* Stare Decisis El Pueblo Filipinas vs. Marcaida [GR No. L-953, 09/18/47] Tala Realty vs.

Banco Pilipinas [GR No. 137980, 06/20/00] Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor [79 Phil. 249 (1947)] * Res Judicata Agilent Technologies vs. Integrated Silicon Technology [GR No. 154618, 04/14/04] Cayana vs. CA [GR No. 125607, 03/18/04] Urabana Velasco vs. Peoples Homesite [GR No. L-39674, 01/31/78] * Law of the Case Argel vs. Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01] Buaya vs. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00] Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596, 04/08/91] JM Tuason vs. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78] Uy Lee vs. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75] * Finality of Decision o Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99] o Buaya vs. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00]

Article 2 of the Jones Act approved by Congress on August 29, 1916, provides asfollows: "That all the people of the Philippines that the April 11 of milochocientosninety-nine were Spanish subjects? Oles and then resided quea in these islands, andtheir children born after that date will be considered and taken as citizens of thePhilippine Islands, excepting those who have preferred to retain their loyalty tolaCorona of Espaa accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty between theUnited States and Espaa, signed in Paris on December 10 of 1898, and with theexception of those that after that date have been from another country CITIZENS: .... Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Philippines dated 1 July 1902, reads as follows:"All inhabitants of the Philippines residing therein and deabril eleven of 1899 wereSpanish subjects? oles residents in these islands and their children born after thatdate, shall be deemed and held as citizens of the Philippines and as such conderechoto the protection of the United States, excepting those who have eligado retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peacebetween the United States and Espaa signed in Paris on December 10 of 1898. The defendant is called Peter Marcaida. By its name, can be Filipino, both Spanishand South American. Nohay proof that a resident of the Philippines and subject bothSpanish on April 11, 1899. If I was a resident and was not subject both Spanish couldnot acquire Filipino because CITIZENSHIP would remain abroad. If it was subject both Spanish and resided in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899,automatically became cuidadanofilipino unless CITIZENSHIP opted to retain bothSpanish, but since there is such evidence, the presumption is that the is Filipino. If born after the April 11, 1899 to parents who were subjects both Spanish follow thenationality of those: both Spanish, if their parents have wanted to retain their loyaltywing Crown Espaa, and Filipino, if they chose to lose . No evidence presented inone way or another: can serentonces both Spanish and Filipino.If born after the April 11, 1899 of Filipino parents is Filipino. It may happen that a descendant of a South American has been established in theprovince of Quezon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, when his father refused touse the provisions of the naturalization law, then the defendant is abroad: seguenationality his father. If a descendant of a cuidadano both Spanish has started to reside in the Philippinesafter the Treaty of Paris, would continue to be both Spanish unless you naturalized.Nor is there evidence to that effect, then it is both Spanish, abroad. Paz Chua Uang by the mere fact of being born in the Philippines was declaredbecause it was sibdita Philippine espa? Ola or daughter of a subject both Spanish on April 11, 1899. (Chua v. Secretary of Labor, 68 Phil., 649.) This doctrine implicitlyrevoked Roa against Insular Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 321) and subsequent.(Va? Insularde Manager or against Customs, 23 Phil., 491, United States v. TianseOng, 29 Phil., 352; United States against Ang, 36 Phil., 915, Go Julian against theGovernment Philippine Islands, 45 Phil., 301; Haw against Insular Collector of Customs, 59 Phil., 646.) In the case of Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim vezlaadopted another theory is sitting in the matter of Roa, but The Court was divided inthe ratio of four for three. Elactual Chief Justice and Judge Imperial were dissenters.The judge felt that the simple Villareal birth in the Philippines not cuidadano makesone Filipino, but concurred in part because of Roa ladoctrina was applying for more than 20 years. The principle of stare decisis is the main reason that prompted most tore-adopt the theory of Roa. In his dissent, the current President of the Court said: The Majority says nothing in support of the correctness of theRoa ruling, and seekssimply to justify its continued observance upon the fact That it "had been adhered toand accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," andThat not " Also only this Court but lower courts had consistently and invariablyFollowed it, the executive and administrative agencies of theGovernment hadtheretofore abide by it, and the public generally had acquiesced in it. I do not yield tothis court policy. If we induced the Government and the public to follow and accept anerror for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them tofollow and accept the same error discovered eleven. The rule of stare decisis doesnot apply to the Extent of perpetuating an Error (15 CJ, p. 918.) It is the duty of everycourt to review its own decisions without fear and reluctance to revise them (Baker vs.Lorillard, 4 NY, 257.) As was well said in a case, " I hold itto be the duty of this courtto examine its freely own decisions, and, When That It Has Fallen satisfied into amistake, to correct the error by overruling its own decision. An Acknowledged mistakemust be more venerable and more

Legal Case of Stare Decisis Doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous judicial decisions unless they contravene the ordinary principles of justice let the decision stand The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases. The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction. G.R. No. L-953 September 18, 1947 EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado,vs. PEDRO MARCAIDA, acusado-apelante. D. Victoriano H. Endaya en representacion del apelante.El Procurador General Auxiliar Sr. Ruperto Kapunan,Jr., y el Procurador Sr.Esmeraldo Umali en representacion del Gobierno. (From Spanish to English) PABLO, J .: Satrata of an appeal by Peter Marcaidaque was sentenced for the crime of treasonafter LaVista corresponding to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessorypenalties prescribed by law and to pay a fine of P10, 000 and the costs of Juico. Theappellant points out three errors incurred, according to him, the Court of Pueblo.1.oCITIZENSHIP Declaring loyalty and accused were sufficiently proven; 2D Givingcredit to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and 3 . or Al convict the accused of the charge No. 3. The defense contends that the evidence of record cuindadania not prove thedefendant's alliance and Philippine Commonwealth algobierno. The transcript of theshorthand notes Aue says the defendant is natural Lopez (a native of Lopez). Thedefense argues that the witness testified in Tagalog saying: "Taga Lopez" and said"ay sa panganak Lopez." Aperece No such thing on the record. If true, it is strange or that counsel did not request the Juzgadoque order the court reporter to do so statedin his notes. When a party is not satisfied with the traduction of a statement of awitness should be asked to enter in cars ne only translation but also translated theoriginal statement, failing, correct sepresumira official interpreter's translation. But even admitting? says the defense? that the defendant was natural for Lopez,Quezon province, its cuidadaniafilipina not properly tested. In support of thiscontention invoked Article IV of the Constitution, which came into force on November 15, 1935. (Article XVI, Section 6, Constitution.) The hearing of this case took lugarelJuly 15, 1946. If the defendant was I born, for example, a day after the Constitutioncame into force on the day of the hearing was not more than ten years and eightmesesde age, and then committed the offense at the age of about nine to years now. Although the record shows sunacimiento date, however we are sure that it was achild? Or so old when I go into view. No querallado the prosecutor would have aserious crime. Certainly, not born before and after entering into force the Constitution.Can not be accepted, therefore, its provisions.

inveterate than it can be made by any singledecision before it can claim upon the principle of Impunity stare decisis. "(Vs. Leavitt.Blatchaford, 17 NY, 521, 523.)" Precedents are to Be Regarded As the greatstorehouse of experience, not always to be Followed, but to be looked to as beaconlights in the progress of judicial investigation. "(Per Bartley, CJ, in Leavitt vs. Morrow,6 Ohio St., 71, 78.) Their "authority must yield to the force Often of reason, and to theParamount Demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, andthe law ought to speak with a voice responsive to These demands." (Norton vs .Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.) "(Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim, 69Phil., 518.) In matters of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, p. 249, ante, and Lam Swee Sang v.Commonwealth of the Philippines, p. 249, ante, we have stated definitivelyabandoned this theory and adopted the deChua v. Secretary of Labor. The reason issimple. The theory of jus soli in America is absolute elsimple American birth According to its constitution and the decision in United States v.. Wong Kim Ark (169U. S., 649). The American Constitution never came into force in the Philippines. Thetheory of jus soli in the Philippines in accordance with the law of 1 July 1902, passedby the U.S. Congress that, under the Treaty of Paris, is one that has dedeterminar parole: that the Philippines-born Filipino citizen with esconsiderado if a resident andsubject both Spanish or child of a resident and subject both Spanish on April 11,1899. If a foreigner or child of an alien in aqeulla date can not be cuidadano Filipino.The defendant then, according to the evidence enautos may be Filipino or foreigner. Under the Treason Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, any resident in thePhilippines, owing allegiance to the UnitedStates or the Government of the PhilippineIslands, or war will formare heciere common cause with their enemies and helpingthem socorriendoles within or outside those Islands, the crime committed treason.The section 1 of the Act is unasimple transplantation over the provisions of theCriminal Code which reads as American FOLLOWING: "Whoever, Owing allegianceto the United States, levies war against them or adhere to Their enemies, giving themaid and comfort Within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. " (Sec. 1,Crim. Code: RS, sec. 5331; Mar. 4.1909, c. 321, sec. 1, 35 Stat., 1088.) "Treason against the United States," says the American Constitution, "shall Consistonly in levying against them, or in adhering to Their Enemies, giving them aid andcomfort." (Section 3 [1], Article III.) In both American and domestic extranjros can commit the crime of treason.Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of America during the time of hisresidence. (Carlisle vs. U.S., 21 Law. Ed., 426; Raditch vs. Hutchins, 24 Law. Ed.,409.) The British hold the same theory. (De Jager vs. Attorney General of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) Need not be a U.S. Citizen for them to commit the crime of treason.But the Revised Penal Code have excluded the foreign nationals can only commit. Article 114 reads: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States or theGovernment of the Philippine Islands, sinser of foreign nationality, I do them formarewar or common cause with their enemies, helping or socorriendoles inside or outsidethese Islands shall be punished with the penalties of reclusion temporal to death anda fine not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. " Executive Order No.44, recognizingthat it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code punish for the crime of treasonagainst foreigners living in the Philippines who have helped the enemies, amended Section 114, are adding to a paragraph of tenor FOLLOWING: "Likewise, any alien,residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined inparagraph 1 of this article Shall be punished by prision mayor to death and Shall paya fine not to Exceed 20,000 pesos." (Executive Order No. 44, May 31, 1945.) If the defendant is Filipino, owing allegiance to the Commonwealth Government andmust be condemned for treason, but sies abroad can not be punished for actscommitted prior to the amendment of Article 114 of the Revised CodigoPenal. Asevidence of unamanera not establish clear that the defendant is Filipino, can not becriminally responsible for the crime of treasonIt reverses the judgment appealed. He ordered his immediate release the costs of trade. Case Digest on El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.

I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.

Case Digest on El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established. I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Slxmis The instant Petition presents a classic example where the application of the principle of stare decisis comes into play. The facts may be summarized as follows: Sometime in 1979, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank faced a legal problem with respect to its branch site holdings. Republic Act No. 337, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, provides that banks may only invest in real estate up to fifty percent (50%) of their net worth.[1] This ceiling on real estate holdings posed a bar to respondents plans for expansion and to address the problem, its major stockholders agreed to set up an entity to which its existing branch sites may be unloaded. The said entity would also acquire new branch sites for it, with all such branch sites, including those unloaded, to be leased to respondent bank. It was thus that petitioner was organized, its name TALA being an acronym of four (4) of the major stockholders and directors of respondent, namely: Antonio Tiu, Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Missdaa On August 25, 1981, pursuant to the foregoing arrangement, respondent sold eleven (11) real estate properties housing its branch sites to petitioner, including the Davao branch site subject of the instant suit. Immediately following the sale, petitioner leased the same branch sites to respondent. According to respondent, petitioner was merely holding out such properties for it for a three percent (3%) per annum add-on to their carrying cost. Respondent further claims that it was part of their agreement that the said properties would be returned to it at its pleasure at the same transfer price. At present, therefore, there stand pending cases filed by respondent against petitioner for reconveyance of all such branch sites held by petitioner on the ground that the latter is a mere trustee of respondent. The present Petition, however, stems from an action for ejectment wherein the issue was which of two (2) different contracts of lease presented by each party governs them. For its part, petitioner presents an 11-year amended lease contract allegedly executed on August 25, 1981 before Notary Public Generoso Fulgencio. On the other hand, respondent presents a 20-year lease contract executed on the same date, August 25, 1981, but before Notary Public Jose Dimaisip. The lease arrangement subject of this case also covered the other branch sites held by petitioner in other locations, i.e., Malabon, Sta. Cruz, R. Hidalgo, Paraaque, Marikina, Malolos, Cabanatuan, Lucena, Urdaneta, La Union, Iloilo and Cotabato. Aside from the present case, therefore, other similar cases for ejectment have been filed where, ultimately, the question of which among the two lease contracts is valid becomes an issue. Under the terms of the eleven-year amended contract presented by petitioner, the lease expired on August 31, 1992. Petitioner claims that thereafter, the lease was extended on a month-to-month basis on the condition that whatever terms and conditions are agreed upon would retroact to September 1, 1992.

The parties negotiations failed to yield any results, whereupon petitioner informed respondent that the rental rates shall be those it submitted to the latter, which were based on a study by the Asian Appraisal Co., Inc., retroactive to September 1, 1992. More particularly, rates were as follows: Two Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (P200,840.00) monthly with a rental escalation of ten percent (10%) per year, with four months deposit, four months advance deposit, and a Five Hundred Thousand Peso (P500,000.00) goodwill. Respondent refused to comply with these terms. Instead, it continued to pay rent in the old monthly rate until March 31, 1994, when it totally ceased paying any rent. This prompted petitioner to demand from respondent, in a letter dated April 14, 1994, payment of its accrued rentals. Petitioner also gave notice to respondent that at the end of the month, the month-to-month lease over the premises would no longer be renewed. This was followed by a letter, dated May 2, 1994, demanding that respondent pay its obligations under the lease and vacate the premises. Sdaadsc On March 27, 1995, petitioner instituted a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2109-95. On June 5, 1995, respondent filed its Answer. After the submission of the parties respective Position Papers, the court a quo rendered its Decision on July 20, 1995,[2] dismissing the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, after finding that the real issue, i.e., which of the two contracts of lease was controlling, was not capable of pecuniary estimation. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City affirmed the decision in toto on June 13, 1996.[3] With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,[4] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48667. On January 12, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision,[5] holding that both lower courts erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the case when the issue of validity of lease contract is intertwined with the issue of possession. However, it dismissed the Petition to maintain judicial stability and consistency, it appearing that in other similar ejectment suits brought before the Court of Appeals, the twenty-year lease contract presented by respondent had been upheld. Petit ioners Motion for Reconsideration was granted in that respondent was ordered to pay unpaid rentals to petitioner.[6] Subsequently, however, on Motion for Reconsideration of respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and revoked its order for payment of back rentals.[7] Petitioner now seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals upon the following grounds "I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE RULING OF THE COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 39104 AS THE LAW OF THE CASE BETWEEN HEREIN PARTIES. II THE HONORABLE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT EJECTING RESPONDENT FROM THE LEASED PREMISES."[8] In its favor, respondent argues that "only decisions of the Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines." And that is exactly what we are faced with at present. On February 17, 2000, the Second Division of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr., rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 129887 between the same parties, this time involving respondents Urdaneta, Pangasinan branch, finding the eleven-year lease contract presented by petitioner as a forgery and consequently upholding the validity of the twenty-year lease contract. Resolving this identical issue, the Decision states, to wit - Rtcspped "Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease contract controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC, however, that the eleven (11)year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and (3) the said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the latters rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 383-384.).

Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation that rightly make any court suspicious and wary of imputing any legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract. Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino testified that he was responsible for the daily operations of said bank. He denied having signed the eleven (11)-year contract and reasoned that it was not in the interest of Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). That fact was corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipinos Legal Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal initials (Id., p. 385). The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his monthly notarial report with copies of acknowledged documents thereto attached. Under this procedure and requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such notarial report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire consequences including the possible revocation of the notarys notarial commission. HTML The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala Realtys alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract did not retain a copy thereof for submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the proper RTC militates against the use of said document as a basis to uphold petitioners claim. The said alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract was not submitted to the Central Bank whose strict documentation rules must be complied with by banks to ensure their continued good standing. On the contrary, what was submitted to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-year lease contract. Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino deliberately omitted to submit the eleven (11)-year contract to the Central Bank, we do not consider that fact as violative of the res inter alios acta aliis non nocet (Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: "Sec. 28. Admission by third party The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided."; Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil. 472, 477[1909]) rule in evidence. Rather, it is an indication of said contracts inexistence. It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions thereof (Art. 1673, New Civil Code)." In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court, we have no option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. "Stare decisis et non quieta movere."[9] katarungan That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[10] to wit "Petitioner criticizes the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the record of this case. The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there is only one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other! Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason &

Corp. v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]). In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different" (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118A, 394, 395 [1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa. 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re Burtts Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J. M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of "stare decisis et non quieta movere." (underscoring, Ours) Kortex Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No. 129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that in the instant case is located in Davao, we can very well apply the conclusion in G.R. No. 129887 that it is the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the parties the same, but more importantly, the issue regarding its validity is one and the same and, hence, should no longer be relitigated. Petitioner is even barred from questioning our adherence to the ruling in G.R. No. 129887 since it categorically declared in its Petition that the same was "likewise filed so that any favorable ruling in said petitions (referring to G.R. Nos. 129887 and 132051) may be extended or made to apply in the instant case."[11] Petitioner cannot now complain that the ruling in G.R. No. 129887 regarding the validity of the twenty-year lease contract is not binding in this case simply because the same is unfavorable to it. Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected for non-payment of rentals, we do not agree with the ruling in G.R. No. 129887 that since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate which it unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did not agree, there lies no ground for ejectment. In such a case, there could still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals. The recent case of T & C Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals[12] is instructional on this point. It was there cautioned that -"The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16, 1993, despite demands to pay and to vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if private respondent deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of private respondent since the account was opened in private respondents name. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of private respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700.00 to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as amended by R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have done was to deposit the original rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this Court held in Uy v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 671, 676 [1989]): Sclaw The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on the part of accept was justified. However, what the lessee should have deposit in 1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was 1984 indicating a delay of more than four years. (P150.00 per the lessor to done was to made only in

on the monthly rental for the period from the eleventh to the twentieth year",[13] the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for rent on the property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989.[14] Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April, 1994, it gave petitioner good ground for instituting ejectment proceedings.[15] We reiterate the ruling in T & C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate, it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. This circumstance, i.e., respondents failure to pay the rent at the old rate, does not appear in G.R. No. 129887. Thus, while we are bound by the findings of this Courts Second Division in that ca se under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that respondents failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887. In this case, we uphold petitioners right to eject respondent from the leased premises. Xlaw WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48667 is SET ASIDE insofar as it denies the prayer for ejectment of petitioner. Judgment is rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject premises and to restore possession thereof to petitioner. Respondent is also ordered to pay rent in the amount of P20,500.00 per month computed from April, 1994 until such time as it vacates the subject property, with interest thereon at the legal rate. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. Sclex

Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas 6.20.00 disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (stare decisis et non quieta movere follow past precedents and do not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different. G.R. No. 47616-September 16, 1947 JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 47623 September 16, 1947 LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE appellant.

PHILIPPINES,

oppositor-

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs." (Underscoring, ours) While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the payment of rentals due from the eleventh year to the twentieth year of the lease, to wit "3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the LESSEE shall pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P1,020,000.00) Philippine Currency representing advance rental to be applied

First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for appellants. Antonio V. Raquiza for appellee. PADILLA, J.: On 15 October 1941, a decision was promulgated in thecase of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 47616,whereby this Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which hAd granted the writ of habeas corpus applied for by tan Chong, on the ground that he, being a native of the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines. On the same date, in the case of Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines (G.R. No. 47623), this Court rendered a decision dismissing the

petition of the applicant for naturalization filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant, having been born in Sulu, Philippines, of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines. The dismissal of the petition implies and means that there was no need of naturalization for the applicant who is aFilipino citizen. On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in both cases by the Solicitor General. The latter contends that even if the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second were born in the Philippines, of a Chines father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, still they are not citizens of the Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their birth, and prays that both decisions be set aside and the judgments appealed from be reversed. This motion for reconsideration was pending in this Court when the Pacific was broke out. During the battle for liberation, the records of both cases were destroyed. Upon petition of the Assistant Solicitor General, Mr. Roberto A. Gianzon, therecords were reconstituted in accordance with the provisionsof Act. No. 3110. The record of the first case, G.R. No. 47616,was declared reconstituted on 5 June, and of the second case, G.R. No. 47623, on 28 June 1946. Upon these reconstituted records, we now proceed to dispose of the motion for reconsideration. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the principle of jus soli applies in this jurisdiction. It is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." In the case of U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S., 649, the SupremeCourt of the United States applying the principle of jus soli held that a person born in the United States of Chinese parents domiciled therein is a citizen of the United States. It further held that the Fourteenth Amendment was declaratory of the common law as existed in England and in the United States before and after the Declaration of independence. From that decision, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented. The principle of jus soli was the rule in this jurisdiction until the 30th of September, 1939, when in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor (68 Phil., 649), this Court abandoned it and held that a person of Chinese parentage born in the Philippines in 1941 is not a citizen thereof, because she followed the citizenship of her Chinese parents and she is not a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of section 2 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. But in the cases of Torres and Gallofin vs. Tan Chim (69 Phil., 518), decided on 3 February 1940 (69 Phil., 518), and Gallofin vs. Ordoez, decided on 27 June 1940 (70 Phil., 287), this Court reverted to the rule of jus soli laid down in the cases prior to the decisionin the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra. The Solicitor General heeding the opinions of the Assitant Secretary of State, Mr. G.S. Messermith, of 15 January 1938; of the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Alvey A. Adee, dated 12 September 1921, and of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson, of 5April 1912, who held that a person born in the Philippines of alien parentage is not a citizen thereof, because the common law principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitutiton of United States was not extended to the Philippines the same opinions upon which the Solicitor General had relied in the case of Chua vs. The Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule applying the principle of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be abandoned urges upon this Court to reconsider its decisions in the cases under consideration. In the case of Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil.,494, the Court applied the principle of jus soli to a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and in so doing it cited the case of U.S. vs. Gosiaco, 12 Phil., 490 where, according to the Court, the principle had been applied. But nowhere in the decision of the last mentioned case was such principle applied, because the only question passed upon was whether a person detained for not having a certificate of registration, as required by Act 702, could be admitted to bail pending determination of his appeal by this Court as to whether he did come within the provisions of said Act. In the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,315, this Court passed upon the question as to whether a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, legally married; is a citizen thereof. In this case this Court took into consideration the provisions of articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Civil Code in viewof the fact that the petitioner was born on 6 July 1889; the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris; section 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902) and the amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912, these being the laws then applicable. Commenting on sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, this Court said: By section 4 the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United States was extended to the Philippine Islands, but with

limitations. In the United States every person, which certain specific exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that country. Under section 4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1889, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at themoment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. From the reading of section 4 and taking into consideration the Act of March 23, 1912, it is clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the Philippine Islands who did not come within the provisions of said section, and also that Congress did not then by express legislation determine the political status of such persons. Therefore, the inquiry is Did Congress intend to say that all of the inhabitants who were not included in section 4 are to be "deemedand held to be" aliens to the Philippine islands? (Pp. 333-334.) (Emphasis supplied.) In answering the question in the negative, this Court cited the case of an unmarried woman, a native of Porto Rico, 20 years of age, who arrived in New York by steamer from Porto Rico on 24 August 1902. She was detained at the Immigrant station, examined by a board of special inquiry, and excluded. The writ for habeas corpus having been denied by the Circuit Court, for the reason that she might become a public charge, she appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which held that she was not an alien to the United States. But the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case cited does not answer negatively the question asked by this Court, because it does not appear that she is of alien parentage and it appears that she was a resident of Porto Rico on11 April 1899. (192 U.S. 1.) Further commenting on section 4, this Court said: This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other inhabitants shall not be citizens. Neither does it declare that other inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare that aperson situated as in the appellant shall not be nor shall not elect to be a citizen of the country on his birth. The appellant could, as we have said, elect to become a citizen of the United States had he been born in that country under the same circumstances which now surround him. All the laws and the rulings of the courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the United States. While it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to this country, but that they must be expressly entended by Congress, nevertheless, some of the basic principles upon which the government of the United States rests and the greater part of the Bill of Rights, which protects the citizens of that country, have been extended to the Philippine Islands by the instructions of the President to the first Philippine Commission and the Philippine Bill. (P. 339-340.) The declaration that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippines is tantamount or equivalent to declaring that those who do not belong to that class shall not be. Realizing the weakness of the position taken, in view of the express provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, and of the fact that the Constitution of the United States and Acts of Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, the Court hastened to add another ground in support of the pronouncement that petitioner Roa is a Filipino citizen, and for that reason entitled to land and reside in the Philippines. The additional ground is that the petitioner's father having died in China in 1900, his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship which he being under age followed upon the death of his father. The concluding pronouncement in the decisionof the case is, as follows: The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. If all the native inhabitants residing in the Philippines on the 11th day of April 1899, regardless of their alien parentage, are citizens thereof, the amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912 empowering the Philippine Legislature to provide by legislation for the acquisition of Filipino citizenship by those natives excluded from such citizenship by the original section 4 of the Philippine Bill, would be meaningless. We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted to us for decision. We know that the decision upon the motion for reconsideration in these cases is momentous. We have given the time and the thought demanded by its importance. While birth is an important element of citizenship, it alone does not make a person a citizen of the country of his birth. Youth spent in the country; intimate and endearing association with the citizens among whom he lives; knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideals, and in the ability of the country's government to protect him, his children, and his earthly possessions against perils from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the

country against such perils, are some of the important elements that would make a person living in a country its citizen. Citizenship is a political status. The citizen must be proud of his citizenship. He should treasure and cherish it. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, "the question of citizenship in a nation is of the most vital importance. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition." (U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.) Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. The pinciple of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrines or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principleof stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force. It appears that the petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, left for China in 1925, and returned to the Philippines on 25 January1940. The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May 1900, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether they were legally married, so in the absence of proof to the contrary they are presumed to be lawfully married. From the date of his birth up to 16 November 1938, the date of filing of his application for naturalization, and up to the date of hearing, he had been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino woman and has three children by her. He speaks the local dialect and the Spanish and English languages. Considering that the common law principle or rule of jus soli obtaining in England and in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has never been entended to this jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Actof 29 August 1916); considering that the law in force and applicable to the petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 March 1912, which provides that only those "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands," we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second case, who were born of alien parentage, were not and are not, under saidsection, citizens of the Philippine Islands. Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who had been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata. Accordingly, the decision of this Court in the first case confirming the lower court's judgment is set aside; the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila appealed from is reversed; the petitioner is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with in accordance with law; and the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the decree of theCourt of First Instance of Zamboanga appealed from granting the applicant's peition for naturalization filed on16 November 1938 is affirmed, for the applicant comes under section 1 (a), Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and possesses the qualifications required by setion 3 of the same Act, as amended, which was the law in force at the time of the filing of the petition for naturalization. No costs shall be taxed in both cases. Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

applicant in the instant cases were born, although also in the Philippines, 1915 and 1900, respectively, i. e., after the abrogation of said articles, due to their political character, upon the changeof sovereignty following the treaty of Paris ending theSpanish-American war (Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315, 330; Halleck's International Law, Chapter 34, par. 14; American and Ocean Insurance Companies vs. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. [26 U.S.], 511 542, 7 Law.ed., 242). As declared in the majority opinion, the citizenship of said petitioner and applicant should be determined as of the dates of their respective births. At the time the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 was born (1915) the law on Philippine citizenship was contained in the Philippine Bill, section 4, as amended by the Act of Congress of March 23, 1912. Under this provision said petitioner could not be a Filipino citizen upon the date of his birth because his father, who was legally married to his mother, was a Chinese citizen and not a subject of Spain. If his father had been a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, like his mother, who was a native Filipina, before their marriage and in that case, after said marriage, she would have acquired the citizenship of her husband even if she had been a foreigner then under section 4 of thePhilippine Bill, as amended, said parents of said petitioner would have become citizens of the Philippines unless they should have elected to preserve their allegiance to Spain in the manner and within the period therein prescribed; and then, too, the petitioner upon being born in 1915 would automatically have acquired Philippine citizenship. But such was not the case. The applicant in G.R. No. 47623 could not possibly be a Filipino citizen upon his birth (1900) because, aside from the fact that his father, who is presumed to have been legally married to his mother, was a Chinese subject, there was no law on Philippine citizenship at that time, because, firstly, even the aforecited articles of the Civil Code had previously been abrogated, as already stated by the change of sovereignty in the Philippines following the SpanishAmerican war, secondly, said articles at any rate did not regulate Philippine citizenship nor did they make said applicant's father a Spanish subject, and, thirdly, the Philippine Bill was not enacted until July 1, 1902. In the case of the applicant in G.R. No. 47623, his father was a Chinese subject on April 11, 1899. And his mother, upon her marriage with her Chinese husband, acquired his nationality. So that when said applicant was born in 1900 his parents were Chinese subjects. When the Philippine Bill was enacted on July 1, 1902, therefore, said applicant and his parents were not subjects of Spain and consequently could not have acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of section 4 thereof. It was only after the Philippine Naturalization Law was enacted, pursuant to the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law), that the said applicant had his first opportunity to become a naturalized citizen of this country. Consequently, I reach the same conclusion as the majority. Case Digest on JOSE TAN CHONG VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR GR 47616 SEPTEMBER 16, 1947LAM SWEE SANG VS. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILS.GR 47623 SEPTEMBER 16, 1947 FACTS: Petitioners in the two cases are both of born of a Chinese fatherand a Filipino mother. The first petitioner was granted writ of habeascorpus since he was declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrineof jus soli, which says that when one is born in a country, he acquiresthe citizenship of that country. Such has been said to be the samewith the second petitioner. Second petitioners petition fornaturalization was dismissed since he no longer needed to benaturalized. The Solicitor General opposed such decision, saying thatthe two are not citizens of the Philippines pursuant to the laws existingduring their time of birth.Before this, the Court, with regard to cases like this, used theprinciple of jus soli, adopted from the US Constitution, which says thatall those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its jurisdiction is a citizen of the US.The Solicitor General mentioned that the principle of jus soliwasnt extended to the Philippines. In a previous case wherein jus soliwas used was based in a prior case, which mentioned the principle of jus soli but wasnt actually the issue at hand. Furthermore, if ever theprinciple of jus soli was extended, it had its limitations. The law thatprevailed then mentioned that if one was born after a certain date andin accordance with other conditions, which would only be the timewhen one is considered a citizen. Otherwise, they are not to beconsidered citizens. ISSUE: Whether or not precedents regarding citizenship should beupheld, following the principle of stare decisis? HELD:

Separate Opinions HILADO, J., concurring: I concur in the entire majority opinion. I concur inthe revocation of the doctrine of jus soli enunciated, among other cases, in Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Besides, the ruling in that case can not be invoked in favor of the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 nor of the applicant in G.R. No. 47623 for the reason that, while Tranquilino Roa in that case was born in the Philippines in theyear 1889, when articles 17 et seq. of the Civil Code were yet in force here and made him a Spanish subject, the said petitioner and

No, the principle of stare decisis doesnt mean being blindadherence to precedents. Even if the doctrines laid down have beenfollowed for years, if it has been found to be contrary to law, it shouldbe abandoned or reconsidered. Principle of stare decisis shouldnt beapplied if there is conflict between law and precedent.Given that the law enforced during the time of birth of twopetitioners doesnt allow them to be citizens of the Philippines, even if precedence tells that they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines,cannot be declared Filipino citizens. Res Judicata Res judicata denotes an important legal doctrine that generally means that once a matter is judicially decided, it is finally decided. The doctrine bars relitigation of matters that have already been determined in adjudication. Broadly, res judicata bars the reconsideration of settled civil matters. Specifically, res judicata precludes only subsequent suits on the same cause of action between the same parties after a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata can also mean the judged matter itself. In other words, a matter that is final such as a claim or cause of action that is settled or a judgment, award, or other determination that is considered final and bars re-litigation of the same matter. The defendant initially responded with a motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD., petitioner, vs. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TEOH KIANG HONG, TEOH KIANG SENG, ANTHONY CHOO, JOANNE KATE M. DELA CRUZ, JEAN KAY M. DELA CRUZ and ROLANDO T. NACILLA, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review assails the Decision dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C and annulled and set aside the Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92. Petitioner Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. (Agilent) is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.[1] Respondent Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation (Integrated Silicon) is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components.[2] Respondents Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicons board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members.[3] The juridical relation among the various parties in this case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA), entered into on April 2, 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (HP-Singapore).[4] Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products.[5] The VAASA had a five-year term, beginning on April 2, 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent.[6] On September 19, 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon,[7] HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent.[8] On May 25, 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor, docketed as Civil Case No. 3110-01-C. It alleged that Agilent breached the parties oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that defendant be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[9] On June 1, 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the courts jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On July 2, 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela

Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla,[10] for Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages, before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, docketed as Civil Case No. 3123-2001C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon. It further prayed that defendants be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[11] Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C,[12] on the grounds of lack of Agilents legal capacity to sue;[13] litis pendentia;[14] forum shopping;[15] and failure to state a cause of action.[16] On September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted petitioner Agilents application for a writ of replevin.[17] Without filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.[18] In the meantime, upon motion filed by respondents, Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is pending. On August 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 4, 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE RESORTING TO THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 323-2001-C BELOW INSTEAD OF ORDERING IT CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C.[19] The two primary issues raised in this petition: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 4, 2001 Order; and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. We find merit in the petition. The Court of Appeals, citing the case of Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO v. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc.,[20] held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. This was error.

Jurisdiction is fixed by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C in the RTC.[21] The Court of Appeals ruling that the assailed Order issued by the RTC of Calamba, Branch 92, was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction due to litis pendentia and forum shopping, has no legal basis. The pendency of another action does not strip a court of the jurisdiction granted by law. The Court of Appeals further ruled that a Motion for Reconsideration was not necessary in view of the urgent necessity in this case. We are not convinced. In the case of Bache and Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Ruiz,[22] relied on by the Court of Appeals, it was held that time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. Tax assessments in that case were based on documents seized by virtue of an illegal search, and the deprivation of the right to due process tainted the entire proceedings with illegality. Hence, the urgent necessity of preventing the enforcement of the tax assessments was patent. Respondents, on the other hand, cite the case of Geronimo v. Commission on Elections,[23] where the urgent necessity of resolving a disqualification case for a position in local government warranted the expeditious resort to certiorari. In the case at bar, there is no analogously urgent circumstance which would necessitate the relaxation of the rule on a Motion for Reconsideration. Indeed, none of the exceptions for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration is present here. None of the following cases cited by respondents serves as adequate basis for their procedural lapse. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission,[24] the questioned order was null and void for failure of respondent tribunal to comply with due process requirements; in Matanguihan v. Tengco,[25] the questioned order was a patent nullity for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants, which fact the records plainly disclosed; and in National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals,[26] the questioned orders were void for vagueness. No such patent nullity is evident in the Order issued by the trial court in this case. Finally, while urgency may be a ground for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration, in the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,[27] cited by respondents, the slow progress of the case would have rendered the issues moot had a motion for reconsideration been availed of. We find no such urgent circumstance in the case at bar. Respondents, therefore, availed of a premature remedy when they immediately raised the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari; and the appellate court committed reversible error when it took cognizance of respondents petition instead of dismissing the same outright. We come now to the substantive issues of the petition. Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit. It is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.[28] The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the identity of parties in Civil Cases No. 3123-2001-C and 3110-2001-C. Well-settled is the rule that lis pendens requires only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties.[29] There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.[30] The parties in these cases are

vying over the interests of the two opposing corporations; the individuals are only incidentally impleaded, being the natural persons purportedly accused of violating these corporations rights. Likewise, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.[31] The identity of parties notwithstanding, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy presented for adjudication; and two causes of action are clearly involved. The fact that respondents instituted a prior action for Specific Performance and Damages is not a ground for defeating the petitioners action for Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages. In Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C filed by respondents, the issue is whether or not there was a breach of an oral promise to renew of the VAASA. The issue in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, filed by petitioner, is whether petitioner has the right to take possession of the subject properties. Petitioners right of possession is founded on the ownership of the subject goods, which ownership is not disputed and is not contingent on the extension or non-extension of the VAASA. Hence, the replevin suit can validly be tried even while the prior suit is being litigated in the Regional Trial Court. Possession of the subject properties is not an issue in Civil Case No. 31102001-C. The reliefs sought by respondent Integrated Silicon therein are as follows: (1) execution of a written extension or renewal of the VAASA; (2) compliance with the extended VAASA; and (3) payment of overdue accounts, damages, and attorneys fees. The reliefs sought by petitioner Agilent in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, are as follows: (1) issuance of a Writ of Replevin or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; (2) recovery of possession of the subject properties; (3) damages and attorneys fees. Concededly, some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions. It cannot be said, however, that exactly the same evidence will support the decisions in both, since the legally significant and controlling facts in each case are entirely different. Although the VAASA figures prominently in both suits, Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is premised on a purported breach of an oral obligation to extend the VAASA, and damages arising out of Agilents alleged failure to comply with such purported extension. Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, is premised on a breach of the VAASA itself, and damages arising to Agilent out of that purported breach. It necessarily follows that the third requisite for litis pendentia is also absent. The following are the elements of res judicata: (a) The former judgment must be final;

(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and

(d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[32] In this case, any judgment rendered in one of the actions will not amount to res judicata in the other action. There being different causes of action, the decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity of the causes of action. Whatever difficulties or inconvenience may be entailed if both causes of action are pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is not the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals. The possible consolidation of said cases, as well as stipulations and appropriate modes of discovery, may well be considered by the court below to subserve not only procedural expedience but, more important, the ends of justice.[33] We now proceed to the issue of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forumshopping was laid down in the case of Buan v. Lopez.[34] Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final

judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other. There being no litis pendentia in this case, a judgment in the said case will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and respondents contention on forum shopping must likewise fail. We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that may be suffered by both petitioner and respondents if replevin is granted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. If respondent Integrated Silicon eventually wins Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and the VAASAs terms are extended, petitioner corporation will have to comply with its obligations thereunder, which would include the consignment of properties similar to those it may recover by way of replevin in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. However, petitioner will also suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of replevin, resort to which is not only allowed but encouraged by law. Respondents argue that since Agilent is an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, it lacks the legal capacity to file suit.[35] The assailed acts of petitioner Agilent, purportedly in the nature of doing business in the Philippines, are the following: (1) mere entering into the VAASA, which is a service contract;[36] (2) appointment of a full-time representative in Integrated Silicon, to oversee and supervise the production of Agilents products;[37] (3) the appointment by Agilent of six full-time staff members, who were permanently stationed at Integrated Silicons facilities in order to inspect the finished goods for Agilent;[38] and (4) Agilents participation in the management, supervision and control of Integrated Silicon,[39] including instructing Integrated Silicon to hire more employees to meet Agilents increasing production needs,[40] regularly performing quality audit, evaluation and supervision of Integrated Silicons employees,[41] regularly performing inventory audit of raw materials to be used by Integrated Silicon, which was also required to provide weekly inventory updates to Agilent,[42] and providing and dictating Integrated Silicon on the daily production schedule, volume and models of the products to manufacture and ship for Agilent.[43] A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is transacting or doing business in the country. The Corporation Code provides: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases, however, we have held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation.[44] Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations.[45] The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.[46] The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;[47] (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction[48]; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporations corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;[49] and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. The challenge to Agilents legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on

what constitutes doing, engaging in, or transacting business in the Philippines, as this Court observed in the case of Mentholatum v. Mangaliman.[50] The Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has it, however, that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.[51] In Mentholatum,[52] this Court discoursed on the two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporat ion can be considered as doing business in the Philippines. The first of these is the substance test, thus:[53] The true test [for doing business], however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The second test is the continuity test, expressed thus:[54] The term [doing business] implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization. Although each case must be judged in light of its attendant circumstances, jurisprudence has evolved several guiding principles for the application of these tests. For instance, considering that it transacted with its Philippine counterpart for seven years, engaging in futures contracts, this Court concluded that the foreign corporation in Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Lara,[55] was doing business in the Philippines. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Japan Airlines (JAL),[56] the Court held that JAL was doing business in the Philippines, i.e., its commercial dealings in the country were continuous despite the fact that no JAL aircraft landed in the country as it sold tickets in the Philippines through a general sales agent, and opened a promotions office here as well. In General Corp. of the Phils. v. Union Insurance Society of Canton and Firemans Fund Insurance,[57] a foreign insurance corporation was held to be doing business in the Philippines, as it appointed a settling agent here, and issued 12 marine insurance policies. We held that these transactions were not isolated or casual, but manifested the continuity of the foreign corporations conduct and its intent to establish a continuous business in the country. In Eriks PTE Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Enriquez,[58] the foreign corporation sold its products to a Filipino buyer who ordered the goods 16 times within an eight-month period. Accordingly, this Court ruled that the corporation was doing business in the Philippines, as there was a clear intention on its part to continue the body of its business here, despite the relatively short span of time involved. Communication Materials and Design, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, ITEC, et al.[59] and Top-Weld Manufacturing v. ECED, IRTI, et al.[60] both involved the License and Technical Agreement and Distributor Agreement of foreign corporations with their respective local counterparts that were the primary bases for the Courts ruling that the foreign corporations were doing business in the Philippines.[61] In particular, the Court cited the highly restrictive nature of certain provisions in the agreements involved, such that, as stated in Communication Materials, the Philippine entity is reduced to a mere extension or instrument of the foreign corporation. For example, in Communication Materials, the Court deemed the No Competing Product provision of the Representative Agreement therein restrictive.[62] The case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation. The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (the FIA; Republic Act No. 7042, as amended), defines doing business as follows: Sec. 3, par. (d). The phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity, or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.

An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute doing business in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed doing business: (1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representatives or distributors own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and

Facts: Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components. Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicons board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members. The juridical relation among the various parties in the case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA), entered into on 2 April 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (HP-Singapore). Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products. The VAASA had a fiveyear term, beginning on 2 April 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent. On 19 September 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon, HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent. On 25 May 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor (Civil Case 3110-01-C), alleging that Agilent breached the parties oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that Agilent be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On 1 June 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the courts jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On 2 July 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla, for Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages, before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92 (Civil Case 3123-2001-C). Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering Integrated Silicon, et. al. to immediately return and deliver to Agilent its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon; and that the latter be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 31232001-C, on the grounds of lack of Agilents legal capacity to sue; litis pendentia; forum shopping; and failure to state a cause of action. On 4 September 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted Agilents application for a writ of replevin. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, upon motion filed by Integrated Silicon, et. al., Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case 3123-2001-C. The case was reraffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case 31102001-C is pending. On 12 August 2002, the Court of Appeals granted Integrated Silicon, et. al.s petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated 4 September 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case 3123-2001-C. Agilent filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether a foreign corporation without a license is incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. Whether Agilent was doing business in the Philippines. Held: 1. A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is transacting or doing business in the country. Section 133 of the Corporation Code provides that "No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation doin g business in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases,

(8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. By and large, to constitute doing business, the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making.[63] By the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilents activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, we hold that, based on the evidence presented thus far, Agilent cannot be deemed to be doing business in the Philippines. Respondents contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. Finally, as to Agilents purported failure to state a cause of action against the individual respondents, we likewise rule in favor of petitioner. A Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits all the allegations in the Complaint, which plainly alleges that these individual respondents had committed or permitted the commission of acts prejudicial to Agilent. Whether or not these individuals had divested themselves of their interests in Integrated Silicon, or are no longer members of Integrated Silicons Board of Directors, is a matter of defense best threshed out during trial. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574 dated August 12, 2002, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REINSTATED. Agilents application for a Writ of Replevin is GRANTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Case Digest Agilent Technologies Singapore vs. Integrated Silicon Techngology Philippines Corp. [GR 154618, 14 April 2004]

however, the Court held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations. The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts; (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporations corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts; and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. 2. The challenge to Agilents legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on what constitutes doing, engaging in, or transacting business in the Philippines, the Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA, as amended by RA 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute doing business in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by RA 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed doing business: (1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representatives or distributors own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. By and large, to constitute doing business, the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making. Herein, by the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilents activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, Agilent cannot be deemed to be doing business in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon, et. al.s contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts.

Marceliano Cayabyab, respectively. Respondent Rosemarie Cayabyab-Ramos is the daughter of Marceliano Cayabyab, while respondent Rafael Ramos is the formers husband. Their dispute involves two parcels of land[1] specifically described thus: First Parcel A parcel of land Lot A, (LRC), Psd-231284, being a portion of Plan Psu-136181, LRC Rec. No. N8805, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the E by Mactec River; SE by Agapito Cabrera; SW by Anselmo Cabrera; NW by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area of 11,735 square meters, more or less. Covered by TCT No. 29332 and assessed at P1,730.00; and Second Parcel A parcel of land Lot 2-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36621, being a portion of Lot 2 described on Plan Psu-70452, GLRO Rec. No. 41762, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N by Ludovico Cayabyab & Agapito Cabrera; E by Eduvejas Cabrera and Lot 2-B of subdivision plan; S by Lot 2-B and W by Clemente Cruz, containing an area of 20,000 square meters more or less. Covered by TCT No. 117094, declared under Tax Decl. No. 29333 and assessed at P2,600.00. It appears that Raymundo Cayabyab, with the marital consent of Eulalia Cayabyab, sold the First and Second Parcels to Pastor Cayabyab by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale[2] respectively dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965. Thereupon, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 117134 and 117094 covering the First and Second Parcels, respectively, were issued in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. After the death of Raymundo Cayabyab on March 20, 1976, his wife Eulalia Cayabyab executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim,[3] dated June 4, 1976, on the subject parcels of land, alleging that the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab were forgeries. However, on June 17, 1976, she executed another Affidavit[4] recognizing Pastor Cayabyabs title and requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims earlier annotated on the titles of the subject properties. On February 9, 1977, Eulalia Cayabyab, together with her children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo, filed a Complaint[5] against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the corresponding TCT Nos. 117134 and 117094, and reconveyance of the First and Second Parcels. They alleged that both parcels were fraudulently registered in the name of Pastor Cayabyab by means of the forged Deeds of Absolute Sale. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15298. On February 28, 1977, Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) with respect to the Second Parcel. On June 12, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab mortgaged[6] the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo. On October 10, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rosafina Reginaldo for P15,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7] Subsequently, TCT No. 117134 was cancelled and TCT No. 124304[8] was issued in the name of Rosafina Reginaldo on October 11, 1977. On the same day, the mortgage over the First Parcel was cancelled.[9] On December 23, 1977, Rosafina Reginaldo mortgaged[10] the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00. Meanwhile, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 proceeded. Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab filed an Answer asserting the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale but were subsequently declared in default after failing to appear at the pre-trial conference. Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. In a decision[11] dated June 17, 1978, the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976, and the corresponding TCT Nos. 117094 and 117134 covering the Second and First Parcels, respectively, null and void. The court, however, denied the prayer for reconveyance in view of the plaintiffs evidence attesting to the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab is still the owner and possessor of the subject properties. No appeal was taken and the decision consequently became final. On April 21, 1981, the mortgage over the First Parcel was foreclosed and the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, as the highest bidder, bought the property.[12] The

G.R. No. 125607. March 18, 2004] RUFINA C. CAYANA, JOSEFINA C. RABINA, MERCEDES C. DE GUZMAN, and SUSANA C. SAMBALE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. PASTOR & ROSITA CAYABYAB, SPS. MARCELIANO & ROSALIA CAYABYAB, SPS. RAFAEL & ROSEMARIE CAYABYAB and INSURANCE CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: The instant case involves an unfortunate, albeit all too common, property dispute among siblings. The petitioners, Rufina Cayana, Josefina Rabina, Mercedes de Guzman and Susana Sambale, and respondents Pastor and Marceliano Cayabyab are children of the spouses Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab. The other respondents, Rosita and Rosalia Cayabyab are the wives of Pastor and

bank consolidated its title on August 2, 1982[13] and TCT No. 142479[14] cancelling TCT No. 124304 was issued in its name on August 19, 1982. In a Deed of Absolute Sale[15] dated September 3, 1982, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo sold the First Parcel to Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab for the amount of P7,221.95. Two days later, the latter were issued TCT No. 142887[16] cancelling TCT No. 142479. For the amount of P10,000.00, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate Property[17] dated January 14, 1983. On January 25, 1983, TCT No. 143859[18] cancelling TCT No. 142887 was issued in the name of the Ramos spouses. On June 8, 1983, the petitioners herein as plaintiffs, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 37, a Verified Complaint[19] docketed as Civil Case No. 15937 against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos and ICP. They prayed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael Ramos and Rosemarie Cayabyab; cancellation of TCT Nos. 124304, 142479, 142887, and 143859 issued in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, respectively; and recovery of possession of the First and Second Parcels by virtue of an alleged deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners herein. As regards the Second Parcel, the plaintiffs prayed that ICP or Pastor Cayabyab, in whose name TCT No. 117094 remained, be ordered to surrender the title. It appears that ICP was not served with summons because it had already ceased to exist due to bankruptcy.[20] The plaintiffs theorized that the documents sought to be annulled are fictitious, simulated and entered into in bad faith as the defendants had full knowledge of the pendency of, as well as the consequent decision in, Civil Case No. 15298. On the other hand, the defendants claimed that all the transactions over the First Parcel were entered into free from all liens and encumbrances not inscribed in the title. Recognizing the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 on the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in favor of Pastor Cayabyab, the trial court rendered on August 22, 1989, a Decision in Civil Case No. 15937 in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which provides: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. The plaintiffs to be the true and lawful owners over the landholdings in question; 2. The annulment of all documents pertaining thereto; namely, Exhs. C,D, & E; 3. The cancellation of TCT No. 124304, TCT No. 142479; TCT No. 142887 & TCT No. 143859; 4. The defendants restore possession of the landholdings in question to plaintiffs; 5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages; 6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as/for attorneys fees; 7. The defendant Pastor Cayabyab and/or Insurance Corporation of the Philippines to surrender TCT No. 117094 free from all liens and encumbrances; 8. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; 9. 10. The dismissal of defendants counterclaim; and The defendants to pay the costs of this suit.[21]

The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. According to them, the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and allowed them to adduce evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land. Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision[22] dated August 21, 1995, held that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there being no identity of the causes of action in Civil Case No. 15298 and Civil Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public documents, the former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the corresponding TCTs for the First and Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case covered not only the annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but also the recovery of possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos executed by Eulalia Cayabyab. The Court of Appeals also upheld the validity of the deeds of sale and the corresponding TCTs in favor of the appellants, declaring that the affidavit cancelling the adverse claim annotated in TCT No. 117134 was duly admitted; that the subsequent sales transactions have not been proven to be simulated or fictitious; that no notice of lis pendens was recorded in the title; and that the appellees were not able to prove their claim of title having failed to present the original or certified true copy of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos or to prove the existence and due execution of the original deed. Hence, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court, accordingly declaring that the deeds of sale as well as the TCTs which emanated from them valid and enforceable, and the appellants the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties in question. The Court of Appeals denied the appellees Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution[23] dated July 11, 1996. In the instant Verified Petition[24] dated July 30, 1996, the petitioners reiterate their argument that the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965, the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels, and the subsequent transfers of the subject properties are all null and void by virtue of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring them to be so. They allege that a notice of lis pendens and an affidavit of adverse claim were duly annotated on the TCTs covering the two parcels of land. Hence, Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos should be considered purchasers in bad faith. The petitioners further claim that the considerations for the subsequent transfers were grossly inadequate leading to the conclusion that the respondents were motivated by a desire to execute fictitious deeds of conveyance. The petitioners also insist that the First and Second Parcels were donated to the petitioners by their mother, Eulalia Cayabyab, through an alleged Donation Inter Vivos attached to the petition as Annex F. Finally, they reiterate that Pastor Cayabyab and ICP entered into a contract of guaranty over the Second Parcel despite the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the title. In their Comment[25] dated October 8, 1997, the respondents contend that whatever doubts may have been raised by Eulalia Cayabyab on the validity of Pastor Cayabyabs title were removed when she executed the Affidavit requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims inscribed in the titles. Hence, the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 in favor of Pastor Cayabyab are legal and valid. The deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab did not vest ownership and possession over the subject properties in favor of the petitioners because of the prior sale to Pastor Cayabyab. Besides, Eulalia Cayabyab did not have the right to donate the subject properties to the petitioners because there was no previous partition of the intestate estate of Raymundo Cayabyab. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1998, the Court denied the instant petition for non-compliance with the Resolution of February 25, 1998, requiring the petitioners to file a reply to the respondents Comment. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Reply[26] dated September 21, 1998. In our Resolution of November 16, 1998, we granted the motion, reinstated and gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.[27] The pivotal issue is whether the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 operates to bar the respondents defenses and counterclaims in Civil Case No. 15937. The petitioners insist that the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15298 has settled with finality the nullity of Pastor Cayabyabs title.

Following the principle of res judicata, the respondents, as transferees of Pastor Cayabyab, should not have been allowed to adduce evidence to prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land. The appellate court, however, ruled that the principle of res judicata does not apply there being no identity of causes of action in the two cases. The trial court and the appellate court both erred in the manner by which they treated and applied the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 to the instant case. This error apparently stems from a misreading of the provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the effect of judgments. Section 47, Rule 39 thereof provides: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto. The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment, under paragraph (b) above and conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) is well-laid. In Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,[28] we held: There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.[29] For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case. In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.[30] We find that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No. 15937, which involves the annulment of the subsequent transactions and TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the recovery of possession thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the

corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. Furthermore, the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 necessarily turned only upon whether the Deeds of Absolute Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case No. 15937 will also have to include a determination of the good or bad faith of the subsequent purchasers. Res judicata, therefore, does not apply. Nonetheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[31] the concept of conclusiveness of judgment was explained, thus: xxx conclusiveness of judgmentstates that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.[32] Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject parcels of land precluded the Court of Appeals from further adjudicating on the validity of the said deeds and titles. The appellate courts pronouncement that the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which declares null and void the deeds of absolute sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 20, 1976 and the corresponding TCT is not conclusive upon the action in Civil Case No. 15937[33] is, therefore, flawed. It is likewise utterly erroneous for the appellate court to have disregarded the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the two parcels of land. It is axiomatic that decisions which have long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial courts final judgment.[34] The issue concerning the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976 and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties must be laid to rest. These documents cannot be relied upon by Pastor Cayabyab and his successors-in-interest as the basis of their claim of ownership over the First Parcel. Having said that, we find it necessary still to determine whether the respondents who take title over the First Parcel from Pastor Cayabyab were purchasers in good faith, i.e., whether they bought the property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and paid a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.[35] If so, their rights will be protected and the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties cannot be successfully invoked to invalidate the titles subsequently issued, for it has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes.[36] As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.[37] However, this principle admits of an unchallenged exception: a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the

certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.[38] [Emphasis supplied] A judicious evaluation of the records and the applicable legal principles leads us to the conclusion that the subsequent purchasers of the First Parcel were not purchasers in good faith. First. The Court notesand it is not disputedthat Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos are successors-in-interest of Pastor Cayabyab, having purchased the First Parcel after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298. In the case of the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, they even purchased the property after the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 had been rendered. The records reveal that a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,[39] dated November 18, 1985, was filed by Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Cayabyab assailing the order and resolutions of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15937, delegating the reception of the plaintiffs evidence ex-parte to the Branch Clerk of Court and denying the defendants motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals[40] set aside the questioned order and resolutions and directed the respondent Judge to allow the defendants to adduce their evidence. The decision was anchored, among others, on the defendants representation that the plaintiffs were neither parties nor intervenors in Civil Case No. 15298 but have only laid claim on the subject properties as donees.[41] This allegation is patently false since, as previously mentioned, Eulalia Cayabyab and her children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo Cayabyab, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. Even so, the decision apparently became one of the bases for the respondents claim that the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues thereby allowing them to adduce evidence in support of their claim of ownership and possession of the subject properties, a stand sanctioned by the appellate court in the instant case. Second. It is important to emphasize that Marceliano Cayabyab was among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298, contrary to the vehement denial in his Answer,[42] dated July 21, 1983, in which he claimed that answering defendants (Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab) are not parties to the said case and are totally strangers as regards the same.[43] Third. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298, Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina, filed a new case[44] for the annulment of certain documents affecting several parcels of land, including the two parcels subject of the instant petition, against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab and Rosafina Reginaldo. This was revealed by the respondents themselves in their Comment[45] dated October 8, 1997 and Memorandum[46] dated January 20, 1999. Parenthetically, in order to bolster their claim of valid title, the respondents constantly underscore the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab executed an Affidavit[47] dated June 17, 1976, affirming the genuineness of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims annotated on the TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. It should be noted, however, that after executing the Affidavit on June 17, 1976, Eulalia Cayabyab herself filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. 15298) for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the reconveyance of the subject properties on February 9, 1977. It is beyond this Courts power to hypothesize on the reasons for Eulalia Cayabyabs change of mind. What is clear is that the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which subsequently became final. Eulalia Cayabyabs Affidavit which was executed before the institution of Civil Case No. 15298 cannot, by any means, be construed as a bar to the final decision declaring Pastor Cayabyabs titles null and void. Curiously, the respondents never questioned the petitioners assertion that a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of the TCT covering the First Parcel. The trial court did not rule on this point but the Court of Appeals declared that there was no such notice annotated on TCT No. 117134. Whether there was an annotation inscribed in TCT No. 117134 will not, however, affect the Courts finding that the respondents are not purchasers in good faith. To summarize, the records disclose circumstances indicating that Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and the respondents Marceliano and

Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos were not purchasers in good faith. Rosafina Reginaldo purchased the First Parcel during the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298. Moreover, she was one of the defendants, together with Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, in Civil Case No. SCC-552 filed by Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina for the annulment of certain documents concerning several parcels of land, among which was the First Parcel. As for the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, it became a mortgagee of the First Parcel initially on June 12, 1977 and later, on December 23, 1977, after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298 on February 9, 1977. After the decision in the case became final, the bank purchased the property during foreclosure proceedings. It later sold the property to Marceliano Cayabyab, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. As regards Marceliano, his participation in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and SCC552 seals his knowledge of the petitioners claim over the subject properties. Likewise, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos cannot feign ignorance of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 and the final decision therein declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. The fact that the parties are family members also convinces the Court that the respondents assertion of lack of knowl edge of Civil Case No. 15298 and the petitioners claim over the subject properties is a mere pretext. As regards the Second Parcel, it is not disputed that TCT No. 117094 is in Pastor Cayabyabs name and possession. Emanating, as it did, from the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298, Pastor Cayabyabs title is null and void. The final issue pertains to the deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners. The trial court sustained the existence and validity of the deed and declared the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to be the true and lawful owners of the subject properties. Interestingly, petitioner Rufina Cayana verified the existence of the deed of donation inter vivos on direct examination. She declared: Q: You said, you know the two parcels of land, subject of this litigation, why do you know them? A: Q: A: sir. Q: I know them, sir, because I am one of the owners of said parcels of land. Who are your co-owners? Mercedes C. de Guzman, Josefina C. Rabina and Susana C. Sambale,

How did you and your co-owners acquire these two parcels of land?

A: By way of donation intervivos executed by our mother, Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab, sometime on January 5, 1980, sir. Q: A: Do you have a copy of that donation intervivos? Yes, sir.

Q: Showing to you this document, entitled Donation Inter-Vivos, will you go over this if this is the same document you are referring to? A: Yes, sir, that is the one.

ATTY. PALMA: May we pray that this document be marked as Exh. A.[48] [Emphasis supplied.] Petitioner Josefina Rabina also confirmed the existence of the deed. She testified: Q: A: Is there any document regarding the donation? Yes, sir.

Q: Showing to you this deed of donation, is this the deed of donation you are referring to?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: There is a signature above the typewritten name Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab, do you know those (sic) signature is that? A: Yes, sir, this is the signature of my mother.[49] [Emphasis supplied.]

The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of thedecision included the application of res judicata. Respondentsappealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CAdecided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata wasinapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCTsvalid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavitwithdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of landwere not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was noevidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes abar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case? HELD: Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effectof judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be asfollows:(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or inrespect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of adeceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legalcondition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing,the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of theperson; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of thetestator or intestate;(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to thematter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could havebeen raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties andtheir successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencementto the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing andunder the same title and in the same capacity;(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successorsin interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein ornecessarily thereto. Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment is not applicable tothis case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present.There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case wherethe judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to bebarred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to thesubsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy,including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as toevery matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat theclaim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which mighthave been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could havebeen adjudged in that case. But where between the first and secondcases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, thefirst judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to thosematters actually and directly controverted and determined and not asto matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, theremust be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) thecourt must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of actionbetween the first and second actions. According to the appellate court,the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present inthis case.The doctrine that should have been followed in this case isconclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in aformer suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by acourt of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgmenttherein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity withthem are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future actionbetween such parties or their privies, in the same court or any othercourt of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.The decision of the trial court, which was final, declaring thedeeds of absolute sale null and void, precluded the CA from furtheradjudicating the validity of the deeds and titles.

The appellate court, however, pronounced that the petitioners were not able to prove their claim of ownership of the subject properties as they failed to present the original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos. The Court of Appeals, in fact, held that the purported Exhibit A is actually the allegation on the existence of the alleged deed contained in the complaint itself.[50] Due to the conflicting findings of the trial court and the appellate court, we requested[51] the transmittal to this Court of, among others, the deed of donation inter vivos marked as Exhibit A for the plaintiffs during the direct examination of Rufina Cayana. In her reply dated September 2, 2002, the clerk of court informed the Court that the entire original records of Civil Case No. 15937, including Exhibit A, were listed in the trial courts records as among the exhibits forwarded to the Court of Appeals. However, except for the Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs-Appellees[52] which lists Exhibit A, the records of this case are bereft of any showing that the plaintiffs formally offered in evidence the original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab. The fact that it was only when they filed the instant petition that the petitioners actually attached as Annex F[53] a copy of the said deed is further proof of the petitioners lapse. As a rule, the court shall not consider evidence which has not been formally offered.[54] This being so, the donation in favor of the petitioners cannot be upheld. This leaves us with the question of who the rightful owners of the subject properties are. The Court holds that the First and Second Parcels properly belong to the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab, the same to be partitioned in accordance with the law on succession. WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the trial court is accordingly REINSTATED but with the modification that the First and Second Parcels should be included in the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab and partitioned in accordance with the law on succession. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave. Case Digest CAYANA VS. CAGR 125607 MARCH 18, 2004 FACTS: It appears that the petitioners and respondents father, with themarital c onsent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the motherfiled an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son wereforgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing suchadverse claims.Later on, together with petitioners of this case and respondentMarceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for thecancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the twoparcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into anagreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation usingsecond parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank andsold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who thenmortgaged the land to respondent bank.As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondentsfiled an answer but were found to be in default, the court allowedpetitioners to file evidence ex parte.The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaringthe deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer forreconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land.No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemedfinal.The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and thebank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it torespondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M.Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos.The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification andcancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. Theyasked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to thealleged donation inter vivos of their mother.

G.R. No. L-39674 January 31, 1978 URBANA VELASCO AROC, assisted by her husband CELESTINO AROC, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION and CIRILO B. GARCIA and FELICIANA BITO, defendants-appellees. Benjamin A. Bongolan for appellant. E.B. Garcia & Associates for appellees Garcia and Bito. GUERRERO, J.: This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 46525-R entitled "Urbana Velasco Aroc assisted by her husband Celestino Aroc, Plaintiff-Appelle, versus People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and Cirilo B. Garcia and Feliciana Bito, Defendants-Appellees," pursuant to the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court per its Resolution dated October 31, 1974 since the appeal involves pure questions of law. Plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dismissing on the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the award and sale of a parcel of land, known as Lot 6, Block E-144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon City, to defendants-appellees Cirilo R. Garcia and his spouse, Feliciano Bito, by the other defendant-appellee PHHC, and the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said spouses. The facts are stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thus: From the allegations of the complaint we gather that as early as 1956 plaintiff and her family started occupying one-half of the lot in controversy while a certain Alfonso Naparan and his family occupied the other half. In 1956 plaintiff constructed a house of strong materials worth P3,270, planted fruitbearing trees and fenced the portion occupied by her. In May 1956 she filed with defendant corporation an application for the award and sale of said portion to her. She filed another application in January 1957. Later she discovered both applications were missing from the files of defendant corporation. Upon suggestion of an official of the latter, she reapplied for the same portion of Lot 6 on February 3, 1966. However, Lot 6 was unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to defendants spouses who were disqualified from purchasing it, since they had previuosly purchased a 1,450square meter lot (Lot 12, Block W-28) from defendant corporation and already owned several lots in Greater Manila. It is further gathered that plaintiff formally protested the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants spouses with the Board of Directors of defendant corporation. The investigating officer recommended the rescission of the conditional sale of Lot 6 and the award of the lot to plaintiff and Alfonso Naparan. In spite of said recommendation defendant corporation executed a deed of sale in favor of defendant-spouses. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106146 covering the lot was subsequently issued to them by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. At the time of the filing of the complaint an January 22, 1968, plaintiff and her family still occupying one-half portion of the lot. In its answer with counterclaim, defendant corporation denied the material allegations of the complaint and, as special and affirmative defenses, alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action; that plaintiff was a mere squatter of Lot 6; that the award and sale of said lot to defendants-spouses was legal and valid, for they had complied with the requirements imposed by defendant corporation for its acquisition; and that plaintiff's claim had been passed upon by an investigating committee which found the same to he without basis. Defendants-spouses likewise denied the material allegations of the complaint. They set up as special and affirmative defenses the following: that there was a pending action to quiet title and/or recovery of possession of Lot 6 with preliminary injunction and damages filed by them against Alfonso Naparan and herein plaintiff Civil Case No. Q-10442) and in her answer she raised the same issues of fact and law alleged by her in the present complaint; that there was a valid ground to dismiss the new complaint due to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-10442 between the same parties for the same cause of action; that Lot 6 was lawfully awarded and sold to them by defendant corporation and if ever plaintiff suffered damages her action should be against the corporation; that plaintiffs could no petitioner question the validity of the award and sale, since it was duly approved by the General Manager of defendant corporation after the investigations on plaintiff's protest had been conducted and she had been given the opportunity to air her grievances, but her protest was dismissed for lack of merit. Defendants-spouses later ammended their answer to include the i following allegation:

6-A That on December 26, 1968, the Honorable Judge Honorato r,. Masakyan Branch V of this Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. Q-10442, the dispositive portion of Which is quoted as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia and against defendants Alfonso Naparan and Urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc, plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia the rightful and legal owner of Lot 6, Block E144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon City, and ordering the defendants Alfonso Naparan and urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc and all person claiming rights under them to vacate the premises in question and restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay the plaintiff the sum P500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. so much so that the above decision having become final and executory, there is nothing left for this Honorable Court to do except to dismiss the instant complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata, otherwise their will be no more end to the controversy, as the parties will be litigating, all over again on the same issues. Two days after the filing of the amended answer, defendants spouses moved for the dismissal of the action on the ground of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Attached to their motion were the complaint, answer and decision in Civil Case No. Q-10442. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Appellant now assails before this Court the order of dismissal, claiming that the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the requisite that there must be Identity of cause of action between the two cases not being present, since the case on appeal is for annulment of the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendantsspouses while Civil Case No. Q-10442 was for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession. Thus, the sole issue to determine is whether or not the final judgment in civil case No. Q-10442 is a bar to the case before us. This involves a question of law (Bengua vs. Abay, CA-G.R. No. 19408-R, July 30,1959) which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. It is for the Supreme court to pass upon the issue in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended. Said section vests in the Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Plaintiff-appellant, litigating this case on appeal as a pauper-litigant, contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint on the ground of res judicata. We find the contention to be meritorious. In determining whether the final judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. Q10442 for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession, constitutes res judicata as would bar the appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-11807, now subject of this appeal, for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the certificate of title to the land, We must examine if between these two cases the requisites of res judicata are present, namely: 1) The former judgment must be final; 2) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, 3) It must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) There must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. 2 It is only in the Identity of cause of action that the parties dispute and disagree. The term "cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 3 Is there Identity of cause of action between the two aforementioned cases, the first case for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession and the second case for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of certificate of title? This query can be answered by a searching look into and a careful perusal of the records of said two cases. In the first case, the records disclose that on Sept. 16, 1966, defendantappellee, Colonel Cirilo V. Garcia, filed against plaintiff-appellant Urbana vs. Aroc and Juan Alfonso Naparan the complaint alleging that plaintiff therein is the absolute owner in fee simple of the parcel of land, Lot No. 6, Block E-144 Pinahan Subdivision; that he acquired the land by way of purchase from the PHHC on December 8, 1965; that said lot is now titled in the name of the plaintiff and is covered by TCT No. 106146 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, that defendant therein, Urbana Velasco Aroc, asserts a claim of ownership and right of decision to the land and in fact still occupies the land, that defendant's claim of ownership and possession is invalid, ineffective and

prejudicial to plaintiff's title as owner in fee simple, consequently entitling plaintiff to bring an action to remove the cloud on and to quiet his title; that defendant owns a house constructed on the western portion of the land and refuses to demolish or remove the same notwithstanding plaintiff's demand therefor. The above allegations state the basic or ultimate facts which constitute complaints cause of action. Defendant Urbana Velasco Aroc having filed her answer on November 29, 1966 but failed to appear at the trial of the case, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, declaring him the rightful and legal owner of the land, and ordering defendant to vacate the premises in question and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff plus the payment of attorneys fees and costs. The above judgment became final and executory during the pendency of the present case. In the second case, now subject of this appeal in Civil Case No. 11807 instituted on January 22, 1968, the plaintiff therein Urbana Velasco Aroc alleged that she is a bona fide occupant and possessor of the one-half portion of Lot 6, Block E-144 Pinahan Subdivision,: that she started occupying the lot as early as 1952; that in 1956, she built her own house therein made of strong materials. introduced improvements and fenced the area; that she applied for the award and subsequent sale to her of the one-half portion in May, 1946, reiterated in January, 1957 and re-applied on Feb. 3, 1966; that the lot was, however, awarded later to the defendant Cirilo V. Garcia and his wife Feliciana Bito in bad faith, contrary to law and public policy. The complaint further alleged that the awardees Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito are disqualified from purchasing Lot No. 6 because they had earlier purchased a parcel of land formerly belonging to the PHHC, consisting of 1,460 sq. meters, known as Block 12, Lot W-8 covered under TCT No. 31596 of the land records of Quezon City, aside from the fact that they are already owners and possessors of several other 'lots in Manila and in the suburbs; and that the award to the spouses Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito was in violation of the charter provisions of the PHHC. The above allegations likewise establish the ultimate facts that constitute the cause of action of plaintiff (now the appellant), entitling her to the one-half portion of Lot 6. Considering now the cause of action in the first case and the cause of action in the second case, the conclusion is inevitable that one is different from the other; that they are not one and the same cause of action. The first seeks only to remove the cloud on the title of the land. The action is premised on Art. 476, New Civil Code, which provides: Art 476. When ever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, remembrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may, be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to teal property or any interest therein. The second seeks not only the nullification of the award and sale to the awardee, the cancellation of the Certificate of Title, but also places in issue the power and authority of the grantor (PHHC) to make the award and sell the land to one disqualified to purchase the same, the awardee being a Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as admitted by the PHHC. 4 The qualification of the purchaser is likewise placed in issue. These issues are more basic and fundamental than the quieting of the title and the removal of the cloud on such title. In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. It has been said that this method is the best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties and it has even been described as infallible. 5 Applying the test accordingly, We hold that the evidence needed to prove the allegations of the second cause of action must necessarily be more than that in the first case for in the herein second case, additional evidence must be adduced to prove that the PHHC acted in violation of its charter, that the

PHHC made the award in violation of the presidential directive alleged in plaintiff's "Opposition to Motion and to Reinstate Writ of Preliminary Injunction," evidenced by a letter dated January 12, 1967 of the President of the Philippines to the General Manager of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, directing the Board of said corporation to award the lots in the Pinahan Area, Quezon City, to the actual and bona fide occupants there; 6 that the awardees have previously purchased another lot from the PHHC and were the owners of several other lots in Manila and Quezon City which disqualified them from acquire the lot in controversy, evidenced by Annexes A & B. 7 There is merit to the claim of the appellant that the legality of the award and sale of the lot in controversy was not directly litigated in the first case not only because the defendant therein did not appear at the trial to adduce evidence, but also because the PHHC, the grantor and vendor of the property, was not impleaded as a party litigant in the case. It is also a general rule that a judgment in an action to quiet title is not conclusive as to matters not in issue and determined particularly where such matters could not have been determined in such action. 8 Since the power or authority of the PHHC was not in issue in the first case to quiet title, and neither was the qualification of the awardees, the plaintiff therein, directly determined the judgment in said case is not conclusive and binding in the pre. sent case for annulment of the award and sale, and the cancellation of the title of the awardees or purchaser. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dated February 19, 1970 is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the said court for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Fernandez, JJ., concur

Case Digest URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. PHHCGR L-39674 JANUARY 31, 1978 FACTS: The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing on the ground of res judicata thecomplaint to declare null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land.Appellants are occupants of one-half of a parcel of land. Theyconstructed a house and made some improvements on the land. Theylater on filed with appellee corporation application for the award andsale of such portion of land. They did this for several times withoutany action from appellee corporation. They later found out that theparcel of land had been unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and soldto appellee spouses, who according to appellants, are disqualified frompurchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land alreadyfrom appellee corporation together with other properties. Appellantsfiled a case against the appellee corporation and spouses.In defense of the spouses, they contend that the case should bedismissed due to the ground of res judicata. A case was alreadydecided in their favor, wherein the issue was regarding quieting of title. They contend that appellants are barred by prior judgment.The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of theappellants, using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata. Itcontended that the prior case had already been final and executoryand that there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss thecomplaint of the appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar? HELD: No, it is not. For the principle of res judicata to apply, fourrequisites must be present: the former judgment must be final, it musthave been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over the case,it must be a judgment on the merits, and there must be, between thetwo cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In

Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010Page 10 of 147 this case, it is only with regard to cause of action that the partiesdisagree.Cause of action is defined to be an act or omission of secondparty in violation of the legal rights of the other, and its essentialelements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of thedefendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of saidlegal right.In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the quietingof title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the caseat bar, the cause of action was not only to ask for the nullification of the award and sale of the

parcel of land but also, it questions thevalidity of appellee corporations award and sale of the parcel of landto the spouses. Given such, the two causes of action are differentfrom one another.In the application of the doctrine of res judicata wherein it issometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of action, the testnormally employed is to consider the identity of the facts or whetherthe same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts and evidencewould sustain both, then the former would be a bar to any subsequentaction. Otherwise, there wouldnt be. And with applying such test, itis found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of action.Given aforementioned circumstances, the second cause of actionis remanded to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.

In a Memorandum dated 11 May 2001 the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be fined P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon rereading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her intention to"revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision."[7] The reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention. Respondent Judge explained that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P60,000.00 for actual damages. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature,[8] to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion,[9] or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.[10] A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.[11] In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation.[12] It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment[13] except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.[14] Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[15] The fact that respondent never had any intention of having complainant incarcerated on the basis of the second decision but only to make him answer for the civil liabilities arising from the crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate her from administrative liability. On the contrary, such thinking on the part of respondent that she could still "revise" a promulgated decision of acquittal even for such a purpose underscores, not mitigates, her gross ignorance. We cannot write finis to this case without also commenting on respondent's negligence in the preparation of her decision. Judges have always been reminded to take down their own notes of salient portions of hearings and not to rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes. The pivotal testimony of Tito Retreta would not have been overlooked and consequently disregarded had respondent prepared her own notes and read them as she was supposed to. WHEREFORE, for Gross Ignorance of the Law respondent Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, is FINED P20,000.00, the same to be deducted from her retirement benefits. Since respondent has already compulsorily retired as of 18 September 1998, let her retirement benefits be immediately released to her minus the amount of P20,000.00 herein imposed on her as fine. SO ORDERED. Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Case Digest of Argel vs. Judge Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]

Law of the Case The principle that if the highest appellate court has determined a legal question and returned the case to the court below for additional proceedings, the question will not be determined differently on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same. The law of the case expresses the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is the final determination of the rights of the parties. The doctrine of "law of the case" is one of policy only, however, and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law decided on the prior appeal. Such circumstances exist when an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has transpired by the establishment of new precedent by a controlling authority or the overruling of former decisions. Courts have ruled that instructionsdirections given by the judge to the jury concerning the law applicable to the caseare the "law of the case" where the appealing defendant, the petitioner, accepted the instructions as correct at the time they were given. [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131. August 20, 2001] MIGUEL ARGEL, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERMINIA M. PASCUA, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, respondent. RESOLUTION BELLOSILLO, J.: A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 (Miguel Argel v. Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan Ilocos Sur). - This is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.[1] Complainant alleged in his complaint that respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated 19 August 1993[2] in Crim. Case No. 2999-V entitled People v. Miguel Argel convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by respondent in her Decision[3] dated 22 July 1993, promulgated on 13 August 1993. Complainant contends that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. In a letter-explanation dated 7 March 1994 respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal dated 22 July 1993 because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. However, when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that there was indeed one in the person of Tito Retreta. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. Fully aware of her prior decision of acquittal, respondent nevertheless ordered the police to bring complainant Argel to court not for the purpose of having him incarcerated but only to inform him of her new decision so that he could be made to answer for his civil liabilities arising from the crime. Before she could explain the matter to complainant, the latter's brother already filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.[4] According to respondent, she decided to await the hearing of the petition before setting complainant free so that she could give him a copy of her new decision.[5] In his Reply to the letter-explanation of respondent, complainant additionally charged respondent with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision.[6]

Facts: Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered decision convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel contends that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Pascua acquitted Argel of murder because she erroneously thought that there was no witness that could have identified the accused. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. After reviewing, she revised her decision finding Argel guilty of murder. Pascua ordered the police to bring Argel to court to inform him of his liabilities arising from the crime.Argel charged Pascua with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision. Issue: Is a decision once final no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration? Ruling: Yes. Ratio: Except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial, a final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision doesnot extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case

fully paid; the sum equivalent to 25% of [respondent's] claim as and for attorney's fees plus the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.' (at page 135, Records).' The [petitioner] appealed, from said Decision, to [the CA], entitled and docketed 'Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., versus Paquito B. Buaya, CA-GR. No. 17329.' On March 30, 1990, this [c]ourt promulgated a Decision in favor of the [petitioner] annulling the Decision of the [c]ourt a quo and remanding the case to the lower [c]ourt for further proceedings. (at page 154, Records). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory. Accordingly, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1990 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (at page 169, Records). The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing. [Petitioner's] motion was granted by the [c]ourt a quo and the hearing was reset [to] February 15, 1991, at 8:30 in the morning. However, the hearing was reset to March 14, 1991, at the same time, on motion of the [respondent] (at page 180, Record). The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing set on March 14, 1991 on the ground that his [c]ounsel, Atty. Bartolome A. Avancena, had died and [petitioner] needed time to engage the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16, 1991 at the same time (at page 187, Record). However, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the resetting of said hearing on the ground that he needed [more] time to secure the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to July 26, 1991, at the same time. But then, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the postponement of said hearing on the ground that 'he was weak and sickly'. However, the [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt reset the hearing to November 29, 1991, at the same time, but subject to the condition that if, for any reason, the [petitioner] still failed to appear on said setting, such failure shall be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence (at page 250, Records). On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel Maranga, the new counsel of the [petitioner], filed a 'Motion to Postpone'. The [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. On December 19, 1991, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] motion and declaring the [petitioner] to have waived his right to adduce evidence in his behalf (at page 222, Record). The [respondent] forthwith filed a motion praying the [c]ourt to reinstate its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991. On March 18, 1992, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] 'Motion for Reconsideration' and granting [respondent's] motion for the reinstatement of its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Certiorari' with [the CA], entitled and docketed as 'Paquito Buaya versus Hon. Fernando Agdamag, et al.,['] CA-G.R. No. 27814 (SP), assailing the Orders of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992. On August 24, 1992, [the CA] promulgated a Decision dismissing [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit (at page 261, Record). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory on June 28, 1993 (at page 282).[4] On [m]otion of the [respondent], the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order, dated October 29, 1993, directing the issuance of a [W]rit of [E]xecution (at page 298, Record). The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of said Order, dated October 29, 1993. On March 16, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying motion (at pages 359-360, Record). On April 12, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Notice of Appeal' from said Order. However, on May 11, 1995, the [c]ourt [a quo] issued an Order declining to give due course to the appeal of the [petitioner] considering that the Decision of the [c]ourt had already become final and executory (at page 365, Record). On June 2, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued a Writ of Execution. On July 27, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Relief from Order'. On November 13, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying the Petitioner's 'Petition for Relief." Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA denied petitioner's appeal which centered on these issues: (1) whether the September 17, 1987 Decision of the trial court had become final and executory, and (2) whether the failure of petitioner to inform his new counsel of the status of the case before the trial court constituted "mistake and excusable negligence." In view of the amount involved in the collection suit, the CA disbelieved petitioner's contention that he had failed to apprise his counsel of the status and the particulars of the case in the trial court. Granting arguendo that he did make such omission through sheer inadvertence, his counsel was duty-bound to familiarize himself with the case before accepting the same, specially because litigation had already commenced. Such omission did not constitute "mistake or excusable negligence" that would have entitled him to relief from the trial court's judgment. Thus, he deserved to suffer the consequences of his own mistake or omission.

PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., Inc., respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the entire proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional evidence, not to conduct a trial de novo. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the August 28, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52999, dismissing Petitioner Paquito Buaya's appeal of the trial court's Order dated November 13, 1995, which denied his Petition for Relief. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Appellant."[2] The Facts The facts of this case are as follows:[3] "On July 31, 1985, x x x Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., the [respondent] in the present recourse, filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, its erstwhile [b]ranch [m]anager for Cebu and the [petitioner] in the present recourse, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, representing his unremitted premium collections owing to the [respondent]. For failure of the [petitioner] and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pretrial, the [petitioner] was declared x x x in default, and the [respondent] was allowed, by the [c]ourt, to adduce its evidence, ex parte. On the basis of the evidence of the [respondent], the Court a quo promulgated a Decision, dated September 17, 1987, in favor of the [respondent], the decretal portion of which reads as follows: 'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P678,076.83 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until

Noting that the validity of the March 18, 1992 Order of the trial court reinstating its September 17, 1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA and the Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of petitioner for resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal was solely designed to further derail the execution of the lower court's Decision. Besides, the present posture of petitioner is antithetical to his earlier "Petition for Relief from Order," which was denied by the trial court. In filing said action for relief, he was admitting that the Decision of the trial court had become final and executory. Hence, he cannot claim the Decision's nullity. Hence, this Petition.[5]

"x x x. The [Petitioner] raised the same issue in his Petition for Certiorari in CA-GR No. 27814 (SP) filed with this Court where he assailed the validity of the Order of the Court a quo, dated March 18, 1992, ordering the reinstatement of the Decision of the Court a quo, dated September 17, 1987, and this Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit, and, [i]n effe[c]t, affirmed the aforesaid Order of the Court a quo. The [petitioner] filed a "Petition to Review" with the Supreme Court, from said Decision of this Court and the Supreme Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition. Appellant's penchant [for] resurrecting the same issue in the Court a quo x x x, in the present recourse, deserves the severest condemnation as it was designed solely to further derail the execution of the Decision of the Court a quo. x x x."[12] Second Issue: Final and Executory Judgment

Issues Petitioner interposes the following issues for resolution:[6] "I - Petitioner is presenting in this petition a question of law which is believed or which appears to be one of first impression, namely: Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution? "II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the [petitioner] of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for the [petitioner] and without anymore requiring the presentation of [respondent's] evidence for cross-examination by the [petitioner]?" The Court's Ruling This Petition has no merit. First Issue: Annulled Decision Petitioner persistently avers that no trial court can reinstate a decision that has been annulled by the CA because such a decision is "dead" in legal contemplation. We disagree. We doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court was annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. He merely alleged that "[t]he aforesaid judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment by default x x x so that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by [petitioner], in its decision rendered on March 30, 1990, SET ASIDE said judgment and ordered the case to be REMANDED to the court of origin for FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. x x x."[7] This allegation shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to attach a copy of the March 30, 1990 CA Decision, which he claims annulled the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, is an added reason why this Petition should be denied. True, said CA Decision is not in question here. Nonetheless, an authentic copy thereof should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA.[8] Hence, a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal.[9] We also reject the assertion of petitioner that the CA Decision of August 24, 1992 did not affirm the reinstatement of the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, but only sustained the denial of his Motion for Postponement. This is simply not true. The CA specifically resolved the issue of the legality of the RTC Orders dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992, which not only denied petitioner's Motion for Postponement but also reinstated the September 17, 1987 trial court Decision.[10] The appellate court ruled that respondent judge showed no arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant the grant of that Petition.[11] Hence, there was no need for the CA to explicitly reinstate the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision. Indeed, petitioner cannot be allowed to prevent that RTC Decision from attaining finality by engaging in useless hairsplitting distinctions. On this dilatory practice, the CA clearly and cogently ruled: Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he had waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that both parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present their respective sets of evidence. We disagree. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein respondent) had rested its case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision was rendered. In fact, the evidence adduced by herein respondent became the sole basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987. Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court become final and executory on June 28, 1993.[13] A Writ of Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987 Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[14] It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous.[15] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.[16] The February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354 barred not only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the Petition, but also any other issues that might have been raised therein. An existing final judgment or decree -- rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.[17] Indeed, nothing decided on in the first appeal, between the same parties and the same facts, can be reexamined in a second or subsequent appeal. Right or wrong, the decision in the first appeal is binding on both the trial and the appellate courts for the purpose of that case and for that case only. Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Case Digest BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.GR 139020 OCTOBER 11, 2000 FACTS: On July 31, 1985, Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed acomplaint against Paquito B. Buaya, a manager of their Cebu branchfor the collection of

the principal amount of P678,076.83, which isallegedly his unremitted premium collections owing to the Stronghold.For failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear at the pre-trial, he wasdefaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences,without the other party. On the basis of Strongholds evidence, thecourt decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold.Buaya appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of Buaya, annulling the decision and remanding the case to the lowercourt for further proceedings. The lower court therefore set a hearingon December 13, 1990 but Buaya filed a Motion of Postponement of the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gaveseveral reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991,Stronghold opposed the motion, but the court granted Buayas motionprovided that the next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of his right to present evidence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate itsprevious decision dated, September 17, 1987. Buaya filed a motionfor reconsideration but was denied. He files a Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of merit.On June 28, 1993, the courts decision has became final and executoryand thus denied all other appeals made before it. ISSUES: 1. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by theCourt of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which renderedthe decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafterorder its execution? 2. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the courtof origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trialcourt merely require the presentation of evidence for Buaya andwithout anymore requiring the presentation of Strongholdsevidence for cross-examination by the Buaya? RULING: This petition has no merit. DENIED. RATIO: 1. Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was notannulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it hadmerely been set aside. This shows that the trial court's Decisionwas reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court.Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present hisevidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of thetrial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed totake advantage of the ample opportunity given him to presentevidence. An authentic copy thereof should have beensubmitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial courthad indeed been annulled by that of the CA. Hence, a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] wouldsupport the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficientground for this Petition's dismissal. 2.Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes finaland executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as amatter of right, it is axiomatic that once a decision attainsfinality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claimthat it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgmentmay no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legalinfirmities or errors it may contain. Litigations must end andterminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficientadministration of justice requires that once a judgment hasbecome final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of thefruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filedby the same parties.

It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: . . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record). 2 As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows: Entry No. 7712/T-5000 CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY It is hereby made of record that a construction of private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley has been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not. Pub. of Manila. 3 The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use. On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a "temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff. 4 (the petitioner herein). Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses. On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court a quo ruled on the same as follows: In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the merit (sic) and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record). 5 On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991 SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Balgos & Perez for petitioner. Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J.:p This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals 1 erred in reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger. We rule for the petitioner on both counts.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the temporary mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the defendant, and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit. The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. (Summary Judgment, p. 6). 6 The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the respondent Court of Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice [to] the final outcome of 7 the private respondent's own appeal (subject of this petition). In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale. As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition. There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the seller, had been constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. . ." 8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude of way. The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in denying injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent Appellate Court committed an error of judgment and law. It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent respect the easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not an easement exists on the property, and as we indicated, we are convinced that an easement exists. It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. 9 Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. 10 Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated 11 from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. 12 The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as

an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi). As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." 13 and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of the easement, thus: WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to adjust the purchase price from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00) 14 Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public. The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. 16 In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, 17 in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public if that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals held that it (the trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error. Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record. 18 In one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money to which the defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce receipts. 19 We held that under the circumstances, the defense was not genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another case, we rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered property and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a summary judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens Certificate and under the law, Torrens titles are imprescriptible. 20 We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment rendered thereon, on the ground that from the records, the plaintiffs were clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven years. 21 We likewise allowed summary judgment and rejected contentions of economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a contract for the reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions. 22 In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.

As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of a trial where, from existing records, 23 the facts have been established, and trial would be futile. What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent and consequently, the challenged holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as well is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA-G.R. No. 13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back of the private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No. 273. As the petitioner now in fact insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14, 1988, in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as "law of the case" is known in law, e.g.: xxx xxx xxx

act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its applicability as the law of the case. As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the owner. In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, 27 this Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto, declared that a personal servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act" 28 of the landowner, and is not "contractual in the nature," 29 and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to claim its benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract and that "[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an offer . . . " 30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no contract." 31 The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal titans (they would contend even more spiritedly in the "larger" world of politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who, because of the paths they have taken, have shaped history itself; after all, and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an easement has been constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the question is whether it is still existing or whether it has been extinguished. As we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the private respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley, from its use. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping. IT IS SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Case Digest Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596, 04/08/91] FACTS: Petitioner Corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, The private respondents (de Guzman) title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record). The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use. ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not an easement exists on the property even after the property was sold. AFFIRMATIVE. Easement cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis supplied). It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.) In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal. As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 127677). (Emphasis supplied.) Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). (Emphasis supplied.) 24 CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine the rights of the parties regarding the easement, subject of the controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may have, at a glance, suggested a different cause of action. And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CAG.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after all, it was the one that initiated the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that precipitated that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the injunction decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, as we have described the term: xxx xxx xxx

RATIO DICIDENDI: It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioners contention that the deed of sale excluded it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioners claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25 to which contempt is a penalty. 26 As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be made to profit from its

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public. The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and cannot militate against the petitioners clear cause of action.

No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein. On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument. The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court. On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531). The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur. Fernando, J, took no part. Case Digest on JM Tuason vs. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78] JM TUASON AND CO. INC. VS. MARIANOGR 3314O OCTOBER 23, 1978 FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint praying that they be declare downers of a certain parcel of land located in Rizal. They alleged that their father acquired this land with a Spanish title. They alleged that petitioner fraudulently or included the land in an original certificate of title. They also alleged that transfer certificates of title were issued to petitioners irregularly. Given such, they are praying that the titles derived there from be declared void due to irregular proceedings. The lower court issued an order requiring the parties to produce documents to support their allegations. With this, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, inter alia, that the lower court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding the case. Before this present complaint, the respondents had already filed a complaint

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents. Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners. Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials. Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas. AQUINO, J.: This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra). On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943). They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case. On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT

questioning the validity of the titles of petitioner, wherein the lower court and the SC upheld its validity. ISSUE: Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents? HELD: They cannot anymore question. Considering the principle of stare decisis, the respondents cannot anymore continue with their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts of the validity of the titles and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relit gated again and again, consuming the courts time and energies at the expense of other litigants. Uy Lee vs. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75] On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants (now petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo). Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their answer with affirmative defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of reconveyance of the homestead land in question, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon the payment by the latter to them of the repurchase price of P16,000.00; (2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of said land; (3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon presentation to him of the deed of reconveyance and payment of his legal fees, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, married to plaintiff Alberta Vicencio; and (4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action.

On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private respondents) agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee (Exh. 1). Upon request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband, plaintiffs (now private respondents) furnished him with a copy of the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2) and a certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal that "there is no certificate of title issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at Antipolo covered by Plan F-54569". Defendants (now petitioners) likewise verified the status of the property from the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands (pp. 48-49, Ibid). On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed of sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of defendants (now Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. The document prepared by defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer, Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman, described the property as "Lot 2 of Plan F954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2). (p. 29, Ibid) The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands (Exh. G.), in which application she expressly acknowledged that said property is a public land previously occupied by Ignacio Simeon and his heirs. The application was denied (p. 50, Ibid). Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in their names under the provisions of Act No. 496. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land court, favorably acted upon their application in a decision dated December 7, 1957 (Exh. 5). However, before the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it was discovered that the land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to register in their names, "has already been patented and is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting upon this information, the Court of First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its decision of December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid) Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a motion praying for the issuance of a substitute owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.) which was "irretrievably lost during the early period of the American liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The motion was granted. (p. 31, Ibid) On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With Partial Sale" (Exh. B), wherein the adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and the sale by the latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. On that day, Original Certificate of Title No. 732 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in the name of Emiliano Simeon. Later that day, the new Transfer Certificate was cancelled and replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 (Exh. 14) in the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject to the provisions of ... the Public Land Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid) What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now substituted by surviving spouse Alberta Vicencio as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the property sold to the spouses Lee. The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows: "On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty. Valeriano Santos, sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita Uy Lee, advising her that he desires to repurchase the parcel of land situated at Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 in your name' and requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five days from receipt hereof." Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants did not bother to make any reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating the demand of Emiliano Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant Vita Uy Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the defendants did not reply to the second letter. Consequently, for the third time, on June 24, 1961, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee repeating the same demand, with a warning that if nothing is heard from her within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to court. Still the defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants, Atty. Santos did not take any court action and apparently because of this indifference of their former counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso Pea (p. 32, Ibid).

The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal) Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and later an urgent motion for reconsideration (pp. 114-116, Ibid), which were both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113-114, Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119-124, Ibid). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 27-45, Rollo). A timely motion for reconsideration (Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. (Annex C to Petition, p. 87, Ibid) The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No. 732 in the name of Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of Emiliano Simeon, issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771 which Ignacio had obtained from the government way back in 1935. (p. 28, Ibid) After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by his spouse, Alberta Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon and his brother Deogracias Simeon, as the only surviving heirs, executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to Deogracias and Lot No. 2 to Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering the said lots could not be found, they were simply described as "Homestead No. 82945." (Ibid)

"On March 2, 1962, Atty. Pea addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee reiterating that Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in question. After receipt of this letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote Atty. Pea on March 12, 1962, that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view of this flat refusal of the defendants to resell the lot in controversy to the plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p. 33, Ibid) Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from defendants (now petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 which provides as follows: Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free patent (p. 36, Ibid), and that its sale is subject to redemption within five (5) years from the execution of the deed of sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G. 5187; Bayaua vs. Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29 SCRA 736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid) Likewise, there is no question that private respondents instituted the action to compel petitioners to resell the land to them only on June 25, 1965 when the redemption period had already elapsed. (p. 27, Ibid) The main issue to be resolved is whether the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to repurchase the property. Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their nature, to first examine the other questions raised herein. Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32, Brief for Petitioners) Petitioners based this assignment of error on the requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court which states: Sec. 4. Findings of the court. Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it." More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the period within which redemption could be made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as another question is raised by them on the basis of the "terminology of those three letters". (Ibid). We find no merit in this contention. At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like the one invoked by petitioner are to be given liberal construction. (Rule 1, Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had the occasion to rule, the findings of facts which as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465) It is not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so would be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of documents when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the purpose of the rule. The respondent Court did not disregard the three letters in question. Neither did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each letter was properly referred to in the decision and its message clearly reflected thereon. Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court misunderstood the communication. Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the testimonies of Henry Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and respondent Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that these matters cannot be inquired into a review on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. Court of

Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97) Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the first three letters sent by private respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo). The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of Emiliano Simeon's "desire to repurchase" the land and requested that the latter be informed of Lee's conformity on the matter within five days from receipt (t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The second letter sent on November 3, 1960 (Exh. J) reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third letter dated June 24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a warning that if nothing is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days from receipt, respondent Simeon would seek judicial intervention (Ibid). In no instance was it shown that private respondent offered or tendered the repurchase price. Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private respondents' desire to repurchase the property and demanding its resale did not constitute a proper exercise of the right of legal redemption, absent an actual and simultaneous tender of payment (p. 17, Brief for Petitioners). Petitioners argue that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the former intends to redeem the property sold, but he must at the same time offer to repay the price. (p. 21, Ibid). This view deserves consideration. The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale ...". Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately thereupon offer to repay the price ...". Likewise, in several other cases decided by the Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases) where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the vendor. Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited above is an obiter dictum because in that case, the period of redemption had prescribed thereby rendering immaterial the question of whether or not a tender of payment was made. This might be so; nevertheless, a dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule (21 C.J.S. 309) may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing Karameros vs. Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508). Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna vs. Javier and Cruz, 110 Phil. 172, where the appellant failed to tender payment of the repurchase price within 30 days after the court below had decided by final judgment that the contract sue upon was a pacto de retro and not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives a vendor a retro "the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked in the subsequent case of Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In that case, Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a part of the repurchase price of P19,313.95. Holding that the vendor who desires to redeem the property should offer to repay the price, the Court went further and declared that the full amount of the repurchase price should be tendered. It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year period,

the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period. Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment was ordinarily required, that the same was not necessary in the instant case because petitioner Vita Uy Lee refused their demands for reconveyance. It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired, respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon sent petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters one in June 1960, the other in November of the same year, and the third in June 1961 demanding the resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the letters, she did not send any reply. It was only when Simeon wrote her a fourth letter, this time after the redemption period had elapsed, that petitioner Lee expressly signified her refusal to resell the land in question on the ground that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid). The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to Simeon's first letters as refusal on petitioners' part to resell the property in question and held that such refusal rendered tender of payment unnecessary (pp. 61-63, Ibid). This position is untenable. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period. WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have lapsed, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered dismissing the complaint. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Aquino J, took no part.

(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order x x x creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law. (3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon x x x. (4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, x x x the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review. (5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit: a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen. In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order x x x is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it. Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General. We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents. I First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation."[1] To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz: "ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Finality of Decision The initial decision of the judge will become final 35 days after issuance. Initial decisions are not precedential. (a) Exceptions. The initial decision will not become final if any party files a petition for review within the time limit for filing specified in 1201.114 of this part, or if the Board reopens the case on its own motion. (b) Petition for review denied. If the Board denies all petitions for review, the initial decision will become final when the Board issues its last decision denying a petition for review. (c) Petition for review granted or case reopened. If the Board grants a petition for review or a cross petition for review, or reopens or dismisses a case, the decision of the Board is final if it disposes of the entire action. (d) Extensions. The Board may extend the time limit for filing a petition for good cause shown as specified in 1201.114 of this part. (e) Exhaustion. Administrative remedies are exhausted when a decision becomes final in accordance with this section. [54 FR 53504, Dec. 29, 1989, as amended at 62 FR 59992, Nov. 6, 1997] Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99] For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that: "(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the aboveentitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: `WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.' and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. Manila, Philippines. Clerk of Court By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP Acting Chief Judicial Records Office" The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2] xxx "the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.[3] There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.[4] x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.[5] In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,[6] viz: "This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution,

in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation." The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution[7] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.[8] For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."[9] Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: "Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter

or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan[10] Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953[11] which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question."[12] The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided: xxx xxx xxx

execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x x a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state: xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief. 6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed. 7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out `without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." (Underscoring supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court. 8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read: SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 9. The `right to information' provision is self-executing. It supplies 'the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.[13] The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxx xxx xxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of

duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987]." The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants. II Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department x x x. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function."[14] Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads: "Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress." The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.[15] As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution."[16] The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. III Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S.

Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law. When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1999[17] at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary - - - "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens. The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows: xxx "a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel."[18] In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressmen as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up to 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House "x x x does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose. A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x x the question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and

will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment."[19] In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and antideath partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x x x it is the very purpose of the Constitution - - - and particularly the Bill of Rights - - - to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."[20] Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.[21] IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999. The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay. SO ORDERED. Case Digest on ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE301 SCRA 96, JANUARY 19, 1999 Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethalinjection (RA 8177) The Supreme Court issued a temporaryrestraining order restraining the execution of said party. Saidexecution was set for Jan. 4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his VeryUrgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. The Court wasin recess at the time but a Special Session was called to deliberate onsaid matters. Furthermore, Congress was a new one with about 130new members whose views on capital punishment were stillunexpressed. The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of thelaw is going to be made). It was alleged that sine it is already finaland executory, the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with thecase. Issue: Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, theSupreme Court has gone beyond its jurisdiction since the case isalready final. Ruling: It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whatthe SC could not do is alter the decision. In the case at hand, the SCdid nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor thecase. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to executeand enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of thecourt to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify oralter the same. The former continues even after the judgment hasbecome final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latterterminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final, facts and circumstances may transpire which canrender the execution unjust or impossible.