxable under the provisions of the above-quoted law. Petitioner contends that the exchange transaction a tantamount to "cancellation" under Section 83(b) making the proceeds thereof taxable. It also argues that the Section applies to stock dividends which is the bulk of stocks that ANSCOR redeemed. Further, petitioner claims that under the "net effect test," the estate of Don Andres gained from the redemption. Accordingly, it was the duty of ANSCOR to withhold the tax-at-source arising from the two transactions, pursuant to Section 53 and 54 of the 1939 Revenue Act. 39 ANSCOR, however, avers that it has no duty to withhold any tax either from the Don Andres estate or from Doa Carmen based on the two transactions, because the same were done for legitimate business purposes which are (a) to reduce its foreign exchange remittances in the event the company would declare cash dividends, 40 and to (b) subsequently "filipinized" ownership of ANSCOR, as allegedly, envisioned by Don Andres. 41 It likewise invoked the amnesty provisions of P.D. 67. We must emphasize that the application of Sec. 83(b) depends on the special factual circumstances of each case.42 The findings of facts of a special court (CTA) exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, generally binds this Court, 43 considering that it is substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is the final arbiter of questions of facts. 44 The issue in this case does not only deal with facts but whether the law applies to a particular set of facts. Moreover, this Court is not necessarily bound by the lower courts' conclusions of law drawn from such facts. 45 AMNESTY: We will deal first with the issue of tax amnesty. Section 1 of P.D. 67 46 provides: 1. In all cases of voluntary disclosures of previously untaxed income and/or wealth such as earnings, receipts, gifts, bequests or any other acquisitions from any source whatsoever which are taxable under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, realized here or abroad by any taxpayer, natural or judicial; the collection of all internal revenue taxes including the increments or penalties or account of non-payment as well as all civil, criminal or administrative liabilities arising from or incident to such disclosures under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Administrative

Code, the Civil Service laws and regulations, laws and regulations on Immigration and Deportation, or any other applicable law or proclamation, are hereby condoned and, in lieu thereof, a tax of ten (10%) per centum on such previously untaxed income or wealth, is hereby imposed, subject to the following conditions: (conditions omitted) [Emphasis supplied]. The decree condones "the collection of all internal revenue taxes including the increments or penalties or account of non-payment as well as all civil, criminal or administrative liable arising from or incident to" (voluntary) disclosures under the NIRC of previously untaxed income and/or wealth "realized here or abroad by any taxpayer, natural or juridical." May the withholding agent, in such capacity, be deemed a taxpayer for it to avail of the amnesty? An income taxpayer covers all persons who derive taxable income. 47 ANSCOR was assessed by petitioner for deficiency withholding tax under Section 53 and 54 of the 1939 Code. As such, it is being held liable in its capacity as a withholding agent and not its personality as a taxpayer. In the operation of the withholding tax system, the withholding agent is the payor, a separate entity acting no more than an agent of the government for the collection of the tax 48 in order to ensure its payments; 49 the payer is the taxpayer he is the person subject to tax impose by law; 50 and the payee is the taxing authority. 51 In other words, the withholding agent is merely a tax collector, not a taxpayer. Under the withholding system, however, the agent-payor becomes a payee by fiction of law. His (agent) liability is direct and independent from the taxpayer, 52 because the income tax is still impose on and due from the latter. The agent is not liable for the tax as no wealth flowed into him he earned no income. The Tax Code only makes the agent personally liable for the tax 53 arising from the breach of its legal duty to withhold as distinguish from its duty to pay tax since: the government's cause of action against the withholding is not for the collection of income tax, but for the enforcement of the withholding provision of Section 53 of the Tax Code, compliance with which is imposed on the withholding agent and not upon the taxpayer. 54 Not being a taxpayer, a withholding agent, like ANSCOR in this transaction is not protected by the amnesty under the decree. Codal provisions on withholding tax are mandatory and must be complied with by the withholding agent. 55 The taxpayer should not answer for the non-performance by the withholding agent of its legal duty to withhold unless there is collusion or bad faith. The former could not be deemed to have evaded the tax had the withholding agent performed its duty. This could be the situation for which the amnesty decree was intended. Thus, to curtail tax evasion and give tax evaders a chance to reform, 56 it was deemed administratively feasible to grant tax amnesty in certain instances. In addition, a "tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by a statute, the term of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 57 The rule on strictissimi juris equally applies. 58 So that, any doubt in the application of an amnesty law/decree should be resolved in favor of the taxing authority. Furthermore, ANSCOR's claim of amnesty cannot prosper. The implementing rules of P.D. 370 which expanded amnesty on previously untaxed income under P.D. 23 is very explicit, to wit: Sec. 4. Cases not covered by amnesty. The following cases are not covered by the amnesty subject of these regulations: xxx xxx xxx (2) Tax liabilities with or without assessments, on withholding tax at source provided under Section 53 and 54 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; 59 ANSCOR was assessed under Sections 53 and 54 of the 1939 Tax Code. Thus, by specific provision of law, it is not covered by the amnesty. TAX ON STOCK DIVIDENDS General Rule Sec. 83(b) of the 1939 NIRC was taken from the Section 115(g)(1) of the U.S. Revenue Code of 60 1928. It laid down the general rule known as the proportionate test 61 wherein stock dividends

once issued form part of the capital and, thus, subject to income tax. 62 Specifically, the general rule states that: A stock dividend representing the transfer of surplus to capital account shall not be subject to tax. Having been derived from a foreign law, resort to the jurisprudence of its origin may shed light. Under the US Revenue Code, this provision originally referred to "stock dividends" only, without any exception. Stock dividends, strictly speaking, represent capital and do not constitute income to its recipient. 63 So that the mere issuance thereof is not yet subject to income tax 64 as they are nothing but an "enrichment through increase in value of capital investment." 65 As capital, the stock dividends postpone the realization of profits because the "fund represented by the new stock has been transferred from surplus to capital and no longer available for actual distribution." 66Income in tax law is "an amount of money coming to a person within a specified time, whether as payment for services, interest, or profit from investment." 67 It means cash or its equivalent. 68 It is gain derived and severed from capital, 69 from labor or from both combined 70 so that to tax a stock dividend would be to tax a capital increase rather than the income. 71 In a loose sense, stock dividends issued by the corporation, are considered unrealized gain, and cannot be subjected to income tax until that gain has been realized. Before the realization, stock dividends are nothing but a representation of an interest in the corporate properties. 72 As capital, it is not yet subject to income tax. It should be noted that capital and income are different. Capital is wealth or fund; whereas income is profit or gain or the flow of wealth. 73 The determining factor for the imposition of income tax is whether any gain or profit was derived from a transaction. 74 The Exception However, if a corporation cancels or redeems stock issued as a dividend at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption, in whole or in part, essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be considered as taxable income to the extent it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen. (Emphasis supplied). In a response to the ruling of the American Supreme Court in the case of Eisner v. Macomber 75 (that pro ratastock dividends are not taxable income), the exempting clause above quoted was added because provision corporation found a loophole in the original provision. They resorted to devious means to circumvent the law and evade the tax. Corporate earnings would be distributed under the guise of its initial capitalization by declaring the stock dividends previously issued and later redeem said dividends by paying cash to the stockholder. This process of issuance-redemption amounts to a distribution of taxable cash dividends which was lust delayed so as to escape the tax. It becomes a convenient technical strategy to avoid the effects of taxation. Thus, to plug the loophole the exempting clause was added. It provides that the redemption or cancellation of stock dividends, depending on the "time" and "manner" it was made, is essentially equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends," making the proceeds thereof "taxable income" "to the extent it represents profits". The exception was designed to prevent the issuance and cancellation or redemption of stock dividends, which is fundamentally not taxable, from being made use of as a device for the actual distribution of cash dividends, which is taxable. 76 Thus, the provision had the obvious purpose of preventing a corporation from avoiding dividend tax treatment by distributing earnings to its shareholders in two transactions a pro rata stock dividend followed by a pro rataredemption that would have the same economic consequences as a simple dividend. 77 Although redemption and cancellation are generally considered capital transactions, as such. they are not subject to tax. However, it does not necessarily mean that a shareholder may not realize a taxable gain from such transactions. 78 Simply put, depending on the circumstances, the proceeds of redemption of stock dividends are essentially distribution of cash dividends, which when paid becomes the absolute property of the stockholder. Thereafter, the latter becomes the exclusive owner thereof

and can exercise the freedom of choice. 79 Having realized gain from that redemption, the income earner cannot escape income tax. 80 As qualified by the phrase "such time and in such manner," the exception was not intended to characterize as taxable dividend every distribution of earnings arising from the redemption of stock dividend. 81 So that, whether the amount distributed in the redemption should be treated as the equivalent of a "taxable dividend" is a question of fact, 82 which is determinable on "the basis of the particular facts of the transaction in question. 83 No decisive test can be used to determine the application of the exemption under Section 83(b). The use of the words "such manner" and "essentially equivalent" negative any idea that a weighted formula can resolve a crucial issue Should the distribution be treated as taxable dividend. 84 On this aspect, American courts developed certain recognized criteria, which includes the following: 85 1) the presence or absence of real business purpose, 2) the amount of earnings and profits available for the declaration of a regular dividends and the corporation's past record with respect to the declaration of dividends, 3) the effect of the distribution, as compared with the declaration of regular dividend, 4) the lapse of time between issuance and redemption, 86 5) the presence of a substantial surplus 87 and a generous supply of cash which invites suspicion as does a meager policy in relation both to current earnings and accumulated surplus,88 REDEMPTION AND CANCELLATION For the exempting clause of Section, 83(b) to apply, it is indispensable that: (a) there is redemption or cancellation; (b) the transaction involves stock dividends and (c) the "time and manner" of the transaction makes it "essentially equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends." Of these, the most important is the third. Redemption is repurchase, a reacquisition of stock by a corporation which issued the stock 89 in exchange for property, whether or not the acquired stock is cancelled, retired or held in the treasury. 90 Essentially, the corporation gets back some of its stock, distributes cash or property to the shareholder in payment for the stock, and continues in business as before. The redemption of stock dividends previously issued is used as a veil for the constructive distribution of cash dividends. In the instant case, there is no dispute that ANSCOR redeemed shares of stocks from a stockholder (Don Andres) twice (28,000 and 80,000 common shares). But where did the shares redeemed come from? If its source is the original capital subscriptions upon establishment of the corporation or from initial capital investment in an existing enterprise, its redemption to the concurrent value of acquisition may not invite the application of Sec. 83(b) under the 1939 Tax Code, as it is not income but a mere return of capital. On the contrary, if the redeemed shares are from stock dividend declarations other than as initial capital investment, the proceeds of the redemption is additional wealth, for it is not merely a return of capital but a gain thereon. It is not the stock dividends but the proceeds of its redemption that may be deemed as taxable dividends. Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the last redemption, the original common shares owned by the estate were only 25,247.5 91 This means that from the total of 108,000 shares redeemed from the estate, the balance of 82,752.5 (108,000 less 25,247.5) must have come from stock dividends. Besides, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tax Code presumes that every distribution of corporate property, in whole or in part, is made out of corporate profits 92 such as stock dividends. The capital cannot be distributed in the form of redemption of stock dividends without violating the trust fund doctrine wherein the capital stock, property and other assets of the corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the payment of the corporate creditors. 93 Once capital, it is always capital. 94 That doctrine was intended for the protection of corporate creditors. 95 With respect to the third requisite, ANSCOR redeemed stock dividends issued just 2 to 3 years earlier. The time alone that lapsed from the issuance to the redemption is not a sufficient indicator to determine taxability. It is a must to consider the factual circumstances as to the manner of both the issuance and the redemption. The "time" element is a factor to show a device to evade tax and the scheme of cancelling or redeeming the same shares is a method

usually adopted to accomplish the end sought. 96 Was this transaction used as a "continuing plan," "device" or "artifice" to evade payment of tax? It is necessary to determine the "net effect" of the transaction between the shareholder-income taxpayer and the acquiring (redeeming) corporation. 97 The "net effect" test is not evidence or testimony to be considered; it is rather an inference to be drawn or a conclusion to be reached. 98 It is also important to know whether the issuance of stock dividends was dictated by legitimate business reasons, the presence of which might negate a tax evasion plan. 99 The issuance of stock dividends and its subsequent redemption must be separate, distinct, and not related, for the redemption to be considered a legitimate tax scheme. 100 Redemption cannot be used as a cloak to distribute corporate earnings. 101 Otherwise, the apparent intention to avoid tax becomes doubtful as the intention to evade becomes manifest. It has been ruled that: [A]n operation with no business or corporate purpose is a mere devise which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to a stockholder. 102 Depending on each case, the exempting provision of Sec. 83(b) of the 1939 Code may not be applicable if the redeemed shares were issued with bona fide business purpose, 103 which is judged after each and every step of the transaction have been considered and the whole transaction does not amount to a tax evasion scheme. ANSCOR invoked two reasons to justify the redemptions (1) the alleged "filipinization" program and (2) the reduction of foreign exchange remittances in case cash dividends are declared. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom of these purposes but on their relevance to the whole transaction which can be inferred from the outcome thereof. Again, it is the "net effect rather than the motives and plans of the taxpayer or his corporation" 104 that is the fundamental guide in administering Sec. 83(b). This tax provision is aimed at the result. 105 It also applies even if at the time of the issuance of the stock dividend, there was no intention to redeem it as a means of distributing profit or avoiding tax on dividends. 106 The existence of legitimate business purposes in support of the redemption of stock dividends is immaterial in income taxation. It has no relevance in determining "dividend equivalence". 107 Such purposes may be material only upon the issuance of the stock dividends. The test of taxability under the exempting clause, when it provides "such time and manner" as would make the redemption "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend", is whether the redemption resulted into a flow of wealth. If no wealth is realized from the redemption, there may not be a dividend equivalence treatment. In the metaphor of Eisner v. Macomber, income is not deemed "realize" until the fruit has fallen or been plucked from the tree. The three elements in the imposition of income tax are: (1) there must be gain or and profit, (2) that the gain or profit is realized or received, actually or constructively, 108 and (3) it is not exempted by law or treaty from income tax. Any business purpose as to why or how the income was earned by the taxpayer is not a requirement. Income tax is assessed on income received from any property, activity or service that produces the income because the Tax Code stands as an indifferent neutral party on the matter of where income comes from. 109 As stated above, the test of taxability under the exempting clause of Section 83(b) is, whether income was realized through the redemption of stock dividends. The redemption converts into money the stock dividends which become a realized profit or gain and consequently, the stockholder's separate property. 110 Profits derived from the capital invested cannot escape income tax. As realized income, the proceeds of the redeemed stock dividends can be reached by income taxation regardless of the existence of any business purpose for the redemption. Otherwise, to rule that the said proceeds are exempt from income tax when the redemption is supported by legitimate business reasons would defeat the very purpose of imposing tax on income. Such argument would open the door for income earners not to pay tax so long as the person from whom the income was derived has legitimate business reasons. In other words, the payment of tax under the exempting clause of Section 83(b) would be made to depend not on the income of the taxpayer, but on the business purposes of a third party (the corporation herein) from whom the income was earned. This is absurd, illogical and impractical considering that the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) would be pestered with instances in determining the

legitimacy of business reasons that every income earner may interposed. It is not administratively feasible and cannot therefore be allowed. The ruling in the American cases cited and relied upon by ANSCOR that "the redeemed shares are the equivalent of dividend only if the shares were not issued for genuine business purposes", 111 or the "redeemed shares have been issued by a corporation bona fide" 112 bears no relevance in determining the non-taxability of the proceeds of redemption ANSCOR, relying heavily and applying said cases, argued that so long as the redemption is supported by valid corporate purposes the proceeds are not subject to tax. 113 The adoption by the courts below 114 of such argument is misleading if not misplaced. A review of the cited American cases shows that the presence or absence of "genuine business purposes" may be material with respect to the issuance or declaration of stock dividends but not on its subsequent redemption. The issuance and the redemption of stocks are two different transactions. Although the existence of legitimate corporate purposes may justify a corporation's acquisition of its own shares under Section 41 of the Corporation Code, 115 such purposes cannot excuse the stockholder from the effects of taxation arising from the redemption. If the issuance of stock dividends is part of a tax evasion plan and thus, without legitimate business reasons, the redemption becomes suspicious which exempting clause. The substance of the whole transaction, not its form, usually controls the tax consequences. 116 The two purposes invoked by ANSCOR, under the facts of this case are no excuse for its tax liability. First, the alleged "filipinization" plan cannot be considered legitimate as it was not implemented until the BIR started making assessments on the proceeds of the redemption. Such corporate plan was not stated in nor supported by any Board Resolution but a mere afterthought interposed by the counsel of ANSCOR. Being a separate entity, the corporation can act only through its Board of Directors. 117 The Board Resolutions authorizing the redemptions state only one purpose reduction of foreign exchange remittances in case cash dividends are declared. Not even this purpose can be given credence. Records show that despite the existence of enormous corporate profits no cash dividend was ever declared by ANSCOR from 1945 until the BIR started making assessments in the early 1970's. Although a corporation under certain exceptions, has the prerogative when to issue dividends, yet when no cash dividends was issued for about three decades, this circumstance negates the legitimacy of ANSCOR's alleged purposes. Moreover, to issue stock dividends is to increase the shareholdings of ANSCOR's foreign stockholders contrary to its "filipinization" plan. This would also increase rather than reduce their need for foreign exchange remittances in case of cash dividend declaration, considering that ANSCOR is a family corporation where the majority shares at the time of redemptions were held by Don Andres' foreign heirs. Secondly, assuming arguendo, that those business purposes are legitimate, the same cannot be a valid excuse for the imposition of tax. Otherwise, the taxpayer's liability to pay income tax would be made to depend upon a third person who did not earn the income being taxed. Furthermore, even if the said purposes support the redemption and justify the issuance of stock dividends, the same has no bearing whatsoever on the imposition of the tax herein assessed because the proceeds of the redemption are deemed taxable dividends since it was shown that income was generated therefrom. Thirdly, ANSCOR argued that to treat as "taxable dividend" the proceeds of the redeemed stock dividends would be to impose on such stock an undisclosed lien and would be extremely unfair to intervening purchase, i.e. those who buys the stock dividends after their issuance. 118 Such argument, however, bears no relevance in this case as no intervening buyer is involved. And even if there is an intervening buyer, it is necessary to look into the factual milieu of the case if income was realized from the transaction. Again, we reiterate that the dividend equivalence test depends on such "time and manner" of the transaction and its net effect. The undisclosed lien119 may be unfair to a subsequent stock buyer who has no capital interest in the company. But the unfairness may not be true to an original subscriber like Don Andres, who holds stock dividends as gains from his investments. The subsequent buyer who buys stock dividends is investing capital. It just so happen that what he bought is stock dividends. The effect of its (stock dividends) redemption from that subsequent buyer is merely to return his capital subscription, which is income if redeemed from the original subscriber. After considering the manner and the circumstances by which the issuance and redemption of stock dividends were made, there is no other conclusion but that the proceeds thereof are essentially considered equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends. As "taxable dividend"

under Section 83(b), it is part of the "entire income" subject to tax under Section 22 in relation to Section 21 120 of the 1939 Code. Moreover, under Section 29(a) of said Code, dividends are included in "gross income". As income, it is subject to income tax which is required to be withheld at source. The 1997 Tax Code may have altered the situation but it does not change this disposition. EXCHANGE OF COMMON WITH PREFERRED SHARES 121 Exchange is an act of taking or giving one thing for another involving 122 reciprocal transfer 123 and is generally considered as a taxable transaction. The exchange of common stocks with preferred stocks, or preferred for common or a combination of either for both, may not produce a recognized gain or loss, so long as the provisions of Section 83(b) is not applicable. This is true in a trade between two (2) persons as well as a trade between a stockholder and a corporation. In general, this trade must be parts of merger, transfer to controlled corporation, corporate acquisitions or corporate reorganizations. No taxable gain or loss may be recognized on exchange of property, stock or securities related to reorganizations. 124 Both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals found that ANSCOR reclassified its shares into common and preferred, and that parts of the common shares of the Don Andres estate and all of Doa Carmen's shares were exchanged for the whole 150.000 preferred shares. Thereafter, both the Don Andres estate and Doa Carmen remained as corporate subscribers except that their subscriptions now include preferred shares. There was no change in their proportional interest after the exchange. There was no cash flow. Both stocks had the same par value. Under the facts herein, any difference in their market value would be immaterial at the time of exchange because no income is yet realized it was a mere corporate paper transaction. It would have been different, if the exchange transaction resulted into a flow of wealth, in which case income tax may be imposed. 125 Reclassification of shares does not always bring any substantial alteration in the subscriber's proportional interest. But the exchange is different there would be a shifting of the balance of stock features, like priority in dividend declarations or absence of voting rights. Yet neither the reclassification nor exchange per se, yields realize income for tax purposes. A common stock represents the residual ownership interest in the corporation. It is a basic class of stock ordinarily and usually issued without extraordinary rights or privileges and entitles the shareholder to a pro rata division of profits. 126 Preferred stocks are those which entitle the shareholder to some priority on dividends and asset distribution. 127 Both shares are part of the corporation's capital stock. Both stockholders are no different from ordinary investors who take on the same investment risks. Preferred and common shareholders participate in the same venture, willing to share in the profits and losses of the enterprise. 128 Moreover, under the doctrine of equality of shares all stocks issued by the corporation are presumed equal with the same privileges and liabilities, provided that the Articles of Incorporation is silent on such differences. 129 In this case, the exchange of shares, without more, produces no realized income to the subscriber. There is only a modification of the subscriber's rights and privileges which is not a flow of wealth for tax purposes. The issue of taxable dividend may arise only once a subscriber disposes of his entire interest and not when there is still maintenance of proprietary interest. 130 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that ANSCOR's redemption of 82,752.5 stock dividends is herein considered as essentially equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends for which it is LIABLE for the withholding tax-atsource. The decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 179063 October 23, 2009 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This is an action involving a disputed assessment for deficiencies in the payment of creditable withholding tax and documentary stamps tax due from a foreclosure sale. The Facts and the Case Respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) granted loans of P68,840,000.00 and P335,000,000.00 to George C. Co, Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc., and Tesco Realty Co. that the borrowers caused to be secured by several real estate mortgages. When the latter later failed to pay their loans, UCPB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. Pursuant to that petition, on December 31, 2001 a notary public for Manila held a public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. UCPB made the highest winning bid ofP504,785,000.00 for the whole lot. On January 4, 2002 the notary public submitted the Certificate of Sale to the Executive Judge of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for his approval. 1 But, on February 18, 2002 the executive judge returned it with instruction to the notary public to explain an inconsistency in the tax declaration of one mortgaged property. The executive judge further ordered the notary public to show proof of payment of the Sheriffs percentage of the bid price.2 The notary public complied.3 On March 1, 2002 the executive judge finally signed the certificate of sale and approved its issuance to UCPB as the highest bidder.4 On June 18, 2002 UCPB presented the certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds of Manila for annotation on the transfer certificates of title of the foreclosed properties. On July 5, 2002 the bank paid creditable withholding taxes (CWT) of P28,640,700.00 and documentary stamp taxes (DST) of P7,160,165.00 in relation to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. It then submitted an affidavit of consolidation of ownership to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with proof of tax payments and other documents in support of the banks application for a tax clearance certificate and certificate authorizing registration. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), however, charged UCPB with late payment of the corresponding DST and CWT, citing Section 2.58 of Revenue Regulation 2-98, which stated that the CWT must be paid within 10 days after the end of each month, and Section 5 of Revenue Regulation 06-01, which required payment of DST within five days after the close of the month when the taxable document was made, signed, accepted or transferred. These taxes accrued upon the lapse of the redemption period of the mortgaged properties. The CIR pointed out that the mortgagor, a juridical person, had three months after foreclosure within which to redeem the properties.5 The CIR theorized that the three-month redemption period was to be counted from the date of the foreclosure sale. Here, he said, the redemption period lapsed three months from December 31, 2001 or on March 31, 2002. Thus, UCPB was in default for having paid the CWT and DST only on July 5, 2002. For this reason the CIR issued a Pre-Assessment Notice6 and, subsequently, a Final Assessment Notice7 to UCPB for deficiency CWT ofP8,617,210.00 and deficiency DST of P2,173,051.75. UCPB protested the assessment. It claimed that the redemption period lapsed on June 1, 2002 or three months after the executive judge of Manila approved the issuance of the certificate of sale. "Foreclosure" under Section 47 of the General Banking Law, said UCPB, referred to the date of approval by the executive judge, and not the date of the auction sale. But the CIR denied UCPBs protest, prompting UCPB to file a petition for review with the CTA in CTA Case 7164. On July 26, 2006 the CTA Second Division set aside the decision of the CIR and held that the redemption period lapsed three months after the executive judge approved the certificate of sale. It said that "foreclosure" under the law referred to the whole process of foreclosure which included the approval and issuance of the certificate of sale. There was no sale to speak of which could be taxed prior to such approval and issuance. Since the executive judge approved the issuance only on March 1, 2002, the redemption period expired on June 1, 2002. Hence, UCPBs payments of CWT and DST in early July were well within the prescribed period. On appeal to the CTA En Banc in CTA EB 234, the latter affirmed the decision of the Second

Division on June 5, 2007. With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner has taken recourse to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. Issue The key issue in this case is whether or not the three-month redemption period for juridical persons should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale. Ruling The CIR argues that he has the more reasonable position: the redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale for, otherwise, the taxing authority would be left at the mercy of the executive judge who may unnecessarily delay the approval of the certificate of sale and thus prevent the early payment of taxes. But the Supreme Court had occasion under its resolution in Administrative Matter 99-10-05-08 to rule that the certificate of sale shall issue only upon approval of the executive judge who must, in the interest of fairness, first determine that the requirements for extrajudicial foreclosures have been strictly followed. For instance, in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Yap,9 this Court sustained a judges resolution requiring payment of notarial commission as a condition for the issuance of the certificate of sale to the highest bidder. Here, the executive judge approved the issuance of the certificate of sale to UCPB on March 1, 2002. Consequently, the three-month redemption period ended only on June 1, 2002. Only on this date then did the deadline for payment of CWT and DST on the extrajudicial foreclosure sale become due. Under Section 2.58 of Revenue Regulation 2-98, the CWT return and payment become due within 10 days after the end of each month, except for taxes withheld for the month of December of each year, which shall be filed on or before January 15 of the following year. On the other hand, under Section 5 of Revenue Regulation 06-01, the DST return and payment become due within five days after the close of the month when the taxable document was made, signed, accepted, or transferred. The BIR confirmed and summarized the above provisions under Revenue Memorandum Circular 58-2008 in this manner: [I]f the property is an ordinary asset of the mortgagor, the creditable expanded withholding tax shall be due and paid within ten (10) days following the end of the month in which the redemption period expires. x x x Moreover, the payment of the documentary stamp tax and the filing of the return thereof shall have to be made within five (5) days from the end of the month when the redemption period expires.1avvphi1 UCPB had, therefore, until July 10, 2002 to pay the CWT and July 5, 2002 to pay the DST. Since it paid both taxes on July 5, 2002, it is not liable for deficiencies. Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the decision of the CTA. Besides, on August 15, 2008, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular 58-2008 10which clarified among others, the time within which to reckon the redemption period of real estate mortgages. It reads: For purposes of reckoning the one-year redemption period in the case of individual mortgagors, or the three-month redemption period for juridical persons/mortgagors, the same shall be reckoned from the date of the confirmation of the auction sale which is the date when the certificate of sale is issued. The CIR must have in the meantime conceded the unreasonableness of the previous position it had taken on this matter. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102967 February 10, 2000 BIBIANO V. BAAS, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AQUILINO T. LARIN, RODOLFO TUAZON AND PROCOPIO TALON, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-C.R. CV No. 17251 promulgated on November 29, 1991. It affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Manila, in Civil Case No. 82-12107. Said judgment disposed as follows: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the complaint against all the defendants and ordering plaintiff [herein petitioner] to pay defendant Larin the amount of P200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Pesos) as actual and compensatory damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of P100,000.00.1 The facts, which we find supported by the records, have been summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: On February 20, 1976, petitioner, Bibiano V. Baas Jr. sold to Ayala Investment Corporation (AYALA), 128,265 square meters of land located at Bayanan, Muntinlupa, for two million, three hundred eight thousand, seven hundred seventy (P2,308,770.00) pesos. The Deed of Sale provided that upon the signing of the contract AYALA shall pay four hundred sixty-one thousand, seven hundred fifty-four (P461,754.00) pesos. The balance of one million, eight hundred fortyseven thousand and sixteen (P1,847,016.00) pesos was to be paid in four equal consecutive annual installments, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum on the outstanding balance. AYALA issued one promissory note covering four equal annual installments. Each periodic payment of P461,754.00 pesos shall be payable starting on February 20, 1977, and every year thereafter, or until February 20, 1980. The same day, petitioner discounted the promissory note with AYALA, for its face value of P1,847,016.00, evidenced by a Deed of Assignment signed by the petitioner and AYALA. AYALA issued nine (9) checks to petitioner, all dated February 20, 1976, drawn against Bank of the Philippine Islands with the uniform amount of two hundred five thousand, two hundred twenty-four (P205,224.00) pesos. In his 1976 Income Tax Return, petitioner reported the P461,754 initial payment as income from disposition of capital asset.2 Selling Price of Land Less Initial Payment Unrealized Gain P2,308,770.00 461,754.00 P1,847,016.00
3

1976 Declaration of Income on Disposition of Capital Asset subject to Tax: Initial Payment Less: Cost of land and other incidental Expenses Income Income subject to tax (P385,206. 10 x 50%) P461,754.00 ( 76,547.90) P385,206.10 P192,603.65

In the succeeding years, until 1979, petitioner reported a uniform income of two hundred thirty thousand, eight hundred seventy-seven (P230,877.00) pesos4 as gain from sale of capital asset. In his 1980 income tax amnesty return, petitioner also reported the same amount of P230,877.00 as the realized gain on disposition of capital asset for the year.

On April 11, 1978, then Revenue Director Mauro Calaguio authorized tax examiners, Rodolfo Tuazon and Procopio Talon to examine the books and records of petitioner for the year 1976. They discovered that petitioner had no outstanding receivable from the 1976 land sale to AYALA and concluded that the sale was cash and the entire profit should have been taxable in 1976 since the income was wholly derived in 1976. Tuazon and Talon filed their audit report and declared a discrepancy of two million, ninety-five thousand, nine hundred fifteen (P2,095,915.00) pesos in petitioner's 1976 net income. They recommended deficiency tax assessment for two million, four hundred seventy-three thousand, six hundred seventy-three (P2,473,673.00) pesos. Meantime, Aquilino Larin succeeded Calaguio as Regional Director of Manila Region IV-A. After reviewing the examiners' report, Larin directed the revision of the audit report, with instruction to consider the land as capital asset. The tax due was only fifty (50%) percent of the total gain from sale of the property held by the taxpayer beyond twelve months pursuant to Section 34 5 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The deficiency tax assessment was reduced to nine hundred thirty six thousand, five hundred ninety-eight pesos and fifty centavos (P936,598.50), inclusive of surcharges and penalties for the year 1976. On June 27, 1980, respondent Larin sent a letter to petitioner informing of the income tax deficiency that must be settled him immediately. On September 26, 1980, petitioner acknowledged receipt of the letter but insisted that the sale of his land to AYALA was on installment. On June 8, 1981, the matter was endorsed to the Acting Chief of the Legal Branch of the National Office of the BIR. The Chief of the Tax Fraud Unit recommended the prosecution of a criminal case for conspiring to file false and fraudulent returns, in violation of Section 51 of the Tax Code against petitioner and his accountants, Andres P. Alejandre and Conrado Baas. On June 17, 1981, Larin filed a criminal complaint for tax evasion against the petitioner. On July 1, 1981, news items appeared in the now defunct Evening Express with the headline: "BIR Charges Realtor" and another in the defunct Evening Post with a news item: "BIR raps Realtor, 2 accountants." Another news item also appeared in the July 2, 1981, issue of the Bulletin Today entitled: "3-face P1-M tax evasion raps." All news items mentioned petitioner's false income tax return concerning the sale of land to AYALA. On July 2, 1981, petitioner filed an Amnesty Tax Return under P.D. 1740 and paid the amount of forty-one thousand, seven hundred twenty-nine pesos and eighty-one centavos (P41,729.81). On November 2, 1981, petitioner again filed an Amnesty Tax Return under P.D. 1840 and paid an additional amount of one thousand, five hundred twenty-five pesos and sixty-two centavos (P1,525.62). In both, petitioner did not recognize that his sale of land to AYALA was on cash basis. Reacting to the complaint for tax evasion and the news reports, petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila an action6for damages against respondents Larin, Tuazon and Talon for extortion and malicious publication of the BIR's tax audit report. He claimed that the filing of criminal complaints against him for violation of tax laws were improper because he had already availed of two tax amnesty decrees, Presidential Decree Nos. 1740 and 1840. The trial court decided in favor of the respondents and awarded Larin damages, as already stated. Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of November 29, 1991, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's decision, thus: The finding of the court a quo that plaintiff-appellant's actions against defendantappellee Larin were unwarranted and baseless and as a result thereof, defendantappellee Larin was subjected to unnecessary anxiety and humiliation is therefore supported by the evidence on record.1wphi1.nt Defendant-appellee Larin acted only in pursuance of the authority granted to him. In fact, the criminal charges filed against him in the Tanodbayan and in the City Fiscal's Office were all dismissed. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7 Hence this petition, wherein petitioner raises before us the following queries: I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF PERTINENT TAX LAWS, THUS IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE CORRECTNESS AND ACCURACY OF PETITIONER'S RETURN OF THE INCOME DERIVED FROM THE SALE OF THE LAND TO AYALA.

II. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO EXTORT [MONEY FROM] PETITIONER BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. III. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1740 AND 1840, AMONG OTHERS, PETITIONER'S IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. IV. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AS REGARDS THE AWARD OF ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT LARIN. In essence, petitioner asks the Court to resolve seriatim the following issues: 1. Whether respondent court erred in ruling that there was no extortion attempt by BIR officials; 2. Whether respondent court erred in holding that P.D. 1740 and 1840 granting tax amnesties did not grant immunity from tax suits; 3. Whether respondent court erred in finding that petitioner's income from the sale of land in 1976 should be declared as a cash transaction in his tax return for the same year (because the buyer discounted the promissory note issued to the seller on future installment payments of the sale, on the same day of the sale); 4. Whether respondent court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding damages to respondent Larin. The first issue, on whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was no extortion, involves a determination of fact. The Court of Appeals observed, The only evidence to establish the alleged extortion attempt by defendants-appellees is the plaintiff-appellant's self serving declarations. As found by the court a quo, "said attempt was known to plaintiff-appellant's son-inlaw and counsel on record, yet, said counsel did not take the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of plaintiff."8 As repeatedly held, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals especially if they affirm factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed by this Court, unless these findings are not supported by evidence.9 Similarly, neither should we disturb a finding of the trial court and appellate court that an allegation is not supported by evidence on record. Thus, we agree with the conclusion of respondent court that herein private respondents, on the basis of evidence, could not be held liable for extortion. On the second issue of whether P.D. Nos. 1740 and 1840 which granted tax amnesties also granted immunity from criminal prosecution against tax offenses, the pertinent sections of these laws state: P.D. No. 1740. CONDONING PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS OF THE INCOME TAX LAW UPON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF UNDECLARED INCOME FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES AND REQUIRING PERIODIC SUBMISSION OF NET WORTH STATEMENT. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 1. Voluntary Disclosure of Correct Taxable Income. Any individual who, for any or all of the taxable years 1974 to 1979, had failed to file a return is hereby, allowed to file a return for each of the aforesaid taxable years and accurately declare therein the true and correct income, deductions and exemptions and pay the income tax due per return. Likewise, any individual who filed a false or fraudulent return for any taxable year in the period mentioned above may amend his return and pay the correct amount of tax due after deducting the taxes already paid, if any, in the original declaration. (emphasis ours) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 5. Immunity from Penalties. Any individual who voluntarily files a return under this Decree and pays the income tax due thereon shall be immune from the penalties, civil or criminal, under the National Internal Revenue Code arising from failure to pay the correct income tax with respect to the taxable years from which an amended return was filed or for which an original return was filed in cases where no return has been filed for any of the taxable years 1974 to 1979: Provided, however, That these immunities shall not apply in cases where the amount of net taxable income declared

under this Decree is understated to the extent of 25% or more of the correct net taxable income. (emphasis ours) P.D. NO. 1840 GRANTING A TAX AMNESTY ON UNTAXED INCOME AND/OR WEALTH EARNED OR ACQUIRED DURING THE TAXABLE YEARS 1974 TO 1980 AND REQUIRING THE FILING OF THE STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH. Sec. 1. Coverage. In case of voluntary disclosure of previously untaxed income and/or wealth such as earnings, receipts, gifts, bequests or any other acquisition from any source whatsoever, realized here or abroad, by any individual taxpayer, which are taxable under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the assessment and collection of all internal revenue taxes, including the increments or penalties on account of non-payment, as well as all civil, criminal or administrative liabilities arising from or incident thereto under the National Internal Revenue Code, are hereby condoned provided that the individual taxpayer shall pay. (emphasis ours) . . . Sec. 2. Conditions for Immunity. The immunity granted under Section one of this Decree shall apply only under the following conditions: a) Such previously untaxed income and/or wealth must have been earned or realized in any of the years 1974 to 1980; b) The taxpayer must file an amnesty return on or before November 30, 1981, and fully pay the tax due thereon; c) The amnesty tax paid by the taxpayer under this Decree shall not be less than P1,000.00 per taxable year; and d) The taxpayer must file a statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as of December 31, 1980, as required under Section 6 hereof. (emphasis ours) It will be recalled that petitioner entered into a deed of sale purportedly on installment. On the same day, he discounted the promissory note covering the future installments. The discounting seems questionable because ordinarily, when a bill is discounted, the lender (e.g. banks, financial institution) charges or deducts a certain percentage from the principal value as its compensation. Here, the discounting was done by the buyer. On July 2, 1981, two weeks after the filing of the tax evasion complaint against him by respondent Larin on June 17, 1981, petitioner availed of the tax amnesty under P.D. No. 1740. His amended tax return for the years 1974 - 1979 was filed with the BIR office of Valenzuela, Bulacan, instead of Manila where the petitioner's principal office was located. He again availed of the tax amnesty under P.D. No. 1840. His disclosure, however, did not include the income from his sale of land to AYALA on cash basis. Instead he insisted that such sale was on installment. He did not amend his income tax return. He did not pay the tax which was considerably increased by the income derived from the discounting. He did not meet the twin requirements of P.D. 1740 and 1840, declaration of his untaxed income and full payment of tax due thereon. Clearly, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of P.D. Nos. 1740 and 1840. The mere filing of tax amnesty return under P.D. 1740 and 1840 does not ipso facto shield him from immunity against prosecution. Tax amnesty is a general pardon to taxpayers who want to start a clean tax slate. It also gives the government a chance to collect uncollected tax from tax evaders without having to go through the tedious process of a tax case. To avail of a tax amnesty granted by the government, and to be immune from suit on its delinquencies, the tax payer must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income and must have paid the corresponding tax on such previously untaxed income.10 It also bears noting that a tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.11 Hence, on this matter, it is our view that petitioner's claim of immunity from prosecution under the shield of availing tax amnesty is untenable. On the third issue, petitioner asserts that his sale of the land to AYALA was not on cash basis but on installment as clearly specified in the Deed of Sale which states: That for and in consideration of the sum of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY (P2,308,770.00) PESOS Philippine Currency, to be paid as follows: 1. P461,754.00, upon the signing of the Deed of Sale; and,

2. The balance of P1,847,016.00, to be paid in four (4) equal, consecutive, annual installments with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, beginning on February 20, 1976, said installments to be evidenced by four (4) negotiable promissory notes.12 Petitioner resorts to Section 43 of the NIRC and Sec. 175 of Revenue Regulation No. 2 to support his claim. Sec. 43 of the 1977 NIRC states, Installment basis. (a) Dealers in personal property. . . . (b) Sales of realty and casual sales of personalty In the case (1) of a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property (other than property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year), for a price exceeding one thousand pesos, or (2) of a sale or other disposition of real property if in either case the initial payments do not exceed twentyfive percentum of the selling price, the income may, under regulations prescribed by the Minister of Finance, be returned on the basis and in the manner above prescribed in this section. As used in this section the term "initial payment" means the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable period in which the sale or other disposition is made. . . . (emphasis ours) Revenue Regulation No. 2, Section 175 provides, Sale of real property involving deferred payments . Under section 43 deferredpayment sales of real property include (1) agreements of purchase and sale which contemplate that a conveyance is not to be made at the outset, but only after all or a substantial portion of the selling price has been paid, and (b) sales in which there is an immediate transfer of title, the vendor being protected by a mortgage or other lien as to deferred payments. Such sales either under (a) or (b), fall into two classes when considered with respect to the terms of sale, as follows: (1) Sales of property on the installment plan, that is, sales in which the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable year in which the sale is made do not exceed 25 per cent of the selling price; (2) Deferred-payment sales not on the installment plan, that is sales in which the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable year in which the sale is made exceed 25 per cent of the selling price; In the sale of mortgaged property the amount of the mortgage, whether the property is merely taken subject to the mortgage or whether the mortgage is assumed by the purchaser, shall be included as a part of the "selling price" but the amount of the mortgage, to the extent it does not exceed the basis to the vendor of the property sold, shall not be considered as a part of the "initial payments" or of the "total contract price," as those terms are used in section 43 of the Code, in sections 174 and 176 of these regulations, and in this section. The term "initial payments" does not include amounts received by the vendor in the year of sale from the disposition to a third person of notes given by the vendee as part of the purchase price which are due and payable in subsequent years. Commissions and other selling expenses paid or incurred by the vendor are not to be deducted or taken into account in determining the amount of the "initial payments," the "total contract price," or the "selling price." The term "initial payments" contemplates at least one other payment in addition to the initial payment. If the entire purchase price is to be paid in a lump sum in a later year, there being no payment during the year, the income may not be returned on the installment basis. Income may not be returned on the installment basis where no payment in cash or property, other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser, is received during the first year, the purchaser having promised to make two or more payments, in later years. Petitioner asserts that Sec. 43 allows him to return as income in the taxable years involved, the respective installments as provided by the deed of sale between him and AYALA. Consequently, he religiously reported his yearly income from sale of capital asset, subject to tax, as follows:

Year 1977 (50% of P461,754) P230,877.00 1978 1979 1980 230,877.00 230,877.00 230,877.00

Petitioner says that his tax declarations are acceptable modes of payment under Section 175 of the Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 2. The term "initial payment", he argues, does not include amounts received by the vendor which are part of the complete purchase price, still due and payable in subsequent years. Thus, the proceeds of the promissory notes, not yet due which he discounted to AYALA should not be included as income realized in 1976. Petitioner states that the original agreement in the Deed of Sale should not be affected by the subsequent discounting of the bill. On the other hand, respondents assert that taxation is a matter of substance and not of form. Returns are scrutinized to determine if transactions are what they are and not declared to evade taxes. Considering the progressive nature of our income taxation, when income is spread over several installment payments through the years, the taxable income goes down and the tax due correspondingly decreases. When payment is in lump sum the tax for the year proportionately increases. Ultimately, a declaration that a sale is on installment diminishes government taxes for the year of initial installment as against a declaration of cash sale where taxes to the government is larger. As a general rule, the whole profit accruing from a sale of property is taxable as income in the year the sale is made. But, if not all of the sale price is received during such year, and a statute provides that income shall be taxable in the year in which it is "received," the profit from an installment sale is to be apportioned between or among the years in which such installments are paid and received.13 Sec. 43 and Sec. 175 says that among the entities who may use the above-mentioned installment method is a seller of real property who disposes his property on installment, provided that the initial payment does not exceed 25% of the selling price. They also state what may be regarded as installment payment and what constitutes initial payment. Initial payment means the payment received in cash or property excluding evidences of indebtedness due and payable in subsequent years, like promissory notes or mortgages, given of the purchaser during the taxable year of sale. Initial payment does not include amounts received by the vendor in the year of sale from the disposition to a third person of notes given by the vendee as part of the purchase price which are due and payable in subsequent years.14 Such disposition or discounting of receivable is material only as to the computation of the initial payment. If the initial payment is within 25% of total contract price, exclusive of the proceeds of discounted notes, the sale qualifies as an installment sale, otherwise it is a deferred sale.15 Although the proceed of a discounted promissory note is not considered part of the initial payment, it is still taxable income for the year it was converted into cash. The subsequent payments or liquidation of certificates of indebtedness is reported using the installment method in computing the proportionate income16 to be returned, during the respective year it was realized. Non-dealer sales of real or personal property may be reported as income under the installment method provided that the obligation is still outstanding at the close of that year. If the seller disposes the entire installment obligation by discounting the bill or the promissory note, he necessarily must report the balance of the income from the discounting not only income from the initial installment payment. Where an installment obligation is discounted at a bank or finance company, a taxable disposition results, even if the seller guarantees its payment, continues to collect on the installment obligation, or handles repossession of merchandise in case of default. 17 This rule prevails in the United States.18 Since our income tax laws are of American origin,19 interpretations by American courts an our parallel tax laws have persuasive effect on the interpretation of these laws.20 Thus, by analogy, all the more would a taxable disposition result when the discounting of the promissory note is done by the seller himself. Clearly, the indebtedness of the buyer is discharged, while the seller acquires money for the settlement of his receivables. Logically then, the income should be reported at the time of the actual gain. For income tax purposes, income is an actual gain or an actual increase of wealth. 21 Although the

proceeds of a discounted promissory note is not considered initial payment, still it must be included as taxable income on the year it was converted to cash. When petitioner had the promissory notes covering the succeeding installment payments of the land issued by AYALA, discounted by AYALA itself, on the same day of the sale, he lost entitlement to report the sale as a sale on installment since, a taxable disposition resulted and petitioner was required by law to report in his returns the income derived from the discounting. What petitioner did is tantamount to an attempt to circumvent the rule on payment of income taxes gained from the sale of the land to AYALA for the year 1976. Lastly, petitioner questions the damages awarded to respondent Larin. Any person who seeks to be awarded actual or compensatory damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving said damages as well as the amount thereof. 22 Larin says the extortion cases filed against him hampered his immediate promotion, caused him strong anxiety and social humiliation. The trial court awarded him two hundred thousand (P200,000,00) pesos as actual damages. However, the appellate court stated that, despite pendency of this case, Larin was given a promotion at the BIR. Said respondent court: We find nothing on record, aside from defendant-appellee Larin's statements (TSN, pp. 6-7, 11 December 1985), to show that he suffered loss of seniority that allegedly barred his promotion. In fact, he was promoted to his present position despite the pendency of the instant case (TSN, pp. 35-39, 04 November 1985).23 Moreover, the records of the case contain no statement whatsoever of the amount of the actual damages sustained by the respondents. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence on the record.24The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages.25 To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss. 26 Since we have no basis with which to assess, with certainty, the actual or compensatory damages counter-claimed by respondent Larin, the award of such damages should be deleted. Moral damages may be recovered in cases involving acts referred to in Article 21 27 of the Civil Code.28 As a rule, a public official may not recover damages for charges of falsehood related to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. In Babst, et. al. vs. National Intelligence Board, et. al., 132 SCRA 316, 330 (1984), we reiterated the test for actual malice as set forth in the landmark American case of New York Times vs. Sullivan,29 which we have long adopted, in defamation and libel cases, viz.: . . . with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. We appreciate petitioner's claim that he filed his 1976 return in good faith and that he had honestly believed that the law allowed him to declare the sale of the land, in installment. We can further grant that the pertinent tax laws needed construction, as we have earlier done. That petitioner was offended by the headlines alluding to him as tax evader is also fully understandable. All these, however, do not justify what amounted to a baseless prosecution of respondent Larin. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove Larin extorted money from him. He even admitted that he never met nor talked to respondent Larin. When the tax investigation against the petitioner started, Larin was not yet the Regional Director of BIR Region IV-A, Manila. On respondent Larin's instruction, petitioner's tax assessment was considered one involving a sale of capital asset, the income from which was subjected to only fifty percent (50%) assessment, thus reducing the original tax assessment by half. These circumstances may be taken to show that Larin's involvement in extortion was not indubitable. Yet, petitioner went on to file the extortion cases against Larin in different fora. This is where actual malice could attach on petitioner's part. Significantly, the trial court did not err in dismissing petitioner's complaints, a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Keeping all these in mind, we are constrained to agree that there is sufficient basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondent Larin. The appellate court believed respondent Larin when he said he suffered anxiety and humiliation because of the unfounded charges against him. Petitioner's actions against Larin were found "unwarranted and baseless," and the criminal charges filed against him in the Tanodbayan and City Fiscal's Office were all dismissed.30 Hence, there is adequate support for respondent court's conclusion that moral damages have been proved. Now, however, what would be a fair amount to be paid as compensation for moral damages also requires determination. Each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 31 On

this score, Del Rosario vs.Court of Appeals,32 cites several cases where no actual damages were adjudicated, and where moral and exemplary damages were reduced for being "too excessive," thus: In the case of PNB v. C.A., [256 SCRA 309 (1996)], this Court quoted with approval the following observation from RCPI v. Rodriguez, viz: ** **. Nevertheless, we find the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages in favor of respondent Rodriguez excessive and unconscionable. In the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) we said: . . . [I]t is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages (Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court" (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bacharach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone v. Bacharach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the actual loses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable amounts. . . . . (Emphasis ours.) In other words, the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered. In the same case (PNB v. CA), this Court found the amount of exemplary damages required to be paid (P1,000,000,00) "too excessive" and reduced it to an "equitable level" (P25,000.00). It will be noted that in above cases, the parties who were awarded moral damages were not public officials. Considering that here, the award is in favor of a government official in connection with his official function, it is with caution that we affirm granting moral damages, for it might open the floodgates for government officials counter-claiming damages in suits filed against them in connection with their functions. Moreover, we must be careful lest the amounts awarded make citizens hesitate to expose corruption in the government, for fear of lawsuits from vindictive government officials. Thus, conformably with our declaration that moral damages are not intended to enrich anyone,33 we hereby reduce the moral damages award in this case from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos to seventy five thousand (P75,000.00) pesos, while the exemplary damage is set at P25,000.00 only. The law allows the award of attorney's fees when exemplary damages are awarded, and when the party to a suit was compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest. 34 Though government officers are usually represented by the Solicitor General in cases connected with the performance of official functions, considering the nature of the charges, herein respondent Larin was compelled to hire a private lawyer for the conduct of his defense as well as the successful pursuit of his counterclaims. In our view, given the circumstances of this case, there is ample ground to award in his favor P50,000,00 as reasonable attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION so that the award of actual damages are deleted; and that petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay to respondent Larin moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 only.1wphi1.nt No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 159610 June 12, 2008 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 13 August 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70480. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (petitioner) questioning the 15 April 2002 Decision3 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 6054 ordering petitioner to issue, in favor of Central Luzon Drug Corporation (respondent), a tax credit certificate in the amount of P2,376,805.63, arising from the alleged erroneous interpretation of the term "tax credit" used in Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7432.4 The Facts Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the retail of medicines and other pharmaceutical products.5 In 1997, it operated eight drugstores under the business name and style "Mercury Drug."6 Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7432 and Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-947 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent granted 20% sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their purchases of medicines covering the calendar year 1997. The sales discount granted to senior citizens totaled P2,798,508.00. On 15 April 1998, respondent filed its 1997 Corporate Annual Income Tax Return reflecting a nil income tax liability due to net loss incurred from business operations of P2,405,140.00.8 Respondent filed its 1997 Income Tax Return under protest.9 On 19 March 1999, respondent filed with the petitioner a claim for refund or credit of overpaid income tax for the taxable year 1997 in the amount of P2,660,829.00.10 Respondent alleged that the overpaid tax was the result of the wrongful implementation of RA 7432. Respondent treated the 20% sales discount as a deduction from gross sales in compliance with RR 2-94 instead of treating it as a tax credit as provided under Section 4(a) of RA 7432. On 6 April 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA in order to toll the running of the two-year statutory period within which to file a judicial claim. Respondent reasoned that RR 2-94, which is a mere implementing administrative regulation, cannot modify, alter or amend the clear mandate of RA 7432. Consequently, Section 2(i) of RR 2-94 is without force and effect for being inconsistent with the law it seeks to implement.11 In his Answer, petitioner stated that the construction given to a statute by a specialized administrative agency like the BIR is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight. When RA 7432 allowed senior citizens' discounts to be claimed as tax credit, it was silent as to the mechanics of availing the same. For clarification, the BIR issued RR 2-94 and defined the term "tax credit" as a deduction from the establishment's gross income and not from its tax liability in order to avoid an absurdity that is not intended by the law. 12 The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals On 15 April 2002, the CTA rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount ofP2,376,805.63 in favor of respondent. The CTA stated that in a number of analogous cases, it has consistently ruled that the 20% senior citizens' discount should be treated as tax credit instead of a mere deduction from gross income.13 In quoting its previous decisions, the CTA ruled that RR 2-94 engraved a new meaning to the phrase "tax credit" as deductible from gross income which is a deviation from the plain intendment of the law. An administrative regulation must not contravene but should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. 14 The CTA also ruled that respondent has properly substantiated its claim for tax credit by documentary evidence. However, based on the examination conducted by the commissioned independent certified public accountant (CPA), there were some material discrepancies due to missing cash slips, lack of senior citizen's ID number, failure to include the cash slips in the summary report and vice versa. Therefore, between the Summary Report presented by respondent and the audited amount presented by the independent CPA, the CTA deemed it proper to consider the lesser of two amounts. The re-computation of the overpaid income tax15 for the year 1997 is as follows:

Sales, Net Add: 20% Sales Discount to Senior Citizens Sales, Gross Less: Cost of Sales Merchandise inventory, beg. Purchases Merchandise inventory, end Gross Profit Add: Miscellaneous income Total Income Less: Operating expenses Net Income Less: Income subjected to final tax (Interest Income ) Net Taxable Income Income Tax Due (35%) Less: Tax Credit (Cost of 20% discount as adjusted ) Income Tax Payable Income Tax Actually Paid Income Tax Refundable
17 16

P176,742,607

2,798,508.00

P179,541,115

P 20,905,489.00 168,762,950.00 -27,281,439.00

162,387,000.

P 17,154,115 402,124.00

P 17,556,239

16,913,699.0

P 642,540.00 249,172.00

P 393,368.00

P 137,679.00

2,514,484.63

(P 2,376,805. 0.00

(P 2,376,805.

Aggrieved by the CTA's decision, petitioner elevated the case before the Court of Appeals. The Ruling of the Appellate Court On 13 August 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA's decision in toto. The Court of Appeals disagreed with petitioner's contention that the CTA's decision applied a literal interpretation of the law. It reasoned that under the verba legis rule, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This principle rests on the presumption that the words used by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently.18 The Court of Appeals distinguished "tax credit" as an amount subtracted from a taxpayer's total tax liability to arrive at the tax due while a "tax deduction" reduces the taxpayer's taxable income upon which the tax liability is computed. "A credit differs from deduction in that the former is subtracted from tax while the latter is subtracted from income before the tax is computed." 19 The Court of Appeals found no legal basis to support petitioner's opinion that actual payment by the taxpayer or actual receipt by the government of the tax sought to be credited or refunded is a condition sine qua non for the availment of tax credit as enunciated in Section 22920 of the Tax Code. The Court of Appeals stressed that Section 229 of the Tax Code pertains to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes while RA 7432 is a special law which uses the method of tax credit in the context of just compensation. Further, RA 7432 does not require prior tax payment as a condition for claiming the cost of the sales discount as tax credit. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises two issues21 in this Petition: 1. Whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent may claim the 20% senior citizens' sales discount as a tax credit deductible from future income tax liabilities instead of a mere deduction from gross income or gross sales; and 2. Whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent is entitled to a refund. The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit. The issues presented are not novel. In two similar cases involving the same parties where respondent lodged its claim for tax credit on the senior citizens' discount granted in 199522 and 1996,23 this Court has squarely ruled that the 20% senior citizens' discount required by RA 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit and not merely a tax deduction from gross sales or gross income. Under RA 7432, Congress granted the tax credit benefit to all covered establishments without conditions. The net loss incurred in a taxable year does not preclude the grant of tax credit because by its nature, the tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability. However, the senior citizens' discount granted as a tax credit cannot be refunded. RA 7432 expressly allows private establishments to claim the amount of discounts they grant to senior citizens as tax credit. Section 4(a) of RA 7432 states: SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit; (Emphasis supplied) However, RR 2-94 interpreted the tax credit provision of RA 7432 in this wise: Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of these regulations: xxx i. Tax Credit - refers to the amount representing 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizenby all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes. (Emphasis supplied). xxx Sec. 4. Recording/Bookkeeping Requirement for Private Establishments xxx The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross income for income tax purposesand from gross sales of the business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes. (Emphasis supplied) Tax credit is defined as a peso-for-peso reduction from a taxpayer's tax liability. It is a direct subtraction from the tax payable to the government. On the other hand, RR 2-94 treated the amount of senior citizens' discount as a tax deduction which is only a subtraction from gross income resulting to a lower taxable income. RR 2-94 treats the senior citizens' discount in the same manner as the allowable deductions provided in Section 34, Chapter VII of the National Internal Revenue Code. RR 2-94 affords merely a fractional reduction in the taxes payable to the government depending on the applicable tax rate. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation ,24 the Court ruled that petitioner's definition in RR 2-94 of a tax credit is clearly erroneous. To deny the tax credit, despite the plain mandate of the law, is indefensible. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, the Court declared,"When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount- when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple." The Court further stated that the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation because "administrative agencies in issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature." Hence, there being a dichotomy in the law and the revenue regulation, the definition provided in Section 2(i) of RR 2-94 cannot be given effect. The tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability. In the petition filed before this Court, petitioner alleged that respondent incurred a net loss from its business operations in 1997; hence, it did not pay any income tax. Since no tax payment was

made, it follows that no tax credit can also be claimed because tax credits are usually applied against a tax liability.25 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation ,26 the Court stressed that prior payment of tax liability is not a pre-condition before a taxable entity can avail of the tax credit. The Court declared, "Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year."27 It is irrefutable that under RA 7432, Congress has granted the tax credit benefit to all covered establishments without conditions. Therefore, neither a tax liability nor a prior tax payment is required for the existence or grant of a tax credit.28 The applicable law on this point is clear and without any qualifications.29 Hence, respondent is entitled to claim the amount of P2,376,805.63 as tax credit despite incurring net loss from business operations for the taxable year 1997. The senior citizens' discount may be claimed as a tax credit and not a refund. Section 4(a) of RA 7432 expressly provides that private establishments may claim the cost as a tax credit. A tax credit can only be utilized as payment for future internal revenue tax liabilities of the taxpayer while a tax refund, issued as a check or a warrant, can be encashed. A tax refund can be availed of immediately while a tax credit can only be utilized if the taxpayer has existing or future tax liabilities. If the words of the law are clear, plain, and free of ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Hence, the senior citizens' discount may be claimed as a tax credit and not as a refund.30 RA 9257 now specifically provides that all covered establishments may claim the senior citizens' discount as tax deduction. On 26 February 2004, RA 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003," was signed into law and became effective on 21 March 2004.31 RA 9257 has amended RA 7432. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 reads: "Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; xxx The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deductionbased on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended." (Emphasis supplied) Contrary to the provision in RA 7432 where the senior citizens' discount granted by all covered establishments can be claimed as tax credit, RA 9257 now specifically provides that this discount should be treated as tax deduction. With the effectivity of RA 9257 on 21 March 2004, there is now a new tax treatment for senior citizens' discount granted by all covered establishments. This discount should be considered as a deductible expense from gross income and no longer as tax credit. 32 The present case, however, covers the taxable year 1997 and is thus governed by the old law, RA 7432. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 August 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70480. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166494 June 29, 2007 CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name and style "Carlos Superdrug," ELSIE M. CANO, doing business under the name and style "Advance Drug," Dr. SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing business under the name and style "City Pharmacy," MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business under the name and style "Botica dela Serna," and LEYTE SERV-WELL CORP., doing business under the name and style "Leyte Serv-Well Drugstore," petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: 1 This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the 2 constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003." Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments. The antecedents are as follows: 3 On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; ... The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as 4 amended. On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257, Rule VI, Article 8 of which states: Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. The establishment may claim the 5 discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 Discounts for Establishments; Section 6 7 8 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities[,] and Sections 10 and 11 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods

sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department 9 of Finance (DOF). On July 10, 2004, in reference to the query of the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines (DSAP) concerning the meaning of a tax deduction under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B. Recente, clarified as follows: 1) The difference between the Tax Credit (under the Old Senior Citizens Act) and Tax Deduction (under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act). 1.1. The provision of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 (the old Senior Citizens Act) grants twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country, the costs of which may be claimed by the private establishments concerned as tax credit . Effectively, a tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayers tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax credit scheme under the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. The tax credit scheme under R.A. No. 7432 is, therefore, inapplicable since no tax payments have previously occurred. 1.2. The provision under R.A. No. 9257, on the other hand, provides that the establishment concerned may claim the discounts under Section 4(a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction from gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Under this scheme, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens. Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the government. This will be an amount equivalent to 32% of the twenty percent (20%) discounts so granted. The establishment shoulders the remaining portion of the granted discounts. It may be necessary to note that while the burden on [the] government is slightly diminished in terms of its percentage share on the discounts granted to senior citizens, the number of potential establishments that may claim tax deductions, have however, been broadened. Aside from the establishments that may claim tax credits under the old law, more establishments were added under the new law such as: establishments providing medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators of domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways and bus transport services. A simple illustration might help amplify the points discussed above, as follows: Tax Deduction Tax Credit Gross Sales x x x x x x x x x x x x

Less : Cost of goods sold x x x x x x x x x x Net Sales x x x x x x x x x x x x Less: Operating Expenses: Tax Deduction on Discounts x x x x -Other deductions: x x x x x x x x Net Taxable Income x x x x x x x x x x Tax Due x x x x x x Less: Tax Credit -- ______x x Net Tax Due -- x x As shown above, under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due 10 amount. Meanwhile, on October 1, 2004, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise 11 known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" was issued by the DOH, providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. 12 On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that "[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens." Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens 13 Act based on the following grounds: 1) The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; 2) It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our Constitution which states that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws;" and 3) The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes "essential goods, health and other social services available to 14 all people at affordable cost." Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Examining petitioners arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is

subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated 15 otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the 16 application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to 17 the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall 18 be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As 19 such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our 20 society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act: ... (f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of 21 the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership. To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that

business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest 22 benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and 23 the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the 24 same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, 25 though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in 26 its favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works 27 greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it atP39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to 28 the drugstores. Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that 29 the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be 30 relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably 31 detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172231 February 12, 2007 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. ISABELA CULTURAL CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) assails the September 30, 2005 1 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78426 affirming the February 2 26, 2003 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 5211, which cancelled and set aside the Assessment Notices for deficiency income tax and expanded withholding tax issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) against respondent Isabela Cultural Corporation (ICC). The facts show that on February 23, 1990, ICC, a domestic corporation, received from the BIR Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680 for deficiency income tax in the amount of P333,196.86, and Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000681 for deficiency expanded withholding tax in the amount of P4,897.79, inclusive of surcharges and interest, both for the taxable year 1986. The deficiency income tax of P333,196.86, arose from: (1) The BIRs disallowance of ICCs claimed expense deductions for professional and security services billed to and paid by ICC in 1986, to wit: 3 (a) Expenses for the auditing services of SGV & Co., for the year 4 ending December 31, 1985; (b) Expenses for the legal services [inclusive of retainer fees] of the law firm Bengzon Zarraga Narciso Cudala Pecson Azcuna & 5 Bengson for the years 1984 and 1985. (c) Expense for security services of El Tigre Security & 6 Investigation Agency for the months of April and May 1986. (2) The alleged understatement of ICCs interest income on the three promissory notes due from Realty Investment, Inc. The deficiency expanded withholding tax of P4,897.79 (inclusive of interest and surcharge) was allegedly due to the failure of ICC to withhold 1% expanded 7 withholding tax on its claimed P244,890.00 deduction for security services. On March 23, 1990, ICC sought a reconsideration of the subject assessments. On February 9, 1995, however, it received a final notice before seizure demanding payment of the amounts stated in the said notices. Hence, it brought the case to the CTA which held that the petition is premature because the final notice of assessment cannot be considered as a final decision appealable to the tax court. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals holding that a demand letter of the BIR reiterating the payment of deficiency tax, amounts to a final decision on the protested assessment and may therefore be questioned before the CTA. This conclusion was 8 sustained by this Court on July 1, 2001, in G.R. No. 135210. The case was thus remanded to the CTA for further proceedings. On February 26, 2003, the CTA rendered a decision canceling and setting aside the assessment notices issued against ICC. It held that the claimed deductions for professional and security services were properly claimed by ICC in 1986 because it was only in the said year when the bills demanding payment were sent to ICC. Hence, even if some of these professional services were rendered to ICC in 1984 or 1985, it could not declare the same as deduction for the said years as the amount thereof could not be determined at that time. The CTA also held that ICC did not understate its interest income on the subject promissory notes. It found that it was the BIR which made an overstatement of said income when it compounded the interest income receivable by ICC from the

promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc., despite the absence of a stipulation in the contract providing for a compounded interest; nor of a circumstance, like delay in payment or breach of contract, that would justify the application of compounded interest. Likewise, the CTA found that ICC in fact withheld 1% expanded withholding tax on its claimed deduction for security services as shown by the various payment orders and confirmation receipts it presented as evidence. The dispositive portion of the CT As Decision, reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90000680 for deficiency income tax in the amount of P333,196.86, and Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000681 for deficiency expanded withholding tax in the amount of P4,897.79, inclusive of surcharges and interest, both for the taxable year 1986, are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. 9 SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the CTA 10 decision, holding that although the professional services (legal and auditing services) were rendered to ICC in 1984 and 1985, the cost of the services was not yet determinable at that time, hence, it could be considered as deductible expenses only in 1986 when ICC received the billing statements for said services. It further ruled that ICC did not understate its interest income from the promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc., and that ICC properly withheld and remitted taxes on the payments for security services for the taxable year 1986. Hence, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition contending that since ICC is using the accrual method of accounting, the expenses for the professional services that accrued in 1984 and 1985, should have been declared as deductions from income during the said years and the failure of ICC to do so bars it from claiming said expenses as deduction for the taxable year 1986. As to the alleged deficiency interest income and failure to withhold expanded withholding tax assessment, petitioner invoked the presumption that the assessment notices issued by the BIR are valid. The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals correctly: (1) sustained the deduction of the expenses for professional and security services from ICCs gross income; and (2) held that ICC did not understate its interest income from the promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc; and that ICC withheld the required 1% withholding tax from the deductions for security services. The requisites for the deductibility of ordinary and necessary trade, business, or professional expenses, like expenses paid for legal and auditing services, are: (a) the expense must be ordinary and necessary; (b) it must have been paid or incurred during the taxable year; (c) it must have been paid or incurred in carrying on the trade or business of the taxpayer; and (d) it must be supported by receipts, records or other 11 pertinent papers. The requisite that it must have been paid or incurred during the taxable year is further qualified by Section 45 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which states that: "[t]he deduction provided for in this Title shall be taken for the taxable year in which paid or accrued or paid or incurred, dependent upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is computed x x x". Accounting methods for tax purposes comprise a set of rules for determining when 12 and how to report income and deductions. In the instant case, the accounting method used by ICC is the accrual method. Revenue Audit Memorandum Order No. 1-2000, provides that under the accrual method of accounting, expenses not being claimed as deductions by a taxpayer in the current year when they are incurred cannot be claimed as deduction from income for

the succeeding year. Thus, a taxpayer who is authorized to deduct certain expenses and other allowable deductions for the current year but failed to do so cannot deduct 13 the same for the next year. The accrual method relies upon the taxpayers right to receive amounts or its obligation to pay them, in opposition to actual receipt or payment, which characterizes the cash method of accounting. Amounts of income accrue where the right to receive them become fixed, where there is created an enforceable liability. Similarly, liabilities are accrued when fixed and determinable in amount, without regard to indeterminacy 14 merely of time of payment. For a taxpayer using the accrual method, the determinative question is, when do the facts present themselves in such a manner that the taxpayer must recognize income or expense? The accrual of income and expense is permitted when the all-events test has been met. This test requires: (1) fixing of a right to income or liability to pay; and (2) the availability of the reasonable accurate determination of such income or liability. The all-events test requires the right to income or liability be fixed, and the amount of such income or liability be determined with reasonable accuracy. However, the test does not demand that the amount of income or liability be known absolutely, only that a taxpayer has at his disposal the information necessary to compute the amount with reasonable accuracy. The all-events test is satisfied where computation remains uncertain, if its basis is unchangeable; the test is satisfied where a computation may be unknown, but is not as much as unknowable, within the taxable year. The amount of liability does not have to be determined exactly; it must be determined with "reasonable accuracy." Accordingly, the term "reasonable accuracy" implies something less than an exact or completely accurate amount.[15] The propriety of an accrual must be judged by the facts that a taxpayer knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, at the closing of its books for the taxable year.[16] Accrual method of accounting presents largely a question of fact; such that the taxpayer bears the burden of proof of establishing the accrual of an 17 item of income or deduction. Corollarily, it is a governing principle in taxation that tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; and one who claims an exemption must be able to justify the same by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon vague implications. And since a deduction for income tax purposes partakes of the nature of a tax exemption, then it must also be 18 strictly construed. In the instant case, the expenses for professional fees consist of expenses for legal and auditing services. The expenses for legal services pertain to the 1984 and 1985 legal and retainer fees of the law firm Bengzon Zarraga Narciso Cudala Pecson Azcuna & Bengson, and for reimbursement of the expenses of said firm in connection with ICCs tax problems for the year 1984. As testified by the Treasurer of ICC, the 19 firm has been its counsel since the 1960s. From the nature of the claimed deductions and the span of time during which the firm was retained, ICC can be expected to have reasonably known the retainer fees charged by the firm as well as the compensation for its legal services. The failure to determine the exact amount of the expense during the taxable year when they could have been claimed as deductions cannot thus be attributed solely to the delayed billing of these liabilities by the firm. For one, ICC, in the exercise of due diligence could have inquired into the amount of their obligation to the firm, especially so that it is using the accrual method of accounting. For another, it could have reasonably determined the amount of legal and retainer fees owing to its familiarity with the rates charged by their long time legal consultant.

As previously stated, the accrual method presents largely a question of fact and that the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing the accrual of an expense or income. However, ICC failed to discharge this burden. As to when the firms performance of its services in connection with the 1984 tax problems were completed, or whether ICC exercised reasonable diligence to inquire about the amount of its liability, or whether it does or does not possess the information necessary to compute the amount of said liability with reasonable accuracy, are questions of fact which ICC never established. It simply relied on the defense of delayed billing by the firm and the company, which under the circumstances, is not sufficient to exempt it from being charged with knowledge of the reasonable amount of the expenses for legal and auditing services. In the same vein, the professional fees of SGV & Co. for auditing the financial statements of ICC for the year 1985 cannot be validly claimed as expense deductions in 1986. This is so because ICC failed to present evidence showing that even with only "reasonable accuracy," as the standard to ascertain its liability to SGV & Co. in the year 1985, it cannot determine the professional fees which said company would charge for its services. ICC thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that the claimed expense deductions for the professional services were allowable deductions for the taxable year 1986. Hence, per Revenue Audit Memorandum Order No. 1-2000, they cannot be validly deducted from its gross income for the said year and were therefore properly disallowed by the BIR. As to the expenses for security services, the records show that these expenses were 20 incurred by ICC in 1986 and could therefore be properly claimed as deductions for the said year. Anent the purported understatement of interest income from the promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc., we sustain the findings of the CTA and the Court of Appeals that no such understatement exists and that only simple interest computation and not a compounded one should have been applied by the BIR. There is indeed no stipulation between the latter and ICC on the application of compounded 21 interest. Under Article 1959 of the Civil Code, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, interest due should not further earn interest. Likewise, the findings of the CTA and the Court of Appeals that ICC truly withheld the required withholding tax from its claimed deductions for security services and remitted the same to the BIR is supported by payment order and confirmation 22 receipts. Hence, the Assessment Notice for deficiency expanded withholding tax was properly cancelled and set aside. In sum, Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680 in the amount of P333,196.86 for deficiency income tax should be cancelled and set aside but only insofar as the claimed deductions of ICC for security services. Said Assessment is valid as to the BIRs disallowance of ICCs expenses for professional services. The Court of Appeals cancellation of Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000681 in the amount of P4,897.79 for deficiency expanded withholding tax, is sustained. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 30, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78426, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680, which disallowed the expense deduction of Isabela Cultural Corporation for professional and security services, is declared valid only insofar as the expenses for the professional fees of SGV & Co. and of the law firm, Bengzon Zarraga Narciso Cudala Pecson Azcuna & Bengson, are concerned. The decision is affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded to the BIR for the computation of Isabela Cultural Corporations liability under Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143672 April 24, 2003 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. GENERAL FOODS (PHILS.), INC., respondent. CORONA, J.: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) assails the resolution1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals which in turn denied the protest filed by respondent General Foods (Phils.), Inc., regarding the assessment made against the latter for deficiency taxes. The records reveal that, on June 14, 1985, respondent corporation, which is engaged in the manufacture of beverages such as "Tang," "Calumet" and "KoolAid," filed its income tax return for the fiscal year ending February 28, 1985. In said tax return, respondent corporation claimed as deduction, among other business expenses, the amount of P9,461,246 for media advertising for "Tang." On May 31, 1988, the Commissioner disallowed 50% or P4,730,623 of the deduction claimed by respondent corporation. Consequently, respondent corporation was assessed deficiency income taxes in the amount of P2,635, 141.42. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. On September 29, 1989, respondent corporation appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but the appeal was dismissed: With such a gargantuan expense for the advertisement of a singular product, which even excludes "other advertising and promotions" expenses, we are not prepared to accept that such amount is reasonable "to stimulate the current sale of merchandise" regardless of Petitioners explanation that such expense "does not connote unreasonableness considering the grave economic situation taking place after the Aquino assassination characterized by capital fight, strong deterioration of the purchasing power of the Philippine peso and the slacking demand for consumer products" (Petitioners Memorandum, CTA Records, p. 273). We are not convinced with such an explanation. The staggering expense led us to believe that such expenditure was incurred "to create or maintain some form of good will for the taxpayers trade or business or for the industry or profession of which the taxpayer is a member." The term "good will" can hardly be said to have any precise signification; it is generally used to denote the benefit arising from connection and reputation (Words and Phrases, Vol. 18, p. 556 citing Douhart vs. Loagan, 86 III. App. 294). As held in the case of Welch vs. Helvering, efforts to establish reputation are akin to acquisition of capital assets and, therefore, expenses related thereto are not business expenses but capital expenditures. (Atlas Mining and Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra). For sure such expenditure was meant not only to generate present sales but more for future and prospective benefits. Hence, "abnormally large expenditures for advertising are usually to be spread over the period of years during which the benefits of the expenditures are received" (Mertens, supra, citing Colonial Ice Cream Co., 7 BTA 154). WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, and finding no error in the case appealed from, we hereby RESOLVE to DISMISS the instant petition for

lack of merit and ORDER the Petitioner to pay the respondent Commissioner the assessed amount of P2,635,141.42 representing its deficiency income tax liability for the fiscal year ended February 28, 1985."3 Aggrieved, respondent corporation filed a petition for review at the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals: Since it has not been sufficiently established that the item it claimed as a deduction is excessive, the same should be allowed. WHEREFORE, the petition of petitioner General Foods (Philippines), Inc. is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision, dated 8 February 1994 of respondent Court of Tax Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letter, dated 31 May 1988 of respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is CANCELLED. SO ORDERED.4 Thus, the instant petition, wherein the Commissioner presents for the Courts consideration a lone issue: whether or not the subject media advertising expense for "Tang" incurred by respondent corporation was an ordinary and necessary expense fully deductible under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). It is a governing principle in taxation that tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority;5 and he who claims an exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon vague implications.6 Deductions for income tax purposes partake of the nature of tax exemptions; hence, if tax exemptions are strictly construed, then deductions must also be strictly construed. We then proceed to resolve the singular issue in the case at bar. Was the media advertising expense for "Tang" paid or incurred by respondent corporation for the fiscal year ending February 28, 1985 "necessary and ordinary," hence, fully deductible under the NIRC? Or was it a capital expenditure, paid in order to create "goodwill and reputation" for respondent corporation and/or its products, which should have been amortized over a reasonable period? Section 34 (A) (1), formerly Section 29 (a) (1) (A), of the NIRC provides: (A) Expenses.(1) Ordinary and necessary trade, business or professional expenses .(a) In general.- There shall be allowed as deduction from gross income all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on, or which are directly attributable to, the development, management, operation and/or conduct of the trade, business or exercise of a profession. Simply put, to be deductible from gross income, the subject advertising expense must comply with the following requisites: (a) the expense must be ordinary and necessary; (b) it must have been paid or incurred during the taxable year; (c) it must have been paid or incurred in carrying on the trade or business of the taxpayer; and (d) it must be supported by receipts, records or other pertinent papers.7 The parties are in agreement that the subject advertising expense was paid or incurred within the corresponding taxable year and was incurred in carrying on a

trade or business. Hence, it was necessary. However, their views conflict as to whether or not it was ordinary. To be deductible, an advertising expense should not only be necessary but also ordinary. These two requirements must be met. The Commissioner maintains that the subject advertising expense was not ordinary on the ground that it failed the two conditions set by U.S. jurisprudence: first, "reasonableness" of the amount incurred and second, the amount incurred must not be a capital outlay to create "goodwill" for the product and/or private respondents business. Otherwise, the expense must be considered a capital expenditure to be spread out over a reasonable time. We agree. There is yet to be a clear-cut criteria or fixed test for determining the reasonableness of an advertising expense. There being no hard and fast rule on the matter, the right to a deduction depends on a number of factors such as but not limited to: the type and size of business in which the taxpayer is engaged; the volume and amount of its net earnings; the nature of the expenditure itself; the intention of the taxpayer and the general economic conditions. It is the interplay of these, among other factors and properly weighed, that will yield a proper evaluation. In the case at bar, the P9,461,246 claimed as media advertising expense for "Tang" alone was almost one-half of its total claim for "marketing expenses." Aside from that, respondent-corporation also claimed P2,678,328 as "other advertising and promotions expense" and another P1,548,614, for consumer promotion. Furthermore, the subject P9,461,246 media advertising expense for "Tang" was almost double the amount of respondent corporations P4,640,636 general and administrative expenses. We find the subject expense for the advertisement of a single product to be inordinately large. Therefore, even if it is necessary, it cannot be considered an ordinary expense deductible under then Section 29 (a) (1) (A) of the NIRC. Advertising is generally of two kinds: (1) advertising to stimulate the current sale of merchandise or use of services and (2) advertising designed to stimulate the future sale of merchandise or use of services. The second type involves expenditures incurred, in whole or in part, to create or maintain some form of goodwill for the taxpayers trade or business or for the industry or profession of which the taxpayer is a member. If the expenditures are for the advertising of the first kind, then, except as to the question of the reasonableness of amount, there is no doubt such expenditures are deductible as business expenses. If, however, the expenditures are for advertising of the second kind, then normally they should be spread out over a reasonable period of time. We agree with the Court of Tax Appeals that the subject advertising expense was of the second kind. Not only was the amount staggering; the respondent corporation itself also admitted, in its letter protest8 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenues assessment, that the subject media expense was incurred in order to protect respondent corporations brand franchise, a critical point during the period under review. The protection of brand franchise is analogous to the maintenance of goodwill or title to ones property. This is a capital expenditure which should be spread out over a reasonable period of time.9

Respondent corporations venture to protect its brand franchise was tantamount to efforts to establish a reputation. This was akin to the acquisition of capital assets and therefore expenses related thereto were not to be considered as business expenses but as capital expenditures.10 True, it is the taxpayers prerogative to determine the amount of advertising expenses it will incur and where to apply them.11 Said prerogative, however, is subject to certain considerations. The first relates to the extent to which the expenditures are actually capital outlays; this necessitates an inquiry into the nature or purpose of such expenditures.12 The second, which must be applied in harmony with the first, relates to whether the expenditures are ordinary and necessary. Concomitantly, for an expense to be considered ordinary, it must be reasonable in amount. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that respondent corporation failed to meet the two foregoing limitations. We find said ruling to be well founded. Respondent corporation incurred the subject advertising expense in order to protect its brand franchise. We consider this as a capital outlay since it created goodwill for its business and/or product. The P9,461,246 media advertising expense for the promotion of a single product, almost one-half of petitioner corporations entire claim for marketing expenses for that year under review, inclusive of other advertising and promotion expenses of P2,678,328 and P1,548,614 for consumer promotion, is doubtlessly unreasonable. It has been a long standing policy and practice of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems. It has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. We extend due consideration to its opinion unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.13 Since there is none in the case at bar, the Court adheres to the findings of the CTA. Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it declared the subject media advertising expense to be deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense on the ground that "it has not been established that the item being claimed as deduction is excessive." It is not incumbent upon the taxing authority to prove that the amount of items being claimed is unreasonable. The burden of proof to establish the validity of claimed deductions is on the taxpayer.14 In the present case, that burden was not discharged satisfactorily. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code, respondent General Foods (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to pay its deficiency income tax in the amount of P2,635,141.42, plus 25% surcharge for late payment and 20% annual interest computed from August 25, 1989, the date of the denial of its protest, until the same is fully paid. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24059 November 28, 1969 C. M. HOSKINS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Special Attorney Michaelina R. Balasbas for respondent. TEEHANKEE, J.: We uphold in this taxpayer's appeal the Tax Court's ruling that payment by the taxpayer to its controlling stockholder of 50% of its supervision fees or the amount of P99,977.91 is not a deductible ordinary and necessary expense and should be treated as a distribution of earnings and profits of the taxpayer. Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business as brokers, managing agents and administrators, filed its income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1957 showing a net income of P92,540.25 and a tax liability due thereon of P18,508.00, which it paid in due course. Upon verification of its return, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, disallowed four items of deduction in petitioner's tax returns and assessed against it an income tax deficiency in the amount of P28,054.00 plus interests. The Court of Tax Appeals upon reviewing the assessment at the taxpayer's petition, upheld respondent's disallowance of the principal item of petitioner's having paid to Mr. C. M. Hoskins, its founder and controlling stockholder the amount of P99,977.91 representing 50% of supervision fees earned by it and set aside respondent's disallowance of three other minor items. The Tax Court therefore determined petitioner's tax deficiency to be in the amount of P27,145.00 and on November 8, 1964 rendered judgment against it, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent is hereby modified. Petitioner is ordered to pay to the latter or his representative the sum of P27,145.00, representing deficiency income tax for the year 1957, plus interest at 1/2% per month from June 20, 1959 to be computed in accordance with the provisions of Section 51(d) of the National Internal Revenue Code. If the deficiency tax is not paid within thirty (30) days from the date this decision becomes final, petitioner is also ordered to pay surcharge and interest as provided for in Section 51 (e) of the Tax Code, without costs. Petitioner questions in this appeal the Tax Court's findings that the disallowed payment to Hoskins was an inordinately large one, which bore a close relationship to the recipient's dominant stockholdings and therefore amounted in law to a distribution of its earnings and profits. We find no merit in petitioner's appeal. As found by the Tax Court, "petitioner was founded by Mr. C. M. Hoskins in 1937, with a capital stock of 1,000 shares at a par value of P1.00 each share; that of these 1,000 shares, Mr. C. M. Hoskins owns 996 shares (the other 4 shares being held by the other four officers of the corporation), which constitute exactly 99.6% of the total authorized capital stock (p. 92, t.s.n.); that during the first four years of its existence, Mr. C. M. Hoskins was the President, but during the taxable period in question, that is, from October 1, 1956 to September 30, 1957, he was the chairman of the Board of Directors and salesman-broker for the company (p. 93, t.s.n.); that as chairman of the Board of Directors, he received a salary of P3,750.00 a month, plus a salary bonus of about P40,000.00 a year (p. 94, t.s.n.); that he was also a stockholder and officer of the Paradise Farms, Inc. and Realty Investments, Inc., from which petitioner derived a large portion of its income in the form of supervision fees and commissions earned on sales of lots (pp. 97-99, t.s.n.; Financial Statements, attached to Exhibit '1', p. 11, BIR

rec.); that as chairman of the Board of Directors of petitioner, his duties were: "To act as a salesman; as a director, preside over meetings and to get all of the real estate business I could for the company by negotiating sales, purchases, making appraisals, raising funds to finance real estate operations where that was necessary' (p. 96, t.s.n.); that he was familiar with the contract entered into by the petitioner with the Paradise Farms, Inc. and the Realty Investments, Inc. by the terms of which petitioner was 'to program the development, arrange financing, plan the proposed subdivision as outlined in the prospectus of Paradise Farms, Inc., arrange contract for road constructions, with the provision of water supply to all of the lots and in general to serve as managing agents for the Paradise Farms, Inc. and subsequently for the Realty Investment, Inc." (pp. 96-97. t.s.n.) Considering that in addition to being Chairman of the board of directors of petitioner corporation, which bears his name, Hoskins, who owned 99.6% of its total authorized capital stock while the four other officers-stockholders of the firm owned a total of four-tenths of 1%, or one-tenth of 1% each, with their respective nominal shareholdings of one share each was also salesman-broker for his company, receiving a 50% share of the sales commissions earned by petitioner, besides his monthly salary of P3,750.00 amounting to an annual compensation of P45,000.00 and an annual salary bonus of P40,000.00, plus free use of the company car and receipt of other similar allowances and benefits, the Tax Court correctly ruled that the payment by petitioner to Hoskins of the additional sum of P99,977.91 as his equal or 50% share of the 8% supervision fees received by petitioner as managing agents of the real estate, subdivision projects of Paradise Farms, Inc. and Realty Investments, Inc. was inordinately large and could not be accorded the treatment of ordinary and necessary expenses allowed as deductible items within the purview of Section 30 ( a) (i) of the Tax Code. If such payment of P99,977.91 were to be allowed as a deductible item, then Hoskins would receive on these three items alone (salary, bonus and supervision fee) a total of P184,977.91, which would be double the petitioner's reported net income for the year of P92,540.25. As correctly observed by respondent. If independently, a onetime P100,000.00-fee to plan and lay down the rules for supervision of a subdivision project were to be paid to an experienced realtor such as Hoskins, its fairness and deductibility by the taxpayer could be conceded; but here 50% of the supervision fee of petitioner was being paid by it to Hoskins every year since 1955 up to 1963 and for as long as its contract with the subdivision owner subsisted, regardless of whether services were actually rendered by Hoskins, since his services to petitioner included such planning and supervision and were already handsomely paid for by petitioner. The fact that such payment was authorized by a standing resolution of petitioner's board of directors, since "Hoskins had personally conceived and planned the project" cannot change the picture. There could be no question that as Chairman of the board and practically an absolutely controlling stockholder of petitioner, holding 99.6% of its stock, Hoskins wielded tremendous power and influence in the formulation and making of the company's policies and decisions. Even just as board chairman, going by petitioner's own enumeration of the powers of the office, Hoskins, could exercise great power and influence within the corporation, such as directing the policy of the corporation, delegating powers to the president and advising the corporation in 1 determining executive salaries, bonus plans and pensions, dividend policies, etc. Petitioner's invoking of its policy since its incorporation of sharing equally sales commissions with its salesmen, in accordance with its board resolution of June 18, 1946, is equally untenable. Petitioner's Sales Regulations provide: Compensation of Salesmen

8. Schedule I In the case of sales to prospects discovered and worked by a salesman, even though the closing is done by or with the help of the Sales Manager or other members of the staff, the salesmen get one-half (1/2) of the total commission received by the Company, but not exceeding five percent (5%). In the case of subdivisions, when the office commission covers general supervision, the 1/2-rule does not apply, the salesman's share being stipulated in the case of each subdivision. In most cases the 2 salesman's share is 4%. (Exh. "N-1"). It will be readily seen therefrom that when the petitioner's commission covers general supervision, it is provided that the 1/2 rule of equal sharing of the sales commissions does not apply and that the salesman's share is stipulated in the case of each subdivision. Furthermore, what is involved here is not Hoskins' salesman's share in the petitioner's 12% sales commission, which he presumably collected also from petitioner without respondent's questioning it, but a 50% share besides in petitioner's planning and supervision fee of 8% of the gross sales, as mentioned above. This is evident from petitioner's board's resolution of July 14, 1953 (Exhibit 7), wherein it is recited that in addition to petitioner's sales commission of 12% of gross sales, the subdivision owners were paying to petitioner 8% of gross sales as supervision fee, and a collection fee of 5% of gross collections, or total fees of 25% of gross sales. The case before us is similar to previous cases of disallowances as deductible items of officers' extra fees, bonuses and commissions, upheld by this Court as not being within the purview of ordinary and necessary expenses and not passing the test of 3 reasonable compensation. In Kuenzle & Streiff, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal 4 Revenue decided by this Court on May 29, 1969, we reaffirmed the test of reasonableness, enunciated in the earlier 1967 case involving the same parties, that: "It is a general rule that 'Bonuses to employees made in good faith and as additional compensation for the services actually rendered by the employees are deductible, provided such payments, when added to the stipulated salaries, do not exceed a reasonable compensation for the services rendered' (4 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sec. 25.50, p. 410). The conditions precedent to the deduction of bonuses to employees are: (1) the payment of the bonuses is in fact compensation; (2) it must be for personal services actually rendered; and (3) the bonuses, when added to the salaries, are 'reasonable . . . when measured by the amount and quality of the services performed with relation to the business of the particular taxpayer' (Idem., Sec. 25, 44, p. 395). "There is no fixed test for determining the reasonableness of a given bonus as compensation. This depends upon many factors, one of them being 'the amount and quality of the services performed with relation to the business.' Other tests suggested are: payment must be 'made in good faith'; 'the character of the taxpayer's business, the volume and amount of its net earnings, its locality, the type and extent of the services rendered, the salary policy of the corporation'; 'the size of the particular business'; 'the employees' qualifications and contributions to the business venture'; and 'general economic conditions' (4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Secs. 25.44, 25.49, 25.50, 25.51, pp. 407-412). However, 'in determining whether the particular salary or compensation payment is reasonable, the situation must be considered as whole. Ordinarily, no single factor is decisive. . . . it is important to keep in mind that it seldom happens that the application of one test can give satisfactory answer, and that ordinarily it is the interplay of several factors, properly weighted for the particular case, which must furnish the final answer." Petitioner's case fails to pass the test. On the right of the employer as against respondent Commissioner to fix the compensation of its officers and employees, we there held further that while the employer's right may be conceded, the question of

the allowance or disallowance thereof as deductible expenses for income tax purposes is subject to determination by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus: "As far as petitioner's contention that as employer it has the right to fix the compensation of its officers and employees and that it was in the exercise of such right that it deemed proper to pay the bonuses in question, all that We need say is this: that right may be conceded, but for income tax purposes the employer cannot legally claim such bonuses as deductible expenses unless they are shown to be reasonable. To hold otherwise would open the gate of rampant tax evasion. "Lastly, We must not lose sight of the fact that the question of allowing or disallowing as deductible expenses the amounts paid to corporate officers by way of bonus is determined by respondent exclusively for income tax purposes. Concededly, he has no authority to fix the amounts to be paid to corporate officers by way of basic salary, bonus or additional remuneration a matter that lies more or less exclusively within the sound discretion of the corporation itself. But this right of the corporation is, of course, not absolute. It cannot exercise it for the purpose of evading payment of taxes legitimately due to the State." Finally, it should be noted that we have here a case practically of a sole proprietorship of C. M. Hoskins, who however chose to incorporate his business with himself holding virtually absolute control thereof with 99.6% of its stock with four other nominal shareholders holding one share each. Having chosen to use the corporate form with its legal advantages of a separate corporate personality as distinguished from his individual personality, the corporation so created, i.e., petitioner, is bound to comport itself in accordance with corporate norms and comply with its corporate obligations. Specifically, it is bound to pay the income tax imposed by law on corporations and may not legally be permitted, by way of corporate resolutions authorizing payment of inordinately large commissions and fees to its controlling stockholder, to dilute and diminish its corresponding corporate tax liability. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in both instances against petitioner. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 137772 July 29, 2005 AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision2 finding herein petitioners liable for the injuries suffered by respondent Edison Lugue as a result of an accident involving four (4) vehicles, one of which was then driven by petitioner Romeo Gonzales and owned by petitioner Amador Corpuz. The pertinent facts are as follows: On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from the right shoulder of the highway. As a result of the collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards the left lane of the highway where it was bumped by a Mazda minibus (minibus) being driven by herein petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the KC-20. At that point, the KC-20 spun and bumped a Transcon service truck parked on the left side of the highway. As a result of the impact, the KC-20 was thrown across the highway where it was again hit by the minibus pushing the former towards a deep portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence of the accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries. To summarize, the parties involved in the vehicular accident are as follows: VEHICLE OWNER DRIVER Isuzu KC-20 Tanker truck Mazda minibus Ricardo Santiago Oscar Jaring Amador Corpuz Jimmy Basilio Gerardo Lim Romeo Gonzales

Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the vehicular incident before the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision holding jointly and severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim, Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales. The appurtenant portions of the decision read: There are two (2) versions of the accident in question respectively espoused by the several parties in the instant case. One version is that put forth by plaintiff Edison Lugue (including his witness Remigio Gervacio) and also by defendants and third-party plaintiffs Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. The other version is that advanced by defendants and third-party plaintiffs Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim. These two versions shall be discussed and their respective merits analyzed. Whichever version is found to be plausible shall determine the proximate cause earlier mentioned. (1) The Lugue-Corpuz version: The Isuzu KC-20 Edison Lugue was riding on the date in question was being driven by thirdparty defendant Jimmy Basilio on the center of the right lane of the national highway headed toward Lamao, Limay, Bataan. When said KC-20 was about 25 to 30 meters from the tanker truck owned by defendant Oscar Jaring, which tanker truck was then just beginning to make a headstart from its former parked position on the right shoulder of said highway, the portion on the left headlight of the tanker truck bumped the KC-20 on its middle portion of the right side. As a result, the KC-20 was thrown to the left side of the highway facing Mariveles and, immediately thereafter, it was bumped by the Mazda minibus owned by defendant Amador Corpuz and then driven by defendant Romeo Gonzales. As a result of such second bumping of the KC-20, it spun and bumped a service truck of the Transcon which was parked on the left side of the highway

facing Mariveles. Finally, the KC-20 fell crumpled on the left concrete lane of the road facing Balanga. (2) The Jaring-Lim version: While third-party plaintiff Oscar Jarings tanker truck was parked on the asphalted shoulder on the right side of the highway near the Caltex at Barangay Pias, Townsite, Limay, Bataan, on the date in question, and he was having some invoices recorded by Caltex employees at the guardhouse, which was some ten and a half (10-1/2) meters away from said tanker truck, he was not looking at said truck and the KC-20. But just the same he testified that the right fender of the KC-20 hit the left front portion of the fender of the tanker truck. As a result, the KC-20 went to the other side of the road, where it was bumped by the minibus behind it. Then the KC-20 hit the rear portion of the Transcon service truck. The minibus bumped the KC-20 again, after which the latter continued on toward Mariveles for about 100 meters until it finally fell into a deep portion of the road. ... It will be noted that the Lugue-Corpuz version was testified to by at least four (4) witnesses Edison Lugue, Remigio Gervacio, Patrocinio Carillo and Romeo Gonzales, whereas the JaringLim version was testified to by only one (1) witness Ricardo Puno. Oscar Jaring himself did not testify to having witnessed the incident. On the other hand, the driver of the tanker truck defendant Gerardo Lim, admitted expressly in his oral testimony that he was at the guardhouse at the time the accident happened, because he was having some invoices recorded by the Caltex employees. Clearly, therefore, he did not witness the accident involving the KC-20 and the tanker truck becausehe was not looking at said two vehicles. Whatever version he testified to of the subject accident could not have been otherwise than pure hearsay. From the foregoing discussion of the respective two versions of the subject accident and the evidence adduced, it would appear that (1) The tanker truck owned by defendant Oscar Jaring, whose authorized driver at the time of the accident was defendant Gerardo Lim, was not actually parked completely (if it was parked at all) on the right shoulder of the national highway where the accident took place, witness Ricardo Puno testified or as defendant Jarings photographed marked as Exhibits "1," "1 -A" and "1-B" would tend to show. If it was parked at all, the plausible likelihood was that it was so parked that while its right front and rear wheels were touching the right asphalted shoulder of that highway, however its left front and rear wheels were actually on the concrete right lane of said highway, with its left front fender and bumper protruding well into said right lane, thus constituting a stumbling block to vehicles traveling on such right lane facing the direction where plaintiff Edison Lugue was going then. This conclusion is bolstered by the obvious fact that from said photograph Exhibit "1" it can be seen that the right bumper of the tanker truck appears to have detached from its former connection to the left front portion of the tanker truck and such left end now appears to have been bent forward. The fender of the same truck also appears to have been damaged on the same left side, with a vertical long portion cut from said fender. If said tanker truck was thus parked as posted in the two foregoing paragraphs, then it had been parked in a negligent manner by its driver, who thereby did not exercise ordinary or simple human prudence or foresight to avoid any portion of said truck from obstructing the way of any oncoming motor vehicle being driven on said right or proper lane of the highway. Any normal or average human being, especially a motor vehicle driver, ought to know that the concrete lanes of highways are intended to be traversed by motor vehicles and are not intended to be used as parking areas. Even in case of emergency, only the shoulders of such highways may be used for parking purposes. (3) There was also the possibility testified to by plaintiff Edison Lugue, his witness Remigio Gervacio and defendant Romeo Gonzales to the effect that the tanker truck was not actually parked but was actually already moving or being driven from its former parked position and its left front wheel (and perhaps even the left rear wheels) had occupied a portion of the concrete right lane of the highway which was also being traversed then by the KC-20. This possibility is silently corroborated by the condition of the front bumper and fender of the tanker truck depicted in the photograph marked as Exhibit "1," as already described

hereinbefore, having in mind the fact that not a single witness testified to having seen the Isuzu KC-20 leave the concrete right lane and occupy the asphalted shoulder. On the plane of logic, this version is also supported by the undisputed fact testified by practically all the witnesses who testified that after the physical contact between the tanker truck and the KC-20, the latter vehicle was shoved from its proper right lane to the left lane as a result of the impact. Such resulting shoving effect could have been the consequence of the push it got from the tanker truck which was already moving then toward the concrete right lane. (4) On the other hand, neither may the Lugue-Corpuz version on the physical contact between the KC-20 and the tanker truck be swallowed or considered as entirely correct. This version attempts to show that the tanker truck, while being initially driven away from the right asphalted shoulder of the highway into the concrete right lane of said highway, bumped with its left side the right middle portion of the body of said KC-20, thus causing the latter to be shoved to the left concrete lane of said highway, where it was bumped by the passing or overtaking Mazda minibus. Plaintiff Edison Lugue himself testified on direct examination that the first time he saw the tanker truck was when the KC-20 was about 25 to 30 meters from said truck. At that time, he said, the truck was just beginning to make a headstart and was still on the asphalted shoulder of the highway. On cross-examination, he modified that distance between the two vehicles the first time he saw them to "from 20 to 35 meters." He also stated that at that distance from the truck, the KC-20 did not slow down until it was bumped by the truck; and that all of the four wheels of the truck were originally occupying the shoulder of the highway. If all of the wheels of the tanker truck had originally been occupying the asphalted shoulder of the highway and said vehicle was just beginning to make a headstart toward the right concrete lane of the highway, then the most probable course or direction of said truck could have been forward but slightly oblique toward its left. Very likely, the truck was still running on first gear, which means it was still going very slowly. Even plaintiff Edison Lugue and driver Romeo Gonzales of the Mazda minibus following the KC-20 did not say that the tanker truck was being driven squarely across the right lane of the highway. If defendant driver Jimmy Basilio of the KC-20 had seen the tanker truck while at a distance of 20 to 35 meters away from it, if he had been prudent and careful he could still avoid having his vehicle get in physical contact with said truck. That distance was still adequate for him to swerve the steering wheel slightly to the left so as to avoid such truck getting in contact with his KC-20. But there is no showing whatsoever that he did that. A number of possibilities present themselves. (a) Because Jimmy Basilio was driving the KC-20 fast, as Lugue stated, he must have calculated that it could already safely pass the truck without the need of swerving the steering wheel even slightly to the left. (b) Basilio might have had in mind the Mazda minibus which was trailing the KC-20 and which was going through the motions of passing or overtaking such KC-20. He may have calculated that if he would swerve the KC-20 even slightly to the left, it might go directly on the path of the minibus. So he avoided swerving the KC-20 and went steadily forward, hoping to safely pass the tanker truck at the fast rate of speed he was then driving. Plaintiff Lugue testified that the KC-20 he was riding in did not change course or position on the right lane of the highway just before the bumping occurred. In other words, the KC-20 did not change course nor relax its speed before the actual physical contact between the tanker truck and the KC-20. In such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right lane traversed by the KC-20 and there was a minibus trailing it, and in the process of passing or overtaking the KC-20, the driver of the minibus (sic) was expected to exercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hit by either or both other motor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that the driver of the KC-20 did not either slacken his speed or even swerve his steering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or being hit by the tanker truck bespeaks reckless imprudence on the part of thirdparty defendant Jimmy Basilio as driver of said KC-20. Had he even only slackened the speed of the KC-20, he could have avoided any contact between it and the tanker truck, given that distance of "25 to 35 meters" from said truck when the latter was first seen. He chose not to do so. "Reckless imprudence consists in the doing or failing to do an act, voluntarily, but without malice, from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or

occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. (Art. 365, Revised Penal Code)" (3) Defendant Gerardo Lim, as driver of the subject tanker truck with Plate No. CVC-563 Phil. 84 on the date in question, has been shown to have been grossly negligent in either (a) improperly parking his said truck on the right lane of the national highway instead of totally on the asphalted shoulder of said highway, or (b) driving said tanker truck from said shoulder of the highway into the right lane of said highway without previously carefully observing and making sure that no other vehicle was coming from the rear of his vehicle so as to avoid any possible accident from such direction, which gross negligence constituted the proximate cause of the accident in question. Otherwise stated, had he not parked his truck improperly, or had he made sure that there was no oncoming vehicle from the direction of the rear of his truck, the initial bumping between the said tanker truck and the Isuzu KC-20 would not have taken place and the subsequent bumpings by and among the other vehicles involved in the subject accident would not have occurred. He is also liable due to culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, under the provisions of Articles 2176 to 2194, inclusive, of the same Code. (4) As far as defendant Amador Corpuz is concerned, who is the owner-operator of the Mazda minibus with Plate No. CVC-563-Phil. 84 being driven by defendant Romeo Gonzales on the date in question, he failed to prove that he had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage sustained by plaintiff Lugue as a consequence of the proven negligence of his said driver Romeo Gonzales. He is liable for quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under the provisions of Articles 1733 or 1766, inclusive of the same code. (5) With respect to defendant and third-party plaintiff Oscar Jaring, as owner-operator of the subject tanker truck driven by defendant and third-party plaintiff Gerardo Lim, he failed to prove that he had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage sustained by plaintiff Lugue as a consequence of the proven negligence of his said driver Gerardo Lim. He is liable for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under the provisions of Articles 1733 to 1766, inclusive, of the same Civil Code. (6) Concerning defendant Romeo Gonzales, driver of the subject Mazda minibus with Plate No. CVC-563-Phil. 84 on the date of the accident in question, he has been shown to have been grossly negligent in the manner he drove or operated the said motor vehicle, which gross negligence constituted an intervening cause for the accident which occurred and which resulted in the injuries sustained by plaintiff Edison Lugue. He is liable for quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, provided for under Articles 1733 to 1766, inclusive, of the same Code. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against all the defendants and third-party defendants (a) Declaring third-party defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio liable for culpa contractual and for culpa aquiliana and to plaintiff Edison Lugue in respect to the accident subject of the instant action and ordering them to pay jointly to said plaintiff (1) Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P19,948.90), Philippine Currency, as actual or compensatory damages; (2) Actual or compensatory damages in the sum of Two Thousand Eleven Pesos (P2,011.00) every month from 14 September 1985, representing the diminution in the monthly salary of plaintiff Edison Lugue as a result of the physical injuries sustained by him arising from the subject accident, or Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Two Pesos (P24,132.00) every calendar year from the aforementioned year, until he shall have been fully paid; and (3) Moral damages in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) Declaring defendants Amador Corpuz, Romeo Gonzales, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim solidarily liable forculpa aquiliana or quasi-delict to Edison Lugue in connection with the same accident and ordering them to pay jointly and severally to said plaintiff the various damages enumerated in Nos. (1) to (3), inclusive, in the foregoing subparagraph (a).

In no case shall said plaintiff be allowed to recover twice from the aforementioned defendants the aforestated damages. Plaintiffs having instituted the present action as paupers-litigants, the docket and other fees that they were exempted from paying shall constitute a lien on any amount that they may collect under this decision.3 Aggrieved by said decision of the trial court, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck respectively, and Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus respectively, filed an appeal before the appellate court. Third-party defendants Santiago and Basilio, owner and driver of the KC-20 respectively, did not interpose an appeal. On 09 March 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, while it dismissed that of plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio in this wise: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED as follows: 1.) Defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio are declared jointly and severally liable with defendants-appellants Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales; and 2.) Defendants-appellants Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim are absolved from liability and the Complaint as against them is DISMISSED. In all other respects, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.4 Hence, the instant petition by Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. Petitioners arguments can be summarized in one issue: whether or n ot the appellate court erred in holding them liable for damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court. Petitioners emphasize that nowhere in the trial courts 43-page decision was there any finding that would remotely support the court a quos conclusion that petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue. We find merit in the petition. A careful perusal of the lower courts decision will show that the following were established during trial through the testimonies of petitioners witnesses: I. According to the testimony of witness Remigio Gervacio during the direct examination, who was then seated on the middle right portion of the minibus, the minibus he was riding was following a KC-20 which was being driven on the right lane of the highway facing Mariveles, while the minibus was occupying the left portion of the road facing the same direction, a little beyond the center line. Then a tanker truck bumped the KC-20, which was thrown to the left portion of the road facing Mariveles. Because the minibus was then already near to the KC-20, it bumped the KC-20.5 II. Petitioner Gonzales, on direct examination, stated that the minibus he was driving on the concrete highway was following a KC-20 vehicle. Then he made a signal to overtake the KC-20 because the way was clear. When the minibus was about ten (10) meters from the KC-20, about to overtake the latter, all of a sudden a gasoline tanker entered the road. While doing so, the tanker bumped the KC-20, as a result of which the latter moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus, the left lane facing Mariveles. He did everything to avoid the KC-20. He pressed the brake fully. But the tanker was already too close to the minibus, that was why the latter hit the KC-20.6 III. Witness Patrocinio Carillo, a passenger of the minibus seated beside his wife who was seated on the front seat beside the driver, maintained that the minibus had been running on the superhighway trailing an Isuzu KC-20. When the minibus was right in front of the Caltex place, it attempted to pass or overtake the KC-20 it had been following by swerving to the left lane facing Mariveles. At that moment, the front of the minibus was about eight (8) meters behind the rear portion of the KC-20, the latter was suddenly thrown to the left and thus it blocked the path of the Mazda minibus. As a result, the minibus bumped the left rear portion of the KC-20. This bumping happened when both vehicles were already on the left lane of the highway facing Mariveles. 7 From the foregoing testimonies, as well as the discussion of the trial court earlier quoted, it is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an

ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 8 Having stated such, it now becomes the trial courts responsibility to adjudge who between the drivers of the two colliding vehicles was negligent and thus liable for damages brought about by the injuries suffered by Edison Lugue. This issue was settled by the court a quo in this wise: In such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right lane traversed by the KC-20 and there was a minibus trailing it, and in the process of passing or overtaking the KC-20, the driver of the minibus (sic) was expected to exercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hit by either or both other motor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that the driver of the KC-20 did not either slacken his speed or even swerve his steering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or being hit by the tanker truck bespeaks reckless imprudence on the part of third-party defendant Jimmy Basilio as driver of said KC-20. Had he even only slackened the speed of the KC-20, he could have avoided any contact between it and the tanker truck, given that distance of "25 to 35 meters" from said truck when the latter was first seen. He chose not to do so.9 [Emphasis ours] Therefore, it is clear that it was the reckless imprudence of the driver of the KC-20, Jimmy Basilio, that set the other events in motion which eventually led to the passengers of the KC-20 sustaining physical injuries. Nonetheless, in a single paragraph of its ten-page Decision, the Court of Appeals discussed the alleged negligence of Romeo Gonzales, and thus attributed liability to the latter, the driver of the minibus, to wit: We however find no merit in the appeal of Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. Faced with the situation where the truck parked on the side was at a headstart in crawling towards the cemented portion of the highway, still the Mazda mini bus recklessly proceeded in attempting to overtake the Isuzu passenger jeep unmindful of the spatial limitations of the road. Defendantdriver Romeo Gonzales was clearly negligent.10 This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of petitioner Gonzales is, however, unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged testimony of petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake the KC-20 because the way was clear.11 That despite his best effort to do everything to avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus as a result of the tanker bumping the KC20.12 Furthermore, based on the unrebutted testimony of both Remigio Gervacio13 and Patrocinio Carillo,14 at the time when the minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already moving towards the middle portion of the highway, occupying the left portion of the road, a little beyond the center line. Certainly, even assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds before actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it. 15 Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered the impending peril.16 In a similar case where a jeepney bound for Isabela collided with a bus on its regular route to Manila when the latter encroached upon the jeepneys lane while it was negotiating a curve, the Court declared that: [E]ven assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.17 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37085, finding petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales liable, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In all other respects, the Court of Appeals Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102253 June 2, 1995 SOUTH SEA SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., respondents. RESOLUTION VITUG, J.: Two issues on the subject of insurance are raised in this petition, that assails the decision, that assails the decision of the Court of Appeals. (in CA-G.R. NO. CV20156), the first dealing on the requirement of premium payment and the second relating to the agency relationship of parties under that contract. The court litigation started when Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. ("Hardwood"), filed with the Regional, Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch l71 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, a complaint for the recovery of the value of lost logs and freight charges from Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation or, to the extent of its alleged insurance cover, from South Sea Surety and insurance Company. The factual backdrop is described briefly by the appellate court thusly: It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff [Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.] entered into an agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former's lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila. On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs, against loss and/or, damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 end the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said date. On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the insurance policy to Mr. Victorio Chua. In the meantime, the said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank on 25 January 1984 resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs. On 30 January 1984, a check for P5,625.00 (Exh. "E") to cover payment of the premium and documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered to the insurer but was not accepted. Instead, the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. cancelled the insurance policy it issued as of the date of inception for non-payment of the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the Insurance Code. On 2 February 1984, plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim. 1

In its decision, dated 11 May 1988, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Hardwood. On appeal perfected by both the shipping firm and the insurance company, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a quo only against the insurance corporation; in absolving the shipping entity from liability, the appellate court ratiocinated: The primary issue to be resolved before us is whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latter's lost logs. It appears that there is a stipulation in the charter party that the ship owner would be exempted from liability in case of loss. The court a quo erred in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to establish the liability of the shipping corporation. The provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its agent is valid (Home Insurance Company, Inc. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA 24). The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the loss of the logs. 2 In this petition for review on certiorari brought by South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., petitioner argues that it likewise should have been freed from any liability to Hardwood. It faults the appellate court (a) for having Supposedly disregarded Section 77 of the insurance Code and (b) for holding Victorio Chua to have been an authorized representative of the insurer. Section 77 of the Insurance Code provides: Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies. Undoubtedly, the payment of the premium is a condition precedent to, and essential for, the efficaciousness of the contract. The only two statutorily provided exceptions are (a) in case the insurance coverage relates to life or industrial life (health) insurance when a grace period applies and (b) when the insurer makes a written acknowledgment of the receipt of premium, this acknowledgment being declared by law to be then conclusive evidence of the premium payment (Secs. 77-78, Insurance Code). The appellate court, contrary to what the petition suggests, did not make any pronouncement to the contrary. Indeed, it has said: Concerning the issue as to whether there is a valid contract of insurance between plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., Section 77 of the

Insurance Code explicitly provides that notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until premium thereof has been paid. It is therefore important to determine whether at the time of the loss, the premium was already paid. 3 No attempt becloud the issues can disguise the fact that the sole question raised in the instant petition is really evidentiary in nature, i.e., whether or not Victorio Chua, in receiving the check for the insurance premium prior to the occurrence of the risk insured against has so acted as an agent of petitioner. The appellate court, like the trial court, has found in the affirmative. Said the appellate court: In the instant case, the Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 was issued by defendant insurance company on 20 January 1984. At the time the vessel sank on 25 January 1984 resulting in the loss of the insured logs, the insured had already delivered to Victorio Chua the check in payment of premium. But, as Victorio Chua testified, it was only in the morning of 30 January 1984 or 5 days after the vessel sank when his messenger tendered the check to defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (TSN, pp. 3-27, 16-17, 22 October 1985). The pivotal issue to be resolved to determine the liability, of the surety corporation is whether Mr. Chua acted as an agent of the surety company or of the insured when he received the check for insurance premiums. Appellant surety company insists that Mr. Chua is an administrative assistant for the past ten years and an agent for less than ten years of the Columbia Insurance Brokers, Ltd. He is paid a salary as a administrative assistant and a commission as agent based on the premiums he turns over to the broker. Appellant therefore argues that Mr. Chua, having received the insurance premiums as an agent of the Columbia Insurance Broker, acted as an agent of the insured under Section 301 of the Insurance Code which provides as follows: Sec. 301. Any person who for any compensation, commission or other thing of value, acts, or aids in soliciting, negotiating or procuring the making of any insurance contract or in placing risk or taking out insurance, on behalf of an insured other than himself, shall be an insurance broker within the intent of this Code, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties requirements, liabilities and penalties to which an insurance broker is subject. The appellees, upon the other hand, claim that the second paragraph of Section 306 of the Insurance Code provide as follows: Sec. 306. . . . Any insurance company which delivers to an insurance agent or insurance

broker a policy or contract of insurance shall be deemed to have authorized such agent or broker to receive on its behalf payment of any premium which is due on such policy of contract of insurance at the time of its issuance or delivery or which becomes due thereon. On cross-examination in behalf of South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. Mr. Chua testified that the marine cargo insurance policy for the plaintiff's logs was delivered to him on 21 January 1984 at his office to be delivered to the plaintiff. When the appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. delivered to Mr. Chua the marine cargo insurance policy for the plaintiffs logs, he is deemed to have been authorized by the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. to receive the premium which is due on its behalf. When therefore the insured logs were lost, the insured had already paid the premium to an agent of the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., which is consequently liable to pay the insurance proceeds under the policy it issued to the insured. 4 We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. Just as so correctly pointed out by private respondent, it is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. WHEREFORE, the resolution, dated 01 February 1993, granting due course to the petition is RECALLED, and the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 85296 May 14, 1990 ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LAWRENCE FERNANDEZ, respondents. Vicente R. Layawen for petitioner. Lawrence L. Fernandez & Associates for private respondent. MEDIALDEA, J.: Assailed in this petition is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 13498 entitled, "Lawrence L. Fernandez, plaintiff-appellee v. Zenith Insurance Corp., defendant-appellant" which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XX in Civil Case No. CEB-1215 and the denial of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The antecedent facts are as follows: On January 25, 1983, private respondent Lawrence Fernandez insured his car for "own damage" under private car Policy No. 50459 with petitioner Zenith Insurance Corporation. On July 6, 1983, the car figured in an accident and suffered actual damages in the amount of P3,640.00. After allegedly being given a run around by Zenith for two (2) months, Fernandez filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for sum of money and damages resulting from the refusal of Zenith to pay the amount claimed. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-1215. Aside from actual damages and interests, Fernandez also prayed for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00, exemplary damages of P5,000.00, attorney's fees of P3,000.00 and litigation expenses of P3,000.00. On September 28, 1983, Zenith filed an answer alleging that it offered to pay the claim of Fernandez pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract which, the private respondent rejected. After the issues had been joined, the pre-trial was scheduled on October 17, 1983 but the same was moved to November 4, 1983 upon petitioner's motion, allegedly to explore ways to settle the case although at an amount lower than private respondent's claim. On November 14, 1983, the trial court terminated the pre-trial. Subsequently, Fernandez presented his evidence. Petitioner Zenith, however, failed to present its evidence in view of its failure to appear in court, without justifiable reason, on the day scheduled for the purpose. The trial court issued an order on August 23, 1984 submitting the case for decision without Zenith's evidence (pp. 10-11, Rollo). Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of the trial court submitting the case for decision without petitioner's evidence. The petition was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 04644. However, the petition was denied due course on April 29, 1986 (p. 56, Rollo). On June 4, 1986, a decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Fernandez. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision provides: WHEREFORE, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff: 1. The amount of P3,640.00 representing the damage incurred plus interest at the rate of twice the prevailing interest rates; 2. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages; 3. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; 4. The amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

5. The amount of P3,000.00 as litigation expenses; and 6. Costs. (p. 9, Rollo) Upon motion of Fernandez and before the expiration of the period to appeal, the trial court, on June 20, 1986, ordered the execution of the decision pending appeal. The order was assailed by petitioner in a petition forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals on October 23, 1986 in C.A. G.R. No. 10420 but which petition was also dismissed on December 24, 1986 (p. 69, Rollo). On June 10, 1986, petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the trial court. The notice of appeal was granted in the same order granting private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal. The appeal to respondent court assigned the following errors: I. The lower court erred in denying defendant appellant to adduce evidence in its behalf. II. The lower court erred in ordering Zenith Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of P3,640.00 in its decision. III. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages, attorneys fees and exemplary damages, the worst is that, the court awarded damages more than what are prayed for in the complaint. (p. 12,Rollo) On August 17, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. It also ruled that the matter of the trial court's denial of Fernandez's right to adduce evidence is a closed matter in view of its (CA) ruling in AC-G.R. 04644 wherein Zenith's petition questioning the trial court's order submitting the case for decision without Zenith's evidence, was dismissed. The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 17, 1988 was denied on September 29, 1988, for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition was filed by Zenith on October 18, 1988 on the allegation that respondent Court of Appeals' decision and resolution ran counter to applicable decisions of this Court and that they were rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction. The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are: a) The legal basis of respondent Court of Appeals in awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and attomey's fees in an amount more than that prayed for in the complaint. b) The award of actual damages of P3,460.00 instead of only P1,927.50 which was arrived at after deducting P250.00 and P274.00 as deductible franchise and 20% depreciation on parts as agreed upon in the contract of insurance. Petitioner contends that while the complaint of private respondent prayed for P10,000.00 moral damages, the lower court awarded twice the amount, or P20,000.00 without factual or legal basis; while private respondent prayed for P5,000.00 exemplary damages, the trial court awarded P20,000.00; and while private respondent prayed for P3,000.00 attorney's fees, the trial court awarded P5,000.00. The propriety of the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is the main issue raised herein by petitioner. The award of damages in case of unreasonable delay in the payment of insurance claims is governed by the Philippine Insurance Code, which provides:

Sec. 244. In case of any litigation for the enforcement of any policy or contract of insurance, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner or the Court, as the case may be, to make a finding as to whether the payment of the claim of the insured has been unreasonably denied or withheld; and in the affirmative case, the insurance company shall be adjudged to pay damages which shall consist of attomey's fees and other expenses incurred by the insured person by reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of payment plus interest of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board of the amount of the claim due the insured, from the date following the time prescribed in section two hundred forty-two or in section two hundred forty-three, as the case may be, until the claim is fully satisfied; Provided, That the failure to pay any such claim within the time prescribed in said sections shall be considered prima facie evidence of unreasonable delay in payment. It is clear that under the Insurance Code, in case of unreasonable delay in the payment of the proceeds of an insurance policy, the damages that may be awarded are: 1) attorney's fees; 2) other expenses incurred by the insured person by reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of payment; 3) interest at twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board of the amount of the claim due the injured; and 4) the amount of the claim. As regards the award of moral and exemplary damages, the rules under the Civil Code of the Philippines shall govern. "The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant, they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action." (J. Cezar S. Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Revised Edition, p. 539) (See also R and B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 64515, June 22, 1984; 129 SCRA 745). While it is true that no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of which is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code), it is equally true that in awarding moral damages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that the breach was wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudently or in bad faith (Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20238, January 30,1965; 13 SCRA 137; Solis v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-17022, August 14, 1965; 14 SCRA 887). In the instant case, there was a finding that private respondent was given a "run-around" for two months, which is the basis for the award of the damages granted under the Insurance Code for unreasonable delay in the payment of the claim. However, the act of petitioner of delaying payment for two months cannot be considered as so wanton or malevolent to justify an award of P20,000.00 as moral damages, taking into consideration also the fact that the actual damage on the car was only P3,460. In the pre-trial of the case, it was shown that there was no total disclaimer by respondent. The reason for petitioner's failure to indemnify private respondent within the two-month period

was that the parties could not come to an agreement as regards the amount of the actual damage on the car. The amount of P10,000.00 prayed for by private respondent as moral damages is equitable. On the other hand, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229, New Civil Code of the Philippines). In the case of Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, G.R. No. 57322, June 22,1987; 151 SCRA 227, exemplary damages were not awarded as the insurance company had not acted in wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The same is true in the case at bar. The amount of P5,000.00 awarded as attomey's fees is justified under the circumstances of this case considering that there were other petitions filed and defended by private respondent in connection with this case. As regards the actual damages incurred by private respondent, the amount of P3,640.00 had been established before the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. Respondent appellate court correctly ruled that the deductions of P250.00 and P274.00 as deductible franchise and 20% depreciation on parts, respectively claimed by petitioners as agreed upon in the contract, had no basis. Respondent court ruled: Under its second assigned error, defendant-appellant puts forward two arguments, both of which are entirely without merit. It is contented that the amount recoverable under the insurance policy defendant-appellant issued over the car of plaintiffappellee is subject to deductible franchise, and . . . . The policy (Exhibit G, pp. 4-9, Record), does not mntion any deductible franchise, . . . (p. 13, Rollo) Therefore, the award of moral damages is reduced to P10,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is hereby deleted. The awards due to private respondent Fernandez are as follows: 1) P3,640.00 as actual claim plus interest of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board computed from the time of submission of proof of loss; 2) P10,000.00 as moral damages; 3) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; 4) P3,000.00 as litigation expenses; and 5) Costs. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is MODIFIED as above stated. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12954 February 28, 1961 COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ARTHUR HENDERSON, respondent. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-13049 February 28, 1961 ARTHUR HENDERSON, petitioner, vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Formilleza & Latorre for respondent. PADILLA, J.: These are petitioner filed by the Collector of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. L-12954) and by Arthur Henderson (G.R. No. L-13049) under the provisions of section 18, Republic Act No. 1125, for review of a judgment dated 26 June 1957 and a resolution dated 28 September 1957 rendered and adopted by the Court of Tax Appeals in Case No. 237. The spouses Artuhur Henderson and Marie B. Henderson (later referred to as the taxpayers) filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue returns of annual net income for the years 1948 to 1952, inclusive, where the following net incomes, personal exemptions and amounts subject to tax appear: 1948: Net Income P29,573.79 ....................................................... Less:Personal .............................. Exemption 2,500.00

....................................... 1952: Net Income P36,780.11 ....................................................... Less:Personal .............................. Exemption 3,000.00

Amount subject to tax P33,780.11 ....................................... (Exhibits 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, A, F, J, N, R). In due time the taxpayers received from the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessment notices Nos. 15804-48, 25450-49, 15255-50, 25705-51 and 22527-52 and paid the amounts assessed as follows: 1948: 14 May 1949, O.R. No. 52991, P2,068.12 Exhibit B ...... 12 September 1950, O.R. No. 160473, Exhibit B-1 . 2,068.11 Total Paid P4,136.23 ......................................................... 1949: 13 May 1950, O.R. No. 232366, P2,314.95 Exhibit G ........... 15 September 1950, O.R. No. 247918, Exhibit G-1 . 2,314.94 Total Paid P4,629.89 ......................................................... 1950: 27 April 1951, O.R. No. 323173, P7,273.00 Exhibit K .... 1951: Amount withheld from salary and P5,780.40 paid by employer . 15 May 1952, O.R. No. 33250, 360.50 Exhibit O ................. 15 August 1952, O.R. No. 383318, Exhibit O-1 .... 361.20 Total Paid P6,502.10 ......................................................... 1952:

Amount subject to ....................................... 1949:

tax P27,073.79

Net Income P31,817.66 ....................................................... Less:Personal .............................. Exemption 2,500.00

Amount subject to ....................................... 1950:

tax P29,317.66

Net Income P34,815.74 ....................................................... Less:Personal .............................. Exemption 3,000.00

Amount subject to ....................................... 1951:

tax P31,815.74

Net Income P32,605.83 ........................................................ Less:Personal .............................. Amount subject Exemption to 3,000.00

Amount withheld from salary and P5,660.40 paid by employer . 18 May 1953, O.R. No. 438026, 1,160.30 Exhibit T .. 13 August 1953, O.R. No. 443483,

tax P29,605.83

Exhibit T-1 .....

1,160.30

Total Paid P7,981.00 ......................................................... On 28 November 1953, after investigation and verification, the Bureay of Internal Revenue reassessed the taxpayers'income for the years 1948 to 1952, inclusive, as follows: 1948: Net income per .................................. Add: Rent expense ........................................................... 7,200.00 Additional bonus for 1947 received May 13, 6,500.00 1948 . Other income: Manager's a/c/#4.51) residential expense (2/29/48 1,400.00 return P29,573.79

Subsistence allowance from A.I.U. ... 6,051.30 Net income per ............................................

14,958.09

investigation P46,775.75 2,500.00

Less: Personal exemption ................................................. Amount of income subject ................................... to

tax 43,275.75

Tax due thereon P8,292.21 ................................................................ Less: tax already assessed & paid per OR Nos. 232366 & 247918 4,629.89

Deficiency tax due P3,662.23 ............................................................. (Should ...................................................................... 1950: Net income per return .................................. P34,815.74 Add: Rent, electricity, water ......................... Net income per ............................................ allowances 8,373.73 investigation P43,189.47 3,000.00 be) 3,662.32

Manager's residential expense (refer to 1948 1,849.32 P & L) .. Entrance fee Marikina Gun & Country Club .... 200.00 Net income per ............................................ Less: Personal ................................................ Net taxable .......................................................... investigation P46,723.11 exemption 2,500.00 income P44,223.11

Less: Personal exemption .................................................

Tax due thereon ............................................................... P8,562.47 Less: Amount of tax already paid per OR #52991 & 160473 ..

Net taxable income P40,189.47 ............................................................ Tax due thereon P10,296.00 ................................................................ Less: tax already paid per OR No. #323173 Deficiency tax due & ................... 1951: Net income per return .................................. P32,605.83 Add: house rental allowance from AIU Net income per ............................................ investigation P83,388.74 3,000.00 5,782.91 7,273.00

4,136.23

Deficiency tax still due & assessable ............................ P4,426.24 1949: Net income per return .................................. P31,817.66 Add: disallowances Capital loss (no capital gain) ................... P3,248.84 Undeclared ..................... bonus 3,857.75

assessable P3,023.00

Rental allowance from A.I.U. ................... 1,800.00

Less: Personal exemption .................................................

Amount of income subject ....................................

to

tax P35,388.74

Tax due thereon ................................................................ P 8,560.00 Less: tax already assessed and paid per O.R. Nos. A33250 & 383318 .......................

6,502.00

Deficiency tax due .................. P2,058.00 1952: Net income per return .................................. P36,780.11 Add: Withholding tax paid ..................................... by company 600.00

Travelling allowances ....................................................... 3,247.40 Allowances for rent, telephone, water, electricity, etc. ..... 7,044.67

Net income per investigation P47,672.18 ............................................ Less: Personal exemption ................................................. 3,000.00

Net taxable income P44,672.18 .................................. Tax due thereon P12,089.00 ................................................................ Less: Tax already withheld P5,660.40 7,981.00

taxpayer's allowances forrental and utilities such as water, electricity and telephone,he did not receive the money for said allowances, but thatthey lieved in the apartment furnished and paid for byhis employer for its convenience; that they had no choicebut live in the said apartment furnished by his employer,otherwise they would have lived in a less expensive one;that as regards his allowances for rental of P7,200 andresidential expenses of P1,400 and P1,849.32 in 1948, rentalof P1,800 and subsistence of P6,051.50 (the latter merelyconsisting of allowances for rent and utilities such as light,water, telephone, etc.) in 1949 rental, electricity and waterof P8,373.73 in 1950, rental of P5,782.91 in 1951 and rental,telephone, water, electricity, etc. of P7,044.67 in 1952, onlythe amount of P3,900 for each year, which is the amountthey would have spent for rental of an apartment includingutilities, should be taxed; that as regards the amount ofP200 representing entrance fee to the Marikina Gun andCountry Club paid for him by his employer in 1948, thesame should not be considered as part of their income forit was an expense of his employer and his membershiptherein was merely incidental to his duties of increasingand sustaining the business of his employer; and that asregards the wife-taxpayer's travelling allowance of P3,247.40 in 1952, it should not be considered as part of theirincome because she merely accompanied him in his businesstrip to New York as his secretary and, at the behestof her husband's employer, to study and look into the detailsof the plans and decorations of the building intendedto be constructed byn his employer in its property at DeweyBoulevard. On 15 and 27 February 1954, the taxpayerspaid the deficiency taxes assessed under Official ReceiptsNos. 451841, 451842, 451843, 451748 and 451844 (ExhibitsC, I, M, Q, and Y). After hearing conducted by theConference Staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on5 October 1954 (pp. 74-85, BIR rec.), on 27 May 1955the Staff recommended to the Collector of Internal Revenuethat the assessments made on 28 November 1953 (Exhibits2, 4, 6, 8, 10) be sustained except that the amountof P200 as entrance fee to the Marikina Gun and CountryClub paid for the husband-taxpayer's account by his employerin 1948 should not be considered as part of thetaxpayers' taxable income for that year (pp. 95-107, BIRrec.). On 14 July 1955, in line with the recommendationof the Conference Staff, the Collector of Internal Revenuedenied the taxpayers' request for reconsideration, exceptas regards the assessment of their income tax due for theyear 1948, which was modified as follows: Net income per return P29,573.79 Add: Rent expense Additional bonus for received on May 13, 1948 Manager's residential (2/29/48 a/c #4.41) Manager's residential (1948 profit and loss) Net income per investigation Less: Personal exemption Net taxable income Tax due thereon Less; Amount already paid 1947 6,500.00 1,400.00 expense 1,849.32 P46,523.11 2,500.00 P44,023.11 P 8,506.47 4,136.23 7,200.00

expense

Tax already paid per O.R. Nos. #438026, 443484 2,320.60

Deficiency tax still due & collectible P4,108.00 ............................... (Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) and demanded payment of thedeficiency taxes on or before 28 February 1954 with respectto those due for the years 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1952and on or before 15 February 1954 with respect to thatdue for the year 1951 (Exhibits B-2, H, L, P, S). In the foregoing assessments, the Bureau of InternalRevenue considered as part of their taxable income thetaxpayer-husband's allowances for rental, residential expenses,subsistence, water, electricity and telephone; bonuspaid to him; withholding tax and entrance fee to the Marikinagun and Country Bluc paid by his employer for hisaccount; and travelling allowance of his wife. On 26 and27 January 1954 the taxpayers asked for reconsiderationof the foregoing assessment (pp. 29, 31, BIR rec.) andon 11 Februayr 1954 and 28 February 1955 stated thegrounds and reasons in support of their request for reconsideration (pp. 36-38, 62-66, BIR rec.). The claimthat as regards the husband-

Deficiency tax still due P 4,370.24 and demanded payment of the deficiency taxes of P4,370.24for 1948, P3,662.23 for 1949, P3,023 for 1950, P2,058 for1951 and P4,108 for 1952, 5% surcharge and 1% monthlyinterest thereon from 1 March 1954 to the date of paymentand P80 as administrative penalty for late payment,to the City Treasurer of Manila not later than 31

July1955 (Exhibit 14). On 30 January 1956 the taxpayersagain sought a reconsideration of the denial of their requestfor reconsideration and offered to settle the case ona more equitable basis by increasing the amount of thetaxable portion of the husband-taxpayer's allowances forrental, etc. from P3,000 yearly to P4,800 yearly, which "isthe value to the employee of the benefits he derived therefrommeasured by what he had saved on account thereof'in the ordinary course of his life ... for which hewould have spent in any case'". The taxpayers also reiteratedtheir previous stand regarding the transportationallowance of the wife-taxpayer of P3,247.40 in 1952 andrequested the refund of the amounts of P3,477.18, P569.33,P1,294, P354 and P2,164, or a total of P7,858.51, (Exhibit Z). On 10 February 1956 the taxpayers again requestedthe Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to them theamounts allegedly paid in excess as income taxes for theyears 1948 to 1952, inclusive (Exhibit Z-1). The Collectorof Internal Revenue did not take any action on the taxpayers'request for refund. On 15 February 1956 the taxpayers filed in the Courtof Tax Appeals a petition to review the decision of theCollector of Internal Revenue (C.T.A. Case No. 237). Afterhearing, on 26 June 1957 the Court rendered judgmentholding "that the inherent nature of petitioner's(the husband-taxpayer) employment as president of theAmerican International Underwriters as president of theAmerican International Underwriters of the Philippines,Inc. does not require him to occupy the apartments suppliedby his employer-corporation;" that, however, onlythe amount of P4,800 annually, the ratable value to him ofthe quarters furnished constitutes a part of taxable income;that since the taxpayers did not receive any benefitout of the P3,247.40 traveling expense allowance grantedin 1952 to the wifetaxpayer and that she merely undertookthe trip abroad at the behest of her husband's employer,the same could not be considered as income; andthat even if it were considered as such, still it could not besubject to tax because it was deductible as travel expense;and ordering the Collector of Internal Revenue to refundto the taxpayers the amount of P5,109.33 with interestfrom 27 February 1954, without pronouncement as tocosts. The taxpayers filed a motion for reconsiderationclaiming that the amount of P5,986.61 is the amount refundableto them because the amounts of P1,400 and P1,849.32 as manager's residential expenses in 1948 shouldnot be included in their taxable net income for the reasonthat they are of the same nature as the rentals for theapartment, they being mainly expenses for utilities aslight, water and telephone in the apartment furnished bythe husbant-taxpayer's employer. The Collector of InternalRevenue filed an opposition to their motion for reconsideration.He also filed a separate motion for reconsiderationof the decision claiming that his assessmentunder review was correct and should have been affirmed.The taxpayers filed an opposition to this motion for reconsiderationof the Collector of Internal Revenue; thelatter, a reply thereto. On 28 September 1957 the Courtdenied both motions for reconsideration. On 7 October1957 the Collector of Internal Revenue filed a notice ofappeal in the Court of Tax Appeals and on 21 October1957, within the extension of time previously granted bythis Court, a petition for review (G.R. No. L-12954). On29 October 1957 the taxpayers filed a notice of appealin the Court of Tax Appeals and a petition for review inthis Court (G.R. No. L-13049). The Collector of Internal Revenue had assigned the followingerrors allegedly committed by the Court of TaxAppeals: I. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in finding that theherein respondent did not have any choice in the selection ofthe living quarters occupied by him. II. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in not consideringthe fact that respondent is not a minor company official butthe President of his employer-corporation, in the appreciationof respondent's alleged lack of choice in the matter of the selectionof the quarters occupied by him. III. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in giving full weightand credence to respondent's allegation, a self-serving and unsupported declaration that the ratable value to him of the living quarters and subsistence allowance was only P400.00 a month.

IV. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that only the ratable value of P4,800.00 per annum, or P400.00 a month constitutes income to respondent. V. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in arbitrarily fixing the amount of P4,800.00 per annum, or P400.00 a month as the only amount taxable aganst respondent during the five tax years in question. VI. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in not finding that travelling allowance in the amount of P3,247.40 constituted income to respondent and, therefore, subject to the income tax. VII. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in ordering the refund of the sum of P5,109.33 with interest from February 17, 1954. (G.R. No. L-12954.) The taxpayers have assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Tax Appeals: I. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in its computation of the 1948 income tax and consequently in the amount that should be refunded for that year. II. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in denying our motion for reconsideration as contained in its resolution dated September 28, 1957. (G.R. No. L-13049.) The Government's appeal: The Collector of Internal Revenue raises questions of fact. He claims that the evidence is not sufficient to support the findings and conclusion of the Court of Tax Appeals that the quarters occupied by the taxpayers were not of their choice but that of the husbandtaxpayer's employer; that it did not take into consideration the fact that the husbandtaxpayer is not a mere minor company official, but the highest executive of his employercorporation; and that the wife-taxpayer's trip abroad in 1952 was not, as found by the Court, a business but a vacation trip. In Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Aznar, 56, Off. Gaz. 2386, this Court held that in petitions for review under section 18, Republic Act No. 1125, it may review the findings of fact of the Court of Tax Appeals. The determination of the main issue in the case requires a review of the evidence. Are the allowances for rental of the apartment furnished by the husband-taxpayer's employercorporation, including utilities such as light, water, telephone, etc. and the allowance for travel expenses given by his employer-corporation to his wife in 1952 part of taxable income? Section 29, Commonwealth Act No. 466, National Internal Revenue Code, provides: "Gross income" includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rents dividend, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever. (Emphasis ours.) The Court of Tax Appeals found that the husband-taxpayer "is the president of the American International Underwriters for the Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in insurance business;" that the taxpayers "entertained officials, guests and customers of his employer-corporation, in apartments furnished by the latter and successively occupied by him as president thereof; that "In 1952, petitioner's wife, Mrs. Marie Henderson, upon request o Mr. C. V. Starr, chairman of the parent corporation of the American International Underwriters for the Philippines, Inc., undertook a trip to New York in connection with the purchase of a lot in Dewey Boulevardby petitioner's employercorporatio, the construction of a building thereon, the drawing of prospectus and plans for said building, and other related matters." Arthur H. Henderson testified that he is the President of American International Underwriters for the Philippines, Inc., which representa a group of American insurance companies engagad in the business of general insurance except life insurance; that he receives a basic annual salary of P30,000 and allowance for house rental and utilities like light, water, telephone, etc.; that he and his wife are childless and are the only two in the family; that during the years 1948 to 1952, they lived in apartments chosen by his

employer; that from 1948 to the early part of 1950, they lived at the Embassy Apartments on Dakota Street, Manila, where they had a large sala, three bedrooms, dining room, two bathrooms, kitchen and a large porch, and from the early part of 1950 to 1952, they lived at the Rosaria Apartments on the same street where they had a kitchen, sala, dining room two bedrooms and bathroom; that despite the fact that they were the only two in the family, they had to live in apartments of the size beyond their personal needs because as president of the corporation, he and his wife had to entertain and put up houseguests; that during all those years of 1948 to 1952, inclusive, they entertained and put up houseguests of his company's officials, guests and customers such as the president of C, V. Starr & Company, Inc., who spent four weeks in his apartment, Thomas Cocklin, a lawyer from Washington, D.C., and Manuel Elizalde, a stockholder of AIUPI; that were he not required by his employer to live in those apartments furnished to him, he and his wife would have chosen an apartment only large enough for them and spend from P300 to P400 monthly for rental; that of the allowances granted to him, only the amount of P4,800 annually, the maximum they would have spent for rental, should be considered as taxable income and the excess treated as expense of the company; and that the trip to New York undertaken by his wife in 1952, for which she was granted by his employer-corporation travelling expense allowance of P3,247.40, was made at the behest of his employer to assist its architect in the preparation of the plans for a proposed building in Manila and procurement of supplies and materials for its use, hence the said amount should not be considered as part of taxable income. In support of his claim, letters written by his wife while in New York concerning the proposed building, inquiring about the progress made in the acquisition of the lot, and informing him of the wishes of Mr. C. V. Starr, chairman of the board of directors of the parent-corporation (Exhibits U-1, U-1-A, V, V-1 and W) and a letter written by the witness to Mr. C. V. Starr concerning the proposed building (Exhibits X, X-1) were presented in evidence. Mrs. Marie Henderson testified that for almost three years, she and her husband gave parties every Friday night at their apartment for about 18 to 20 people; that their guests were officials of her husband's employer-corporation and other corporations; that during those parties movies for the entertainment of the guests were shown after dinner; that they also entertained during luncheons and breakfasts; that these involved and necessitated the services of additional servants; and that in 1952 she was asked by Mr. C. V. Starr to come to New York to take up problems concerning the proposed building and entertainment because her husband could not make the trip himself, and because "the woman of the family is closer to those problems." The evidence presented at the hearing of the case substantially supports the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals. The taxpayers are childless and are the only two in the family. The quarters, therefore, that they occupied at the Embassy Apartments consisting of a large sala, three bedrooms, dining room, two bathrooms, kitchen and a large porch, and at the Rosaria Apartments consisting of a kitchen, sala dining room, two bedrooms and a bathroom, exceeded their personal needs. But the exigencies of the husband-taxpayer's high executive position, not to mention social standing, demanded and compelled them to live in amore spacious and pretentious quarters like the ones they had occupied. Although entertaining and putting up houseguests and guests of the husbnad-taxpayer's employercorporation were not his predominand occupation as president, yet he and his wife had to entertain and put up houseguests in their apartments. That is why his employercorporation had to grant him allowances for rental and utilities in addition to his annual basic salary to take care of those extra expenses for rental and utilities in excess of their personal needs. Hence, the fact that the taxpayers had to live or did not have to live in the apartments chosen by the husband-taxpayer's employer-corporation is of no moment, for no part of the allowances in question redounded to their personal benefit or was retained by them. Their bills for rental and utilities were paid directly by the employer-corporation to the creditors (Exhibit AA to DDD, inclusive; pp. 104, 170-193, t.s.n.). Neverthelss, as correctly held by the Court of Tax Appeals, the taxpayers are entitled only to a ratable value of the allowances in question, and only the amount of P4,800 annually, the

reasonable amount they would have spent for house rental and utilities such as light, water, telephone, etc., should be the amount subject to tax, and the excess considered as expenses of the corporation. Likewise, the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that the wife-taxpayer had to make the trip to New York at the behest of her husband's employer-corporation to help in drawing up the plans and specificatins of a proposed building, is also supported by the evidence. The parts of the letters written by the wife-taxpayer to her husband while in New York and the letter written by the husband-taxpayer to Mr. C. V. Starr support the said findings (Exhibits U-2, V-1, W-1, X). No part of the allowance for travellking expenses redounded to the benefit of the taxpayers. Neither was a part thereof retained by them. The fact that she had herself operated on for tumors while in New York wsa but incidental to her stay there and she must have merely taken advantage of her presence in that city to undergo the operation. The taxpayers' appeal: The taxpayers claim that the Court of Tax Appeals erred in considering the amounts of P1,400 and P1,849.32, or a total of P3,249.32, for "manager's residential expense" in 1948 as taxable income despite the fact "that they were of the same nature as the rentals for the apartment, they being expenses for utilities, such as light, water and telephone necessarily incidental to the apartment furnished to him by his employer." Mrs. Crescencia Perez Ramos, an examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who examined the books of accound of the American International Underwriters for the Philippines, Inc., testified that he total amount of P3,249.32 was reflected in its books as "living expenses of Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Henderson in the quarters they occupied in 1948;" and that "the amount of P1,400 was included as manager's residential expense while the amount of P1,849.32 was entered as profit and loss account." Buenaventura Loberiza, acting head of the accouting department of the American International Underwriters for the Philippines, Inc., testified that rentals, utilities, water, telephone and electric bills of executives of the corporation were entered in the books of account as "subsistence allowances and expenses;" that there was a separate account for salaries and wages of employees and officers; and that expenses for rentals and other utilities were not charged to salary accounts. The taxpayers' claim is supported by the evidence. The total amount of P3,249.32 "for manager's residential expense" in 1948 should be treated as rentals for apartments and utilities and should not form part of the ratable value subject to tax. The computation made by the taxpayers is correct. Adding to the amount of P29,573.79, their net income per return, the amount of P6,500, the bonus received in 1948, and P4,800, the taxable ratable value of the allowances, brings up their gross income to P40,873.79. Deducting therefrom the amount of P2,500 for personal exemption, the amount of P38,373.79 is the amount subject to income tax. The income tax due on this amount is P6,957.19 only. Deducting the amount of income tax due, P6,957.19, from the amount already paid, P8,562.47 (Exhibits B, B-1, C), the amount of P1,605.28 is the amount refundable to the taxpayers. Add this amount to P563.33, P1,294.00, P354.00 and P2,154.00, refundable to the taxpayers for 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 and the total is P5,986.61. The judgment under review is modified as above indicated. The Collector of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to the taxpayers the sum of P5,986.61, without pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 165617 February 25, 2011 SUPREME TRANSLINER, INC., MOISES C. ALVAREZ and PAULITA S. ALVAREZ, Petitioners, vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 165837 BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Petitioner, vs. SUPREME TRANSLINER, INC., MOISES C. ALVAREZ and PAULITA S. ALVAREZ, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This case involves the question of the correct redemption price payable to a mortgagee bank as purchaser of the property in a foreclosure sale. On April 24, 1995, Supreme Transliner, Inc. represented by its Managing Director, Moises C. Alvarez, and Paulita S. Alvarez, obtained a loan in the amount of P9,853,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank with a 714-square meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79193 in the name of Moises C. Alvarez and 1 Paulita S. Alvarez, as collateral. For non-payment of the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property was sold to the bank as the highest bidder in the public auction conducted by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Lucena City. On August 7, 1996, a Certificate of 2 Sale was issued in favor of the bank and the same was registered on October 1, 1996. Before the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the mortgagors notified the bank of their intention to redeem the property. Accordingly, the following Statement of 3 Account was prepared by the bank indicating the total amount due under the mortgage loan agreement: xxxx Balance of Principal Add: Interest Due Late Payment Charges MRI Fire Insurance Foreclosure Expenses P 9,551,827.64 1,417,761.24 155,546.25 0.00 0.00 155,817.23

Total Amount Due As Of 10,372,711.35 08/07/96 (Auction Date) Add: Attorneys Fees (15%) Liquidated Damages (15%) 1,555,906.70 1,555,906.70

Interest on P 10,372,711.35 1,207,772.58 from 08/07/96 to 04/07/97 (243 days) at 17.25% p.a. x x x x Asset Acquired Expenses: Documentary Stamps Capital Gains Tax Foreclosure Fee Registration and Filing Fee 155,595.00 518,635.57 207,534.23 23,718.00

Addl. Registration & Filing 906,142.79 Fee 660.00 Interest on P 906,142.79 105,509.00 from 08/07/96 to 04/07/97 (243 days) at 17.25% p.a. Cancellation Fee 300.00

Total Amount Due As Of P 04/07/97 (Subject to Audit) 15,704,249.12 xxxx The mortgagors requested for the elimination of liquidated damages and reduction of attorneys fees and interest (1% per month) but the bank refused. On May 21, 1997, the mortgagors redeemed the property by paying the sum of P15,704,249.12. A 4 Certificate of Redemption was issued by the bank on May 27, 1997. On June 11, 1997, the mortgagors filed a complaint against the bank to recover the allegedly unlawful and excessive charges totaling P5,331,237.77, with prayer for damages and attorneys fees, docketed as Civil Case No. 97 -72 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 57. In its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, the bank asserted that the redemption price reflecting the stipulated interest, charges and/or

Sub-total Less: Unapplied Payment

P 11,280,952.36 908,241.01

expenses, is valid, legal and in accordance with documents duly signed by the mortgagors. The bank further contended that the claims are deemed waived and the mortgagors are already estopped from questioning the terms and conditions of their contract. On September 30, 1997, the bank filed a motion to set the case for hearing on the special and affirmative defenses by way of motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion on January 8, 1998 and also denied the banks motion for reconsideration. The bank elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 47588) which dismissed the petition for certiorari on February 26, 1999. 5 On February 14, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and the banks counterclaims. The trial court held that plaintiffs -mortgagors are bound by the terms of the mortgage loan documents which clearly provided for the payment of the following interest, charges and expenses: 18% p.a. on the loan, 3% postdefault penalty, 15% liquidated damages, 15% attorneys fees and collection and legal costs. Plaintiffs-mortgagors claim that they paid the redemption price demanded by the defendant bank under extreme pressure was rejected by the trial court since there was active negotiation for the final redemption price between the banks representatives and plaintiffs-mortgagors who at the time had legal advice from their counsel, together with Orient Development Banking Corporation which committed to finance the redemption. According to the trial court, plaintiffs-mortgagors are estopped from questioning the correctness of the redemption price as they had freely and voluntarily signed the letter-agreement prepared by the defendant bank, and along with Orient Bank expressed their conformity to the terms and conditions therein, thus: May 14, 1997 ORIENT DEVELOPMENT BANKING CORPORATION 7th Floor Ever Gotesco Corporate Center C.M. Recto Avenue corner Matapang Street Manila Attention: MS. AIDA C. DELA ROSA Senior Vice-President Gentlemen: This refers to your undertaking to settle the account of SUPREME TRANS LINER, INC. and spouses MOISES C. ALVAREZ and PAULITA S. ALVAREZ, covering the real estate property located in the Poblacion, City of Lucena under TCT No. T-79193 which was foreclosed by BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. With regard to the proposed refinancing of the account, we interpose no objection to the annotation of your mortgage lien thereon subject to the following conditions: 1. That all expenses for the registration of the annotation of mortgage and other incidental registration and cancellation expenses shall be borne by the borrower. 2. That you will recognize our mortgage liens as first and superior until the loan with us is fully paid. 3. That you will annotate your mortgage lien and pay us the full amount to close the loan within five (5) working days from the receipt of the titles. If within this period, you have not registered the same and paid us in full, you will immediately and unconditionally return the titles to us without need of demand, free from liens/encumbrances other than our lien. 4. That in case of loss of titles, you will undertake and shoulder the cost of re-issuance of a new owners titles. 5. That we will issue the Certificate of Redemption after full payment of P15,704,249.12. representing the outstanding balance of the loan as of May

15, 1997 including interest and other charges thereof within a period of five (5) working days after clearance of the check payment. 6. That we will release the title and the Certificate of Redemption and other pertinent papers only to your authorized representative with complete authorization and identification. 7. That all expenses related to the cancellation of your annotated mortgage lien should the Bank be not fully paid on the period above indicated shall be charged to you. If you find the foregoing conditions acceptable, please indicate your conformity on the space provided below and return to us the duplicate copy. Very truly yours, BPI FAMILY BANK BY: (SGD.) LOLITA C. CARRIDO Manager CONFORME: ORIENT DEVELOPMENT BANKING CORPORATION (SGD.) AIDA C. DELA ROSA Senior Vice President CONFORME: SUPREME TRANS LINER, INC. (SGD.) MOISES C. ALVAREZ/PAULITA S. ALVAREZ 6 Mortgagors (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied.) As to plaintiffs-mortgagors contention that the amounts representing attorneys fees and liquidated damages were already included in the P10,372,711.35 bid price, the trial court said this was belied by their own evidence, the Statement of Account showing the breakdown of the redemption price as computed by the defendant bank. The mortgagors appealed to the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 74761) which, by 7 Decision dated April 6, 2004 reversed the trial court and decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered as follows: 1. Plaintiffs-appellants complaint for damages against defendant-appellee is hereby REINSTATED; 2. Defendant-appellee is hereby ORDERED to return to plaintiffs-appellees (sic) the invalidly collected amount of P3,111,813.40 plus six (6) percent legal interest from May 21, 1997 until fully returned; 3. Defendant-appellee is hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiffs-appellees (sic) the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; 4. Costs against defendant-appellee. 8 SO ORDERED. The CA ruled that attorneys fees and liquidated damages were already included in the bid price ofP10,372,711.35 as per the recitals in the Certificate of Sale that said amount was paid to the foreclosing mortgagee to satisfy not only the principal loan but also "interest and penalty charges, cost of publication and expenses of the foreclosure proceedings." These "penalty charges" consist of 15% attorneys fees and 15% liquidated damages which the bank imposes as penalty in cases of violation of the terms of the mortgage deed. The total redemption price thus should only be P12,592,435.72 and the bank should return the amount ofP3,111,813.40 representing attorneys fees and liquidated damages. The appellate court further stated that the mortgagors cannot be deemed estopped to question the propriety of

the charges because from the very start they had repeatedly questioned the imposition of attorneys fees and liquidated damages and were me rely constrained to pay the demanded redemption price for fear that the redemption period will expire 9 without them redeeming their property. 10 By Resolution dated October 12, 2004, the CA denied the parties respective motions for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions separately filed by the mortgagors and the bank. In G.R. No. 165617, the petitioners-mortgagors raise the single issue of whether the foreclosing mortgagee should pay capital gains tax upon execution of the certificate of sale, and if paid by the mortgagee, whether the same should be shouldered by the redemptioner. They specifically prayed for the return of all asset-acquired expenses consisting of documentary stamps tax, capital gains tax, foreclosure fee, registration and filing fee, and additional registration and filing fee totaling P906,142.79, with 6% 11 interest thereon from May 21, 1997. On the other hand, the petitioner bank in G.R. No. 165837 assails the CA in holding that 1. the Certificate of Sale, the bid price of P10,372,711.35 includes penalty charges and as such for purposes of computing the redemption price petitioner can no longer impose upon the private respondents the penalty charges in the form of 15% attorneys fees and the 15% liquid ated damages in the aggregate amount of P3,111,813.40, although the evidence presented by the parties show otherwise. 2. private respondents cannot be considered to be under estoppel to question the propriety of the aforestated penalty charges despite the fact that, as found by the Honorable Trial Court, "there was very active negotiation between the parties in the computation of the redemption price" culminating into the signing freely and voluntarily by the petitioner, the private respondents and Orient Bank, which financed the redemption of the foreclosed property, of Exhibit "3", wherein they mutually agreed that the redemption price is in the sum of P15,704,249.12. 3. petitioner [to] pay private respondents damages in the aggregate amount of P300,000.00 on the ground that the former acted in bad faith in the imposition upon them of the aforestated penalty charges, when in truth it is entitled thereto as the law and the contract expressly provide and that 12 private respondents agreed to pay the same. On the correct computation of the redemption price, Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337, otherwise known as theGeneral Banking Act, governs in cases where the 13 mortgagee is a bank. Said provision reads: SEC. 78. x x x In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income received from the property. x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Mortgage Loan Agreement, petitioners-mortgagors undertook to pay the attorneys fees and the costs of registration and foreclosure. The following contract terms would show that the said items are separate and distinct from the bid price which represents only the outstanding loan balance with stipulated interest thereon. 23. Application of Proceeds of Foreclosure Sale. The proceeds of sale of the mortgaged property/ies shall be applied as follows: a) To the payment of the expenses and cost of foreclosure and sale, including the attorneys fees as herein provided; b) To the satisfaction of all interest and charges accruing upon the obligations herein and hereby secured. c) To the satisfaction of the principal amount of the obligations herein and hereby secured. d) To the satisfaction of all other obligations then owed by the Borrower/Mortgagor to the Bank or any of its subsidiaries/affiliates such as, but not limited to BPI Credit Corporation; or to Bank of the Philippine Islands or any of its subsidiaries/affiliates such as, but not limited to BPI Leasing Corporation, BPI Express Card Corporation, BPI Securities Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank; and e) The balance, if any, to be due to the Borrower/Mortgagor. xxxx 31. Attorneys Fees: In case the Bank should engage the services of counsel to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the Borrower/Mortgagor shall pay an amount equivalent to fifteen (15%) percent of the total amount claimed by the Bank, which in no case shall be less than P2,000.00, Philippine currency, plus costs, collection expenses and disbursements allowed by law, all of which shall be secured by this 15 mortgage. 16 Additionally, the Disclosure Statement on Loan/Credit Transaction also duly signed by the petitioners-mortgagors provides: 10. ADDITIONAL CHARGES IN CASE CERTAIN STIPULATIONS ARE NOT MET BY THE BORROWER a. Post Default Penalty 3.00% per month b. Attorneys Services 15% of sum due but not less than P2,000.00 c. Liquidated Damages 15% of sum due but not less than P10,000.00 d. Collection & Legal Cost As provided by the Rules of Court e. Others (Specify) As correctly found by the trial court, that attorneys fees and liquidated damages were not yet included in the bid price of P10,372,711.35 is clearly shown by the Statement of Account as of April 4, 1997 prepared by the petitioner bank and given to petitioners-mortgagors. On the other hand, par. 23 of the Mortgage Loan Agreement indicated that asset acquired expenses were to be added to the redemption price as part of "costs and other expenses incurred" by the mortgagee bank in connection with the foreclosure sale. Coming now to the issue of capital gains tax, we find merit in petitioners-mortgagors argument that there is no legal basis for the inclusion of this charge in the redemption price. Under Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 13-85 (December 12, 1985), every sale or exchange or other disposition of real property classified as capital asset under 17 Section 34(a) of the Tax Code shall be subject to the final capital gains tax. The term sale includes pacto de retro and other forms of conditional sale. Section 2.2 of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 29-86 (as amended by RMO No. 16-88 and as further amended by RMO Nos. 27-89 and 6-92) states that these conditional sales "necessarily include mortgage foreclosure sales (judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure sales)." Further, for real property foreclosed by a bank on or after September 3, 1986,

14

the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax must be paid before title to the 18 property can be consolidated in favor of the bank. Under Section 63 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, if no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the purchaser. But where the right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be registered by brief memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the property is redeemed, the certificate or deed of redemption shall be filed with the Register of Deeds, and a brief memorandum thereof shall be made by the Register of Deeds on the certificate of title. It is therefore clear that in foreclosure sale, there is no actual transfer of the mortgaged real property until after the expiration of the one-year redemption period as provided in Act No. 3135 and title thereto is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee in case of non-redemption. In the interim, the mortgagor is given the option whether or not to redeem the real property. The issuance of the Certificate of 19 Sale does not by itself transfer ownership. RR No. 4-99 issued on March 16, 1999, further amends RMO No. 6-92 relative to the payment of Capital Gains Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax on extrajudicial foreclosure sale of capital assets initiated by banks, finance and insurance companies. SEC. 3. CAPITAL GAINS TAX. (1) In case the mortgagor exercises his right of redemption within one year from the issuance of the certificate of sale, no capital gains tax shall be imposed because no capital gains has been derived by the mortgagor and no sale or transfer of real property was realized. x x x (2) In case of non-redemption, the capital gains [tax] on the foreclosure sale imposed under Secs. 24(D)(1) and 27(D)(5) of the Tax Code of 1997 shall become due based on the bid price of the highest bidder but only upon the expiration of the one-year period of redemption provided for under Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, and shall be paid within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the said one-year redemption period. SEC. 4. DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. (1) In case the mortgagor exercises his right of redemption, the transaction shall only be subject to the P15.00 documentary stamp tax imposed under Sec. 188 of the Tax Code of 1997 because no land or realty was sold or transferred for a consideration. (2) In case of non-redemption, the corresponding documentary stamp tax shall be levied, collected and paid by the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring the real property wherever the document is made, signed, issued, accepted or transferred where the property is situated in the Philippines. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Although the subject foreclosure sale and redemption took place before the effectivity of RR No. 4-99, its provisions may be given retroactive effect in this case. Section 246 of the NIRC of 1997 states: SEC. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. Any revocation, modification, or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases:

(a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. In this case, the retroactive application of RR No. 4-99 is more consistent with the policy of aiding the exercise of the right of redemption. As the Court of Tax Appeals concluded in one case, RR No. 4-99 "has curbed the inequity of imposing a capital gains tax even before the expiration of the redemption period [since] there is yet no transfer of title and no profit or gain is realized by the mortgagor at the time of 20 foreclosure sale but only upon expiration of the redemption period." In his commentaries, De Leon expressed the view that while revenue regulations as a general rule have no retroactive effect, if the revocation is due to the fact that the regulation is erroneous or contrary to law, such revocation shall have retroactive operation as to affect past transactions, because a wrong construction of the law 21 cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer. Considering that herein petitioners-mortgagors exercised their right of redemption before the expiration of the statutory one-year period, petitioner bank is not liable to pay the capital gains tax due on the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. There was no actual transfer of title from the owners-mortgagors to the foreclosing bank. Hence, the inclusion of the said charge in the total redemption price was unwarranted and the corresponding amount paid by the petitioners-mortgagors should be returned to them. WHEREFORE, premises considered, both petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In G.R. No. 165617, BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby ordered to RETURN the amounts representing capital gains and documentary stamp taxes as reflected in the Statement of Account To Redeem as of April 7, 1997, to petitioners Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez, and to retain only the sum provided in RR No. 4-99 as documentary stamps tax due on the foreclosure sale.1awphi1 In G.R. No. 165837, petitioner BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby declared entitled to the attorneys fees and liquidated damages included in the total redemption price paid by Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez. The sums awarded as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez are DELETED. The Decision dated April 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74761 is accordingly MODIFIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148512

June 26, 2006

Less:

Cost of Sales

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Decision, dated May 31, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60057, entitled "Central Luzon Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," granting herein respondent Central Luzon Drug Corporations claim for tax credit equal to the amount of the 20% discount that it extended to senior citizens on the latters purchase of medicines pursuant to Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for other Purposes" otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act. The antecedents are as follows: Central Luzon Drug Corporation has been a retailer of medicines and other pharmaceutical products since December 19, 1994. In 1995, it opened three (3) drugstores as a franchisee under the business name and style of "Mercury Drug." For the period January 1995 to December 1995, in conformity to the mandate of Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, petitioner granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778. Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-941 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted the total amount of P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. For said taxable period, respondent reported a net loss of P20,963 in its corporate income tax return. As a consequence, respondent did not pay income tax for 1995. Subsequently, on December 27, 1996, claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, the amount ofP219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, respondent filed a claim for refund in the amount of P150,193, thus:

Merchandise Inventory, beg

P 1,232,740.00

Purchases

41,145,138.00

Merchandise Inventory, end

8,521,557.00

33,856,621.00

Gross Profit

P 3,377,964.00

Miscellaneous Income

39,014.00

Total Income

3,416,978.00

Operating Expenses

3,199,230.00

Net Income Before Tax

P 217,748.00

Income Tax (35%)

69,585.00

Less:

Tax Credit

Net Sales

P 37,014,807.00

(Cost of 20% Discount to Senior Citizens)

219,778.00

Add:

Cost of 20% Discount to Senior Citizens

219,778.00 Income Tax Payable (P 150,193.00)

Income Tax Actually Paid Gross Sales P 37,234,585.00

-0-

Tax Refundable/Overpaid Income Tax

(P 150,193.00)

and unequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to mean exactly what it says.5 Its literal meaning should be followed;6 to depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute.7 The above provision explicitly employed the word "tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a "deduction" from gross sales. To construe it otherwise would be a departure from the clear mandate of the law. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition of tax credit found in Section 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is erroneous as it refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20% discount that "shall be deducted by the said establishment from their gross sales for value added tax and other percentage tax purposes." This definition is contrary to what our lawmakers had envisioned with regard to the treatment of the discount granted to senior citizens. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount -- when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability.8 The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. The administrative agencies issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law they administer. 9 In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity."10 Finally, for purposes of clarity, Sec. 22911 of the Tax Code does not apply to cases that fall under Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 7432 because the former provision governs exclusively all kinds of refund or credit of internal revenue taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected pursuant to the Tax Code while the latter extends the tax credit benefit to the private establishments concerned even before tax payments have been made. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund. As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.12 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60057, dated May 31, 2001, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

As shown above, the amount of P150,193 claimed as a refund represents the tax credit allegedly due to respondent under R.A. No. 7432. Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue "was not able to decide the claim for refund on time,"2 respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998. On April 24, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition, declaring that even if the law treats the 20% sales discounts granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, the same cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability.3Also, no refund can be granted as no tax was erroneously, illegally and actually collected based on the provisions of Section 230, now Section 229, of the Tax Code. Furthermore, the law does not state that a refund can be claimed by the private establishment concerned as an alternative to the tax credit. Thus, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Review on August 3, 2000. On May 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision stating that Section 229 of the Tax Code does not apply in this case. It concluded that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. In view of this, the CA held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the CTA dated 24 April 2000 and its resolution dated 06 July 2000 are SET ASIDE. A new one is entered granting petitioners claim for tax credit in the amount of Php: 150,193.00. No costs. SO ORDERED.4 Hence, this petition raising the sole issue of whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94. Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides: Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit. The CA and the CTA correctly ruled that based on the plain wording of the law discounts given under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself especially when the words and phrases therein are clear

G.R. No. 142299 June 22, 2006 BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION (FORMERLY ELMAS DRUG COPRORATION), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for review1 by Bicolandia Drug Corporation, formerly known as Elmas Drug Corporation, seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 19, 1999 and February 18, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R SP No. 49946 entitled "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Elmas Drug Corporation." The controversy primarily involves the proper interpretation of the term "cost" in Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7432, otherwise known as "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for Other Purposes." The facts2 of the case are as follows: Petitioner Bicolandia Drug Corporation is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the retail of pharmaceutical products. Petitioner has a drugstore located in Naga City under the name and business style of "Mercury Drug." Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for Other Purposes," also known as the "Senior Citizens Act," and Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, petitioner granted to qualified senior citizens a 20% sales discount on their purchase of medicines covering the period from July 19, 1993 to December 31, 1994. When petitioner filed its corresponding corporate annual income tax returns for taxable years 1993 and 1994, it claimed as a deduction from its gross income the respective amounts of P80,330 and P515,000 representing the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens. On March 28, 1995, however, alleging error in the computation and claiming that the aforementioned 20% sales discount should have been treated as a tax credit pursuant to R.A. No. 7432 instead of a deduction from gross income, petitioner filed a claim for refund or credit of overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994, amounting toP52,215 and P334,750, respectively. Petitioner computed the overpayment as follows: Income benefit credit of tax tax tax tax 100%

Overpaid corporate income tax For 1994 20% discount granted in 1993 Multiply by 65% Overpaid corporate income tax

P52,215

P515,000

x 65%

P334,750

Income benefit of deduction Differential For 1993 20% discount granted in 1993 Multiply 65% by

35%

65%

P80,330

x 65%

On December 29, 1995, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period for claiming for a tax refund under Section 230, now Section 229, of the Tax Code. It contended that Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 provides in clear and unequivocal language that discounts granted to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit. Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, therefore, which is merely an implementing regulation cannot modify, alter or depart from the clear mandate of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432, and, thus, is null and void for being inconsistent with the very statute it seeks to implement. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the other hand, maintained that the aforesaid section providing for a 20% sales discount to senior citizens is a misnomer as it runs counter to the solemn duty of the government to collect taxes. The Commissioner likewise pointed out that the provision in question employs the word "may," thereby implying that the availability of the remedy of tax credit is not absolute and mandatory and it does not confer an absolute right on the taxpayer to avail of the tax credit scheme if he so chooses. The Commissioner further stated that in statutory construction, the contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive officers of the government whose duty is to execute it is entitled to great respect and should ordinarily control in its interpretation. Thus, addressing the matter of the proper construction of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 regarding the treatment of the 20% sales discount given to senior citizens on their medicine purchases, the CTA ruled on the issue of whether or not the discount should be deductible from gross sales of value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes as prescribed under Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 or as a tax credit deductible from the tax due. In its Decision, dated August 27, 1998, the CTA declared that: "x x x Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 gave a new meaning to the phrase "tax credit," interpreting it to mean that the 20% discount granted to qualified senior citizens is an amount deductible from the establishments gross sales, which is completely contradictory to the literal or widely accepted meaning of the said phrase, as an amount subtracted from an individuals or entitys tax liability to arrive at the total tax liability (Blacks Law Dictionary). In view of such apparent discrepancy in the interpretation of the term "tax credit", the provisions of the law under R.A. 7432 should prevail over the subordinate regulation issued by the respondent under Revenue Regulation No. 2-94. x x x Having settled the legal issue involved in the case at bar, We are now tasked to resolve the factual issues of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the claim for refund of its overpaid income taxes for the years 1993 and 1994 based on the evidence at hand. Contrary to the findings of the independent CPA, aside from the unverifiable 20% sales discounts in the amount ofP18,653.70 (Exh. R-3), the Court noted some material discrepancies. Not all the details listed in the 1994 "Summary of Sales and Discounts

Given to Senior Citizens" correspond with the cash slips presented. There are various sales discounts granted which were not properly computed and there were also some cash slips left unsigned by the buyers. xxx After a careful scrutiny of the documents presented, the Court, allows only the amount of sales discounts duly supported by the pre-marked cash slips x x x. Hence, only the above amounts which are properly documented can be used as base in computing for the cost of 20% discount as tax credit. The overpaid income tax therefore is computed as follows: 3 For 1993 Net Sales Add: 20% Discount to Senior Citizens P31,080,508.00 80,330.00 P31,160,838.00

Year AMOUNT REFUNDABLE For 1994 Net Sales Add: 20% Discount to Senior Citizens P 29,904,734.00 515,000.00 P 30,419,734.00 P 45,574.63

Gross Sales Less: Cost of Sales Merchandise Inventory, beg. Add Purchases P 4,875,944.00 28,138,103.00 P 33,014,047.00 5,036.117.00

Gross Sales Less: Cost of Sales Merchandise Inventory, beg. Add Purchases Total Goods available for Sale Less: Merchandise Inventory, End P 4,226,588.00 29,234,361.00 P33,460,947.00 P 4,875.944.00

Total Goods available for Sales Less: Merchandise Inventory, End

27,977,930.00 P 2,441,804.00 1,880,153.00 P 561,651.00 82,207.00 P 643,858.00 30,618.00 P 613,240.00 P 214,634.00

Gross Income P28,585,003.00 P 2,575,835.00 1,706,491.00 P 869,344.00 72,680.00 P 942,024.00 21,140.00 P 920,884.00 P 322,309.40 Less: Operating Expenses

Gross Income Less: Operating Expenses

Net Operating Income Add: Miscellaneous Income

Net Operating Income Add: Miscellaneous Income

Net Income Less: Interest Income Subject to Final Tax

Net Income Less: Interest Income Subject to Final Tax

Net Taxable Income Tax Due (613,240 x 35%) Less: 1) Tax Credit (Cost of 20% Discount) [(28,585,003.00/31,160,838.00) x 80,330.34] 2) Income Tax Payment for the Year

Net Taxable Income Tax Due (P920,884 x 35%) Less: 1) Tax Credit (Cost of 20% Discount) [(28,585,003.00/31,160,838.00) x 80,330.34] 2) Income Tax Payment for the

P316,156.48 34,384.00 P 350,540.48 P 135,906.48

P 73,690.03 294,194.00 P 367,884.03

AMOUNT REFUNDABLE

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioners claim for refund is hereby partially GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND, or in the alternative, to ISSUE a tax credit certificate in favor of the petitioner the amounts of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48, representing overpaid income tax for the years 1993 and 1994, respectively. SO ORDERED.4 Both the Commissioner and petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. Petitioner, in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, claimed that the "cost" that private establishments may claim as tax credit under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 should be construed to mean the full amount of the 20% sales discount granted to senior citizens instead of the formula --[Tax Credit = Cost of Sales/Gross Sales x 20% discount] used by the CTA in computing for the amount of the tax credit. In view of this, petitioner prayed for the refund of the amount of income tax it allegedly overpaid in the aggregate amount of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48, respectively, for the taxable years 1993 and 1994 as a result of treating the sales discount of 20% as a tax deduction rather than as a tax credit. The Commissioner, on the other hand, moved for a re-computation of petitioners tax liability averring that the sales discount of 20% should be deducted from gross income to arrive at the taxable income. Such discount cannot be considered a tax credit because the latter, being in the nature of a tax refund, is treated as a return of tax payments erroneously or excessively assessed and collected as provided under Section 204(3) of the Tax Code, to wit: (3) x x x No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty. lawphil.net In its Resolution, dated December 7, 1998, the CTA modified its earlier decision, thus: ACCORDINGLY, the petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to ISSUE tax credit certificates in favor of petitioner [in] the amounts of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48 representing overpaid income tax for the years 1993 and 1994, as prayed for in it s motion. On the other hand, the Respondents Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.5 Consequently, the Commissioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals asking for the reversal of the CTA Decision and Resolution. The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on October 19, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The resolution issued by the Court of Tax Appeals dated December [7], 1998 is SET ASIDE and the Decision rendered by the latter is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No costs. SO ORDERED.6 Hence, this petition positing that: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT IN COMPUTING THE TAX CREDIT TO BE ALLOWED PETITIONER FOR DISCOUNTS GRANTED TO SENIOR CITIZENS ON THEIR PURCHASE OF MEDICINES, THE ACQUISITION COST RATHER THAN THE ACTUAL DISCOUNT GRANTED TO SENIOR CITIZENS SHOULD BE THE BASIS.7 Otherwise stated, the matter to be determined is the amount of tax credit that may be claimed by a taxable entity which grants a 20% sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their purchase of medicines pursuant to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 which states: Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost8 as tax credit.

The term "cost" in the above provision refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be carried over to the succeeding taxable year. This is in line with the interpretation of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation9 wherein it affirmed that R.A. No. 7432 allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they grant to senior citizens. The Court notes that petitioner, while praying for the reinstatement of the CTA Resolution, dated December 7, 1998, directing the issuance of tax certificates in favor of petitioner for the respective amounts of P45,574.63 andP135,906.48 representing overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994, asks for the refund of the same. 10 In this regard, petitioners claim for refund must be denied. The law expressly provides that the discount given to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit, and not a refund. Thus, where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 11 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 19, 1999 and February 18, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R SP No. 49946 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated December 7, 1998, directing the issuance of tax credit certificates in favor of petitioner in the amounts of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.